ML18283B607

Responding to Letter of 11/2/1976, Referring to IE Inspection Reports for 50-259/76-20, 50-260/76-20, 50-296/76-18, Letter Advising No Proprietary Information Is Contained

ML18283B607
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	11/22/1976
From:	Gilleland J Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Moseley N NRC/RGN-II
References
IR 1976018, IR 1976020
Download: ML18283B607 (22)

Text

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6p 830 Power Buildin~

ENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401

'P/6 19]6 November 22, 1976 Mr, Norman C. Moseley, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Suite 818.

230 Peachtree Street, NWo Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mro Moseley:

This is in response to Po Jo Long's November 2, 1976, letter, IE:II:RPS 50-259/76-20, 50-260/76-20, 50-296/76-18 which transmitted for our review an IE Inspection Report (same number). We have reviewed that report and do not consider any part of proprietaryo it to be h, ~

Very trul yours, pJo 4i 0A<~

E, Gilleland Assistant Manager of Power An Equal Opportunity Employer

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0 t UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI REGION II 230 PEACHTREE STREET, N.W. SUITE 818 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303

~ov 8 1976 In Reply Refer To:

IEIII:RFS 50-259/76-20 50-260/76-20 50-296/76-18 Tennessee Valley Authority Attn: Mr. Godwin Williams, Jr.

Manager of Power 830 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Messrs. J. E. Ouzts, D. J. Burke and R. F. Sullivan of this office on September 14-17, 21-24, 27 and October 1, 1976, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos.

DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Units 1; 2 and 3 facilities, and to the discussion of our findings held with Mr. J. G. Dewease at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during the inspection and our findings are discussed in the enclosed inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

We have examined actions you have taken with regard to previously identified enforcement matters. These are identified in Section II of the summary of the enclosed report.

During the inspection, it was found that certain activities under your license appear to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements. This item and references to pertinent requirements are listed in Section I of the summary of the enclosed report. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence were completed prior to the conclusion of this inspection; therefore, a reply to tha.s. item, of noncompliance is not requested.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"

Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you submit a written application to this office requesting that such information be withheld from public disclosure. If no proprietary information is identified, a written

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AUV 4 ldlb Tennessee Valley Authority statement to that effect should be submitted. If an application is submitted, it must fully identify the bases for which information is claimed to be proprietary. The application should be prepared so that information sought to be withheld is incorporated in a separate paper and referenced in the application since the application will be placed in the Public Document Room. Your application, or written statement, should be submitted to us within 20 days. If we are not contacted as specified, the enclosed report and this letter may then be placed in the Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, F. J. Long, Chic Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

Enclosure:

IE Inspection Report Nos.

50-259/76-20, 50-260/76-20 and 50-296/76-18

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~o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI REGION II 230 PEACHTREE STREET, N.W. SUITE 818 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303

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IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-259/76-20, 50-260/76-20 and 50-296/76-18 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 818 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name: Browns Ferry 1, 2 and 3 Docket NoseI 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.: DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Location: Limestone County, Alabama Type of License: 3923 Mwt, BWR (GE)

Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced Dates of Inspection: September 14-17, 21-24, 27 and October 1, 1976 Dates of Previous Inspection: September 3-4 and 9-11, 1976 Principal Inspector: R, F. Sullivan, Reactor Inspector Inspectors-in-Charge: J. E. Ouzts, Reactor Inspector (September 14-17)

D, J. Burke, Reactor Inspector (September 27)

Accompanying Inspectors: G, L, Constable, Insp ction Programs Specialist, (IE:HQ)

Principal Inapecrcr: / lg R. F. Sullivan, Reactor Inspector Date Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Reviewed By: ,~ / <

H. C. Dance,

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Support Branch Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Date Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

IE Rpt. Nos. 50-259/76-20, 50-260/76-20 and 50-296/76-18 SALARY OF FINDINGS I. Enforcement Item Infraction Contrary to Technical Specification 6.3.A, procedures were not adhered to in that the core spray differential instrumentation for System II of Unit 1 was valved out-of-service during operation and no corrective action was taken on the lighted annunciated panel and data sheet which showed an abnormal reading. (Details II, paragraph 2)

II. Licensee Action on Previousl Re orted Enforcement Matters Infraction The corrective action taken relative to the failure to follow procedure during torch cutting in the Unit 1 drywell as described in IE Report No. 50-259/76-12 was reviewed and is considered closed. (Details II, paragraph 4}*

III. New Unresolved Items None IV. Status of Previousl Re orted Unresolved Items Not inspected.

V. Unusual Occurrences None VI. Other Si nificant Findin s None VII. Mana ement Interview The results of the inspection were discussed with Mr. Dewease on September 17, 24 and October 1, 1976.

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IE Rp t. Nos. 50-259/76-20, 50-260/76-20 and 50-296/76- 18 /

DETAILS I Prepared by: <~U/8- l> .

J. E. Ouzts, Reactorl,Inspector 'a'te Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: September 14-17, 1976 Reviewed by:

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H. C. Dance, Acting Chief 'Date Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

1. Personnel Contacted H. J. Green Plant Superintendent L. F. Blackner Nuclear Engineer T. A. Bragg QA Supervisor J. G. Dewease Assistant Plant Superintendent j

M. Long Reactor Operator

'-R. Mentke Results Supervisor

= ..E. Nave Nuclear Engineer J. Pittman Instrument Engineer D. Stevens Reactor Operator W. Roberts Maintenance Supervisor D. Stewart Shift Supervisor B. Willis QA Engineer

.2. Safet S stem Settin s and Limitin Conditions for 0 erations a~ Plant records as identified in Section 3 and the existing status of plant equipment for all three units were inspected to verify that safety system settings and limiting conditions for operations were in compliance with the following sections of the technical specifications:

(1) 1.1 Fuel Cladding Integrity (2} 1.2 Reactor Coolant System Integrity (3) 3.2 Protective Instrumentation (4) 3.3 Reactivity Control

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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-250/76-20, 50-260/76-20 and 50-296/76-.18'. (5) 3.4 .Standby Liquid Control Sytem (6) 3.5. A Core Spray System (7)3.5.B Residual Heat Removal System (8}3.5.E High Pressure I+ection Cooling System (9)3.5.F Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (10) 3. 5. G Automatic Depressurization System (11}3.5.K Minimum Critical Power Ratio (12}3.6.B - Coolant Chemistry Q3}3. 6. C Coolant Leakage (14}3. 7.A Primary Containment (15} 3.9 Auxiliary. Electrical System (16) 3.11 Fire Protection System

b. The most recently completed copy of safety-related surveil-lance test procedures, operators logs and computer printouts were reviewed for Units 1 and 2 and where identified by asterisks for Unit 3. In the case of surveillance procedures, the test results of several recent tests were reviewed where more than one test had been performed as required. The following documents that identified setpoints were reviewed:

Surveillance Tests (3.} 4.11.A,l-b HP Fire Protection Pump Operability *

(2) 4.,9.A.l.a Diesel Generator Monthly Test *

(3} 4.9.A,2. a Battery Check *

(4) 4.5.A.l.d(I) Core Spray System, Flow Test (5). 4.5.B.l.d RHR System Flow Test (6}. 4.5.E.2.d & e HPCI System Turbine and Pump Flow Test (Auxiliary Steam)

IE Rp t. Nos. 50-250/76-20, 50-260/76-20 and 50-296/76-18 . (7) 4.5. 2.d 6 e RCIC System Turbine and Pump Flow Test (Auxiliary Steam)

(8) 4.5.G ADS Simulated Automatic Actuation (9) 4. 6. B. 2 Coolant Chemistry QO) 4. 6. C. 2 Coolant leakage (ll} 4.1.A.13 RPS Turbine Control Valve Loss of Oil Pressure (12) 4. 1.'A-9 Turbine Condenser Low Vacuum Functional and Calibration (13} 4.1.A.11 RPS MSIV Closure (14} 4.2.B.1A Reactor Low Water Level-LIS-3-58A-D (15) 4.2 A.3 Core and Containment Cooling initiation Reactor Water Level (16},4.7.D.l.b-2 MSIV Closure Time (17) 4. 2.'C-3A Instruments that Initiate Pod Blocks (18) 4 2. C. 1A

~ Power Range Neutron Monitoring APRM Functional (19) 4.1. A-6 RPS High Drywell Pressure Functional and Calibration (20) 4.1. A-7 RPS Reactor Building and Primary Con-tainment Isolation Initiation Reactor Water Level (21) 4.1.A-8 RPS High Level in Scram Discharge Tank Functional and Calibration (22), 4. 1. A-14 - RPS - Turbine'1st Stage Pressure Permissive Functional Test (23) 4.1.A-10 Main Steam Line'igh Radiation Monitoring Functional Test (24) 4.2.A-6 Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instruments Low Pressure Main Steam Line Functional and Calibration

IE Rp t. Nos. 50-250/76-20, 50-260/76-'20 and 50-296/76-.3.8 . (25) 4. 2. A-7 Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Initiation High Flow Main Steam Line (26) 4.2. C-lA Rod Block Monitor APRM Channel Functional Test (27) 4. 1.A. 5 RPS High Reactor Pressure (28) 4.2.J-2A - Biaxial Seismic Switches (29} 4.2.J-lA Triaxial Time History Acceleration *

(30) 4. 2.A. 8 Primary Containment and Reactor Building Isolation Instruments Main Steam Line Tunnel High Temperature Functional and Calibration (31) 4.2.A-10A - Reactor Building Ventilation Rod Monitor-ing System RM-90-140, 141, 142 and 143 Functional Test (32$ 4~2 A"12 SBGT System Blower and Heater Logic Functional Test (33). 4.2.A-17 Refueling Zone Isolation Static Pressure Permissive Logic System (34} 4.2.B-2 Instruments that Initiates or Control the CSCS - Reactor Low'ater Level (35) 4.2.B-8 Instruments that Initiates or Control CSCS- Reactor Pressure (36) 4.2.B-39 Core Spray Logic (37) 4.2.B-44A Time ADS Delay Relay Calibration (38) 4. 2. H-1 Flood Protection Instruments Reservoir Level Monitoring '- Functional and Calibration *

(39) 4.4.A,l Standby Liquid Control System Loop Functional Test

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IE t. Nos. 50-250(76-20, 50-260/76-20 Rp and 50-296/76-,18'5-(40) 4. 4. A. 2 Standby Liquid Control System Functional Test (Relief Valve Setpoints)

(,41) 4. 6.D. 1 Relief and Safety Valve Setpoint Check (42) 4. 7. C-l Secondary Containment Capability (43} 4.3.C Rod Insertion Times>> (Did not include Unit 1) 0 erators Lo s SI-2 Shift Surveillance Log Com uter Pro rams (1) P-1 Core Evaluation (2) OD-3 Thermal Balance c As a result of the review of safety systems setpoints and limiting conditions for operation records and documents, and interviews with personnel,no discrepancies were identified.

IE Rpt. Nos. 50-259/76-20, 50-260/76-20 and 50-296/76-18 1

DETAILS II Prepared by: J' y u/>-o(pg R. F. Sullivan, Reactor Inspector Date Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: September 21-24 and October 1, 1976 Reviewed by: F7 4 . .C~

H. C. Dance, Chief ~ Date Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

1. Persons Contacted H. J. Green Plant Supexintendent J. G. Dewease Assistant Plant Superintendent J. B. Studdard Operations Supervisor R. Hunkapiller Assistant Operations Supervisor J. D. Glover Shift Engineer J. A. Mantooth Shift Engineer P. B. Border Training Supervisor L. L. Kennedy Shift Engineer

2. Review of Plant 0 erations A review was made of recent plant operations with emphasis on the period of September 1 through 21 to ascertain that operations were being conducted in accordance with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements. This period has been a particularly

.demanding time on the operating staff and service groups since all 3 units are going through the startup phase. Operators were on a temporary 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> work-day schedule to provide the needed additional manpower imposed by the testing program. The inspectors observations on staffing revealed no instances where manpower requirements were not being met.

The review included examination of the following xecords for the period indicated:

a~ Shift Engineers, Journal, 9/1-22/76

b. ASE Journals, Units 1, 2 and 3'/1-22/76 c ~ UO Daily Journals, Units 1, 2 and 3; 9/10-23/76

d. Surveillance Instruction 2 Data Sheets, Units 1, 2 and 3; 9/19-23/76 p <<w>>. e

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IE Rp t. Nos. 50-259/76-20, 50-260/76-20 and 50-296/76-18

e. UO Reactor Bldg. Daily Log, Units 1, 2 and 3; 9/10-21/76

f. Trouble Reports, about 60 from last 3 months Jumper, Inhibit and Mire Removal Log, Units 1, 2 and 3; about 35 outstanding items

h. Shift Engineers Order Book; last 6 months entries Questions which the inspector had as a result of the records review were satisfactorily answered by staff members. The inspector did identify a jumper in the Manual Control Systems which was no longer needed and was subsequently removed but in this case it had no adverse affect on safety. The Assistant Operations Supervisor indicated he would re-emphasize to the operations staff the importance of checking the JIMR log prior to startups.

A tour was made of all 3 reactor buildings and their respective control rooms. Observations included overall housekeeping, readings on selected indicating instrumentation, valve positions, annunciator panels, tags and fluid leaks. An item of noncompliance was identified on the tour of Unit '1 on September 23. The core spray differential pressure instrumentation for System II was valved out-of-service with recirculation flow established and reactor re-start operations in progress. The inspector identified the noncompliance as failure to adher to procedures as required by Technical Specification 6.3.A, in that; the indicated pressure differential of zero had been entered in the control room data sheet, SI 2, for four successive days without being recognized as abnormal, and the annunciator panel for this system was lighted and not followed up on by operating personnel.

Corrective action was initiated promptly with the instrumentation being returned to service and an effort made to determine why had been removed from service.

it Steps were taken to revise the data sheet to show the expected reading and to bring this matter to the attention of the operating staff. The inspector had no further questions on this item.

3. S ecial 0 erator Trainin By letter dated 4/23/76 to the Operator Licensing Branch, TVA committed to add'itional training and examination for licensed operators if fuel loading were to begin more than 6 months after operators completed their restart training.'The status of the special training conducted to meet this commitment was reviewed.

Thirty-three licensed personnel recently received this, special training. Each was given a study guide to complete and return to the training supervisor. In turn each was individually given a walk-through two hour oral examination. Records in the training

IE Rp t. Nos. 50-259/76-20, II-3 50-260/76-20 and 50-296/76-18 office confirmed that each successfully completed the scheduled training, including the oral examination.

4. Followu on Previous Noncom liance Additional followup to the noncompliance item transmitted to TVA by letter of 6/8/76 was made. This item dealt with failure to follow procedures with respect to torch cutting operations in the Unit 1 drywell. TVA's corrective action was stated in reportable occurrence BFAO-259/765 and by letter to IE dated 6/28/76. Initial IE followup was covered in IE Report 50-259/76-13. All action committed to by TVA was verified.

Standb Gas Treatment S stem (SGTS)

TVA by letter to NRR dated 6/22/76 committed to specific items in the operating procedure for the SGTS until certain modifications to the instrumentation and controls are made. The inspector verified tht the procedure requirements had been implemented on 6/30/76 and that system status and changes were being entered in logs and data sheets in each control room.

Tar et Rock Safet /Relief Valve Testin The inspector reviewed the in-place testing procedures for the Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRV) for conformance to the recommended testing procedure provided to TVA by RL in letter of 10/21/75. The maintenance procedure MMI 1.3 was revised to conform to the RL letter. The procedure calls for testing at approximately 150 psig following maintenance and reinstallation of a MSRV. In actual practice this testing is done at close to 250 psig because this provides better system control and verification of valve operation.

In-place testing at approximately 250 psig was done for all MSRV's on Unit 3 prior to startup and for all Unit 1 and 2 MSRV's prior to restart from the extended shutdown. In addition all valves had been steam tested at Hyle Laboratory.

7. Unit 3 .Shutdown From Outside The Control Room On October 1; 1976, the inspector witnessed shutdown of Unit 3 from outside the control room. The test was performed in accordance with TVA procedure STJ 75 which was consistent with the test descrip-tion in Section 13.5 of the FSAR.

IE Rpt. Nos. 50-259/76-20, 50-260/76-20 and 50-296/76-18 The reactor was scrammed from 11.5% of full power by closing the MSIV's from the backup control station. This resulted in an immediate pressure increase of about 15 psi and the pressure then slowly decreased without any manual or automatic relief valve operation since there was very little decay heat in the core. The RCIC system was,placed into operation by backup controls and successfully maintained reactor water level within test limits.

Suppression pool cooling was established by backup controls using "A" RHR pump. All test criteria were met.

IE Rpt. No. 50-259/76-20 and 50-260/76-20 III-1 j

DETAILS III Prepared by: ~1)/s.'I d D. J.;yBur e, Reactor Inspector Date Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Date of Inspection: September 27, 1976 Reviewed by:

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H'. C. Dance, Acting Section Chief Nuclear Support Section

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1. Personnel Contacted H. J. Green Plant Superintendent J. G. Dewease Assistant Plant Superintendent J. B. Studdard Operations Supervisor R. Hunkapiller Assistant Operations Supervisor Several Unit Operators and Assistant SE and UO personnel 2.'ransient Test Witnessin The inspector witnessed the performance of startup test STI-31, "Loss of Turbine Generator and Offsite Power," which was initiated on Unit 3 at approximately 4:15 p.m. 'Test and operating personnel actions, reactor response and station electrical system performance were observed and'ompared to the various TS requirements, to Section 13.5 of the FSAR, and to Regulatory Guide 1.68e Within the areas inspected, no discrepancies were noted.

The Unit 3 electrical loads were aligned such that their sole source of power was the Unit 3 main generator, and Unit 3 was then systematically isolated from power supplies outside the station.

With Unit 3 at .25% power, the main generator was tripped, causing a complete loss of power. After several seconds, one licensed operator apparently tripped the reactor manually, but one RPS motor-generator had already lost enough inertia to trip. The reactor vessel level and pressure did not change enough to actuate or initiate any of the safety systems. After several minutes, the vessel was ma'nually isolated and RCIC was started to increase the vessel water level. The Unit 3 diesel-generators started as re-quired and automatically restored voltage to the safety-related busses. Prior to the test initiation, the inspector verified that various test prerequisites were satisfied. The inspector had no further questions.