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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML22348A0322022-11-30030 November 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Request to Resume Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation for Decommissioning of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 ML22348A0532022-11-30030 November 2022 NRC to National Marine Fisheries Service (Nmfs), Request to Resume Endangered Species Act Consultation for Decommissioning of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 ML22278A0182022-10-0404 October 2022 (SONGS) Unit 2 Reactor Head and Closure of Commitments Related to Peaceful Use of Foreign Technology- Acknowledge Receipt ML22265A2122022-09-22022 September 2022 Request for Additional Information for Exemption Request from 100m 72.106(B) Requirement, Docket Nos 50-206, 50-361, and 50-362 ML22119A2422022-04-29029 April 2022 Riv FOLLOW-UP Response: Question About April 11 San Onofre Event ML22034A9962022-02-0202 February 2022 S. Morris Response to C. Langley-Questions About Moving Snf at San Onfre ML21280A1022021-12-0606 December 2021 NRC to NMFS, Supplement to Request to Reinitiate Endangered Species Act Consultation for San Onofre Decommissioning ML21277A2342021-09-30030 September 2021 NMFS to NRC, Receipt of Request to Reinitiate Endangered Species Act Consultation for San Onofre Decommissioning ML21242A0602021-09-30030 September 2021 NRC to NMFS, Request to Initiate Consultation for SONGS Decommissioning ML21117A3492021-03-30030 March 2021 March 30, 2021, Email from Public Watchdogs on Providing New Information to Its October 13, 2020, 2.206 Petition ML21069A2482021-03-10010 March 2021 Umax, 07200054, 05000361, 05000362, FSAR Revision 4 for San Onofre ISFSI ML21068A2712021-03-0909 March 2021 Request for Additional Information Regarding Biological Opinion - SONGS- EPID L-2021-LLL-0006 ML20343A1292020-12-0808 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information ML20302A3252020-10-21021 October 2020 E-Mail: Acknowledgement of Receipt to the Petitioner Regarding SCE Use of Hi-Storm at SONGS ML20233A7342020-08-18018 August 2020 LTR-20-0313 David Victor, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Community Engagement Panel, Chair, Et Al., Letter Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security at SONGS and Recent SONGS Community Engagement Panel Meeting on O ML20224A0172020-08-0707 August 2020 8-7-20 Corrected Hearing Time - Intervenor SCEs Acknowledgement of Oral Argument Notice (9th Cir.)(Case No. 20-70899) ML20224A0182020-08-0707 August 2020 8-7-20 Intervenor SCEs Acknowledgement of Oral Argument Notice (9th Cir.)(Case No. 20-70899) ML20204B0782020-07-22022 July 2020 Donna Gilmore Email Holtec Umax Materials (07200054, 05000361, 05000362) ML20198M4522020-07-15015 July 2020 Supplement to Public Watchdogs 2.206 Petition ML20163A3402020-05-0505 May 2020 Email Transmission - Peaceful Use Commitments State Dept for SONGS Rx Heads and Steam Generators ML20120A0282020-04-28028 April 2020 4-28-20 Notice of Addition of James Adler as Attorney for NRC (9th Cir.)(Case No. 20-70899) ML20076A5742020-03-11011 March 2020 Response to A.Mcnally San Onofre Canisters (LTR-20-0003) ML20062F5762020-02-28028 February 2020 Public Watchdogs 10 CFR 2.206 Petition - NRC E-mail to Petitioner Regarding Petition Screening Results February 28, 2020 ML20063M3092020-02-28028 February 2020 Public Watchdogs 10 CFR 2.206 Petition - Response from Petitioner to NRC E-mail Regarding Petition Screening Results, February 28, 2020 ML20059M2292020-02-25025 February 2020 OEDO-20-00053 2.206 Petition - Flooding Likely to Create Radioactive Geysers at SONGS ML20049A0802020-02-14014 February 2020 Public Watchdogs 10 CFR 2.206 Petition - E-mail to Petitioner on Immediate Actions Request Determination February 14, 2020 ML20007E5342020-01-0606 January 2020 Oceansiders Initial Assessment & Public Meeting Response E-Mail ML20006D7012019-12-23023 December 2019 Public Watchdogs 10 CFR 2.206 Petition SONGS - Petitioner Request for Public Meeting and NRC Response - December 23, 2019 ML19354B6762019-12-20020 December 2019 2.206 Petition Initial Assessment Notification E-Mail ML19325C5902019-11-20020 November 2019 2.206 Petition Status Notification Email ML19326B2392019-11-18018 November 2019 Public Watchdogs 10 CFR 2.206 Petition SONGS - Screened-in and PRB November 18, 2019 ML19319B6262019-11-0808 November 2019 Oceansiders 2.206 Petition Immediate Action Response E-Mail ML19326A7122019-10-30030 October 2019 Public Watchdogs 10 CFR 2.206 Petition - SONGS Receipt of Exhibits October 30, 2019 ML19326A9692019-10-25025 October 2019 Public Watchdogs 10 CFR 2.206 Petition - SONGS Immediate Action Determination October 25, 2019 ML19326A3602019-10-23023 October 2019 Public Watchdogs 10 CFR 2.206 Petition - SONGS First E-mail to Petitioner October 23, 2019 ML19284B3232019-10-0808 October 2019 Response LTR-19-0351 Kalene Walker, E-mail Concerns About Critical Safety Problems with Holtec Nuclear Waste Storage System at San Onofre ML19344C7842019-09-0303 September 2019 Response from NEIMA Local Community Advisory Board Questionnaire 09-03-2019 RSCS ML19344C7212019-08-30030 August 2019 Response from NEIMA Local Community Advisory Board Questionnaire 08-30-2019 J Steinmetz ML19217A1862019-08-0202 August 2019 E-Mail from M. Layton/Nrc to K. Walker/Public San Onofre - SONGS Special Inspection - Damaged Canisters ML19214A1362019-08-0202 August 2019 Riv Pao Response to Mr. Langley Response to Inquiry ML19221B4122019-07-30030 July 2019 Southern California Edison Company, Southern California Nuclear Generating Station, E-mail from Charles Langley to Scott Morris, NRC, Redundant Drop Protection Features at SONGS ML19213A1072019-07-29029 July 2019 Reply to Mr. Langley Re. Redundant Drop Protection Feature at SONGS ML19210D4292019-07-29029 July 2019 E-Mail from M. Layton/Nrc to D. Gilmore/Public Reply to E-Mail Questions ML19210D4342019-07-11011 July 2019 Curtiss-Wright SAS - 10 CFR Part 21 Reporting of Defects for Introl Positioner 890265-010 ML19190A0432019-06-28028 June 2019 Discusses Proprietary Information for Curtiss-Wright SAS - 10 CFR Part 21 Reporting of Defects for Introl Positioner 890265-010 - Cw SAS Initial Report No. 10CFR21-48 ML19165A1102019-06-11011 June 2019 SONGS Webinar (6-3-2019) Message - Sarah Akerson ML19190A0442019-06-0707 June 2019 10 CFR Part 21 Reporting of Defects for Introl Positioner 890265-010 - Cw SAS Initial Report No. 10CFR21-48 ML19158A4432019-06-0404 June 2019 Southern California Edison Company; Scratches on Nuclear Storage Canisters at San Onofre Pose No Problems, NRC Says After Its Own Analysis - Orange County Register ML19156A1422019-06-0404 June 2019 LTR-19-0218 Donna Gilmore, Sanonofresafety.Org, E-mail Scratches on Nuclear Storage Canisters at San Onofre ML19158A1312019-05-31031 May 2019 Paragon Energy Systems LLC -10 CFR Part 21 Report of Defect GS2 Terry Turbine Introl Positioners 2022-09-22
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CHAIRMAN Resource From: Ace Hoffman < rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:24 PM
Subject:
High Burn-Up Fuel: The problems multiply ...
9/26/2013
Dear Readers,
Spent fuel is hot stuff. It's thermally hot-- about 400 degrees Fahrenheit. That's not residual heat from when the fuel was in the reactor, it's decay heat from fission products with relatively short half-lives -from days or weeks to about 30 years for most of them (most isotopes of iodine, cesium, strontium, etc.). The fuel will stay well above the boiling point of water for centuries or even millennia, although the temperature will keep dropping over time.
(Note: The term "short" for the half-lives of most fission products compares to Uranium, which is a billion years or more, or even Plutonium, which is 1Os of thousands of times more radioactive (SHORTER half-life) than Uranium. Fission products are thousands of times more deadly than that, not counting Pu and U's heavy metal horrors.)
And speaking of the boiling point of water, above that you get steam. Steam is particularly hazardous to the zirconium cladding of the fuel rods. The zirconium separates the hydrogen from the oxygen in the water molecules of the steam, and the hydrogen atoms combine with each other as H2, which is explosive. Because it's so hot and radioactive inside the dry cask, they can't monitor this process near where it's happening, inside the "dry" cask. They need to monitor the water content, as well as the hydrogen, oxygen, helium, and "fission gasses" that are emitted.
After draining the fuel rods by slowly lifting the entire dry cask assembly out of the spent fuel pool (about 15 years after it was used in the reactor) about 25 gallons of water will remain in the fuel assembly. This water must be removed through repeated drying processes which are only partially successful each time. After that, water seepage into the dry cask is also an ever-constant threat.
There are now about 50 and will be approximately 150 dry casks at San Onofre. Each one will need a constantly-operating monitoring system to know the levels of hydrogen and other gasses in each cask. Such systems have not been designed for horizontally-stored casks such as are used at San Onofre. Instead, walk-by monitoring will be done for escaping radiation. That's not sufficient.
The threat of water intrusion comes from many sources. The dry casks will supposedly be submersible to 50 feet of water, according to regulations. But on the other hand, they will barely be above sea level, and the California State coast and waterways brochures state that everywhere along California's coast, 50 foot tsunamis are possible. Should we risk these "dry" casks on a coast with 9 million people within 50 miles and with so little margin of error?
In some ways, it's too bad the fuel isn't hotter, because if the temperature is above the "brittle/ductile boundary temperature" (which varies for every alloy of cladding and everything else in a fuel rod assembly) then it's much easier to move. But instead, the fuel has been cooling to well below that temperature, and now it's very brittle and difficult to deal with. As it gets older it also gets more and more embrittled, and so, even more difficult to deal with. That is where we are heading here at San Onofre.
Additionally, in high burn-up fuel, the ceramic pellets of Uranium Dioxide, which forms the bulk of the mass of the fuel rods (uranium is 1. 7 times more dense than lead) fuses to the zirconium cladding. This is a very serious problem during later transport of the fuel, especially during postulated (let alone, greater-than-1
postulated) accidents, because the weight of the fuel on the ring of zirconium cladding is all concentrated on the very thin areas between the fuel pellets. So a force that was supposed to be spread out along the length of a pellet (about an inch) is instead borne nearly entirely by mere fractions of a millimeter. A crack means deadly fission products escape, a full rupture of a fuel rod means pellets drop out and could cause a criticality event when they gather at the bottom of the cask.
There are no shipping containers which the NRC has licensed for transporting high burn-up fuel, and worries about criticality events is one reason why. There aren't even any dry cask storage containers which have been licensed beyond the 20-year period for storage of high burn-up spent fuel. As recently as last March, the NRC's own experts can be heard at a meeting stating that tests for the quality of such containers should take at least 10 years to conduct -- and that's after the regulators have already conducted preliminary experiments to determine the type of testing that needs to be done! But it's the nuclear industry's job to actually do the tests (according to the NRC). The tests need to be done for each type of cladding. All zirconium alloys behave uniquely, and the industry hasn't even started to develop a plan for a test, let alone started a test of there systems for long-term storage or for transport afterwards.
However, despite these "known unknowns," high burn-up fuel IS being used around the country, and IS being loaded into dry casks, which are currently licensed for up to 20 years sitting on site wherever they happen to be produced. Never mind the pressures from vibrations of ocean waves and rails and truck routes a few feet away and all those unknowns. Never mind that there is no national plan to move the fuel ever. Never mind all that, so that operating reactor sites can keep making more waste.
High burn-up fuel allows reactor companies to keep operating even when they would otherwise be unprofitable. It also wears out the steam generators and/or other components of the reactor faster. It's no bargain for society to let the utilities get away with using high burn-up fuel!
Sincerely, Ace Hoffman Carlsbad, CA
- Ace Hoffman, Owner & Chief Programmer, The Animated Software Co.
- POB 1936, Carlsbad CA 92018
- U.S. & Canada (800) 551-2726; elsewhere: (760) 720-7261
- home page: www.animatedsoftware.com
- email: rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com
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