IR 05000266/2013009

NRC 95001 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000266-13-009 and Assessment Follow-Up Letter

ML13262A523
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	09/19/2013
From:	Patricia Pelke NRC/RGN-III/DNMS/MLB
To:	Meyer L Point Beach
References
EA-12-220 IR-13-009
Download: ML13262A523 (20)

Text

mber 19, 2013

SUBJECT:

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 - NRC 95001 SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2013009 AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER

Dear Mr. Meyer:

On August 9, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a supplemental inspection pursuant to Inspection Procedure (IP) 95001, Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1.

The enclosed report documents the results of this inspection, which were discussed during an exit meeting on August 12, 2013, with you and other members of your staff. During this meeting, Ms. P. Pelke, Acting Chief, Region III Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 6, discussed the associated performance deficiencies and corrective actions, which fulfills the NRC regulatory performance meeting requirement.

In accordance with the NRC Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix, this supplemental inspection was performed to follow-up on a finding with low-to-moderate safety significance (White) in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, which occurred in the fourth quarter of 2012.

This issue involved the inoperability of the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW)

pump 1P-29 on May 21, 2012, during surveillance testing, which was previously documented and assessed in NRC Inspection Reports (IRs) 05000266/2012009 and 05000266/2012010.

The NRC was informed by your letter dated on April 16, 2013, of your staffs readiness for this inspection.

This supplemental inspection was conducted to provide assurance that: (1) the root causes and the contributing causes for the risk-significant issues were understood; (2) the extent of condition and extent of cause of the issues were identified; and (3) corrective actions were or will be sufficient to address and preclude repetition of the root and contributing causes. The NRC determined that the staff at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, performed an acceptable evaluation of the White finding. The root cause evaluation identified the primary root cause of the issue to be that the TDAFW pump 1P-29 turbine exhaust piping was not installed properly during original construction to eliminate stresses on the turbine per vendor recommendations resulting in cold piping spring and causing coupling misalignment. The licensee determined inadequate process improvements made to standard pump maintenance practices during November 2011, as a contributing cause. The process improvements lacked barriers to measure and prevent errors, which resulted in unintentional consequences. To correct this issue and prevent recurrence, your staff implemented a permanent modification to the turbine exhaust steam piping by installing a wedge between the exhaust pipe flange and the turbine exhaust flange to eliminate stresses on the turbine, and revised the maintenance procedures to correct procedure deficiencies.

No findings of significance were identified during this inspection.

The NRC has determined that inspection objectives stated above have been met. Therefore in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program, this performance issue shall not be considered in the Action Matrix after the end of the third quarter of 2013. However, due to the performance issues in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone resulting in a White finding in the first quarter of 2013, the closure of this finding will not change Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 status and it will remain in the Degraded Cornerstone Column of the ROP Action Matrix. This White finding was associated with your failure to implement external flooding wave run-up protection design features as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 remains in Column III (Degraded Cornerstone) of the Action Matrix until resolution of the issues associated with that Cornerstone.

Once you have notified us that you are ready, we will conduct a supplemental inspection using Inspection Procedure 95002, Supplemental Inspection for One Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area. The objectives of the supplemental inspection procedure are to provide assurance that the root and contributing causes of risk significant performance issues are understood; to provide assurance that the extent of condition and the extent of cause are identified; to determine if safety culture components caused or significantly contributed to the individual and collective risk significant performance issues; and to provide assurance that corrective actions are sufficient to address root and contributing causes and prevent recurrence. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Patricia J. Pelke, Acting Chief Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-266 License No. DPR-24

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000266/2013009 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION III==

Docket No: 05000266 License No: DPR-24 Report No: 05000266/2013009 Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Location: Two Rivers, WI Dates: August 5 through August 9, 2013 Inspectors: D. Betancourt, Acting Senior Resident Inspector Approved by: Patricia J. Pelke, Acting Chief Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Report (IR) 05000266/2013009; 08/05/2013 - 08/09/2013; Point Beach Nuclear

Plant, Unit 1; Supplemental Inspection - Inspection Procedure (IP) 95001 This report documents the results of a one-week announced supplemental inspection by an acting senior resident inspector. No findings were identified during this inspection. The Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

The inspection was performed in accordance with IP 95001, Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, to assess the licensees evaluation associated with the inoperability of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump 1P-29 in May 2012. The NRC determined this issue as having low-to-moderate safety significance, (i.e., White), as documented in NRC IR 05000266/2012010. During this supplemental inspection, the inspector determined that the licensee performed a comprehensive evaluation of the self-revealed TDAFW pump 1P-29 failure, which occurred during a routine Technical Specification (TS) surveillance test. The licensee identified the primary root cause of the issue to be that the TDAFW pump 1P-29 turbine exhaust piping was not installed properly during original construction. The licensee determined inadequate process improvements made to standard pump maintenance practices during November 2011, as a contributing cause.

The process improvements lacked barriers to measure and prevent errors, which resulted in unintentional consequences. Specifically, the final alignment of the turbine-to-pump was completed prior to the completion of all maintenance activities that could affect the alignment of the turbine-to-pump. To correct this issue and prevent recurrence, the licensee implemented a permanent modification to the turbine exhaust steam piping by installing a wedge between the exhaust pipe flange and the turbine exhaust flange to eliminate stresses on the turbine, and revised the maintenance procedures to correct procedure deficiencies.

Given the licensees acceptable performance in addressing the inoperable TDAFW pump 1P-29, the White finding associated with this issue will only be considered in assessing plant performance for a total of four quarters in accordance with the guidance in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program. Inspectors will review the licensees implementation of corrective actions during a future inspection.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA4 Supplemental Inspection

.01 Inspection Scope

This inspection was conducted in accordance with IP 95001, to assess the licensees evaluation of a White finding, which affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone.

The inspection objectives were to:

• provide assurance that the root causes and contributing causes of risk significant performance issues were understood;

• provide assurance that the extent of condition and extent of cause of risk significant issues were identified; and

• provide assurance that licensee corrective actions to risk significant performance issues were sufficient to address the root causes and contributing causes, and to prevent recurrence.

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 entered the Regulatory Response column of NRCs Action Matrix in the fourth quarter of 2012 due to a White finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone as documented in NRC inspection report (IR) 05000266/2012010.

The finding was associated with the inoperability of the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump 1P-29 on May 21, 2012. On that date, approximately 70 minutes after the pump was started for Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance test, the pump was shut down after local operators and engineers reported sparks were emanating from the turbine-to-pump coupling guard area and pieces of coupling were observed on the pump skid. Subsequent investigation determined that during routine maintenance performed in November and December 2011, the final alignment of the turbine-to-pump was completed prior to completing all the maintenance activities that could affect the turbine-to-pump alignment. Additionally, the licensee discovered during repairs that the turbine exhaust flange and exhaust piping flange were not aligned, and that this condition existed since original installation. The finding was characterized as being of low-to-moderate safety significance (White) based on the results of a Phase 3 risk analysis performed by a Region III (RIII) senior reactor analyst (SRA), as discussed in IR 05000266/2012009, and finalized in IR 05000266/2012010.

As part of the corrective actions, the licensee repaired the failed coupling; implemented a permanent modification to the turbine exhaust steam piping by installing a wedge between the exhaust pipe flange and the turbine exhaust flange to eliminate stresses on the turbine; and corrected procedural deficiencies to prevent future occurrence.

By letter dated April 16, 2013, the licensee notified the NRC that it had completed its evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the degraded performance and was ready for the NRC to assess the licensees evaluation and subsequent corrective actions.

The inspector reviewed the licensees Root Cause Evaluations (RCEs) in addition to other evaluations conducted in support of and as a result of the RCEs. The inspector reviewed corrective actions that were taken or planned to address the identified causes.

In addition, the inspector examined the TDAFW pump 1P-29 and interviewed approximately 10 plant employees from various areas and levels within the licensees organization. The inspector also held discussions with licensee personnel to ensure that the root and contributing causes were understood and corrective actions taken or planned were appropriate to address the causes and preclude repetition.

.02 Evaluation of the Inspection Requirements

02.01 Problem Identification a. Determine whether the evaluation identified who (i.e., licensee-identified, self-revealed, or NRC-identified) and under what conditions the issue was identified.

The licensees RCE concluded that the event was self-revealed on May 21, 2012, when the TDAFW pump 1P-29 was unexpectedly declared out-of-service during routine TS surveillance testing. The pump was shut down after local operators and engineers reported that sparks were emanating from the turbine-to-pump coupling guard area, and pieces of coupling were observed on the pump skid. During disassembly the turbine-to-pump alignment was discovered at approximately 0.0670 inches when coupled, and 0.0858 inches when uncoupled. The coupling manufacturer suggested alignment for optimal coupling life at less than 0.007 inches, with a maximum allowed misalignment of 0.024 inches. The licensees procedure RMP 9044-1, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Terry Turbine Overhaul, required as-left alignment to be less than 0.002 inches. When compared to the procedure as-left acceptance criteria, the coupling was excessively out of alignment. Additionally, subsequent analysis determined that the turbine exhaust flange and the exhaust piping flange were not aligned, with approximately 0.085 inches out of parallel, and that this had been the condition since the original installation. The installation condition had been discovered and corrected on the Unit 2 TDAFW pump during refueling outage 2R31 in early 2011. However, no action request (AR) was written to document this condition and no extent of condition was performed on the other unit. The RCE was completed under AR01768931, and the corrective actions taken to address the failure were documented under the same condition report.

The inspector determined that the licensees RCE adequately identified who and under what conditions the issue was identified. Additionally, the inspector determined that the licensees RCE adequately discussed the identification of the issue. This was accomplished by reviewing the narrative logs for May 20-22, 2011, as well as the information contained in ARs.

During the review of AR01768931, the inspector determined that the licensee failed to properly classify the failure of the TDAFW pump 1P-29 as a significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ), as defined in the licensees procedures PI-AA-204, Condition Identification and Screening, and PI-AA-205, Condition Evaluation and Corrective Action. During initial screening, the licensee improperly classified the issue as a Severity Level 2 condition adverse to quality (CAQ) based on the guidance provided in PI-AA-204, Attachment 3, which defined a CAQ as:

Any failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective items, abnormal occurrences, non-conformances or out-of-control processes that have the potential to affect nuclear safety, radiological safety, operability or functionality of safety related structures, systems or components, or any programmatic or operational aspects associated with nuclear or radiological safety.

The same Attachment 3 defined a SCAQ as:

Any failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective items, abnormal occurrences, non-conformances, or out-of-control processes that significantly threatens or has compromised nuclear safety or radiological safety.

With the damage to the coupling, the TDAFW pump 1P-29 would not have been able to perform its safety function; therefore the condition should have been classified as a SCAQ. This issue was determined to be a minor procedure deficiency because, even though the licensee improperly classified the issue as a CAQ, all actions taken were commensurate with the actions required to be taken to prevent recurrence of an SCAQ.

The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as AR01894831.

b. Determine whether the evaluation documented how long the issue existed and whether there were any prior opportunities for identification.

The licensees RCE concluded the root cause of the event was the exhaust steam piping on the TDAFW pump 1P-29 was not installed properly per vendor recommendations during original construction to eliminate stresses on the turbine resulting in cold piping spring and causing pipe misalignment. In addition, the licensee identified a number of missed opportunities including, in part: the failure to document the basis for making as-found alignment data as information only in procedure RMP 9044-1 and not initiating ARs for pipe strain misalignment in the TDAFW pump 2P-29 and bent studs. The licensee performed a Previous Occurrence Evaluation to determine whether there was any prior opportunity for identification of the exhaust steam piping misalignment. The licensee did not identify any opportunities that would have led to the identification and correction of the issue prior to the discovery of the issue on Unit 2 in 2011.

The inspector determined that the licensees evaluation was adequate with respect to identifying how long the issue existed and whether there were any prior opportunities for identification. However, the inspector identified one potential missed opportunity that was not discussed in the RCE. The evaluation did not include a discussion on whether the post-maintenance test performed following the maintenance should have caught the alignment issues. However, the licensee provided an evaluation that showed that due to the time needed for the condition to develop, it would not have manifested itself until some thermal cycles had passed. This issue was determined to be a minor procedure deficiency for the failure to document the evaluation of the adequacy of the post-maintenance test in the RCE. The licensee entered this item into the CAP as AR01894925.

c. Determine whether the licensees RCE documented the plant specific risk consequences and compliance concerns associated with the issue.

The licensees RCE included a discussion of nuclear, radiological and environmental safety significance and stated that they agreed with the detailed risk evaluation that was performed by the RIII SRA and documented in IR 05000266/2012009.

The inspector concluded that the licensees RCE adequately documented the risk consequences and compliance concerns associated with the issue.

d. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

02.02 Root Cause, Extent of Condition, and Extent of Cause Evaluation a. Determine whether the licensees root cause evaluation applied systematic methods in evaluating the issue in order to identify root and contributing causes.

In its RCE, the licensee used the following systematic methods to perform the root cause analysis:

• Event and Casual Factor Charting;

• Change Analysis;

• Why Staircase; and

• Support Refute Matrix.

Additionally, the licensee reviewed past maintenance history and performed interviews of key maintenance and engineering personnel involved in the event.

Based upon this information, the inspector determined that the licensee adequately applied systematic methodology to identify root and contributing causes.

b. Determine whether the licensees RCE was conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the issue.

In its RCE, the licensee used an evaluation team with broad knowledge and expertise.

Team members had backgrounds in the following areas: training, system engineering, operations, and maintenance. The licensees change analysis was used to evaluate selected parameters from the November 2011 maintenance activities. The licensee then used a Why Staircase Analysis to identify one root cause and four contributing causes.

The licensee identified the root cause, as follows: 1P-29 turbine exhaust piping was not installed properly during original construction to eliminate stresses on the turbine per vendor recommendations resulting in cold piping spring and causing coupling misalignment. The contributing causes, as stated in the licensees RCE, were:

• process improvements made to standard pump maintenance practices during November 2011, caused unintentional consequences because of the lack of barriers to measure and prevent errors, and included removing threads from bolts to try to achieve alignment using less force than previously;

• RMP 9044-1 identified as-found alignment data as information only resulted in not evaluating out-of-tolerance conditions; and RMP-9044-1 lacked acceptance criteria;

• 1P-29 pump and turbine were not aligned during original installation using vendor recommended dowels allowing subsequent movement of equipment; and

• the existence of pipe misalignment on 2P-29 and bent studs found on TDAFW pump 1P-29 were not documented in condition reports nor evaluated for corrective actions for 1P-29.

Based upon the work performed for this root cause, the inspector determined that the RCE was conducted to a level commensurate with the significance of the issue. The licensees evaluation team and analysis techniques used were sufficient to identify the root and contributing causes of the event.

c. Determine whether the licensees RCE included consideration of prior occurrences of the issue and knowledge of prior operating experience (OE).

In its RCE, the licensee included an evaluation of internal and external operating OE.

This OE evaluation included similar events that involved coupling failures associated with Thomas Rexnord manufacturer selection. The only results involving flexible couplings showed a Thomas Rexnord brand coupling failure from San Onofre Unit 2, for which the coupling had failed due to corrosion.

Based on the licensees evaluation, the inspector determined that the licensees RCE included a consideration of prior occurrences of the issue and knowledge of prior OE.

d. Determine whether the licensees RCE addressed the extent of condition and extent of cause of the issue.

In its RCE, the licensee considered the extent of condition associated with reviewing maintenance procedures to ensure that acceptance criteria for critical parameters of the Thomas Rexnord coupling, which was the type of coupling associated with the TDAFW pump 1P-29. The review consisted of ensuring that the procedures included acceptance criteria for critical parameters and a formal evaluation by Engineering to determine whether any of the criteria were exceeded. The licensees review identified seven potential procedures that could be affected. Only two of the potentially affected procedures were associated with safety-related equipment:

(1) the containment spray pumps; and

(2) the containment accident recirculation fans. The licensee concluded that no changes were needed for the safety-related procedures. During the review of the procedures, the inspector concluded that procedure RMP-9401, Containment Accident Fan Inspection and Maintenance, did not include acceptance criteria even though it required an alignment check. This issue was determined to be a minor procedure deficiency because, even though the licensee did not have acceptance criteria, there was a provision in the procedure that required Engineering to review the results of every alignment of the fan. The licensee entered this item into the CAP as AR01895229.

The licensees evaluation also considered the extent of cause associated with the exhaust steam piping not being installed properly during original construction. The affected equipment was identified as the Unit 2 2P-29 TDAFW pump. The issue was corrected in early 2011 during refueling outage 2R31. The inspector concluded that the licensees RCE adequately addressed the extent of condition and extent of cause of the problem.

e. Determine whether the licensees RCE, extent of condition, and extent of cause evaluations appropriately considered the safety culture components as described in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program.

The licensees RCE, extent of condition, and extent of cause considered the safety culture components as described in IMC 0305. The inspector reviewed the RCE and validated that the licensee had systematically considered each of the safety culture components. One potential aspect in the area of implementing the CAP for low-threshold issues was identified. This insight was considered when addressing the root and contributing causes. To address this issue the licensee instituted actions to reinforce initiating ARs with low thresholds.

The inspector determined that the RCE, extent of condition, and extent of cause appropriately considered the safety culture components as described in IMC 0305.

The inspectors review of the event did not identify other potential weaknesses in safety culture components.

f. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

02.03 Corrective Actions a. Determine whether the licensee specified appropriate corrective actions for each root and/or contributing cause, or that the licensee evaluated why no actions were necessary.

The licensee implemented immediate corrective actions to restore the TDAFW pump 1P-29 to operable status following the May 2012 failure. The immediate actions included replacing the failed coupling.

The licensees RCE concluded that there was one root cause and four contributing causes for the event. A description of each cause is provided in Section 02.02.b.

The licensees corrective actions included, in part:

• removing the misalignment from turbine exhaust piping at its source by squaring up the piping;

• removing the misalignment from turbine exhaust piping 1P-29 by installing a tapered wedge in the exhaust connection;

• revising the Desktop Planners Guide to add a step that alteration of a safety-related system, structure or component requires written authorization from Engineering;

• revising RMP 9044-1 for the TDAFW pump overhaul to address procedure deficiencies;

• revising monitoring criteria for the TDAFW pumps to 1.3 times baseline for vibrations; and

• reinforcing a low threshold initiation for ARs.

The inspector reviewed the corrective actions and conducted interviews with maintenance personnel. Through this review the inspector concluded that the corrective actions taken were appropriate to prevent recurrence. No concerns were identified.

b. Determine whether the licensee prioritized the corrective actions with consideration of the risk significance and regulatory compliance.

The licensees corrective actions to address the root and contributing causes were prioritized in accordance with procedure PI-AA-205, Condition Evaluation and Corrective Action. The inspector reviewed the licensees plans for accomplishing the corrective actions and noted that the risk significance of the equipment was being appropriately considered. Based on the guidance provided in the licensees procedures and the prioritization of the corrective actions in accordance with these procedures, the inspector determined that the corrective actions were adequately prioritized with consideration of the risk significance and regulatory compliance.

c. Determine whether the licensee established a schedule for implementing and completing the corrective actions.

The licensee established due dates for the corrective actions in accordance with procedure PI-AA-205, Condition Evaluation and Corrective Action requirements for timeliness. The due dates were captured in AR01768931. The inspector determined that the licensee adequately established a schedule for implementing and completing the corrective actions. At the time of the inspection, all corrective actions to prevent recurrence had been completed. A number of corrective actions had not been completed at the end of the inspection. The inspector verified that due dates were assigned for each pending corrective action in accordance with their significance.

The inspector determined that the licensee adequately established a schedule for implementing and completing corrective actions.

d. Determine whether the licensee developed quantitative and/or qualitative measures of success for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

As documented in AR01768931, the licensee established measures for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions. These measures included reviews to confirm that all recommended changes had been incorporated into the pertinent procedures, reviews of coupling parameters, and improved trending of low level CAP issues. The inspector determined that the licensee had adequately developed quantitative and qualitative measures of success for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions to preclude repetition.

e. Determine that the corrective actions planned or taken adequately address the Notice of Violation (NOV) that was the basis for the supplemental inspection.

The NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) (EA-12-220) to the licensee on January 2, 2013. The NOV associated with the White finding that was the subject of this inspection identified one violation of NRC requirements. Specifically, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances. The licensee failed to ensure that the work performed on the safety-related turbine for the 1P-29 TDAFW pump via Work Order 40101094 and routine maintenance procedure RMP 9044-1, an activity affecting quality, was prescribed by documented instructions or procedures of the type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, Work Order 40101094, Task 7 specified a first time evolution of unbolting the steam exhaust piping to the turbine, aligning the turbine to the pump and then re-bolting the steam piping to the turbine. Performance of this Task was not appropriate to the circumstances in that it did not ensure the final turbine-to-pump alignment was performed after the bolting of the steam exhaust piping to the turbine flange.

The NRC concluded that information regarding the reasons for the violation, the corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved, has already been adequately addressed on the docket in IR 05000255/2012019. During this inspection, the inspector confirmed that the licensees RCE and the planned and completed corrective actions adequately addressed the NOV.

f. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting

On August 12, 2013, the inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Wright and other members of his staff. The inspector asked the licensee if any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. The licensee did not identify any proprietary information.

.2 Regulatory Performance Meeting

On August 12, 2013, the inspector met with the licensee to discuss its performance in accordance with IMC 0305, Section 10.02.b.4. During this meeting, the NRC and licensee discussed the issues related to this White finding that resulted in Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 being placed in a column of the NRCs ROP Action matrix with additional oversight. This discussion included the causes, corrective actions, extent of condition, extent of cause, and other planned licensee actions.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

R. Wright, Plant General Manager

J. Atkins, Engineering Manager

J. Golding, Engineering Technical Lead

J. Wilson, Maintenance Director

P. Baranowski, System Engineer

T. Lesniak, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

K. Locke, Licensing

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

P. Pelke, Acting Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 6

LIST OF ITEMS

Opened

None

Closed

05000266/2012009-01 VIO Failure To Have Adequate Work Instructions And Procedures For Work Performed On The Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feed Water Pump

Discussed

None Attachment