ML17080A119

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NRR Position on NCV 05000315/2014005-03; 05000316/2014005-003 Radiological Impact of the Removal of the Auxiliary Shield Blocks on the Containment Accident Shield Post LBLOCA
ML17080A119
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 06/23/2017
From: Kathryn Brock
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
To: Mohammed Shuaibi
Division of Reactor Safety III
Dietrich A
References
Download: ML17080A119 (3)


See also: IR 05000315/2014005

Text

June 23, 2017

MEMORANDUM TO: Mohammed A. Shuaibi, Deputy Director

Division of Reactor Safety

Region III

FROM: Kathryn M. Brock, Deputy Director /RA/

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - NRR

POSITION ON NCV 05000315/2014005-03; 05000316/2014005-03;

RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE REMOVAL OF THE AUXILIARY

SHIELD BLOCKS ON THE CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT SHIELD POST

LBLOCA

On March 17, 2017, a teleconference was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and NRC Region III regarding

the corrective actions performed by Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M, the licensee), in

response to a non-cited violation (NCV) against Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 3, Design Control, which requires that design changes

be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design.

The NCV was issued in an inspection report dated February 10, 2015 (Agencywide Documents

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15042A380). The violation was

identified by NRC inspectors for the licensees inadequate radiological review of permanently

removing auxiliary missile blocks (AMBs) from the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Unit

Nos. 1 and Unit 2, containment accident shields. The inspection report stated that by

permanently removing the AMBs, the licensee failed to provide for safe radiation levels outside

the containment building following a maximum design-basis accident. The removal of the

AMBs was performed under 10 CFR 50.59, and the regional inspectors have determined that

the licensee correctly followed the NRC-approved 10 CFR 50.59 process. In response to the

NCV, the licensee took several corrective actions, which included improving evacuation

procedures and adding postings to the access points. However, the licensee does not consider

restoration of the AMBs, or installation of equivalent shielding, to be required for regulatory

compliance.

In order to evaluate the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions, the NRC staff in

Region III requested that NRR provide clarification of the requirements for protecting

occupational workers from radiation exposure during a design basis accident. During the

March 17, 2017 call, the staff agreed that the request could be summarized as follows: Clarify

the occupational dose requirements for personnel evacuating from non-vital areas during a

design basis accident at CNP.

Requirements for accident shielding are located in 10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(vii), which references

NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, II.B.2.Section II.B.2 of

NUREG 0737, requires that each licensee perform shielding design review of the spaces that

may contain highly radioactive materials as a result of an accident. The design review should

M. Shuaibi -2-

identify the location of vital areas in which occupancy may be limited by post-accident radiation

levels, and provide for adequate access to these vital areas. NUREG 0737 defines a vital area

as any area which will or may require occupancy to permit an operator to aid in the mitigation of

or recovery from an accident.

At CNP, the areas of the plant affected by the removed AMBs are the areas outside of the

equipment access hatches for each unit. The licensee calculated that without the AMBs,

radiation levels outside of the equipment access hatches would result in lethal doses to

individuals in a very short period of time in the event of a postulated design basis accident.

However, access to this area would not be required to mitigate the design basis accident.

Therefore, this area is not considered a vital area, and the requirements of

10 CFR 50.34(f)(2)(vii) do not apply.

The inspection report dated February 10, 2015, states that the removal of the AMBs was

inconsistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101, Radiation Protection Programs. The

inspection report specifically references 10 CFR 20.1101(b), which requires that each licensee

use procedures and engineering controls to achieve occupational doses and doses to the public

that are as low as reasonably achievable. However, as stated in the 1992 Statements of

Consideration (56 FR 23387), compliance with 10 CFR 20.1101 does not require that radiation

doses be an absolute minimum, nor that all possible methods have been used to reduce

exposure. Additionally, there is no requirement for the licensee to demonstrate radiation doses

are ALARA during the extremely unlikely event of a reactor accident. Therefore,

10 CFR 20.1101 is not applicable in this case.

In summary, the licensee is not required to limit the dose to occupational workers in non-vital

areas during design basis accidents. There is no regulation related to radiation exposure that

would require restoration of the AMBs or installation of equivalent shielding at CNP.

Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316

ML17080A119

OFFICE DORL/LPL3/PM DORL/LPL3/LA DRA/ARCB/BC

NAME ADietrich SRohrer UShoop

DATE 3/20/17 3/21/17 3/29/17

OFFICE DORL/LPL3/BC DORL/DD

NAME DWrona (RKuntz for) KBrock

DATE 3/30/17 6/23/17