ML19290D280

Proposes Second Review of Restart Rept.Section 8 Discusses Effect of Sys Design Mods on Safety Analyses.Forwards List of Sample Areas That Should Be Reviewed Prior to Restart

ML19290D280
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	11/27/1979
From:	Mazetis G NRC - TMI-2 OPERATIONS/SUPPORT TASK FORCE
To:	Silver H NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE
Shared Package
ML111090060	List: ML19208A315 ML19208A325 ML19250B014 ML19250B445 ML19250B480 ML19250B482 ML19254C975 ML19254G119 ML19254G128 ML19255K396 ML19255K397 ML19257E274 ML19257F047 ML19257F050 ML19260B823 ML19260E912 ML19260E913 ML19260E914 ML19261C469 ML19262E467 ML19262F230 ML19263D836 ML19263F605 ML19263G068 ML19268C086 ML19268C087 ML19269F130 ML19271A085 ML19271A172 ML19273B051 ML19273D308 ML19274A409 ML19274E085 ML19275B428 ML19275B444 ML19275C327 ML19275C328 ML19275G904 ML19275G918 ML19275H308 ML19275H317 ML19275H339 ML19275H341 ML19275H375 ML19275H401 ML19275H405 ML19275H493 ML19275H655 ML19275H660 ML19276D594 ... further results
References
FOIA-80-515, FOIA-80-555 NUDOCS 8002210038
Download: ML19290D280 (2)

Text

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s,......o' NOV 2 7 079 Docket No. 50-289 MEMORANDUM FOR: Harley Silver FROM:

Jerry Mazetis

SUBJECT:

TMI-1 REVIEW Section 8 of the TMI-1 Restart Report discusses the effect of system design modifications on the TMI-1 safety analyses. Some analyses are discussed which have not been completed for THI-1, but Met. Ed. states that previous TMI-2 analyses would be bounding. Although these areas are not directly related to Bulletins and Orders or Lessons Learned, they should be reviewed prior to restart of TMI-1. Examples of these areas are enclosed.

Since these items may take considerable additional review effort, and since reviewer manpower and time is currently limited, we propose a sectnd review phase subsequent to our Order-related review. This second phase vould be reviewed by us (or 00R, or...) concurrent witt: the late rubmitta".s we know

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. vill exist (i.e., final designs, test res its, etc.).

/

Gerald R.

az is TMI Support

Enclosure:

Review Areas cc:

R. Vollmer D. Ross T. Novak J. Voglewede P. Norian S. Israel S. Newbm ry

Contact:

Scott Newberry, NRR 8003210 C) b y

C

E'. ' 05URE Steam Line Break Operator would have to isolate affected steam generator to prevent containment over ressure. The operator, they state, wculd have 20 minutes to perform this action, (TMI-1 differs from TTt!-2:

1. currently no cavitating venturis on Tiii-1 EFW. and 2.

TitI-1 MSIV's are stop checks.) THI-1 has not been analy:ed for the environmental effect inside containment for the worst single failure (currently being evaluated by Met. Ed.).

Feedwater Line Break This event has not been analyzed for TMI-1; however, Met. Ed. believes that the Dt!-2 analysis is bounding. The margins available in this analysis would probably be increased by anticipatory reactor trip (should one occur for a feed line break) and the lower high pressure reactor trip set point.

Larce LOCA Met. Ed. states that deletion of sodium thiosulfate from the reactor building spray system will increase offsite doses resulting from design basis LOCA; although they will be within 10 CFR 100. Met. Ed. also states that TMI-2 calculations would bound TMI-1.

Automatic Shift to Recirculation of ECCS

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