ML19327B220

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LER 89-015-00:on 890918,discovered That Channel Calibr for Containment Wide Range Pressure post-accident Channels Not Done within Required Time Frame.Caused by Weak Tech Spec Amend Implementation in 1987.Process upgraded.W/891018 Ltr
ML19327B220
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 10/18/1989
From: Miller L, Pollack M
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-015-02, LER-89-15-2, NUDOCS 8910270129
Download: ML19327B220 (6)


Text

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1. O PSEG Public Ssrvice E tecttic and Gas Company P O. Box E Hancocks B'i@e, New Jensey 08038 Salem Generating Station October 18, 1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk .!

Mashington, DC 20555  :

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Dear Sirt i i

.I SALEN GENERATING STATION i LICENSE NO. DPR-75 i DOCKET NO. 50-311. j UNIT NO. 2 i LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 89-015-00 l

'This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the r requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR f 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B) . This report is required within thirty (30) days j of discovery, j f

t Sincerely yours, [

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I L. K. Miller i General Manager - i Salen Operations l

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UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) i eae ute neon ni noe.n- m m -, ,

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On 9/18/89, it was discovered that the channel calibration for the two (2) Containment Wide Range Pressure Post Accident Channels had not been completed within the required time frame as required by Technical Specification Surveillance 4.3.3.7. The Surveillance had been required to be completed no later than 7/16/88. The root cause of this event has been attributed to personnel error. This was a result of inattention to detail upon implementation review of the April 1987 Technical Specification Amendment (both Units) which added the wide range pressure indication requirements. The pressure channels were surveilled prior to this amendment but as a preventive maintenance (PM) requirement. When the Technical Specification became effective, I two of the four narrow range pressure transmitters were incorrectly identified as the wide range transmitters. The actual wide range transmitters PM specification was therefore not changed to a Surveillance Task (ST) specification. Contributing to this event was I a relatively weak Technical Specification Amendment implementation process in 1987. This process has since been upgraded, reference Unit 1 LER 272/89-028-00. The Unit 2 wide range channels were surveilled as per the Technical Specifications and on 9/19/89 the Action Statement was exited. The MMIS data base has been revised to correctly identify the narrow and wide range containment pressure transmitters. The PM tasks were changed to ST tasks for the wide range containment pressure indication. A verification audit to ensure all requirements of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Surveillances are met will be completed by 4/30/90.

3,* "

l

, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION j l

Salen Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE  :

unit 2 5019211 89-013-00 2__of 5 j I%N!rT_ mfd _EIEt5tt_LQ5MTIrJCAIL Mt f Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor l Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as lxxl f

IRENTLE1QATION OF OCCURREILQJ1  ;

t Technical Specification Surveillance 4.3.3.7 not completed within the i required time frame due to personnel error i Event Date 7/26/88 Discovery Date: 9/18/89 i Report Dates. 10/18/89  !

This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.89-567 and 89-573. i g_ONDITIONS . PRI9R TO OCC1/RR51[QA f Node 1 Reactor Power 100% - Unit Load 1130 NWe  !

l ,

D5j_Q,RIPTION OF _O_Q.QUR.Q AEN_Q11  !

i  !

, On September 18, 1989 at 1230 hours0.0142 days <br />0.342 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.68015e-4 months <br />, it was discovered that the i channel calibration for the two (2) Containment Wide Range Pressure l Post Accident Channels had not been completed within the required t i time frame as required by Technical Specification Surveillance  :

l 4.3.3.7. The Surveillance had been required to be completed no later i l- than July 26, 1988. j l'

The late surveillance was discovered by Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) who had been tasked to evaluate Salen Station Technical Specification compliance. The scope of the evaluation included i taking a randon sample of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification }'

Surveillances to verify that appropriate Surveillance Task work orders (STW0s) and procedures exist. )

Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 states: ,

"The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table I 3.3-11a and Table 3.3-11b shall be operable.  ;

APPLICABILITY: NODES 1, 2, AND 3."

i, Table 3.3-11b Action 7 states: [

i "With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Required -

l Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-11a, operation may proceed '

l until the next CHANNEL CALIBRATION (which shall be performed upon the next entry into NODE 5, COLD SHUTDOWN).  ;

AP P AR ENT C AU S EJf____ OCCURR_EliC El The root crJse of this event has been attributed to personnel error. .

T l

LICENSEE EVENT RCPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION  !

^

831em Generating Station DOCKET NUNSER LER NUMBER PAGE i Unit 2 500q11) 89-0J5-0Q 3 of 5

&ERARJMT.CMJJ OF OCCURRENQEt ( cpAtr ' dl In April 1987 Technical Specification Amendment No. 53 (79 for Unit i

1) was implemented. This Amendment added the requirements associated with containment wide range pressure indication. The pressure [

channels (which were installed circa 1981) were calibrated, prior to  ;

this amendment, as a preventive maintenance (PM) requirement. When  ;

the Technical Specification became effective, two (2) of the four (4) i narrow range pressure transmitters were incorrectly identified as the l wide range transmitters due to an inattention to detail. The actual  !

wide range transmitters PM specification was therefore not changed to j a Surveillance Task (ST) specification. The ST designation is  ;

specific to Technical Specification Surveillance requirements. ,

Contributing to this event was a relatively weak Technical i specification Amendment implementation process in 1987. As discussed in Unit 1 LER 272/89-028-00, the Technical Specification Amendment l implementation program has been revised. This program now has a single individual delegated to ensure Amendments are reviewed by  ;

cognizant personnel. This individual uses computerized tracking s (using the Action Tracking System (ATS)) to ensure appropriate and  ;

timely implementation actions. Additionally, the Station operations '

Review Committee (SORC) approves all Amendment implementation  ;

actions, prior to Amendment implementation, after verification that all affected departments are prepared to institute the programmatic  !

j' or procedural changes necessitated by the Amendment. Had this -

program been in place when the 1987 Technical Specification Amendment I was implemented, the PM would have been changed to an ST; therefore this event would not have occurred.  :

L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE _ j The accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient  !

information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and I assess these variables following an accident. Specifically, the I Containment Wide Range Pressure Channels provide post accident i indication of containment pressure. This capability is consistent with the Recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation r for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant [

l: Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and '

NUREG-0578, "TMI Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and -

i Short-Tern Recommendations."

l i l In January 1989, a Technical Department audit which validated the i l MMIS computerized work order aystem Technical Specification L Surveillance data base was completed. The scope of the audit l included confirmation that each surveillance procedure had a i recurring task in the data base, that recurring tasks in the data ,

base were applicable to referenced Technical Specifications (this included frequency and schedule type) and that each Technical Specification had a recurring task (i.e., line by line check).

The Technical Department auditors did not identify this missed I surveillance because the MMIS rusource/ component data base had 1

I l

-j

,. b1CENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION  !

i Salen Generating Station DOCKRT NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE l Unit 2 50QAjl1 89-01_5_09 4_oL) l MgYsIs OF OCCMRENqEt (qenMdL identified two (2) of the four (4) narrow range containment pressure l transmitters as narrow and wide range transmitters. The auditors i believed that the NMIS data base correctly identified applicable equipment. Also, it was incorrectly assumed that the narrow range ,

calibration procedure fulfilled the wide range calibration i' requirements since the narrow and wide range transmitters were apparently one and the same as per the data base. {

As indicated above, the NMIS resource / component data base only identified four (4) containment pressure transmitters, two (2) narrow ,

range and two (2) wide / narrow range. The QA evaluation revealed this is not the case. There are six (6) transmitters, two (2) are wide ,

range and four (4) are narrow range. This was not identified by the  ;

Technical Department audit since the audit did not include in its  !

scope a verification of the resource / component data base.  !

Upon identification of the late surveillance, the Unit 2 wide range '

containment prescure channels were calibrated. One (1) of the trcnsmitters required zero and range adjustment. The other '

transmitter was found to be within required specifications of the surveillance.

Investigation of the Salen Unit 1 wide range containment pressure (

channels identified a similar concern. The Unit 1 Technical i Specifications for these channels are identical to Unit 2 Technical '

Specifications. It was found that the surveillance had been  !

performed within the last eighteen (18) months (i.e., April 6, 1989  ;

for Channel IV and May 24, 1989 for Channel III). However, a review ,

of the historical surveillances revealed that the Unit 1 channels had l*

not been surveilled for approximately three years prior to the 1989 surveillance (i.e., April 8, 1986), although, the eighteen (18) month ,

surveiliance requirement did not become effective until April 1987.  !

With one (1) of the two (2) Unit 2 wide range channels within i l required tolerances as per the specifications, the required function to monitor post accident containment pressure would have been met.

Therefore, this event did not affect the health or safety of the ,

public. However, since the wide range containment pressure post accident monitoring channels surveillances were not completed within their required time frame (both Units), this event is reportable as ,

per Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B) .

CORRECTIVE _ ACTION: ,

l Upon discovery of this event, Technical Specification Table 3.3-11b Action 7 was entered at 1230 hours0.0142 days <br />0.342 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.68015e-4 months <br /> on September 18, 1989. The Unit 2

wide range containment pressure post accident monitoring channels

, were surveilled as per the Technical Specifications. The Action Statement was exited at 1010 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.84305e-4 months <br /> on September 19, 1989.

l As committed to in a recent NRC violation response, all stetion '

personnel completed review of the senior management video tape

,O LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION SOlem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE [

MRA_t 2 5000)JJ 8)-015-00 5__tf 5 __

[

t G.9 M E l lI5_ A C_T1 9N! (cAn_t'd1 '

addressing attention to detail. It was presented in conjunction with  !

a set of the accepted procedural compliance work standards, "Salen Handbook of Standards". '

The NNIS resource / component data base has been revised to correctly  :

Identify the narrow and wide range containment pressure transmitters. To ensure future compliance with the Technical  :

Specification requirement, the preventive maintenance tasks were  ;

changed to surveillance tasks for the wide range containment pressure '

indication, i The Technical Specification improvement project completed in January  !

1989, discussed in the Analysis of Occurrence section, addressed the '

concerns associated with the transfer of the Inspection order system to the new NNIS in 1986. These concerns included missed Technical <

Specification Surveillances attributed to that transfer. Since then, additional administrative changes have been put in place to ensure 3 proper use of the NNIS data base to prevent additional missed  !

Technical Specification Surveillances. The most recent project undertaken by PSE&G has been the Procedure Upgrade Project. This l project will result in the thorough review and technical verification of. procedures in use at Salen Generating Station. +

l To ensure a similar event does not occur, a verification audit of the ,

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Surveillances, ensuring all i requirements are met, will be initiated and completed by April 30, 1990. The audit includes identification of all required Surveillances. Those Surveillances with performance frequencies greater than seven (7) days will be verified to have specific i l recurring tasks and that those tasks contain the correct relevant .

l information. This will verify the accuracy of the MMIS resource / component data base for those components requiring l surveillance activities. Where the data base proves incorrect, it  ;

will be revised accordingly. Due to the root cause identified, the '

initia3. effort of this audit will be focused on all Technical Specification Amendments for both Units.

The Procedure Upgrade  !

Project will verify that those procedures wnich address Technical l Specification Surveillance requirements are technically consistent  !

L with those requirements.

c t

-Q '

'(I General Manager -

Salem Operations NJP:pc SORC Mtg.89-101 i

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