ML15131A536

NRC Staff Answer to San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace'S Motion to File New Contentions Regarding the Adequacy of the Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis for Diablo Canyon

ML15131A536
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	05/11/2015
From:	Lindell J, Straus D, Uttal S NRC/OGC
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
50-275-LR, 50-323-LR, ASLBP 10-900-01-LR-BD01, RAS 27792
Download: ML15131A536 (26)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-275-LR/ 50-323-LR

)

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

NRC STAFF ANSWER TO SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACES MOTION TO FILE NEW CONTENTIONS REGARDING THE ADEQUACY OF THE SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS FOR DIABLO CANYON Joseph A. Lindell Daniel D. Straus Susan Uttal Counsel for NRC Staff

-i-TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1 BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................... 2 DISCUSSION............................................................................................................................. 6 I. The NRCs Consideration of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives in License Renewal Proceedings ................ 7 II. SLOMFPs Proposed Contentions Do Not Meet the Admissibility Requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1) ................................................................... 9 A. CONTENTION C............................................................................................... 10

1. Contention C is Inadmissible Because it is Premature.............................. 11

2. Proposed Contention C is Inadmissible Because it Fails to Raise a Material Dispute with the SAMA Analysis ................................... 13

a. SLOMFP Fails to Show Why the SAMA Analysis Must Use Dr. Jacksons Methods................................................. 14

b. SLOMFP Challenges the 2015 Seismic Hazards Assessment, But Does Not Materially Challenge the SAMA Analysis ............... 15

c. Dr. Jacksons Methods Were Considered When the 2015 Seismic Hazards Analysis was Developed .......................... 16 B. CONTENTION D............................................................................................... 18

1. PG&E Considered External Flooding, Including Intense Precipitation, When Preparing Its SAMA Analysis .......................................................... 18

2. The Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report Relied on a Conservative Analysis That Ignored Site-Specific Characteristics ............ 20 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 23

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-275-LR/ 50-323-LR

)

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

NRC STAFF ANSWER TO SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACES MOTION TO FILE NEW CONTENTIONS REGARDING THE ADEQUACY OF THE SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS FOR DIABLO CANYON INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(i)(1) and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (Board) revised scheduling order,1 the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Staff) hereby files its answer to San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peaces (SLOMFP or Intervenor) Motion to File New Contentions Regarding Adequacy of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis for Diablo Canyon License Renewal Application (Motion).2 In its Motion, SLOMFP proffers two contentions concerning the adequacy of the Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) analysis supporting the license renewal application (LRA) of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (DCPP or Diablo Canyon).3 1

Revised Scheduling Order, 8-10 (Nov. 19, 2012) (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12324A214).

2 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peaces Motion to File New Contentions Regarding Adequacy of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis for Diablo Canyon License Renewal Application (Apr.

15, 2015) (ADAMS Accession No. ML15105A633) (Motion). The Motion is supported by attachments of the Declaration of Dr. David D. Jackson In Support of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peaces Motion to File New Contention Regarding Adequacy of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis for Diablo Canyon License Renewal Application (Apr. 15, 2015) (Jackson Decl.), and David D. Jacksons Curriculum Vitae (Apr. 15, 2015).

3 Letter from James R. Becker, Site Vice President, to NRC, Information to Support NRC Review of DCPP License Renewal Application (LRA) (Nov. 23, 2009) (ADAMS Accession No. ML093350335)

(transmitting application for license renewal for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.). The

As more fully set forth below, the Staff opposes the admission of SLOMFPs two proposed contentions. Although SLOMFP has already demonstrated standing in this proceeding,4 and the Staff does not contest the timeliness of SLOMFPs filing, SLOMFPs contentions should be denied because they do not meet the general contention admissibility requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1). Specifically, SLOMFPs proposed contentions: (1) are premature and not ripe for litigation, and/or (2) do not raise a genuine material dispute with the licensees SAMA analysis.5 Therefore, SLOMFPs Motion should be denied.

BACKGROUND This proceeding concerns PG&Es November 23, 2009 application to renew its operating licenses for Diablo Canyon for an additional twenty years from the current expiration dates of November 2, 2024, and August 26, 2025.6 PG&E submitted its application pursuant to the NRCs license renewal regulations at 10 C.F.R. Part 54.7 The NRC published a notice of receipt of the LRA, which included PG&Es initial environmental report, in the Federal Register on December 11, 2009.8 The NRC accepted the LRA for review, and on January 21, 2010, published a Federal Register notice providing an opportunity for hearing.9 Diablo Canyon LRA (2009) is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/diablo-canyon.html.

4 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(4) (If the party or participant has already satisfied the requirements of standing under paragraph (d) of this section in the same proceeding in which the new or amended contentions are filed, it does not need to do so again.).

5 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1).

6 LRA at Section 1.0, 1.1-1.

7 See 10 C.F.R. §§ 54.19-54.23 (providing general requirements regarding the contents of license renewal applications); See 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c) (providing environmental requirements regarding the contents of license renewal applications).

8 Pacific Gas & Electric Company; Notice of Receipt and Availability of Application for Renewal of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82 for an Additional 20-Year Period, 74 Fed. Reg. 65,811 (Dec. 11, 2009).

9 Notice of Acceptance for Docketing of the Application, Notice of Opportunity for Hearing for Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82 for an Additional 20-Year Period; Pacific Gas &

Electric Company, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; and Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI) for Contention Preparation, 75 Fed. Reg. 3493 (Jan. 21, 2010).

The period for filing a petition for intervention or request for hearing closed on March 22, 2010. SLOMFP timely filed a petition to intervene and a waiver petition on March 22, 2010.10 The Board granted SLOMPFs hearing request and admitted SLOMFPs contention claiming that the SAMA analysis was inadequate because it did not account for the Shoreline Fault.11 On February 25, 2015, PG&E submitted an update to its Environmental Report.12 One portion of the update, Appendix F, concerned the SAMA analysis for Diablo Canyon, which PG&E stated that it revised using an updated Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model incorporating plant design changes, an upgrade to the internal flooding analysis, and an updated fire model. Notably, [T]he updated SAMA analysis incorporated more recent population, economic, and evacuation information, and updated seismic hazard curves that considered the Shoreline fault and other regional faults.13 On April 6, 2015, SLOMFP filed a motion with two new proposed contentions (Contentions A and B) challenging the adequacy of the discussion of alternatives in PG&Es 10 Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene by San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (Mar. 22, 2010) (ADAMS Accession No. ML100810441). San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peaces Petition for Waiver of 10 C.F.R. Part 51 Subpart A Appendix B and 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(2) (Mar. 22, 2010) (ADAMS Accession No. ML100810442).

11 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-10-15, 72 NRC 257, 345-46 (2010). On appeal, the Commission affirmed the Boards ruling on admissibility but restated the contention. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon, CLI-11-11, 74 NRC 427,429, 438 (2011).

12 PG&E Letter DCL-15-027, Update to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant License Renewal Application (LRA) Amendment 49 and LRA Appendix E, Applicants Environmental Report - Operating License Renewal Stage, Amendment 2 (Feb. 25, 2015) (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML15057A102) (ER update). The revised SAMA is in Enclosure 2, Attachment 2 - Environmental Report, Amendment 2, Section 4.20 Appendix F (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML15056A755, ML15056A756, ML15056A758, ML15056A759, ML15056A763, ML15056A765, ML15056A769) (revised SAMA analysis or SAMA analysis).

13 ER Update at 4.20-3 (emphasis omitted).

updated Environmental Report.14 PG&E and the Staff filed answers opposing the admission of Contentions A and B on May 1, 2015.15 SLOMFPs instant proposed contentions (Contentions C and D) are based on two documents submitted to the NRC in March 2015 in response to the NRCs March 12, 2012 request for information pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(f), which, among other things, implemented Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1.16 In accord with Recommendation 2.1, the March 2012 letter asked PG&E to reevaluate the seismic and flooding hazards at their sites using updated seismic and flooding hazard information and present-day regulatory guidance and methodologies and, if necessary, . . . perform a risk evaluation.17 On March 11, 2015, PG&E responded to the NRCs 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(f) letter by submitting a Seismic Hazard Screening Report for Diablo Canyon (SHS Report). The report performed a seismic hazard reevaluation for Diablo Canyon and developed a plant specific ground motion response spectrum for screening purposes.18 The ground motion response spectrum was developed based on the results of PG&Es Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA), the details of which are provided in two additional reports i) the Seismic Source 14 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peaces Motion to File New Contentions Regarding Adequacy of Environmental Report for Diablo Canyon License Renewal Application (Apr. 6, 2015) (ADAMS Accession No. ML15096A613).

15 Pacific Gas and Electric Companys Answer Opposing Proposed Energy Alternatives Contentions (May 1, 2015) (ADAMS Accession No. ML15121A805). NRC Staff Answer to San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peaces Motion to File New Contentions Regarding the Adequacy of the Updated Environmental Report for Diablo Canyon (May 1, 2015) (ADAMS Accession No. ML15121A804).

16 Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident at Enclosure 2 at 4 (Mar. 12, 2012) (ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340)

(March 2012 letter).

17 Id. at 4.

18 PG&E Letter DCL-15-035, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident: Seismic Hazard and Screening Report, at 1 (Mar. 11, 2015) (ADAMS Accession No. ML15070A607).

Characterization for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, San Luis Obispo County, California (SSC Report) and the ii) Southwestern United States Ground Motion Characterization SSHAC Level 3 Technical Report (collectively 2015 seismic hazards analysis).19 In its updated Environmental Report, PG&E committed to addressing the impacts of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis on the SAMA analysis.20 Also on March 11, 2015, PG&E responded to the NRCs 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(f) letter by submitting a Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report for Diablo Canyon (Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report). In the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, PG&E reevaluated external flooding mechanisms pursuant to present-day regulatory guidance and methodologies.21 The report included an Interim Action Plan that that documented actions planned or taken to address locally intense precipitation (LIP) events that could cause flooding exceeding the current licensing basis.22 PG&E explained that as directed by the March 2012 letter, it would perform an integrated assessment of the plant to identify vulnerabilities and actions to address them, prior to March 13, 2017.23 In its instant Motion, SLOMFP contends that the revised SAMA analysis is inadequate to satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).24 SLOMFPs proposed Contention C argues that the SAMA analysis does not account for the revised seismic hazard in the 2015 analysis, and even if PG&E were to incorporate the results of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis, the SAMA analysis would be inadequate because of deficiencies in the 2015 seismic 19 Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee Studies for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Seismic Hazard Update (Mar. 2015), available at http://www.pge.com/en/safety/systemworks/dcpp/sshac/index.page.

20 Revised SAMA analysis at F-34.

21 PG&E Letter DCL-15-034, Final Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 Flooding, at 1 (Mar. 11, 2015) (ADAMS Accession Nos.

ML15070A605 and ML15070A606).

22 Id. at 1-2.

23 See id. at 2.

24 Motion at 1.

hazards analysis.25 Proposed Contention D argues that the SAMA analysis fails to consider the flooding risks to safety equipment caused by LIP flooding events as described in the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report.26 SLOMFP maintains that its proposed contentions are timely because they are based on the 2015 seismic hazards analysis and the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, which SLOMFP first obtained on March 16, 2015.27 The Staff does not contest the timeliness of SLOMFPs filing. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1)(i)-

(iii) provides that contentions filed after the initial deadline for submitting contentions will be entertained if the petitioner demonstrates good cause. To demonstrate good cause, the petitioner must show that the information upon which its filing is based was not previously available, that such information is materially different from information previously available, and that it submitted its filing in a timely fashion based on the availability of the information. In this case, SLOMFPs contentions concern the impact of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis and the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report on PG&Es SAMA analysis. The 2015 seismic hazards analysis and the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report were first submitted to the NRC in March 2015. SLOMFP filed its Motion in a timely fashion after receipt of the reports. Therefore, the Staff does not challenge the timeliness of SLOMFPs Motion.

Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed more fully below, SLOMFPs proposed contentions are inadmissible because they fail to satisfy the NRCs contention admissibility requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1).

25 Id. at 2-15.

26 Id. at 16-18.

27 Id. at 19.

DISCUSSION I. The NRCs Consideration of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives in License Renewal Proceedings NRC regulations implementing NEPA require SAMA analyses during the environmental license renewal review.28 Mitigation alternatives or SAMAs refer to safety enhancements such as a new hardware item or procedure intended to reduce the risk of severe accidents.29 Specifically, a SAMA analysis is a systematic search for potentially cost beneficial enhancements to further reduce nuclear power plant risk. A key tool used in identifying SAMAs is the use of a site specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The NRC uses PRAs to estimate risk by computing real numbers to determine what can go wrong, how likely is it, and what are its consequences. That is, a SAMA analysis examines the probability of various accident scenarios, spanning a spectrum of potential initiating events, accident sequences, and consequence severity.30 The analysis determines whether particular SAMAs would sufficiently reduce risk - e.g., by reducing frequency of core damage or frequency of containment failure -

for the SAMA to be cost-effective to implement.31 If the cost of implementing a particular SAMA is greater than its estimated benefit, the SAMA is not considered cost-beneficial to implement.32 Importantly, the Commission has explained that in a highly predictive analysis 28 See 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L) (noting that an ER must provide a consideration of alternatives to mitigate severe accidents if the Staff has not previously considered such alternatives for the plant in a NEPA document). See also Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-11, 71 NRC 287, 290 (2010) reconsideration denied, CLI-10-15, 71 NRC 479 (2010).

29 Pilgrim, CLI-10-11, 71 NRC at 290-91.

30 See Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-02-17, 56 NRC 1, 12 (2002) (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.

519, 551 (1978); Citizens Against Burlington v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).

31 Pilgrim, CLI-10-11, 71 NRC at 291.

32 Id.

such as a SAMA analysis, there are bound to be significant uncertainties, and therefore an uncertainty analysis is performed.33 Therefore, the NRCs SAMA analysis does not need to predict the results of any single incidence of a severe accident with absolute accuracy. That exercise would be of limited value given the wide range of possible conditions that may accompany a severe accident.34 Rather, because the analysis rests on the statistically-significant consequences of thousands of varied scenarios, the SAMA analysis for any given set of scenarios provides a reasonable and sufficient model to satisfy NEPAs hard look requirement.35 Moreover, the SAMA analysis is not based on worst-case accident scenarios.36 The NRC Staffs obligation regarding SAMAs under NEPA and Part 51 is met by taking a hard look at those SAMAs identified as potentially cost beneficial.37 Only those SAMAs that are cost-beneficial and bear on adequately managing the effects of aging need be implemented as part of the license renewal safety review, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 54.38 Although a SAMA analysis considers safety issues, it is ultimately an environmental review and subject to different requirements then NRC safety reviews performed under the AEA. As such, a SAMA analysis should be judged under NEPAs rule of reason, and not under NRC safety requirements.39 In this vein, the Commission has long stressed that NRC 33 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-01, 75 NRC 39, 58 (2012).

34 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-07-13, 66 NRC 131, 142 n.12 (2007), revd. on other grounds, CLI-10-11, 71 NRC 287.

35 Id.

36 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-15, 75 NRC 704, 706-08 (2012).

37 Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3), LBP-10-13, 71 NRC 673, 679 (2010).

38 Pilgrim, CLI-10-11, 71 NRC at 294.

39 Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at, 706-07.

adjudicatory hearings are not EIS editing sessions.40 Under NEPA, mitigation (and the SAMA issue is one of mitigation) need only be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences [of the proposed project] have been fairly evaluated.41 Thus, the Commission has stated that the ultimate concern for a SAMA analysis is whether any additional SAMA should have been identified as potentially cost beneficial, not whether further analysis may refine the details in the SAMA NEPA analysis.42 The Commission has explained that when it comes to admissibility of SAMA contentions, the proper question is not whether there are plausible alternative choices for use in the analysis, but whether the analysis that was done is reasonable under NEPA.43 Unless a petitioner sets forth a supported contention pointing to an apparent error or deficiency that may have significantly skewed the environmental conclusions, there is no genuine material dispute for hearing.44 In this case, the Intervenor claims that the SAMA analysis is deficient. However, none of its claims are admissible.

II. SLOMFPs Proposed Contentions Do Not Meet the Admissibility Requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)

SLOMFPs proposed contentions should be denied because they do not meet the Commissions general contention admissibility standards in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1). Under

§ 2.309(f)(1), an admissible contention must:

(i) Provide a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. . .

40 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-09-11, 69 NRC 529, 533 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).

41 Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 &

2), CLI-03-17, 58 NRC 419, 431 (2003) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.

332, 353 (1989) (alteration in original)).

42 Pilgrim, CLI-09-11, 69 NRC at 533.

43 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-12-08, 75 NRC 393, 406 (2012) (alterations in original) (citing NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-12-05, 75 NRC 301, 323-24 (2012).

44 Id. at 407 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).

(ii) Provide a brief explanation of the basis for the contention; (iii) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention is within the scope of the proceeding; (iv) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention is material to the findings the NRC must make to support the action that is involved in the proceeding; (v) Provide a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinions which support the requestors/petitioners position on the issue and on which the petitioner intends to rely at hearing, together with references to the specific sources and documents on which the requestor/petitioner intends to rely to support its position on the issue; [and]

(vi) . . . [P]rovide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant/licensee on a material issue of law or fact. This information must include references to specific portions of the application (including the applicants environmental report and safety report) that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute, or, if the petitioner believes that the application fails to contain information on a relevant matter as required by law, the identification of each failure and the supporting reasons for the petitioners belief[.]45 The Commission has strictly applied these contention admissibility requirements in NRC adjudications.46 As the Commission and Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards have repeatedly held, [a] failure to meet any of these criteria renders the contention inadmissible.47 A. CONTENTION C Proposed Contention C states that PG&Es SAMA analysis is inadequate to satisfy NEPA because the evaluation of potential mitigation measures is not based on a sufficiently rigorous or up-to-date analysis of seismic risks, rendering the cost-effectiveness analysis of the 45 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1). A further provision, § 2.309(f)(1)(vii), applies only to COL applications submitted under 10 C.F.R. Part 52.

46 AmerGen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-06-24, 64 NRC 111, 118-19 (2006).

47 N. States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Independent Spent Fuel Installation), LBP-12-24, 76 NRC 503, 509 (2012). See also South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. (Virgil C.

Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-10-1, 71 NRC 1, 7 (2010) (Our contention admissibility requirements are deliberately strict, and we will reject any contention that does not satisfy the requirements.) (quoting USEC Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-9, 63 NRC 433, 437 (2006)).

mitigation measures insufficient.48 The contention acknowledges that the PRA upon which the SAMA analysis is based is an interim PRA, and alleges that the interim PRA is not sufficiently rigorous or updated to support the SAMA analysis.49 The contention also states that updating the SAMA analysis with the results of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis as committed to by the licensee, would not cure the alleged deficiencies in the SAMA analysis.50 As basis for this proposed contention, SLOMFP claims that: (1) DC03, which is the 2014 interim PRA that will be updated with results from the 2015 seismic hazard analysis, is inadequate to support the SAMA analysis because it does not contain the latest information that is in the 2015 seismic hazards analysis;51 and, (2) the seismic hazard assessment results in the 2015 report are inadequate to support the SAMA analysis because they fail to account for nearby earthquakes and for potentially larger earthquakes.52 However, as discussed below, proposed Contention C is inadmissible because it raises issues that are premature and not ripe for litigation, and because it fails to show a material dispute with the licensees SAMA analysis.

1. Contention C is Inadmissible Because it is Premature First, SLOMFP argues that the interim PRA in the revised SAMA analysis is not a reasonable basis for the SAMA analysis because it does not currently consider the results of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis.53 However, this argument is inadmissible because it is premature. As SLOMFP itself acknowledges,54 the licensee has committed to evaluating the 48 Motion at 2.

49 Id.

50 Id. at 6.

51 Id. at 4-5.

52 Id. at 6-12.

53 Id. at 4-5.

54 Id. at 4.

impacts of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis on the SAMA analysis in the near future.55 Thus, there is no reason for the Board to admit this aspect of the contention, as the issue raised by the Intervenor will be cured shortly.56 Second, the Intervenor argues that even if the results of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis were incorporated into PG&Es SAMA analysis, the SAMA analysis would still be deficient because the 2015 seismic hazards analysis failed to adequately characterize the seismic risk to Diablo Canyon.57 This argument, however, is also premature. PG&E stated that it would address the impacts of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis on the SAMA analysis.58 Until PG&E performs this evaluation, it is impossible to know exactly what effect the 2015 seismic hazards analysis will have on the SAMA analysis. Until the final SAMA analysis is submitted, it is not possible to determine whether it complies with NEPA. Any arguments that SLOMFP makes about deficiencies in a future, updated SAMA analysis, are speculative.

Consequently, proposed Contention C is premature.59 [T]he Commission has indicated that 55 See Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on March 4, 2015, Between the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Pacific Gas and Electric Company Concerning the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, License Renewal Application at 1 (Mar. 24, 2015) (ADAMS Accession No. ML15069A095) (PG&E intends to submit in June 2015 an evaluation of any changes to the DCPP severe accident mitigation alternatives analysis resulting from the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 seismic hazard re-evaluation.).

56 See Calvert Cliffs 3 Nuclear Project., LLC & Unistar Nuclear Operating Serv., LLC (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3), LBP-12-19, 76 NRC 184, 199 (2012) (stating that licensing boards should not consider premature contentions.).

57 Motion at 6.

58 Revised SAMA analysis at F-34.

59 See e.g., Crow Butte Res. (In Situ Leach Facility, Crawford, Nebraska), CLI-09-09, 69 NRC 331, 348-49 (2009) (reversing the Boards admission of a contention as premature because the Staff had not yet completed the consultation process under section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act);

Powertech USA, Inc. (Dewey-Burdock in Situ Uranium Recovery Facility), LBP-13-9, 78 NRC 37,104 (2013) (same); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plants, Units 6 and 7), LBP-11-33, 74 NRC 675, 681 (2011) (denying admission of NEPA contention challenging failure to address events at Fukushima in a draft or final EIS as, inter alia, premature, because [u]ntil each document is issued, it cannot plausibly be argued that the document is inadequate or otherwise fails to satisfy NEPA.).

licensing boards should not consider premature contentions.60 For this reason, proposed Contention C is inadmissible.

2. Proposed Contention C is Inadmissible Because it Fails to Raise a Material Dispute with the SAMA Analysis Proposed Contention C is also inadmissible because it does not raise a material dispute with PG&Es revised SAMA analysis. As discussed above, SLOMFP argues that even if the results of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis were incorporated into PG&Es SAMA analysis, the SAMA analysis would be deficient because the 2015 seismic hazards analysis failed to adequately characterize the seismic risk to Diablo Canyon.61 Based on Dr. David Jacksons analysis, SLOMFP argues that the 2015 seismic hazards analysis failed to account for earthquakes located nearer to the plant than PG&E assumed.62 Moreover, SLOMFP claims that the 2015 seismic hazards analysis failed to account for recent data and models showing that earthquakes on given faults may be much larger than previously assumed.63 However, as the Commission has explained with regard to SAMA contentions, the question is not whether more or different analysis can be done.64 Rather, Contentions challenging a SAMA analysis [] must identify a deficiency that plausibly could alter the overall result of the analysis in a material way.65 In this case, SLOMFPs claims do not raise a material dispute with the SAMA analysis for three reasons. First, the revised SAMA analysis, unlike the prior SAMA analysis, considers the full range of faults that contribute to the seismic hazard at the Diablo Canyon site, and will soon consider the 2015 seismic hazards analysis as well.

SLOMFP fails to demonstrate how the use of the models preferred by Dr. Jackson would 60 Calvert Cliffs, LBP-12-19, 76 NRC at 199.

61 Motion at 6.

62 Id. at 6-7.

63 Id. at 7-12.

64 Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 714.

65 Id.

materially affect the SAMA analysis or make its conclusions unreasonable. Second, SLOMFP disputes the 2015 seismic hazards analysis without sufficiently linking its claims to material deficiencies in the revised SAMA analysis. Third, Dr. Jacksons views were already considered in the development of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis.

a. SLOMFP Fails to Show Why the SAMA Analysis Must Use Dr. Jacksons Methods SLOMFP fails to demonstrate how the use of the models preferred by Dr. Jackson would materially affect the SAMA analysis or make its conclusions unreasonable. Notably, SLOMFPs proposed Contention C is different than SLOMFPs contention regarding the Shoreline Fault that this Board admitted in 2010.66 One of the primary reasons this Board admitted SLOMFPs initial contention asserting that the SAMA analysis failed to account for the Shoreline Fault was because SLOMFP argued that the available deterministic assessment of the Shoreline Fault was highly preliminary and . . . subject to further probabilistic analysis.67 In other words, PG&Es initial SAMA analysis was deficient because it failed to consider a new fault for which only preliminary deterministic conclusions had been reached, and that had never been analyzed probabilistically. The revised SAMA analysis, however, uses an updated PRA model that considers the Shoreline and other regional faults.68 Thus, the revised SAMA analysis does not leave a significant contributor to seismic events unconsidered.69 Moreover, PG&E has 66 See LBP-10-15, 72 NRC at 287-292, 345-46.

67 Id. at 289.

68 ER Update at 4.20-3; revised SAMA analysis at F F-36.

69 Moreover, the Shoreline Fault has now been the subject of several in-depth analyses. See, e.g., PG&E, Report on the Analysis of the Shoreline Fault Zone, Central Coastal California (Jan. 2011)

(ADAMS Accession No. ML110140431); RIL 12-01, Confirmatory Analysis of Seismic Hazard at [DCPP]

from the Shoreline Fault Zone (Sept. 2012) (ADAMS Accession No. ML121230035); PG&E Letter DCL-14-081, Central Coastal California Seismic Imaging Project, Shoreline Fault Commitment (Sept. 10, 2014)

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14260A387) (transmitting the enclosed Seismic Report (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML14260A106)).

committed to evaluating its updated PRA model in light of the PRA in the 2015 seismic hazards analysis.70 In its proposed Contention C, SLOMFP asserts that not only is the updated PRA that makes up the revised SAMA analysis insufficient, but that PG&Es commitment to address the impacts of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis PRA on the SAMA analysis is still not good enough. According to SLOMFP, because Dr. Jackson disputes the methodology of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis, the SAMA analysis will not satisfy NEPA until it uses Dr. Jacksons methods. But NEPA is governed by a rule of reason.71 As the Commission has explained, It will always be possible to envision and propose some alternate approach, some additional detail to include, some refinement.72 However, without demonstrating why a different methodological approach will materially affect the conclusions of the SAMA analysis, and render it unreasonable, an intervenor does not raise an admissible issue.73 SLOMFP has not demonstrated how Dr. Jacksons methods are material to a SAMA analysis that already considers all of the regional faults and will soon consider the latest seismic hazards analysis.

b. SLOMFP Challenges the 2015 Seismic Hazards Assessment, but Does Not Materially Challenge the SAMA Analysis SLOMFP focuses exclusively on methodological flaws in the 2015 seismic hazards analysis, but does not explain how the alleged deficiencies would materially affect the SAMA analysis. For example, SLOMFP maintains that the 2015 seismic hazards analysis uses models that underestimate the ground motion that could be caused by nearby earthquakes,74 but does not explain how the use of its preferred model would make a material difference to the 70 Revised SAMA analysis at F-34.

71 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. & Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-22, 72 NRC 202, 208 (2010); see also Hells Canyon Alliance v. United States Forest Serv., 227 F.3d 1170, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2000).

72 Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 714.

73 Pilgrim, CLI-12-1, 75 NRC at 58.

74 Motion at 7.

SAMA analysis. Similarly, SLOMFP contends that the earthquake models relied on by PG&E in the 2015 seismic hazards analysis have been discredited,75 but does not set forth how the use of different models would materially change the SAMA analysis. Finally, SLOMFP does not point to any particular SAMA that would become cost-beneficial because of the alleged errors in the 2015 seismic hazards analysis.76 In essence, SLOMFPs challenges are not directed toward the SAMA analysis, but at the adequacy of 2015 seismic hazards analysis. However, the 2015 report was submitted as a response to the Staffs request for information pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(f), and concerns current operating issues. As such, the seismic hazards analysis is not within the scope of license renewal except to the extent it is tied to PG&Es SAMA analysis.77 SLOMFP has failed to sufficiently make this connection because it has not demonstrated that the SAMA analysis is materially deficient.78

c. Dr. Jacksons Methods Were Considered When the 2015 Seismic Hazards Analysis was Developed NEPA does not prescribe outcomes, but requires only that the best available information be considered in the SAMA analysis.79 Dr. Jacksons views were, in fact, considered by the team that developed the probabilistic seismic hazard assessment (PSHA) used in the 2015 75 Id. at 7-12.

76 Pilgrim, CLI-09-11, 69 NRC at 533.

77 The Staff is currently reviewing the 2015 seismic hazards analysis, and will consider whether the reports methodology is appropriate or sufficient. The Staff and Commission will determine what regulatory actions, if any, must be taken. Yet these current operating matters are distinct from license renewal and the SAMA review. See Pilgrim, CLI-12-1, 75 NRC at 57 (The SAMA analysis is not a safety review performed under the Atomic Energy Act. The mitigation measures examined are supplemental to those we already require under our safety regulations for reasonable assurance of safe operation.

Through our reactor oversight process, including generic safety issue reviews, we revisit whether additional mitigation measures should be imposed as a safety matter under 10 C.F.R. Part 50.).

78 To the extent that SLOMFP is challenging the adequacy of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis, its arguments are outside the scope of license renewal. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii).

79 See, e.g., Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 2 and 3), LBP-13-13, 78 NRC 246, 473 (2013).

seismic hazards analysis. Therefore, SLOMFP has not shown that PG&Es commitment to evaluate the effects of the 2015 seismic hazards analysis on the SAMA analysis is insufficient.

The PSHA used in the 2015 seismic hazards analysis was developed using guidelines from the Senior Seismic Hazards Advisory Committee (SSHAC), which are identified in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.208 as an acceptable approach for conducting a PSHA.80 The SSHAC guidelines explain that a PSHA should consider a range of diverse technical interpretations81 from a diverse group of experts [] large enough to ensure that all credible points of view are represented.82 In November 2012, Dr. Jackson participated in a workshop held by PG&E on alternative PSHA models. Dr. Jacksons presentation and associated group discussions focused on the technical issues raised in proposed Contention C.83 Among other things, Dr.

Jackson advocated that the PSHA include the effect of large earthquakes occurring off of known faults,84 and maintained that different scaling relationships should be used to account for potentially large earthquakes.85 Thus, Dr. Jacksons views, even if not incorporated into the PSHA, were considered and discussed during its development. SLOMFPs preference for Dr.

Jacksons views is not sufficient to mandate that the SAMA analysis rely on those views instead of on the opinions of others. As explained above, there are always alternative approaches and other ways to perform an analysis.86 The revised SAMA analysis assesses the seismic risks for Diablo Canyon, and PG&Es commitment to address the impacts of the 2015 seismic hazards 80 Regulatory Guide 1.208, A Performance-Based Approach to Define the Site-Specific Earthquake Ground Motion (Mar. 2007) (ADAMS Accession No. ML14104B261).

81 NUREG/CR-6372, Vol. 1, Recommendations for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis:

Guidance on Uncertainty and Use of Experts, at 23 (Apr. 1997) (ADAMS Accession No. ML080090003).

82 Id. at 38.

83 Seismic Source Characterization for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, San Luis Obispo County, California, Rev. A., Appendix D: Workshop Summaries, at D29-30 (Mar. 2015), available at http://www.pge.com/en/safety/systemworks/dcpp/sshac/index.page.

84 See Motion at 6-7.

85 See id. at 7-12.

86 Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 714.

analysis on the SAMA analysis will further refine that analysis. SLOMFP has not shown that anything more must be done.

For all of these reasons, proposed Contention C does not raise a material issue.87 B. CONTENTION D Proposed Contention D states that PG&Es SAMA analysis does not satisfy NEPA because it is not based on a sufficiently rigorous or up-to-date analysis of flooding risks.88 In particular, SLOMFP contends that PG&Es SAMA Analysis contains no information about the risk of [local intense precipitation (LIP)] flooding events, and that PG&E failed to identify mitigation measures for LIP flooding events.89 SLOMFP further contends that PG&Es SAMA analysis should have considered the information contained in PG&Es Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report.90 However, as discussed below, Contention D is inadmissible because it does not raise a material dispute with PG&Es SAMA analysis. Specifically, Contention D is immaterial because (1) PG&E already considered intense precipitation events in its SAMA analysis, and (2) the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report utilized a Hierarchal Hazards Assessment Approach (HHAA), which would not be useful in a SAMA analysis.

1. PG&E Considered External Flooding, Including Intense Precipitation, When Preparing Its SAMA Analysis First, SLOMFP fails to raise a material dispute with the SAMA analysis because the SAMA analysis already considered intense precipitation.

87 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iv).

88 Motion at 16.

89 Id. at 16-17.

90 Id.

In its SAMA analysis, PG&E calculated the maximum averted cost-risk by preparing an integrated PRA.91 PG&Es integrated PRA included risk contributors from internal (including internal flooding), fire, and seismic events. This integrated PRA accounted for roughly 97% of the maximum averted cost-risk.92 The remaining non-seismic/non-fire external events contributed only 3% of maximum averted cost-risk.93 All external flood hazards, when considered together, accounted for roughly 1.3% of the total averted cost-risk.94 PG&E did not incorporate the non-seismic/non-fire external event contributors into the integrated PRA because complete, current, quantifiable external events models are not available for those remaining events. Instead, PG&E used a multiplier to account for the external event contributors. PG&E developed this multiplier based upon PG&Es IPEEE report.95 The IPEEE report analyzed the risk posed by many external events, and it found that at Diablo Canyon the high wind, ship impact, accidental aircraft impact, external flooding, and chemical release events have the potential to credibly impact plant operation. After evaluating flood risks from numerous potential events, PG&E concluded that the flood initiator group core damage failure frequency was 7.2xE-7 per year, which is small compared with other external contributors, and less than the 1x10E-6 per year suggested for screening in NUREG-1407.96 Significantly, PG&E specifically considered the impact of intense precipitation.97 Relying on NRC approved documents and guidance, PG&E concluded that intense precipitation will not 91 Cost-risk is the monetary equivalent of the risk that could be eliminated if a particular hazard were eliminated. See, e.g., Revised SAMA at F-66.

92 See revised SAMA at F F-66.

93 Id.

94 Id.at F F-67.

95 Id. at F F-68 and F F-92.

96 Id. See also Letter from Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice President and General Manager, PG&E, to NRC, Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, at 5-2-5-3 (June 27, 1994) (IPEEE Report). The report is currently not publicly available.

97 IPEEE Report at 5 5-11, Table 5-1 Summary Evaluation of Other External Events.

cause safety-related buildings to flood.98 PG&E cited site topography, drainage measures, and building design as realistic mitigating measures that would reduce the risk of flooding.

Thus, the Intervenor is incorrect; PG&E considered intense precipitation when preparing its SAMA analysis. While PG&E did not consider precipitation using the same methodologies as those in the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, that omission alone does not make SLOMFPs contention admissible. Indeed, SAMA adjudications would prove endless if hearings were triggered merely by suggested alternative inputs and methodologies that conceivably could alter the cost-benefit conclusions but that may be no more accurate or meaningful.99 The fact that the SAMA analysis could have been run using alternate methodologies does not, ipso facto, suggest that the inputs used were unreasonable.100 In this instance, SLOMFP has not explained how PG&Es SAMA analysis is inadequate. Rather, SLOMFP has simply identified a report where PG&E used a more conservative methodology to evaluate flooding risks without explaining its relevance to PG&Es SAMA analysis or the NRCs NEPA obligations.

Therefore, SLOMFPs proposed contention should be rejected as immaterial to this proceeding.

2. The Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report Relied on a Conservative Analysis That Ignored Site-Specific Characteristics Second, SLOMFP does not raise a material dispute with the SAMA analysis because SLOMFP has not shown that the Hierarchal Hazards Assessment Approach (HHAA) used in PG&Es Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report would be useful in a SAMA analysis.

In its Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, PG&E used the HHAA to evaluate flood hazards related to a local intense precipitation event.101 The NRCs NUREG/CR-7046 98 Id. at 5-2.

99 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-12-5, 75 NRC 301, 323-24 (2012).

100 Id. at 336-37 (Again, any number of alternative analyses may be reasonable under NEPA.

The issue is not whether alternative approaches exist[.]).

101 See NUREG/CR-7046, Design-Basis Flood Estimation for Site Characterization at Nuclear Power Plants in the United States of America (Nov. 2011) (ADAMS Accession No. ML11321A195).

describes the HHAA in the context of evaluating LIP events.102 The HHAA may be performed in three stages. In the first stage, licensees use a simple and conservative conceptual model for site drainage[, assuming] that no active components remain functional and even the passive site drainage network is compromised.103 Using this conservative model, if flood levels would adversely affect safety related SSCs, licensees may use less conservative conceptual models, which assume that some functioning mitigating measures remain functional.104 PG&E, however, performed only the most conservative stage one analysis. PG&Es model assumed that all the drainage system components (e.g., gravity storm drain systems, culverts, inlets) are non-functional or completely blocked during the LIP event [and that]. . . [a]ll the precipitation falling on the buildings was . . . discharge[d] onto the ground [contributing] to ground surface runoff.105 Based on these conservatisms, PG&E concluded that the water depth above the door thresholds and areas to the west of the turbine and buttress building varied between 0.09 ft. and 1.4 ft., with five of the doors/areas showing no inundation.106 PG&E did not reduce conservatisms used in the LIP modeling (roof drains blocked, storm drains blocked, etc.) which are potentially acceptable in a HHA approach.107 Instead, PG&E proposed mitigating the identified adverse impacts by utilizing existing weather forecasting technologies combined with deploying temporary barriers at affected doors, and entered the approach into its corrective action program.108 The HHAA used in PG&Es Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report would not be useful in preparing a SAMA analysis because it essentially postulates a worst-case scenario. Such a 102 See id. at 3-2.

103 Id.

104 Id. at 3 3-3.

105 Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report at 3-3 (emphasis added).

106 Id.

107 Id. at 5-1.

108 Id.

scenario ignores site-specific, realistic mitigating measures, such as drainage and compensatory measures. The PRAs used to identify cost benefits for SAMAs are not intended to be representative of any specific accident scenario, including a worst-case scenario.109 Rather, a SAMA analysis estimates the mean accident consequence values, which are averaged over many hypothetical severe accident scenarios.110 Indeed, the NRCs Regulatory Guide detailing how to perform external flood PRAs specifically advises licensees to use methodologies incorporating plant-specific and realistic assumptions.111 As discussed above, PG&Es SAMA analysis took account of realistic site-specific mitigation measures at Diablo Canyon, including site drainage mechanisms.112 SLOMFP has not explained how this analysis is inadequate. It has simply identified a report using a more conservative methodology. Merely identifying alternative methodologies is not sufficient to raise an admissible contention.113 Regardless, PG&E has already committed to adopting interim mitigating measures, and will perform an integrated assessment as required by the March 2012 letter. SLOMPF has not explained how incorporating the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report might lead to the identification of additional cost beneficial SAMAs.114 109 Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, 75 NRC at 708.

110 Id.

111 Regulatory Guide 1.200, Rev. 2, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, at 24-25 (Mar. 2009) (ADAMS Accession No. ML090410014).

112 IPEEE Report at 5-2.

113 Seabrook, CLI-12-5, 75 NRC at 323-24.

114 Also, LIP events constitute only one of several contributing flooding events to the overall external flood risk, which overall only constitutes roughly 1.3% of the maximum averted cost-risk for Diablo Canyon. Given external floodings relative insignificance, SLOMFP has not explained how the SAMAs incorporation of the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report would lead to the identification of any additional mitigation measures.

For all of these reasons, proposed Contention D does not raise a material dispute with the SAMA analysis and should be rejected.115 CONCLUSION The Staff respectfully submits that the Intervenor has not proffered an admissible contention, as required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(i)-(vi). Rather, SLOMFPs Motion raises issues that are either premature and/or immaterial to what must be considered in this proceeding. Therefore, the Motion should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

/Signed (electronically) by/

Joseph A. Lindell Counsel for the NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop O15-D21 Washington, DC 20555 Telephone: (301) 415-1474 Email: Joseph.Lindell@nrc.gov Date of Signature: May 11, 2015 Executed in Accord with 10 CFR 2.304(d) Executed in Accord with 10 CFR 2.304(d)

Daniel D. Straus Susan L. Uttal Counsel for the NRC Staff Counsel for the NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop O15-D21 Mail Stop O15-D21 Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Telephone: (301) 415-2793 Telephone: (301) 415-1582 Email: Daniel.Straus@nrc.gov Email: Susan.Uttal@nrc.gov 115 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iv).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-275-LR/ 50-323-LR

)

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.305 (revised), I hereby certify that copies of the NRC STAFF ANSWER TO SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACES MOTION TO FILE NEW CONTENTIONS REGARDING THE ADEQUACY OF THE SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS FOR DIABLO CANYON have been served upon the Electronic Information Exchange, the NRCs E-Filing System, in the above captioned proceeding, this 11th day of May, 2015.

/Signed (electronically) by/

Joseph A. Lindell Counsel for the NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop O15-D21 Washington, DC 20555 Telephone: (301) 415-1474 Email: Joseph.Lindell@nrc.gov Date of Signature: May 11, 2015