ML16321A447
| ML16321A447 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/20/2016 |
| From: | Browne K NextEra Energy Seabrook |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 52310 | |
| Download: ML16321A447 (4) | |
Text
1012012016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Part 21 (PAR)
Rep Org: NEXTERA ENERGY SEABROOK, LLC Supplier: WESTINGHOUSE Region: 1 Event#
Notification Date I Time: 10/20/2016 11 :45 Event Date I Time: 08/31/2016 11 :26 Last Modification: 10/20/2016 Docket #: 05000443 City: SEABROOK County:
Agreement State:
Yes State: NH NRC Notified by: KEN BROWNE HQ Ops Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER.
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:
21.21 (d)(3)(i)
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE License#:
Notifications: CHRISTOPHER CAHILL PART 21/50.55 REACTORS WESTINGHOUSE LIFE LINED TYPE LAC INDUCTION MOTOR FAILURE The following Part 21 Report was received from the licensee via facsimile:
Pagel 52310 (EDT)
(EDT)
R1DO EMAIL 10 CFR Part 21 Notification - Westinghouse Life Line D Type LAC Induction Motor Model HSDP 4000V, 700hp.
"This is a non-emergency facsimile notification required by 10 CFR 21.21 ( d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days.
"NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC has determined there is evidence that the Westinghouse Life Line D Type LAC Induction Motor Model HSDP 4000V, 700 hp motors, original to plant construction, have a deviation from expected quality of construction. Of the four motors purchased for Unit 1, Primary Component Cooling Water (PCCW) pumps CC-P-11-D and CC-P-11-C failed after approximately 87,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operation on July 23, 2008, and November 21, 2008, due to a short caused by localized heating. On June 13, 2015, CC-P-11-B failed due to shorted windings following approximately 32,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operation. Failure analysis determined tpe heating was most likely caused by a turn-to-turn short circuit which led directly to the eventual failure of the entire coil-to-ground. Forensic examination identified that the coil insulation was not tightly wrapped, resulting in less than 100% resin penetration throughout the stator insulation system (i.e., voids). The voids led to poor thermal conductivity and localized hot spots that accelerated the degrading of insulation properties over time.
"Based on the failure analysis, it can be concluded that the undesirable coil quality is most likely attributed to workmanship, not motor design. The failure of motor insulation could cause phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground faults which ultimately would prevent motor and PCCW pump from performing their intended safety function.
"The identified condition appears to be a deviation from expected quality of construction and the three failures
1012012016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Pagel indicate that the condition is likely applicable to all the motors manufactured at the same time.
"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."
Oct.20. 2016 11:32AM No.0731 P. 1 Nl{C FORM 361 U.S. NUCl-EAR REC3Ul-ATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)
Ol'ERAllONS GENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN#
NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY -- 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469*, BACKUPS -- [1st] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*,
[2nd] 301-415-0550 a11d 13rdl 301-415-0553
- ucensaas who maintain lhalr own ETS are nrov!ded lhese lelenhone numbers.
NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL l'IACK U 11:38 Seabrook 1
Ken Browne (603) 773-7932 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 11:26 cc.r) 8131/2016 100%/1 100%/1 EVENT Cl..ASSlFICATIONS 1*Hr. Non-Emeraencv 10 CFR 50.721b\\11) 0 (v)(A)
Safa SID Capabll~y AINA D GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC D rs DavlaUon AOfN D (v)(B)
RHR Capabmty AINB D SITE AAi:A eMERGENCY Sfl'/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emeraencv 10 CFR 50.721b\\12l D (v)(C) con1ro1 or R!ld Rele~se AINC D ALERT ALE/AA EC D (Q TS Required S/D ASHLJ D (v)(D]
Ac;1;idanl Miligalion AIND D UNUSUAL EVE:NI UNUIAAi:C D (lv)(A)
ECCS Olacharga lo RCS ACCS D (xff)
Orrs11e Me<!lcaf AMEO D 50,12 NON*fi~liRGl'iNCY (see nel(( eo!utnns) D (tv)(B)
ARPS 0 (xiii)
Loss Comm/Asml/Rasp ACOM D PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71)
DDOD D (x~
Off'slia NollficaUon APRE 60-Day Optional 10 CFR 60.73(a)(1)
D MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B???
8-Hr. Non-Emeraencv 10 CFR 60.7.2(b\\f3\\
D Invalid $pacttled $yalem Allluauon AINV D FITNESS f'OR DlJTY HFIT D (ii)(A)
Degraded Condition ADEG Other UnspeclHed Requirement (Identify) 0 OTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (sec last rolumn) D (ii)(B)
Unanaly.!:ed Condilion AUNA JZI 10 CFR21.21(d)(3)~)
NONA.
D INl'ORMAl"ION ONLY NINF D (tv)(A)
$ pecl!lad $yalem ActuaUon AESF D NONfl.
DESCRIPTION lnctude: S)'$lems arrecled, actuations and lhcir initialing signals, i;;auscs, cffecl lilf even! on planl, atUons lakan or planned, c!G. (Gon6nu9 on back) 10 CFR Part 21 Notification - Westinghouse Life Line D Type LAC Induction Motor Model HSDP 4000V, 700hp This is a non-emergency facsimile notification required by 1 O CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(i). A wrillen notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days.
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC has determined there is evidence that the Westinghouse Life Line D Type LAC Induction Motor Mode HSDP 4000V, 700 hp motors original to plant construction have a deviation from expected quality of construction. Of the four motors purchased for Unit 1, Primary Component Cooling Water (PCCW) pump$ CC*P-11-D and CC*P-11-C failed after approximately 87,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operation on July 23, 200Band November 21, 2008 due to a short caused by localized heating.
On June 13, 2015, CC-P-11-B failed due to shorted windings following approximately 3.2,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operation. Failure analysis determined lhe healing was most llkely caused by a turn-to-turn short circuit which led directly to the eventual failure of the entire coif-to-ground. Forensic examination identified that the coil insulation was not tightly wrapped, resulting in Jess than 100% resin penetration throughout the stator insulation system (i.e., voids). lhe voids led to poor thermal conductivity and localized hot spots that accelerated the degrading of Insulation properties over time.
Based on the failure analysis, it can be concluded that the undesirable coil quality is most likely ~ttributed to workmanship, not motor design. The failure of motor Insulation could cause phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground faults which ultimately would prevent motor and PCCW pump from performing their intended safety function.
The identified condition appears lo be a deviation from expected qualily of construction and the three failures indicate that the condition is likely applicable to all the motors manufactured at the same time.
The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.
NOTIFICATIONS vi:s NO WILL al: ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR 0 YES (Explain above)
({)NO NRC RESIDENT 171 n
n NOT UNDERSTOOD?
STATE(s) n 171 D
Dill ALL SYSlEMS
[{] YE'.S D NO (Ellplain above)
LOCAi.
D 0
D FUNCTION AS REQUIRE07 OTHER GOV AGl:!NCI~
n 171 D
MODIO OF OP~AATION I
EST I MA TED I
ADO}TIONAL INFO ON f!ACK D
0 0
UWTI L CORRECTED:
NA RESTART DATE:
NA 0Yl':S
[{)NO MEDIA/PRESS RELEASE (MMIDOIYYVYJ NRG FORM 3&1 (12..2000)
PAGE1 OF2
Oct. 20. 2016 11:32AM No. 0731 P. 2 NRCFORM381 REACTOR PLANT (12-2000)
EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)
ADDITIONAL INFORMA'TION RAOIOLOGtCAl RELEA<: ER* Cl-IEGK ni:;> i::n r U Al inr lf'A~r " ITEMS r~"~' "le detallslext'llanatlons should b"' cav,,red in """ "'
D LIQUID RELEASE D GASEOUS RELEASE D UNPLANNED RELEASE DI PLANNED RE;l.J:::ASE ID ONGOING D TERMINATED D MONITORED D lJNMONITORED D OFFSIT!'; RELEASE DI T. S. EXCEEDED lo RM ALARMS D ARIOAS EVACUATED 0 PERSONNEL E'.XPOSt::P OR CONTAMINATED D OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTION.S RECOMMENDED
- Slats relaasa palh In daacripUon
~aleai.;a Rate (Gi!sec)
%'1'.S. LIMIT HOOGUIOE Tola! ActiYity (Cl)
%T.S. LIMIT HOO GUIDE Nobla Gas 0.1 GI/sec 1000 CI Iodine 10 uGi/~ec 0.01 GI Partlculata 1 uCl/sec 1mCI Liquid (exc:l11ding tritium and 10 uCl/mln 0,1 Ci dissolved nob/a aase.sJ Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cl/min 6CI Tolal PLANT STACK CONDENSER/Al~ EJl!C'rOR lll!AlN STEAM lfNE; St3 BLOWDOWN OTHER RAD MONITOR READINGS ALARM SETPOlNTS
% T. S. LIMIT(lf appllcab/e)
RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHIOCl< O~ FILL IN AF'PLIGABl-E; ITEMS: (specific detalls!exp/anatlons should be coverad In event descrlptfon)
LOCATION 01' THE'. LEAK (e.g., SG #, varve, pipe, eto.J LEAK RATE UNIYS: gpmlgpd T.$.LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DA"fE TIME C:OOLAlolT ACTIVITY PRIMARY SECONDARY Alolb UNITS:
LIST OF SAFETY RE: LATED EQIJIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued from fronl)
NRC FORM 381 (12..2000)
PAGE 2 OF 2