ML18101B278

LER 96-022-01:on 960110,evaluation Determined That Motor Operated Gate Valves Susceptible to Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding.Caused by Inability to Meet GL 95-07 Criteria.Test Procedure changed.W/960318 Ltr

ML18101B278
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/15/1996
From:	Hassler D, Warren C Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GL-95-07, GL-95-7, LER-96-002, LER-96-2, LR-N96064, NUDOCS 9603210171
Download: ML18101B278 (5)

Text

e OPS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit MAR 181996 LR-N96064 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

LER 272/96-002-00-01 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT l FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 This Licensee Event Report Supplement entitled "Motor Operated Gate Valves* Susceptible to Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B).

siCc~reJ~

Cla'!zarren

• General Manager -

Salem Operations Attachment SORC Mtg.96-031 DVH/tcp C Distribution LER File 3.7 9603210171 960315 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR The power is in your hands.

95*2168 REV. 6/94

Document Control Desk LR-N96064 Attachment A The following item represents commitments that Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) made to the Nuclear Requlatory Commission (NRC) relative to this LER (272/96-002-01). The commitments are as follows:

1. Pressure locking of the Containment Spray Valves will be addressed by a surveillance test procedure change to cycle the valves after the system has been depressurized.

2. The Refueling Water Storage Tank Supply to Charging/Safety Injection Pump Suction Valves will be modified to preclude pressure locking by providing an appropriate bonnet cavity pressure relief path.

3. The Cross Tie Connection - suction of Charging Pumps *to Suction of Safety Injection Pumps Valves will also be modified to preclude pressure locking by providing an appropriate bonnet cavity pressure relief path.

4. The PORV Block Valves will be modified to provide primary control of the motor operator based on disc position instead of torque control, and a maximum thrust limit will be identified as a test procedure control to assure a positive margin of capability.

NRCFORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 315CM>104

_;. (4-96) EXPIRES 04/30198 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: llO.O HRS.

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-41 ~&~NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of REGULATORY COMMIS~!'~INGTON, DC  :.:1-A!fD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUc11UN PROJECT (315CMH04), Ul'l'lllLiE OF dlgltalcharaclers for each block) llANAGEllENT AND BU~, WASHINGTON, De 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF3 TITLE(4)

Motor Operated Gate Valves Susceptible to Pressure locking and Thermal Binding EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) llONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUlllBER I REVISION NUMBER llONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 lS FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 10 96 96 - 002 - 01 03 96 05000 OPERATING N THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE(9) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50. 73(a)(2)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 000 ..,_.....,..20~.2~2=0~3(~*~)(1~).,,.,....~~-+-...+..,,,2~0.~22=0~3~<*~><~3)~(1~)~~__,~x.-..+,s=o~.7~3(~*~)(2~)~(ii~)~~~~.__+s=o~.7~3~(a~><~2>~<x~>~-11 LEVEL(10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)- oTHER 20.;;c-,03(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(e)(2)(v) =~~~~

-, 20.2203(a)(:Z)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) _50.73(a)(2)(vil)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

TELEPHONE NUlllBER (Include Arn Code)

Dennis V. Hassler, LER Coordinator 609-339-1989 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEll COMPONENT MANUFACTURER ~~Jfit.fs-E ~~iit,!!t~1: CAUSE SYSTEll COllPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS

~~~-+-~~~+-~~~-+-~~~~-+-~~~--ii

@%~ ____ :

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION X

I(lfye1, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 1pace1, i.e., approximately 15 1ingle-1paced typewritten lines) (18)

DATE(15) 03 15 96 An evaluation perfonned for pressure locking and thennal binding in power operated gate valves required by Generic Letter 95-07 detennined that four Containment Spray Valves, four Refueling Water Storage Tank Supply to Charging/Safety Injection Pump SUction Valves, four Cross Tie Connection - Suction of Charging Purcps to Suction of Safety Injection Purcps Valves, and four PORV Block valves are susceptible to pressure locking or thennal binding.

Corrective actions include a sw:veillance test procedure change for the Containment Spray Valves; a m:x:iification to preclude pressure locking for the Refueling Water Storage Tank Supply to Charging/Safety Injection Pt.mp suction Valves, and the Cross Tie Connection -

suction of Charging Purcps to suction of Safety Injection Purcps Valves; and a m:x:iification to provide primary control of the rcotor operator based on disc position instead of torque control for the PORV Block Valves. These actions will be c:anpleted prior to the restart of Salem Units 1 and 2.

This issue is reportable under 10 CER 50. 73 (a) (2) (ii), a condition that was outside of the design basis of the plant.

NRC FORM 388 (~96)

NRC FORM 38SA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a (4-96)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKETNUMBER(2) LERNUMBER(8) PAGE(3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 osooo212 YEAR I SE.fill.fmAL 1i : : 2 oF s 96- 002 - 01 TEXT (If more 1p*ce i* required, uee additional copiee of NRC Form 386A) (17)

PIAN'!' AND SYSTEM IIENTIFICATICN Westinghouse - Pressurized. Water Reactor

- Contairnnent Spray Valves, {BEN}*

- Refueling Water Storage Tank Supply to Charging/Safety Injection Purrp suction Valves {BQ/V}

- Cross Tie Connection - suction of Charging Purcps to suction of Safety Injection Purrps Valves {BQ/V}

- PORV Block Valves, {ABN}

• Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and canponent ftmction identifier cxxies appear in the text as SS/CCX:} *

. CCNDITICNS PRICR TO OCCURRENCE lJnit 1: De fueled, 000 % Reactor Power lJnit 2: Defueled, 000 % Reactor Power There were no structures, c:arcponents, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed. to the event.

IESCRIPl'ICN OF OCCURRENCE An evaluation perfonned for pressure locking and thennal binding in p:>wer operated. gate valves required. by Generic Letter 95-07 detennined. that four Contaimnent Spray Valves, four Refueling Water Storage Tank Supply to Charging/Safety Injection Purrp SUctiop. Valves, four Cross Tie Connection - suction of Charging Purrps to suction of Safety Injection Purrps Valves, and four PORV Block valves are susceptible to pressure locking or thennal binding.

Original plant design did not accolll'lt for the pressure locking and thennal binding effects. In 1977 double-disc gate valves were m::xiified. based on recanmendations by Westinghouse. In 1986, a review of flexible wedge gate valves to address INPO SOER 84-7 determined. that the valves were not susceptible to pressure locking or thennal binding based on valve design, expected. seat leakage and the use of diagnostic thrust measuring equipnent as a preventative maintenance/surveillance tool. E\Jrther analyses of the pressure locking and thermal binding was not perfonned 1.ll'ltil issuance of GL 95-07.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The regulatory requirements associated. with the issuance of GL 95-07 resulted. in a reassessment of the Salem p:>wer operated. valve p:>pulation to ensure corrpliance. The criteria available in 1986 was not as stringent as that contained. in GL 95-07 and therefore, the 1986 review was satisfactory at that tillle. However, the identified valves do not meet the requirements of GL 95-07 for pressure locking and thennal binding.

NRC FORM~ (4-95)

I NRC FORll 368A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-116)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I SE.fill=AL I~ 3 OF 3 98- 002 - 01 TEXT (If more 1p*c* 11 required, u.. edditional copie1 of NRC Form 368A) (17)

During the previous ~ years there were no LERs that attributed their root cause to revised design requirements.

ASSF.Ss.1ENT OF SAEETY CCNSECUENCES There were no safety consequences because these valves have not been challenged under design basis accident conditions. The health and safety of the public was not affected.

The safety inplications for the Refueling Water Storage Tank ~ly to Charging/Safety Injection Purrp suction valves, and Cross Tie Connection - suction of Charging Pt.mps to l suction of Safety Injection Punps Valves failing to open would be the loss of High Head 1 Injection. With the loss of the High Head Injection and-pressure remaining above the Intennediate Head Injection shutoff head, operator action to manually open the valves would be required. If manual opening of the valves was unsuccessful, operator actions outside the parameters of the Einergency cperating Procedures would then be required.

Intennediate Head Injection is not affected by the above valves failing to open.

For accident conditions, the only event the PORVs are relied upon is a steam generator tube rupture (SGI'R). If the PORV Block valves were closed and failed to open during a SGI'R, pressurizer spray w::>uld be used to control RCS pressure.

If the Contaimnent Spray valves fail to open, there may be a concern with the containment tenperature and pressure if all five fan cooling uni ts are not operating. The Containment Spray valves have not been challenged and corrective actions are being taken to address the pressure locking and thennal binding concern.

CORRECTIVE ACTICNS

-~ The following actions will be corcpleted prior to the restart of Salem Units 1 and 2.

Pressure locking of the Containment Spray Valves will be addressed by a surveillance test procedure change to cycle the valves after the system has been depressurized.

The Refueling Water Storage Tank SUpply to Charging/Safety Injection Punp suction Valves will be nodified to preclude pressure locking by providing an appropriate bonnet cavity pressure relief path.

The Cross Tie Connection - suction of Cllarging Purrps to Suction of Safety Injection Punps Valves will also be nodified to preclude pressure locking by providing an appropriate bonnet cavity pressure relief path.

The PORV Block Valves will be nodified to provide primary control of the notor operator based on disc position instead of torque control, and a :maxi.nu.mt thrust limit will be identified as a test procedure control to assure a positive margin of capability.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)