ML18102A867

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
LER 97-001-00:on 970117,discovered Inadequate IST Surveillance of B Injection Inlet Valves.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP & Ist.Reviewed Salem EOPs for Similar problems.W/970214 Ltr
ML18102A867
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 02/14/1997
From: Garchow D, Hassler D
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-97-001-02, LER-97-1-2, LR-N97120, NUDOCS 9702210120
Download: ML18102A867 (4)


Text

.;

OPS~G

  • -1 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Muclear Business Unit FEB 141997 LR-N97120

..-l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/97-001-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Gentlemen:

This Licensee Event Report entitled ~Inadequate IST Surveillance of the Boron Injection Inlet Valvesn is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B).

General Manager Salem Operations Attachment d:

DVH C Distribution LER File 3.7

. . 210009 9702210120 970214 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR The power is in your hands.

95-2168 REV. 6/94

'i

'.h~*""<<C'*"-'." *"""*--."-* -~*--. .*.' *'**' ---*~.*-~***-'-'*'*-~>.-.-'.',*-.--.-**V".j,-.*.- ..;.".-.-~ -.*.- ....... _.... _. .. - .... - ... -_.,. .. ,. **.-.... -* * ** ,.,.,,. ... ,.

  • d

- i

.::~

>~

l

- *1 NRC FORM 388

(<M&)

. 4 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0118 NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04l30191 EmllATED BURDEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY wmt THIS MANDATORY INFORllATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

=

REPORn!D LESSONS LEARNED ARI! INCORPORATED INTO THE

  • >1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COllllENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION
  • 1 AND RECORDS MANAOEMENr BRANCH (T-0 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION~ASHINGTON, DC rlli 0001~D TO

-\ (Se* reverse f~r required number of THE PAPERWORK REDU l'RO.IECT ~fi0.0104), E OF dlgblci.aractera for each block) llAHAGEllENT AND BUDOET', WASHINGTON, 20llOS.

FACILITY NAllE (1) DOCKET NUll8ER (2) PAGE(3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1-0F 3

  • m.E(4)

INADEQUATE !ST SURVEILLANCE OF THE BORON INJECTION INLET VALVES EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (8) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILmES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER

!REVISION NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME Salem Unit 2 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 DOCKET NUMBER 01 17 97 97 - 001 - 00 02 14 97 OPERATING N THIS REPORT 18 SUBMITIED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR f: (ateok one or more) (11)

MODE(9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203{a)(2)(Y) x 50. 73(*)(2)(1) O(J; 73{*)(2)(Yili)

POWER 000 20.2203(*)(1) 20.2208(*)(3)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(il) 50. 73(*)(2)(*)

LEVEL(10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(ili) 73.71

  • ~*=-= 20.2203(*)(2)(11) 20.2203(*)(4) 50. 73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(111) 50.38(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) ~lnAbelnlctbelow or C Fonn 388A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50. 73(*)(2)(Yii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Aru Code)

Dennis v. Hassler, LER Coordinator 609-339-1989 COM~ ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

.-i CAUSE SYSTDI COMPONENT lllANUFAcTuRER T.RTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COllPONENT lllANUFAOTURER REPORTABLE ONPRDS TONPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR IYES SUBMISSION (ff ye*, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). XINO DATE(15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 *pace1, i.e., approximately 151ingte.. p11ced typewritten lines) (18)

On January 18, 1997 a review determined that the Inservice Test surveillance on motor operated valves SJ4 and SJ5, Safety Injection Charging ~s to Boron Injection Tank, was not properly performed in the past. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) SGTR-1 requires the operators to close these valves to terminate safety injection during the steam generator tube rupture event. This method implements UFSAR Section 15.4.4 to terminate safety injection. The closure of these valves is an active safety function of the design basis of the plant. Because it is an active safety function, testing of these valves to close is required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 and must be included in the !ST program. A subsequent review of the EOPs determined that there were 12 additional valves that were not being tested in the IST program in the direction contained in the EOPs.

The cause of the event was inadequate corranunication between the EOP group and the !ST reviewers in determining valves manipulated in the EOPs that were required to be included in the !ST Program. Corrective actions include procedure revisions and completing surveillances.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

NRC FORM 3G8 (4-96)

. -i

~'
  • I

"{

i

~~~) FQRll 366A

  • LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TEXT CONTINUATION FACILrrY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)

.. . ) '

05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER IREVISION NUlllBER 2 OF 3 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 97 - 001 - 00 TEXT (If more *P*C* I* required, UH additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Safety Injection {BP/-}

Component Cooling {KB/-}

Main Steam {SB/-}

  • Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

-At the time of the occurrence Salem Unit 1 was defueled and Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On January 18, 1997 a review as a result of a recent NRC inspection determined that the Inservice Test (IST) surveillance on motor operated valves SJ4 {BP/V}

and SJ5, Safety Injection Charging Pumps to Boron Injection Tank {BP/TK}, was not properly performed in the past. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) SGTR-1 requires the operators to close these valves to terminate safety injection during the steam generator tube rupture event. This method implements UFSAR

"-l Section 15.4.4 to terminate safety injection. The closure of these valves is an active safety function of the design basis of the plant. Because it is an active safety function, testing of these valves to close is required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 and must be included in the !ST program.

Subsequent review of the SJ4 and SJ5 issue determined that there were 12 additional Unit 2 valves that were not being tested in the IST program in the direction contained in the EOPs. These 12 valves are 21CC16 {KB/V}, 22CC16, 2SJ12 {BP/V}, 2SJ13, 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54, 21CS36 {BE/V}, 22CS36, 21MS45 {SB/V} and 23MS45. The corresponding Unit 1 valves are likewise affected.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the event was inadequate communication between the EOP group and the IST reviewers in determining what valves were manipulated in the EOPs and were therefore required to be included in the IST Program.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

NRC FORM 388.A (4-86) ~ '

  • LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
  • U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER 8) PAGE(3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I se=mAL 3 OF 3 97 - 001 - 00 TEXT (If more ajMoe la required, u. . additional ooplea of NRC Form 388A) (17)

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRJ-JNCES In the past two years there have been three LERs, 272/95-018-00, 272/95-005-09, and 311/97-001-00, that addressed IST issues. The corrective actions in LER 272/95-018-01 was to complete an assessment of the IST program to ensure that programmatic and procedure deficiencies were identified and corrected. This assessment did not adequately review the UFSAR and EOPs to identify the issues contained above. The corrective actions in LERs 272/96-005-09 and 311/97-001-00 were specific to the issues in those LERs.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS There were no safety consequences associated with the occurrences in this LER.

Evaluation of other testing performed on the- identi'fied valves provides confidence that the valves would have operated if needed. This is based on the following.

The 21CC16, 22CC16, 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ13 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and are stroke timed quarterly in the open direction.

The 21CS36 and 22CS36 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and open stroked during cold shutdown. After the open stroke test,_ the valve is returned to the closed position.

The 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54 valves are in the GL 89-10 Program and are operated when transitioning in and out of cold shutdown.

The 21MS45 and 23MS45 valves are manual valves and do not have any scheduled stroke tests. These valves are -closed which provides assurance that they were capable of "

being closed in the past.

The health and safety of the public was not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The Salem EOPs were reviewed for similar problems and the results are noted
.~

.! above

  • 2
  • The Operations Department Emergency /Abnormal Operating Procedure Program procedure, SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0113, will be revised to include IST notification of proposed changes. This will be completed by May 5, 1997.
3. As a result of the issues in this LER and other recently identified IST issues, a plan has been developed and will be completed to ensure that the Unit 2 IST Program is satisfactory prior to Unit 2 entering Mode 4.
4. The Salem Generating Station IST Manual will be revised to include the addition of the stroke test to the required valve tests for these valves. This will be completed by March 31, 1997.
5. The revised surveillance test for the identified valves will be performed prior to entering the applicable mode when the valve is required to be operable for Units 1 and 2.

NRC FORM 368A (4-95)