ML19032A163
| ML19032A163 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/2019 |
| From: | William Gideon Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Catherine Haney NRC/RGN-II |
| References | |
| RA-19-2019 IR 2018301 | |
| Download: ML19032A163 (8) | |
Text
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Page 2 of 2 cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Mr. Bruno Caballero, Chief Examiner 245 Peachtree Center Ave, NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Mr. Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Operations Branch 1 245 Peachtree Center Ave, NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Dennis J. Galvin (Mail Stop OWFN 8B1A) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Gale Smith, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission (Electronic Copy Only) 4325 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27626-0510 swatson@ncuc.net
RA-19-0083 Enclosure List of Post-Examination Documentation The following documentation is being provided electronically via a secure File Transfer Protocol (FTP) website to Mr. Bruno Caballero, the assigned NRC chief examiner, only. The documentation is not included herein.
- 1. Graded Written Examinations and Applicants' Answer Sheets
- 2. Master Examination and Answer Key
- 3. Applicants' Questions Asked and Answers Given During the Written Examination
- 4. Review Comments
- 5. Written Examination Seating Chart
- 6. ES-403-1, "Written Examination Grading Quality Checklist"
- 7. Written Examination Performance Analysis Results (with recommended substantive changes)
Facility Comment on the Tech Spec determination for Scenario 2 Event 2.
The answer key stated to declare the control rod inoperable IAW TS 3.1.3. This is not correct based on the following (follows the IDO format):
Entry Condition Control rod drifting in to 00.
From Tech Spec bases for LCO 3.1.3:
The OPERABILITY of an individual control rod is based on a combination of factors, primarily, the scram insertion times, the control rod coupling integrity, and the ability to determine the control rod position. Accumulator OPERABILITY is addressed by LCO 3.1.5. The associated scram accumulator status for a control rod only affects the scram insertion times; therefore, an inoperable accumulator does not immediately require declaring a control rod inoperable.
Although not all control rods are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the intended reactivity control requirements, strict control over the number and distribution of inoperable control rods is required to satisfy the assumptions of the DBA and transient analyses.
There is no mission time applicable for the control rod system.
Surveillance requirements for control rod per TS 3.1.3 are:
Determine the position of each control rod Insert each withdrawn control rod at least one notch Verify each control rod scram time from fully withdrawn to notch position 06 is 7 seconds.
Verify each control rod does not go to the withdrawn overtravel position.
Basis for Reasonable Expectation of Operability With a control rod drifting in to position 00 no technical specification surveillance requirements are adversely impacted for the control rod. In this scenario the control rod was latched at position 00 and was performing its required function. Also, there were no indications of abnormally elevated temperatures on the control rod drive (i.e. CRD Hydraulic Temperature High alarm was not received) so scram times would not be adversely affected. Subsequent actions required by plant procedures to isolate and disarm the control rod would render the control rod inoperable, however, these actions were not completed in the observed scenarios. Therefore, given the identified condition of the control rod drifting in to 00 the control rod remains operable.