ML18094B192
| ML18094B192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1985 |
| From: | Elliott A, Hossain Q, Tang C QUADREX CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18094B191 | List: |
| References | |
| QUAD-1-85-004, QUAD-1-85-4, NUDOCS 8912080182 | |
| Download: ML18094B192 (76) | |
Text
~., J' QUAD~l-85-004 CONTROLLED No.
NINE-MONTH RESPONSE FOR CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS FOR SALEM NUCLEAR STATION UNITS l AND 2
~._ ._
Prepared for:
.* PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
( 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Prepared by:
QUADREX CORPORATION 1700 Dell Avenue Campbell, California 95008 Prepared by: Q fl- ~
A. J. Elliott
- Reviewed by:
Approved by:~)~~
Revision No. Date *Charge Number Released by Date 0 2/11/85 PSE-0109
(
I 8912080182. 850214 1 PDR ADOCK 05000272 I R PNU
QUAD-1-85-004
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
~
Page
- l. 0 INTRODUCTION 1-1 thru 1 2.0 REVIE\il
SUMMARY
2-l thru 2-29 2.1 Overhead Load Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools 2-1 2.2 Overhead Load Handling Systems Operating in the Containment 2-3 2.3 Overhead Load Handling Systems Operating Outside Containment and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Areas 2-a
~
3.0 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING PLANT STRUCTURES 3-1 thru 3-4
(. 4.0 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING REACTOR VESSEL
5.0 REFERENCES
4-1 thru 4-3 5-1 thru 5-3 _,,.
APPENDIX A LOAD PATHS A-1 thru A-22 APPENDIX B SAFE DROP HEIGHTS AND ASSOCIATED AREAS B-1 thru B-11
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QUAD-1-85-004
- l. 0 INTRODUCTION
._~
This report summarizes the evaluation of overhead load handling systems and load drop consequences for the Salem Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2..
The evaluation was performed in response to the USNRC letter of December 23, 1980 (reference 1-1). The scope of the evaluation was to review the overhead load handling systems as required in sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 of enclosure 2 of the USNRC letter.
{
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QUA0-1-85-004
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2.0 REVIEW
SUMMARY
The results of the evaluation for the overhead load handling system are presented in the following subsections. These subsections are arranged -
to generally conform to* sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 of enclosure 3 of the December 23, 1980 letter from the USNRC (reference 1-1).
The review results have been summarized in tables 2-1 and 2-2. In these tables, as well as elsewhere in this report, overhead load handling system numbers in the 100 series refer to Unit 1 systems, and those in I .
the 200 series refer to Unit 2 systems. Table 2-1 lists the cranes which are included in the present evaluation. Accidental drop of heavy loads from these cranes can potentially result in impacting the spent fuel, equipment that is required to achieve safe shutdown, or equipment that is required for decay heat removal after shutdown. The table also identifies the heavy load, the maximum safe lift height, the load path, the safety-related equipment that may be affected if the heavy load is accidentally dropped, the frequency of the lift, the hazard elimination category, and the thickness of the impacted floor slab. Table 2-2 lists the cranes which have been excluded from evaluation. The reasons for exclusions are also presented in this table.
2.1 Overhead Load Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools 2.1.1 Included-OVt!rhead Load Handling Systems
.The overhead load handling systems operating in the vicinity of fuel ~torage pools from which a heavy load could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool are the cask handling cranes (crane nos. 111 & 211) and the stop 1og monorails (crane nos.* 114 &
214). The evaluation of these four systems are presented in table 2-lA.
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QUA0-1-85-004
- 2.1.2 Excluded Overhead Load Handling Systems Table 2-2A lists the four (two for each plant unit) overhead load handling systems in the fuel building that are exc~uded from hazar~
evaluation (crane nos. 113, 213, 112, and 212). These systems were excluded because:
o They.handle only the fuel assembly or other loads that are not heavy loads, o Sufficient physical separation exists between any potential load-impact point and safety-related equipment or components.
The semigantry fuel handling cranes (crane nos. 112 and 212, one for each plant unit) were previously rated to handle heayy loads.
However, the capacity rating of these two cranes has since been lowered so that these cranes may no longer handle heavy loads (reference 2-1).
2.1.3 Single-Failure-Proof Overhead Load Handling Systems The overhead load handling systems listed in table 2-lA (see section 2.1.1) were designed neither to be single-failure-proof nor to be in compliance with NUREG-0612, section 5.1.6 (reference 2-2).
Therefore, the accidental drop of heavy loads from these systems was postulated and the consequences evaluated. The results of the evaluation are presented in table 2-lA and discussed in the next subsection.
2.1.4 Hazard Evaluation The controlling heavy load that can accidentally drop from the cask handling cranes (crane nos. 111 &211) is the spent fuel cask. The physical arrangement of the Fuel Handling Building is such that the spent fuel cask can travel only over the transfer- pool, which is physically separated from the spent fuel pool. Thus, an accidental drop of the cask would not result in loss of water from the spent 2-2
QUAD-1-85-004
- fuel pool. Therefore, the drop consequences were judged to be acceptable (evaluated earlier and submitted to the NRC, see reference 2-3).
The stop log monorail (crane nos. 114 and 214) has been provided with a Retractastop Unit that provides a redundant load path. This unit was qualified by subjecting it to drop t~stirig. Also, the monorail and building structure was evaluated for the impact loading produced by the postulated accident condition. The stress levels in a few components of the monorail were found to exceed the allowables. Modifications will be made to those components whose j
failure could result in the stop log impacting spent fuel. t l
2.2 Overhead load Handling Systems Operating in the Containment , I 2.2.l Included Overhead Load Handling Systems The overhead load handling systems operating in the containment " I that are capable of carrying heavy loads over the re~ctor vessel are the polar cranes and the mobile cherry pickers (see table 2-18).
In addition, the circular monorail {an integral part of the head lift rig) carries the stud detensioner.
2.2.2 Excluded Overhead Load Handling Systems Table 2-28 lists the three (combined for both units) overhead load handling systems ';n -the containment building that are excluded from hazard evaluation.* These systems were excluded because they handle only the fuel assembly or other loads that are ~ot heavy loads.
The overhead load handling systems 103 and 203 were previously rated to handle heavy loads. However, the capacity ratings of these cranes have been lowered so that these systems may no longer handle heavy loads (reference 2-1).
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QUAD-1-85-004 2.2.3 Single-Failure-Proof Overhead Load HandliQg Systems The overhead load handling systems listed in table 2-18 (see section 2.2.1) were designed neither to be single-failure-proof nor to be in compliance with NUREG-0612, section 5.1.6 (reference 2-2); thereforer the accidental drop of heavy loads from these systems was postulated and the consequences evaluated. The results of the evaluation are presented in table 2-18, and discussed in the next subsection.
2.2.4 Hazard Evaluation An evaluation of the consequences of postulated drops of heavy loads from the polar cranes, the mobile cherry pickers, and the stud detensioner monorails are presented in this subsection.
The results.of the evaluation have been summarized in table 2-lB.
In addition, interaction curves have been developed to determine the maximum safe lift height* for miscellaneous heavy loads which could potentially drop onto the operating floor at elevation 130 ft.
and onto the reactor cavity. The curves are shown in figures B-1 thru B-3 in appendix B. The evaluation of the critical drops are discussed in the following subsections.
2.2.4.1 Drops of the Reactor Vessel Head and Upper Internals from Polar Cranes The probab*i l ity. of. a drop of the reactor vessel (RV) head or upper internals from the main hoist of the polar crane (crane nos. 101
~The maximum safe lift height is the height from which ~he heavy load may fall without resulting in perforation, scabbing, or collapse of the target. structure. Drop of a heavy load from this height may result in local damage (penetration) and yielding of the impacted slab, but the slab possesses sufficient capacity to absorb the impact energy with.out exceeding the ~aximum allowable ductility ratios defined in table 3-1.
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QUA0-1-85-004
- ~
and 201) upon the RV wol.il d. be insignificant. The. prob ab i 1 i ty is low because of the following reasons:
o Reactor vessel (RV) head and upper internals are removed and installed in accordance with detailed written instructions and procedures.
o The lifting devices undergo scheduled periodi~ inspections and load testing. . ---
After an foitial lift of a few iriches, the load is held while *'~ .- *-- J:.
0 a detailed structural inspection of the lift rigs and lift points are performed.
o For the upper internals, a load cell is used to safeguard against excessive loading due to binding.
0 Successful lifting of the RV head demonstrates the structural \*
integrity of the crane system prior to the lift of the lighter upper internals.
Dual travel-limit switches are being installed on the polar 0
cranes to minimize the possibil-ity of two-blocking.
Even though the probabnity of accidental drop of the RV head or upper internals was judged to be insignificant, the consequences of such drops were evaluated in order to determine the extent *of potential damages, and to provide additional confidence that the intent of section 5.1 of NUREG-0612 is met.
The consequences were evaluated for the governing drop cases, i.e.,
the drops of the reactor vessel head and upper internals (with lift rig) from the maximum lift heights (section 4.0). The results of these analyses and evaluations are summarized in table 4-1. These results showed that the deformation to the reactor vessel components and fuel bundles resulting from the worst-case drops would be The consequences of the postulated drop within acceptable limits. I of the lower internals was not evaluated because, when it is lifted z-s
QUAD-1-85-004 the plant would be in a shutdown condition and the reactor vessel would not contain any fuel assemblies.
2.2.4.2 Drops from Mobile Cherry Pickers (Crane Nos. 191 and 291) and the Stud Tensioner Monorails (Crane Nos. 104A, B, C and 204A, B, C)
The consequences of load drops onto the operating floor at 130 !t ele~ation and into the reactor cavtty have been evaluated. The evaluation results as well as the load/impact area matrix for the postulated drops are summarized in table 2-18.
The hazard evaluation consisted of determining the structural integrity (both globally and locally) of the impacted floor slab at the 130 ft elevation and the reactor cavity. For the maximum safe lift heights specified in table 2-lB, structural elements of the impacted floors have sufficient capacity to absorb the impact energy from the heavy load without exceeding the maximum allowable ductility ratio (see.table 3-1). They also have sufficient thickness to prevent perforation and scabbing. Therefore, no damage to the safety-related equipment and components below the floors at elevation 130 ft and t~e reactor cavity is predicted.
2.2.4.3 Drops of Head Lift Rig, Internal Lift Rig, and Load Block from Polar Cranes (Crane Nos. 101 and 201)
The purpose o~ t~is evaluation is to demonstrate that the containment polar gantry crane can carry the following lighter ~eavy loads at a level of reliability that satisfies the _intent of NUREG-0612 (refer-ence 2-2) requirements:
o Unloaded head lift rig <14.0 tons o Unloaded internal lift rig 7.25 tons 0 Unloaded polar crane load block 6.35 tons The reliability analysis in appendix B of NUREG-0612 shows the following four possible causes for a load drop:
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o Crane component failure o Lift rig failure o Load hangup o Two-blocking The polar cranes are unlikely to drop these 11 light" heavy loads (weighing less than 28,000 lbs.) because, as discussed in the following paragraphs, they are protected against all four possible causes with a high degree of reliability.
The safety factors for the crane component and lift rig against failure are presented in table 2. Based on these high factors of ~-
~
safety, it is concluded that failure of the lift rigs or a crane component, is not credible~
- There are two ways a load can hang up on a stationary object.
Eit~er a protrusion of the load could catch on a looped or over-hanging stationary object, or a protruding stationary object could catch on a hook or a loop in the load. The possibility of occurrence of these two events is minimized by controlling the lifts and movements through use of trained operators following detailed maintenance procedures. The load paths and laydown area are simple and rigidly defined by procedures for the lift rigs. The normal position of the load block plus its configuration reduce the possi-bi 1ity of load hangup.
Two-blocking is* the* major cause of load drops when the load is much lighter than the crane capacity. To reduce the probability of such an event, dual travel-limit switches are being added to the polar gantry crane main hoists. These switches will comply with the provisions of NUREG-0554, section 4.5 (reference 2-6) and will be tested by the alternate method described in paragraph 8 of NUREG-0612, appendix C (reference 2-2).
2-7
QUAD-1-85-004 2.3 Overhead Load Handling Systems Operating Outside *containment and Spent Fuel Storage Areas 2.3.1 Included Overhead Load Handling Systems The overhead load handling systems outside the containment and spent fuel areas that are capable of carrying heavy loads near or over the safety-related equipment or components are listed in table 2-lC.
2.3.2 Excluded Overhead Load Handling Systems Table 2-2C lists the overhead load handling systems outside the containment and the spent fuel pool areas that are excluded from hazard evaluation. These systems were excluded because:
o They handle only the fuel assembly or other loads that are not heavy loads or 0 Sufficient physical separation exists between any potential load-impact point and safety-related equipment or components.
The decontamination room overhead crane (crane no. 135) was previously rated to handle heavy loads. However, the capacity rating of. this crane has been lowered so that it may no longer handles heavy loads
- (reference 2-1).
2.3.3 Single-fai)ure-Proof Overhead Load Handling Systems The overhead load handling systems listed in table 2-lC (see section 2.3.1) were designed neither to be single-failure-pr~of, nor to be in compliance with NUREG-0612, section 5.1.6 (refer-ence 2-2); therefore, the accidental drop of heavy loads from these systems was postulated and the consequences evaluated. The results of the evaluation are presented in table 2-lC, and discussed in the next subsection.
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QUAD-1-85-004 2.3.4 Hazard Evaluation The consequences of load drops were evaluated. The results of the evaluation as well as the load/impact area matrix for the postulated drop of heavy loads are provided in table 2-lC. In addition to the drop evaluation results, the table also identifies* the heavy Joad, the maximum safe lift height, the load path or area, the safety-related equipment that may be affected if the heavy load is accident-ally dropped, the frequency of the lift, the hazard elimination category, and the thickness of the impacted roof slab, floor slab, or basemat.
2.3.4.1 Structural Except for the safety injection pump and motor in the Auxiliary Building, and the service water strainer in the Service Water Intake Structure, no safety-related equipment can be impacted directly during a postulated heavy load drop. However, there is essential equipment located below the floor or roof slabs that would be impacted by a postulated heavy load drop perforating the floor or roof slab. Therefore, the hazard evaluation consisted of determining the structural integrity (both globally and locally) of the* impacted roof and floors. The potential drops* on the basemat were also evaluated to predict the extent of structural damage, if any. For the maximum safe lift height. specified in table 2-lC, all structural elements of the impacted roof, floors, a_nd basemat have sufficient capacity to absorb the impact energy from the heavy load. They also have sufficient thickness to prevent perforation and scabbing.* Therefore, damage to the safety-related equipment and components on the floors below the impacted roof or floor is not predicted. In addition, for the maximum safe lift height specified in table 2-lC, the potential damage to the impacted basemats will not affect the safety-related function of the building.
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(
2.3.4.2 Safety Injection Pump The consequence of a postulated drop of the Safety Injection (SI) pump in the auxiliary building upon the other redundant SI system -
has been evaluated. An adverse effect can only occur if all of the following events occur almost simultaneously:
o A small break LOCA that is too small to depressurize the RCS.
but too large to be handled by only one charging pump and no SI pumps.
o A random failure of the ch~rging pump.
o Drop of heavy load. and o The other SI system is damaged by the drop.
It is our opin,ion that the probability of such simultaneous occur:-
rences is negligible. Therefore. the drop does not present a safety hazard.
2.3.4.3 Service Water Strainer The consequences of a postulated drop of the service water strainer in the service water intake structure has been evaluated. An adverse event can not occur because of system redundancy and separa-tion. The plant has a total of four independent service water intake systems physically separated in four individual bays: two for each plant. The four individual bays are separated with 18 inch thick reinforced concrete walls. There are cross ties from one division to another that pass through the bay of another plant.
The cross ~ie lines are not in the path of a postulated drop of the service water strainer .
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QUAD-1-85-004 Table 2 Crane Component & Lift Rig Evaluation Summary Maximum Design Capacity Safety Item Load ~ton)! Load ~tonl ~ton} Factor Reeving 23.4 230 1150. 49 Load Block & 23.4 230 1150. 49 Hook Other Crane 23.4 230 600 26 Components
~.
Lift Rig 2 i:t '.
Connecting Pin l
RV Head 16.i 172.5 1297. 80 Internals 8.3 160. 1587. 190 Notes:
1 Includes impact loading.
2 See reference 2-5.
~*
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TABLE 2-lA LOAIJ/lHPACT AREA MATRIX FOR EVALUATING CONSEQUENCES OF POSJULAllD DROP OF HEAVY LOADS lN THE VICINITY OF FUEL STORAGE POOLS Overhe*d lo*d H*ndling SysllNI Heavy Load Ml*I-Descripl ion Rated local ton Oe.c:rlption Weight S*te Figure Ho. Safety Related Frequency HHard Thlclr.neu of (Muir. Ho.) Capulty (l lev*llon) (lb) UH for Equi,_ent/C1111ponent* of ltft 2 EH*lnallon l111>*cled (Jon) Height load Path Involved in Po*tul*ted (No./Yr.) Category 3 Structure (It. ) 1 Drop (ln.)
, .. k Handling 110 Kain Fuel HandHng Spent fu91 Cull Z00,000 A-1 L<<*
Overhead l Au* Area w/Spent fuel A-Z Crane See Fuel In Cask see, (111,211) Hot*
le Tran*fer pool liner
- llot*
le Botloll Block 4,200 Spent Fu~l l fuel Spent. Fuel Pool NA A-l Spent. fuel In racks 1 NA Pool GatH Handling Gate ),400 Monorail Bldg. Pool Hner f (stop log) [I. 130' (114,214)
- 1. lhe ***i*ii. **fe llft height Is the height from .-hlch the heavy lo*d *ay fall without resulting In perforation, *cabbing, or cellap1e of U'9 largel structure. Drop of
- heavy load from this height *ay result In local daaage (penelrat.lon) and yleldlng of the Impacted alab, but I.he slab po******* *ulficienl c~aclty t.o absorb the imp*cl energy without exceeding.the ~*1.... allowable ductility r*llo* defined ** I.a.le )-1.
- 2. The frequency of lift 11 for no.... 1 plant operation.
). Hazard Ell*lnatlon Categories:
- a. Crane travel for this area/load cOllblnallon prohibited by electrical Interlocks or *ch*nical stop*.
- b. System redund*ncy *nd separation preclude* loss of capablllty of sy*llNI lo perform Its safety-related function follo.1lng this lo*d drop in this area. *
- c. Slte-s~clflc considerations eli*lnale the need to consider lo*d/equiflllll!nl cOllblnation.
- d. likelihood of handling sys .... failure for thl* load Is extre111ly s11all. * .0
- e. An*lysls IM9onstr*le* that crane failure and load drop wlll not d..aga safety-related equipment (See section Z.l.4). c:
'.):oo
- f. A special .~sign feature (Retractastop Unit) for providing a redundant load path would prevent any postulated 0 I
drop *ccldent. See section 2.1.4 and reference 2-l. .....I CX>
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QUA0-1-81-22!>- l
IABLE 2-18 LOAO/IMPACl AREA MAlRIX FOR EVALUATING CONSEQUENCES OF POSlULAIED DROP or HEAVY LOADS IN IHE CONJAltltlHI Overhe.11d lo.sd Handling Sy s t - Heavy load Hui-.
Descrlpl ion Rated location Oe1crlplton Weight Sale figure Mo. Safely Related Frequency Hau rd Thlcllneu of (Hark Ho.) Capacity (Elevalton) (lb) Liil for EqutpiM!nl/Co-.ionenls of Ufl 2 EH*lnatlon l11p1cled (lon) Height load Path Involved In Postulated (No./Yr.) Category> Slr&Klure (fl. ) I Drop 4 (In.)
Polar Gantry HlnHe Shields, llO Main Contal-nt F1ns 0 Plenu., and 18,000 Reactor Pressure Cranes with l!i Aux Bui ldlng
[quii-nt Hatch Jib -
lift Rio 1 loll IH*'
- Cibleviy Structure 40,000 A-4 A-S Venel (APV), fuel, prt .. ry system piping, and RHR piping (101, 201) 60 1 e&b MA Stud Oelen1lon-* l,300 A-i er
- Hol1t Stud Rack with 91 7,000 A-6a IPV head I tucf1 Aemov1ble W1llway 4,000 A-7 and Slillrway1 RPV Head w/llft Rte I load llock l!H,000 30 A-8 Upper lnternall w/lfft Rig* Load I lock 161,000 JO A-9
- 1. lhe 11axi11U111 safe ltft height Is the height fro. which UM! heavy load uy fall without resulting In perforalton, 1cabblng, or collepae of lhol.
tnget structure. Drop of 1 heavy IHd froe this height *ay result In local dauge (penelraUo") and yielding of the Impacted 1lab, but the slab possesse1 1uffltlent c1p1clty lo 1bsorl> the Impact energy without exceeding.the ... 1.... allowable ductility ratlo1 defined In Jabl* J-1.
- l. The frequency of llft 11 for no,...1 pla"t operation.
.0
- l. Hazard Ell*inatlon Categorle1: c
- a. Crane travel for thl1 area/load cOIAblnatton prohibited by electrical Interlocks or 11echanlcal stops. :l>
0
- b. System redundancy and 1eparatlon precludes loss of capability of sy1let1 to perfona its s*fety-related function following this load I drop In th 15. *re*. * * ~
I
- c. Sile-~peciflc considerations ell*lnate lhe need lo consider load/equtp11ent combination. O'.>
- d. likelihood of h*ndllng systM failure for lhh load h extremely s-11. . ln I
- e. Aru1 lyi ls det9onstrate1 that crane failure end load drop wi 11 not daaage s.fety-re h1ted equlp11en\. 0 0
- 4. Plant Is shutdown.
N
....w I
~- Only moved ne*r lhe RPV ,"!"-n the RPV head Is In place upon the RPV .
QllAll- l-lll-U~-z
~*
TABLE 2-18 LOAD/IMPACJ AREA MATRll FOR EVALUArlHG CONSEQUENCES Of POSIULAllD DROP Of HfAVY LOADS IN IHE CONTAINMlNT (CONJ'O)
Overhe*d Load H*ndling Syslr. Heavy lo*d M.lli-Description Rotted location Oe1crtptlon Wetghl Safe Ftgure Ho. Safely Rel*ted Freq<!ncy Huard Thickness of (Hark No.) C*p*clty (Elewatton) (lb) ltfl for Equtp19ent/C011ponents of liftZ El l*lnatton lmp*cted (Ion) Hetghl LDAd Path Involved tn Postulated (No./Yr.) Category 3 Structure (fl. ) I Drop* (In.)
Polar C*ntry 230 Hain Conlat ...nl RCP Motor Access Reactor Pressure r
~r*ne1 with l!> Aux la,ooo* Ves1el (RPV), fuel, fqulp.ent Hatch Jib Bui ldtng Plug1
. prt .. ry systet1 piping, and Rlffl piping (101, 201) '
llCP Nolor 71,0001 60 A-10 l to 2 .... NA RCP Motor flywhffl 14,2!>01 A-ll (qutpmnt Hatch 14,000 NA A-12 b l to S
- l. lhe *a*lmuai safe llfl height Is the height frOll which the heavy load ..Y fill without resulting In perforation, sc*bblng, or cellap1a of the largel structure. Orop of a heavy load fr09 this height ..y result In local d.a1ge (penetratton) and yielding of the l11p1cled 1lab, but the slab possesses 1ufftcienl c~ctty lo absorb the l11p.ct energy without exceeding.the ll&lllllUll allowable ductlllly ratlo1 defln941 I* Jabl* l-1.
- 2. The fn~quency of llft ii for ROr91l plant operation.
- l. H*11rd Eli*inatlon C*tegorles:
- Crane travel for this area/load cOllblnatlon prohibited by eleclrlcal Interlocks or 11echanlcal slops.
- b. System redundancy and separation preclude* loss of cap*blllty of systet1 to perfon1 tts safety-related function following this lo*d.
drop In this are*.
- c. Site-specific considerations ell*inate the need to consider load/equipment cOllblnatton.
- d. likelihood of handling 1ystr11 failure for this load Is extre.ely s.. 11.
- e. An*lysls demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not d..age safety-related equipment.
- 4. Plant Is shutdown. .0 I.
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QUA0-1-82-22!>-l
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- TABLE 2-lB LOAD/IMPACT AREA MAIRIX FOR EVALUATING CONSEQUENCES OF POSTULAJEO DROP OF HEAVY LOADS IN THE CONTAINMENT (CONT'D)
Overhead Load Handling Syste11 Heavy Load -
Maxt-Oescription Rated Location Oescript ion Wetght Safe Ftgure Ho. Safety Related frequency Hazard lhiclmess ol (Hark No.) Capacity (Elevation) (lb) LlfL for Equip11ent/C011ponents of*Lift2 EI i*inat Ion lmtflaCled (Ton) Height Lo~ Path Involved in Postulated (No./Yr.) Category3 Structure (fl. )I Drop* (In.)
Polar Gantry 230 Contairment RPV Head Lift Rig 14,SOO A-8 Reactor Pressure Cranes Bui Iding Vessel (RPV), fuel, (101.201) pri*ary sysle* pipiny, Internals Lift Ri~ 28,000 NA A-9 and RHR piping d HA Polar Crane Load 12,700 A-13 l Block Stud 2 Above RPV Head Stud Delensioner5 3,SOO NA Localed Delensioner with RPV head stud above Hoists on RPV Circular Head e&il Monorail (l04A,8,C; 204A,B,C)
Hobi I Cherry 12. S for Containment Stud Rack with 9 RPV 5 1.000 Pickers Crane 191 Building head studs l ' NA (191,291) and lS Operations '
NA A-14 for Crane Floor at Miscellaneous low 291 elev. 130' Htsc. '
*-*--~----*
- 1. lhe 111axi 111 w. safe lift height ts the height from which* the hHvy load **Y f*ll without rHulttng tn perforation, scabbing, or col lapu of the target structure. Drop of a heavy load fro* this height *ay result In loc;al daiuge (penelratton) *nd yteldlng of the l*pacled slab, but l~e slab possesses sufficient capacity to absorb the l1111act energy without exceeding.the --~lllUll ;allowiibl* ductility ratios defined tn Tiible 3 1.
- 2. The frequency of lift is for noraal plant operation.
- 3. Hazard Eli*ination Categories:
- a. Crane travel for this area/load cOllbination prohibited by electrical Interlocks or lll!Chanlcal slops.
- b. Syste* redundancy and separation precludes loss of capiibility of syste11 to perfora Its safety-related function following lhis lodd drop in this area. *
- c. S!te-~pecific considerations eli*inate the need to co~sider load/equipment cOllbination.
- d. L1kel1hood of handling syste11 failure for this load is extre11ely saall. (See section 2.2.4.l)
N I e. Analysis de*onstrates that crane failure and load drop will nol dilllage s;afety-related equip11enl.
...... 4. Plant is shutdown.
U1
-~~ ........-~-------* .-,--------..-....~ ~*- ~ --~----
~1------------------------------------
TABLE 2-18 LOAD/IMPACT AREA MATRIX FOR EVALUATING CONSEQUENCES OF POSTULAIEO DROP OF HEAVY LOADS IN THE CONTAINMENT (CONT'D)
Overhead Load Handling System Heavy Load Haxl11um De&criplion Rated Location Descrtpt ton Weight Safe Figure No. Sofety Related Frequency tlaurd Thlcknes ~ of (Mark No.) Capacity (Elevation) (lb). lift for Equipment/Components of lift 2 Eli111inalion lmpacte d (Ton) Height Load Path Involved in Postulated (No./Yr.) Category 3 Structur *e (ft. ) 1 Drop* (In.)
.~
Polar Gantry 230 Contatrnnent Lower Internals 339,SOO NA None None 5 Low *C!i NA rane Building w/llft Rtg and Load (101,201) Block
- 1. lhe maximum safe lift height Is the height from which the heavy load *ay fall without resulting in perforation, scabbing, or collapse of .the target structure. Urop of a heavy load fro* this height *ay result in local damage (penetration) and yielding of the l*pacted slab, but the slab possesses sufficient capacity to absorb the iapacl energy without exceeding.the 11a~l*um allowable ductility ratios defined in Table 3-1.
- 2. The frequency of ltft ts for nor11al plant operation.
- 3. Hazard Ell*lnatton Categories:
- a. Crane travel for this area/load comiblnatton prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.
- b. System redundancy and separation precludes loss or capability of syste* lo perfor11 itli safety-related function following this load drop In this area.
- c. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load/equlJ>lll!nt cOllbination.
- d. Likelihood of handling syste* failure for this load Is extrl!llely s11all.
- e. Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not da11age safety-related equipment.
- 4. Plant ts shutdown.
S. There is not any fuel In the RPV.
N I
m 11111\JI I u*> *J) 11- '. -
TABLE 2-18 lOAD/IMflACT AREA MATRIX fOR EVALUATING CONSEQUENCES OF POSIULAIEO DROP Of HEAVY LOADS.
IN IHE CONIAINHENI (COHJ'O)
Overhe*d load Handling Systet1 Oescriplion Rated locat Ion DHcrtplton HHVY load We*ghl Sale Ftgure No. *Safely Related lhtdness of Frequency Hazard
( ... rk Ho.) Capacity (l levallon) (lb) lift for. (qut1>11ent/Co.ponenl* of lift 1 El l*lnallon Impacted (Ion) Height load Path Involved In Postulated (Ho./Yr.) Categorys Structure (ft.,. Drop 1 (In.)
Polar wntry 230 Containment RPV Head.lift Rig 14,500 A-8 Reactor Pre**ure Crane Building Ve**el (RPV), fuel, (101, 201) prt ..ry *Y*l.. piping, 1 d NA Internal* lift Rig 28,000 NA A-9 RCP. etc:. r I
.Polar Crane Load 12.100 A-ll Block Polar Gantry 230 Main Crane "'ilh lS Au11 Mhce llaneoua SH Flga.
See 8-4 low
- Thk Area*
10.!ii A Equii-nt figs. thru Hatch Jib 11-1. 8-1. 8-8 24 I
( 101,201) a-z. & 8-2. & 36 D 8-l 8-l 48 E Mobt le Cherry 12.S for Containment Picken CnM 191 Bui Id Ing 60
~4 108 G
"..L I (191, 291) and l!> Operations !>4 for Crane Floor al 291 Elev. UO'
- 1. lhe *a*imim sale llfl height 11 the height frOll Which the heavy load *ay fall without resulting In perforation, 1cabblng, or ce)lap1e of the target ~truclure. Drop of a ~eavy load frOll this height aay result In local d,...ge (penetration) and yielding of the Impacted 1111>>, IMlt ~
slab possessu *ufflclent C*INC_lty to absorb the t11p1ct energy 111lthout eaceedlng_the ~*-allowable ducttllty rettoa deflnecl tn 111>>1* l-1.
- 2. The frequency of lift 11 for no,..1 plant operation.
- l. Hazard Ell*tnallon Cetegorle1: ,C)
- a. Crane travel for lhl1 area/load colllllnatlon prohlblt-4 by electrical Interlocks or aechanlcal slops. c
- J>
- b. Sysltt1 redundancy and seperatlon precludes loss of capability of 1y1tea to perfora Its safely-related function following this load 0 I
drop In lhl* *r~a. ......I
- c. Site-specific conslderatlon1 elt*lnate the need lo consider 1olld/equl.,.ent colllltnallon.
- d. Likelihood of handljng systea failure for this load ts extre11ely s*all (see section 2.2.4.l). CD l11
- e. A~y1ls dellonstr*t.* thel crane failure and load drop wlll not da1W1ge 1afely-rel~led equl.,.enl. I 0
- 4. For def inlllon of areas, see figure 1-4 thru 8-8. 0
~
). The plant le In op*r*tlOQ.
QUA0-1-81
- 72!.-b
\.
lABlE 2-lC LOAO/lMPACl AREA MAIRIX FOR [VAlUAllNG CONSCQUENCES Of POSIULAllO DROP Of HEAVY LOADS OUTSIUl CONlAINHlNI ANO SPCNI fU[L HAHDLING AREAS Overhead Load Handling System Heavy load tt.xl-Oescript ion Rated location
- Description Weight Sale figure No. S*fety Related Frequency HH1rd lhicltness of (Mark No. ) Capacity (Elevation) (lb) lift. for Equlp11ent/eomponents of ltfl 1 EI l*I n.t ion l1111*cted (Jon) Helghl lo*d PAth Involved in Postulated (No./Yr.) Category 1 Structure (ft.) 1 Drop (In.)
18T Grove 18 Roof of MbcellHeous (See (See A-1!> Safety-related 2 e 20 -ArH A4 Crane (194 & l94A)
Au11ili1ry Bui !ding El. 140'*
Flq.
1-9) f lg.
1-9) equls-nt on lhe floors below r
24 -ArH B~
Pemin. & Ion 6 Au11i li1ry Leid filled Plugs 10,000 22 Above A-16* eve system control 2 e "-el. 102' Exchanger Bui ldi!!\I EI. 102' c~les running in Service EI. 122 l\ Above Tr1ys 1A418, 1A420 22-EI. 122' Honorai I El. 122' 2Ml8; 2A420 (121,221) Concrete Floor Plugs S,uoo 2 Spent Fue I 4 Au11il l1ry filler &filler Bell l,500 1 A-11 COllpOnenl cooling ~ater 2-1 e 22 Pit Filler Bui ldtny he*t exchanger & assoc-
~and I iny EI. 100 i1ted piping on the ele-Honorai I v*tion below. Nearby llll,2ll) **fety-related cables (not directly below the dropped It fl.)
- l. lhe *a*l~u. safe lltt helghl 11 the helghl from ~lch the heavy lo*d ..y fall wllhoul resulting In perforation, 1c*bblng, er collap1* of th*
l*rgel structure. Drop of
- he*vy*lo1d from lhl1 height ..y result In loc*I d...ge (penetration) and yielding of the Impacted 1leb, but the slab possesses 1ufflclenl capacity to ebsorb the impact energy ~lthout eaceedlng.lhe ... 1111111 alloweble dtlctlllty r*tlo1 defllled I* ~at.I* J-1.
- 2. lhe frequency of llfl is for no,..I pl1nl operation.
- 3. Haiard Eli*inallon C1tegortes: 0 c:
- a. Crane tr*vel for this 1rea/lo1d cOllbinatlon prohibited by electrica1 Interlocks or ..chanical stops. ):>
0
- b. System redund1ncy and separ*tlon prec1udes loss of capability of system to perfora its 11fely-re1ated function foll0111ing this load I drop in this 1re1. * ......I
- c. Site-specific consider1tion1 eli*in1le the need lo consider load/equij>llent cOllbination. CX>
- d. Likelihood of hand1ing syste8 f*i1ure for this 1oad is exlreme1y s.. 11. U1 I
- e. ~n1lysis demonstrates th*t crane f*i1ure and 1oad drop_wl11 not damage s1fet~-re1ated equiPlll!nt. 0 0
N 4. For definition of 1reas, see figure 1-9. ~
I
~
CD QUAU-1-e2-22s-1
TABLE 2-lC LOAO/IMPACI AREA HATRIX FOR lVALUAllNG CONSEQUENCES OF POSTULAIED DROP Of HEAVY LOADS OUTSIDE CONIAINMENl AND SPENT FUEL HANDLIMG AREAS (CONT'D)
Overhead Load Handling Syste11 He.vy Lo*d Description Rated Lou ti on Descript.ion Weight S1l1 figure No. Sdely Rel*led frequency Hu*rd Thickness of (tt.rk No.) Capacity (E lev.t ion) (lb) llfl for Equip11enl/C011Ponenls of Ltfl1 Ell*in1lion l11p1cted (Ton) Height Loild P*th Involved in Postulated (No./Yr.) C1tegory:1 Structure (ft.,. Drop (In.)
Reactor 4 Aux i 1iuy filler l filter Bell 3,!>>00 12 A-11 18 and 28 Notor Control Z-3 e . 24 Coolant Ion Buildi~ Center &Aa*oci*ted Exchanger &
f i Iler El. 100
. Cable lr*ys Handling Underhung Bridge Cr*ne (ll4,2l4)
Reflieling 4 Aux ii i*ry Filter l Filter Bell 3,500 1 A-11 Possible lo*d swing 2-] e 22 Waler Puri- - tnto liquid w*ste.
f icalion & Component cooling heilt Concentrate exch*nger and *ssoc-f i Iler leted piping on the Handling elev*tion belo.1 Honorai I*
( 118,238)
- 1. lht ***1*1111 s1fe llft height ts the height fr1111 which the heevy lo*d **Y fall without resulting In perfor1llon, sc1bblng, or collap1* of the tugel 1lruclure. Drop of a heavy load froe this height uy result In local dilUge (penetraUon) and yielding of the impKted 1lall, but the sl1b pQHHHI 1ufflcl1nt. capeclty to ebsorb the I.peel energy without excndlng.lhe ...1-allowlble ductlllt.y rat.101 *fined la Tebl* J-1.
- z. The frequency of lift is for no.... 1 pl*nt operetion.
- l. Hazard lli*inatlon Cetegorles:
- a. Cr*nt trav~I for this eree/loid cOllbln1tlon prohibited by electric11 interlocks or .echilnic*I stops.
- b. Sysle11 redundancy 1nd seper1tton precludes loss of c*pability of syslell to perto... Its sefety-rel*ted function following this lo1d drop in this *rH.
- D c
- c. Site-specific conslderetlons eltatn1te the need lo consider load/equtp111nt cOllblnetton. )>
- d. Likelihood of h1ndllng systea f1tlure for this lo1d ts extrt11ely saall. 0 I
- e. An*lysls demonstretes th1t crene feilure Ind lo*d drop will not di1Mge Hfety-releted equ*lp111nt. ......I CD U'I I
0 N 0 I ~
ID QUAD-1-82-22~-8
lABLE 2-lC LOAD/IMPACl ARCA MA1RIX FOR (VALUA11NG CONSEQUENCES OF POSJULAIED DROP OUlSIDE CONlAINHlNl AND SPLNI FUEL HANDLING AREAS (CONl'U) or HEAVY LOADS Overhead Load Handling Sysleti HHVY Load
.... 1 -
Descripl ion Rated Location Description Weight Safe ~tgure No. Safety Related Frequency Hazard lhickneH ~f (Mark No.) Capacity (Elevation) (lb) Lift for EquiJ111ent/Ce>11ponents of lifl 1 E1l*hw1Uon Impacted (lon) Height load Path Involved in Postulated (No./Yr.) Category 3 Structure
- (ft. ) I Drop (In.)
Sol id 20 Au1d I iary large Cask* 2~.000 14-ArH 84 Piece* of **fe Z-l 22 Area A4 Aadwasle Ouildi~ I *a*. '9-ArH A" shutdown equipi1ent al OverhHd EI. 100 El. 84', such as con- Area 1 4 Crane (lll) Portable O.in. 9,000 14-Area 1* A-17 tain.ent spray PllllPS e See 12 ' 22, charging PllllP llote Hitt.iln Casks lid 9,500 2ft-ArH A* B-10 * *21, associated piping and electric cables '
Charging 2.4!'>/ Au*il iary Upper Centr. Chuging 4,900 Associated Che*ical Voll9C!
Jf Monorai Pump Is Bui !ding El. 84' PllllP CAsing Control (CVC) piping and vaste decon. tanks on the (241A,B,C) Aeclp. Charging Pimp 1,500 lit A-18 floor below 2 e 28 Motor Aeclp. Charging PUip 2.~00 Coupling Contai,_nl 2. l!'> Au1d liary Contai1111ent Spray 4,000 l\ A-18 Associated contal1111ent 2 e 20 Spray Piap Bui !ding Pump Motor spray piping. Che*ical Monorai I~ u. 84' Volume Contro1 (CVC)
(242A, 8) System and service vater piping and vital cable trays on the floor below
.0 c:
)>
- 1. lht *a*l*um safe llfl height Is the height from lldllch the heavy load ..y fall vllhout resulting In perforation, scabbing, or ce11apse of the 0 target structure. Drop of a heavy load from this height **Y result In local da11ag1 (penetration) and yleldlng of the Impacted *lab, but t~ I
.....I slab possesses sufficient capacity to absorb the Impact* energy ~llhoul exc1edlng_lhe llAJClllllll allllllfabla ductlltty ratios defl....S In Table .J 1.
CD
- 2. lhe frequency of lift Is for nul"llll plant operation. U1 I
0
- l. Hazard (li*inatlon Categories: 0
- a. Crane travel for this area/load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or lll!Chanlcal stops.
N b. ~y~tl'll redund*ncy and separation precludes loss of capability of sysleti to pertor. Its safety-related function foll0111ing this load """'
I N drop in this *rea.
0 c. Sile-specific considerations eli*lnate the need lo consider load/equip1tent cOllblnatlon.
- d. I illelihood of handling systea fatlure fOf' this .load is extre11ely s*all.
- e. Analysis dH10nslrales that crane fat lure and load drop "ill not da*age safely-related equipment.
- 4. lor lleflnlllon of areH, He figure B-10.
~. 1hl'fe Is a thick supporting vall belOlll the floor slab.
QUAD-1-u2- 22~..- 'J
---11:ra't1.r ..... ,., '
TABLE*Z-lC LOAO/IMPACI AREA HAIRIX FOR EVALUATING CONSEQUENCES Of POSIULAIED DROP OF HEAVY LOADS OUTSIDE CONTAINMEMI AND SPlNI IUCL HANDLING AREAS (COHl'D)
Overhead Load Handling Sysle*
~escripl ion R.ited Loe.it ion Description Heavy Lo*d Weight Sale Figure No. Safely Related frequency Huard Thickness of (Mark No. ) Capacity (Elevation) (lb) Ult for Equip!lenl/Co.ponenls of Li ft 1 Eli*ln.llon Impacted (lon) He\ghl loM Path Involved in Postulated (No./Yr.) Category2 Structure (fl. ) I Drop (In.)
Seal Water 4 Au1d1iary Filter &Ftlter Bell ],SQQ CJ l/] A-18 W*ste gas compressor Z-J e 28 Inject ion & Building and cable trays on the Return f i Iler El. 84' elevation below
~norai 15. r (143, 243)
Auxiliuy 1.£1!'> Aux i 1iary Motor Ortven PUllP 4,400 fHdwaler Building Pumps [1. 84' ] A-18 lledundan~ Air Suppy z e 22
'4onorai h oo elevation below (244A,B,C) Turbine Drtven Pimp 3,300 COllflonent l.60 Auxiliary C011ponent Cooling Z,6!'>0 8 A-18 Waste holdup tanks, 2 e 22
- 28 Coo I ing Pump Building Pimp Motor 110nltor tanks, vital
'4onorai Is [I. 84 cable trays and (24!'JA,8,C) service water piping on elevation below Safety lnjec- l. 3 Auxi 1lary Safety Injection Z,4!'>0 4 A-18 S*fely Injection pimp 2 e&b 22 lion PllllP Building Pump Motor and piping Honorai h El. 84 (246A,B)
- 1. lhe *axl*U11 safe llfl height Is lht helghl frOll which the heavy load ..y fall without resultl1111 In perforation, scabbing, *r collap1* of the ,c:i.
target structure. Drop of 1 heavy load fr1111 this height .ay result In local dil9age (penetration) ind yleldlflll of the Impacted 1191>>, but the c
~lab possesses sufficient capacity lo absorb the i!lpact energy without exceeding.the ... 1.... *ll0111able ductility r*tlo1 deftlled I* T.i.le J-1. '.J>o 0
I
- 2. The frequency of lift Is for no.... 1 plant operation. ......I
- 3. Hazard Eli*ination Categories: a>
ll'
- a. Crane travel for this area/load cOllblnalion prohibited by electrical interlocks or 11echanical slops. I
- b. Sy~le* redundancy *nd separation precludes loss of c*pabllity of system lo perfora Its s*fely-relaled function followtng this load 0 drop in lhts area. 0 N
N I
c_
d.
Site-~peciflc considerations ell*inale the need lo consider load/equipiM!nl cOllbination.
Likelihood of h1ndling system failure for lhis load is extremely s*all .
- e. Analy~i~ d~nstrates lh1t crane failure and load drop will not da.age safely-rel*ted equipment.
QUAD-1-82-22~-10
TABLE 2-lC LOAD/IMPACT AREA MATRIX FOR (VALUATING CONSEQUENCES Of POSTULAT£D DROP Of HEAVY LOADS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENl AND SPENI FUEL KANOLING AREAS (CONl'O)
Overhead load Handling Sy1l.. He*vy lo*d MAlll111a Ducrlptton Ra led local Ion 0.1crlpt.lon W.lghl Sale figure No. S*fely Rel*led frequency Hazard lhlcltneu of (Mlrlt Ho.) Capacity (Elev.lion) (lb) Llfl for Equlp.enl/C011ponenls of LI ft' £1 l*lnalton Impacted (Ion) ltelghl Load Path Involved In Poslul*led (No./Yr.)- Caugory1 Slruclure (fl. ) I Drop (In.)
v 14cmoral 1 2.1s / Au11l llary llealdual Heat 1,9so I 2't Above lle1ldu*l he*t re111>val e ZZ-£1. 55 Serving Building lletioval P.-.a Motor £1. 55' (IHll) p1111p and piping ll. 55' and ~e~ E1. 55' r
[ 1. 45' OC.il." AcceH Plug 8,000 *~ l Above A-19 2 c Foundation (161A,B; 1~<>-llS'l. . ... .
El. ,,. ..... - EL 45 261A,B) i..sc. -1ti~
Service Weter 5 Service Water Service Water 6,000 >12 A-20 Service w*ter piping 12 e&b 84 Slralnen lnl*lte Structure Strainer and header & Int.It~
IMonor*I h *bove service bay pump suctions on
( 111A.B; w.ler strainer th9 elevation below 271A,B) El. 90' 801 Grove 80 Grove Service Water Service W*ter Con- 12,000 .. Service waler lnl*lte 12 24 Cuna (I'll) 225 Mer. lnl*ke Str.ucture crele Cover Plugs ll,500 1lructure - service
& 900 SerlH El. 112' (Hatchs MKPC-1 and waler piping *nd Merlc*n MKPC-2) he*der lo lnl*lte bay Crawler pump suctions on the Cr*ne (192) Service W*ter Pump 12,000 >l-Area A A-21 elev*tlon below 2 Service Water Pump ll,200 (See f lg. 2 e 24 Motor A-21)
- l. lhe *a*l*um safe lllt height Is the height from which the heavy load ..y fall without resulting In perforation, sc*bblng, er collep1e ef the C>
laryel structure. Drop of a heavy load from thl1 height aay result In local d;aa.ge (penetration) and yielding of the Impacted 1lab, but the c
- l>
\l1b possesses sufficient capacity to absorb the Impact energy without exceedlnt.tba ... 1... allG111able ductility rat.101 4eftlled I* 1.atl* 1-1. 0 I
- 2. The frequency of.lift 11 for no,..1 plant oper*llon. ......I
- l. Ha1ard Ell*lnatlon C*legorles: m
- a. Crane travel for l~l1 *re*/load cOllbln*llon prohibited by elec:trlc*l l~terloc~1 or mechanical slops. U1 I
- b. Sy,lem redund1ncy and sep*r*tlon precludes los1 of capability of syslea to perfona Its safety-related function following this load 0 drop In lhls *re*.
- C>
~
N c. Slte-,~ciflc conslder*llons ell*ln*le lhe need lo consider load/equlp.ent cOllbln*lton.
I N d. lllt~llhood of h*ndllng 1y1l.. failure for lhls load Is e11tremely , .. 11.
N e. Analy1ots detlonst.rates that crene. failure *nd load drop w111 *not d*age Hfety-relaled equipm.nt.
QUA0-1-82-22~*11
..... ,_,, t
TABLE 2-lC LOAD/IMPACT AREA MATRIK FOR EVALUATING CONSEQUENCES Of POSlULAllO DROP Of HEAVY LOADS OUISIDE CONTAINf4ENl AND SPENT FUEL HANDLING Afl(AS (CONl'D)
~-
Overhe*d lo*d H*ndllng Sys le* He*vy lHd Mlxl111m Description Rated location 0.1crtptlon Weight Safe ftgure Mo. Safety llel*led frequency Hazard Thickness of (Mtirk Mo.) Cap.ctly (E levalton) (lb) llfl for Equipment/Component~ of Uftl Eltalnatton lmpac.ted (Ion) Height Lo.d Path Involved In Po~tutated (Mo./Yr.) C*tegorya Structure (ft.>' Drop (In.)
1900 Serles 22~. Service Water Traveling Scr..n1 17,125 A-21 Service llHller tnleke 111
~rlcan lcr-ter Intake Structure lh. 112 ' 122' fl5h Gal* l,000 12-Area A structure -.*ervlce veter piping and 12
- 24 '
k:nne ( 192) 12-Area B hHder & Intake r Z-Area C pay pump section*
(See fig. on the elevation A-21) belOlll
- 1. lhe *axi~u* safe lift heighl ts the height frOll which the he*vy load llAY fall vlthout re1ultlng tn perforation, 1cabbtng, or cellap1e of the largel structure. Drop of 1 heavy load from this height ~y result In local d...g* (pe,..tratton) and yl*ldlng of the l111>act*d 1lab, but the slab possesses sufficient capacity to absorb the l11p1ct ener.w. without exceeding.the 11AJ1l11&111 allaweble ductility ratios dettllell In Table J-1.
- 2. lhe frequency of ttft ta for nor11al plant operation.
- 3. Hazard Eli*lnallon Categories: c
- a. Crane lr*vel for thl5 *r*a/load cOllbtnatlon prohibited by el*ctrlca1 lnt*rlock5 or 11echanlca1 *lop5.
- b. Sy\le. redundancy and *eparatlon pr~lude1 lo** of capability of *Y*teta to perfof'll It* **f*ty-related function following thi* lo*d drop in this *rea.
- c. Sile-specific con5fderatlons ell*lnal* the need to con*lder load/equl..-nt cOllblnatton.
- d. Likelihood of handling *Y*~eta fallur* for thl5 load la e*tr... ly s.. 11.
- e. Analy\is deeonstrate5 lhat crane f*llur* and load drop wilt not d...ge *afety-r*lated equipment.
£:)
c
)>
CJ I
~
I CX>
U1 I
0 I
0 QUAD-l-82-1l~*IZ
*J!ll!lll(i'*.
TABLE 2-2A EKCLUOED OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTCMS IN lHE VICINllY Of FUEL SIORAGE POOLS Overhead load Handling System Lo.d Description Ra led Location OeiCrlplion Mui- Safely Ael*led Equlp11enl/ frequency Re*son for Excluslon 1 (Mark No.) C1pacily Weight CC111POnenls Involved In or Litt' (lon) (Lb.) Poslul*led Drop (No./Yr.)
Sir. i-.er Fi l ler 2 Fuel !Mndllng Skl-r Fii ter 1.200 None 6 C*legory A ' B I.Jib Crane, 90° Blclg. El. 100' Swivel Jib (113.213) .
Fuel Hand I Ing l. 13 f ue I !Mnd ll ng Fuel EleMnt & Fuel 2.200 Spent fuel In Spent Fuel Pool l C*tegory A
~nne. Seai- Bldg. ll. 130' llilndllng Tool Gantry (112,212)
- 1. The frequency of lift Is for norlhlll pl*nt operation
- 2. Reason for Exclusion:
Category A: Carry light loads only (2.200 lbs. or less)
C1legory B: No s*fely related equl1111ent/cC111POnents Involved In dropped lift Category C: Adltlnislrallve control
- 3. Crane is being rated lo this IOll'er c~*clty (reference 2-1)
CJ c
- J>
CJ I
t--'
I 00 U1 I
N o I O N ~
QUA0- } Wr l
--**-*-~"\*~ ....... ,., '
TABLE Z-2B EXCLUDED OVERHEAD LOAD HAHflLING SYSTEMS IN THE CONTAl ...ENI Overhud Load Handling System La.d 0Hcrlplion Rated Location De1crlptlon .... 1... Safety Related Equli:i-ent/ f reqwnc y Rea1on for Exclusionl (Mark No.) Cdpacity Weight C011Ponents Involved In or Litt*
(lon) (lb.) Po1tulated Drop (Ho. /Yr.)
"-nlpulalor 1. fl Contehwent. Fuel Aultlhly 2,200 React.or *Ve11el and Exposed Fuel 1 Category_ A lcrane Aux Hoisl Operellng Deck an4 flature
~raveling Brid~ E1. 130' (103,203) r 0 - Service l Conteh-nt. ttot1t ..y be used t.o <SOO Hoitt currently cen travel 1 Category A I C Bridge (202) Bldg. Unit. 2 ral1e light objects slightly ov~r the Reector (Holst seldoll used since Into the cavity Veuel construct ion. lhe craM Is during refuel Ing and above the contal,...nt spray lo repl*ce sect.Ions piping which retrains its of the contaln.ent use at lower elevations.
1pray piping. lifts are only ..de In the wlndolil area.)
- 1. Tlw frequency of lift 11 for nor-.1 plant. operation
- 2. Ruson for Exclusion:
Category A: Carry light loed1 only (2,200 lb1. or le11)
Category B: No safety relaled equlp.ent/cG111>0nent1 Involved In dropped lift Category C: Adlllnlslrallve control
- l. Crane Is being rated t.o t.hl1 lower capeclt.y (reference 2-1)
.0 c
)>
0 I
......I (X)
V>
I C>
C>
QUAD-1-82-22~-2
lABLE 2-2C EKClUOEO OVERHEAD LOAD HAHDllttG SYSJCMS OUTSIDE CONIAIHMlNJ AND SPlNI JUEL HARDLIHG AREAS
- o~erhead load Handling System Load Description Rated Location De.cription Maiii*u. Safely Related [qui!>llenl/ Frequency Rea1on for Exclu~ion 2 (Mark Ho.) Capacity Weight C011Ponenls Involved In or un*
(Jon) (Lb.) Postulated Drop (No./Yr.)
Boric Acid l Aux. Building Drum of Boric Acid l2!> Boric Acid Batching Equi.-.nt ]0 Category A t Batching Mono- (I. 122' rail (122,222)
Sten Generator 4 Aux. Bui Jding Service Be11 and 3,500 None 2-] Category 8 '
8 Jowdown f ii ter [I. 122' filter 1 "°norai I (123,223)
Hatchway 6 Aux. Building Mi see 11 aneous ~o.ooo None Category B (lifts are only Monorai I Wa 11 El. 100' Electrtcal and ude through the hatchway Mounted ~ Unit 1 only." Mechanical EquiPMnt to El. 100'. The Aux.
l~O Bldg. slab below the
.... opening has only ellbedded drains.)
Diesel Genertlor .75 Diesel Genera* Diesel Ge~ralor <l,000 Diesel Fuel 011 Tanks are on the 2 Category A Monorails tor AOOll in . P.rts floor belov these lift points.
(132 A,B,C; Aux. Building 212 A,8,C) EI. 100' Oecon RoOll 1. Jl Decon Ro1111 in Parts being deconned <1,000 lhere is not any safe shutdown 40 Category A Overhud Crane Au11. Building equiPMnt below the lift on
( 13!1) Unit l only El. 100'. Jhere are aux. feed waler pimps and associated piping and wiring on the floor below.
A:>
c:
)>
- 1. The frequency of lift is for noraal plant operation 0 I
~
Z. Reason for lxclusion: I Category A: Carry light loads only (~.200 lbs. or less) CX>
U1 N Category 8: No safely related equipment/c1111ponents involved In dropped lift I N
I Category C: Adilinistraltv~ control 0 O'I 0
- l. Crane is being rated to this lover capacity (reference 2-1) ~
QUA0-1-82-22!1-l
'I lo..-~*****
TABLE 2-zc EXCLUDfD OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OUTSIDE COHTAIHMCNI AHO SPENT fUEl HANDLING AREAS (COHJ'D)
Overhead load Han~llng Sy, lea LOAd
_,euriptfon A.led loullon De~crlptlon Ma*l*um Safely Related lquipmenl/ Frequency Re11on for £aclu,ion1
(,..rlt No.) Capacity Weight CC111Ponent1 Involved In Of litt 1 (Ton) (lb.) Pa.tu11ted Drop (No./Yr.)
liquid Waste 1 Aua. Butldlng Liquid W11te hap. <1,000 There 11 1u11. feed w1ter P191P 1 C1tegory A
~vap. Mononl 1 UnH 1 only. P1rta piping 1nd wiring on the floor (136)
Above liquid WHte hap. . belw.
El. 100' r
Boric Acid . 1!) Au11. But ldlng Boric Acid hep. <l,000 There *re SI PlllllP* *nd 111oclated 1 C.legory A
"'"'°r* ti ( ll1) Unit l only. Part1 piping 1nd wtrfog, COllpnnlve
£I. 100' cooling pmp1 *nd he*t e11changers and a11oct1ted piping and wiring' on the elev1llon below.
Spent fuel Pit . 55 Au11. Building Spent F*I Pit PllllP 905 Pu.pi ..Y a. *v*d over operable 2 C1tegory A P11111p Monor~tl EI. 84' pmp1. Vll*I cable* on elevation (247) belw.
Monor1ll Above . 75 Aull. Bui ldlng Acceu tt.lch <l,000 Waste Drain* Plplng-V11ve Pit 112 Category A Waste Monitor 11. 64' Valve Pit (15.1,251) ltlmorall s~ 2 Aua. llutldlng Re1ldu1l Heat Re.ov*I l,9!>0 None 2 Category B
- usz,zsi ~ El. 64'. Pmp Motor Above SS'
~""' c})J ~ Acceu Cover .c>
c:
- l>-
0 I
- l. The frequency of l"itt 11 for norul pl1nt operation ......
I
- 2. Reason for Exclusion: co Cateyory A; Carry light lo1d1 only (2,200 lb,. or leis) 1.11 I
N. Category 8: No 1afety ,..11ted ~ulp.ent/c011ponent1 Involved In dropped lift I
N Category C: Adllllnl,lratlve control ...
0 0
QUAO- l-8Z- 22!>
- 4
aumy;-*** *. ~
TABLE 2-2C EKCLUOlD OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OUTSIDE COHJAINMENT AHO SPENT fU[L HANDLING AREAS (COllT'O)
Overhead Load Handling SystM load Pescrlplion Rated locatton De1crlptton Meal- Safety Related Equlpilent/ .frequency leas on for hcluslonl (Mark No.) Capacity Weight C011pOnents Involved In Of ltft 1 (Ton) (lb.) Po1lul*led Drop (No./Yr.)
~In Turbine 200 ... In Turbine Area ,._., low Prenure None l/Z Category B Area Gantry 2!> AUit EI. 140' .Turbine Rotor
"'r*ne (181)
Aux. Turbine 110 Main Turbine Area ...., low Pr***ure None l/Z Category 8
~rea Crane 2!> Au1t (I. 140' Turbine Rotor '
(281)
~In feed Wahr 10 Turbine Area feed Water Pump None l Category B Pimp Monoral h Unit 2 only. Turbine -
(282 A,8) El. 100' Station Air 10 Turbtne Area Slatton Air None l Category B ICompreuon Unit l only. C011pre11or1 Motor Monorails El. 100' (18J A,l,C)
Service 81dg. 10 Service Bldg. <20,000 None Category B MonoraH (I. 100' (Near llevator:)
(184)
Crane and 10 Servtce Bldg. <20,000 None Category 8 Monoral I El. 100' Sy*l- (18!>)
.C>
c:
)>
lhe frequency of lift I* for noraal plent operation 0
- l. I for [1tclu*lon:
- 2. Rea~on I Cateyory A: Carry light load* only (2,200 lbs. or less) co Ul Category 8: No ~afety related equlpment/cQ11Ponent1 Involved In dropped ltft I I
CD Category C: Adlllnl*trattve control c C*
QUAD- l-82-22!>-!>
lfi:f:J:!S'.:~/* .. -. -
TABLE Z-ZC EXCLUDED OVERHEAD LOAD HANDLING SYSICHS OUISIDE COHIAlffilENJ AND SPEHI FUEL HANDLING AREAS (COHT'O)
Overhead Load Handling Sysle* Load Description
- Rated lout ion Desert pt ion Ha*i*um Safety Related Equip11ent/ frequency Rea1on for E11clusion1 (tt.rk No.) Capac:ily Weight C011ponents lnvol¥ed In Of Lift 1 (Jon) (Lb.) Postulated Drop (No./Yr.)
Ma tntenance s CIHn hct1ilf None Category I Shop Crane Bldg. El. 100 IUecellaneoua Hbc (186)
MainleMnce s Controlled IUecelleneoue <Z0,000 None Category B Shop Crane hci ltty Bldg.
(187) r
- 1. The frequenc:y of lift is for no1'11al plant operation
- 2. Reason for E11clusion:
Category A: Carry light loads only (2,200 lbs. or less)
Category B: Ho safety related equip11ent/c011pOnents involved in dropped lift
_Category C: Administrative control
.0 c:
)>>
0 I
I N <X>
f U1 N I
'° _,.
0C>
QUAO-l-82-22!i-6
'I
- . \
**r-~**-*..,,,**
- *:. ~**
3.0 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING PLANT STRUCTURES Analytical met~ods used in the evaluation of plant structures subjected t~ the impact from heavy load drop are briefly described in this sectio~.
These include the methodologies for: a) evaluating the local damage-of the target structure due to the heavy load drop and b) evaluating the overall response of the target structure subjected to combined dead load, live load, and the impact load due to postulated heavy load drop.
The structural analysis of ,the impacted roof slab, floor slabs, and the basemat consisted of the following steps:
0 Determine impact velocity and energy \;
o Evaluate penetration and scabbing o Determine fesistance-diJplacement (elastic-plastic) relationships of the impacted structure by using yield-line theory 0 Evaluate reaction shear 0 Determine effective target structure mass 0 Determine kinetic energy absorbed by the impacted structure 0 Determine ductility demand of the impacted structure.
The extent of local damage to concrete structures such as floor or roof slabs was determined using empirical formulae which define the penetration depth and thicknesses necessary to prevent perforation (complete penetration) aryd scabbing. Based on test data, industry practice, and the results of comparative studies (references 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3), the modified National Defense Research Co~i~tee (NDRC) formula was chosen to predict the local damage. The modified NDRC formula given in reference 3-1 was used to determine the penetration.depth of the missile (i.e., heavy load) into the concrete target, the perforation thickness (the maximum thickness of a target that a projectile with a given impact velocity will completely penetrate), and the scabbing thickness (the thickness of the structure required ta prevent scabbing of material from the rear face) .
- 3-1
QUAO-l-85-004 For the purpose of determi~ing its resistance-displac~ment character-istics, the target structure was assumed to behave as an elasto-plastic system as represented by a bilinear resistance-displacement function.
The maxim~m resistance Rm or collapse load for reinforced concrete slabs was determined by using the yield-11ne method of analysis (references 3-7 and 3-8). The maximum resistance Rm of concrete and st~el beams subject to the applied load was obtained based on limit or plastic structural analysis theory (references 3-8 and 3-9).* For concrete beams and slabs, the ultimate moment capacity Mu was calculated according to the ACI Code 318 (reference 3-6). For steel beams, the ultimate moment was calculated according to the AISC Code, part II (reference 3-10). Adjustments.were -;~*
made for dead and live loads that are present on the target structure and act concurrently with the impact loads.
The possibility of premature shear failure of the concrete walls and slabs was investigated to ensure that these components can develop the *
- flexural strain energy capacity defined by the resistance-displacement function. To accomplish this, the reaction shear capacity of the components was determined according to the applicable criteria of ACI Code 318 (reference 3-6), which was compared to the shear demand corresponding to the maximum flexure resistance of the component.
In order to determine the global response of the target structu.re, its inertial resistance or "effective mass" was computed. Since an under-estimation of the target mass leads to a conservative estimation of the energy transmitted to the global response of the target structure, a low effective mass was used in all cases.
Conservation of momemtum and energy were used to calculate the kinetic energy transmitted to the structure and the maximum displacement of the structure. For the case of a heavy load drop upon a concrete slab, the impact was treated as a 11 plastic 11 impact (references 3-1 and 3-4) .
- 3-2
QUAD-1-85-004
- After determining the amount of kinetic energy absorbed by the target and the target*resistance displacement curve, the ductility demand was calculated.* Ductility demands due to other loads present (i.e., dead and live loads) supported by the target structure were also considered.
The safe drop heights presented in tables 2-lA, 2-18, and 2-lC were selected so the computed ductility demands are less than the allowable ductility ratios defined in table 3-1. .
- 3-3
QUAD-1-85-004 Table 3-1. Allowable Ductility Ratios REINFORCED CONCRETE Maximum Allowable Value of*
The Ductility Ratio µi Flexure Beams 0.10 < 10 p-p*
Slabs 0.10 < 30 p-p*
where p is the ratio of tensile reinforcement= As
- bd p 1 is the ratio of compressive reinforcement= A's bd Compression Walls and Columns 1. 3 STEEL ELEMENTS Flexure, compression, and shear for members proportioned 20 to preclude lateral and local buckling STEEL COLUMNS
~roportioned to preclude elastic buckling 1.3 STEEL TENSILE MEMBERS*
eu Stressed in tension only o.s e-Y where eu =ultimate uniform strain 2 ey =yield strain 1
Based on references 3-1, 3-4, and 3-5.
2 Ultimate uniform strain is the strain at ultimate stress.
3-4
QUA0-1-85-004 4.0 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING REACTOR VESSEL The nonlinear dynamic analyses used to evaluate the reactor vessel subjected to the impact from the accidental heavy load drop are briefly_
described in this section. In order to envelope a variety of probable heavy load drop scenarios, the following three cases of heavy load drop onto the reactor vessel were evaluated:
- a. Case 1: 30-ft. flat and axisymmetric drop of the vessel head (with CROM, lifting rig, and the load block) ~nto the vessel flange of the open vessel.
- b. Case 2: 26-ft. inclined drop of the vessel head (with CROM, lifting rig, and the load block) onto the vessel flange such that the center of gravity of the dropping mass is vertically above the impact point on the vessel flange of the open vessel, and
- c. Case 3: 30-ft. flat and axisymmetric drop of the upper internals onto the open vessel through water (with lifting rig and the load block}, first impacting the top of the lower internals, then impacting the hold-down spring at the vessel flange.
The structural analysis and evaluation of the impacted reactor vessel consisted of the following steps:
o Determine drop weight and impact velocity, o Determine load-deformation characteristics of the reactor vessel support structure, o Establish a dynamic analysis model for each drop case, o Perform a nonlinear dynamic response analysis, and o Oe_termine the strain or ductility ratio, and compare these values with the acceptance criteria.
4-1
QUA0-1-85-004 l
For the purpose of determining the load-deformation characteristics of the Reactor Ve'Ssel (RV) support structure, a two-dimensional finite element model with the ANSYS computer code (reference 4-1) was used.
This idealized the actual RV support consisting of nozzles, nozzle support structures, pipes, and pipe restraint structures.
The model used for axisymmetrical drop analysis of vessel head was a multi-stick lump~d-mass model. A three-dimensional finite element model was used for the inclined drop analysis of the vessel head. A multi~stick lumped-mass model was used for dynamic analysis of the upper internal l.
l"
~
drop. t
- A transient dynamic analysis*was performed for each of the three drop
- cases using the three analytical models. The ANSYS computer code was used in these analyses. The actual impact phenomenon resulting from the free drop of the vessel head or upper internals was simulated using a procedure that allows starting the transient with a nonzero initial velocity imposed on the mass of the dropping object. The integration time step {ITS) or interval chosen for transient time-history analyses were based on the consideration of the highest frequency-of interest and the duration the non-linear elements remain elastic.
The effect of dead weights was taken into account in these analyses by specifying a constant downward gravitational acceleration. Maximum deformation or strain af the critical components from time-history response analyses were obtained. The predicted ductility ratio or ductility demands, defined as the ratio of maximum deformation divided by deformation at yield strain, were computed for all critical components and compared with the acceptance criteria. The results of this evaluation are presented in table 4-1 for the critical components.
4-2
QUA0-1-85-004 Table 4-1. Summary of Results for the Reactor Vessel Subjected to Heavy Load Drops - -
Ductility Permissible Dema_nd or Ductility (Predicted Ratio or Drop Deformation) (Deformation)
Component ill! Description Nozzle 10.0 20 1 Axisymmetric Drop of Head 1.42 20 Vessel Shell Nozzle 12.9 20 2 Inclined Drop of Head \.
\
Vessel Shell 10.8 . 20 ~:>
- 1. 25 20 f4 f.a 3 Upper Internals Drop Nozzle Hold-Down Spring 3.2 20 Guide Thimble 16.0 20 Fuel Rods (0.09 in.) (0.16 in.) 1
- 1. Permissible deformation value is based on a strain limit of 1% for the Zircaloy fuel rod cladding (reference 4-2).
4-3
QUA0-1-85-004
5.0 REFERENCES
1-1 NRC letter of December 22, 1980, to all licensees of operating plants and applicants for operating licenses and holders of con-struction permits.
Subject:
1-2 Quadrex Report No. QUAD-1-81-933, revision 0, Six-Month Response for Control of Heavy Loads Units 1 and 2 Salem Nuclear Station, dated December 17, 1981.
2-1 PSE&G letter from E. A. Lider to S. A. Varga (NRC), dated 27 April 1984, subject: NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads Supplement to Six-Month Response," Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units No. l &
2, Docket Nos. 50-272 &50-311.
2-2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," USNRC Report NUREG-0612, January 1980.
2-3 Letter from PSE&G to NRC, subject: "Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, 11 Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Docket No. 50-272, dated July 21, 1978.
2-.4 Maintenance Procedures:
o Number MSC, Revision 16, Reactor Refueling o Number M28, Revision 3, Special Lifting Devices ;-..:..~--
o Number M2R, Revision 1, Control of Heavy Loads . __.;.::d
- _ . ..:.:=-::-..:-*.
2-5 Westinghouse Report No. WCAP-10167, Rev. l, "Evaluation of the Acceptability of the Reactor Vessel Head Lift Rig, Reactor Vessel Internals Lift Rig, Load Cell, and Load Cell Linkage tq the Require-ments of NUREG-0612, 11 fof Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Salem Generation Station Units 1 and 2, dated June 1984.
5-1
- 2-6 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants, 11 USNRC Report NUREG-055~, May 1979.
3-1 Structural Analysis and Design of Nuclear Plant Facilities, American Society of Civil Engineers, Manual No. 58, 1980.
3-2 Kennedy, R. P., 11 A Review of Procedures for the Analysis and Design of Concrete Structures to Resist Missile Impact Effects," Nuclear Engineering and Design, Volume 37, 1976.
3-3 "Full-Scale Tornado-Missile Impact Tests," NP-440, Electric Power Research Institute, July 1977.
3-4 Topical Report" BC-TOP-9'-A, "Design of Structures for Missi1e Impact, 11 revision 2, Bechtel Power Corporation, September 1974.
3-5 ACI 349-80, "Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures," American Concrete Institute.
3-6 ACI 318-80, "Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, 11 American Concrete Institute.
3-7 Wood, R. H., "Plastic and Elastic Design of Slabs and Plates," The Ronald Press Corporation, New York, 1961.
3-8 Ramakrishnan, V. ~nd Arthur, P. D., "Ultimate Strength Design for.
Structural Concrete," Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., London.
3-9 Lothers, J. E., "Advanced Design in Structural Steel," Prentice-Hall~
Incorporated, 1960.
3-10 "Manual of Steel Construction, 11 7th Edition, American Institute of
- Steel Construction.
5-2
QUAO-l-85-004
- ~
Swanson, J. A., "ANSYS - Engineering Analys.is Sys~ems User's Manual ,
11 4-1
-Swanson Analysis Systems, Inc., Revision 4.1.
4-2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Evaluating Strength and Ductility of Irradiated Zircaloy Tasks, 11 USNRC Report NUREG/CR-1729.
-' I
- 5-3
QUAD-1-85-004 APPENDIX A LOAD PATHS
't!'!
iit,!
_J A-1
QUAD-1-85-004
- -~
i.
r igure A-1. Load Path for Cask Handling Cranes 111 & 211 in the Fuel Handling Area <Yuel is loaded into the spent fuel shipping cas~ in the
- transfer pool. The cask is lifted from th'e pool, held over transfer peel until drained o( water, moved to the decon pit for Se3li~g 3~~
- !~<~')ntamination, and transferred to the receiving area for transpcrta::.:.on off site.)
A-2
QUAD-1-85-004
- -**-*--?~-*-
ri:
I It I r.J.,
~
~:Jlll'"\t-'~-r--=-'--l~i-J:'"""V'l""='"""'!ll~~
I I:::,~!-**"',*,.,. *1 .... ~
ll*tl*'f****-........
j, I
l*
r
~
- ' ~
(""'
rigure A-2. Load Path for Cask Handling Cranes 111 & 211 in the Fuel Handling Area (Plan at 130') (Fuel is loaded into the spent fuel shipping cask in the ,II..
- II
.~
transfer pool. The cask is lifted from the pool, held over
..!. ~-
..j. ~ ** ;.
trar.sfer pool until drained of j --1@
~ater, ~cved to t~e decon pit for sea:ir.g and cecon~a~ination, .-1
~~1 tr~~s[errec to the recetvi~g area for transportation off site.)
A-3
QUAD-1-85-0014
- ------~---
'**cc.,..... ,.,,,-*
~
-.re a.
~
(#
~
, ,.,. . ,,.. -**** F I
" *****I
~~*,_-::**&:*/;:!
. Z1' :I: t\~
I
- . h.,,,,*,...~
I I .
i
~
i I
Figure A-3. Load Path for Log 1~~
Gate Monorail Cranes 114 and 214 in the Fuel Handling Area. ..
(The transfer canal gates are lifted by an overhead hoist and 10
,lo moved ind;vtdually to their storage location beneath a
.... ~ .-
... -,. . _ __i._ I
-1@
hatch at the 130' elevation.
i~e canal gates must be lifted approximately 3 1/2 feet above elevation 130' to clear the wall around the fuel pool.)
A-4
- QUAD-1 0014 .
- HC..,.,_..,.,C.-..,_
,~~.,_,,...-.:,,:.-~
J ,,,....,...,, * .,,,,,.,~
... ~re*
,.._#,,.*r**-
c**., ***" -
u.*-Jf ,,,... l1Jll"1r'1 ...... a::s:::.,..,..
.,.. - '11.A* I* -U-.:....U,1
.1&...!l..***.
- #()11116 N11r fllAf'l#ll ~ti" r:=~=!+/-i:!
Figure A-4. Load Path for the Polar Cranes 101 & 201 1n the Containment for the Miss1*1e Shield, Fans, Plenum, Lift R1g, Box Beam, and Cableway Stru:ture iOnly Unit 2 is shown)
QUA0-1-85-004
- c*"
Figure A-5. Load Path for the Polar Cranes 101 & 201 in the Containment for the Missile Shield, Fans, Ple_num, Lift Rig, Box Seam, and Cableway Structure {Only Unit 2 is shown)
A-6
- ----*--~~
QUAD-1-85-004
- ~
~------
- c111r*
-**...- - /
Figure A-6. Load Area (shaded) for the Polar Cranes 101 & 201 1n the Contain~ent for the Access Hatchway and Equipment (Stud Rack, Stud Tensioners, Pump, Misc.
Rigging, etc. Stored Below and Brought to the Operation Deck.
El. 130'.)
A-7
QUAD-1-85-001.l Ir*
- ~-
'-'-- ---- if*
~~:=:.=.
-*r*'*=*'*l:I Figu!"e A-5a. Load Path fo!"
the Stud Rai:k wi:.h 9 RP\i Head Studs A-7a
- .,., QUAD-1-85-0014
~-,.-~~,-
- c**'*
\
Figure A-7. Load Path for the Polar Cranes 101 & 201 in the Containment for the Removable Walkway and Stairway (Only Unit 2 is shown.
A-8
QUAD-1-85-004 t.
--~---
~!W-figure A-8. Load Path for the a11~ +
r:* ~*:1*
- i-.. f:....,:k..t:b..::. :..
Polar Cranes 101 & 2C1 in the Ii~**
Containment for the RPV Head.
(Only Unit 2 is shown.)
l " ; .**--"i!-~-!!""'*!!I A-9.
- ----*-=....~
QUA0-1-85-004
- ~
t, .
--.-.~-
c---
-w*u=*re.a
~~ !.W -
--J~
Figure A-9. Loac Path for the iili~ +
~,1:!
Polar Cranes 101 & 201 in the Containment for the Upper Internals. (Onl:Y Unit 2* is
';.... f:: :~*-..;:,,
shown.)
A-10 l =-;;1--~-u:..
li.i-ii*
~" .
- QUAD-1-85-004
~-.*
t
- Hc*,.,....,C.-. 11.16'#.ll'a I": ... I* it **** ** ** .. : ...
- Figure A-10. Load Path for the Polar Cranes 101 & 201 in the Containment for the RCP, Motor Flywheel, RCP Motor, and Access Plugs. (Only Unit 2 is shown. All movements over the RPV are made with the head in place.)
QUAD-1-85-004 I
I
~ .
a..------
-~
Figure A-11. Load Path and Load Area (shaded) for the Polar Cranes 101 and 201 in the Containment for RCP, Motor Flywheel, RCP Motor, and Access Plug.
(Only Unit 2 is shown. All movements over the RPV are made with the head in place.)
A-12
QUAD-1-85-004 i
t i*
t~
_,,_._ .-<<,r** -
- c**r*
Figure A-12. Load Path for the Polar Cranes 101 & 201 1n the Containment.for the Equipment Hatch.
(Only Unit 2 is shown. The Equipment Hatch is moved to the storage cra.dle with the polar crane jib.~
A-13
QUA0-1-85~004
- .,*,,,I
(
,.,,,,-~,, ... -
~ .*
Figure A-13. Load Area (shaded) for the Polar Cranes 101 & 201 in the Containment for the Load Block.
(Only Unit 2 is shown.)
A-14
..,... QUAD-1-85-004 r
-*-~>--
- c**'*
,*. I
'~~
/ *./(..,
. /. ./.
~-. I
/ *.~.-
-n:m:_
Figure A-14. Load Area (shaded) for the Mobile Calion Cherry Pickers 191 & 291 in the Contain~ent upon the Operations floor. El. 130' (Only Unit 2 is shown).
A-15
L. __ rjp_
>I D
c
- JI>>
0 I
I Fleure A-15. Load ArP.a for the Mobile prove Cranes 194 & 194A on the ..,.
00 Auxiliary Building Roof. El. lllO'. (The Crane ls picked up by the Main 0 I
Turbine Building Crane and carried to the turbine deck area between the H.P. 0 t
turbines. It 19 driven from the turbine deck across the roof of the Service and Auxiliary Building to the designated lift positions near the Auxiliary liulldlng roof openings.)
- QUAD-1-85-QOij I
-1 LI~':
f .
I ~
Figure A-16. Load Path for the Monorails 121 & 221 in the Auxiliary Building. EL 122'
,* QUAD-1-85-004
~--
t ..
_J,
.'.~ .-*.*
~~n~:""ai:s 1
rigure A-17. L::3c! ;.:"eas ar.c Patl":s for the Cranes;::,::: 1
'3 1 ,_ ::.
233, 134, 23::, 138, and 233 in the Auxiliary 8uild~;.g. El. 1c::*.
A-18
~
QUAD-1-85-004
- i*
-~
I
+ ._,,_.
&It**
IU**
- .* *-C
/
- ---~
- 1.11.....-
- ~~:a::.:.'\-
....,.~ ...
c.;, *. **
- t:* **** ,
-:--r.
.,::~ ~*.~..
~!...., * ,
.~
-F:i
~,. '~ -:~::~
tf~- ':,/ 7*1
~ .. J
.: -.~
. ::;:{:! ..,#
,Q *
~
...... :** I
~--*
,: "1 i! ;
ii:.
- .. t: . -
.* \'
......... ............... ~ ~
- 0
.:l, 5 ;;
~*;;.
- f'
-* '. e~.
it ** J__ '"!,P
"~' \ ***~ ,: '
- j
\ #, - ...... ..
.. ' :.::.~* ** :.~. *.-;!.'
- "igure A-18. Load Pat~s for the M~ncrails 241A, ~. ~ C; - '".. _,..,. ~ S; 2ll4A, B, & C; 245A, S, & C; and 2~6A & 8 in the Auxil!ary A-19
-* QUAD-1-85-004 t--,. -*
i Loo: ?a:ns for the Monorails 161A & ~ and 26:~ ~ 3. --*
- ..-='
figure A-19.
A-20
QUAD-1-85-004 .
N~
l Control Room El. 133' I
Outside El. 112'
~ ~ [@] ~
J______ ---------
Stairway El 122'
~~0~~t~H2l~~~~~ig~
aaaaaa aoaaaaa Fig'.lr-e A-20. Load Pa:.~s for the Monorails 171A & 3 ar.: 271A & sin :.he Service Water Inta~e Structure. El. 90'.
A-21
QUAD-1-85-oo~
+
Control Room, El. 133 I Service Water Concrete Plug (Hatch MKPC-2)
Area A (Outside Yard.
El
- 112 I )
Service Wa~er Concrete Plug (Hatch MKPC-1)
Area C (Stairway. ****
El. 122 I) - + - - **
Area B **
- Traveling Screen (Traveling Screen **
Enclosure Area. ~~ ~ ~ ~ 8 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
f-a nDDDD 0 El. 112 1 ) 0 0 DD Fishgate figure A-21. Load Area and Paths fer ~he Grove Cra~e 193 an~ Cra~:er :r=~~
192 on ~he ServicP Water lntaKe Structure. E!s. 112' and 1?-*
A-2:
QUA0-1-85-004
- APPENDIX B SAFE DROP HEIGHTS AND ASSOCIATED AREAS i....
B-1
QUAD-1-85-004 8.0 7.
6.
5.
cc 4.
_./
..-4 Qj
==a. 3.
Q
...0
....cu Qj en 2.
1.
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 Heavy Load Weight (lbs)
For De~ini~ion of areas, see figures B-4 thru 3-9.
I Notes:
Figure 8-1. Safe Drop Heights for Heavy Loads or. Areas A, 8, !t E i:-: ~:-.e Containment upon the .Operation Floor while t:-:e Plant is Jpera:ir.g.
El. 130'.
- QUAD-1-85-004 80 70 60 50 ~
- -=c.c 40 I
~ .JI
- c. 30
,..0 Q
....C'O q,J Cll 20 10 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 Heavy Load Weight (lbs)
I Notes: For Definition of areas, see figures S-4 thru 8-8.
Fig~re B-2. Safe Drop Heights for Heavy Loads or. Areas D, C, L, & ~ 1~ ~~e Containment upon the Operation Floor while the Plant is Opera~i~e*
El. 130'.
B-3
- QUAD-1-85-00.I!
80 70 60 Area
- ~
50
- 4"'
4"'
oc 40
~
Q.I
=Q.
0
~
Q 30
....Ill Q.I i:n 20 10 20, 000 40,00U 60,000 80,000 l00,000 Heavy Load Weight (lbs)
I F~::*.. r<: 'i:.-3 * .:..:lf** ..,~;,;.;. i:.:::::r.i:3 f~r '"ie.vy ;..o,-:::s on ~rej ~: '~ t:-:~- ::::~1.:-.-*::.~
- i~-:;n the :iperatlor. Floor w~:il1: the ?lant is C~i~r.:ot~n~.
s-:.
- QUAD-1-85-00l4 r-=-=
I I
l I
I
- -=,._lt
-...r.
~*e*-----
L.--~---
Area
,<<*. . l"
"~*
"**~.:-J ,'
,~,
" I Figur*e B-4. Load Area A in the Containment on* the Operations Floe!".
El. 130'. (Only Unit- 2 is shown. For sare drop heights see figure B-1).
- QUAD-1-85-00~
\*.
r~ .;.
I
- ....*=*-.,,,,.--
I cu f!l*fw.----
1
~- .. .. --
<<: ,~*
-~~<<t~/
Figure B-5. Load Areas B and E in the Containment Upon th~ Opera~i~ns Floor~ El. 130'. (Only Unit 2 is shown. For sare drop heights see figure B-1.)
QUAD-1-85-00ll kt r~
I I
I I
'*='....,.."--
!I~*.----
k~* ,.
~~ .. .
~. .,, ,
'**~. ~,'
I
':a ,
I Figure B-6. Load Area O 1n the Containment Upon the Operations Floor.
El. 130*. (Only Unit 2 1s shown. For sare drop heights see figure B-2.)
QUAD-1-85-004 re::1:
I I
I
', ?J:""".-,,,,.
llll./Ur
' 1!1"'f t11. - - - -
- ~-
G L.------
Figure B-7. Load Area G in the Containment Upon the Operations Floor.
El. 130'. (Only Unit 2 is shown*. For safe dr*op heights see figure B-2.)
- QUA0-1-85-004
...,.. )
I I
I I
I I
,.=,,_II....... -
lllU4'
'l!'.ff/I. - - - -
I N
Area M k~* ,.
~~ .
-~~¥?
- Figure B-8. Load Areas L, M, & N in the Containment Upon the Ope~a~ior.s Floor. El. 130'. (Only Unit 2 is shown. For ~afe drop heights see figures B-2 and e-3.)
QUAD-1-85-00!l 120 100 80
- ~~_,
Slab Between Column Lines (AA) and (LL)
/
60 7c
.... ~
~ 40 1i c.
0 i..
Q QI co en 20 (LL) and (TT) 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 36,000 Heavy Load Weight (lbs)
Figure 3-9. Safe Drop Heights for Heavy Loa~s upon the Roof ~f :;.~
Auxiliary Building B-10
I) 't ~: .
QUA0-1-85-00~
Figure B-10. Load Area for Crane 131 in the Auxiliary Building. EL 1 OC'.
(For safe drop heights see table 2-1C.)
B-11