ML20009E201

Proposed Tech Specs Requiring Quarterly Inservice Insp & Deleting Requirement to Demonstrate Diesel Generator Operability When Another Diesel Generator Fails

ML20009E201
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	07/20/1981
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20009E200	List: ML20009E199 ML20009E201
References
NUDOCS 8107270224
Download: ML20009E201 (10)

Text

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Attachment 1 Amended Technical Specification Pages Quad Cities Unit 1, DPR-29 The following pages have been revised:

3.7/4.7-5 3.7/4.7-16 3.9/4.9-4 3.9/4.9-5 These changes are additional to those proposed in Reference (b).

(1107270224 810720 p DR ADOCK 05000254 PDR

? .

QUAD-CITIES DPR-29 pression chamber-reactor building breakers and associated instru-vacuum breakers in each line shall mentation, including setpoint, be cperable at all times when the shall be checked for proper opera-primary containment integrity is tion every 3 months.

required. The setpoint of the dif-

b. During each refueling outage each ferential pressure instrumentation va r sh!! k dm which actuates the pressure sup-pression chamber-reactor building dein h k fom gid to open it does not exceed the force air-operated vacuum breakers specified in Specification 3.7.A.3.a; shall not exceed 0.5 psid. The vac-each vacuum breaker shall also be uum breakers shall open fully inspectc.: and verified to meet de-when subjected to a foree equiv-si ir m s.

alent to or less than 0.5 ps,d i acting on the valve disk.

b. From and after the date that one of the pressure suppression cham-ber-reactor building vacuum breakers is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, the vac-uum breaker shall be 11cked closed and reactor operation be permissi-ble only during the succeeding 7 days unless such vacuum breaker is sooner made operable, provided that the procedure does not violate primary containment integrity.

4. Pressure Suppression Chamber- 4. Pressure Suppression Chamber-Drywell Vacuum Breakers Drywell Vacuum Breakers

a. Whern primary containment is a. Periodic Operability Tests requi ed, a'! pressure suppression

1) Once each qua rt,e r eaeh pres-l charr.ber-drywell vacuum breakers sure suppress n chamber-shall be operable except during d.ywell vacuum breaker shall testing and as stated in Specifica-tions 3.7.A.4.b. c, and d, below. be exercised. Operabihty of

..s.p siti n switches, and Pressure suppression chamber-p sitt n mdicators and drywell vacuum breakers shall be alarms shall be verified.

considered operable if:

2) A drywell to suppression

1) The valve is demonstrated to chamber differential pressure open fully with the applied decay rate test shall be con-force at all valve positions not at least every exceeding the equivalent to 0.5 psi acting on the suppres-fcteg ,,

sion chamber face of the valve b. During each refueling outage:

disk'

1) The pressure suppression

2) The valve can be closed by chamber-drywell vacuum gravity when released after breakers shall be tested to de-being opened by remote or termine the force required to manual means to within the open each valve from fully equivalent of 1/16 inch at all closed to fully open.

3.7/ 4.7-5

i QUAD-CITIES DPR-29

(

multiplying the maximum allowsble leak rate by 0.75, thereby providing a 25% margin to a!!ow for leakage deterioration which may occur during the period between Icak rate tests.

The primary containment feak rate test frequency is based on maintaining adequate assurance that the leak rate remains within the specification. A!!owing the test intervals to be extended up to 8 months permits some ficaibility needed to have the tests coincide with scheduled or unscheduled shutdown Penoda. .

The data reduction methods of ANSI N45.4-1972 will be applied for integrated leak rate tests.

The penetration and air purge piping Icakage test frequency, along with the containment lesk rate tests, is adequate to allow detection of leakage trends. Whenever a double gasketed penetration (primary containment head equipment hatches and the suppression chamber access hatch)is broken and remade, the space terween the gaskets is pressurized to determine that the seats are performing properly. The test pressure of 48 psig is consistent with the accident analyses and the maximum preoperationalleak rate test pressure. It is expected that the majority of the leakage from valves, penetrations, and seals would be into the reactor building. However, it is poss.ble that leakage into other paru of the facility could occur.

Such leakage paths that may affect significantly the consequences of accidents are to be minimited. The penonnel air lock is tested at 10 psig because the inboard door is not designed to shut in the opposite dsreenon.

The results of the loss-of-coc! ant accident analysis referenced in Section 514.3 of the SAR indicate that 6ssion products would not be released directly to the environs because orleskage from the main steamline isolation valves due to holdup in the steam system complex. Although this effect would indicate that an adequate margin exists with regard to the release of fission products, a program will be undertaken to thrther reduce the potential for such leakage to bypass the standby gas t.eatment system.

I Surveillance of the reactor building. pressure suppression chamber vacuum breakers consists of I operability checks and leakage tests (conducted as part of the containment leaktightness tests). These vacuum breakers are normally in the closed position and open only during tests or an .iccident condition.

As a result, a testing frequency of 3 months for operability is considered justified for this equipment.

Inspections and calibrations are performed during refueling outages, this frequency being based on experience and judgment.

Pressure suppression chamber-drywc!! vacuum breakers quarterly aparability tests are perrmed to check the capability of the disks to open and close and to verify that the position indication and alarm circuits function properly.The disks must open during accident conditions and during transient additions of energy through relief valves. This periodic operation of the disks and the quality of equipmentjustify the frequency of operability tests of this equipment.

Following each quarterly operability test, a differentia! pressure decay rate test is performed to verify that leakage from the drywc!! to the suppression ihamber is within specified limits.

! Measurement of force to open, calibration of position switches, inspection of equipment and functional testing are performed duririg each refuelinf outage. This frequency is based on equiprnent quality, experience, andjudgment. Aiso, a rnore string nt differential pressure decay rate test is performed dunng refueling outages than is performed monthly. This test is performed to verify that totalleskage paths between the drywell and suppression chamber are not in excess of the equivslent to a 1 inch orifice.

'Dtis smallleakage path is only a small fraction of the allowable, thus integrity of the containment system i is assured prior to startup following each refi eling outage (Reference 1).

3.7/4.7-16 l

l

a .

QUAD-CITIF.S DPR-29 1

reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

2. Specification 3.9.E.1 shall not apply when a diesel generator has been made inoperable for a period not to exceed 1 1/2 hours for the purpose of con-ducting preventative maintenance.

Additionally. preventative mainte-nance shall not be undertaken unless two offsite lines are available and the alternate diesel generator is operable.

3. Whenever the reactor is in the Cold Shutdown or Refueling mode, a mini-mum of one diesel generator (either the Unit diesel generator or the Unit 1/2 diesel generator) shall be operable whenever any work is being done which has the potential for draining the vessel, secondary containment is required, or a core or containment cooling system is required.

3.9 / 4.9-4

QUAD-CITIES DPR-29 3.91.lMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION BASI'S A. The general objective of this specification is to awure an a&quate source of electrical power to operate the auxiliaries during plant operation, to operate facilities to cool and lubricate the plant during shutdown, and to operate the engineered safety features fi>llowing an accident. There are two sources of electrical energy available, namely, the 345-kV transmission system and the diesel generators.

B. The d-c supply is required for control and motive power li>r switchgear and engineered safety features.

The electrical power required provides for the maximum availability of power, i.e.. one active offsite source and one backup source of offsite power and the mar.imrm numbers of onsite sources.

A battery charger is supplied with each of the 125-volt and 250-volt batteries, and in addition, a shared battery charger is supplied which can be used fiar Units I and 2.Thus, on the low of the normal battery charger, the shared charger can be used. Since an alternate charging source is available, one battery charger can be allowed out ofservice for 30 days without low of this source of power.The 125-volt hattery system shall have a minimum of 105 volts at the battery terminals to be considered operable.

C. Auxiliary power for the Unit is supplied from two sources, either the Unit auxiliary transformer or the Unit reserve auxiliary transformer. Both of these transformers are sized to carry 100% of the auxiliary load. If the reserve auxiliary transformer is lost the unit can continue to run fiir 7 days, since the Unit auxiliary transformer is available and both diesel generators are operational. A 7-day period is provided if one source of offsite power is lost. This period is based on having two diesels operable which are adequate to handle an accident assuming a single failure. In addition, auxiliary power from the other unit can be obtained through the 4160-volt bus tie. If both offsite lines are lost, power is reduced to 40% of rated so that the turbine bypass system could accept the steam flow without reactor trip should the generator be separated from the system or a turbine trip occur. In this condition, the turbine-generator is capable of supplying house load and ECCS load if necewary through the unit ausiliary transformer.

If the unit were shut down on loss of both lines, fewer sources of power would be available than for sustained operation at 40% power. Attention will be given to restoring normal offsite power to minimize the length of time operation is allowed in a condition where both sources are unavailable, in the normal mode of operation, the 345-kV system is operable and two diesel generators are operable.

One diesel generator may be allowed out of service fbr a short period of time to conduct preventative maintenance provided that power is available from the 345-kV system through a 4160-volt hus tie to supply the emergency buses, and the alternate diesel generator is ope ra t>1e . ortzite power is quite l reliable, and in the last 25 years there has been only one instance in which all offsite power was lost at a Commonwealth Edison Generating Stetion. When the unit or shared diesel generator is made or found inoperable for reasons other than preventative maintenance the remaining diesel generator and its associated low-pressure core cooling and containment cooling systems, which provide sufficient engineered safety features equipment to cover all breaks, will be -perst>1e. l D. The diesel fuel supply of 10,000 gallons will supply each diesel generator with a minimum of 2 days of full load operation or about 4 days at I/2 load. Additional diesel fuel can be obtained and delivered to the site within an 8-hour period; thus a 2-day supply provides for adequate margin.

E. Diesel generator operability is discussed in Paragraph 3.9.C above.

3.9 / 4.9 - 5

O Attachment 2 Amended Technical Specification Pages Quad Cities Unit 2, DPR-30 The following pages have been revised:

3.7/4.7-5 3.7/4.7-16 3.9/4.9-4 3.9/4.9-5 These changes are additional to those proposed in Reference (b).

i I

l f

L

l l QUAD-CITIES DPR-30 breakers and associated instru-pression chamber-reactor building mentation, including setpoint, vacuum breakers in each line shall shall be checked for proper opera-be operable at all times when the tion every 3 months.

primary containment integrity is required. The setpoint of the dif- h. During each refueling outage each ferential pressure instrumentation vacuum breaker shall be tested to which actuates the pressure sup- determine that the force required pression chamber-reactor building to open it does not exceed the force air-operated vacuum breakers i6d in Spihin 3h3x shall not exceed 0.5 ps,d.Thei vac- each vacuum breaker shall also be uum breakers shall open fully inspected and verified to meet de-when subjected to a foree equiv- ,

sign requirements.

alent to or less than 0.5 ps,d t acting on the valve disk.

b. From and after the date that one of the pressure suppression cham-ber-reactor building vacuum breakers is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, the vac-uum breaker shall be locked closed and reactor operation be permissi-ble only during the succeeding 7 days unless such vacuum breaker is sooner made operable, provided that the procedure does not violate primary containment integrity.

4. Pressure Suppression Chamber-

4. Pressure Suppression Chamber-Drywell Vacuum Breakers Drywell Vacuum Breakers

a. Feriodic Operability Tests

a. When primary containment is required, all pressure suppression 1) Once each riua rf,ur each p re :- l chamber-drywell vacuum breakers sure suppressi n chamber-shall be operable except during drywell vacuum breaker shall testing and as stated in Specifica- be exercised. Operabil,ty i of tions 3.7.A.4.b, c, and d, below. ""k'. P

• i n switches, and Pressure suppression chamber- "

• drywell vacuum breakers shall be {5* , g, be fied.

considered operable if:

2) A drywell to suppression

'l ) The valve is demonstrated to chamber differential pressure i

open fully with the applied dq m W M1 & m force at all valve positions not dM a is q exceeding the equivalent t 3 months.

0.5 psi acting on the suppres-

b. During each refueling outage:

sion chamber face of the valve disk

• 1) The pressure suppression chamber-drywell vacuum

2) The valve can be closed by breakers shall be tested to de-gravity when released after termine the force required to being opened by remote or open each valve from fully manual means to within the closed to fully open.

equivalent of 1/16 inch at all 3.7 /4.7-5

QUAD. CITIES DPR. TO

. multiplying the maximum allawable leak rate by 0.75, thereby providing a 25% margin to allow for leakage deterioration which may occur during the period between leak rate tests.

The primary containment leak rate test frequency is based on maintaining adequate assurance that the leak rate remains within the specification. A!!owing the test intervals to be extended up to 8 months permits some flexibility needed to have the tests coincide with scheduled or unscheduled shutdown periods.

The data reduction methods of ANSI N45 4-1972 will be applied for integrated leak rate tests.

The penetration and air purge piping leak. ige test frequency, along with the containment feak rate tests, is adequate to allow detection of leakage trends. Whenever a double.gasketed penetration (primary containment head equipment hatches and the suppression chamber access hatch) is broken and remade, the space between the gaskets is pressurized to determine that the seats are perform:ng properly.The test pressure of 48 psig is consistent with the accident analyses and the maximum preoperational leak rate test pressure. !:is expected that the majority of the Icakage from valves. penetrations, and seats wou*id be into the reactor building. However,it is possible that leakage into other parts of the facility could occur.

Such leakage paths that may afect signincantly the consequences of accidet ts are to be minimized. The personnel air lock is tested at 10 psig because the inboard door is not designed to shut in the opposite direction.

The results of the less-of. coolant accident analysis referenced in Section 5.2A.3 of the SAR indicate that fission producu would not be released directly to the environs because orleakage from the main steamline isolation valves due to holdup in the steam system complex. Although this effect would indicate that an adequate margin exisu with regard to the release of fission produe*,. a program wi!! be undertaken to further reduce the potential for such leakage to bypass the standby ga* treatment system.

w Survei!!ance of the reactor building. pressure suppression chamber vacuum breakers consists of operability checks and leakage tests (conJucted as part of the containment leaktightness tesu). These vacuum breakers are normally in the closed position and open only during tests or an accident condition.

As a result, a testing frequency of 3 months for operability is considered justi6ed for this equipment.

Inspections and calibrations are perforrred during refueling outages. this frequency being based on experience and judgment.

Pressure suppression chamber-drywellvacuum breakers quarterly ergt11ty tes,ts ar pe rrermed toevenl the capability of the disks to open and close and to verify that the position indication and a! arm circuits function properly.The disks must open during accident conditions and during transient additions of energy through reliervalves.This periodia operation of the disks and the quality ot'equipmentjustify the frequency of operability tests of this equipment.

Following each quarterly operability test, a diferential pressure decay rate test is performed to verify that leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber is within specifted limits.

Measurement of force to open, calibration of position switches, inspection of equipment, and functional testing are performed during each refueling outage. This frequency is based on equipment quality, saperience, and judgment. Also, a more strinEent differential pressure decay rate test is per formed during refueling outages than is performed monthly. This test is performed to verify that total leakage paths between the drywell and suppression chamber are not in excess of the equivalent to a 1. inch orince.

This sma'!! leakage path is only a small fraction of the allow able, thus integrity of the containment system is assured prior to startup following each refue!ing outage (Reference I).

3.7/4.7-16

QliAI)-CITil3 Di'H -30 I

reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

2. Specification 3.9.L.I shall not apply when a diesel generator has been made inoperable for a period not to exceed 1-1/2 hours for the purpose of con-ducting preventative maintenance.

Additionally, preventative mainte-nance shall not be undertaken unlew two effsite lines are available and the alternate diesel generator is operable.

3. Whenever the reactor is in the Cold Shutdown or Refueling mode, a mini-mum of one diesel generator (either the Unit diesel generator or the Unit 1/2 diese: generator) shall be operable whwever any work is being done whi.n has the potential for draining the vessel, secondary containment is required, or a core or containment cooling system is required.

l l

3.9 / 4.9-4 t

QUAD-CITIES DPR-30 l

3.9 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION BASES A. The general objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate the auxiliaries during plant operation, to operate facilities to cool and lubricate the plant during shutdown, and to operate the engineered safety features following an accident. There are two sources of electrical energy available, namely, the 345-kV transmission system and the diesel generators.

B. The d-c supply is required for control and motive power for switchgear and engineered safety features.

The electrical power required provides for the maximum availability of power, i.e., one active otTsite source and one backup source of otTsite power and the maximum numbers of onsite sources.

A battery charger is supplied with each of the 125-volt and 250-volt batteries, and in addition, a shared battery charger is supplied which can be used for Units I and 2.Thus, on the loss of the normal battery charger, the shared charger can be used. Since an alternate charging source is available, one battery charger can be allowed out of service for 30 days without loss of this source of power. The 125-volt battery system shall have a minimum of 105 volts at the battery terminals to be considered operable.

C. Auxiliary power for the Unit is " applied from two sources, either the Unit auxiliary transformer or the Unit reserse auxiliary transformer. Both of these transformers are. sired to carry 100% of the auxiliary load. If the reserve auxiliary transformer is lost, the unit can continue to run for 7 days, since the Unit auxiliary transformer is available and both diesel generators are operational. A 7-day period is provided if one source of offsite power is lost This period is based on having two diesels operable which are adequate to handle an accident assuming a single failure. In addition, auxiliary power from the other unit can be obtained through the 4160-volt bus tie. If both otTsite lines are lost, power is reduced to 40% of

( rated so that the turbine bypass system could accept the steam flow without reactor trip should the generator be separated from the system or a turbine trip occur. In this condition, the turbine-generator is capable of supplying house load and ECCS load if necessary through the unit auxiliary transformer.

If the unit were shut down on loss of both lines, fewer sources of power would be available than for sustained operation at 40% po. er. Attention will be given to restoring normal offsite power to minimize the length of time operation is allowed in a condition where both sources are unavailable.

In the normal mode of operation, the 345-kV system is operable and two diesel generators are operable.

One diesel generator may be allowed out of service for a short period of time to conduct preventative maintenance provided that power is available from the 345-kV system through a 4160-volt bus tie to supply the emergency buses, and the alternate diesel generator is v role- orrsite swer is quite l reliable, and in the last 25 years there has been only one instance in which all offsite power was lost at a Commonwealth Edison Generating Station. When the unit or shared diesc' generator is made or found inoperable for reasons other than preventative maintenance, the remaming diesel generator and its associated low-pressure core cooling and containment cooling systems, ubich provide sufficient engineered safety features equipment to cover all breaks, will be .gow, l D. The diesel fuel supply of 10,000 gallons will supply each diesel generator with a mini.num of 2 days of full load operation or about 4 days at 1/2 load. Additional diesel fuel can be obtained and delivered to the site within an 8-hour period, thus a 2-day supply provides for adequate margin.

E. Diesel Fenerator operability is discussed in Paragraph 3.9.C above.

3.9 / 4.9-5