ML19319B824

Isolation Circuit Test Rept.

ML19319B824
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	12/16/1976
From:	TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8001280654
Download: ML19319B824 (22)

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PROTECTION SYSTB4 .

IS01ATION DEVIG CIRWITS s

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( 1.0 Scoyce The scope of this docunent is to describe the isolation device circuits utilized in Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Plant Protection Systems.

In addition, analysis and test data is presented to support the suitability of the isolation device circuits. In the context of this document, Nuclear Plant Protection Systems are limited to the Nuclear Instrumentation / Reactor Protection System (NI/RPS).

2.0 Introduction Plant Protection System designs are characterized by the use of redundancy to promote reliability, systan testing, and plant availability.

Redundant portions (channels) of the protection systems, in order to.

ensure true redundancy, are:

A. housed in individual seismically qualified cabinet assemblies.

B. powered by independent electrical power resources.

C. qualified to cperate through the expected range of environmental and seismic conditions.

To fully exploit the attributes of redundancy, coincidence logic networks are employed to make. protective action decisions based on redundant inputs. The use of coincidence logic networks requires the interchange of information between redundant channels. These are referred to as interchannel signals.

Protection Systems are also designed to provide the operator with timely infonnation relative to their status. This involves the connunication of infonnation from the protection system (class IE) to non-protection systems (non-IE). These are referred to as non-IE signals.

1 2

For redundant channels to be truly redundant, adequate electrical isolation nust be provided in interchannel and non-IE signal paths.

4 The electrical isolation circuits are housed in, qualified with, and considered a part of the protection system.

3.0 Philosophy

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The philosophy stated in this section are based on the following definitions:

Electrical Faults - the transmission line connected to the output of an isolation device circuit may be open circuited, short circuited, grounded, or subjected to credible fault voltages.

Maxinum Credible Voltage - is considered to be 400 VDC and 400 V peak AC for analog signals and 480 VAC RMS for digital signals.

Unacceptable Effects - non-performance of protdctive action when

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required of perfonnance or protective action when not required.

3.1 Interchannel Sigaal Paths ,-

hhen interchannel signal paths are provided with adequate electrical isolation, electrical faults in one channel of the protection system will not produce unacceptable effects in any other redundant channel of the protection system.

3.2 Non-IE Signals hhen non-IE signal paths are provided with adequate electrical isolation, electrical faults affecting the transmission lines in the non-IE environment will not p:oduce unacceptable affects in any channel of the protection system.

4.0 Analysis Two types of signal paths (analog and digital) which require electrical isolation are involved in protection systen designs. Electrical

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( isolation of analog signals is accomplished by isolation amplifier circuits while electric.a1 isolation of digital signals is accomplished by relay circuits. This section addresses connecting circuits, and isolatica devices (isolation amplifiers and relays) separately.

4.1 Connecting Circuits The components utilized to connect, field wiring to the isolation devices (relays and amplifiers) combine to fann the isolation circuit.

The connecting circuits must possess dielectric strengths equal to or greater than the maximm credible voltages indicated in section 3.0 in order to maintain electrical isolation. Components involved in connecting circuits are listed in Table 4-1. Table 4-1, in adilition, provides working voltage ratings and material data relative to connecting circuits. The component ratings exc.eed the maxinum credible

$. fault voltage in section 3.0. Also, it should be noted that breakdown voltage values are considerably greater than working voltage ratings.

For example, the wiring rating is established at twice rated voltage plus one thousand volts.

4.2 Relays Interchannel and non-IE signal paths are provided with electrical isolation by means of relays. The inherent electrical separation

' between relay contacts and coils and between individual contacts is

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ed to isolate digital signals. In relays, the main variable i determining isolation capability is dielectric strength. The relays,

, employed in the protection systans for electrical isolation purposes, have a mininum dielectric strength of 1,000 VRMS coil to contact and contact to contact.

4.3 Analog Signal Isolators Figure 1 depicts a typical analog signal path where amplifiers A and l

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I~ B2 Process the protective action signal while amplifier B1 provides the isolated analog output signal. Various faults, at the output of B1 , are acceptable when signal V2 and hence signal V5 are essentially unaffected. In this circuit:

A. the 220 ohm resistors preclude overload of the related amplifier in the event of an inadvertent short at the amplifier output.

l B. the gain of A, B1 , and B2 is essentially unity.

C. the dynamic signal range is ten volts. .

D. amplifiers A, B 1, and B2 are capable of supplying up to five milliamperes mininum without limiting.

E. the nonnal loading on amplifier A is approximately 0.0001 amperes per each driven amplifier.

F. the maximum input current to amplifier B2 is 0.0001 ampere.

G. the changes in the value of R1 will be reflected as a signal error in the output signal at Rt. Changes in R1 are, therefore, self .

annunciating.

H. the protective action signal is conservatively considered as unaffected so long as current I2 does not exceed 0.004 amperes under fault conditions at the B1 output.

IA = 0.005 A max. without limiting It = 0.0001 A max.

12 nonnal = 12N = 0.0001 A max.

I2 fault = I2F = 0.004 A max. under fault conditions IA=Il+I2F = 0.0001 + 0.004 = 0.0041 A max. allowable under

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fault conditions I2F < IA max.

4.3.1 Worst Case Analysis From section 4.3, the worst case fault is assumed to be the case where a high voltage is applied at the output of By and results in a

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8 Table 4-1. Connectung Circuit Data COMPONENT RATING lMTERIAL RDMRKS W.V.= Working Voltage -

D.S.= Dielectric Strength Teminal Blocks 1100 VAC W.V.' Phenolic Interconnects field wiring and cabinet back-plane wiring Backplane Wiring 600 VAC W.V. Teflon Type G Connects teminal blocks to blue ribbon connectors Blue Ribbon 750 V D.S. Diathoulate Connects backplane wiring to module internals Connectors Module Internal 600 VAC W.V. Teflon Type G Connects blue ribbon connector to mother Wiring board internal to modules Connector 600 V D.S. Lexan Connects printed circuit board carrying the isolation device (relay or isolation amplifier)

Printed Circuit 600 V W.V.

• Glass / Epoxy

• Working voltage between adjacent printed Lanes circuit board conductors per 1/16 inch spacing.

Also applicable to mother board.

5 t short circuit fault between the B inpitt y and output. In this case, the impedance between the fault source and the IE output of A is ninimum and equal to R1 = 105 ohms. The maximum tolerable fault voltage at the By output is, therefore, Ef ault

• Ifault x R1 = 0.004 x 105 = 400 volts. Under worst case fault R y is required to dissipate 1.6 watts and not breakdown with 400 v,olts impressed across its teminals. The characteristics of R1 are consistent with these requirements. -

4.3.2 Analfsis Results Fault potentials up to and including 400 VDC and 400 volts peak AC have been analyzed to demonstrate that under worst case conditions (amplifier B1 input to output shorted) amplifier A will not be driven into limits. The protection system would, therefore, suffer no

! unacceptable effects.

5. 0 Isolator Tests The isolation device circuits utilized in the protection systems were subjected to type tests designed to verify the analysis described in section 4 of this document. The tests and their results are described below.

5.1 Connecting Circuits The connecting circuits are described in section 4.1. The dielectric strengths and working voltage ratings of these devices are considerably above the maximum credible fault voltage levels -- see section 3.0.

Vendors procurement specification and quality assurance procedures ensure electrical isolation ratings of these components is maintained.

5.2 Relays Since relays are standard products and are installed as a unit and since their electrical isolation ability is accepted, the manufacturers

6 dielectric rating certifications are utilized as evidence of their suitability. The relay manufacturers certifications verify that the piutection system vendor's requirements for 1,000 volt minimtn dielectric strength are met. The ratings of these devices is considerably above the maximm credible fault voltage level -- section 3.0.

5.3 Analog Isolators The analog isolation device, illustrated in figure 1, was subjected to eight tests. The tests are illustrated in figures 2 through 9 ,

where the reference conditions and effects of the simlated electrical fault on the protective action signal are enumerated in a table at the bottom of each figure. Three types of tests were conducted:

1. Passive - illustrated in figures 2 and 3,

2. Credible Fault Voltages - illustrated in figures 4, 5, 6, and 7, and

3. High Fault Voltages - illustrated in figures 8 and 9.

5.3.1 Passivd Tests .

Faults such as shorted and open isolator outputs are passive faults which do not introduce foreign sources of voltage into isolator output circuits. These tests are illustrated in figures 2 and 3.

In these cases, protective action signals V2 and V5 were not affected to an unacceptable degree.

5.3.2 Credible Fault Voltages j Credible fault voltage tests are tests where the output of the isolator is subjected to foreign voltages which are credible due to exposure j of the transmission line and load. The tests are illustrated and the

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results enumerated in figures 4 through 7. Tests 3 and 4 (figures 4 and 5) were designed to verify the adequacy of isolation at the low end of the credible fault range. Tests 5 and 6 (figures 6 and 7) were designed to verify the adequacy of isolation in the center and ,

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7 upper portion of the credible fault voltage range for both AC and DC potentials.

In these cases (tests 3, 4, 5 and 6) protective action signals V2 and V5 were not affected to an unacceptable degree.

i 5.3.3 High Fault Voltages liigh fault voltage tests are where the output of the isolator is subjected to foreign voltages in the upper region of the credible fault voltage range and beyond for both AC and DC potentials. These i tests are illustrated and the results enumerated in figures 8 and 9.

l In these cases (tests 7 and 8) protective action signals V2 and V; were not affected to an unacceptable degree.

5.4 Test Conclusions .

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' The results of the analog isolator tests ara sumarized in figure 10.

The tests were conducted in the fault voltage range o to 608 volts peak 60 Hz AC and 0,to 475 VDC. The extremely low percentage of error and low values of ripple induced in the protective action signal  ;

V2 and V5 indicates the suitability of the analog isolator ciesign. I No tur.cceptable effects were noted in any of the tests.

6.0 NI/RPS to Actuated Device Interface A discussion of the NI/APS should include the electrical interface between the NI/RPS and the control rod drive control systs.

A typical interface is shown in simplified fom in figure 11. Since the NI/RPS is comprised of four redundant channels, the arrangement shown is repeated four times (once in each division of plant redundancy).

There are four control rod drive breaker cabinets where each cabinet

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I contains a channel of trip' equipment. The cabinet and trip equipnent l

are seismically and envirornentally qualified.

E The NI/RPS channel controls the vital power source that maintains the under voltage coil (W) and relay K2 in a statically energized state. To convey a trip, the NI/RPS interrupts vital power to de-energize the W coil. The W coil can also be de-energized by means of 'a momentary manual trip switch. When the W coil de-energizes, the associated contacts intermpt primary power to the CRD system. The breakers are arranged to produce a trip of the control rods in a one-out-of-two taken twice coincidence of the four breakers. Relay K2 produces a secondary trip into the motor return cabinets while relay K1 transmits a signal to the NI/RPS for breaker trip confinnation.

(. All wiring between each NI/RPS channel and the respective control rod drive' breaker cabinet is classified as class IE and required to be

maintained within its division of redundancy.

All class IE and non-class IE wiring within the control rod drive breaker cabinets have mininum voltage ratings of 600 VRMS. All components (terminal blocks, connectors, etc.) within these i

connecting paths posssess dielectric strengths in excess of 600 VRMS.

l l

l Relays K'1 and K2 have a dielectric strength rating of 1,250 VRMS coil to contact.

_ The maximtsn credible failure mode voltage within the control rod i

drive breaker cabinet'is 480 VRMS. The maximin credible failure voltage b .is well below the minimum relay dielectric strength of the control i ~

. rod drive trip channel equipment. Failures to maximum credible voltage, within a given control rod drive breaker cabinet will not produce unacceptable effects within the NI/RPS.

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