ML15293A491

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Revision 153 to SLC-16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System
ML15293A491
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, McGuire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/13/2015
From:
Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TR-NUC-MC-001004 MNS-SLC-16.9.7
Download: ML15293A491 (15)


Text

Date: 1011312015 Distribution: Duke Energy Document Transmittal #: TR-NUC-MC-O01004

1. Beaver, Bonnie C DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORM

Purpose:

Issue

2. Carroll, Michael E
3. Dacus, Casey Michelle Released By:

Facility: MC*GUIRE NUCLEAR STATION

4. Gardner, Troy R SUBJECT 1.3225 Haoers Ferry Road
5. Helton, Daniel E MNS-SLC-16.9.7 Standby Shutdown System Document Manaoement;
6. Mc Ginnis, Vickie L (At Mcguire)
7. McCree, Victor M MG02M Huntersville, NC 28078 B. MCG DOC CNTRL MISC MAN
9. MCG OPS PROCEDURE GP MNSDCRM @duke-enerav.com
10. MCG OPS STAFF MGR
11. MCG PLANT ENG. LIBR.
12. Miller, Don
13. Montgomery, Gary L
14. OPS HUMAN PERFORMANCE -
15. OPS TRNG MGR.
16. RESIDENT NRC INSPECT
17. SERV BLDG FILE ROOM -
18. Spencer, William C
19. U S NUC REG WASHINGTON, DC
20. USNRC Page 1 of 1 ILICN -'MC -: MNS-SLC:'16.9.7T- 153 -ISSUED* :'i':,..:'FYIIE FYIIE, ,FYIIE FYIIEFIjlEI. YIIEIFYIlEIFYIIE FYIIEIFYIIEIFYIIEIFYIIE FYIIE FYIIE FYIIE R&I ,FYIIE FYIE R&AIR&IIRAl Remarks: Replace existing MNS-SLC-16.9,7 with revision 153

/o,

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION SECTION 1 REVISION NUMBER IDATE 16.1 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.2 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.3 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.4 Not Issued 16.5.1 REVISION 151 9/29/15 16.5.2 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.5.3 REVISION 151 9/29/15 16.5.4 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.5.5 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.5.6 DELETED - REVISION 120 12/30/10 16.5.7 REVISION 53 1/13/04 16.5.8 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.5.9 REVISION 108 06/10/09 16.5.10 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.6.1 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.6.2 DELETED - REVISION 43 6/11/03 16.6.3 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.6.4 REVISION 27 06/12/02 16.7.1 REVISION 149 2/25/15 16.7.2 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.3 REVISION 136 4/26/13 16.7.4 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.5 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.6 REVISION 139 8/28/13 16.7.7 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.8 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.9 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.10 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.11 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.12 REVISION 144 9/18/14 16.7,13 REVISION 146 10/14/14 16.7.14 REVISION 152 9/23/15 16.8.1 REVISION 135 3/18/13 16.8.2 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.8.3 REVISION 121 12/30/10 16.9.1 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.2 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.3 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.4 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.5 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.6 REVISION 138 10/11/13 16.9.7 REVISION 153 10/1/15 16.9.8 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.9 REVISION 154 10/1/15 16.9.10 DELETED - REVISION 13 2/26/01 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Revision 131

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION SECTION REVISION NUMBER DATE 16.9.11 REVISION 22 2/25/02 16.9.12 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.9.13 DELETED - REVISION 13 2/26/01 16.9.14 REVISION 22 2/25/02 16.9.15 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.16 REVISION 111 09/09/09 16.9.17 REVISION 86 1/17/07 16.9.18 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.9.19 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.20 REVISION 8 11/30/00 16.9.21 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.9.22 REVISION 109 8/13/09 16.9.23 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.24 DELETED - REVISION 74 6/27/05 16.9.25 REVISION 87 1/17/07 16.10.1 REVISION 56 4/6/04 16.11.1 REVISION 137 5/13/13 16.11,2 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.11.3 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11.4 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.11.5 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11,6 REVISION 137 5/13/13 16.11.7 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.11.8 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11.9 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11.10 REVJSlON 134 3/6/13 16.11.11 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.11.12 REVISION 67 2/28/05 16.11.13 REVISION 137 5/13/13 16.11.14 REVISION 21 1/17/02 16.11.1 5 REVISION 21 1/17/02 16,11.16 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.11.17 REVISION 143 5/30/14 16.11.1 8 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11.19 R EVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11.20 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.12.1 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.12.2 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.13.1 REVISION 51 10/1/03 16.13.2 DELETED -REVISION 75 7/20/05 16.13.3 DELETED -REVISION 75 7/20/05 16.13.4 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.14.1 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.14.2 REVISION 104 3/18/09 McGuire Units 1 and 2 2Rvso 3 Revision 131

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS - FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 16.9.7 Standby Shutdown System COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, and 3.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS


..................... NOTE--------------------------.............

1. The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS non-functional. Immediately upon discovery of SSS non-functionality, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of the discovery.
2. If a non-functional SSS component is located inside containment, repairs shall be made at the first outage which permits containment access.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

-NOTE----------....A.1 Verify the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Not applicable to the SSS FUNCTIONALITY of fire Diesel Generator or 24 V detection and suppression Battery Bank and Charger. systems in the associated

.......... .......................areas identified in Table 16.9.7-1.

A. One or more required SSS components AND identified in Table 1 6.9.7-1 non-functional. A.2 Restore the component to 7 days FUNCTIONAL status.

B. SSS Diesel Generator or B.1 Verify the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 24 V Battery Bank and FUNCTIONALITY of fire Charger non-functional. detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Tabele6.9.7-1.

AND (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 216971Rvso15 16.9.7-1 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 REMEDIAL ACTIONS (continued) _________

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued). 8.2 Verify offsite power and 1hour one emergency diesel generator OPERABLE.

AND B.3 Restore the component to 7days FUNCTIONAL status. _________

C. Total Unidentified C.1 Declare the Standby Immediately LEAKAGE, Identified Makeup Pump non-LEAKAGE, and reactor functional.

coolant pump seal leakoff >20 gpm. AND O._R C.2 Enter Condition A.

Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.

Any reactor coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff

> 4.0 gpm. _________

D. Lake Norman level D.1 Verify the "C" Fire 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> below 746 feet. Suppression Pump is FUNCTIONAL (Unit 1

______________only). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

E. Required Action A.2 and E.1 Prepare and submit a 30 days its associated Special Report to the NRC Completion Time not outlining the cause of the met. non-functionality, corrective actions taken, and plans for restoring the SSS to FUNCTIONAL status.

F. Required Action B.3 and F.1 Prepare and submit a 14 days its associated Special Report to the NRC Completion Time not outlining the extent Of met. repairs required, schedule for completing repairs, and basis for continued

________________________operation.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 16.9.7-2 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 TESTING REQUIREMENTS TEST FREQUENCY TR 16.9.7.1 Verify total Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff are < 20 gpm.

AND Verify total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff <_16.3 gpm.

AND Verify each reactor coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff < 4.0 gpm.

TR 16.9.7.2 Verify the requirements for spent fuel pool water level in 7 days Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13.1 are met and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool is within the limits specified in the COLR.

AND Verify the refueling water storage tank (RWST) is capable of being aligned to the spent fuel pool.

TR 16.9.7.3 Verify fuel oil level in the SSS diesel generator fuel 31 days storage tank is >_6.0 ft.

TR 16.9.7.4 Verify the SSS diesel generator starts from ambient 31 days conditions and operates for > 30 minutes at > 700 kW.

TR 16.9.7.5 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil for the In accordance with SSS diesel generator are tested in accordance with, and the Diesel Fuel Oil maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Testing Program Program.

TR 16.9.7.6 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V battery voltage is > 31 days 24 volts.

TR 16.9.7.7 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the SSS Instrumentation 31 days as required by Table 16.9.7-2.

TR 16.9.7.8 Verify the electrolyte level of each SSS 250/1 25 V battery 31 days bank is above the plates. _________

(continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 1..-

16.9.7-3 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 TESTINGREQUIREMENTS_(continued) _______

TEST FREQUENCY TR 16.9.7.9 Verify the total battery terminal voltage of each SSS 31 days 250/1 25 V battery bank is > 258/1 29 V on float charge.

TR 16.9.7.10 Verify the average specific gravity of each SSS 250/1 25 92 days V battery bank is > 1.200._________

TR 16.9.7.11 Verify the standby makeup pump's developed head and 92 days capacity is greater than or equal to that required by the Inservice Testing Supplemental Program.

TR 16.9.7.12 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V batteries and 18 months battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.

TR 16.9.7.13 Verify SSS diesel generator 24 V battery to battery and 18 months terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.

TR 16.9.7.14 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the SSS 18 months Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.

TR 16.9.7.15 Perform inspection of SSS diesel generator in 18 months accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with manufacturer's recommendations for class of service.

TR 16.9.7.16 Verify the sSS 250/1 25 V batteries, cell plates, and 18 months battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.

TR 16.9.7.17 Verify the SSS 250/125 V battery to battery and terminal 18 months connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.

TR 16.9.7.18 Verify the "C" solenoid to valve SA48ABC can be 18 months deenergized to provide steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

TR 16.9.7.19 Verify the CA Storage Tank level is > 20 feet. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> TR 16.9.7.20 Verify Lake Norman level is > 746 feet 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> McGuire Units 1 and 216974Rvso15 16.9.7-4 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 TABLE 16.9.7-1 STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATIONt 11 NON-FUNCTIONAL SSS FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS LOCATION COMPONENT ___ ________ _____

EL 716 EL 733 EL 750 Control Battery Cable Turbine Driven Motor Driven Containment EE-KK( EE-KK EE-KK Room Room Rooms AFW Pump AFW Pump _____

SSS Diesel Generator( 3t X X X X, X X X X Note 2 SSS DG Starting 24 VBattery X X X X X X X X Note 2 Bank and Chargert*________ ______ ______

Standby Makeup Pump and XX X Water Supply____

SSS 250/1 25V Battery and X X XNote 2 Chargert~ _________ ____ ________ _______ _______

Turbine Driven AFW Pump and X Water Suppliest 4t ____ ____ _______________

Turbine Driven AFW Pump X SolenoidC ___C"____

Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump A X

  • Groundwater Drainage Sump rPump A* Sump B 4

Fire Suppression Pump "C" (see -r t I- I t --

Condition D). X INSTRUMENTATION: ___ __ ______ .___ ______I_____ _____

1. RCS Pressure __ _ _ X X X _ __I _ __ Note 2
2. Pressurizer Level _ _ _ X X X _ _ ote 2 N__
3. SG Level _ _ __ __ X X X _ Note__ 2__
4. Incore Temperature
5. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature

__4 J X X

X X X

jNote

_ _ _ Note 2 2

NOTES:

1.. If tire detection and/or suppression systems are non-functional, then the ACTION statement(s) of the applicable fire detection and/or suppression SLC shall be complied with.

2. Monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations specified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1 or 3.6.5.2, in lieu of verification of functionality of systems inside containment.
3. With this component non-functional, then denoted areas of both units are affected.
4. Water supplies include the Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank (CAST) and Condenser Circulating Water (RC) System via valves 1/2CA-316/317. Continuous vents at 1/2RN-1065 and 1 RN-1066 support FUNCTIONALITY of the RC source for Unit 1 only.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 16.9.7-5 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 TABLE 16.9.7-2 STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS

  • REQUIRED TESTING READOUT INSTRLJMENT CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS LOCATION
1. Reactor Coolant Pressure 1TR 16.9.7.7 SSF Control TA 16.9.7.14 Panel
2. Pressurizer Level 1 TR 16.9.7.7 SSF Control TR 16.9.7.14 Panel
3. Steam Generator rLevel 1 per SG TR 16.9.7.7 SSF Control (Wide Range) TA 16.9.7.14 Panel Incore Temperatu.ire 1TA 16.9.7.7 SSF Control 4.

TA 16.9.7.14 Panel

5. Standby Makeup Pump Flow 1 TA 16.9.7.14 SSF Control Panel
6. NC Wide Range Cold Leg 2 TA 16.9.7.7 SSF Control Temperature TA 16.9.7.14 Panel McGuire Units 1 and 216976Rvso15 16.9.7-6 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 BASES The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is designed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated fire incidents, sabotage, or station blackout events by providing capability to maintain HOT STANDBY conditions and by controlling and monitoring vital systems from locations external to the main control room. The facility is credited with the ability to cope with a station black out (SBO) event of 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> duration. This capability is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and 10 CFR 50.63.

By design, the 555 is intended to respond to those low-probability events which render both the control room and automatic safety systems inoperable. Because of the low probability of occurrence of these events, the remedial actions rely on compensatory action, timely repair or return to functionality and, ifnecessary, a justification for continued operation.

Because the SSS performs a redundant fire protection function, compensatory action during periods when the SSS is non-functional relies largely on assurance of the functionality of fire detection and suppression systems. Table 16.9.7-1 establishes requirements for functionality of fire detection and suppression systems.

Both A&D NC Cold Leg Wide Range Temperatures are required for SSS functionality. This conclusion is based on NRC Correspondence during issuance of the original operating license.

The Source Range Wide Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation was installed at the SSS Control Panel as part of NRC review of this system in the early 1980s. The indication is not required for SSS functionality, based on the NRCs response to Duke dated July 21, 1983.

Controls and power to the pressurizer heater banks are included for SSF events; however, they are not required for 555 functionality. NRC Generic Letter 86-10 provides that conclusion.

The Testing Requirements ensure that the SSS systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions. The testing requirements were based largely on SSS Technical Specifications for the Catawba Nuclear Station, which was approved prior to the issuance of the fuel load license for Unit 1 of that plant. Also considered in the formulation of the testing requirements were existing McGuire Technical Specifications, such as those for the 1E Diesel Generators, Refueling Water Storage Tank, Fire Protection & Detection Systems, and other Tech Specs which are related to the safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant.

The required level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank ensures sufficient fuel for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of uninterrupted operation. Per Appendix R requirements, the unit must be in cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of going to the SSF. The 72-hour supply of fuel oil assures this capability. The specified minimum fuel oil level required in the storage tank is based on Calculation MCC- 1223.10-00-0003.

Testing has demonstrated the ability of plant operations to start the SSF diesel within 10 minutes of the recognition of an 560 event, thus satisfying the intent of NUMARC 87-00 guidance. The SSF diesel generator has sufficient capacity and capability to operate equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for a 4-hour SBO event.

McGuire Units 1 and 216977Rvso15 16.9.7-7 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 BASES (continued)

Fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator is tested and maintained in accordance with the same Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program used for the 4kV emergency diesel generators (see Technical Specification 5.5.13, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.3.2 and associated Bases).

Although the Standby Makeup Pump is not nuclear safety-related and was not designed according to ASME code requirements, it is tested quarterly to ensure its FUNCTIONALITY.

The Standby Makeup Pump (SMP) functions as part of the SSF to provide makeup capacity to the reactor coolant system and cooling flow to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals.

The RCP seal leak-off flow is temperature dependent (i.e., the higher the temperature the higher the leak-off flow). During normal operation the RCP seals are supplied from the Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) drawing from the Volume Control Tank (VCT). During the SSF event, the SMP draws from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). During the SSF event there is no SFP cooling, so water injected into the RCP seals will have a higher temperature than during normal operation. The SMP is capable of providing a makeup capacity of 26 gpm.

The revised SLC limit of 20 gpm total accumulative leakage is based on a calculation that was performed by Westinghouse, indicating increased RCP seal leak-off at higher seal water temperatures, to relate the SSF event leakage of 26 gpm at elevated RCP seal temperatures. This more conservative limit will ensure that the SMP will be capable of providing makeup and seal cooling flow equal to or greater than total leakage during the SSF event, increased RCP seal leak-off flow due to heat-up of the SFP, and still provide a margin of safety. As a conservative measure, during normal power operation the total accumulative system leakage (unidentified + identified + RCP seal leak-off flows) shall be limited to 20 gpm.

Testing Requirement 16.9.7.2 ensures that an adequate borated water volume is available to supply the SMP continuously for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (references 26 through 31). The SMP draws borated water from the SEP. Additional borated water inventory is transferred from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the SEP via gravity flow. Transfer of water from the RWST to the SEP maintains required SEP levels and adequate SMP net positive suction head.

The additional requirement that total RCP seal leak-off flow be < 16.3 gpm resulted from a historical review of NRC correspondence that specified the SMP also provide for reactor coolant system makeup and boration in addition to RCP seal leakage requirements (Ref.

17). Calculations show that this upper limit for RCP seal leak-off provides sufficient margin to maintain the required unit conditions for a bounding SSS event.

Calculation MCC-1201.01-00-0053, Rev. 0, "MNS Units 1 & 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Response To Loss Of Seal Cooling," Sections 2 and 10 (Tab D, page 15) determined the elapsed time from loss of all seal cooling (loss of NV seal injection and loss of KC flow to the RCP thermal barrier heat exchanger) to when hot NC water entered the RCP No. 1 seal at varying seal leakoff rates. Chart interpolation determined that at a nominal No. 1 seal leakoff rate of 4 gpm, the seal would be at 235°F in 6.4 minutes from loss of all seal cooling event initiation. Therefore, for a maximum No. 1 seal leakoff of 4 gpm and ifthe Operators are instructed to stop all 4 RCPs at 3 minutes into the scenario, 3.4 minutes remain for the RCP motors to coast down to a stop and no seal rotation would occur above the No. 1 seal trip setpoint (2350 F) during loss of all seal cooling. The 4 gpm limit is conservative based on the guidance provided in Westinghouse WCAP-17100, Section 1.2.3.4, "Response during a Loss of All Seal Cooling," and Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-04-22, Revision 1, for McGuire Units 1 and 216978Rvso15 16.9.7-8 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 BASES (continued)

RCP coast down times and time for hot NC system water to reach the No. 1 seal on loss of  ;

all seal cooiing.

The Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, in the A (Unit 1) and B (Unit 2) sumps, can be controlled and powered from the SSF. These Sump Pumps remove accumulation of groundwater, Turbine driven AFW Pump drains, and other miscellaneous sources. For the SSS to be FUNCTIONAL, a minimum of one of these pumps must be FUNCTIONAL. Credit is taken for the groundwater underdrain system to transport water from one sump to the other.

The turbine driven AFW pump can be controlled from the SSF and is utilized during an SSS event to maintain adequate secondary side heat removal. For the SSS to be FUNCTIONAL, the turbine driven AFW pump must be FUNCTIONAL. For the turbine driven AFW pump to meet SSS functionality requirements, it requires a FUNCTIONAL SSS-related steam supply flowpath from the "C" steam generator (valve SA-48ABC). Additional detail regarding AFW SSS requirements can be found on the applicable AFW Teat Acceptance Criteria (TAC) sheets, and in the SSS Design Basis Specification, MCS-1223.SS-00-0001.

The turbine driven AFW pump water supply for the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO event is provided by the CA Storage Tank (CAST). The water supply for the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> fire event is initially provided by the CAST then later by manual alignment to the RC system via valves 1/2CA-31 6/317. The Unit 1 valves are maintained closed to prevent air entrainment (Ref.22). Adequate CAST inventory of 200,000 gallons (20 feet of level) is ensured by TR 16.9.7.19. For a fire event, an initial CAST inventory is needed to allow time to perform the manual alignment from the CAST to the RC system. For Unit 1 only, in the remote chance that the level of Lake Norman drops below 746 feet, air entrainment from the RC system cannot be prevented. In' this case, adequate water supplies for a fire event are ensured by making up to the Unit 1 CAST from the Fire Suppression system using the "C" Fire Suppression pump.

The SSF is provided with its own 250/125 VDC power system which is independent from the normal 125 VDC and 120 VAC vital l&C power systems. The SSF batteries are charged by the SSF diesel generator and are available to power the SSF instruments and controls necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from the SSF control room following a station blackout (SBO) event.

While the SSS 24 VDC battery charger is isolated for battery surveillance testing, the SSS Diesel Generator remains functional as long as the battery voltage is > 24 volts.

The SSS 125V batteries and battery chargers consist of three pairs SDSP1, SDSP2 and SDSS. Each pair consists of a battery and associated battery charger. Pair SDSS can be used to substitute for either pair SDSP1 or SDSP2. Only two of these pairs are required functional since pair S0S5 is spare.

This selected licensee commitment is part of the McGuire Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C.4 (Unit 1) and C.7 (Unit 2).

McGuire Units 1 and 216979Rvso15 16.9.7-9 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.

9.7 REFERENCES

1. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Chapter 9.511
2. McGu ire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 2, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix 0
3. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 5, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix B
4. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 6, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix C
5. McGuire Fire Protection Review, as revised
6. McGuire Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Review
7. IEEE 308-1974, Class 1 E Power Systems
8. IEEE 450-1975, Maintenance Testing & Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries
9. OP/0/B/6350/04, Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Operation
10. McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses, Unit 1 License Condition C.(4) and Unit 2 License Condition C.(7)
11. PIP 0-M-99-03926
12. PIP-M-01-3466
13. 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current
14. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 4, 1990, Requirements for Station Blackout.
15. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 17, 1989, Requirements for Station Blackout,
16. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Safety Evaluation for Station Blackout (10CFR50.63), Dated February 19, 1992.
17. SAIC-91/1 265, "Technical Evaluation Report, McGuire Nuclear Station, Station Blackout Evaluation," Dated December 10, 1991.
18. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Section 18.2.4, Chemistry Control Program.
19. MCS-1465.00-00-0019, "Plant Design Basis Specification For Station Blackout Rule,"

Rev. 3.

20. McGuire License Renewal Commitments MCS-1274.00-00-0016, Section 4.6, Chemistry Control Program.
21. PIP M-04-3317.
22. MCC-1223.42-00-0055, "Design Considerations and Bases for 1/2CA-161C and 1/2CA-162C Automatic Open Deletion Modifications MD101869 and MD201870."

McGuire Units 1 and 2 1..-0Rvso 16.9.7-10 5 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.

9.7 REFERENCES

(continued)

23. PIP M-08-001 29.
24. MCC-1223.10-00-0003, "SSF DIG Fuel Oil Requirements".
25. 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979.1 26.* September 23, 1981 letter, R.A. Birkel (NRC) to Duke
27. October 21, 1981 letter, W.O. Parker Jr. (Duke) to H.R. Denton (NRC)
28. December 14, 1982 letter, H.B. Tucker (Duke) to H.R. Denton (NRC)
29. January 5, 1983 letter, H.B. Tucker (Duke) to H.R. Denton (NRC)
30. Suppl. 6 to McGuire Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-0422, February 1983.
31. MCC-1223.04-00-0012, "Critical Fuel Pool Level with Standby Makeup Pump Taking Suction," Rev. 3
32. MCS-1 223.SS-00-0001, "Design Basis Specification for the Standby Shutdown System,"* Rev, 29 McGuire Units 1 and 2 1..-1Rvso 16.9.7-11 5 Revision 153

CLEANING MODE Date: 1011312015 Distribution: Duke Energy Document Transmittal #: TR-NUC-MC-O01004

1. Beaver, Bonnie C DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL FORM

Purpose:

Issue

2. Carroll, Michael E
3. Dacus, Casey Michelle Released By:

Facility: MC*GUIRE NUCLEAR STATION

4. Gardner, Troy R SUBJECT 1.3225 Haoers Ferry Road
5. Helton, Daniel E MNS-SLC-16.9.7 Standby Shutdown System Document Manaoement;
6. Mc Ginnis, Vickie L (At Mcguire)
7. McCree, Victor M MG02M Huntersville, NC 28078 B. MCG DOC CNTRL MISC MAN
9. MCG OPS PROCEDURE GP MNSDCRM @duke-enerav.com
10. MCG OPS STAFF MGR
11. MCG PLANT ENG. LIBR.
12. Miller, Don
13. Montgomery, Gary L
14. OPS HUMAN PERFORMANCE -
15. OPS TRNG MGR.
16. RESIDENT NRC INSPECT
17. SERV BLDG FILE ROOM -
18. Spencer, William C
19. U S NUC REG WASHINGTON, DC
20. USNRC Page 1 of 1 ILICN -'MC -: MNS-SLC:'16.9.7T- 153 -ISSUED* :'i':,..:'FYIIE FYIIE, ,FYIIE FYIIEFIjlEI. YIIEIFYIlEIFYIIE FYIIEIFYIIEIFYIIEIFYIIE FYIIE FYIIE FYIIE R&I ,FYIIE FYIE R&AIR&IIRAl Remarks: Replace existing MNS-SLC-16.9,7 with revision 153

/o,

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION SECTION 1 REVISION NUMBER IDATE 16.1 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.2 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.3 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.4 Not Issued 16.5.1 REVISION 151 9/29/15 16.5.2 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.5.3 REVISION 151 9/29/15 16.5.4 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.5.5 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.5.6 DELETED - REVISION 120 12/30/10 16.5.7 REVISION 53 1/13/04 16.5.8 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.5.9 REVISION 108 06/10/09 16.5.10 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.6.1 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.6.2 DELETED - REVISION 43 6/11/03 16.6.3 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.6.4 REVISION 27 06/12/02 16.7.1 REVISION 149 2/25/15 16.7.2 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.3 REVISION 136 4/26/13 16.7.4 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.5 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.6 REVISION 139 8/28/13 16.7.7 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.8 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.9 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.10 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.11 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.7.12 REVISION 144 9/18/14 16.7,13 REVISION 146 10/14/14 16.7.14 REVISION 152 9/23/15 16.8.1 REVISION 135 3/18/13 16.8.2 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.8.3 REVISION 121 12/30/10 16.9.1 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.2 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.3 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.4 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.5 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.6 REVISION 138 10/11/13 16.9.7 REVISION 153 10/1/15 16.9.8 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.9 REVISION 154 10/1/15 16.9.10 DELETED - REVISION 13 2/26/01 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Revision 131

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS (SLC)

LOES SLCs ARE REVISED PER SECTION SECTION REVISION NUMBER DATE 16.9.11 REVISION 22 2/25/02 16.9.12 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.9.13 DELETED - REVISION 13 2/26/01 16.9.14 REVISION 22 2/25/02 16.9.15 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.16 REVISION 111 09/09/09 16.9.17 REVISION 86 1/17/07 16.9.18 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.9.19 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.20 REVISION 8 11/30/00 16.9.21 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.9.22 REVISION 109 8/13/09 16.9.23 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.9.24 DELETED - REVISION 74 6/27/05 16.9.25 REVISION 87 1/17/07 16.10.1 REVISION 56 4/6/04 16.11.1 REVISION 137 5/13/13 16.11,2 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.11.3 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11.4 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.11.5 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11,6 REVISION 137 5/13/13 16.11.7 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.11.8 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11.9 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11.10 REVJSlON 134 3/6/13 16.11.11 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.11.12 REVISION 67 2/28/05 16.11.13 REVISION 137 5/13/13 16.11.14 REVISION 21 1/17/02 16.11.1 5 REVISION 21 1/17/02 16,11.16 REVISION 134 3/6/13 16.11.17 REVISION 143 5/30/14 16.11.1 8 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11.19 R EVISION 0 12/14/99 16.11.20 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.12.1 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.12.2 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.13.1 REVISION 51 10/1/03 16.13.2 DELETED -REVISION 75 7/20/05 16.13.3 DELETED -REVISION 75 7/20/05 16.13.4 REVISION 148 2/27/15 16.14.1 REVISION 0 12/14/99 16.14.2 REVISION 104 3/18/09 McGuire Units 1 and 2 2Rvso 3 Revision 131

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS - FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 16.9.7 Standby Shutdown System COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, and 3.

REMEDIAL ACTIONS


..................... NOTE--------------------------.............

1. The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS non-functional. Immediately upon discovery of SSS non-functionality, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of the discovery.
2. If a non-functional SSS component is located inside containment, repairs shall be made at the first outage which permits containment access.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

-NOTE----------....A.1 Verify the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Not applicable to the SSS FUNCTIONALITY of fire Diesel Generator or 24 V detection and suppression Battery Bank and Charger. systems in the associated

.......... .......................areas identified in Table 16.9.7-1.

A. One or more required SSS components AND identified in Table 1 6.9.7-1 non-functional. A.2 Restore the component to 7 days FUNCTIONAL status.

B. SSS Diesel Generator or B.1 Verify the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 24 V Battery Bank and FUNCTIONALITY of fire Charger non-functional. detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Tabele6.9.7-1.

AND (continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 216971Rvso15 16.9.7-1 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 REMEDIAL ACTIONS (continued) _________

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued). 8.2 Verify offsite power and 1hour one emergency diesel generator OPERABLE.

AND B.3 Restore the component to 7days FUNCTIONAL status. _________

C. Total Unidentified C.1 Declare the Standby Immediately LEAKAGE, Identified Makeup Pump non-LEAKAGE, and reactor functional.

coolant pump seal leakoff >20 gpm. AND O._R C.2 Enter Condition A.

Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.

Any reactor coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff

> 4.0 gpm. _________

D. Lake Norman level D.1 Verify the "C" Fire 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> below 746 feet. Suppression Pump is FUNCTIONAL (Unit 1

______________only). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

E. Required Action A.2 and E.1 Prepare and submit a 30 days its associated Special Report to the NRC Completion Time not outlining the cause of the met. non-functionality, corrective actions taken, and plans for restoring the SSS to FUNCTIONAL status.

F. Required Action B.3 and F.1 Prepare and submit a 14 days its associated Special Report to the NRC Completion Time not outlining the extent Of met. repairs required, schedule for completing repairs, and basis for continued

________________________operation.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 16.9.7-2 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 TESTING REQUIREMENTS TEST FREQUENCY TR 16.9.7.1 Verify total Identified LEAKAGE, Unidentified LEAKAGE, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff are < 20 gpm.

AND Verify total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff <_16.3 gpm.

AND Verify each reactor coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff < 4.0 gpm.

TR 16.9.7.2 Verify the requirements for spent fuel pool water level in 7 days Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13.1 are met and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool is within the limits specified in the COLR.

AND Verify the refueling water storage tank (RWST) is capable of being aligned to the spent fuel pool.

TR 16.9.7.3 Verify fuel oil level in the SSS diesel generator fuel 31 days storage tank is >_6.0 ft.

TR 16.9.7.4 Verify the SSS diesel generator starts from ambient 31 days conditions and operates for > 30 minutes at > 700 kW.

TR 16.9.7.5 Verify fuel oil properties of new and stored fuel oil for the In accordance with SSS diesel generator are tested in accordance with, and the Diesel Fuel Oil maintained within the limits of, the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Testing Program Program.

TR 16.9.7.6 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V battery voltage is > 31 days 24 volts.

TR 16.9.7.7 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of the SSS Instrumentation 31 days as required by Table 16.9.7-2.

TR 16.9.7.8 Verify the electrolyte level of each SSS 250/1 25 V battery 31 days bank is above the plates. _________

(continued)

McGuire Units 1 and 2 1..-

16.9.7-3 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 TESTINGREQUIREMENTS_(continued) _______

TEST FREQUENCY TR 16.9.7.9 Verify the total battery terminal voltage of each SSS 31 days 250/1 25 V battery bank is > 258/1 29 V on float charge.

TR 16.9.7.10 Verify the average specific gravity of each SSS 250/1 25 92 days V battery bank is > 1.200._________

TR 16.9.7.11 Verify the standby makeup pump's developed head and 92 days capacity is greater than or equal to that required by the Inservice Testing Supplemental Program.

TR 16.9.7.12 Verify the SSS diesel generator 24 V batteries and 18 months battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.

TR 16.9.7.13 Verify SSS diesel generator 24 V battery to battery and 18 months terminal connections are clean, tight, and free of corrosion.

TR 16.9.7.14 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the SSS 18 months Instrumentation as required by Table 16.9.7-2.

TR 16.9.7.15 Perform inspection of SSS diesel generator in 18 months accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with manufacturer's recommendations for class of service.

TR 16.9.7.16 Verify the sSS 250/1 25 V batteries, cell plates, and 18 months battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.

TR 16.9.7.17 Verify the SSS 250/125 V battery to battery and terminal 18 months connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti-corrosion material.

TR 16.9.7.18 Verify the "C" solenoid to valve SA48ABC can be 18 months deenergized to provide steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

TR 16.9.7.19 Verify the CA Storage Tank level is > 20 feet. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> TR 16.9.7.20 Verify Lake Norman level is > 746 feet 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> McGuire Units 1 and 216974Rvso15 16.9.7-4 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 TABLE 16.9.7-1 STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATIONt 11 NON-FUNCTIONAL SSS FIRE DETECTION & SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS LOCATION COMPONENT ___ ________ _____

EL 716 EL 733 EL 750 Control Battery Cable Turbine Driven Motor Driven Containment EE-KK( EE-KK EE-KK Room Room Rooms AFW Pump AFW Pump _____

SSS Diesel Generator( 3t X X X X, X X X X Note 2 SSS DG Starting 24 VBattery X X X X X X X X Note 2 Bank and Chargert*________ ______ ______

Standby Makeup Pump and XX X Water Supply____

SSS 250/1 25V Battery and X X XNote 2 Chargert~ _________ ____ ________ _______ _______

Turbine Driven AFW Pump and X Water Suppliest 4t ____ ____ _______________

Turbine Driven AFW Pump X SolenoidC ___C"____

Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, Sump A X

  • Groundwater Drainage Sump rPump A* Sump B 4

Fire Suppression Pump "C" (see -r t I- I t --

Condition D). X INSTRUMENTATION: ___ __ ______ .___ ______I_____ _____

1. RCS Pressure __ _ _ X X X _ __I _ __ Note 2
2. Pressurizer Level _ _ _ X X X _ _ ote 2 N__
3. SG Level _ _ __ __ X X X _ Note__ 2__
4. Incore Temperature
5. NC Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature

__4 J X X

X X X

jNote

_ _ _ Note 2 2

NOTES:

1.. If tire detection and/or suppression systems are non-functional, then the ACTION statement(s) of the applicable fire detection and/or suppression SLC shall be complied with.

2. Monitor containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations specified in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.5.1 or 3.6.5.2, in lieu of verification of functionality of systems inside containment.
3. With this component non-functional, then denoted areas of both units are affected.
4. Water supplies include the Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank (CAST) and Condenser Circulating Water (RC) System via valves 1/2CA-316/317. Continuous vents at 1/2RN-1065 and 1 RN-1066 support FUNCTIONALITY of the RC source for Unit 1 only.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 16.9.7-5 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 TABLE 16.9.7-2 STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TESTING REQUIREMENTS

  • REQUIRED TESTING READOUT INSTRLJMENT CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS LOCATION
1. Reactor Coolant Pressure 1TR 16.9.7.7 SSF Control TA 16.9.7.14 Panel
2. Pressurizer Level 1 TR 16.9.7.7 SSF Control TR 16.9.7.14 Panel
3. Steam Generator rLevel 1 per SG TR 16.9.7.7 SSF Control (Wide Range) TA 16.9.7.14 Panel Incore Temperatu.ire 1TA 16.9.7.7 SSF Control 4.

TA 16.9.7.14 Panel

5. Standby Makeup Pump Flow 1 TA 16.9.7.14 SSF Control Panel
6. NC Wide Range Cold Leg 2 TA 16.9.7.7 SSF Control Temperature TA 16.9.7.14 Panel McGuire Units 1 and 216976Rvso15 16.9.7-6 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 BASES The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) is designed to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated fire incidents, sabotage, or station blackout events by providing capability to maintain HOT STANDBY conditions and by controlling and monitoring vital systems from locations external to the main control room. The facility is credited with the ability to cope with a station black out (SBO) event of 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> duration. This capability is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and 10 CFR 50.63.

By design, the 555 is intended to respond to those low-probability events which render both the control room and automatic safety systems inoperable. Because of the low probability of occurrence of these events, the remedial actions rely on compensatory action, timely repair or return to functionality and, ifnecessary, a justification for continued operation.

Because the SSS performs a redundant fire protection function, compensatory action during periods when the SSS is non-functional relies largely on assurance of the functionality of fire detection and suppression systems. Table 16.9.7-1 establishes requirements for functionality of fire detection and suppression systems.

Both A&D NC Cold Leg Wide Range Temperatures are required for SSS functionality. This conclusion is based on NRC Correspondence during issuance of the original operating license.

The Source Range Wide Range Neutron Flux Instrumentation was installed at the SSS Control Panel as part of NRC review of this system in the early 1980s. The indication is not required for SSS functionality, based on the NRCs response to Duke dated July 21, 1983.

Controls and power to the pressurizer heater banks are included for SSF events; however, they are not required for 555 functionality. NRC Generic Letter 86-10 provides that conclusion.

The Testing Requirements ensure that the SSS systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions. The testing requirements were based largely on SSS Technical Specifications for the Catawba Nuclear Station, which was approved prior to the issuance of the fuel load license for Unit 1 of that plant. Also considered in the formulation of the testing requirements were existing McGuire Technical Specifications, such as those for the 1E Diesel Generators, Refueling Water Storage Tank, Fire Protection & Detection Systems, and other Tech Specs which are related to the safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant.

The required level in the SSS diesel generator fuel storage tank ensures sufficient fuel for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of uninterrupted operation. Per Appendix R requirements, the unit must be in cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of going to the SSF. The 72-hour supply of fuel oil assures this capability. The specified minimum fuel oil level required in the storage tank is based on Calculation MCC- 1223.10-00-0003.

Testing has demonstrated the ability of plant operations to start the SSF diesel within 10 minutes of the recognition of an 560 event, thus satisfying the intent of NUMARC 87-00 guidance. The SSF diesel generator has sufficient capacity and capability to operate equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for a 4-hour SBO event.

McGuire Units 1 and 216977Rvso15 16.9.7-7 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 BASES (continued)

Fuel oil for the SSS diesel generator is tested and maintained in accordance with the same Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program used for the 4kV emergency diesel generators (see Technical Specification 5.5.13, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.3.2 and associated Bases).

Although the Standby Makeup Pump is not nuclear safety-related and was not designed according to ASME code requirements, it is tested quarterly to ensure its FUNCTIONALITY.

The Standby Makeup Pump (SMP) functions as part of the SSF to provide makeup capacity to the reactor coolant system and cooling flow to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals.

The RCP seal leak-off flow is temperature dependent (i.e., the higher the temperature the higher the leak-off flow). During normal operation the RCP seals are supplied from the Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) drawing from the Volume Control Tank (VCT). During the SSF event, the SMP draws from the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). During the SSF event there is no SFP cooling, so water injected into the RCP seals will have a higher temperature than during normal operation. The SMP is capable of providing a makeup capacity of 26 gpm.

The revised SLC limit of 20 gpm total accumulative leakage is based on a calculation that was performed by Westinghouse, indicating increased RCP seal leak-off at higher seal water temperatures, to relate the SSF event leakage of 26 gpm at elevated RCP seal temperatures. This more conservative limit will ensure that the SMP will be capable of providing makeup and seal cooling flow equal to or greater than total leakage during the SSF event, increased RCP seal leak-off flow due to heat-up of the SFP, and still provide a margin of safety. As a conservative measure, during normal power operation the total accumulative system leakage (unidentified + identified + RCP seal leak-off flows) shall be limited to 20 gpm.

Testing Requirement 16.9.7.2 ensures that an adequate borated water volume is available to supply the SMP continuously for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (references 26 through 31). The SMP draws borated water from the SEP. Additional borated water inventory is transferred from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the SEP via gravity flow. Transfer of water from the RWST to the SEP maintains required SEP levels and adequate SMP net positive suction head.

The additional requirement that total RCP seal leak-off flow be < 16.3 gpm resulted from a historical review of NRC correspondence that specified the SMP also provide for reactor coolant system makeup and boration in addition to RCP seal leakage requirements (Ref.

17). Calculations show that this upper limit for RCP seal leak-off provides sufficient margin to maintain the required unit conditions for a bounding SSS event.

Calculation MCC-1201.01-00-0053, Rev. 0, "MNS Units 1 & 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Response To Loss Of Seal Cooling," Sections 2 and 10 (Tab D, page 15) determined the elapsed time from loss of all seal cooling (loss of NV seal injection and loss of KC flow to the RCP thermal barrier heat exchanger) to when hot NC water entered the RCP No. 1 seal at varying seal leakoff rates. Chart interpolation determined that at a nominal No. 1 seal leakoff rate of 4 gpm, the seal would be at 235°F in 6.4 minutes from loss of all seal cooling event initiation. Therefore, for a maximum No. 1 seal leakoff of 4 gpm and ifthe Operators are instructed to stop all 4 RCPs at 3 minutes into the scenario, 3.4 minutes remain for the RCP motors to coast down to a stop and no seal rotation would occur above the No. 1 seal trip setpoint (2350 F) during loss of all seal cooling. The 4 gpm limit is conservative based on the guidance provided in Westinghouse WCAP-17100, Section 1.2.3.4, "Response during a Loss of All Seal Cooling," and Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-04-22, Revision 1, for McGuire Units 1 and 216978Rvso15 16.9.7-8 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.9.7 BASES (continued)

RCP coast down times and time for hot NC system water to reach the No. 1 seal on loss of  ;

all seal cooiing.

The Groundwater Drainage Sump Pump A, in the A (Unit 1) and B (Unit 2) sumps, can be controlled and powered from the SSF. These Sump Pumps remove accumulation of groundwater, Turbine driven AFW Pump drains, and other miscellaneous sources. For the SSS to be FUNCTIONAL, a minimum of one of these pumps must be FUNCTIONAL. Credit is taken for the groundwater underdrain system to transport water from one sump to the other.

The turbine driven AFW pump can be controlled from the SSF and is utilized during an SSS event to maintain adequate secondary side heat removal. For the SSS to be FUNCTIONAL, the turbine driven AFW pump must be FUNCTIONAL. For the turbine driven AFW pump to meet SSS functionality requirements, it requires a FUNCTIONAL SSS-related steam supply flowpath from the "C" steam generator (valve SA-48ABC). Additional detail regarding AFW SSS requirements can be found on the applicable AFW Teat Acceptance Criteria (TAC) sheets, and in the SSS Design Basis Specification, MCS-1223.SS-00-0001.

The turbine driven AFW pump water supply for the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO event is provided by the CA Storage Tank (CAST). The water supply for the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> fire event is initially provided by the CAST then later by manual alignment to the RC system via valves 1/2CA-31 6/317. The Unit 1 valves are maintained closed to prevent air entrainment (Ref.22). Adequate CAST inventory of 200,000 gallons (20 feet of level) is ensured by TR 16.9.7.19. For a fire event, an initial CAST inventory is needed to allow time to perform the manual alignment from the CAST to the RC system. For Unit 1 only, in the remote chance that the level of Lake Norman drops below 746 feet, air entrainment from the RC system cannot be prevented. In' this case, adequate water supplies for a fire event are ensured by making up to the Unit 1 CAST from the Fire Suppression system using the "C" Fire Suppression pump.

The SSF is provided with its own 250/125 VDC power system which is independent from the normal 125 VDC and 120 VAC vital l&C power systems. The SSF batteries are charged by the SSF diesel generator and are available to power the SSF instruments and controls necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions from the SSF control room following a station blackout (SBO) event.

While the SSS 24 VDC battery charger is isolated for battery surveillance testing, the SSS Diesel Generator remains functional as long as the battery voltage is > 24 volts.

The SSS 125V batteries and battery chargers consist of three pairs SDSP1, SDSP2 and SDSS. Each pair consists of a battery and associated battery charger. Pair SDSS can be used to substitute for either pair SDSP1 or SDSP2. Only two of these pairs are required functional since pair S0S5 is spare.

This selected licensee commitment is part of the McGuire Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of McGuire Facility Operating License Conditions C.4 (Unit 1) and C.7 (Unit 2).

McGuire Units 1 and 216979Rvso15 16.9.7-9 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.

9.7 REFERENCES

1. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Chapter 9.511
2. McGu ire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 2, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix 0
3. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 5, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix B
4. McGuire Nuclear Station SER Supplement 6, Chapter 9.5.1 and Appendix C
5. McGuire Fire Protection Review, as revised
6. McGuire Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Review
7. IEEE 308-1974, Class 1 E Power Systems
8. IEEE 450-1975, Maintenance Testing & Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries
9. OP/0/B/6350/04, Standby Shutdown Facility Diesel Operation
10. McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses, Unit 1 License Condition C.(4) and Unit 2 License Condition C.(7)
11. PIP 0-M-99-03926
12. PIP-M-01-3466
13. 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current
14. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 4, 1990, Requirements for Station Blackout.
15. Letter from H.B. Tucker to NRC, dated April 17, 1989, Requirements for Station Blackout,
16. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Safety Evaluation for Station Blackout (10CFR50.63), Dated February 19, 1992.
17. SAIC-91/1 265, "Technical Evaluation Report, McGuire Nuclear Station, Station Blackout Evaluation," Dated December 10, 1991.
18. McGuire Nuclear Station UFSAR, Section 18.2.4, Chemistry Control Program.
19. MCS-1465.00-00-0019, "Plant Design Basis Specification For Station Blackout Rule,"

Rev. 3.

20. McGuire License Renewal Commitments MCS-1274.00-00-0016, Section 4.6, Chemistry Control Program.
21. PIP M-04-3317.
22. MCC-1223.42-00-0055, "Design Considerations and Bases for 1/2CA-161C and 1/2CA-162C Automatic Open Deletion Modifications MD101869 and MD201870."

McGuire Units 1 and 2 1..-0Rvso 16.9.7-10 5 Revision 153

Standby Shutdown System 16.

9.7 REFERENCES

(continued)

23. PIP M-08-001 29.
24. MCC-1223.10-00-0003, "SSF DIG Fuel Oil Requirements".
25. 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979.1 26.* September 23, 1981 letter, R.A. Birkel (NRC) to Duke
27. October 21, 1981 letter, W.O. Parker Jr. (Duke) to H.R. Denton (NRC)
28. December 14, 1982 letter, H.B. Tucker (Duke) to H.R. Denton (NRC)
29. January 5, 1983 letter, H.B. Tucker (Duke) to H.R. Denton (NRC)
30. Suppl. 6 to McGuire Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-0422, February 1983.
31. MCC-1223.04-00-0012, "Critical Fuel Pool Level with Standby Makeup Pump Taking Suction," Rev. 3
32. MCS-1 223.SS-00-0001, "Design Basis Specification for the Standby Shutdown System,"* Rev, 29 McGuire Units 1 and 2 1..-1Rvso 16.9.7-11 5 Revision 153

CLEANING MODE