ML18176A394
| ML18176A394 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | NuScale |
| Issue date: | 06/25/2018 |
| From: | Rad Z NuScale |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of New Reactors |
| References | |
| LO-0618-60233 | |
| Download: ML18176A394 (51) | |
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1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com
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LO-0618-60233 Page 2 of 2 06/25/18 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com : Turbine Missile Protection: Summary of Methodology Change from Probabilistic to Barrier Based : Evaluation of Barriers Credited for Protecting Essential SSC against Turbine Missiles : Changes to Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Sections:
Part 2 - Tier 1 - Section 2.4, Turbine Generator System
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 1.8, Interfaces with Certified Design
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 1.9, Conformance with Regulatory Criteria
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 3.5, Missile Protection
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 3.8, Design of Category I Structures
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 9.1, Fuel Storage and Handling
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 10.1, Summary Description (Steam and Power Conversion System)
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 10.2, Turbine Generator
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 10.3, Main Steam System
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 14.2, Initial Plant Test Program
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 14.3, Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
LO-0618-60233 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com :
Turbine Missile Protection: Summary of Methodology Change from Probabilistic to Barrier-Based
LO-0618-60233 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com Turbine Missile Protection:
Summary of Methodology Change from Probabilistic to Barrier-Based Because NuScales design already contained barriers meeting the requirements for protection against aircraft and vehicle impact, NuScale considered it reasonable that those same barriers might also be credited for protection against turbine-generated missiles.
NuScale analyzed the ability of the current designs physical barriers to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases, for protecting structures, systems, and components (SSC) important to safety. The results showed that essential SSC, as defined by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.115, are protected by barriers alone. Consequently, NuScale finds it unnecessary to include detailed information in the DCA related to: (1) the turbine casing and rotor materials, (2) inspections and valve testing programs related to turbine rotor integrity, (3) ITAAC related to turbine rotor integrity, and (4) turbine overspeed protection systems meeting the specifications of SRP 10.2.
DSRS 3.5.1.3, Turbine Missiles,Section I.1 states, Plants that use barriers to protect all essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115, would not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity discussed in DSRS Section 10.2.3, Turbine Rotor Integrity. The analysis of the missile barriers will be reviewed in this DSRS section meeting the acceptance criteria in SRP 3.5.3, Barrier Design Procedures. RG 1.115, Revision 2, Section B, Protection against Turbine Missiles, cites shielding as one of the principal means of protecting against turbine missiles. Sections C.2.d and C.3 of RG 1.115 provide guidance for using barriers for protection. NuScale utilized this guidance as the basis for its approach. The acceptance criteria (Section II.6) of DSRS 3.5.1.3, Turbine Missiles, indicates that both high and low trajectory turbine missiles be accounted for. This guidance also appears in RG 1.115. The use of barriers must also meet the acceptance criteria for penetration (and scabbing) of concrete described in RG 1.115 and SRP 3.5.3.
NuScale evaluated the adequacy of the barriers it intended to credit for protection against turbine-generated missiles by addressing the essential SSC identified in Appendix A of RG 1.115. The evaluation showed that the reactor building and the control building provide adequate protection for essential SSC contained therein. The evaluation did show that portions of the gaseous radwaste system located outside the reactor building could potentially be affected by turbine missiles. However, these effects were already bounded by other postulated events and are within regulatory limits.
To assist the staff in their review, a summary of the RG 1.115, Appendix A evaluation is provided in Enclosure 2.
The FSAR has been revised to remove information specific to the probabilistic approach to turbine missile protection and updated to reflect crediting the use of shielding and barriers as summarized above. A copy of the changes is provided in Enclosure 3.
LO-0618-60233 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com :
Evaluation of Barriers Credited for Protecting Essential SSC against Turbine Missiles
LO-0618-60233 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com Evaluation of Barriers Credited for Protecting Essential SSC against Turbine Missiles Regulatory Guide 1.115, Appendix A states that structures, systems, and components (SSC) considered for protection from postulated turbine missiles may be limited to the 14 items listed in the Appendix.
A - Commonalities of NuScales Analysis Results Applicable to Appendix A (A-1 through A-14):
The exterior walls and roof of the reactor building (RXB) are heavily reinforced concrete. This structure is sufficient to prevent turbine missile perforation and back-face scabbing assuming minimal credit being taken to reduce the velocity of the missile as it penetrates the turbine generator casing.
The exterior walls and roof of the control building (CRB) are heavily reinforced concrete. This structure is sufficient to prevent turbine missile perforation and back-face scabbing assuming minimal credit being taken to reduce the velocity of the missile as it penetrates the turbine generator casing.
The RXB and CRB protect essential SSC or portions of essential SSC located within each against the effects of turbine missiles.
A number of the following evaluations refer to an underground chase or to the 75-foot elevation tunnel. The chase is located approximately 11 feet below grade and runs between the RXB and radiological waste building (RWB). The 75-foot elevation tunnel is located approximately 25 feet below grade and runs between the CRB and RXB. Each protects essential SSC or portions of essential SSC located or contained therein against the effects of turbine missiles due to the shielding effect provided by the depth of earth above each.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
The reactor coolant pressure boundary.
NuScale Evaluation:
The reactor coolant pressure boundary is located within the RXB and is protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
Those portions of the main steam and main feedwater systems in pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves.
NuScale Evaluation:
The portions of the main steam and main feedwater systems, up to and including the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), secondary MSIVs, feedwater isolation valves (FWIVs), and feedwater regulating valves are located within the RXB and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
The reactor core.
LO-0618-60233 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com NuScale Evaluation:
The reactor core is located within the RXB and is protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
Systems or portions of systems, considering a single failure, that are required for 1.
Attaining safe shutdown.
2.
Removing residual heat.
3.
Cooling the spent fuel storage pool.
4.
Mitigating the consequences of a credible missile-induced high energy line break.
Alternatively, the main steam system, up to and including a second isolation valve, such as a redundant series main steam isolation valve or a turbine stop valve, may be protected.
5.
Supplying makeup water for the primary system.
6.
Supporting the above systems (e.g., cooling water, ultimate heat sink, air supply, auxiliary feedwater, and ventilation).
NuScale Evaluation:
1.
Systems or portions of systems required for attaining safe shutdown are contained in the RXB and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
2.
Systems or portions of systems required for removing residual heat are contained in the RXB and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
3.
Systems or portions of systems required for cooling the spent fuel storage pool are contained in the RXB and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
4.
There are no systems required for mitigating the consequences of a credible missile-induced high energy line break. Therefore, this requirement is not applicable.
5.
There are no systems required for supplying makeup water for the primary system to achieve safe shutdown. Therefore, this requirement is not applicable.
6.
There are no support systems required for supporting the above functions. Therefore, this requirement is not applicable.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
The spent fuel storage pool, to the extent necessary to preclude significant loss of watertight integrity of the storage pool and to prevent missiles from contacting fuel within the pool.
NuScale Evaluation:
The spent fuel storage pool is located within the RXB and is protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
The reactivity control systems (e.g., control rod drives and boron injection system).
LO-0618-60233 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com NuScale Evaluation:
The reactivity control systems are contained within the RXB and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
Any remaining portions of the instrumentation and control interfaces (i.e., cable runs) are contained in the 75-foot elevation tunnel and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
The control room, including all equipment needed to maintain the control room within safe habitability limits for personnel and safe environmental limits for protected equipment.
NuScale Evaluation:
Control room habitability is not an essential SSC in the NuScale design. However, the control room, including equipment needed to maintain the control room within safe habitability limits for personnel and safe environmental limits for protected equipment, is located within the CRB and is protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
Those portions of the gaseous radwaste treatment system whose failure due to missile effects could result in potential radioactive release resulting in calculated off-site exposures greater than 25 percent of the guideline exposures in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1), 50.67(b)(2), or 100.11, as applicable, using appropriately conservative analytical methods and assumptions.
NuScale Evaluation:
Portions of the gaseous radwaste treatment system (GRWS) are located in the RXB, underground, and in the RWB. The portions of the GRWS located in the RXB are protected against the effects of turbine missiles. The gaseous radwaste piping located underground is contained in a chase at a depth of approximately 11 feet below grade and, therefore, is also protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
The portions of the GRWS located in the RWB are susceptible to the effects of turbine missiles.
However, should a portion of the GRWS located in the RWB fail due to the effects of a turbine missile, the potential radioactive release that might result would not be expected to exceed off-site exposures greater than 25 percent of the applicable guideline exposures in 10 CFR 52.47(a)(2)(iv) (equivalent to the guideline exposures of 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1)) using appropriately conservative analytical methods and assumptions. Such a release is already bounded by the failure of the GRWS postulated in FSAR Section 11.3.3.1 and the related doses presented in FSAR Table 11.3-9.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
Systems or portions of systems that are required for monitoring, actuating, and operating protected portions of systems listed in Items 4, 6, 7, and 13.
LO-0618-60233 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com NuScale Evaluation:
Systems or portions of systems that are required for monitoring, actuating, and operating protected portions of systems listed in Items 4, 6, 7, and 13 of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.115 are located in the RXB, the CRB, or underground and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles. The portions of those systems that are located underground (primarily cable runs) are contained in the 75-foot elevation tunnel and are also protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
Electric and mechanical devices and circuitry between the process sensors and the input terminals of the actuator systems involved in generating signals that initiate protective actions by protected portions of systems listed in Items 4, 6, 7, and 13.
NuScale Evaluation:
Item 4: Electric and mechanical devices and circuitry between the process sensors and the input terminals of the actuator systems involved in generating signals that are relied on for initiating actions for:
attaining safe shutdown are located in the RXB, the CRB, or are contained in the 75-foot elevation tunnel and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
removing residual heat are located in the RXB, the CRB, or are contained in the 75-foot elevation tunnel and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
cooling the spent fuel storage pool are located in the RXB, the CRB, or are contained in the 75-foot elevation tunnel and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
mitigating the consequences of a credible missile-induced high energy line break are located in the RXB, the CRB, or are contained in the 75-foot elevation tunnel and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
supplying makeup water to the primary system are located in the RXB, the CRB, or are contained in the 75-foot elevation tunnel and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
Item 6: Electric and mechanical devices and circuitry between the process sensors and the input terminals of the actuator systems involved in generating signals that are relied on for reactivity control are located in the RXB, the CRB, or are contained in the 75-foot elevation tunnel and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
Item 7: Electric and mechanical devices and circuitry between the process sensors and the input terminals of the actuator systems involved in generating signals that initiate protective actions by protected portions of the control room are located in the CRB and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
Item 13: The requirement to protect electric and mechanical devices and circuitry between the process sensors and the input terminals of the actuator systems involved in generating signals that initiate protective actions by protected portions of the Class 1E electric systems and auxiliary systems for the on-site electric power supplies that provide the emergency electric power needed for the functioning of plant features is not applicable to the NuScale design.
LO-0618-60233 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com NuScale does not have a Class 1E electric system or any other emergency electric power necessary for the functioning of essential SSC. Therefore, this requirement is not applicable.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
When adjacent turbine units are present at the site, those portions of the long-term emergency core cooling system that would be required to maintain the plant in a safe condition for an extended time after a loss of coolant accident and individual fuel assemblies at all times.
NuScale Evaluation:
Portions of the long-term emergency core cooling system required to maintain the plant in a safe condition for an extended time (see FSAR Section 6.2.2) after a loss of coolant accident are contained within the RXB and are protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
Primary reactor containment and other safety-related structures, such as the control building and auxiliary building, to the extent that they not collapse, allow perforation by missiles, or generate secondary missiles, any of which could cause unacceptable damage to protected items.
However, the primary containment need not necessarily maintain its leak-tight integrity.
NuScale Evaluation:
The primary reactor containment is located within the RXB and is protected against the effects of turbine missiles.
The CRB protects essential SSC contained within the building against the effects of turbine missiles.
The auxiliary building contains no essential SSC requiring protection from turbine missiles.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
The Class 1E electric systems, including the auxiliary systems for the on-site electric power supplies, that provide the emergency electric power needed for the functioning of plant features included in Items 1 through 11 above.
NuScale Evaluation:
NuScales design has no Class 1E electric systems or auxiliary systems for on-site electric power supplies that provide emergency electric power needed for the functioning of plant features included in Items 1 through 11 of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.115. Therefore, this requirement is not applicable.
A Regulatory Guidance Statement:
Those portions of structures, systems, and components whose continued function is not required but whose failure could reduce to an unacceptable safety level the functional capability of any plant features included in Items 1 through 13 above, or could result in incapacitating injury to occupants of the control room.
LO-0618-60233 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com NuScale Evaluation:
There are no SSC or portions of SSC located outside of the RXB, outside of the CRB, or above ground whose failure could reduce to an unacceptable safety level the functional capability of any plant features included in Items 1 through 13 of RG 1.115, Appendix A; including failures that could result in incapacitating injury to occupants of the control room. Those SSC or portions of SSC located inside the RXB, inside the CRB, or below ground are protected from the effects of turbine missiles.
LO-0618-60233 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com :
Changes to Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Sections:
Part 2 - Tier 1 - Section 2.4, Turbine Generator System
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 1.8, Interfaces with Certified Design
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 1.9, Conformance with Regulatory Criteria
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 3.5, Missile Protection
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 3.8, Design of Category I Structures
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 9.1, Fuel Storage and Handling
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 10.1, Summary Description (Steam and Power Conversion System)
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 10.2, Turbine Generator
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 10.3, Main Steam System
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 14.2, Initial Plant Test Program
Part 2 - Tier 2 - Section 14.3, Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
NuScale Tier 1 Not UsedTurbine Generator System Tier 1 2.4-1 Draft Revision 2 RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 2.4 Not UsedTurbine Generator System RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 2.4.1 Design Description RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2
System Description
The scope of this section is the turbine generator system (TGS). The TGS converts steam into electricity. The turbine is equipped with independent and diverse electronic overspeed protection. The steam flow to the turbine is controlled by a single stop valve.
Multiple inlet control valves are used to throttle steam flow to the turbine during normal operation. The turbine stop valve and turbine control valves close in response to a turbine overspeed trip signal. The TGS is a nonsafety-related system. Each NuScale Power Module has its own module-specific TGS. The Turbine Generator Building(s) house the TGS equipment.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Design Commitments The trip signals from the turbine overspeed emergency trip system are independent of the governor overspeed detection circuit.
The turbine stop valve and turbine control valves close in response to a turbine overspeed trip signal.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 2.4.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4-1 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the TGS.
NuScale Tier 1 Not UsedTurbine Generator System Tier 1 2.4-2 Draft Revision 2 RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Table 2.4-1: Not UsedTurbine Generator System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No.
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1
The trip signals from the turbine overspeed emergency trip system are independent of the governor overspeed detection circuit.
An inspection will be performed of the as-built turbine overspeed protection arrangement.
The turbine overspeed emergency trip system is supplied from different power sources and does not share common equipment with the governor overspeed detection circuit.
2 The turbine stop valve and turbine control valves close in response to a turbine overspeed trip signal.
A test will be performed of the turbine stop valve and turbine control valves.
The turbine stop valve and turbine control valves close on a turbine overspeed trip signal from both the turbine overspeed emergency trip system and the governor overspeed detection circuit.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Interfaces with Certified Design Tier 2 1.8-3 Draft Revision 2 RAI 01-61, RAI 02.04.13-1, RAI 03.04.02-1, RAI 03.04.02-2, RAI 03.04.02-3, RAI 03.05.01.04-1, RAI 03.05.02-2, RAI 03.06.02-15, RAI 03.06.03-11, RAI 03.07.01-2, RAI 03.07.01-3, RAI 03.07.02-8, RAI 03.07.02-12, RAI 03.08.04-23S1, RAI 03.08.05-14S1, RAI 03.09.02-15, RAI 03.09.02-48, RAI 03.09.02-67, RAI 03.09.03-12, RAI 03.09.06-5, RAI 03.09.06-6, RAI 03.09.06-16, RAI 03.09.06-16S1, RAI 03.09.06-27, RAI 03.11-8, RAI 03.11-14, RAI 03.11-14S1, RAI 03.11-18, RAI 03.13-3, RAI 04.02-1S2, RAI 05.02.05-8, RAI 05.04.02.01-13, RAI 05.04.02.01-14, RAI 06.04-1, RAI 09.01.02-4, RAI 09.01.05-3, RAI 09.01.05-6, RAI 09.03.02-3, RAI 09.03.02-4, RAI 09.03.02-5, RAI 09.03.02-6, RAI 09.03.02-8, RAI 10.02-1, RAI 10.02-2, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2, RAI 10.03.06-1, RAI 10.03.06-5, RAI 10.04.06-1, RAI 10.04.06-2, RAI 10.04.06-3, RAI 10.04.10-2, RAI 13.01.01-1, RAI 13.01.01-1S1, RAI 13.02.02-1, RAI 13.03-4, RAI 13.05.02.01-2, RAI 13.05.02.01-2S1, RAI 13.05.02.01-3, RAI 13.05.02.01-3S1, RAI 13.05.02.01-4, RAI 13.05.02.01-4S1, RAI 14.02-7, RAI 19-31, RAI 19-31S1, RAI 19-38, RAI 20.01-13 Table 1.8-2: Combined License Information Items Item No.
Description of COL Information Item Section COL Item 1.1-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will identify the site-specific plant location.
1.1 COL Item 1.1-2:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will provide the schedules for completion of construction and commercial operation of each power module.
1.1 COL Item 1.4-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will identify the prime agents or contractors for the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant.
1.4 COL Item 1.7-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will provide site-specific diagrams and legends, as applicable.
1.7 COL Item 1.7-2:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will list additional site-specific piping and instrumentation diagrams and legends as applicable.
1.7 COL Item 1.8-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will provide a list of departures from the certified design.
1.8 COL Item 1.9-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will review and address the conformance with regulatory criteria in effect six months before the docket date of the COL application for the site-specific portions and operational aspects of the facility design.
1.9 COL Item 1.10-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will evaluate the potential hazards resulting from construction activities of the new NuScale facility to the safety-related and risk significant structures, systems, and components of existing operating unit(s) and newly constructed operating unit(s) at the co-located site per 10 CFR 52.79(a)(31). The evaluation will include identification of management and administrative controls necessary to eliminate or mitigate the consequences of potential hazards and demonstration that the limiting conditions for operation of an operating unit would not be exceeded. This COL item is not applicable for construction activities (build-out of the facility) at an individual NuScale Power Plant with operating NuScale Power Modules.
1.10 COL Item 2.0-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will demonstrate that site-specific characteristics are bounded by the design parameters specified in Table 2.0-1.
If site-specific values are not bounded by the values in Table 2.0-1, the COL applicant will demonstrate the acceptability of the site-specific values in the appropriate sections of its combined license application.
2.0 COL Item 2.1-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will describe the site geographic and demographic characteristics.
2.1 COL Item 2.2-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will describe nearby industrial, transportation, and military facilities. The COL applicant will demonstrate that the design is acceptable for each potential accident, or provide site-specific design alternatives.
2.2 COL Item 2.3-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will describe the site-specific meteorological characteristics for Section 2.3.1 through Section 2.3.5, as applicable.
2.3 COL Item 2.4-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will investigate and describe the site-specific hydrologic characteristics for Section 2.4.1 through Section 2.4.14, as applicableexcept Section 2.4.8 and Section 2.4.10.
2.4 COL Item 2.5-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will describe the site-specific geology, seismology, and geotechnical characteristics for Section 2.5.1 through Section 2.5.5, below.
2.5 COL Item 3.2-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will update Table 3.2-1 to identify the classification of site-specific structures, systems, and components.
3.2
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Interfaces with Certified Design Tier 2 1.8-4 Draft Revision 2 COL Item 3.3-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design will confirm that nearby structures exposed to severe and extreme (tornado and hurricane) wind loads will not collapse and adversely affect the Reactor Building or Seismic Category I portion of the Control Building.
3.3 COL Item 3.4-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power plant design certification will confirm the final location of structures, systems, and components subject to flood protection and final routing of piping.
3.4 COL Item 3.4-2:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power plant design certification will identify the selected mitigation strategy for each room containing structures, systems, and components subject to flood protection.
3.4 COL Item 3.4-3:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power plant design certification will develop an inspection and maintenance program to ensure that each water-tight door, penetration seal, or other degradable measure remains capable of performing its intended function.
3.4 COL Item 3.4-4:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power plant design certification will confirm that site-specific tanks or water sources are placed in locations where they cannot cause flooding in the Reactor Building or Control Building.
3.4 COL Item 3.4-5:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will determine the extent of waterproofing and dampproofing needed for the underground portion of the Reactor Building and Control Building based on site-specific conditions. Additionally, a COL applicant will provide the specified design life for waterstops, waterproofing, damp proofing, and watertight seals. If the design life is less than the operating life of the plant, the COL applicant will describe how continued protection will be ensured.
3.4 COL Item 3.4-6:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will confirm that nearby structures exposed to external flooding will not collapse and adversely affect the Reactor Building or Seismic Category I portion of the Control Building.
3.4 COL Item 3.4-7:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will determine the extent of waterproofing and damp proofing needed to prevent groundwater and foreign material intrusion into the expansion gap between the end of the tunnel between the Reactor Building and the Control Building, and the corresponding Reactor Building connecting walls.
3.4 COL Item 3.5-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant certified design will provide a missile analysis for the turbine generator which demonstrates that protection from turbine missiles is accomplished by using barriers.the probability of a turbine generator producing a low trajectory turbine missile is less than 10-5.
3.5 COL Item 3.5-2:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant certified design will address the effect of turbine missiles from nearby or co-located facilities.Not Used.
3.5 COL Item 3.5-3:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant certified design will confirm that automobile missiles cannot be generated within a 0.5-mile radius of safety-related structures, systems, and components and risk-significant structures, systems, and components requiring missile protection that would lead to impact higher than 30 feet above plant grade.
Additionally, if automobile missiles impact at higher than 30 feet above plant grade, the COL applicant will evaluate and show that the missiles will not compromise safety-related and risk-significant structures, systems, and components.
3.5 COL Item 3.5-4:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will evaluate site-specific hazards for external events that may produce more energetic missiles than the design basis missiles defined in FSAR Tier 2, Section 3.5.1.4.
3.5 COL Item 3.6-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will complete the routing of piping systems outside of the reactor pool bay, identify the location of high-and moderate-energy lines, and update Table 3.6-1 as necessary.
3.6 COL Item 3.6-2:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will verify that the pipe rupture hazards analysis (including dynamic and environmental effects) of the high-and moderate-energy lines in the reactor pool bay is applicable. If changes are required, the COL applicant will update the pipe rupture hazards analysis, design additional protection features as necessary, and update Table 3.6-2, Figure 3.6-12, Figure 3.6-13, Figure 3.6-14, and Figure 3.6-15 as appropriate.
3.6 Table 1.8-2: Combined License Information Items (Continued)
Item No.
Description of COL Information Item Section
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Interfaces with Certified Design Tier 2 1.8-13 Draft Revision 2 COL Item 10.2-3:
Not Used.A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will perform an evaluation of the probability of turbine missile generation. The report provides a calculation of the probability of turbine missile generation using established methods and industry guidance applicable to the fabrication technology employed. The analysis is a comprehensive report containing a description of turbine fabrication methods, material quality and properties, and required maintenance and inspections that addresses:
a) the calculated probability of turbine missile generation from material and overspeed-related failures based on as-built rotor and blade designs and as-built material properties (as determined in certified testing and nondestructive examination).
b) maximum anticipated speed resulting from a loss of load, assuming normal control system function without trip.
c) overspeed basis and overspeed protection trip setpoints.
d) discussion of the design and structural integrity of turbine rotors.
e) an analysis of potential degradation mechanisms (e.g., stress corrosion cracking, pitting, low-cycle fatigue, corrosion fatigue, erosion and erosioncorrosion), and maintenance or operating requirements necessary for mitigation.
f) material properties (e.g., yield strength, stress-rupture properties, fracture toughness, minimum operating temperature of the high-pressure turbine rotor) and the method of determining those properties.
g) required preservice test and inspection procedures and acceptance criteria to support calculated turbine missile probability.
h) actual maximum tangential and radial stresses and their locations in the turbine rotor.
i) rotor and blade design analyses, including loading combinations, assumptions and warmup time, that demonstrate sufficient safety margin to withstand loadings from postulated overspeed events up to 120 percent of rated speed.
j) description of the required inservice inspection and testing program for valves essential to overspeed protection and inservice tests, inspections, and maintenance activities for the turbine and valve assemblies that are required to support the calculated missile probability, including inspection and test frequencies with technical bases, type of inspection, techniques, areas to be inspected, acceptance criteria, disposition of reportable indications, and corrective actions.
10.2 COL Item 10.3-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will provide a site-specific chemistry control program based on the latest revision of the Electric Power Research Institute Pressurized Water Reactor Secondary Water Chemistry Guidelines and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97-06 at the time of the COL application.
10.3 COL Item 10.3-2:
Not used.A COL Applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will provide a description of the flow-accelerated corrosion monitoring program for carbon steel portions of the steam and power conversion systems that contain water or wet steam and are susceptible to flow-accelerated corrosion.
10.3 COL Item 10.4-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will determine the size and number of new and spent resin tanks in the condensate polishing system.
10.4 COL Item 10.4-2:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will describe the type of fuel supply for the auxiliary boilers.
10.4 COL Item 10.4-3:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will provide a secondary water chemistry analysis. This analysis will show that the size, materials, and capacity of the feedwater treatment system equipment and components satisfies the water quality requirements of the secondary water chemistry program described in Section 10.3.5, and that it is compatible with the chemicals used.
10.4 Table 1.8-2: Combined License Information Items (Continued)
Item No.
Description of COL Information Item Section
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-5 Draft Revision 2 RAI 01-1, RAI 02.03.01-5, RAI 03.09.02-58, RAI 05.02.03-13, RAI 05.03.01-3, RAI 05.04.02.01-11, RAI 06.01.01-8, RAI 06.01.01-9, RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.01-1S1, RAI 08.02-4, RAI 08.02-6, RAI 08.03.02-1, RAI 09.02.06-1, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2, RAI 14.02-7 Table 1.9-2: Conformance with Regulatory Guides RG Division Title Rev.
Conformance Sta-tus Comments Section 1.3 Assumptions Used for Evalu-ating the Potential Radiologi-cal Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water Reactors 2
Not Applicable This guidance is only applicable to BWRs.
Not Applicable 1.4 Assumptions Used for Evalu-ating the Potential Radiologi-cal Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressur-ized Water Reactors 2
Not Applicable This RG pertains to existing reactors; RG 1.183 is specified in SRP Section 15.0.3 to be used for new reactors.
Not Applicable 1.5 Safety Guide 5 - Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Conse-quences of a Steam Line Break Accident for Boiling Water Reactors Not Applicable This guidance is only applicable to BWRs.
Not Applicable 1.6 Safety Guide 6 - Indepen-dence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems Partially Conforms The onsite electrical AC power systems do not contain Class 1E distribution systems. The EDSS design conforms to the guidance for independence of standby power sources and their distribution systems.
8.3 1.7 Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Contain-ment 3
Not Applicable The containment vessel integrity does not rely on combustible gas control systems.
Not Applicable 1.8 Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants 3
Not Applicable Site-specific programmatic and operational activities are the responsibility of the COL applicant.
Not Applicable 1.9 Application and Testing of Safety-Related Diesel Genera-tors in Nuclear Power Plants 4
Not Applicable The NuScale design does not require or include safety-related emergency diesel gen-erators.
Not Applicable 1.11 Instrument Lines Penetrating the Primary Reactor Contain-ment 1
Not Applicable No lines penetrate the NPM containment.
Not Applicable
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-25 Draft Revision 2 1.114 Guidance to Operators at the Controls and to Senior Opera-tors in the Control Room of a Nuclear Power Unit 3
Partially Conforms Site-specific guidance is the responsibility of the COL applicant. Consistent with the discus-sion in RG 1.114, Section B.1, the ability of the COL applicant to meet this guidance is facili-tated by the control room design and layout (including the designated surveillance area described in Position C.1.3). Due to advanced design and operational features unique to the NuScale power plant, portions of this guidance that implement operator staffing require-ments of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) and (iii) (e.g.,
Position C.1.5) are not applicable to COL appli-cants. It is more appropriate that the operating organization be based on these advanced plant design features rather than on staffing levels prescribed in 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) and (iii).
18.5 18.7 1.115 Protection Against Turbine MissilesLow-Trajectory Tur-bine Missiles 2
Conforms Site-specific guidance is the responsibility of the COL applicantNone.
3.5 9.1 10.1 10.2 10.33.5.3 1.117 Protection Against Extreme Wind Events and Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants 2
Conforms None.
3.5 9.1 1.118 Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Sys-tems 3
Partially Conforms Site-specific guidance is the responsibility of the COL applicant.
7.2 8.3 1.121 Bases for Plugging Degraded PWR Steam Generator Tubes (for Comment)
Conforms None.
5.4 1.122 Development of Floor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor-Supported Equipment or Components 1
Conforms None.
3.7 3.12 Table 1.9-2: Conformance with Regulatory Guides (Continued)
RG Division Title Rev.
Conformance Sta-tus Comments Section
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-54 Draft Revision 2 RAI 03.08.04-10, RAI 05.03.01-3, RAI 06.02.04-8, RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.01-1S1, RAI 08.02-4, RAI 08.02-6, RAI 08.03.02-1, RAI 09.02.06-1, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2, RAI 10.03.06-4, RAI 10.04.07-1, RAI 14.03.12-2, RAI 14.03.12-3 Table 1.9-3: Conformance with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS)
SRP or DSRS Section, Rev: Title AC AC Title/Description Conformance Status Comments Section SRP 1.0, Rev 2:
Introduction and Interfaces II.1 No Specific Acceptance Criteria No Specific Acceptance Criteria.
Not Applicable SRP 1.0, Rev 2:
Introduction and Interfaces II.2 SRP Acceptance Criteria Associated with Each Referenced SRP section Conforms None.
Ch 1 SRP 1.0, Rev 2:
Introduction and Interfaces II.3 Performance of New Safety Features and Design Qualification Testing Requirements Conforms None.
Ch 1 SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters II.1 Specific SRP Acceptance Criteria Contained in Related SRP Chapter 2 or Other Referenced SRP sections Conforms This acceptance criterion is a pointer to other SRP sections.
2.0 SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters II.2 COL Application Referencing an Early Site Permit Not Applicable This acceptance criterion is applicable only to COL applicants that do not reference the DCA.
Not Applicable SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters II.3 COL Application Referencing a Certified Design Not Applicable This acceptance criterion is for COL applicants to meet the design parameters established in the DCA.
Not Applicable SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters II.4 COL Application Referencing an Early Site Permit and a Certified Design Not Applicable This acceptance criterion is for COL applicants to meet the design parameters established in the DCA.
Not Applicable SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters II.5 COL Application Referencing Neither an Early Site Permit Nor a Certified Design Not Applicable This acceptance criterion is applicable only to COL applicants that do not reference the DCA.
Not Applicable SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters App A Table 1: Examples of Site Characteristics and Site Parameters Partially Conforms NuScale provides design parameters where applicable.
Table 2.0-1 SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters App A Table 2: Examples of Site-Related Design Parameters and Design Characteristics Partially Conforms NuScale provides design parameters where applicable.
Table 2.0-1
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-66 Draft Revision 2 SRP 3.5.1.2, Rev. 3:
Internally Generated Missiles (Inside Containment)
II.1 Statistical Significance of an Identified Missile by Probability Analysis Conforms None.
3.5.1 SRP 3.5.1.2, Rev. 3:
Internally Generated Missiles (Inside Containment)
II.2 Acceptable Methods of Providing Missile Protection Conforms None.
3.5.1 DSRS 3.5.1.3, Rev. 0:
Turbine Missiles II.1 Probability of Unacceptable Damage From Turbine Missiles Not Applicable COL applicant to verify that TG missile generation is less than 1.0E-05.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
Not Applicable DSRS 3.5.1.3, Rev. 0:
Turbine Missiles II.2 Turbine Missile Generation Not Applicable The NuScale design assumes no turbine missile is generated.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
Not Applicable DSRS 3.5.1.3, Rev. 0:
Turbine Missiles II.3 Acceptably Low Missile Generation Probability Not Applicable The NuScale design assumes no turbine missile is generated.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
Not Applicable Table 1.9-3: Conformance with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS) (Continued)
SRP or DSRS Section, Rev: Title AC AC Title/Description Conformance Status Comments Section
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-67 Draft Revision 2 DSRS 3.5.1.3, Rev. 0:
Turbine Missiles II.4 Missile Generation Probability Tables From Turbine Manufacturers (Including Table 3.5.1.3-1)
Not Applicable The NuScale design assumes no turbine missile is generated.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
Not Applicable DSRS 3.5.1.3, Rev. 0:
Turbine Missiles II.5 Inservice Inspection and Test Program for Applicants Obtaining Turbine From Manufacturers without NRC-Approved Procedures for Calculating Missile Generation Probabilities Not Applicable COL applicant to verify that TG missile generation is less than 1.0E-05.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
Not Applicable DSRS 3.5.1.3, Rev. 0:
Turbine Missiles II.6 Protective Barriers Not ApplicableConfor ms COL applicant to verify that TG missile generation is less than 1.0E-05.None.
3.5.1.3Not Applicable SRP 3.5.1.4, Rev. 4: Missiles Generated by Extreme Winds II.1 Design Basis Tornado-Generated Missile Spectrum Conforms The NuScale design also includes RG 1.221 for Design Basis Hurricane-Generated Missiles.
3.5.1.4 SRP 3.5.1.4, Rev. 4: Missiles Generated by Extreme Winds II.2 Statistical Significance of an Identified Missile by Probability Conforms None.
3.5.1.4 SRP 3.5.1.4, Rev. 4: Missiles Generated by Extreme Winds II.3 Identifying Appropriate Design Basis Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena Conforms None.
3.5.1.4 SRP 3.5.1.5, Rev 4: Site Proximity Missiles (Except Aircraft)
II.1 Compliance with 10 CFR 100 Not Applicable The NuScale design assumes no proximity missiles.
Not Applicable SRP 3.5.1.5, Rev 4: Site Proximity Missiles (Except Aircraft)
II.2 Compliance with GDC 4 Not Applicable The NuScale design assumes no proximity missiles.
Not Applicable SRP 3.5.1.6, Rev 4: Aircraft Hazards II.1 and II.2 Various Not Applicable The NuScale design assumes no aircraft hazard missiles.
Not Applicable Table 1.9-3: Conformance with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS) (Continued)
SRP or DSRS Section, Rev: Title AC AC Title/Description Conformance Status Comments Section
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-152 Draft Revision 2 SRP 10.2, Rev 3: Turbine Generator II.1 Protect SSC important to safety from the effects of turbine missiles with a turbine overspeed protection system (GDC 4)
Partially ConformsNot Applicable The combination of turbine rotor inspections and the low probability of turbine missile generation is sufficient to protect SSC from the adverse effects of turbine missiles.The NuScale plant design relies on the use of barriers for the protection of SSCs important to safety from the effects of turbine missiles.
10.2.2Not Applicable SRP 10.2, Rev 3: Turbine Generator II.2 Inservice Inspection covering valves essential for overspeed protection.
ConformsNot Applicable None.The NuScale plant design relies on the use of barriers for the protection of SSCs important to safety from the effects of turbine missiles.
10.2.2Not Applicable SRP 10.2, Rev 3: Turbine Generator II.3 Prevention of Adverse Effects on Safety-Related SSC in the Turbine Building Not Applicable There are no safety-related SSC in the Turbine Building.
Not Applicable DSRS 10.2.3, Rev 0: Turbine Rotor Integrity II.1 Materials Selection ConformsNot Applicable None.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
10.2.3Not Applicable DSRS 10.2.3, Rev 0: Turbine Rotor Integrity II.2 Fracture Toughness ConformsNot Applicable None.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
10.2.3Not Applicable Table 1.9-3: Conformance with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS) (Continued)
SRP or DSRS Section, Rev: Title AC AC Title/Description Conformance Status Comments Section
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-153 Draft Revision 2 DSRS 10.2.3, Rev 0: Turbine Rotor Integrity II.3 Pre-Service Inspection ConformsNot Applicable None.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
10.2.3Not Applicable DSRS 10.2.3, Rev 0: Turbine Rotor Integrity II.4 Turbine Rotor Design ConformsNot Applicable None.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
10.2.3Not Applicable DSRS 10.2.3, Rev 0: Turbine Rotor Integrity II.5 Inservice Inspection ConformsNot Applicable None.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
10.2.3Not Applicable DSRS 10.2.3, Rev 0: Turbine Rotor Integrity II.6 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1) ITAAC ConformsNot Applicable Including ITAAC because it is noted as DSRS guidance.Per DSRS 10.2.3,Section I and DSRS 3.5.1.3,Section I.1, plants that use barriers to protect essential SSCs specified in RG 1.115 do not have to rely on the turbine missile generation probabilities, including turbine rotor integrity.
10.2.3Not Applicable Table 1.9-3: Conformance with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS) (Continued)
SRP or DSRS Section, Rev: Title AC AC Title/Description Conformance Status Comments Section
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Missile Protection Tier 2 3.5-5 Draft Revision 2 are ASME Class 1 or 2 and therefore not credible missile sources as discussed in Section 3.5.1.1.1.
A control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) housing failure, sufficient to create a missile from a piece of the housing or to allow a control rod to be ejected rapidly from the core, is non-credible. The CRDM housing is a Class 1 appurtenance per ASME Section III.
3.5.1.3 Turbine Missiles RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The turbine generator building layout in relation to the overall site layout is shown on Figure 1.2-2. Safety related and risk significant SSC for the design are located principally within the RXB and CRB. The turbine generator rotor shafts are physically oriented such that the RXB, and CRB, and RWB are within the turbine low-trajectory hazard zone and considered to be unfavorably oriented with respect to the NPMs, as defined by RG 1.115, Revision 2. Appendix A of RG 1.115, Rev. 2 identifies SSC requiring protection from turbine missiles. The SSC that require protection from turbine missiles (high-trajectory and low-trajectory turbine rotor and blade fragments) are located in either the RXB, the CRB, the RWB, or underground.Safety-related and risk-significant SSC within the reactor and control building are protected from the effects of turbine missiles by limiting the generation of missiles from the turbine generators to be less than 10-5 consistent with Table 1 of RG 1.115.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Protection from turbine missiles is accomplished by using barriers instead of the statistical significance criteria outlined in Section 3.5.1. The Seismic Category I RXB and CRB provide protection from turbine missiles for SSC located within each building. The SSC located underground are protected by their depth below grade. The SSC located in the Seismic Category II RWB are not protected from the effects turbine missiles.
However, any radioactive release that might result from the effects of a turbine missile is bounded by the failure of the gaseous radioactive waste system postulated in Section 11.3.3 and the resultant doses presented in Table 11.3-9.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 COL Item 3.5-1:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant certified design will provide a missile analysis for the turbine generator which demonstrates that protection from turbine missiles is accomplished by using barriers.the probability of a turbine generator producing a low trajectory turbine missile is less than 10-5.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Section 10.2 describes the turbine generator requirements for turbine rotor integrity, including rotor material fracture toughness, overspeed protection, and inspection and testing. The turbine rotor inspection program along with the low probability of turbine missile generation provide assurance that safety related and risk significant SSC are protected from the adverse effects of turbine missiles, consistent with GDC 4.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Missile Protection Tier 2 3.5-6 Draft Revision 2 RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 COL Item 3.5-2:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant certified design will address the effect of turbine missiles from nearby or co-located facilitiesNot used.
3.5.1.4 Missiles Generated by Tornadoes and Extreme Winds Hurricane and tornado generated missiles are evaluated in the design of safety-related structures and risk-significant SSC outside those structures. The missiles used in the evaluation are assumed to be capable of striking in all directions and conform to the Region I missile spectrums presented in Table 2 of RG 1.76, Rev. 1, "Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants" for tornado missiles and Table 1 and Table 2 of RG 1.221, Rev. 0, "Design-Basis Hurricane and Hurricane Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants," for hurricane missiles. These spectra are based on the design basis tornado and hurricane defined in Section 3.3.2 and represent probability of exceedance events of 1 x 10-7 per year for most potential sites.
The selected missiles include A massive high-kinetic-energy missile that deforms on impact, such as an automobile.
The "automobile" missile is 16.4 feet by 6.6 feet by 4.3 feet with a weight of 4000 lbs. and a CDA/m (drag coefficient x projected area/mass) of 0.0343 ft2/lb.
This missile has a horizontal velocity of 135 ft/s and a vertical velocity of 91 ft/s in a tornado; and corresponding velocities of 307 ft/s and 85 ft/s, respectively, in a hurricane.
The automobile missile is considered capable of impact at all altitudes less than 30 ft above all grade levels within 1/2 mile of the plant structures.
A rigid missile that tests penetration resistance, such as a six-inch diameter Schedule 40 pipe.
The "pipe" missile is 6.625 inch diameter by 15 feet long with a weight of 287 lbs.
and a CDA/m of 0.0212 ft2/lb.
This missile has a horizontal velocity of 135 ft/s and a vertical velocity of 91 ft/s in a tornado; and corresponding velocities of 251 ft/s and 85 ft/s, respectively, in a hurricane.
A one-inch diameter solid steel sphere to test the configuration of openings in protective barriers.
The "sphere" missile is 1 inch in diameter with a weight of 0.147 lbs. and a CDA/m of 0.0166 ft2/lb.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Missile Protection Tier 2 3.5-7 Draft Revision 2 This missile has a horizontal velocity of 26 ft/s and a vertical velocity of 18 ft/s in a tornado; and corresponding velocities of 225 ft/s and 85 ft/s, respectively, in a hurricane.
These missile parameters are key design parameters and are provided in Table 2.0-1.
3.5.1.5 Site Proximity Missiles (Except Aircraft)
As described in Section 2.2, the NuScale Power Plant certified design does not postulate any hazards from nearby industrial, transportation or military facilities.
Therefore, there are no proximity missiles.
3.5.1.6 Aircraft Hazards As described in Section 2.2, the NuScale Power Plant certified design does not postulate any hazards from nearby industrial, transportation or military facilities.
Therefore, there are no design basis Aircraft Hazards. Discussion of the beyond design basis Aircraft Impact Assessment is provided in Section 19.5.
3.5.2 Structures, Systems, and Components to be Protected from External Missiles RAI 03.05.01.04-1, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 All safety-related and risk-significant SSC that must be protected from external missiles are located inside the seismic Category I RXB and Seismic Category I portions of the CRB. The concrete walls and roof of the RXB and the CRB below the 30 ft above plant grade threshold are designed to withstand all design basis missiles discussed in Section 3.5.1.4Section 3.5.1.3 and Section 3.5.1.4. The portions of the RXB and the CRB that are above 30 ft plant elevation have not been analyzed to withstand the design basis automobile missile, but are resistant to the other design basis missiles discussed in Section 3.5.1.4. Section 3.8 provides additional information for the design of RXB and CRB.
RAI 03.05.01.04-1 COL Item 3.5-3:
A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant certified design will confirm that automobile missiles cannot be generated within a 0.5-mile radius of safety-related structures, systems, and components and risk-significant structures, systems, and components requiring missile protection that would lead to impact higher than 30 feet above plant grade. Additionally, if automobile missiles impact at higher than 30 feet above plant grade, the COL applicant will evaluate and show that the missiles will not compromise safety-related and risk-significant structures, systems, and components.
The RXB and CRB meet the requirements of the RG 1.13, Rev. 2, "Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis", RG 1.117, Rev. 2, "Protection Against Extreme Wind Events and Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants," and RG 1.221, Revision 0, "Design-Basis Hurricane and Hurricane Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants" for protection of SSC from wind, tornado and hurricane missiles.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Missile Protection Tier 2 3.5-8 Draft Revision 2 RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The RXB and CRB have not been credited to withstand turbine missiles.
RAI 03.05.02-02 COL Item 3.5-4:
A COL Applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will evaluate site-specific hazards for external events that may produce more energetic missiles than the design basis missiles defined in FSAR Tier 2, Section 3.5.1.4.
3.5.3 Barrier Design Procedures In the design, there are a limited number of potential internal missiles and a limited number of targets. If a missile/target combination is determined to be statistically significant (i.e., the product of (P1), (P2) and (P3) is greater than 10-7 per year), barriers are installed.
Safety-related and risk-significant SSC are protected from missiles by ensuring the barriers have sufficient thickness to prevent penetration and spalling, perforation, and scabbing that could challenge the SSC. Missile barriers are designed to withstand local and overall effects of missile impact loadings. The barrier design procedures discussed below may be used for both internal and external missiles.
3.5.3.1 Local Damage Prediction The prediction of local damage in the impact area depends on the basic material of construction of the structure or barrier (i.e., concrete, steel, or composite). The analysis approach for each basic type of material is presented separately. It is assumed that the missile impacts normal to the plane of the wall on a minimum impact area.
3.5.3.1.1 Concrete Barriers Concrete missile barriers are evaluated for the effects of missile impact resulting in penetration, perforation, and scabbing of the concrete using the Modified National Defense Research Committee formulas discussed in "A Review of Procedures for the Analysis and Design of Concrete Structures to Resist Missile Impact Effects,"
(Reference 3.5-3) as described in the following paragraphs. Concrete barrier thicknesses calculated using the equations in this section for perforation and scabbing are increased by 20%.
RAI 03.05.03-1 Concrete thicknesses to preclude perforation or scabbing from the design basis hurricane and tornado pipe and sphere missiles have been calculated for the 5000 psi and 7000 psi concrete used for the RXB, CRB and RWB external walls and roof using the below equations. The design basis hurricane and tornado automobile missile is incapable of producing significant local damage; therefore, it is not considered. The results are tabulated in Table 3.5-1. The RXB has five foot thick outer walls and a four foot thick roof. The missile protected portions of the CRB have three foot thick exterior walls and roof, consisting of a concrete slab with a
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Design of Category I Structures Tier 2 3.8-49 Draft Revision 2 RG 1.13, Rev. 2 Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis RG 1.29, Rev. 5 Seismic Design Classification RG 1.61, Rev. 1 Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants RG 1.69, Rev. 1 Concrete Radiation Shields for Nuclear Power Plants RG 1.76, Rev. 1 Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants RG 1.78, Rev. 1 Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release RG 1.91, Rev. 2 Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur at Nearby Facilities and on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants RG 1.92, Rev. 3 Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis RG 1.102, Rev. 1 Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 RG 1.115, Rev. 2 Protection against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles RG 1.117, Rev. 1 Tornado Design Classification RG 1.122, Rev. 1 Development of Floor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor-Supported Equipment or Components RG 1.142, Rev. 2 Safety-Related Concrete Structures for Nuclear Power Plants (Other than Reactor Vessels and Containments RG 1.160, Rev. 3 Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants RG 1.183, Rev. 0 Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors RG 1.189, Rev. 2 Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants RG 1.196, Rev. 1 Control Room Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors RG 1.197, Rev. 0 Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors RG 1.199, Rev. 0 Anchoring Components and Structural Supports in Concrete
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel Storage and Handling Tier 2 9.1-6 Draft Revision 2 9.1.2 New and Spent Fuel Storage The new fuel assemblies (NFAs) and spent fuel assemblies (SFAs) are stored in fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pool (SFP) located in the Reactor Building (RXB). The structures that form the new and spent fuel storage facility consist of the fuel storage racks, the SFP, the stainless steel liner in the SFP, and the RXB.
9.1.2.1 Design Bases This section identifies the system required or credited functions, the regulatory requirements that govern the performance of those functions, and the controlling parameters and associated values that ensure that the functions are fulfilled. Together this information represents the design bases defined in 10 CFR 50.2, as required by 10 CFR 52.47(a) and (a)(3)(ii).
The design for structures, systems, and components (SSC) that support storage of NFAs and SFAs complies with the applicable regulatory requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 61, and 63 and 10 CFR 20.1101(b).
General Design Criterion 2 was considered in the design of the new and spent fuel storage facility. The fuel storage racks, SFP, liner, and RXB that form the facility protect the NFAs and SFAs from the effects of natural phenomena hazards, including earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, tsunami, seiches, and external missiles, and meet the applicable guidance for protection from such hazards in Regulatory Guides 1.13, Revision 2, 1.29, Revision 5, and 1.117, Revision 2 and ANSI/ANS 57.2 (Reference 9.1.2-1) and ANSI/ANS 57.3 (Reference 9.1.2-6).
The fuel storage racks, SFP, liner, and RXB meet Seismic Category I requirements and are protected from non-Seismic Category I SSC to ensure that the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) would not cause a loss of capability to perform their safety functions.
The design of the SFP, liner, and RXB does not result in a substantial loss of water from the SFP as a result of an SSE. The design ensures that the spent fuel assemblies have sufficient cooling and shielding during and after an SSE.
General Design Criterion 4 was considered in the design of the fuel storage racks, SFP, liner, and RXB. These structures accommodate the effects of the environmental conditions during normal operation and postulated accidents. The design of these structures protects the stored fuel assemblies from dynamic effects that result from equipment failures in or outside of the RXB, including the effects of internal missiles, pipe whipping, and discharging fluids.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Section 3.5.1 provides a description of the approach to protection from potential low-trajectory turbine blade missiles. The approach ensures protection of the SFP and liner from such missiles.
General Design Criterion 5 was considered in the design of the new and spent fuel storage facility. Even though the fuel storage racks, SFP, liner, and RXB are shared
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel Storage and Handling Tier 2 9.1-11 Draft Revision 2 The fuel storage racks use integral neutron absorber plates made of boron carbide-aluminum metal matrix composite. The structural analyses of the fuel storage racks take no credit for the mechanical properties of the neutron absorber plates. For the criticality analyses, long-term testing is used to show that this material is suitable for the chemical, radiation, and thermal environment present in the fuel storage racks (Section 9.1.2.4).
9.1.2.3 Safety Evaluation RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The design of the fuel storage racks, SFP, liner, and RXB that form the new and spent fuel storage facility meets GDC 2 and withstands the effects of natural phenomena hazards without the loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The design of the RXB withstands combinations of mechanical, hydraulic, and thermal loads and natural phenomena effects, including: severe winds such as hurricanes and tornadoes (see Section 3.3), floods (see Section 3.4), external and turbine-generated missiles (see Section 3.5), and the SSE (see Sections 3.7 and 3.8). The RXB protects the SFP, liner, and fuel storage racks from these external hazards. For an SSE, the SFP and liner also meet the design requirements for Seismic Category I structures and withstand the effects as described in Section 3.8.4. The UHS design removes heat through boiling and evaporation if the active cooling systems are unavailable. The RXB structure and pool liners containing the coolant withstand the maximum temperature and pressure for pool boiling. As shown in Section 3.2, the SFP liner is a RXB component classified as nonsafety-related. The basis for this classification for accident conditions is provided in Section 9.2.5.
This classification for the liner is also appropriate for the protection provided by the liner for the concrete structure forming the SFP behind the liner. As shown in Section 3.2, the liner has augmented design requirements and is classified as Seismic Category I. In addition, the UHS pools have a pool leakage detection system that provides for collection of water leaking from a liner in the pools and detection of the leakage. As described in Section 9.1.3, the pool leakage detection system ensures that operators take actions to determine the cause of leakage and implement repairs, which protects the concrete from degradation.
The fuel storage racks are Seismic Category I structures that withstand the postulated design loads from an SSE and maintain the stored fuel assemblies in a cooled and subcritical configuration. As documented in Reference 9.1.1-1, the fuel storage racks meet the seismic design criteria for development of acceleration time histories as specified in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and Structural Engineering Institute (SEI) standard, "Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities," ASCE/SEI 43-05 (Reference 9.1.2-4).
The fuel storage racks meet the structural integrity criteria specified in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division I, Subsection NF (Reference 9.1.2-2) and the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Manual of Steel Construction 9th edition (Reference 9.1.2-5). Reference 9.1.1-1 demonstrates that the transient deflection of the fuel storage racks during an SSE and,
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel Storage and Handling Tier 2 9.1-12 Draft Revision 2 considering the load combinations shown in Table 9.1.2-1, does not result in a keff that exceeds the applicable limit as described in Section 9.1.1. The structural analyses of the fuel storage racks also verify that although they are free-standing structures on the SFP floor, their movements in an SSE result in sliding and tipping without contact with the walls of the SFP.
As described in Section 3.7.3, non-Seismic Category I SSC that could adversely affect Seismic Category I SSC are categorized as Seismic Category II and analyzed using the methods described in that section. The fuel handling equipment other than the fuel handling machine meets Seismic Category II design requirements. The RBC and fuel handling machine meet Seismic Category I design requirements. The design of this equipment ensures that the fuel storage racks are not impacted by a collapse of this equipment during an SSE. Section 9.1.3 addresses a failure of the Seismic Category II dry dock gate due to an SSE.
RAI 09.01.02-28, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 An extreme wind or tornado event can generate external missiles that could strike the RXB. As described in Sections 3.3 and 3.5, the RXB is designed to withstand the effects of extreme winds and tornadoes, including missile strikes (including turbine missiles),
and protects the new and spent fuel storage facility within the building. Section 3.5.1 describes the approach to protection from damage from low-trajectory turbine blade missiles.
The design of the fuel storage racks, SFP, liner, and RXB meets GDC 4 and accommodates normal and accident conditions including the dynamic effects of equipment failure. The design protects the stored fuel assemblies using the thick concrete walls forming the SFP and the substantial depth of water above the fuel storage racks. These features provide protection from dynamic effects resulting from equipment failures in or outside of the RXB, including the effects of equipment collapse, pipe whipping, and discharging fluids.
The fuel handling equipment and RBC meet single-failure proof criteria that provide protection from damage due to drops of heavy loads. A single fuel assembly with a control rod assembly defines the heaviest load that can be dropped due to equipment failure during fuel movements by the fuel handling machine. Reference 9.1.1-1 evaluates this event for a shallow or horizontal drop onto the top of a fuel storage rack and for deep drops into empty storage locations. The loading combinations evaluated for such drop conditions demonstrate the continued functional capability of the fuel storage racks.
A stuck fuel assembly in the fuel storage racks could result in the fuel handling machine applying an uplift force greater than the weight of a fuel assembly plus control rod assembly. The fuel handling machine design has interlocks that prevent an excessive force from being applied and causing the stuck fuel assembly to damage the storage tube in a fuel storage rack. As shown in Reference 9.1.1-1, the fuel storage rack withstands fuel handling machine uplift forces and meets the applicable requirements in Reference 9.1.2-2.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Summary Description Tier 2 10.1-3 Draft Revision 2 result in a loss of feedwater to both of the steam generators, the decay heat removal system cools the reactor coolant system. This event is further addressed in Section 10.4.7 and Section 15.2.7.
10.1.2.4 Turbine Overspeed Protection RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The Tturbine overspeed protection is provided by two independent and diverse electronic overspeed protection featuressystem provides protection from exceeding overspeed limits. The turbine stop and control valves, and the extraction steam block and non-return valves close upon actuation of the emergency trip system within a time period to preclude unsafe turbine overspeed. Additionally, the valve arrangements and valve closure times are such that a failure of a single valve to close will not result in unsafe turbine overspeed in the event of a trip signal. Turbine overspeed protection is further discussed in Section 10.2.2.
10.1.2.5 Turbine Missile Protection RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Turbine rotor integrity minimizes the probability of generating turbine missiles and is discussed in Section 10.2.3. The combination of turbine rotor inspections and the low probability of turbine missile generation is sufficient to protect structures, systems and components from the adverse effects of turbine missiles. Turbine missiles are discussed in Section 3.5.
10.1.2.6 Radioactivity Protection Under normal operating conditions, radioactive contaminants are not expected to be present in the steam and power conversion system. However, it is possible for the system to become contaminated through primary-to-secondary side steam generator tube leakage or in the unlikely event of a steam generator tube failure. Radiation monitors in the MSS and the CARS alarm in the control room for operator action on a high radiation signal. Primary-to-secondary side leakage is specified in the Technical Specifications.
10.1.2.7 Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Protection The MSS and feedwater system piping is designed considering the effects of flow-accelerated corrosion and erosion/corrosion. Erosion/corrosion resistant chromium-molybdenum material has been selected for piping downstream of the MSIVs. The feedwater system piping is also designed with chromium-molybdenum to avoid erosion damage.
The process sampling system provides chemistry monitoring of the MSS and CFWS for corrosion products and other contaminants as discussed in Section 10.3.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-1 Draft Revision 2 10.2 Turbine Generator The primary function of the turbine generator system is to convert steam into electricity. Each turbine generator system services one NuScale Power Module (NPM). There are up to two turbine generator buildings, each with up to six separate turbine generator systems.
10.2.1 Design Bases This section identifies the turbine generator system (TGS) required or credited functions, the regulatory requirements that govern the performance of those functions, and the controlling parameters and associated values that ensure that the functions are fulfilled.
Together, this information represents the design bases (as defined in 10 CFR 50.2) for the TGS.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The TGS serves no safety-related functions, is not credited for mitigation of a design basis accident, and has no safe shutdown functions. General Design Criteria (GDC) 2, 4, and 5 were considered in the design of the TGS. No safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) are affected by natural phenomena such as earthquakes. The design of the TGS provides protection of safety-related SSC from the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including the effects of turbine missiles (Section 10.2.2) Protection of essential SSC from turbine generator missiles is addressed in Section 3.5. The components in the TGS are not shared among NPMs; therefore failure of the TGS of one NPM does not impair the ability of other NPMs to perform their safety functions. Consistent with 10 CFR 20.1101(b), the TGS design supports keeping radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The TGS is designed consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1406 as it relates to minimization of contamination of the facility. See Section 10.2.4 for the safety evaluation.
The TGS control system is designed to automatically trip the turbine on the abnormal conditions listed in Section 10.2.2.4.
As discussed in Section 10.2.2.3.3, turbine overspeed protection ensures that a full-load turbine trip does not cause the turbine to overspeed beyond the acceptable limits. The single failure of a component or subsystem does not cause an unsafe turbine overspeed.
The TGS design parameters are listed in Table 10.2-1.
10.2.2
System Description
10.2.2.1 General Description The TGS for each NPM has three supporting subsystems: the turbine, the generator, and the turbine lube oil system. Figure 10.2-1 shows the TGS simplified piping and instrumentation diagram. The TGS and associated piping, valves, and controls are located completely within the turbine generator building. There are no safety-related systems or components located within the turbine generator building.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-2 Draft Revision 2 The TGS is Seismic Category III and TGS piping is designed to ASME B31.1. Components, piping, and structures are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards as discussed in Section 3.9. Table 3.2-1 provides the seismic and quality group classifications for the TGS structures, systems, and components. High-energy and moderate-energy pipe breaks are addressed in Section 3.6.1. Turbine rotor integrityProtection against turbine missiles is discussed in Section 10.2.3Section 3.5.
The following areas address aspects of the TGS design:
Regulatory treatment of nonsafety systems equipment (Section 19.3)
Quality assurance (Chapter 17)
Fire protection (Section 9.5.1)
To maintain the radiation exposure to operating and maintenance personnel ALARA, the TGS is designed to facilitate maintenance, inspection, and testing in accordance with the guidance in Regulatory Guide 8.8.
There are no relevant generic letters or unresolved safety issues for this system.
Operating experience insights are incorporated into this system as noted. The system has no relevant TMI requirements.
10.2.2.1.1 Turbine Subsystem Description One turbine is utilized for each NPM. Superheated steam is provided to the turbine from the steam generator by the main steam system. The steam passes through the stages of the turbine converting the thermal energy to mechanical energy. The turbine subsystem performs the following functions:
converts thermal energy into rotational energy controls steam flow to match control system demand provides extraction steam for the feedwater heaters transports steam to the condenser supports major pipe connection reactions for main steam (Section 10.3),
extraction steam, and exhaust steam piping systems The components of the turbine subsystem include the turbine stop valve control valves turbine bypass valve and desuperheater steam piping between turbine valves and casing outlet connections for extraction steam drain and vent connections turbine shaft journal and thrust bearings and housings
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-3 Draft Revision 2 turning gear gland seal steam control skid turbine rotor grounding device turbine to generator shaft coupling The boundary between the main steam system and TGS is the upstream side of the turbine generator vendor package interface, the upstream side of the gland steam condenser connection point, and downstream of the extraction line connection points. See Figure 10.2-1 and Section 10.3 for additional information.
The turbine generator design utilizes a condensing steam turbine with uncontrolled extractions. The turbine is a single inlet design with one stop valve and a steam chest with multiple inlet control valves.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The turbine shaft journal bearings are lubricated by the lube oil subsystem. The turbine is also restrained via a thrust bearing to absorb the axial thrust of the turbine. Turbine materials are listed in Table 10.2-2.
The turbine generator design includes a spray system which provides cooling to the turbine exhaust hood upon sensing a high temperature condition.
The gland seal steam control skid (Section 10.4.3) is also a part of the turbine subsystem. The gland seal steam control skid performs the following functions:
prevents air leakage into the turbine under vacuum and prevents steam leakage out of the turbine under pressure for anticipated load conditions provides for the use of redundant steam supplies and controlling devices Areas of the turbine requiring attention during operation are accessible during expected plant operating conditions.
10.2.2.1.2 Generator Subsystem Description The generator takes the rotational mechanical energy from the turbine and converts it into electricity by spinning the generator rotor through a magnetic field.
The magnetic field is produced by self-excitation of the stator coils. The frequency is synchronized with the offsite transmission system and power is transferred to the grid. The generator is directly coupled to the turbine, and is air cooled. Cooling water for the generator air cooling is provided by the site cooling water system.
Components of the generator subsystem include the generator stator generator air coolers generator rotor brushless or static exciter shaft grounding devices
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-5 Draft Revision 2 10.2.2.2.1 Turbine Stop Valve The steam flow to the turbine is controlled by a single stop valve, located adjacent to the turbine. The valve is used to control the flow entering the turbine during startup and shutdown.
The stop valve is hydraulically operated and isolates steam flow to the turbine upon receiving a trip signal. The stop valve also includes a throttling pilot to support startup and shutdown operations. If a loss of oil pressure occurs, an independent hydraulic trip relay closes the turbine stop and control valves.
Hydraulic fluid is supplied to the stop valve by a control oil skid.
10.2.2.2.2 Turbine Control Valves Multiple inlet control valves are used to throttle steam flow to the turbine during normal operation. These valves close upon actuation of the emergency trip signal within a time period to preclude unsafe turbine overspeed. The valve arrangements and valve closure times are designed such that a failure of a single valve to close will not result in unsafe turbine overspeed in the event of a trip signal. The turbine control valves are positionable by hydraulic operators. If a loss of oil pressure occurs, an independent hydraulic trip relay closes the valves.
Hydraulic fluid is supplied to the control valves by a control oil skid.
Turbine Bypass Valve and Desuperheater Turbine bypass is capable of transferring up to 100 percent of the main steam flow to the condenser to remove heat from the reactor and prevent overpressure following a reduction or loss of electrical load. A desuperheater is used downstream of the turbine bypass valve to reduce the steam temperature of bypassed steam. The design and operation of the turbine bypass valve and desuperheater is described in Section 10.4.4.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 10.2.2.2.3 Speed Sensors RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Three turbine shaft mounted speed sensors are contained in both the turbine overspeed emergency trip system and the governor overspeed detection circuit.
Each turbine overspeed speed detection probe has its own magnetic pickup and power supply. The modules can be individually tested and replaced online without causing a trip.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The governor overspeed detection circuit reads the turbine rotational speed with redundant magnetic speed pickups. Each magnetic speed pickup has its own overspeed detection circuit. Overspeed protection is further discussed in Section 10.2.2.3.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-7 Draft Revision 2 satisfy 20 percent of rated power step demand increase or decrease within ten minutes.
the capability to perform an increase or decrease of 10 percent in 60 seconds without trip while operating between 50 and 100 percent power.
the capability to remain online following a sudden load reduction down to the minimum operating load.
10.2.2.3.3 Overspeed Protection RAI 10.02-1, RAI 10.02-2, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Turbine control and overspeed protection controls turbine action under normal or abnormal operating conditions and ensures that a full load turbine trip does not cause the turbine to overspeed beyond acceptable limits. Turbine overspeed is a potential initiating event that could cause turbine blades to fail and become a source of missiles. The turbine generator overspeed control system has two independent and diverse subsystems. Figure 10.2-2 provides a diagram of the overspeed protection system.
RAI 10.02-1, RAI 10.02-2, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The turbine governor is the primary speed controller and is the first line of defense against turbine overspeed. The governor modulates the turbine stop and control valves to control speed to no more than 103 percent of rated speed. At approximately 103 percent of rated speed, the control valve will be fully closed, but not tripped. The governor is set to trip the turbine at approximately 106 percent of rated speed.
RAI 10.02-1, RAI 10.02-2RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The primary turbine overspeed control system (governor) has redundant speed sensors, processors, and power supplies. The governor will, at a minimum, contain dual redundancy using 1 out of 2 voting logic to minimize spurious trips with no shared components to ensure reliability. Dual redundancy was chosen due to the space limitations inherent in small turbines and because dual redundancy is considered sufficiently reliable for this application. Redundancy is included throughout the primary overspeed protection system from sensors, processors, voting logic circuits, through the trip solenoids.
RAI 10.02-1, RAI 10.02-2RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Upon indication of an overspeed condition, the primary overspeed protection system opens the trip relays which opens the internal solenoid-operated hydraulic dump valves which closes the turbine stop and control valves. Both sets of valves are hydraulically actuated so the trip mechanism consists of trip solenoids that dump the high pressure hydraulic fluid causing the valves to spring closed to their fail safe position.
RAI 10.02-1, 10.02-2RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-8 Draft Revision 2 The emergency trip system is the second line of defense to the turbine governor for overspeed protection. It monitors turbine speed and other critical parameters that could damage the turbine. The emergency trip system utilizes its own set of triple redundant sensors, processors, and power supplies. It closes the turbine stop valve upon sensing approximately 10 percent overspeed. The emergency trip systems components come from different vendors than the primary turbine overspeed control system (governor) to ensure diversity.
RAI 10.02-1, RAI 10.02-2RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The design speed of the turbine is 120 percent of synchronous, thus assuring that there is adequate margin between the trip settings and the design speed. Triple Redundancy is enforced throughout the emergency trip system from sensors, processors, voting logic circuits, through trip solenoids. Triple redundancy of the speed sensors eliminates spurious trips due to a single failure while maintaining high reliability. Two out of three voting logic eliminates spurious trips due to a single failure while maintaining high reliability.
RAI 10.02-1, RAI 10.02-2RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The turbine is tripped by opening three hydraulic fluid solenoid valves. The solenoid valves are plumbed in a two-out-of-three fashion so that if one solenoid valve fails, it will not inadvertently trip the turbine or prevent the overspeed systems from tripping the turbine on a valid overspeed detection. If either the governor or emergency trip system initiates a turbine trip, power to the three solenoid valves will be deenergized. The solenoid valves will open and dump the hydraulic fluid from the main steam stop and control valve actuators into the hydraulic fluid reservoir, allowing the valve springs to close the steam valves.
RAI 10.02-1, RAI 10.02-2, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 In summary, the two diverse overspeed protection systems with internal redundancy each have the capability to shut down the turbine. A single failure of a component does not defeat the turbine overspeed protection. If a loss of oil pressure were to occur, an independent hydraulic solenoid closes the valves.
Diversity and independence in turbine overspeed protection is achieved by having two overspeed control subsystems that do not have common components.
Common cause failures of the overspeed trip protection systems are prevented through the use of redundant and diverse hardware and software.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The turbine generator overspeed control system is testable when the turbine is in operation. One circuit can be manually disconnected from service and calibrated while the other circuits remain operational. The modules can be individually tested and replaced on-line without causing a trip. This inservice testing ensures a high reliability of the system. In addition, the stop and control valves are periodically exercised in accordance with the turbine suppliers recommendation to prevent them from building up deposits on the shafts and bushings that might hinder closure. Valve stroking ensures that the valves will close when called upon.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-10 Draft Revision 2 10.2.2.5 Inspection and Testing RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The TGS components undergo preservice inspection and testing as described in Chapter 14.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Additional information is provided in Section 10.2.3.3 on turbine rotor testing.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Major system components are accessible for inspection and are available for testing during normal plant operations. The inservice inspection and test program for the governor and overspeed protection provides reasonable assurance that flaws or component failures are detected in the inspected components. This includes the overspeed sensing and tripping subsystems, the stop valve, and the control valves. The inservice inspection program for the governor and overspeed protection includes the following provisions:system are tested and inspected as recommended by the manufacturer. The stop valve and control valves are exercised at a frequency recommended by the turbine vendor or valve manufacturer.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The TGS permits periodic testing of the diverse electronic overspeed protection.
Critical trip components are tested in service, such as individual testing of each overspeed module, and the exercising of the hydraulic dump valves and stop valve.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 At intervals of approximately four years, during refueling or maintenance shutdowns, the stop valve and at least one main steam control valve are dismantled for examination. If the visual and surface examinations of valve internals reveal unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion, other valves of that type are inspected. Valve bushings are inspected and cleaned and bore diameters are checked for proper clearance.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The stop valve and control valves are exercised at a frequency recommended by the turbine vendor or valve manufacturer.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 10.2.3 Turbine Rotor IntegrityNot Used RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Turbine rotor integrity is provided by the integrated combination of material selection, fracture toughness requirements, rotor design, and preservice inspections and tests. The combination results in a very low probability of rotor failure.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 COL Item 10.2-3:
Not used.A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will perform an evaluation of the probability of turbine missile
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-11 Draft Revision 2 generation. The report provides a calculation of the probability of turbine missile generation using established methods and industry guidance applicable to the fabrication technology employed. The analysis is a comprehensive report containing a description of turbine fabrication methods, material quality and properties, and required maintenance and inspections that addresses:
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 a) the calculated probability of turbine missile generation from material and overspeed-related failures based on as-built rotor and blade designs and as-built material properties (as determined in certified testing and nondestructive examination).
b) maximum anticipated speed resulting from a loss of load, assuming normal control system function without trip.
c) overspeed basis and overspeed protection trip setpoints.
d) discussion of the design and structural integrity of turbine rotors.
e) an analysis of potential degradation mechanisms (e.g., stress corrosion cracking, pitting, low-cycle fatigue, corrosion fatigue, erosion and erosion-corrosion), and maintenance or operating requirements necessary for mitigation.
f) material properties (e.g., yield strength, stress-rupture properties, fracture toughness, minimum operating temperature of the high-pressure turbine rotor) and the method of determining those properties.
g) required preservice test and inspection procedures and acceptance criteria to support calculated turbine missile probability.
h) actual maximum tangential and radial stresses and their locations in the turbine rotor.
i) rotor and blade design analyses, including loading combinations, assumptions and warmup time, that demonstrate sufficient safety margin to withstand loadings from postulated overspeed events up to 120 percent of rated speed.
j) description of the required inservice inspection and testing program for valves essential to overspeed protection and inservice tests, inspections, and maintenance activities for the turbine and valve assemblies that are required to support the calculated missile probability, including inspection and test frequencies with technical bases, type of inspection, techniques, areas to be inspected, acceptance criteria, disposition of reportable indications, and corrective actions.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The analysis/report demonstrates that the probability of turbine failure resulting in the ejection of turbine rotor (or internal structure) fragments through the turbine
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-12 Draft Revision 2 casing is less than 1x10-5 per year. The as-built turbine material properties, turbine rotor and blade designs, preservice inspection and testing results and inservice testing and inspection requirements will be verified to meet the requirements defined in the turbine missile probability analysis.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 10.2.3.1 Materials Selection RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The turbine is designed considering the effects of vibration and flow erosion and corrosion. Critical components that see high stress as well as critical areas for corrosion are the turbine blades and turbine rotor. Materials for major components are listed in Table 10.2-2.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Turbine blades and rotors are made from vacuum treated or remelted alloy steel components using processes that minimize flaw occurrence and maximize fracture toughness. Elements that have a deleterious effect on toughness, such as sulfur and phosphorus, are controlled to the lowest practical concentrations appropriate to the required fracture toughness. The turbine materials have the lowest fracture appearance transition temperatures and highest Charpy V-notch energies obtainable, on a consistent basis from material at the sizes and strength levels used.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The 50% fracture appearance transition temperature as obtained from Charpy tests performed in accordance with specification ASTM A-370 is no higher than -18°C (0°F).
The Charpy V-notch (Cv) energy at the minimum operating temperature of the rotor in the tangential direction is at least 8.3 kg-m (60 ft-lbs.). A minimum of three Charpy V-notch specimens are tested in accordance with specification ASTM A-370 to determine this energy level. The determination of fracture appearance transition temperature is used in lieu of nil-ductility transition temperature methods.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 10.2.3.2 Fracture Toughness RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Sufficient material toughness is achieved through the use of selected materials as described in Section 10.2.3.1. Stress calculations include consideration of centrifugal loads, interference fit, and thermal gradients where applicable. Sufficient warmup times are specified in the turbine operating instructions to ensure that toughness is adequate to prevent brittle fracture during startup. The ratio of the fracture toughness (k1c ) of the rotor material to the maximum tangential stress at speeds from normal to design overspeed is at least 10mm (2in), at minimum operating temperature.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Fracture toughness properties are obtained by one or more of the following methods:
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-13 Draft Revision 2 Testing of the actual material of the turbine rotor to establish the k1c value at normal operating temperature.
Testing of the actual material of the turbine rotor with an instrumented Charpy machine and a fatigue precracked specimen to establish the k1c (dynamic) value at normal operating temperature.
Estimating of k1c values at various temperatures from conventional Charpy and tensile data on the rotor material using methods presented in J. A. Begley and W. A.
Logsdon, Scientific Paper 71-1E7-AMSLRF-P1 (Reference 10.2-1).
Estimating "lower bound" values of kIc at various temperatures using the equivalent energy concept developed by F. J. Witt and T. R. Mager, ORNL-TM-3894 (Reference 10.2-2).
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The Charpy V-notch test criteria are specified in Section 10.2.3.1.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 10.2.3.3 Preservice Inspection RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The rotor preservice inspection procedures and acceptance criteria are as follows:
Forged or welded rotors are rough machined prior to heat treatment.
Each finished forged or welded rotor is subjected to 100% volumetric (ultrasonic),
surface, and visual examinations using procedures and acceptance criteria equivalent to those specified for Class 1 components in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sections III and V. Before welding or brazing, surfaces prepared for welding or brazing are examined. After welding or brazing, surfaces exposed to steam are surface examined, giving particular attention to stress risers and welds. Welds are ultrasonically examined in the radial and radial-tangential sound beam directions.
Finish machined bores, keyways, and drilled holes are subjected to magnetic particle or liquid penetrant examination. Flaw indications in keyway or hole regions are not allowed.
Each turbine rotor assembly is spin tested at 5% above the maximum speed anticipated during a turbine trip following loss of full load.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 10.2.3.4 Turbine Rotor Design RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 The turbine assembly is designed to withstand normal conditions, anticipated transients, and accidents resulting in a turbine trip without loss of structural integrity.
The design of the turbine assembly meets the following criteria:
The design overspeed of the turbine is 5% above the highest anticipated speed resulting from a loss of load.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-14 Draft Revision 2 The combined stresses of low-pressure turbine rotor at design overspeed due to centrifugal forces, interference fit, and thermal gradients do not exceed 0.75 of the minimum specified yield strength of the material, or 0.75 of the measured yield strength in the weak direction of the materials if appropriate tensile tests have been performed on the actual rotor material.
The turbine shaft bearings are able to withstand a combination of the normal operating loads, anticipated transients, and accidents resulting in a turbine trip.
The natural critical frequencies of the turbine shaft assemblies existing between zero speed and 20% overspeed are controlled in the design and operation stages so as to not cause distress to the unit during operation.
The turbine rotor design facilitates inservice inspection of the high stress regions, including bores and keyways, without the need for removing the disks from the shaft.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 10.2.3.1 Inservice Inspection RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 A turbine rotor inservice inspection program detects rotor or disk flaws that can lead to brittle failure at or below design speed in the steam turbine rotor assembly.
Inservice inspection and maintenance activities are performed during plant shutdown and include inspection of the turbine components, such as couplings, coupling bolts, turbine shafts, low-pressure turbine blades, low-pressure rotors, and high-pressure rotors. The turbine rotor inservice inspection program uses visual, surface, and volumetric examinations to inspect components in the turbine rotor assembly.
Inspections are done during refueling outages as prescribed by the inservice inspection schedules and the turbine manufacturer's turbine missile analysis, and provide assurance that rotor flaws that might lead to brittle failure of a rotor at speeds up to design speed are detected.
The inservice inspection and maintenance program for the turbine assembly complies with the manufacturer's recommendations.
10.2.4 Safety Evaluation The TGS serves no safety-related functions, is not credited for mitigation of a design basis accident, and has no safe shutdown functions. General Design Criterion 2 was considered in the design of the TGS. The TGS system meets RG 1.29, in that the TGS is not located in areas that contain safety-related components and is not required to operate during or after an accident.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 General Design Criterion 4 was considered in the design of the TGS. The design of the TGS provides protection of safety-related SSC from the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including the effects of turbine missiles. The combination of turbine rotor inspections and the low
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-15 Draft Revision 2 probability of turbine missile generation is sufficient to protect SSC from the adverse effects of turbine missiles. Section 3.5.1.3 discusses turbine missile generation. As discussed in Section 10.2.3, measures taken to ensure turbine rotor integrity and reduce the probability of turbine rotor failure satisfy the relevant requirements of GDC 4. Appendix A of RG 1.115, Rev. 2 identifies SSC requiring protection from turbine missiles and defines those SSC as essential. Essential SSC are protected from high-trajectory and low-trajectory turbine rotor and blade fragments by using barriers. Section 3.5.1 describes how the protection of essential SSC is accomplished using barriers.
General Design Criterion 5 was considered in the design of the TGS. The components of the TGS are not shared among NPMs, so their failure does not impair the ability of other NPMs to perform their safety functions.
The requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101(b) was considered in the design of the TGS.
Radiological considerations do not affect access to system components during normal conditions. Therefore, radiation shielding is not provided for the TGS and associated components. However, in the event of a primary to secondary system leak or steam generator tube failure, the steam could become contaminated. The Technical Specifications (Chapter 16) provide a maximum limit on secondary coolant activities. If a steam generator tube failure is detected, the secondary coolant is sampled and a radiation survey is completed for ALARA purposes before performing maintenance or modification work on the system. Access to the areas containing the system is restricted if required based on the survey results. The TGS provides for continuous monitoring for radioactivity in the effluent discharge.
Instrumentation is provided at the condenser air removal system discharge as described in Section 11.5. The TGS design satisfies 10 CFR 20.1406 requirements relating to minimization of contamination of the facility. Further discussion of the facility design features to protect against radioactive contamination is provided in Section 12.3.
Chapters 11 and 12 discuss the potential radiation of a primary to secondary coolant leak.
Section 15.0.3 discusses the radiological consequences of a steam generator tube failure.
RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 ITAAC are addressed in Section 14.3.
10.2.5 References 10.2-1 J. A. Begley and W. A. Logsdon, Correlation of Fracture Toughness and Charpy Properties for Rotor Steels, Scientific Paper 71-1E7-MSLRF-P1, Westinghouse Research Laboratories, 1971.
10.2-2 F. J. Witt and T. R. Mager, "A Procedure for Determining Boundary Values in Fracture Toughness at any Temperature," ORNL-TM-3894, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1972.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-17 Draft Revision 2 RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Table 10.2-2: Major Turbine Component MaterialsNot Used Turbine Rotor ASTM 470 CL 4 or equal Blades ASTM A276 - A403 or equal Stop Valve Body ASTM A217 WC9 or equal Turbine Shroud ASTM A422 or equal
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Turbine Generator Tier 2 10.2-21 Draft Revision 2 RAI 10.02-1, RAI 10.02-2, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Figure 10.2-2: Not UsedTurbine Overspeed Logic Speed Sensor Type A Speed Detection Module Type A Speed Sensor Type A Speed Detection Module Type A Speed Sensor Type B Speed Detection Module Type B Speed Sensor Type B Speed Detection Module Type B Speed Sensor Type B Speed Detection Module Type B Power Supply Solenoid Valves 2 out of 3 Trip Block NOTES:
- 1) Type A devices are diverse from Type B devices
- 2) Relay contacts are closed when energized (no overspeed condition is detected)
- 3) Speed detection modules send a vote to their respective Voters when the speed sensed is above the overspeed value.
- 4) The outputs from the Voters are normally energized (no overspeed condition). The Voters de-energize all their 3 output relay contacts, causing all 3 relay contacts to open, when sufficient votes from their respective speed modules are received at the input.
- 5) The 2 out of 3 Trip Block is a solenoid valve configuration consisting of 3 solenoid valves, where if any 2 solenoid valves are de-energized, hydraulic oil will be dumped and the turbine will trip.
Relay Contacts Emergency Overspeed Trip System Governor Overspeed Trip System 1 out of 2 Voter Type A 2 out of 3 Voter Type B
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Tier 2 14.2-85 Draft Revision 2 RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Table 14.2-33: Turbine Generator Test # 33 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.
The TGS is described in Sections 10.2, 10.4.3, and 10.4.4. The TGS and other functions verified by this test are:
System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #
1.
The TGS supports the MSS by providing steam bypass from the MSS to the main condenser.
nonsafety-related Test #33-1 2.
The MHS supports the CVCS by adding heat to primary coolant.
non-safety related Test #33-1 3.
The CVCS supports the reactor coolant system (RCS) by heating primary coolant.
nonsafety-related Test #33-1 4.
The ABS supports the module heatup system (MHS) by supplying steam for heating reactor coolant at startup and shutdown.
nonsafety-related Test #33-1 5.
The FWS supports the CNTS by supplying feedwater to the SGs.
nonsafety-related Test #33-1 6.
The FWS supports the TGS by cooling superheated turbine bypass steam in the turbine bypass desuperheater prior to the steam entering the main condenser.
nonsafety-related Test #33-1 7.
The FWS supports the TGS by accepting turbine bypass steam into the main condenser.
nonsafety-related Test #33-1 8.
The FWS supports the TGS by cooling superheated steam in the gland steam desuperheater prior to the steam entering the gland seals.
nonsafety-related Test #33-1 9.
The FWS supports the TGS by accepting exhaust steam from the turbine into the main condenser.
nonsafety-related Test #33-2
- 10. The MSS supports the TGS by providing steam to the TGS.
nonsafety-related Test #33-2 Prerequisites i.
Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.
The following prerequisites are not required for component testing:
ii.
Verify Test #32-1 has been completed to verify the CARS can maintain main condenser vacuum pressure (reference test 14.2-32).
iii. The SG feedwater flush is complete.
iv. The CARS is automatically maintaining main condenser vacuum.
v.
Initial RCS temperature must be approximately 200°F to allow for hot functional testing to obtain data at an RCS temperature of 200°F and above.
vi. The NPM and supporting systems are aligned to increase RCS temperature and pressure.
Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria i.
Verify each TGS remotely-operated valve can be operated remotely.
Operate each valve from the MCR and local control panel (if design has local valve control).
MCR display and local, visual observation indicate each valve fully opens and fully closes.
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Tier 2 14.2-86 Draft Revision 2 ii.
Verify each TGS air-operated valve fails to its safe position on loss of air.
Place each valve in its non-safe position.
Isolate and vent air to the valve.
MCR display and local, visual observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.
iii. Verify each TGS air-operated valve fails to its safe position on loss of electrical power to its solenoid.
Place each valve in its non-safe position.
Isolate electrical power to each air-operated valve.
MCR display and local, visual observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.
iv. Verify each TGS lube oil pump can be started and stopped remotely.
Align the TGS to allow for main lube oil, auxiliary lube oil, and emergency pump operation.
Stop and start each pump from the MCR.
MCR display and local, visual observation indicate each pump starts and stops.
v.
Verify the TGS exhaust hood is protected against high temperature.
Initiate a simulated high exhaust hood temperature.
Any remote display or the local, visual observation indicates the exhaust hood spray valve is open.
vi. Verify TGS lubricating oil flow capability by automatic start of the auxiliary lube oil pump.
Align the TGS to allow for main lube oil and auxiliary lube oil pump operation.
Place the TGS main oil pump in normal service. Place the auxiliary oil pump in standby.
Simulate a TGS low main oil pump discharge pressure.
MCR display and local, visual observation indicate the auxiliary oil pump starts.
Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.
vii. Verify TGS lubricating oil flow capability by automatic start of the emergency direct current (DC) lube oil pump.
Align the TGS to allow for auxiliary lube oil pump and emergency lube oil pump operation. Place the turbine generator auxiliary oil pump in normal service.
Simulate a turbine generator auxiliary oil pump low discharge pressure or simulate a loss of ac power to start the TGS emergency oil pump.
MCR displays and local, visual observation indicate the TGS emergency oil pump starts.
Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.
viii. Verify the turbine stop valve and turbine control valves close on turbine overspeed.
i.
Simulate an overspeed trip signal from the turbine overspeed emergency trip system.
ii.
Simulate an overspeed trip signal from the governor overspeed detection circuit.
i.
The turbine stop valve and turbine control valves close.
[ITAAC 02.04.02]
ii.
The turbine stop valve and turbine control valves close.
[ITAAC 02.04.02]
ix. Verify each TGS instrument is monitored in the MCR and the RSS, if the signal is designed to be displayed in the RSS.
(Test not required if the instrument calibration verified the MCR and RSS display).
Initiate a single real or simulated instrument signal from each TGS transmitter.
i.
The instrument signal is displayed on an MCR workstation or recorded by the applicable control system historian.
ii.
The instrument signal is displayed on an RSS workstation or recorded by the applicable control system historian if the instrument signal is designed to be displayed in the RSS.
iii. The instrument signal is displayed on an MCR module-specific safety display instrument monitor or an MCR common safety display instrument monitor if the instrument signal is designed to be displayed on a safety display instrument monitor.
Table 14.2-33: Turbine Generator Test # 33 (Continued)
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Tier 2 14.3-14 Draft Revision 2 RAI 08.01-1S1, RAI 08.01-2, RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2, RAI 14.03.03-3S1, RAI 14.03.03-4S1, RAI 14.03.03-6, RAI 14.03.03-6S1, RAI 14.03.03-7, RAI 14.03.03-7S1, RAI 14.03.03-8, RAI 14.03.03-9 Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1)
ITAAC No.
System Discussion DBA Internal/External Hazard Radiological PRA & Severe Accident FP 02.01.01 NPM As required by ASME Code Section III NCA-1210, each ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 component (including piping systems) of a nuclear power plant requires a Design Report in accordance with NCA-3550. NCA-3551.1 requires that the drawings used for construction be in agreement with the Design Report before it is certified and be identified and described in the Design Report. It is the responsibility of the N Certificate Holder to furnish a Design Report for each component and support, except as provided in NCA-3551.2 and NCA-3551.3. NCA-3551.1 also requires that the Design Report be certified by a registered professional engineer when it is for Class 1 components and supports, Class CS core support structures, Class MC vessels and supports, Class 2 vessels designed to NC-3200 (NC-3131.1), or Class 2 or Class 3 components designed to Service Loadings greater than Design Loadings. A Class 2 Design Report shall be prepared for Class 1 piping NPS 1 or smaller that is designed in accordance with the rules of Subsection NC. NCA-3554 requires that any modification of any document used for construction, from the corresponding document used for design analysis, shall be reconciled with the Design Report.
An ITAAC inspection is performed of the NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 as-built piping system Design Report to verify that the requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.
X
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Tier 2 14.3-30 Draft Revision 2 02.03.02 CES Section 5.2.5, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection, discusses that RCS leakage detection systems are designed to detect and, to the extent practicable, identify the source of reactor coolant leakage. The RCS leakage detection systems conform to the guidance of RG 1.45, regarding detection, monitoring, quantifying, and identification of reactor coolant leakage.
In accordance with Table 14.2-41, a preoperational test demonstrates that the CES is capable of detecting a pressure increase in the CES inlet pressure instrumentation (PIT-1001/PIT-1019), which correlates to a detection of an unidentified RCS leakage rate of one gpm within one hour.
X 02.04.01 TG Section 10.2.2.3.3, Overspeed Protection, provides a description of the turbine generator system and its redundant independent turbine overspeed protection systems (OSPs), i.e., the governor overspeed detection circuit and the turbine emergency trip system.
An ITAAC inspection is performed of the turbine overspeed protection arrangement to verify that the trip circuitry for the governor overspeed detection circuit and the turbine emergency trip system are supplied from different power sources and do not share common equipment.
X 02.04.02 TG Section 10.1.2.4, Turbine Overspeed Protection, discusses the turbine stop valve and turbine control valves and the associated turbine trip signals.
In accordance with the information provided in Table 14.2-33, a preoperational test will be performed to verify the turbine stop valve and turbine control valves close on a turbine overspeed trip signal from both the turbine emergency trip system and the governor overspeed detection circuit.
X Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)
ITAAC No.
System Discussion DBA Internal/External Hazard Radiological PRA & Severe Accident FP