ML15055A512

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Proposed License Amendment Regarding Extending the Containment Type a Leak Rate Testing Frequency to 15 Years
ML15055A512
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/20/2015
From: Peterson A
State of NY, Energy Research & Development Authority
To: Pickett D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML15055A512 (6)


Text

nysercia Energy. Innovation. Solutions.

-r February 20, 2015 Douglas V. Pickett, Senior Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, 869A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Re: Proposed license amendment for Indian Point Unit 3 regarding extending the Containment Type A Leak Rate testing frequency to 15 years

Dear Mr. Pickett:

The State of New York welcomes the opportunity to provide comments on the February 4, 2014 proposed license amendment. The States comments are enclosed.

Thank you for your consideration of our comments. We look forward to your response.

Sincerely, Alyse Peterson Senior Project Manager State Liaison Officer Designee New York State Energy Research and Development Authority Albany Buffalo New York City West Valley Site 17 Columbia Circle, Albany, NY 12203-6399 726 Exchange Street 1359 Broadway Management Program (P) 1-866-NYSERDA I (9518-862-1091 19Th Floor Suite 821 9030-B Route 219 nyserda.ny.gov info@nyserda.ny.gov Buffalo. NY New York, NY West Valley, NY 14210-1484 10018-7842 14171-9500 Richard L. Kauffman, Chair (9716-842-1522 (9212-971-5342 (P) 716-942-9960 John B. Rhodes, President and CEO (9 716-842-0156 (F) 518-862-1 091 (9716-942-9961

INDIAN POINT UNIT 3 PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT REGARDING EXTENDING THE CONTAINMENT TYPE A LEAK RATE TESTING FREQUENCY TO 15 YEARS

- New York State Comments, February 2015 INTRODUCTION Entergy has asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to amend the operating license for Indian Point Unit 3 to further defer the deadline for an important safety related test designed to protect New York citizens and communities. Specifically, Indian Point seeks to change Unit 3s licensing basis so that Entergy is only required to conduct a Type A containment leak rate test once every fifteen years. It is important to recognize that over the past twenty years, the frequency of Type A containment testing has been continuously degraded from three tests every ten years to once every ten years. Entergy now seeks to extend the time to conduct the testing even further to once every fifteen years. If NRC grants Entergys proposal, the NRC will be permitting Entergy to avoid conducting the required leak test before the facility enters its requested period of extended operation and, in addition, that the leak test would be conducted only once during a twenty year extended operating period.

Containment leak rate testing is composed of three different types of tests. Type B and C testing focus on assuring that containment penetrations such as valves and pipes are essentially leak tight. Type A testing, or Integrated Leak Rate Testing, determines the leak rate of the passive containment structure as a whole to ensure the integrity of the structure is maintained during its service life. Type A testing seeks to find any leakage past structural elements that cannot be locally leak tested, such as containment liner seal welds. In addition, any leakage through the containment liner or other structural elements due to corrosion or cracks are monitored by Type A testing.

The limitation on containment leakage provides assurance that the containment shell around the nuclear power reactor will perform its design function to prevent or minimize the escape of radioactivity to the environment following an accident. Type A tests are performed when the power plant is off line, for example during a re-fueling outage. Type A leak testing is especially important because it provides an opportunity to test and observe the effectiveness of the entire containment system under pressure. As such, the Type A test is critical for providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection to New York communities near Indian Point.

Indeed, Entergy itself acknowledges that The primary containment function is to provide an essentially leak tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment for postulated accidents. As such, the containment itself and the testing requirements to periodically demonstrate the integrity of the containment exist to ensure the plants ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident do not involve any accident precursors or initiators. Entergy Letter, NL-14-014, Attachment 1,

p. 17 of 20 (ML14050A383).

In 2001, Indian Point Unit 3 received a one-time extension of the Type A containment test rate to once in fifteen years. If NRC were to approve Entergys February 4, 2014 license amendment request in conjunction with the renewal of Unit 3s operating license for an additional twenty years, Entergy would be required to perform only one Type A test between 2005 and 2035. New York State respectfully 1

requests NRC deny Indian Points amendment request since both tIe Entergy and NRC risk assessments justifying this amendment use a one in fifteen year interval instead of the one in thirty year span likely to occur if Unit 3 receives a license renewal.

NRC should also deny Entergys request because its justification or basis is legally impermissible. The Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 etseq., requires the NRC to ensure that nuclear power plants are secure against accidents and deliberate attacks. In particular, the NRC must determine that the operation of a facility is in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a). In this case, Entergy has made clear that Indian Point wants to defer the test in order to reduce Entergys opetating costs and increasing its revenues. According to Entergy, The performance of fewer [Type A Integrated Leak Rate Tests] would result in significant savings in radiation exposure to personnel, cost, and critical path time during future refueling outages. Entergy letter NL-14-014, Attachment 1 at p.4 of 20. Entergy seeks to justify its request to permanently defer this important test and reduce protection for New Yorkers on the basis that the Type A leak test takes time, extends the plants outage, and, therefore, reduces Entergys financial revenues. But that rationale could be used to suggest that other operating license conditions and technical specifications or regulations should be amended, deferred, or relaxed.

However, the NRC has previously determined that Indian Point Unit 3 must conduct the Type A leak test no less than once every ten years. At present, that determination is part of the facilitys current licensing basis and is an essential part of NRC obligation to ensure the adequate protection of New York citizens and communities. It is well established that consideration of cost may not enter the NRC decision making when a requirement is part of the adequate protection licensing basis. As the D.C.

Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, In setting or enforcing the standard of adequate protection that [~

2232(a)] requires, the Commission may not consider the economic costs of safety measures. The Commission must determine, regardless of costs, the precautionary measures necessary to provide adequate protection to the public; the Commission then must impose those measures1 again regardless of costs, on all holders of or applicants for operating licenses. Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 824 F.2d 108, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Just as the considerations of cost may not enter into the establishment of the adequate protection licensing basis for a power reactor, it should not enter into the Commissions consideration when a licensee Seeks to slide back from or dilute that adequate protection standard that the Commission has previously fixed for a regulated facility. See also Public Service Company of Colorado, 4 A.E.C. 214, 216 (1969) (stating that the Atomic Energy Act does not permit matters of economic feasibility of plant operation to interfere with the controlling consideration of health and safety).

BACKGROUND The table below demonstrates the degradation of Type A testing requirements. As of now, Unit 3 is held to the June 17, 1997 regulation requiring testing once every ten years. If approved, the proposed license amendment for Unit 3 would revise the next scheduled Type A test to March 2020 as opposed to the currently scheduled test on .March 2015. This will be approximately 15 years since the last Type A test completed on March 2005.

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Date Regulatory Document Type A Testing Requirement March 16, 1973 10 CFR 50, Appendix J 3 tests every 10 years September 1995 Regulatory Guide 1.163 Option B requires that test Performance Based Containment intervals be determined by using Leak Test Program a performance based approach 10CFR5O.54(o) and with a maximum test frequency 10CFRSO App J Option B of 1 test every 10 years June 17, 1997 Indian Point Unit 3 Type ATe~t Frequency for Unit 3 License Amendment 174 changes to once every ten years April 17, 2001 Indian Point Unit 3 Unit 3 is granted a temporary, License Amendment 206 one-time extension of the Type A test from once every 10 years to once every 15 years February 4, 2014 Indian Point Unit 3 Unit 3 requests to allow

~ Proposed License Amendment extension of the ten-year frequency of the Type A test to 15 years on a permanent basis.

With NRC approval of Indian Points February 4, 2014 amendment to a fifteen year frequency, the Type A test would be required again in March 2035. However, if Unit 3 is granted a 20 year license extension, this test would be required in the spring of the same year the license is set to expire. To perform a Type A Containment Leak Rate test, the nuclear plant must be in a shutdown condition, which explains why these tests coincide with plant refueling outages. However, it is unnecessary for Entergy to plan a Unit 3 refueling outage the same year retirement is planned. Therefore, if the Unit 3 license renewal and amendment is approved, only one Type A containment leak test will be performed for the remaining lifetime of Unit 3.

RISK IMPACT ASSESSMENT Entergys proposed license amendment to extend the Type A leak test frequency for Unit 3 references the most nuclear industry guidelines that has been accepted by NRC staff. However, these guidelines do not take individual nuclear plant lifetimes and circumstances into account. Extending the Type A test interval from 10 to 15 years increases the average time that a leak det&table only by a Type A test goes undetected from 60 to 90 months.1 With NRC approval of Indian Points February 4, 2014 amendment to allow Type A testing frequency of 15 years, Unit 3 will operate for 30 years with only one Type A containment test. Therefore, NRC should deny Indian Points amendment request since Entergys risk assessment time intervals do not match the reality of Indian Point Unit 3 circumstances.

In addition, Entergys proffered risk assessment fails to adequately account for several factors unique to the Indian Point site. To begin with, the assessment does not acknowledge that Indian Point Unit 3 has the highest core damage frequency (CDF) of plants in the central and eastern United States. See NUREG-1742, Vol. 2, Table 2-2 (which reports a CDF for 1P3 of 5.90E-05). In addition, the risk 1 NRC Staff, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No.3 Amendment to Facility Operating License (April 17, 2001)

(No. 206, Docket No. 50-286).

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assessment does not reflect recent data available to NRC that the seismic profile for the Indian Point site has increased since the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorized the operation of Unit 2 and Unit 3 in the 1970s.

The recently-produced ground motion curves appear to be higher than the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) design curves that resulted from licensing hearings in the 1970s and were adopted by the Commission at that earlier time. The following figures are from a presentation for a June 19, 2014 meeting at NRC headquarters in Rockville:

A~~.is ft~b,a*&th. Indian Point 3 1.4 1.2 1

.90.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0

0.1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Licensee_SSE Licensee GMRS NRC GMRS Indian Point 2 1.4 1.2 1

~L*,~z 0.6 0.4 0.2 0

0.1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Llcensee_55E licensee GMRS NRC GMRS IHS/RLE Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1, Seismic Hazard Evaluation, Entergy, slides 6-7 (June 18, 2014).

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Staff has placed the Indian Point Unit 2 and Indian Point Unit 3 facilities in the Priority Group 1 for additional review. According to Staff Group 1 plants are generally those that have the highest re evaluated hazard relative to the original plant seismic design basis (GMRS to SSE) as well as ground motions in the 1-10Hz range that are generally higher in absolute magnitude. Group 1 plants are expected to conduct a seismic risk evaluation and submit it by June 30, 2017.?J2 Moreover, the risk analysis does not adequately account for potential malevolent actions or sabotage against the facility. Neither does the analysis adequately acknowledge the presence of several major airports in the New York metropolitan area, nor does it include an adequate aircraft impact analysis --

such as NRC requires for new facilities.

According to the Environmental Report prepared by Entergy and submitted as part of its application to renew the operating licenses for Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, by 2035 19.2 million people will live within 50 miles of the Indian Point site.3 Moreover, each day tens of thousands people commute or travel into the 50 mile radius around the plant site. According to Entergy, An estimated 41 million people visit the New York Metropolitan area each year; or approximately 112,329 people per day.4 Indian Point is in close proximity to the New York City metropolitan area, the financial center of the country, critical transportation links, and unique scientific, medical, educational, and historical resources. Indian Points spent fuel pools, dry storage casks and reactors are 6 miles from reservoirs that are part of the New York City Watershed which provides drinking water for 8 million city residents. It is also near drinking water resources for other New York and Connecticut communities.

SUMMARY

The Indian Point Unit 3 containment building is the last barrier protecting New York citizens from radioactivity during a nuclear emergency. The NRC should deny Entergys request to further extend the timely and thorough testing of the containment building because its justification or basis is legally impermissible and the risk impact assessment does not account for the current re-licensing circumstances of Indian Point Unit 3.

2 NRC Staff, Support Document for Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Re Evaluations for Operating Reactors in the Central and Eastern United States, p. 2 (May 21, 2014)

(ML14136A126.)

Environmental Report for License Renewal of Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3 (2007) at 2-35 (The total population (including transient populations) within a 50-mile radius of the site is projected to be 19,228,712 in 2035.).

~ Entergy Environmental Report for License Renewal of Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3 at 2-62.

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