ML17269A285

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LLC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No. 147 (Erai No. 9041) on the NuScale Design Certification Application
ML17269A285
Person / Time
Site: NuScale
Issue date: 09/26/2017
From: Rad Z
NuScale
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of New Reactors
References
RAIO-0917-56203
Download: ML17269A285 (32)
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Text

RAIO-0917-56203 September 26, 2017 Docket No.52-048 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738

SUBJECT:

NuScale Power, LLC Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No.

147 (eRAI No. 9041) on the NuScale Design Certification Application

REFERENCE:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Request for Additional Information No.

147 (eRAI No. 9041)," dated August 05, 2017 The purpose of this letter is to provide the NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale) response to the referenced NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI).

The Enclosure to this letter contains NuScale's response to the following RAI Question from NRC eRAI No. 9041:

08.03.02-1 This letter and the enclosed response make no new regulatory commitments and no revisions to any existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions on this response, please contact Darrell Gardner at 980-349-4829 or at dgardner@nuscalepower.com.

Sincerely, Zackary W. Rad Director, Regulatory Affairs NuScale Power, LLC Distribution: Gregory Cranston, NRC, OWFN-8G9A Omid Tabatabai, NRC, OWFN-8G9A Samuel Lee, NRC, OWFN-8G9A : NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information eRAI No. 9041 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvalis, Oregon 97330, Office: 541.360.0500, Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

RAIO-0917-56203 :

NuScale Response to NRC Request for Additional Information eRAI No. 9041 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvalis, Oregon 97330, Office: 541.360.0500, Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

Response to Request for Additional Information Docket No.52-048 eRAI No.: 9041 Date of RAI Issue: 08/05/2017 NRC Question No.: 08.03.02-1 Question 1:

In FSAR, Tier 2, Figures 8.3-8a and 8.3-8b, Normal Direct Current Power System, Note 2 states Refer to DCD Section 8.3.2, Tables 8.3-14a-h for a listing of loads on each EDNS subsystem.

The staff could not find Tables 8.3-14a-h in FSAR Tier 2, Section 8.3. Please provide Tables 8.3- 14a-h and update the FSAR accordingly.

Question 2:

In FSAR Tier 2, Section 8.3.2.2.2, related to conformance with 10 CFR 50.34 (f)(2)(v), it is stated that that bypassed or deliberately induced inoperability of the EDSS and EDNS batteries and battery chargers is automatically annunciated in the MCR to indicate the bypassed system or component. The EDSS and EDNS alarms are discussed in Chapter 18.

The staff could not find the discussion of EDSS and EDNS alarms in Chapter 18 of FSAR.

Please provide the discussion of EDSS and EDNS alarms and update the FSAR accordingly.

NuScale Response:

Question 1 The information included in Note 2 to the EDNS figures is incorrect. NuScale has revised the associated drawings (FSAR Figures 8.3-8a through 8.3-8f) to remove this note as it is not NuScales intention to include tables of all the individual EDNS loads in the FSAR. (In some cases the applicable note for a particular figure is Note 1.)

FSAR Section 8.3.2.2.1 provides a list of systems that receive EDNS power. The MPS Class 1E interface for CRDM power is identified in Figure 8.3-8a. The 250 VDC lube oil loads are identified in Figure 8.3-b. The remaining individual EDNS loads, which are all nonsafety-related, NuScale Nonproprietary

are not explicitly identified in the FSAR EDNS figures. Considering this system's importance to safety, the amount of FSAR detail on EDNS loads is consistent with Section C.I.8.3.2.1 of RG 1.206, Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants, and with recently submitted FSARs from other design centers with nonsafety-related DC systems.

Question 2 The reference to Chapter 18 in FSAR Section 8.3.2.2.2 for the EDSS and EDNS alarms is incorrect. The EDSS and EDNS alarms are described in FSAR Section 8.3.2.4. FSAR Section 8.3.2.2.2 has been revised to remove the reference to Chapter 18.

In the course of responding to this question, NuScale identified errors in the FSAR regarding conformance with 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v) for the electric power systems within the scope of Chapter 8. In various places in the FSAR, Chapter 8 incorrectly indicates that 10 CFR 50.34 (f)(2)(v), RG 1.47, BTP 8-5, and NUREG-0718 apply to the onsite AC System, EDNS, and EDSS.

10 CFR 50.34 (f)(2)(v) and the associated guidance documents apply to safety-related systems and do not apply to the onsite AC System or the EDNS, both of which are nonsafety-related and not risk-significant. The EDSS is also nonsafety-related, which obviates the need for the EDSS to comply with Part 10 CFR 50.34 (f)(2)(v) and the associated guidance documents.

Unlike the onsite AC System and the EDNS, the EDSS is subject to the augmented provisions contained in Table 3-2 of topical report TR-0815-16497-P (Reference 8.3-1) that are typically applied to safety-related systems. Consistent with the surveillance and testing provisions of Table 3-2 of Reference 8.3-1, the appropriate design bases for the EDSS status indication in the main control room are Section 5 (Design Requirements) of IEEE Std. 338-1987 (Reference 8.3-21), which includes bypassed and inoperable indication in part 16, and Section 6.1 Surveillance and Test Requirements of IEEE Std. 308-2001 (Reference 8.3-15). As described in FSAR Section 8.3.2.2.2, the EDSS conforms to RG 1.32 and IEEE Standard 308-2001 to the extent described in Reference 8.3-1. Similarly, the EDSS conforms to RG 1.118 and IEEE Standard 338-1987 (Reference 8.3-21) to the the extent described in Reference 8.3-1.

BTP 8-5 was previously determined to be not applicable to the NuScale design as described in the NuScale Power, LLC, Design-Specific Review Standard (DSRS) Sections and Scope and Safety Review Matrix issued by the NRC under Federal Register notice (FRN) (81 FR 75449).

Consistent with the above discussion, the associated FSAR sections have been revised to eliminate bypass and inoperable indication for the onsite AC power systems and the EDNS.

With regard to the EDSS sections, the FSAR has been revised to change the design basis for EDSS status indication to the applicable IEEE standards described above. The revised FSAR sections include: Table 1.9-2, Table 1.9-3, Table 1.9-5, Section 8.1.4.3, Table 8.1-1, Section 8.3.1.2.7, Section 8.3.2.2.2, and Section 8.3.2.4.

NuScale Nonproprietary

Impact on DCA:

FSAR Table 1.9-2, Table 1.9-3, Table 1.9-5, Section 8.1.4.3, Table 8.1-1, Section 8.3.1.2.7, Section 8.3.2.2.2, Section 8.3.2.4, and Figures 8.3-8a through 8.3-8f have been revised as described in the response above and as shown in the markup provided in this response.

NuScale Nonproprietary

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.02-4, RAI 08.02-6, RAI 08.03.02-1, RAI 09.02.06-1 Table 1.9-2: Conformance with Regulatory Guides RG Division Title Rev. Conformance Sta- COL Applicabil- Comments Section tus ity 1.3 Assumptions Used for Evalu- 2 Not Applicable Not Applicable This guidance is only applicable to BWRs. Not Applicable ating the Potential Radiologi-cal Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water Reactors 1.4 Assumptions Used for Evalu- 2 Not Applicable Not Applicable This RG pertains to existing reactors; RG 1.183 Not Applicable ating the Potential Radiologi- is specified in SRP Section 15.0.3 to be used for cal Consequences of a Loss of new reactors.

Coolant Accident for Pressur-ized Water Reactors 1.5 Safety Guide 5 - Assumptions - Not Applicable Not Applicable This guidance is only applicable to BWRs. Not Applicable Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Conse-quences of a Steam Line 1.9-5 Break Accident for Boiling Water Reactors 1.6 Safety Guide 6 - Indepen- - Partially Conforms Applicable The onsite electrical AC power systems do not 8.3 dence Between Redundant contain any Class 1E distribution systems. The Standby (Onsite) Power EDSS design conforms to the guidance for Sources and Between Their independence of standby power sources and Distribution Systems their distribution systems.

1.7 Control of Combustible Gas 3 Not Applicable Not Applicable The containment vessel design is such that its 6.2 Concentrations in Contain- integrity does not rely on combustible gas Conformance with Regulatory Criteria ment control systems.

1.8 Qualification and Training of 3 Not Applicable Applicable Site-specific programmatic and operational Not Applicable Personnel for Nuclear Power activities are the responsibility of the COL Plants applicant.

1.9 Application and Testing of 4 Not Applicable Not Applicable Based on reduced reliance on AC power, the 8.3 Safety-Related Diesel Genera- design does not require or include safety-tors in Nuclear Power Plants related emergency diesel generators.

Draft Revision 1 1.11 Instrument Lines Penetrating 1 Not Applicable Not Applicable No lines penetrate the NPM containment. 6.2 the Primary Reactor Contain-ment

Table 1.9-2: Conformance with Regulatory Guides (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report RG Division Title Rev. Conformance Sta- COL Applicabil- Comments Section tus ity 1.45 Guidance on Monitoring and 1 Partially Conforms Applicable The design satisfies RG 1.45 guidance in that 5.2 Responding to Reactor Cool- two systems are utilized to detect leakage into 6.2 ant System Leakage the containment; containment pressure moni-9.3 toring and leakage collection. Both leakage detection methods satisfy Regulatory Posi- 11.5 tions C.2.1 and C.2.2 in RG 1.45 in that: a) leak-age to the primary reactor containment from unidentified sources can be detected, moni-tored, and quantified for rates = 0.05 gpm; and, b) response time (not including transport delay time) is < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for a leakage rate greater than 1 gpm. Regulatory Position C.2.4 is satisfied in that the containment pressure method is capable of performing its function following a seismic event that does not require plant shutdown (i.e., vacuum pump remains functional). C.2.5 is satisfied in that both meth-1.9-12 ods permit calibration and testing during plant operation. Finally, radiation detectors in the CES condenser vent line provide an early indi-cation of RCS leakage consistent with Regula-tory Position C.2.3. All leakage is treated as unidentified because of the limited capability to identify or quantify RCS leakage.

1.47 Bypassed and Inoperable Sta- 1 Conforms Applicable None. 7.2 tus Indication for Nuclear 8.3 Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Power Plant Safety Systems 1.50 Control of Preheat Tempera- 1 Conforms Applicable None. 5.2 ture for Welding of Low-Alloy 5.3 Steel 5.4 6.1 10.3 Draft Revision 1

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.02-4, RAI 08.02-6, RAI 08.03.02-1, RAI 09.02.06-1 Table 1.9-3: Conformance with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS)

SRP or DSRS Section, AC AC Title/Description Conformance COL Comments Section Rev: Title Status Applicability SRP 1.0, Rev 2: II.1 No Specific Acceptance Criteria - - No Specific Acceptance Criteria. X Introduction and Interfaces SRP 1.0, Rev 2: II.2 SRP Acceptance Criteria Conforms Applicable None. Ch 1 Introduction and Associated with Each Referenced Interfaces SRP section SRP 1.0, Rev 2: II.3 Performance of New Safety Conforms Applicable None. Ch 1 Introduction and Features and Design Qualification Interfaces Testing Requirements SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site II.1 Specific SRP Acceptance Criteria Conforms Applicable This acceptance criterion is a pointer to 2.0 Characteristics and Site Contained in Related SRP Chapter other SRP sections.

Parameters 2 or Other Referenced SRP sections 1.9-55 SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site II.2 COL Application Referencing an Not Applicable Applicable This acceptance criterion is applicable 2.0 Characteristics and Site Early Site Permit only to COL applicants that do not Parameters reference the DCA.

SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site II.3 COL Application Referencing a Not Applicable Applicable This acceptance criterion is for COL 2.0 Characteristics and Site Certified Design applicants to meet the design Parameters parameters established in the Design Certification Application.

SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site II.4 COL Application Referencing an Not Applicable Applicable This acceptance criterion is for COL 2.0 Characteristics and Site Early Site Permit and a Certified applicants to meet the design Parameters Design parameters established in the Design Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Certification Application.

SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site II.5 COL Application Referencing Not Applicable Applicable This acceptance criterion is applicable Not Applicable Characteristics and Site Neither an Early Site Permit Nor a only to COL applicants that do not Parameters Certified Design reference the DCA.

SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site App A Table 1: Examples of Site Partially Conforms Applicable NuScale provides design Parameters Table 2.0-1 Characteristics and Site Characteristics and Site where applicable.

Draft Revision 1 Parameters Parameters SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site App A Table 2: Examples of Site-Related Partially Conforms Applicable NuScale provides design Parameters Table 2.0-1 Characteristics and Site Design Parameters and Design where applicable.

Parameters Characteristics

Table 1.9-3: Conformance with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Design Specific Review Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Standard (DSRS) (Continued)

SRP or DSRS Section, AC AC Title/Description Conformance COL Comments Section Rev: Title Status Applicability SRP BTP 8-4, Rev 3: All (B.1 Various Not Applicable Not Applicable BTP8-4 establishes the acceptability of 8.1.1 Application of the Single through B.5) disconnecting power to electrical 8.3.1 Failure Criterion to components of a fluid system as one Manually Controlled means of designing against a single Electrically Operated failure that might cause an undesirable Valves component action. Removal of electric power from safety-related valves is not used in the design as a means of satisfying the single failure criterion.

SRP BTP 8-5, Rev 3: All (B.1 thru Design Criteria Reflecting ConformsNot ApplicableNot None.This BTP does not apply to 8.1.1 Supplemental Guidance B.6) Importance of Providing Accurate Applicable Applicable NuScale electric power systems as 8.3.1 for Bypass and Inoperable Information to the Operator and these systems are not engineered 8.3.2Not Status Indication for Reducing the Possibility of safety features and are not relied on to Applicable Engineered Safety Adversely Affecting Monitored support engineered safety features.

Features Systems Safety Systems 1.9-136 SRP BTP 8-6, Rev 3: B.1All Isolation of important to safety Not Applicable Not Applicable The undervoltage provisions contained 8.1.48.2.3 Adequacy of Station loads from degraded grid in BTP 8-6 are not relevant to the 8.3.1 Electric Distribution conditionsCriteria for evaluating NuScale plant design since a loss of System Voltages (for voltage protection for the offsite voltage or degraded voltage condition Passive Design) power system to assure proper on the offsite power system would operation and sequencing of have no reasonable likelihood of Class 1E loads adversely affecting the performance of plant safety functions.For the NuScale design, the offsite power system does not supply power to Class 1E loads and Conformance with Regulatory Criteria does not support safety-related functions.

SRP BTP 8-6, Rev 3: B.2 Monitoring of degraded grid Not Applicable Not Applicable The undervoltage provisions contained 8.1.4 Adequacy of Station conditions in BTP 8-6 are not relevant to the 8.3.1 Electric Distribution NuScale plant design since a loss of System Voltages (for voltage or degraded voltage condition Passive Design) on the offsite power system would Draft Revision 1 have no reasonable likelihood of adversely affecting the performance of plant safety functions.

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.02-4, RAI 08.02-6, RAI 08.03.02-1, RAI 09.02.06-1 Table 1.9-5: Conformance with TMI Requirements (10 CFR 50.34(f)) and Generic Issues (NUREG-0933)

Item Regulation Description / Title Conformance COL Comments Section Status Applicability 50.34(f)(1)(i) Perform a plant/site-specific probabilistic Partially Applicable Design certification will address reliability of core 19.0 risk assessment, the aim of which is to seek Conforms and containment heat removal systems, with an 19.1 such improvements in the reliability of core update required by COL applicant to reflect site- 19.2 and containment heat removal systems as specific conditions.

are significant and practical and do not impact excessively on the plant (II.B.8) 50.34(f)(1)(ii) Perform an evaluation of the proposed Not Applicable Not Applicable This rule requires an evaluation of proposed Not Applicable auxiliary feedwater system (II.E.1.1) PWR auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems. The NuScale plant design does not involve an AFW system as would be found at a typical large LWR.

Neither the literal language nor the intent of this rule applies to the NuScale design.

50.34(f)(1)(iii) Perform an evaluation of the potential for Not Applicable Not Applicable The NuScale reactor design differs from that of Not Applicable and impact of reactor coolant pump seal large PWRs in that the NuScale design does not 1.9-252 damage following small-break LOCA require or include reactor coolant pumps.

(II.K.2.16 and II.K.3.25) Rather, the NuScale design uses passive natural circulation of the primary coolant, eliminating the need for reactor coolant pumps.

50.34(f)(1)(iv) Perform an analysis of the probability of a Not Applicable Not Applicable This guidance is applicable only to PWRs that are Not Applicable small-break LOCA caused by a stuck-open designed with power-operated pressurizer relief power-operated relief valve (PORV) (II.K.3.2) valves. The NuScale design does not use power-operated relief valves.

50.34(f)(1)(v) Perform an evaluation of the safety Not Applicable Not Applicable This requirement explicitly states its applicability Not Applicable effectiveness of providing for separation of only to BWRs. As a PWR, the NuScale design is Conformance with Regulatory Criteria high pressure coolant injection and reactor fundamentally different than that of a BWR, such core isolation cooling system initiation that separation of system initiation levels as levels (II.K.3.13) contemplated by this requirement is not pertinent.

50.34(f)(1)(vi) Perform a study to identify practicable Not Applicable Not Applicable This requirement explicitly states its applicability Not Applicable system modifications that would reduce only to BWRs. Regardless, the issue challenges and failures of relief valves contemplated by this requirement was related Draft Revision 1 (II.K.3.16) to power-operated relief valves. The NuScale design does not use power-operated relief valves.

Table 1.9-5: Conformance with TMI Requirements (10 CFR 50.34(f)) and Generic Issues (NUREG-0933) (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Item Regulation Description / Title Conformance COL Comments Section Status Applicability 50.34(f)(2)(iv) Provide a plant safety parameter display Conforms Applicable Similar to previous design certification holders 7.2.13 console (I.D.2) for which exemptions have been granted, the 18.7.2 NuScale safety display and indication system is integrated into the control room human-system interface design rather than having a separate console.

However, based on recent precedent, NuScale has concluded that integration of the safety display and indication system into the control room human-system interface design will not require an exemption from 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(iv).

50.34(f)(2)(v) Provide for automatic indication of the Conforms Applicable None. 7.2.4 bypassed and operable status of safety 7.2.13 systems (I.D.3) 8.3.1 8.3.2 50.34(f)(2)(vi) Provide the capability of high point venting Departure Not Applicable The venting of noncondensible gases is 5.4.412 1.9-255 of noncondensible gases from the reactor unnecessary to ensure long term core cooling coolant system, and other systems that may capability. Therefore, the NuScale design be required to maintain adequate core supports an exemption from the requirements cooling. Systems to achieve this capability of 50.34(f)(2)(vi), as well as the substantively shall be capable of being operated from the equivalent requirements of 10 CFR 50.46a.

control room and their operation shall not lead to an unacceptable increase in the probability of loss-of-coolant accident or an unacceptable challenge to containment integrity. (II.B.1)

Conformance with Regulatory Criteria 50.34(f)(2)(vii) Perform radiation and shielding design Conforms Applicable None. 12.2 reviews of spaces around systems that may, 12.3.1 as a result of an accident, contain accident 12.4 source term radioactive materials, and design as necessary to permit adequate access (II.B.2) 50.34(f)(2)(viii) Provide capability to promptly obtain and Partially Applicable As described by SRP 9.3.2, I.6, and RG 1.206, 9.3.2 Draft Revision 1 analyze samples from the reactor coolant Conforms C.I.9.3.2, a post-accident sampling system is not 11.5 system and containment that may contain required provided that the guidance provided in 12.4 accident source term radioactive materials SRP 9.3.2 for utilizing the normal process (II.B.3) sampling system (post-accident) has been satisfied.

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Introduction RAI 08.03.02-1

  • The design of the NuScale AC and DC electrical systems conforms to 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v) (TMI Item I.D.3) to the extent described in Section 8.3.1 and Section 8.3.2.
  • The NuScale design does not rely on pressurizer heaters to establish and maintain natural circulation in shutdown conditions. Accordingly, the NuScale design supports an exemption from the 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xiii) (TMI Item II.E.3.1) requirement to provide pressurizer heater power supply and associated motive and control power interfaces to establish and maintain natural circulation in shutdown conditions.
  • The NuScale design does not include pressurizer relief valves or pressurizer relief block valves. Therefore, 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xx) (TMI Item II.G.1) requirements to provide emergency power sources and qualified motive and control power connections for such valves are not technically relevant to the NuScale design. The NuScale design supports an exemption from the portions of the rule which require vital power buses for pressurizer level indicators.
  • The extent to which the design of NuScale electrical systems conforms to 10 CFR 50.55a(h) is described in Section 8.3.1 and Section 8.3.2.
  • The NuScale Power Plant design conforms to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.63 for a light water reactor to have the capability to withstand an SBO for a specified duration and recover from an SBO as defined in 10 CFR 50.2. Additional details regarding conformance with 10 CFR 50.63 are described in Section 8.4.
  • The 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) assessment is applied to NuScale electrical system SSC that (1) are determined to meet the 10 CFR 50.65(b) criteria, and (2) a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

Section 17.6 describes the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) program.

RAI 08.03.02-1

  • Portions of NUREG/CR-0660 relevant to the NuScale electrical systems are considered as reference only, consistent with NuScale DSRS Section 8.1.

Conformance with TMI items, including those addressed in this NUREG, is described in Section 1.9.

  • SECY-90-016 pertains to evolutionary advanced light water reactor (ALWR) designs and is not directly applicable to passive plant designs. As a passive ALWR design, the NuScale electrical system design conforms to the passive plant guidance of SECY-94-084, Section F.

Tier 2 8.1-6 Draft Revision 1

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.02-2, RAI 08.02-4, RAI 08.02-6, RAI 08.02-8, RAI 08.03.02-1 Table 8.1-1: Acceptance Criteria and Guidelines for Electric Power Systems Criteria Title Applicable Section (Note 1) Remarks 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2 8.4 Offsite Onsite Onsite DC Station Power AC Power Power Blackout System System System

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Plants
a. GDC 2 Design bases for protection against A A §8.2 - ADAMS Accession natural phenomena No. ML090260039
b. GDC 4 Environmental and dynamic effects A A §8.2 - ADAMS Accession design bases No. ML090260039
c. GDC 5 Sharing of structures, systems, and A A §8.2 - ADAMS Accession components Nos. ML11133A334 and ML090260039
d. GDC 17 Electric power systems The NuScale design supports an exemption from GDC 17.
e. GDC 18 Inspection and testing of electric The NuScale design supports an 8.1-8 power systems exemption from GDC 18.
f. GDC 33 Reactor coolant makeup The NuScale design supports an exemption from GDC 33.
g. GDCs 34, 35, 38, 41, 44 Residual heat removal, emergency The plant design complies with a core cooling, containment heat set of principal design in lieu of removal, containment atmosphere these GDC, as described in Section cleanup, cooling water 3.1.4.
h. GDC 50 Containment design basis A A Containment vessel penetration assemblies are not included in the scope of the onsite electrical power system.

Penetration assemblies are part of the containment design.The electrical design requirements for electrical penetration assemblies are included in Section 8.3.1.

Draft Revision 1

2. Regulations (10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 52)
a. 10 CFR 50.34 Contents of applications; technical Introduction information

Table 8.1-1: Acceptance Criteria and Guidelines for Electric Power Systems (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Criteria Title Applicable Section (Note 1) Remarks 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2 8.4 Offsite Onsite Onsite DC Station Power AC Power Power Blackout System System System

i. 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v) Additional Three Mile Island (TMI)- A A This requirement is not applicable related requirements (Item I.D.3) to the NuScale electric power systems, which are not safety-related.

ii. 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xiii) Additional TMI-related requirements The NuScale design supports an (Item II.E.3.1) exemption from 10CFR50.34(f)(2)(xiii).

iii. 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xx) Additional TMI-related requirements The NuScale design does not (Item II.G.1) include pressurizer relief valves or block valves, and the the design supports an exemption from the pressurizer level indicator portion of 10CFR50.34(f)(2)(xx).

b. 10 CFR 50.55a(h) Codes and standards A A 8.1-9 c. 10 CFR 50.63 Loss of all alternating current power G A
d. 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) Requirements for monitoring the GA A A Development and implementation effectiveness of maintenance at of the Maintenance Rule program is nuclear power plants discussed in Section 17.6.
e. 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1) Contents of applications; technical A A A A Paragraph (b)(1), as it relates to information ITAAC (for design certification) sufficient to assure that the SSCs in this area of review will operate in accordance with the certification.
f. 10 CFR 52.80(a) Contents of applications; additional N/A for NuScale, this rule pertains to technical information applications referencing an early site permit or a standard design certification.
3. Regulatory Guides (RGs)
a. Regulatory Guide 1.6 - March 1971 Safety Guide 6 - Independence G G Draft Revision 1 Between Redundant Standby (Onsite)

Power Sources and Between Their Introduction Distribution Systems

b. Regulatory Guide 1.32 - Revision 3, Criteria for Power Systems for Nuclear G G G As it relates to the EDSS; see March 2004 Power Plants Section 8.3.2

Table 8.1-1: Acceptance Criteria and Guidelines for Electric Power Systems (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Criteria Title Applicable Section (Note 1) Remarks 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2 8.4 Offsite Onsite Onsite DC Station Power AC Power Power Blackout System System System

c. Regulatory Guide 1.47 - Revision 1, Bypassed and Inoperable Status G G As it relates to the EDSS; see February 2010 Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Section 8.3.2This guidance does not Safety Systems apply to the NuScale electric power systems, which are not safety-related.
d. Regulatory Guide 1.53 - Revision 2, Application of the Single-Failure G G As it relates to the EDSS; see November 2003 Criterion to Safety Systems Section 8.3.2
e. Regulatory Guide 1.63 - Revision 3, Electric Penetration Assemblies in G G The electrical design requirements February 1987 Containment Structures for Nuclear for electrical penetration assemblies Power Plants (EPAs) with respect to RG 1.63 are included in Section 8.3.1.
f. Regulatory Guide 1.68 - Revision 4, June Initial Test Programs for water-Cooled G G G As it relates to the EDSS; see 2013 Nuclear Power Plants Section 8.3.2. See Section 8.2 as it 8.1-10 relates to the offsite power system.
g. Regulatory Guide 1.75 - Revision 3, Criteria for Independence of Electrical G G As it relates to the EDSS; see February 2005 Safety Systems Section 8.3.2
h. Regulatory Guide 1.81 - Revision 1, Shared Emergency and Shutdown G G No sharing of EDSS-MS, sharing of January 1975 Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear EDSS-C meets the intent of the Power Plants guidance; see Section 8.3.2
i. Regulatory Guide 1.106 - Revision 2, Thermal Overload Protection for Not applicable; no safety-related February 2012 Electric Motors on Motor-Operated MOVs Valves
j. Regulatory Guide 1.118 - Revision 3, Periodic Testing of Electric Power and G G As it relates to the EDSS; see April 1995 Protection Systems Section 8.3.2
k. Regulatory Guide 1.128 Revision 2, Installation Design and Installation of G Applicability as described in February 2007 Vented Lead-Acid Storage Batteries Reference 8.3-1 and Section 8.3.2 for Nuclear Power Plants
l. Regulatory Guide 1.129 - Revision 3, Maintenance, Testing, and G Applicability as described in September 2013 Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Reference 8.3-1 and SSection 8.3.2 Draft Revision 1 Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants Introduction
m. Regulatory Guide 1.153 - Revision 1, Criteria for Safety Systems G G §8.3.2 - Applies to EDSS to the June 1996 extent described in Reference 8.3-1

Table 8.1-1: Acceptance Criteria and Guidelines for Electric Power Systems (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Criteria Title Applicable Section (Note 1) Remarks 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2 8.4 Offsite Onsite Onsite DC Station Power AC Power Power Blackout System System System

n. Regulatory Guide 1.155 - August 1988 Station Blackout G G G Limited to portions relevant to passive plant designs; see Section 8.4.2
o. Regulatory Guide 1.160 - Revision 3, Monitoring the Effectiveness of G G May 2012 Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants
p. Regulatory Guide 1.204 - November Guidelines for Lightning Protection of G 2005 Nuclear Power Plants
q. Regulatory Guide 1.206 - June 2007 Combined License Applications for G G G G Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)
r. Regulatory Guide 1.212 - November Sizing of Large Lead-Acid Storage G As it relates to sizing VRLA batteries; 2008 Batteries see Section 8.3.2
s. Regulatory Guide 1.218 - April 2012 Condition-Monitoring Techniques for G G G Limited to cables determined to be Electric Cables Used in Nuclear Power within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 8.1-11 Plants
4. Branch Technical Positions (BTPs)
a. SRP BTP 8-1 Requirements on Motor-Operated Not applicable; no safety-related Valves in the ECCS Accumulator Lines MOVs or ECCS accumulator lines in the NuScale design
b. SRP BTP 8-2 Use of Onsite AC Power Sources for G As it relates to the non-Class 1E Peaking BDGs; see Section 8.3.1
c. SRP BTP 8-3 Stability of Offsite Power Systems G
d. SRP BTP 8-4 Application of the Single Failure Not applicable; see Section 8.3.1 Criterion to Manually-Controlled and Section 8.3.2 Electrically-Operated Valves
e. SRP BTP 8-5 Supplemental Guidance for Bypass G G See Section 8.3.1.2 and and Inoperable Status Indication for Section 8.3.2.2This BTP does not Engineered Safety Features Systems apply to NuScale electric power systems as these systems are not engineered safety features and are Draft Revision 1 not relied on to support engineered safety features.

Introduction

f. SRP BTP 8-6 Adequacy of Station Electric G G Not applicable; See Section 8.2.3 Distribution System Voltages (for and Section 8.3.1 Passive Design)

Table 8.1-1: Acceptance Criteria and Guidelines for Electric Power Systems (Continued)

Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Criteria Title Applicable Section (Note 1) Remarks 8.2 8.3.1 8.3.2 8.4 Offsite Onsite Onsite DC Station Power AC Power Power Blackout System System System

g. SRP BTP 8-7 Criteria for Alarms and Indications Not applicable; no Class 1E Associated with Diesel-Generator Unit emergency diesel generators Bypassed and Inoperable Status
h. SRP BTP 8-8 Onsite (emergency diesel generators) Not applicable; with non-reliance and offsite power sources allowed on AC power, no technical outage time extensions specification operating restrictions for inoperable AC power sources
i. SRP BTP 8-9 Open Phase Conditions in Electric G G See Section 8.2 Power System
5. NUREG Reports
a. NUREG-0718 Licensing Requirements for Pending G G See Section 8.1.4.3 Applications for Construction Permits and Manufacturing License 8.1-12 ba.NUREG-0737 Clarification of TMI Action Plan See Section 8.1.4.3 Requirements cb.NUREG/CR-0660 Enhancement of Onsite Diesel G Reference only Generator Reliability
6. Commission Papers (SECYs)
a. SECY-90-016 Evolutionary Light Water Reactor Not applicable Certification Issues and their Relationships to Current Regulatory Requirements, 1990
b. SECY-91-078 Electric Power Research Institute Not applicable Requirements Document and Additional Evolutionary Light Water Reactor (LWR) Certification Issues, 1991
b. SECY-94-084 Policy and Technical Issues Associated G G G G Used as guidance as described in Draft Revision 1 with the RTNSS in Passive Plant Section 8.1.4.3 Designs, 1994 Introduction
c. SECY-95-132 Policy and Technical Issues Associated G G G G Used as guidance as described in with the RTNSS in Passive Plant Section 8.1.4.3 Designs, 1995

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems The only circuits that penetrate the CNVs are I&C circuits that serve to control power to and operate safety-related and nonsafety-related equipment (e.g.,

sensors, execute devices, etc.) associated with each NPM as described in Section 7.0.4. There are no on site AC electrical power system cables that penetrate the CNVs.The electrical design requirements for electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) comply with GDC 50 as described in Section 8.3.1.2.5.

RAI 08.03.02-1 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v)

The bypass and inoperable status indications provided for safety systems and conformance with 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v) and RG 1.47, Rev. 1 are further described in Section 7.2.4. General conformance to 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v) is described in Section 1.9.

10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xiii)

As described in Section 8.1.4.3, the NuScale design supports an exemption from the 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xiii) (Three Mile Island (TMI) Item II.E.3.1) requirements.

10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xx)

As described in Section 8.1.4.3, the NuScale Power Plant design does not include pressurizer relief valves or pressurizer relief block valves. Therefore, 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xx) (TMI Item II.G.1) requirements to provide emergency power sources and qualified motive and control power connections for such valves are not technically relevant to the NuScale Power Plant design. The NuScale design supports an exemption from the portions of the rule that require vital power buses for pressurizer level indicators.

10 CFR 50.55a(h)

The onsite electrical AC power system equipment is not a protection system and does not perform any safety-related functions. Therefore, the system is not required to conform to 10 CFR 50.55a(h) and IEEE Standard 603-1991 (Reference 8.3-19) endorsed by RG 1.153, Rev. 1. The conformance of the design of I&C equipment and circuits, such as Class 1E pressurizer heater circuit breakers that are not within the scope of the on-site electrical systems, to 10 CFR 50.55a(h) is shown in Table 7.0-1.

10 CFR 50.63 The NuScale Power Plant conformance with 10 CFR 50.63 is described in Section 8.4.

10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)

Tier 2 8.3-16 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems The development and implementation of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) program, including the identification of SSC that require assessment per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), is stated in Section 17.6.

10 CFR 52.47(b)(1)

See section 14.3 for the methodology related to developing the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for AC systems.

Regulatory Guide 1.6 (March 1971)

The scope of RG 1.6 is limited to independence of standby power sources and Class 1E distribution systems. Because the onsite electrical AC power systems do not contain any Class 1E distribution systems, this RG is not applicable to the AC electrical system design.

Regulatory Guide 1.32, Rev. 3 The NuScale Power Plant design uses passive safety systems that do not require AC electric power to fulfill safety-related functions and the onsite electric AC power systems are nonsafety-related. Therefore, RG 1.32 is not applicable.

RAI 08.03.02-1 Regulatory Guide 1.47, Rev. 1 The onsite AC power system conforms to RG 1.47 to the extent described in the discussion of conformance to 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v) above.

Regulatory Guide 1.53, Rev. 2 The onsite electric AC power systems do not perform any safety-related functions.

Therefore, application of the single-failure criterion to these systems is not required.

RAI 08.01-1 Regulatory Guide 1.63, Rev. 3 Details regarding conformance with GDC 50 and RG 1.63 are provided in Section 8.1.4.3 and in the discussion of conformance with GDC 50 above.The electrical design requirements for electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) satisfy RG 1.63 as described in Section 8.3.1.2.5.

Regulatory Guide 1.68, Rev. 4 Regulatory Guide 1.68 is implemented using a graded approach to testing in order to provide reasonable assurance, considering the importance to safety of the item, that the item performs satisfactorily while, at the same time, accomplishing the testing in a cost-effective manner. Preoperational testing of the onsite AC electrical system is performed as part of the initial test program described in Section 14.2.12.

Tier 2 8.3-17 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems Regulatory Guide 1.160, Rev. 3 Regulatory Guide 1.160 provides guidance for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants. The development and implementation of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) program, including the identification of SSCs that require assessment per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), is stated in Section 17.6.

Regulatory Guide 1.204 (November 2005)

Details demonstrating conformance with RG 1.204 and the IEEE standards it endorses are provided in Section 8.3.1.2.4.

Regulatory Guide 1.218 (April 2012)

Regulatory Guide 1.218 provides guidance for monitoring the condition of cables that have been determined to fall within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65). The development and implementation of the maintenance rule program, including the identification of SSC that require assessment per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), is stated in Section 17.6.

Branch Technical Position 8-2, Rev. 3 The intent of Branch Technical Position (BTP) 8-2 is to ensure that the provision of GDC 17 is met with respect to minimizing the probability of concurrent loss of electrical power sources. This guidance precludes the use of onsite standby AC power sources for purposes other than supplying standby power when needed.

With the NuScale Power Plant non-reliance on AC power for the performance of safety-related functions, the concurrent loss of onsite and offsite AC power sources would have no significant adverse effect on plant safety. Notwithstanding this conclusion, for operational, commercial, and plant investment protection purposes, the BDGs are used only to supply standby power to designated loads when needed, and are not interconnected with other AC power sources, except for short periods to perform load testing.

As described in Section 8.3.1.1, there are certain operating conditions during which the AAPS may be interconnected with other AC power sources (e.g., one or more NPM turbine generators or offsite power sources, if available). The NuScale design does not rely on AC power sources for the performance of safety-related functions, and the guidance of BTP 8-2 need not be applied to the AAPS.

Branch Technical Position 8-4, Rev. 3 Branch Technical Position 8-4 establishes the acceptability of disconnecting power to electrical components of a fluid system as one means of designing against a single failure that might cause an undesirable component action. Removal of electric power from safety-related valves is not used in the NuScale Power Plant design as a means of satisfying the single failure criterion. Therefore, this BTP is not applicable to the NuScale design.

RAI 08.03.02-1 Tier 2 8.3-19 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems Branch Technical Position 8-5, Rev. 3 Branch Technical Position 8-5 provides supplemental guidance for implementing RG 1.47 in the onsite AC power system. The conformance to RG 1.47 is described above.

Branch Technical Position 8-6, Rev. 3 The undervoltage provisions contained in BTP 8-6 are not relevant to the NuScale Power Plant design because a loss of voltage or a degraded voltage condition on the offsite power system would have no reasonable likelihood of adversely affecting the performance of plant safety-related functions.

Branch Technical Position 8-9, Rev. 0 The criteria specified in BTP 8-9 relevant to passive plant designs are considered as described in Section 8.2.

RAI 08.02-9 SECY 94-084 and SECY 95-132 FSAR Section 17.4.3 describes the NuScale methodology to establish risk significance of SSC. The NuScale process for evaluating SSC against the RTNSS criteria is described in FSAR Section 19.3. This process did not identify any safety-related or risk-significant loads for the onsite AC power systems.

RAI 08.02-9 The lack of safety-related and risk-significant AC loads and the 72-hour SBO coping capability of the passive NuScale design as described in Section 8.4 obviate the need for an alternate AC power source or a safety-related emergency diesel generator, consistent with SECY 94-084 Parts F and G, which were confirmed in SECY 95-132.

8.3.1.2.8 Electrical Power System Calculations and Distribution System Studies for Alternating Current Systems Load-flow studies, short-circuit studies, and motor-starting studies for the AC power system are performed using the Electrical Transient Analyzer Program (ETAP) (Reference 8.3-11).

Load-Flow Studies and Undervoltage or Overvoltage Protection Load-flow studies are performed to evaluate whether an acceptable voltage range is maintained at equipment terminals under worst case loading conditions. Voltage drop at equipment terminals is also calculated for the largest motor starting condition. The studies confirm that terminal voltage of equipment meets the acceptable voltage ranges.

Tier 2 8.3-20 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems Section 6.2.1.The electrical design requirements for electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) comply with GDC 50 as described in Section 8.3.1.2.5.

RAI 08.03.02-1 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v)

Bypassed or deliberately induced inoperability of the EDSS and EDNS batteries and battery chargers is automatically annunciated in the MCR to indicate the bypassed system or component. The EDSS and EDNS alarms are discussed in Chapter 18. The bypass and inoperable status indications provided for safety systems, and conformance with 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v) and RG 1.47 are further described in Section 7.2.4. General conformance to 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v) is described in Section 1.9.

10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xiii)

As described in Section 8.1.4.3, the NuScale design supports an exemption from 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xiii) (TMI Item II.E.3.1) and this requirement is not applicable to the DC systems.

10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xx)

As described in Section 8.1.4.3, the NuScale design supports an exemption from the portions of 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(xx) that require vital power buses for pressurizer level indicators. This requirement is not applicable to the DC systems.

10 CFR 50.55a(h)

The onsite electrical DC power system equipment is not a protection system and does not perform any safety-related functions. Therefore, the system is not required to conform to 10 CFR 50.55a(h) and IEEE Standard 603-1991 (Reference 8.3-19).

However, the EDSS design is augmented to conform to 10 CFR 50.55a(h) and IEEE Standard 603-1991 to the extent described in Reference 8.3-1. The conformance of the design of I&C equipment and circuits (that are not within the scope of electrical systems) to 10 CFR 50.55a(h) is shown in Table 7.0-1.

10 CFR 50.63 The NuScale Power Plant design conformance with 10 CFR 50.63 is described in Section 8.4.

10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)

The development and implementation of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) program, including the identification of SSC that require assessment per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), is stated in Section 17.6.

Tier 2 8.3-34 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1)

See section 14.3 for the methodology related to developing the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria for DC systems.

Regulatory Guide 1.6 (March 1971)

The EDSS design conforms to the guidance for independence of standby power sources and their distribution systems provided in RG 1.6.

Regulatory Guide 1.32, Rev. 3 The EDSS conforms to RG 1.32 and IEEE Standard 308-2001 to the extent described in Reference 8.3-1.

RAI 08.03.02-1 Regulatory Guide 1.47, Rev. 1 The onsite DC power systems conform to RG 1.47 to the extent described in the discussion of conformance with 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v) above.

Regulatory Guide 1.53, Rev. 2 The EDSS conforms to RG 1.53 and IEEE Standard 379-2000 (Reference 8.3-20) to the extent described in Reference 8.3-1.

RAI 08.01-1 Regulatory Guide 1.63, Rev. 3 Details regarding conformance with GDC 50 and RG 1.63 is provided in Section 8.1.4.3 and in the discussion of conformance with GDC 50 above.The electrical design requirements for electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) satisfy RG 1.63 as described in Section 8.3.1.2.5.

Regulatory Guide 1.68, Rev. 4 Initial testing of the EDSS conforms to RG 1.68. Per RG 1.68 in that, preoperational testing is implemented using a graded approach to testing in order to provide reasonable assurance, considering the importance to safety of the item, that the item performs satisfactorily while, at the same time, accomplishing the testing in a cost-effective manner. The EDSS preoperational testing is performed as part of the Initial test program described in Section 14.2.12.

Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 3 The EDSS conforms to RG 1.75 and IEEE Standard 384-1992 to the extent described in Reference 8.3-1.

Tier 2 8.3-35 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems Regulatory Guide 1.160, Rev. 3 Regulatory Guide 1.160 provides guidance for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants. The development and implementation of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) program, including the identification of SSC that require assessment per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), is stated in Section 17.6.

Regulatory Guide 1.212 The EDSS and EDNS batteries are sized per IEEE Standard 485-1997 as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.212 (November 2008).

Regulatory Guide 1.218 (April 2012)

Regulatory Guide 1.218 provides guidance for monitoring the condition of cables that have been determined to fall within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65). The development and implementation of the maintenance rule program, including the identification of SSC that require assessment per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), is stated in Section 17.6.

Branch Technical Position 8-4, Rev. 3 Branch Technical Position 8-4 establishes the acceptability of disconnecting power to electrical components of a fluid system as one means of designing against a single failure that might cause an undesirable component action. Removal of electric power from safety-related valves is not used in the NuScale Power Plant design as a means of satisfying the single failure criterion. Therefore, this BTP is not applicable to the NuScale design.

RAI 08.03.02-1 Branch Technical Position 8-5, Rev. 3 The onsite DC power systems conform to BTP 8-5 to the extent described in the discussion of conformance with 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(v) above.

RAI 08.02-9 SECY 94-084 and SECY 95-132 FSAR Section 17.4.3 describes the NuScale methodology to establish risk significance of SSC. The NuScale process for evaluating SSC against the RTNSS criteria is described in FSAR Section 19.3. This process did not identify any safety-related or risk-significant functions for the onsite DC power systems.

Tier 2 8.3-37 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems 8.3.2.3 Inspection and Testing Highly Reliable Direct Current Power System The inspection and testing of the EDSS structures, systems, and components are based on the augmented provisions in Reference 8.3-1. Periodic inspection and testing is performed on the EDSS for operational, commercial, and plant investment protection purposes.

The EDSS is designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the operability and functionality of the systems and the condition of their components.

Specifically, the EDSS design allows for removing portions of the system from operation without affecting continued operation of the plant. Protection devices are capable of being tested, calibrated, and inspected.

Preoperational tests are conducted to confirm battery capacity and verify proper operation of the EDSS. These tests are within the scope of the initial test program described in Section 14.2.

Normal Direct Current Power System Periodic inspection and testing is performed on the EDNS for operational, commercial, and plant investment protection purposes.

The EDNS is designed to permit inspection and testing to assess the operability and functionality of the systems and the condition of their components. The EDNS design allows a portion of the system to be removed from service without affecting continued operation of the plant.

Preoperational tests are conducted in accordance with manufacturer's instructions to confirm battery capacity and verify proper operation of the equipment.

8.3.2.4 Instrumentation and Controls The MCR and remote shutdown station monitoring and control of onsite DC power system components is provided by the plant control system and the module control system described in Section 7.0.4.

Highly Reliable Direct Current Power System RAI 08.03.02-1 Each EDSS subsystem includes indications for DC bus voltage, battery current during charging and discharging, battery charger output current, and battery charger output voltage. Similarly, each battery and battery charger provides alarms and indications for high and low battery voltage, high and low DC bus voltage, battery charger undervoltage, battery discharge alarm, battery charger input and output breaker open alarms, and a high impedance ground fault detector. The EDSS includes provisions for automatic indication of system status in the main control room. The design of the EDSS status indication is consistent with the surveillance and test requirements of IEEE Tier 2 8.3-40 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems Standard 308-2001 (Reference 8.3-15) and IEEE Standard 338-1987 (Reference 8.3-21) as described in Reference 8.3-1. Table 8.3-6 provides a listing of the EDSS indications and alarms.

Each EDSS-C and EDSS-MS battery has a battery monitor connected which provides continuous monitoring of EDSS battery performance characteristics, including temperature deviations, discharges, and voltage excursions that exceed predefined tolerances.

Normal Direct Current Power System Each EDNS subsystem includes indications for DC bus voltage, battery charging and discharging current, battery charger output current, and battery charger output voltage. Similarly, each primary and standby battery and battery charger (where provided) provides alarms and indications for high and low battery voltage, high and low DC bus voltage, battery charger undervoltage, battery discharge alarm, battery charger input and output breaker open alarms, and a high impedance ground fault detector.

8.3.3 References 8.3-1 NuScale Power, LLC, "Safety Classification of Passive Nuclear Power Plant Electrical Systems," TR-0815-16497-P, Rev. 0.

8.3-2 Insulated Cable Engineers Association, "Ampacities of Cables Installed in Cable Trays," ICEA P-54-440 (NEMA WC 51) - 2009, Carrollton, GA.

8.3-3 National Fire Protection Association, "National Electric Code," NFPA 70-2014, Quincy, MA.

8.3-4 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems (IEEE Buff Book)," IEEE Standard 242-2001, Piscataway, NJ.

8.3-5 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Design Guide for Electric Power Service Systems for Generating Stations," IEEE Standard 666-2007, Piscataway, NJ.

8.3-6 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications," IEEE Standard 450-2010, Piscataway, NJ.

8.3-7 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Guide for Generating Station Grounding," IEEE Standard 665-1995, Piscataway, NJ.

8.3-8 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Guide for Instrumentation and Control Equipment Grounding in Generating Stations," IEEE Standard 1050-2004, New York, NY.

Tier 2 8.3-41 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems RAI 08.03.02-1 Figure 8.3-8a: Normal Direct Current Power System NOTES FOR FIGURES 8.3-8a:

EDNS-RXB FIGURE 8.3-4 FIGURE 8.3-4 1. MANUAL MAINTENANCE BYPASS SWITCH WITH OVERLAPPING CONTACTS PERMITS TRANSFERRING TO ALTERNATE SOURCE BATTERY WITHOUT INTERRUPTION OF POWER AND AT THE SAME TIME ISOLATES THE INVERTER.

250VDC 2. DELETED ELV CONNECTION ELV CONNECTION 120 CELL 3. CLASS 1E CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM MAIN POWER BREAKERS ARE CONTROLLED BY THE MPS.

NOTE 5 NOTE 5 40 MIN VRLA 4. ENTIRE DRAWING IS TYPICAL FOR THE ENDS-NORTH RXB AND ENDS-SOUTH RXB SUBSYSTEMS.

5. REFER TO TABLE A FOR TABLE OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EDNS-RXB SUSYSTEMS AND ELVS.
6. REFER TO FIGURE 1.7-1 FOR SYMBOL LEGEND AND GENERAL NOTES.

EDNS-RXB SPARE BATTERY/ BATTERY TEST FUSED TRANSFER CHARGER TERMINAL TERMINAL SWITCH EDNS-RXB BATTERY CHARGER 480VAC, 3 INPUT TEST / 250VDC OUTPUT TABLE A - EDNS RXB OFFLINE N.O. CONNECTIONS RECHARGE ID SHEET ID SHEET N.O. EDNS-RXB NORTH N011 k NB01 l OFF M EDNS-RXB SOUTH N021 m NB02 n NORMAL EDNS-RXB DC SWITCHGEAR EDNS-RXB DC BUS - 250VDC EDNS-RXB EDNS-RXB EDNS-RXB INVERTER 1 VOLTAGE REGULATING INVERTER 2 TRANSFORMER 250VDC INPUT 250VDC INPUT 120/208VAC, 3 OUTPUT 480V - 120/208VAC, 3 120/208VAC, 3 OUTPUT STATIC SWITCH STATIC SWITCH MANUAL MANUAL MAINTENANCE/BYPASS MAINTENANCE/BYPASS SWITCH (NOTE 1) SWITCH (NOTE 1)

EDNS-RXB AC SWITCHGEAR EDNS-RXB AC BUS - 120/208VAC, 3 MPS CLASS 1E NOTE 3 DIVISION I DIVISION II EDNS-RXB BATTERY BACKED AC LOADS CRDS MAIN POWER Tier 2 8.3-132 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems RAI 08.03.02-1 Figure 8.3-8b: Normal Direct Current Power System EDNS-TGB NOTES FOR FIGURES 8.3-8b:

FIGURE 8.3-4 FIGURE 8.3-4 BATTERY 1. MANUAL MAINTENANCE BYPASS SWITCH WITH OVERLAPPING CONTACTS PERMITS TRANSFERRING TO ALTERNATE SOURCE 250VDC WITHOUT INTERRUPTION OF POWER AND AT THE SAME TIME ISOLATES THE INVERTER.

ELVS CONNECTION ELVS CONNECTION 2. DELETED 120 CELL NOTE 4 NOTE 4 3. ENTIRE DRAWING IS TYPICAL FOR THE ENDS-NORTH TGB AND ENDS-SOUTH TGB SUBSYSTEMS.

40 MIN VRLA

4. REFER TO TABLE A FOR CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EDNS-TGB SUBSYSTEMS AND ELVS.
5. REFER TO TABLE B FOR MODULE NUMBER OF EACH STG EMERGENCY DC LUBE OIL PUMP MOTOR.
6. REFER TO FIGURE 1.7-1 FOR SYMBOL LEGEND AND GENERAL NOTES.

EDNS-TGB SPARE BATTERY/ BATTERY TEST EDNS-TGB FUSED TRANSFER CHARGER TERMINAL TERMINAL BATTERY CHARGER SWITCH 480VAC, 3 INPUT TEST / 250VDC OUTPUT OFFLINE N.O.

RECHARGE TABLE A - EDNS TGB N.O. CONNECTIONS OFF M ID SHEET ID SHEET NORMAL EDNS-TGB NORTH N011 k NB01 l EDNS-TGB SOUTH N021 m NB02 n EDNS-TGB DC SWITCH GEAR EDNS-TGB DC BUS - 250VDC EDNS-TGB EDNS-TGB INVERTER VOLTAGE REGULATING STG TURBINE STG TURBINE STG TURBINE STG TURBINE STG TURBINE STG TURBINE TRANSFORMER EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EMERGENCY 250VDC INPUT DC LUBE OIL DC LUBE OIL DC LUBE OIL DC LUBE OIL DC LUBE OIL DC LUBE OIL 120/208VAC, 3 OUTPUT 480V - 120/208VAC, 3 PUMP MOTOR PUMP MOTOR PUMP MOTOR PUMP MOTOR PUMP MOTOR PUMP MOTOR NOTE 5 NOTE 5 NOTE 5 NOTE 5 NOTE 5 NOTE 5 STATIC SWITCH TABLE B - STG MODULE NUMBER EDNS-TGB NORTH 01 02 03 04 05 06 MANUAL EDNS-TGB SOUTH 07 08 09 10 11 12 MAINTENANCE/BYPASS SWITCH (NOTE 1)

EDNS-TGB AC SWITCH GEAR EDNS-TGB AC BUS - 120/208VAC, 3 EDNS-TGB BATTERY BACKED AC LOADS Tier 2 8.3-133 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems RAI 08.03.02-1 Figure 8.3-8c: Normal Direct Current Power System EDNS-CRB NOTES FOR FIGURES 8.3-8c:

FIGURE 8.3-4k FIGURE 8.3-4n BATTERY 1. MANUAL MAINTENANCE BYPASS SWITCH WITH OVERLAPPING CONTACTS PERMITS TRANSFERRING TO 125VDC ALTERNATE SOURCE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION OF POWER AND AT THE SAME TIME ISOLATES THE INVERTER.

MODULE 06 BUS 1 MODULE 07 BDG- 2. DELETED 60 CELL CRB MCC BACKED CRB MCC 2 3. REFER TO FIGURE 1.7-1 FOR SYMBOL LEGEND AND GENERAL NOTES.

40 MIN VRLA N051 NB05 EDNS-CRB SPARE BATTERY/ BATTERY TEST FUSED TRANSFER CHARGER TERMINAL TERMINAL SWITCH EDNS-CRB BATTERY CHARGER 480VAC, 3 INPUT TEST / 125VDC OUTPUT OFFLINE N.O.

RECHARGE N.O.

OFF M NORMAL EDNS-CRB DC SWITCHGEAR EDNS-CRB DC BUS - 125VDC EDNS-CRB EDNS-CRB INVERTER VOLTAGE REGULATING TRANSFORMER 125VDC INPUT 120/208VAC, 3 OUTPUT 480V - 120/208VAC, 3 STATIC SWITCH MANUAL MAINTENANCE/BYPASS SWITCH (NOTE 1)

EDNS-CRB AC SWITCHGEAR EDNS-CRB AC BUS - 120/208VAC, 3 EDNS-CRB BATTERY BACKED AC LOADS Tier 2 8.3-134 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems RAI 08.03.02-1 Figure 8.3-8d: Normal Direct Current Power System EDNS-RWB NOTES FOR FIGURES 8.3-8d:

FIGURE 8.3-4u FIGURE 8.3-4b BATTERY 1. MANUAL MAINTENANCE BYPASS SWITCH WITH OVERLAPPING CONTACTS PERMITS TRANSFERRING TO 125VDC ALTERNATE SOURCE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION OF POWER AND AT THE SAME TIME ISOLATES THE INVERTER.

MODULE 11 BUS 1 MODULE 01 BDG- 2. DELETED 60 CELL RWB MCC BACKED RXB MCC 4 3. REFER TO FIGURE 1.7-1 FOR SYMBOL LEGEND AND GENERAL NOTES.

40 MIN VRLA N061 NB06 EDNS-RWB SPARE BATTERY/ BATTERY TEST FUSED TRANSFER CHARGER TERMINAL TERMINAL SWITCH EDNS-RWB BATTERY CHARGER 480VAC, 3 INPUT TEST / 125VDC OUTPUT OFFLINE N.O.

RECHARGE N.O.

OFF M NORMAL EDNS-RWB DC SWITCHGEAR EDNS-CRB DC BUS - 125VDC EDNS-RWB EDNS-RWB INVERTER VOLTAGE REGULATING TRANSFORMER 125VDC INPUT 120/208VAC, 3 OUTPUT 480V - 120/208VAC, 3 STATIC SWITCH MANUAL MAINTENANCE/BYPASS SWITCH (NOTE 1)

EDNS-RWB AC SWITCHGEAR EDNS-RWB AC BUS - 120/208VAC, 3 EDNS-RWB BATTERY BACKED AC LOADS Tier 2 8.3-135 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems RAI 08.03.02-1 Figure 8.3-8e: Normal Direct Current Power System NOTES FOR FIGURES 8.3-8e:

1. DELETED
2. ENTIRE DRAWING IS TYPICAL FOR THE ENDS-PDC 60 CELLS SUBSYSTEMS.
3. REFER TO TABLE A FOR CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EDNS-PDC SUBSYSTEMS AND ELVS.
4. REFER TO FIGURE 1.7-1 FOR SYMBOL LEGEND AND GENERAL NOTES.

EDNS-PDC BATTERY 125VDC FIGURE 8.3-4 FIGURE 8.3-4 60 CELL 40 MIN VRLA ELVS CONNECTION ELVS CONNECTION NOTE 2 NOTE 2 EDNS-PDC FUSED BATTERY TEST TRANSFER TERMINAL SWITCH TABLE A - EDNS-PDC EDNS-PDC EDNS-PDC CONNECTIONS BATTERY SPARE BATTERY ID SHEET ID SHEET CHARGER CHARGER EDNS-PDC #3 N091 g N092 h EDNS-PDC #4 N121 s N122 t EDNS-PDC #5 N131 q N132 r 480VAC, 3 INPUT 480VAC, 3 INPUT 125VDC OUTPUT 125VDC OUTPUT EDNS-PDC #6 N141 q N142 r TEST /

OFFLINE EDNS-PDC #7 N071 y N072 y N.O. N.O.

RECHARGE EDNS-PDC #8 N081 z N082 z NORMAL OFF M M EDNS-PDC DC SWITCHGEAR N.O.

EDNS-PDC DC BUS - 125VDC EDNS-PDC BATTERY BACKED DC LOADS Tier 2 8.3-136 Draft Revision 1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Onsite Power Systems RAI 08.03.02-1 Figure 8.3-8f: Normal Direct Current Power System NOTES FOR FIGURES 8.3-8f:

1. DELETED
2. ENTIRE DRAWING IS TYPICAL FOR THE ENDS-PDC 120 CELL SUBSYSTEMS.
3. REFER TO TABLE A FOR CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EDNS-PDC 120 CELL SUBSYSTEMS AND ELVS.
4. REFER TO FIGURE 1.7-1 FOR SYMBOL LEGEND AND GENERAL NOTES.

EDNS-PDC #1 BATTERY 125VDC 120 CELL FIGURE 8.3-4e FIGURE 8.3-4f 40 MIN VRLA MODULE 03 BUS 1 TGB MODULE 03 BUS 3 TGB MCC MCC N101 N102 EDNS-PDC #1 BATTERY TEST FUSED TERMINAL TRANSFER SWITCH TABLE A - EDNS-PDC EDNS-PDC #1 EDNS-PDC #1 CONNECTIONS BATTERY SPARE BATTERY CHARGER CHARGER ID SHEET ID SHEET EDNS-PDC #1 N101 e N102 f EDNS-PDC #2 N111 g N112 h 480VAC, 3 INPUT 480VAC, 3 INPUT TEST / 125VDC OUTPUT 125VDC OUTPUT OFFLINE N.O. N.O.

RECHARGE NORMAL OFF M M EDNS-PDC #1 DC SWITCHGEAR N.O.

EDNS-PDC #1 DC BUS - 125VDC EDNS-PDC 120 CELL BATTERY BACKED DC LOADS Tier 2 8.3-137 Draft Revision 1

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