DCL-15-027, Er Changes Reflected in the Environmental Report Update Amendment 2. Part 8 of 9
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-28 DCPP LEVEL 2 (ST2) 1 IMPORTANCE LIST REVIEW EVENT PROBABILITY RISK DESCRIPTION POTENTIAL SAMAS NAME REDUCTION WORTH ZPRS2F 9.98E-01 1.01 E+OO Inadvertent pressurizer spray For scenarios that include fire induced pressurizer spray through aux or normal path: All actuation induced LOCAs, many of the contributors components impacted initially have an RHR pump available for mitigation.
Failure to trip the deadheaded pump before it is damaged leads to loss of heat removal capability and subsequent containment overpressurization. A potential means of precluding the need to trip the RHR pumps would be to install a normally open CCW flow bypass line around the RHR Hx outlet valve. This would ensure that minimum cooling flow would be available to prevent damage to the RHR pumps when they are running with the RCS at high pressure (SAMA 1).
DB4F 5.64E-03 1.01 E+OO 125V DC BUS F - LONG TERM This is an intermediate SF for DF4, which represents the (TRAIN 11): 125V DC VITAL unavailability of DC bus F. An alternate DC generator POWER BUSES: Train OF- could be used to either power critical DC buses or to (BTC11=S, BTC121=F) directly power critical DC equipment (SAMA 10). The generator would have to be stored in a seismically qualified area.
IPCET2 1.20E-01 1.01 E+OO INDUCED RCS HOT LEG OR They include primarily large magnitude seismic events SURGE LINE FAILURE: RCS at and fire events in which 480V switchgear room cooling setpoint pressure, Seal LOCA, fails. Given that this SF is associated with a large scale smallest leak size, no CST seismic event (greater than 1. 75g), a new mitigating resupply, no RCS failures system capable of responding after seismic events
- (potentially up to 4g) is considered to be required. Such a system would include a 4KV power source, a core spray type injection system (with a qualified PORV) capable of spraying the core for cooling until the reactor cavity is flooded to a level above TAF, a connection to a large seismically qualified source of water (wells or seawater),
' and a heat exchanger system (SAMA 4). For the fire Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-223 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-28 DCPP LEVEL 2 (ST2) 1 IMPORTANCE LIST REVIEW EVENT PROBABILITY RISK DESCRIPTION POTENTIAL SAMAS NAME REDUCTION WORTH events, the action to align portable switchgear ventilation is credited, (instrumentation required for diagnosis is not degraded) and it fails. Loss of all AC power is considered to be an adequate cue to credit the alignment of an additional mitigation strategy, such as the use of portable, engine driven, high pressure RCS and SG injection pumps (SAMA 18).
ZPRSI1 2.80E-01 1.01 E+OO Operator action to terminate Addressed in the Level 1 importance list.
spurious Sl: Instrumentation OK DB2H 5.64E-03 1.01 E+OO 125V DC VITAL *POWER This is an intermediate SF for DH10, which represents BUSES: Train DH - BTC132=S, the unavailability of DC bus H. An alternate DC BTC131=F generator could be used to either power critical DC buses or to directly power critical DC equipment (SAMA 10).
The generator would have to be stored in a seismically qualified area.
DF4 5.64E-03 1.01 E+OO 125V DC BUS F - LONG TERM This SF represents the unavailability of DC bus F. An (TRAIN 11 ): BTC11 =S, alternate DC generator could be used to either power BTC121=F critical DC buses or to directly power critical DC equipment (SAMA 10). The generator would have to be stored in a seismically qualified area.
ZSVHES 5.80E-03 1.01 E+OO 480V Switchgear Ventilation - Addressed in the Level 1 importance list.
Operator Action: No fire damage to flow switches Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-224 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-2B DCPP LEVEL 2 (ST2) 1 IMPORTANCE LIST REVIEW EVENT PROBABILITY RISK DESCRIPTION POTENTIAL SAMAS NAME REDUCTION WORTH OG230S 6.63E-01 1.01 E+OO AVAILABILITY OF POWER This SF represents the failure of offsite power from the FROM 230 KV OFFSITE GRID: 230KV source in a fire event. The scenario including this 52HG15 impacted -for scenario SF are typically associated with fires in the 4-A-1 area ZTRY22F1 (Chemical Lab Area, G Bus Compartment). In these cases, the fire impacts RHR pump 1-1 and 480V bus Gin combination with the random failue of DG 1-1 and fire induced failue of 4KV bus G. The result is a failure of power to the DG fuel oil system, which leads to an SBO as it is also combined with a failure to align the backup power supply to the fuel oil system. DCPP has a viable recovery option for this typs of event, but the action to perform the task is impacted by degraded instrumentation and it has failed. These types of events could also potentially be mitigated through the use of portable, engine driven, high pressure RCS and SG injection pumps (SAMA 18).
AWBB 6.23E-03 1.01 E+OO SUPPORT FOR THE TOP AND This SF represents the failure of MD AFW pump 13 given MOP 1-2 UNAVAILABLE the unavailability of the other two pumps. A potential approach to restoring SG makeup would be to provide an engine driven SG makeup pump that can be aligned in time to mitigate loss of SG makeup scenarios (SAMA 2).
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.S-28 DCPP LEVEL 2 {ST2) 1 IMPORTANCE LIST REVIEW EVENT PROBABILITY RISK DESCRIPTION POTENTIAL SAMAS NAME REDUCTION WORTH GYG 5.65E-02 1.01 E+OO 1/3 DIESELS UNAVAILABLE This is an intermediate SF for TG1 and similar SFs, which (BUS G) represent the unavailability of DG 2-1. The SF appears in the importance list, but it is related to non-minimal failures that do not directly impact the sequence of events. No SAMAs are required.
SIZCR4 8.73E-01 1.01 E+OO TOP EVENT Sl: 8976, 8974B, This SF represents the failure of the Sl top event given and all ZSI2 components fire impact on the RWST suction and recirculation valves.
impacted The sequences that include this SF often include RHR pump failure due to the failure to trip the pumps when operating in the "deadhead" condition. A potential means of precluding the need to trip the RHR pumps would be to install a normally open CCW flow bypass line around the RHR Hx outlet valve. This would ensure that minimum cooling flow would be available to prevent damage to the RHR pumps when they are running with the RCS at high pressure (SAMA 1).
Cl4 1.03E-01 1.01 E+OO SSPS Trains A and B Not Avail This represents failure of containment isolation when both but Manual Recovery Avail SSPS trains are unavailable. The primary contributors to these scenarios are flooding events that lead to failure of all three DC batteries/buses. Credit is already taken for manual isolation of the flooding event. A portable DC generator could be used to directly power critical loads in the event that batteries have failed (SAMA 10).
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.S-28 DCPP LEVEL 2 (ST2) 1 IMPORTANCE LIST REVIEW EVENT PROBABILITY RISK DESCRIPTION POTENTIAL SAMAS NAME REDUCTION WORTH PRA1A 1.96E-01 1.01 E+OO PRESSURE RELIEF: PR Failed This SF represents the fire related failures of PORV 474 due to PORV 474 8000A faiure- block valve 8000A. The scenarios generally include for fire area 9A either a failure to swap recirculation mode or failure to trip deadheaded RHR pumps to prevent pump damage.
Automating the swap to recirculation mode could improve the reliability of the function (SAMA 7). A potential means of precluding the need to trip the RHR pumps would be to install a normally open CCW flow bypass line around the RHR Hx outlet valve. This would ensure that minimum cooling flow would be available to prevent damage to the RHR pumps when they are running with the RCS at high pressure (SAMA 1).
I GH4F 3.52E-02 1.01 E+OO UNIT 1 BUS H DIESEL This SF represents the failure of DG 1-1 given success of I
GENERATOR: DG 1-1 (BUS H) DG 1-2 (and bypass of DG 1-3). In top contributors, the
- GF-B,GG-S failure of DG 1-1 is combined with fire induced failure of Sl pump 1-2, leaving no adequate high pressure injection supply to mitigate the fire induced LOCA. Cross-tie from the opposite unit is available, but common cause failures would likely limit the credit associated with including the capability in the model. Installation of a self-contained, independent swing diesel, not dependent on external support systems, would provide increased defense in depth and should be considered for loss of onsite emergency AC power sources (SAMA 15).
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-28 DCPP LEVEL 2 (ST2) 1 IMPORTANCE LIST REVIEW EVENT PROBABILITY RISK DESCRIPTION POTENTIAL SAMAS NAME REDUCTION WORTH I
AWS4 1.61 E-02 1.01 E+OO SUPPORT FOR BOTH MOP'S This is an intermediate SF for AW4S. The primary UNAVAILABLE contributors containing this SF are LOOP and SBO seismic events in which MD AFW is failed due to power dependencies. Subsequent to the TO AFW failure, feed and bleed is unavailable due to loss of po_wer to one PORV and loss of instrument air for the other. Providing a backup air supply to PORV PCV 474 could reduce the feed and bleed failures associated with loss of instrument air (SAMA 5). Also, a more robust seismically-resistant 4kV power source (SAMA 4 or SAMA 15) can provide some benefit.
ZSG234 9.83E-01 1.01 E+OO PCV-19 spuriously opens due to This SF represents the failure of PCV-19 to open for fire: fire impact PCV-20, PCV-21 steam relief given fire impact on the other 3 ADVs . Many and PCV-22 of the scenarios that include this SF also include failure of the charging pumps due to loss of cooling to the pumps, which impacts mitigation of a fire induced LOCA. In these cases, instrumentation for diagnosis is degraded and there is limited time for the 30 minute alternate cooling alignment from fire water. A potential imporovement would be to provide a hard pipe connection between the fire water system and the charging pump cooling lines to simplify the alignment and reduce the time required for the action (SAMA 23) .
IPCET1 7.20E-01 1.01 E+OO INDUCED RCS HOT LEG OR This SF represents the probability of failure of the RCS SURGE LINE FAILURE hot leg or surge line after core damage, which occurs for a diverse range of events. A potential means of preventing these failures would be to provide an independent means of adding water to the RCS at high pressure. These types of events could also potentially be mitigated through the use of portable, engine driven, high Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-228 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-2B DCPP LEVEL 2 (ST2) 1 IMPORTANCE LIST REVIEW EVENT PROBABILITY RISK DESCRIPTION POTENTIAL SAMAS NAME REDUCTION
TD1 1.61 E-02 1.01 E+OO SEISMIC TD AFW PUMP - This SF represents the failure of the turbine driven AFW SCT=F pump in seismic events. Most of the contributors are related to large magnitude events. Given that this SF is associated with a large scale seismic event (greater than 1.75g), a new mitigating system capable of responding after seismic events (potentially up to 4g) is considered to be required. Such a system would include a 4KV power source, a core spray type injection system (with a qualified PORV) capable of spraying the core for cooling until the reactor cavity is flooded to a level above TAF, a connection to a large seismically qualified source of water (wells or seawater), and a heat exchanger system (SAMA 4).
BB1H 1.42E-02 1.01 E+OO Train 2H fails with Recovery - Addressed in the Level 1 importance list.
TH=S GYF 5.65E-02 1.01 E+OO DEG 2-3 GENERATOR This is an intermediate SF for TF1 and similar SFs, which FAILURE (1/3): 1/3 DIESELS represent the unavailability of DG 2-3. The SF appears in UNAVAILABLE (BUS F) the importance list, but it is related to non-minimal failures that do not directly impact the sequence of events. No SAMAs are required.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.S-28 DCPP LEVEL 2 (ST2) 1 IMPORTANCE LIST REVIEW EVENT PROBABILITY RISK DESCRIPTION POTENTIAL SAMAS NAME REDUCTION WORTH F02AZ 4.34E-03 1.01 E+OO FUEL OIL TRANSFER A portable diesel fuel oil transfer pump is already SYSTEM: SUPPORT FOR available. The risk importance of this split fraction would TRAIN 0-1 AVAIL; FIRE fall below the review threshold if its use were credited in INDUCED FAILURE OF TRAIN the model. No SAMA is required.
0-2 SOP6 9.97E-01 1.01 E+OO SEIS6, Hazard Levels: This SF represents the loss of all offsite power and is 3.00E+OO to 3.99E+OO based on the 230kV switchyard seismic fragility, which is significantly stronger than the 500kV switch yard seismic fragility. Given that this SF is associated with a large scale seismic event (greater than 1. 75g), a new mitigating system capable of responding after seismic events (potentially up to 4g) is considered to be required. Such a system would include a 4KV power source, a core spray type injection system (with a qualified PORV) capable of spraying the core for cooling until the reactor cavity is flooded to a level above TAF, a connection to a large seismically qualified source of water (wells or seawater),
and a heat exchanger system (SAMA 4).
1 ST2 refers to the Small Early release category.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-3 DCPP PHASE 1 SAMA LIST
SUMMARY
SAMA SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION SOURCE COST ESTIMATE PHASE 1 BASELINE NUMBER DISPOSITION 1 Install a Minimum For scenarios in which an Sl signal is PRA $3,020,424 Implementation cost is CCW Cooling Flow generated while the RCS pressure remains Importance List less than MACR. Retain Line Around the above the RHR low pressure interlock for Review for Phase II analysis.
RHR Heat extended times, it is necessary for the See Section F.6.1.
Exchanger Outlet operators to check the status of the RHR Valve pumps at some point after initiation and to shut them down to prevent pump damage.
If CCW is flowing to the RHR heat exchangers, however, the action to trip the RHR pumps is not required to prevent pump failure. A means of preventing RHR pump failure without adding a large, early demand on the CCW system is to add a small, normally open bypass line around the RHR heat exchanger outlet valves in the CCW flowpath.
2 Provide an Engine For cases in which the AFW pumps have PRA $17,492,616 Implementation cost is Driven SG Makeup failed and/or the support systems are failed, Importance List greater than the MACR.
Pump such as the 480V AC switchgear, providing Review Screened from further an independent means of injecting water to analysis.
the steam generators could provide the secondary side heat removal function.
Ensuring that the makeup pump can be aligned in time to mitigate early loss of AFW scenarios and that diverse pump suction supplies are available (e.g., Fire Water, Raw Water) is required to mitigate the top DCPP risks.
(This SAMA is addressed by elements of the DCPP FLEX strategy.)
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-3 DCPP PHASE 1 SAMA LIST
SUMMARY
SAMA SAMATITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION SOURCE COST ESTIMATE PHASE 1 BASELINE NUMBER DISPOSITION 3 Change The DCPP fire procedure already identifies PRA $376,342 Implementation cost is Procedures to equipment that may be damaged for each Importance List less than MACR. Retain Explicitly Address fire area and provides guidance to mitigate Review for Phase II analysis.
Vulnerability of failed equipment. A potential enhancement See Section F.6.2.
Auto Sl would be explicitly identify that fire damage may impact auto Sl actuation and direct the operators to monitor valid instruments to ensure it functions when it is required.
4 Seismically For large scale seismic events, many of the PRA $160,001,440 Implementation cost is Qualified Response plant's mitigating systems may be damaged Importance List greater than the MACR.
System to an extent that only an independent, Review Screened from further seismically durable system would be analysis.
capable of preventing core damage. Such a system would include a 4KV power source, a core spray type injection header (with a qualified PORV) capable of spraying the core for cooling until the reactor cavity is flooded to a level above TAF, a connection to a large seismically qualified source of water (wells or seawater), and a heat exchanger system.
(A significant portion of this SAMA's design is addressed by elements of the DCPP FLEX strategy. One exception is that this SAMA includes a core spray-like injection for reactor cavity flooding.)
5 Backup Air System Currently, loss of offsite power results in the PRA $3,133,404 Implementation cost is for PORV PCV 474 loss of the lA system . Changing the air Importance List less than MACR. Retain supply to PCV 474 (Pressurizer PORV) to a Review for Phase II analysis.
class I backup air supply would prevent this See Section F.6.13 and reduce the loss of lA contributions to Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-232 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-3 DCPP PHASE 1 SAMA LIST
SUMMARY
SAMA SAMATITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION SOURCE COST ESTIMATE PHASE 1 BASELINE NUMBER DISPOSITION core damage.
6 Install an Additional Alternate Switchgear Room cooling PRA $9,993,910 Implementation cost is Train of 480V procedures already exist for DCPP, but the Importance List greater than the MACR.
Switchgear Room loss of room cooling is still an important Review Screened from further HVAC issue. While costly, a potential means of analysis.
7 Automate Swap to The operators are well trained on the action PRA $10,616,468 Implementation cost is Recirculation to transition the RCS injection systems to Importance List greater than the MACR.
recirculation mode, but automating the Review Screened from further process will further improve reliability and analysis.
reduce the contribution of this action to core damage scenarios.
8 Protect RHR For fires in areas 6-A-2 and 6-A-3, fire PRA $1,072,493 Implementation cost is Cables in Fire induced failure of the 8700A/B and the FCV- Importance List less than MACR. Retain Areas 6-A-2 and 6- 641A/B valves lead to loss of the RHR Review for Phase II analysis.
A-3 system, which is critical for mitigating the See Section F.6.4.
fire scenarios. Providing additional protection for the cables associated with these components in these areas could help improve the likelihood that RHR would remain available.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.S-3 DCPP PHASE 1 SAMA LIST
SUMMARY
SAMA SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION SOURCE COST ESTIMATE PHASE 1 BASELINE NUMBER DISPOSITION 9 Install Spray For some flooding scenarios, including PRA $25,520,160 Implementation cost is Barriers to Protect those in fire areas 14-A and 3-Q-2, the AFW Importance List greater than the MACR.
the TO AFW Pump system is damaged by flood water from fire Review Screened from further and Install a protection system breaks. Providing barriers analysis.
Waterproof MD to protect the TD AFW pump can reduce the AFW Pump likelihood that the pump will be damaged.
The MD AFW pumps are susceptible to flood water incursion via ventilation ducts that must remain open to provide adequate room cooling. To protect the MD AFW pumps from these flooding events, it would be necessary to replace the existing equipment with a waterproof pump.
10 Alternate DC In order to mitigate DC system failures, an PRA $22,572,878 Implementation cost is Generator alternate DC generator could be used to Importance List greater than the MACR.
directly power a bus (bypasses charger Review Screened from further faults) or directly power critical loads
- analysis.
(bypasses distribution failures). The generator should be stored in a seismically qualified area so that it would potentially be available to respond in seismic scenarios.
11 Install a Swing For LOCA events in which the RHR pumps PRA $75,042,192 Implementation cost is RHR Pump have failed, but cooling flow is available to Importance List greater than the MACR.
the RH R heat exchangers, the availability of Review Screened from further an additional RHR pump that can be analysis.
powered from any AC division would provide a means of containment heat removal.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.S-3 DCPP PHASE 1 SAMA LIST
SUMMARY
SAMA SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION . SOURCE COST ESTIMATE PHASE 1 BASELINE NUMBER DISPOSITION 12 Use an Alternate A low cost SBO mitigatio-n strategy is to use PRA $13,560,218 Implementation cost is EDG to Support a small, alternate EDG to power a station Importance List greater than the MACR.
Long Term AFW battery charger for steam generator level Review Screened from further Operation and a instrumentation and AFW control. In analysis.
480V AC Self- addition, if power can be supplied to a 480V Cooled PDP for AC self-cooled, high pressure positive Primary Side displacement pump, primary side makeup Makeup could be maintained to make up for normal seal leakage and potentially for boil off in longer timeframes.
(This SAMA is addressed by elements of the DCPP FLEX strategy.)
13 Not Used.
14 Protect the In some cases, fires in area 5-A-1 can lead PRA $5,620,896 Implementation cost is Letdown Isolation to uncontrolled letdown flow that opens a Importance List less than MACR. Retain Capability in Fire system relief valves and results in a LOCA Review for Phase II analysis.
Area 5-A-1 path. The DCPP fire procedure already See Section F.6.6.
directs actions to isolate the letdown path by depowering the 8149A/B/C valves. To further reduce the risk associated with a letdown LOCA for fires in these areas, a potential enhancement would be to protect the cables associated with either LCV-459 or LCV-460 such that they could function normally and terminate/control flow through the line.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-3 DCPP PHASE 1 SAMA LIST
SUMMARY
SAMA SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION SOURCE COST ESTIMATE PHASE 1 BASELINE NUMBER DISPOSITION 15 Install a Self~ One of the most effective means of reducing PRA $146,105,155 Implementation cost is Contained Swing SBO scenarios is to provide a diverse Importance List greater than the MACR.
EDG emergency power supply that can support Review Screened from further all of the equipment normally supplied by an analysis.
existing EDG.
(Some of the capabilities represented by this SAMA are addressed by elements of the DCPP FLEX strategy. One difference is that the FLEX strategy uses a portable 4 kV power supply delivered from the regional response center that would not be immediatley available.)
16 Change The DCPP fire procedure already include PRA $372,788 Implementation cost is Praced ures to guidance that addresses spurious actuation Importance List less than MACR. Retain Caution About of equipment, but its use is not currently tied Review for Phase II analysis.
Spurious Sl Signals to specific fire areas. A potential See Section F.6.7.
in Specific Fire enhancement would be to include cautions Areas in the procedures to identify fire areas where damage could cause specific spurious actuations and identify the attachment with the mitigating steps.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-3 DCPP PHASE 1 SAMA LIST
SUMMARY
SAMA SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION SOURCE . COST ESTIMATE PHASE 1 BASELINE NUMBER DISPOSITION 17 Install Flood There are multiple scenarios related to Fire PRA $9,610,440 Implementation cost is Sensors to Mitigate Protection system pipe breaks that, if un- Importance List greater than the MACR.
Fire Protection isolated, lead to significant equipment Review Screened from further System Pipe damage. In order to improve the likelihood analysis.
Breaks of flood termination, water sensors could be installed in areas containing critical equipment that can be impacted by fire protection system floods, such as those containing the AFW, CCW, and RHR pumps. The water level sensor could be linked to logic that would trip the fire protection pumps and/or isolate a critical valve for scenarios where there is not a coincident fire alarm.
18 Portable Engine For events such as internal floods or fires PRA $49,473,576 Implementation cost is Driven Primary and that can result in the loss of multiple, critical Importance List greater than the MACR.
Secondary Side plant functions, recovery may be easier via Review Screened from further Pumps the use of portable equipment that bypasses analysis.
the permanently installed equipment. The use of portable engine driven pumps for primary and secondary side makeup can provide a means of maintaining RCS inventory and decay heat removal. Ensuring the equipment can be aligned in time to respond to loss of AFW cases, have diverse suction sources, and injection points will improve the flexibility of the enhancement.
(This SAMA is addressed by elements of the DCPP FLEX strategy; however, the FLEX strategy uses a 480V AC pump powered by a portable generator for RCS makeup.)
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-3 DCPP PHASE 1 SAMA LIST
SUMMARY
SAMA SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION SOURCE COST ESTIMATE PHASE 1 BASELINE NUMBER DISPOSITION 19 Primary Side The availability of primary side steam PRA $137,797,270 Implementation cost is Isolation Valves generator isolation vales would provide a Importance List greater than the MACR.
simple means of isolating ruptured SGs. Review Screened from further While secondary side isolation capability analysis.
exists, these valves would help avoid challenges to secondary side integrity due to failure to rapidly cool down the primary side.
20 Use Alternate In the event that the MG set breakers do not PRA $11,173,059 Implementation cost is Signal (such as trip in an ATWS, an alternate signal, such Importance List greater than the MACR.
AMSAC) to De- as an AMSAC signal, could be used to Review Screened from further energize the 480V depower the 480V AC supply that powers analysis.
AC Buses that the MG sets to ensure the control rod drive Supply the Rod units are shut down. The 480V trip could be Drive Motor delayed so that it is only performed after 30 Generator Sets seconds with a valid ATWS signal.
21 Change Fire The DCPP fire procedure already identifies PRA $256,817 Implementation cost is Procedures to equipment that may be damaged for each Importance List less than MACR. Retain Include Fire Area fire area and provides guidance to mitigate Review for Phase II analysis.
Specific Guidance failed equipment. A potential enhancement See Section F.6.8 .
on Containment would be to explicitly identify the Isolation Valves containment isolation valves that may be impacted for each fire area. Where possible, the fire procedures could direct manual actions to close the valves. In cases where manual isolation would not be desirable until after loss of equipment or core damage, a reference to other procedures, such as the Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines could be provided.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.5-3 DCPP PHASE 1 SAMA LIST
SUMMARY
SAMA SAMA TITLE SAMA DESCRIPTION SOURCE COST ESTIMATE PHASE 1 BASELINE NUMBER DISPOSITION 22 Install Containment Early containment failure is a contributor to PRA $13,083,120 Implementation cost is Combustible Gas the LERF release category. Although Importance List greater than the MACR.
Igniters inerting containment in accident conditions Review Screened from further could help prevent burns of combustible analysis.
gases, a better solution is to install battery-backed igniters throughout upper dome of containment.
23 Enhancethe For cases in which CCW is not available for PRA $491,021 Implementation cost is Firewater to charging pump cooling, it is possible to Importance List less than MACR. Retain Charging Pump connect the Fire Protection system to the Review for Phase II analysis.
Cooling Connection charging pump cooling line to provide See Section F.6.9.
alternate pump cooling. However, the current alignment requires the use of fire hoses and may not be viable in time stressed events, such as some fire scenarios. By providing a hard piped connection with manual isolation valves, the alignment could be performed rapidly and the reliability of the action could potentially be improved.
Notes:
1
( ) Cost estimates are on a per unit basis Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-239 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 Table F.S-1 DCPP Phase 2 SAMA List Summary SAMA SAMA Title SAMA Description Source Phase 2 Baseline Number Disposition 1 Install a Minimum For scenarios in which an Sl signal is generated while the RCS PRA Importance This SAMA's net value CCW Cooling Flow pressure remains above the RHR low pressure interlock for List Review is negative and is Line Around the RHR extended times, it is necessary for the operators to check the classified as not "cost Heat Exchanger status of the RHR pumps at some point after initiation and to beneficial".
Outlet Valve shut them down to prevent pump damage. If CCW is flowing to the RHR heat exchangers, however, the action to trip the RHR pumps is not required to prevent pump failure. A means of preventing RHR pump failure without adding a large, early demand on the CCW system is to add a small, normally open bypass line around the RHR heat exchanger outlet valves in the CCW flowpath.
3 Change Procedures to The DCPP fire procedure already identifies equipment that may PRA Importance This SAMA's net value Explicitly Address be damaged for each fire area and provides guidance to List Review is positive and is Vulnerability of Auto mitigate failed equipment. A potential enhancement would be classified as potentially Sl explicitly identify that fire damage may impact auto Sl actuation "cost beneficial".
and direct the operators to monitor valid instruments to ensure it functions when it is required.
5 Backup Air System for Currently, loss of offsite power results in the loss of the lA PRA Importance This SAMA's net value PORV PCV 474 system. Changing the air supply to PCV 474 (Pressurizer List Review is negative and is PORV) to a class I backup air supply would prevent this and classified as not "cost reduce the loss of lA contributions to core damage. beneficial".
8 Protect RHR Cables Fore fires in areas 6-A-2 and 6-A-3, fire induced failure of the PRA Importance This SAMA's net value in Fire Areas 6-A-2 8700A/B and the FCV-641A/B valves lead to loss of the RHR List Review is negative and is and 6-A-3 system, which is critical for mitigating the fire scenarios. classified as not "cost Providing additional protection for the cables associated with beneficial".
- these components in these areas could help improve the likelihood that RHR would remain available.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 Table F.S-1 DCPP Phase 2 SAMA List Summary SAMA SAMA Title SAMA Description Source Phase 2 Baseline Number Disposition 14 Protect the Letdown In some cases, fires in area 5-A-1 can lead to uncontrolled PRA Importance This SAMA's net value Isolation Capability in letdown flow that opens a system relief valves and results in a List Review is negative and is Fire Area 5-A-1 LOCA path. The DCPP fire procedure already directs actions classified as not "cost to isolate the letdown path by depowering the 8149AIB/C beneficial".
valves. To further reduce the risk associated with a letdown LOCA for fires in these areas, a potential enhancement would be to protect the cables associated with either LCV-459 or LCV-460 such that they could function normally and terminate/control flow through the line.
16 Change Procedures to The DCPP fire procedure already includes guidance that PRA Importance This SAMA's net value Caution About addresses spurious actuation of equipment, but its use is not List Review is negative and is Spurious Sl Signals in currently tied to specific fire areas. A potential enhancement classified as not "cost Specific Fire Areas would be to include cautions in the procedures to identify fire beneficial".
areas where damage could cause specific spurious actuations and identify the attachment with the mitigating steps.
21 Change Fire The DCPP fire procedure already identifies equipment that may PRA Importance This SAMA's net value Procedures to Include be damaged for each fire area and provides guidance to List Review is positive and is Fire Area Specific mitigate failed equipment. A potential enhancement would be classified as potentially Guidance on to explicitly identify the containment isolation valves that may "cost beneficial".
Containment Isolation be impacted for each fire area. Where possible, the fire Valves procedures could direct manual actions to close the valves. In cases where manual isolation would not be desirable until after loss of equipment or core damage, a reference to other procedures, such as the Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines could be provided .
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-241 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 Table F.S-1 DCPP Phase 2 SAMA List Summary SAMA SAMA Title SAMA Description Source Phase 2 Baseline Number Disposition 23 Enhancethe For cases in which CCW is not available for charging pump PRA Importance This SAMA's net value Firewater to Charging cooling, it is possible to connect the Fire Protection system to List Review is negative and is Pump Cooling the charging pump cooling line to provide alternate pump classified as not "cost Connection cooling. However, the current alignment requires the use of fire beneficial".
hoses and may not be viable in time stressed events, such as some fire scenarios. By providing a hard piped connection with manual isolation valves, the alignment could be performed rapidly and the reliability of the action could-potentially be improved.
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-242 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT2 TABLE F.7-1 SENSITIVITY OF DCPP BASELINE RISK TO PARAMETER CHANGES Pop. Dose Cost Risk Parameter Description Risk A Base ABase (o/o) (Ofo)
Meteorology Year 2004 MET data -9% -1%
Year 2006 MET data -11% -5%
Evacuation Time Evacuation delay time increased from 100 min to 200 min. -20% 0%
Evacuation Speed Evacuation speed decreased from 0.76 m/s to 0.38 m/s. 0% 0%
No Evacuation No evacuation or relocation in the 7 day emergency -9% 0%
phase.
Release Height Ground level release. Base case is top of containment. -10% -3%
Release Heat Buoyant Plume. Base case is zero heat energy. -14% 0%
Deposition Velocity Dry deposition velocity decreased from 0.01 m/sec to 20% -35%
0.003 m/sec Population Year 2045 population uniformly increased 30% 30% 29%
Resettlement No "Intermediate Phase" resettlement planning (in lieu of 6 6% -31%
Planning months) 1 year "Intermediate Phase" resettlement planning (in lieu -3% 32%
of 6 months)
Economic Inputs Generic economic inputs increased (factor of 2) -2% 44%
Rate of Return 3% expected rate of return (in lieu of 7%) 1% -9%
12% expected rate of return (in lieu of 7%) -1% 11%
Value of Farm and Doubled value of farm wealth (12,241 $/hectare) and non- 1% 68%
Non-Farm Wealth farm wealth (370,506 $/person) to 24,482 $/hectare and 741,012 $/person , respectively.
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-243 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 TABLE F.7-2 MACCS2 ECONOMIC PARAMETERS INPUTS FOR SENSITIVITY Base Case Sensitivity Variable Description Value Value DPRATEtlJ Property depreciation rate (per yr) 0.20 0.20 DSRATE( 2 J Investment rate of return (per yr) 0.07 0.07 EVACST( 0 J Daily cost for a person who has been evacuated ($/person-day) 58.59 117.18 RELCST( 0 J Daily cost for a person who is relocated ($/person-day) 58.59 117.18 POPCST( 0 J Population relocation cost ($/person) 10,850 21,700 TIMDEC( 1 J Decontamination time for each level(oJ 2&4 2&12 months months CDFRM0( 0 J Cost of farm decontamination for two levels of decontamination 1,221 2,442
($/hectare) (5 l 2,713 5,426 CDNFRM( 0 J Cost of non-farm decontamination per resident person for two levels of 6,510 13,020 decontamination ($/person)( 5l 17,360 34,720 0
DLBCST( J Average cost of decontamination labor ($/man-year) 75,950 151,900 TFWKF( 1 J Time workers spend in farm land contaminated areas(oJ 1/10 1/4 1/3 1/4 TFWKNF( 1 J Time workers spend in non-farm land contaminated areas(oJ 1/3 1/4 1/3 1/4 VALWF0( 4 J Weighted average value of farm wealth ($/hectare) 12,241 12,241 VALWNF(oJ Weighted average value of non-farm wealth ($/person) 370,506 370,506 Notes to Table F.7-2:
1
( ) Uses NUREG/CR-4551 (Reference 20) value.
(Zl DSRATE based on NUREG/BR-0058 (Reference 25).
3
( ) These parameters use the NUREG/CR-4551 (Reference 20) value, updated to the July 2014 using the CPl.
4
( ) VALWFO is based on the 2012 Census of Agriculture (Reference 63), Bureau of Labor Statistics (Reference 64), and Bureau of Economic Analysis (Reference 2) data, updated to July 2014 using the CPI for the counties within 50 miles.
5
( ) Two decontamination levels are modeled. The first value is associated with a dose reduction factor of 3. The second value is associated with a dose reduction factor of 15.
(B) VALWNF is based on 2007 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Reference 64), U.S. Census Bureau (References 88 and 86), National Resources Conservation Service (Reference 87), Bureau of Economic Analysis (Reference 2), 2007 and 2012 U.S. Census of Agriculture (Reference 85 and 63), and the Journal of Monetary Economics (Reference 91 ).
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-244 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 F.10 FIGURES MLOCA, 2.1%\
LOCV, 2.3%~ \
TLMFW, 2.3%
PLMFW, 2.6 SGTRN, 8.2%
Initiator Description SELOCA RCP Seal LOCA LPCC Loss of Component Cooling Water system LOSW Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water System SLOCN Non-lsolable Small Break LOCA SGTRN Non-Isolated Steam Generator Tube Rupture LCV Loss of Condenser Vacuum LOSWV Loss of Switchgear Ventilation L1DCG Loss o DC Bus G RTRIP Reactor Trip PLMFW Partial Loss of Main Feedwater TTRIP Turbine Trip TLMFW Total Loss of Main Feedwater LOCV Loss of Control Room Ventilation MLOCA Medium Break LOCA Others Remaining Internal Events Environmental Report Diablo Canyon Power Plant Figure F.2-1 DC03 Internal Contribution to CDF by Initiating Event Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-245 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 LOSW, 2.4%
SELOCA, 3.7%
LOSWV, 3.9%
Initiator Description SGTRN Non-Isolated Steam Generator Tube Rupture LOSWV Loss of Switchgear Ventilation SELOCA RCP Seal LOCA LOSW Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water System SLOCN Non-lsolable Small Break LOCA LPCC Loss of Component Cooling Water system VSI Interfacing System LOCA at RHR Pump Suction LOCV Loss of Control Room Ventilation Others . Remaining Internal Events Environmental Report Diablo Canyon Power Plant Figure F.2-2 DC03 Internal Contribution to LERF by Initiating Event Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-246 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 SEIS3, 5.8% SEIS2, 1.3%
Initiator Description SEIS6 SEISMIC LEVEL 6 SEIS5 SEISMIC LEVEL 5 SEIS4 SEISMIC LEVEL 4 SEIS1 SEISMIC LEVEL 1 SEIS3 SEISMIC LEVEL 3 SEIS2 SEISMIC LEVEL 2 Environmental Report Diablo Canyon Power _Plant Figure F.2-3 DC03 Seismic Contribution to CDF by Initiating Event Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-247 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 SEIS3, 4.3% SEIS2, 1.0%
Initiator Description SEIS6 SEISMIC LEVEL 6 SEIS1 SEISMIC LEVEL 1 SEIS5 SEISMIC LEVEL 5 SEIS4 SEISMIC LEVEL 4 SEIS3 SEISMIC LEVEL 3 SEIS2 SEISMIC LEVEL 2 Environmental Report Diablo Canyon Power Plant Figure F.2-4 DC03 Seismic Contribution to LERF by Initiating Event Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-248 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 3BB115, 4.7%
Initiator Description 1A Containment 6A3 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus H 7A Cable Spreading Room 6A5 P250 Room 6A2 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus G 8G SSPS Room 5A1 Vital 480VAC SWGR Room 5A4 Non-Vital 480VAC Bus SWGR and MCC Room 6A1 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus F Others Remaining Unit 1 Fire Areas Environmental Report Diablo Canyon Power Plant Figure F.2-5 DC03 Fire Contribution to Unit 1 CDF by Initiating Event Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-249 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 Others , 25.9%
5A2,1.1% ~
SA4,2.1% -
6A2, 2.8%
SAl, 2.9%
Initiator Description 7A Cable Spreading Room 6A3 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus H 1A Containment 8G SSPS Room 14A Turbine Building 10-85 12kV SWGR Room 5A1 Vitai480VAC SWGR Room 6A2 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus G 8C Main Control Room 6A1 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus F 6A5 P250 Room 5A4 Non-Vital 480VAC Bus SWGR and MCC Room 5A2 Vitai480VAC SWGR Room Others Remaining Unit 1 Fire Areas Environmental Report Diablo Canyon Power Plant Figure F.2-6 DC03 Fire Contribution to Unit 1 LERF by Initiating Event Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-250 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 6A3, 3.9%
Initiator Description 14A Turbine Building 301 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Room 31 Fuel Handling Building 6A2 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus G 6A1 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus F 6A3 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus H 302 Motor Drivn AFW Pumps Room Others Remaining Unit 1 Fire Areas Environmental Report Diablo Canyon Power Plant Figure F.2-7 DC03 Flooding Contribution to CDF by Initiating Event Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-251 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 3Q2, 3.1%
38885,4.7 Initiator Description 14A Turbine Building 6A1 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus F 6A2 Vital Battery Charger Room Bus G 31 Fuel Handling Building 3Q1 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Room 3BB85 Containment Pen Area Elev 85' 3Q2 Motor Drivn AFW Pumps Room Others Remaining Unit 1 Fire Areas Environmental Report Diablo Canyon Power Plant Figure F.2-8 DC03 Flooding Contribution to LERF by Initiating Event Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-252 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 I" .10 Cll
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 r * .~
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Environmental Report Diablo Canyon Power Plant Figure F.2-1 0 Containment Event Tree Top Events Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-254 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 REFERENCES*
- 1. Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers RA-SB-2003. Addenda to ASM RA-S-2002. March 17, 2005 (draft).
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- Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts, www.bea.gov/regional, accessed September 2014.
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Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2. Appendix F Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives, Letter, J. W. Moyer (CP&L) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Carolina Power and Light. Application for Renewal of Operating License. June 14, 2002. Available at:
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http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewallapplications/harris/harris-er.pdf.
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Dobbe, E.R. Carlson, N.H. Marshall, E.S. Marwil, J.E. Tolli. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. NUREG/CR-5376 (EGG-2566). 1990.
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November 1990.
- 10. Fire PRA Method Enhancements Additions Clarifications, and Refinements to EPRI 1019189, Section 3.7. Electric Power Research Institute. 2008.
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-255 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2
- 12. Comparison of Average Transport and Dispersion Among a Gaussian, a Two-Dimensional, and a Three-Dimensional Model. Mollenkamp, C.R., N.E. Bixler, C.W. Morrow, J.V. Ramsdell, Jr., and J.A. Mitchell, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Atmospheric Science Division, Livermore, CA. NUREG/CR-6853, October 2004.
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NEI-05-01. Rev. A. Nuclear Energy Institute. November 2005.
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15.Applicant's Environmental Report; Operating License Renewal Stage; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. Appendix F SAMA Analysis. Application for Renewed Operating Licenses. Nuclear Management Company, LLC. February 2004. Available at:
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewallapplications/point-beach/er.pdf 16.Application for Renewed Operating Licenses- Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2, Nuclear Management Company, LLC. Xcel Energy Inc.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota. 2008.
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Washington, D.C. December 1990.
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Washington, D.C. December 1990.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1997.
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Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-256 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2
- 23. Sector Population, Land Fraction, and Economic Estimation Program.
SECPOP2000: NUREG/CR-6525, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Washington, D.C., Rev. 1, August 2003.
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NUREG/BR-0058, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, D.C., Rev 4, September 2004.
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Analyses, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 10, 2006.
- 27. Environmental Standard Review Plan: Section 7.2 Severe Accidents, NUREG-1555, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 2007.
- 28. Deleted
- 29. Diablo Canyon PRA (DCPRA-1988), as accepted in Supplement No. 34 to NUREG-0675, Dated June 1991.
- 30. Long-Term Seismic Program (LTSP)
- 31. Supplement No. 34 to NUREG-0675, Dated June 1991.
32.1ndividual Plant Examination of External Events for severe Accident Vulnerabilities, Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, U.S. Nuclear regulatory Commission, June 28, 1991.
33.1ndividual Plant Examination Report for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 in Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, April 1992.
- 34. PG&E Letter to NRC, DCL-92-084, SBO submittal, April 3, 1992.
- 35. DCPP PRA Containment Event Tree. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, NOS-PRA Calc. File PRA91-009, Revision 0, February 1992.
- 36. Staff Evaluation of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Units 1 and 2, Individual Plant Examination (IPE) - Internal Events Submittal, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 30, 1993.
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-257 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 37.1ndividual Plant Examination of External Events Report for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 in Response to Generic Letter 88-20 Supplement 4, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, June 1994.
- 38. NUREG/CR-5726, Review of the Diablo Canyon Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
Bozoki et al. August 1, 1994.
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1987-1995. Polaski, J.P., et al. 1999.
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2014.
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- 45. Diablo Canyon Power Plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment Peer Review Report, Final Report, August 2000.
- 46. Human Action Analysis- Failure Likelyhood Range Factor Calculation, Calculation File GF .2, Revision 5.
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Draft NUREG/CR (INEEL/EXT-04-02326), S.A.Eide, C. D. Gentillon, and .T.E Wierman of IN EEL and D.M. Rasmuson of NRC. October 2004.
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Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-258 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2
- 52. Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 & 2 FSAR Update, Revision 21, September 2013.
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Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation, EP G-1, Rev. 37A.
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- 65. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation. Applicant's Environmental Report; Operating License Renewal Stage, Attachment F. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Burlington, Kansas. 2006.
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-259 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2
- 66. WCAP-16464-NP, Westinghouse Owner's Group Mitigating Systems Performance Index Cross Comparison, Revision 0, August 2005.
- 67. Diablo Canyon Power Plant: Development of Evacuation Time Estimates, KLD TR-498, November 2012.
- 68. EPRI Report 1019194, Guidelines for Performance of Internal Flooding Probabilistic Risk Assessment, December 2009.
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- 70. NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants. Supplement 33, Regarding Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. August, 2008.
- 71. NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants. Supplement 13, Regarding H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. December, 2003.
- 72. NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants. Supplement 23, Regarding Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. August, 2005
- 73. NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants. Supplement 39, Regarding Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. Units 1 and 2. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. May, 2011.
- 74. NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants. Supplement 32, Regarding Wolf Creek Generating Station.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. May, 2008.
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76.Applicant's Environmental Report; Operating License Renewal Stage; Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Attachment E Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis.
Application for Renewed Operating Licenses. Entergy Operations, Inc.~
November 2011.
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Draft Report for Comment. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. November, 2013.
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-260 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2
- 78. Applicant's Environmental Report; Operating License Renewal Stage; Seabrook Station, Unit 1. Attachment F Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis.
License Renewal Application. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC. June 2010.
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80.ASME/ANS RA-Sa- 2009 (American Society of Mechanical Engineers/American nuclear Society). 2009,. Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S-2008, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications. New York, New York. February.
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- 83. NUREG/CR-6850, Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities, September 2005.
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Diablo Canyon Power Plant Page F-261 License Renewal Application
APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2
- 91. Davis M.A. and Heathcote J., "The price and quantity of residential land in the United States", Journal of Monetary Economics, 54 (2595-2620), June, 2007.
- 92. California Department of Finance, State and County Total Population Projections, 2010-2060.
- 93. Regulatory Guide 1.174 Revision 2, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, U.S.NRC, May 2011.
- 94. Diablo Canyon Power Plant Administrative Procedure, TS3.NR1, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Revision 8, August 1, 2013
- 95. Diablo Canyon Power Plant Administrative Work Procedure, AWP E-028, Revision 0, August 1, 2013
- 96. Diablo Canyon Power Plant, PRA Calculation, G.2, Revision 7 (draft)
- 97. Diablo Canyon Power Plant, PRA Calculation, G.?, Revision 0 (draft)
- URls delineated in some references may no longer be valid.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 Addendum 1 Evaluation of PRA Open Items /Issues on SAMA Process Action Title/ Current Status/
Action Description Importance to SAMA Application Applicable SR Comment Internal flooding AR A0468801 was written to document PG&E'S This will be None. No direct impact on current
-NRC IN 98-31 I evaluation of an event at WNP-2, where a fire system considered in the model anticipated.
SER 3-98, water hammer led to flooding of emergency core updating of the
- No expected change in core A0468801 cooling system (ECCS) pump rooms. The evaluation Internal Flooding damage frequency (CDF) or was not complete by the time the 1997 PRA internal PRA. Level 2 results.
flood update was performed. This PG&E evaluation should be reviewed as part of the 1999/2000 PRA
- No expected change in the update to see if any assumptions or new insights need SAMA cost benefit analysis.
to be added to the PRA internal flooding analysis.
Hard coded Originally, in the model there was one HEP for the A new conditional If the failure probability of the RWST conditional HEP operators to makeup to the RWST in the general prob of 0.5 was used makeup action is too low, the SAMA in top event MU transient tree. During the HEP dependency study it in sensitivity study. analysis could be impacted.
was noticed that the HEP was used even if the However, a SAMA was identified to operators had failed to swap over to recirculation automate swap to recirc mode cooling. As a work around for this, a conditional (SAMA 7), which would preclude the probability of 0.1 was used. A new HEP needs to be need to refill the RWST, if developed for this situation that is more realistic. successful. Even if it assumed that the benefit of SAMA 7 is directly proportional to the RWST makeup HEP, a multiplier of 5 on the SAMA 7 averted cost risk (to account for the difference in proposed HEPs) would still not yield a cost beneficial result.
The result of multiplying the 951h percentile averted cost-risk by a factor of 5 is still far below the $10.6 million implementation cost: 5 *
$1,019,665 = $5,098,325.
This issue will not change the SAMA identification process or the conclusions of the cost benefit analysis.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 Addendum 1 Evaluation of PRA Open Items /Issues on SAMA Process Action Title/ Current Status/
Action Description Importance to SAMA Application Applicable SR Comment Seismic trip and In revision 2 of calculation file F.6, the assumption that Modeling PORV None. Insignificant impact on CDF, PORV there was a PORV challenge on every seismic initiating challenge due to Level 2 results, and SAMA analysis.
challenge event was removed. This was because in most cases, seismic induced the plant had already tripped from the seismic event LOSP has (via seismic trip) and did not experience a load insignificant impact on rejection when 500 kV was lost. The first item is that the seismic induced this assumes the seismic trip works successfully all the CDF/LERF.
time. To be more correct, the seismic trip should be added to the model and then the effect of the seismic trip can be evaluated probabilistically. Second item is the seismic trip has a setpoint of about 0.3 g's which is about 2/3's the way through the first seismic initiator (which goes to 0.53) . This would imply that below 0.35 there should be a PORV challenge, if 500 kV was lost (which is not yet modeled). To better model this SEIS1 initiator should be changed to 0.4, and the details of the 500 kV and seismic trip should be modeled. Note RISKMAN is limited to only six acceleration levels, so this would require re-adjusting the exist boundary between SEIS1 and SEIS2. Also note this corresponds to the double design earthquake (ODE) earthquake, which was the safe shutdown earthquake prior to the HOSGRI upgrades which put the SSE to 0.75 g's.
12/19/02 EGO Also note we do not model a PORV challenge on seismically induced LOSP, which should be adequate for SEIS 2 through 6 due to seismic trip, but maybe a noticeable contributor in SEIS1.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 Addendum 1 Evaluation of PRA Open Items /Issues on SAMA Process Action Title/ Current Status/
Action Description Importance to SAMA Application Applicable SR Comment Address NRC letter dated 12/4/97 informed DCPP that the To confirm that an This is a documentation issue and anchorage of intent of GL 88-20, supplement 4, had been met. The analysis had been no impact on the SAMA analysis.
relay panels in attachment to the NRC report was a consultant's report performed of the cable spreading entitled, "Technical Evaluation Report on the Submittal- anchorage of relay rooms Only review of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (Units 1 panels within the and 2) Individual Plant Examination Of External cable spreading room .
Events," dated September, 1997.
On page 28 of the consultant's report, they state in (8)(1) " .. it is unclear if the licensee performed an analysis of the anchorage of relay panels within the cable spreading room." the concern is whether this equipment is a seismic induced hazard .
Please address this issue and reference documentation. - - - - *- -
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 Addendum 1 Evaluation of PRA Open Items /Issues on SAMA Process Action Title/ Current Status/
Action Description Importance to SAMA Application Applicable SR Comment Address NRC letter dated 12/4/97 informed DCPP that the Address Seismic- The electrical power reliability, potential for d/g intent of GL 88-20, supplement 4, had been met. The induced loss of C02 including the EDGs, has been lockout from attachment to the NRC report was a consultant's report and its impact. addressed in the SAMA analysis.
card ox entitled, "Technical Evaluation Report On The The risk contribution due to a failure Submittal-Only Review Of The Diablo Canyon Power of EDGs from a seismically failed Plant (Units 1 and 2) individual plant examination of C02 system is expected to be minor.
external events," dated September, 1997.
- No significant change in CDF or Level 2 results.
Page 28 of the consultant's report, under (8)(2), they state " .. it is unclear if the analysis considered the
- No significant change in the SAMA cost benefit analysis.
potential for diesel generator (lockout or starvation) failure caused by seismically induced activation of the co-located C02 system.
Also, it is unclear if the licensee analyzed the potential for icing or freezing or relays within the cable spreading room given seismically induced activation of the C02 system, or the potential for the weight of the C02 suppressant, which condenses on the cable trays, to fail safety-related cabling because of structural failure.
Please address these three issues and reference documentation.
Split fraction The backstop split fraction SEX is seen in sequence Need to add SF and Current results are conservative.
event tree rules 124 (DC01 ECCS AOT application) and others. This is rule for the scenarios Even with conservative results, this for seismic RCP a result of the lack of a rule that looks for no CCW flow with No CCW and no was not an issue for the SAMA seal modeling with AS=S but with no support for CCP 1-1. The support for CCP 1-1. analysis and resolution of the issue complementary rule exists (with no support for CCP 1- will have no significant impact on the
- 2) . The result of this discrepancy is to give slightly application.
more conservative results since a guaranteed failure is used in this particular instance rather than a calculated split fraction.
'Update SE event tree logic with provision for no CCP 1-1 support.
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 Addendum 1 Evaluation of PRA Open Items /Issues on SAMA Process Action Title/ Current Status/
Action Description Importance to SAMA Application Applicable SR Comment CCW model has While researching HEPs, it was noticed that credit is taken for Revise rule for split Not significant since impact on Header 'C' and the operator to reduce heat loads for LLOCA (and MLOCA fraction SE2 and SEF CDF/Level 2 results is also HEP combined and SLBI), even though they may not have enough time. In associated with SLBI insignificant.
other words, we are using the HEP for heat load reduction for initiator. This has an .
- No significant change in all initiators.
insignificant impact on CDF or Level 2 results .
For LLOCA, MLOCA and SLBI, we generally have HI-HI the CDF/LERF.
- No significant change in the containment pressure ("P" signal), which will isolate CCW non-vital Header C. The various CCW calculations support SAMA cost benefit analysis.
one CCW pump as adequate for flow and heat loads when Header C is isolated. This implies that failure of the HEP roughly approximates the hardware failure of Header C to isolate.
To more accurately model the worth of the HEP and FCV-355 (Header C), they should probably be split out into separate items. Also note that the current modeling does not model the support for Header C automatic isolation (SSPS for "P" signal and Bus H for MOV power) .
This should have little affect on CDF or LERF, but will affect some basic event importances.
07/11/02 Further research during the NRC inspection also noticed FCV-355. We need to investigate if Header 'C' Isolation is required for Phase "B" actuation even if two CCW pumps are running .
11/12/02 Upon reviewing E.11 revision 9, it was noticed by AXA that the calc file talks about isolating Header 'C' (implied by INIT=SLBI for general transient) and failing to trip the RCPS should give a failure of the seals. There is logic in top event for this in RP, but no logic for it in SE. so on INIT=SLBI if the RCPS are still running, and charging has failed the rules use split fraction SE2. But it should use SE2 only if -INIT=SLBI, and if INIT=SLBI (and charging AHS failed, it should use SEF). On reviewing past calculation files it appears that it has been this way since Revision 1 and possibly Revision 0 of C.4.2. A quick review of INIT=SLBI in PLG-0637 did not clarify anything as none of the SBLI sequences showed any SE failing (almost like it was bypassed in the tree .
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APPENDIX E ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT AMENDMENT 2 This page intentionally left blank.
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Enclosure 3 PG&E Letter DCL-15-027 Page 1 of 2 Diablo Canyon Power Plant LRA Changes Reflected in the LRA Update Amendment 49 Affected LRA Reason for Change Section Table 3.3.2-5 Errata. Plant-specific Note 6 was changed to Plant-specific Note 9.
Enclosure 3 Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-15-027 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SUPPLEMENT Page 2 of 2 I
ITable 3.3.2-5 Auxiliary Systems- Summary of Aging Management Evaluation- Makeup Water System Component Intended Material Environment Aging Effect Aging Management NUREG- Table 1 Item Notes Type Function Requiring Program 1801 Vol.
Management 21tem Tanks PB Carbon Steel Concrete Loss of material Inspection of Internal None None G, e9 Surfaces of Miscellaneous Ducting and Piping Components (82.1.22)
Enclosure 4 PG&E Letter DCL-15-027 Page 1 of 17 Diablo Canyon Power Plant License Renewal Application, Appendix E Changes Reflected in the Amendment 2 The following LRA, Appendix E sections that were submitted by Pacific Gas and Electric Company Letter DCL-14-103, "10 CFR 54.21(b) Annual Update to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant License Renewal Application (LRA), Amendment 48 and LRA Appendix E, Applicant's Environmental Report- Operating License Renewal Stage, Amendment 1," Enclosure 2, dated December 22, 2014, contain reference and typographical corrections. All corrections are shown as electronic markups (deletions crossed out and insertions italicized).
Section 2.2.2.1 Section 2.4 Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 Section 2.7 Sections 2.8 and 2.8.1 Sections 2.13.5 and 2.13.6 Section 2.14 Section 3.1 Section 4.0.2 LRAAppendix E, Tables 2.13-1 and 2.13-2 have been updated.
ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT PG&E Letter DCL-15-027 APPENDIX E AMENDMENT 2 Page 2 of 17 2.2.2.1 Species and Relative Abundance In addition to the aquatic species special status species listed in Table 2.2-3, Table 2.4-1 presents a list of terrestrial special status species with the potential to occur on the Diablo Canyon lands including some freshwater species discussed above.