ML13148A007

Zionsolutions - Updated Request for Amendment to Approve Methods of Analysis, Use of the Upgraded Fuel Handling Building Crane System as a Single-Failure Proof Crane and Approval of a NUREG 0612 Compliant Heavy Loads Handling Program

ML13148A007
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	05/16/2013
From:	Daly P ZionSolutions
To:	Document Control Desk, NRC/FSME
References
ZS-2013-0194
Download: ML13148A007 (349)

Text

ZIONSOLUTIONSUC An EnergySohA$ Comnpany 10 CFR 50.59 10 CFR 50.90 May 16, 2013 ZS-2013-0194 U.S. Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units l and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48 NRC Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304

Subject:

Updated Request for Amendment to Approve Methods of Analysis, use of the Upgraded Fuel Handling Building Crane System as a Single-Failure Proof Crane and Approval of a NUREG 0612 Compliant Heavy Loads Handling Program

Reference:

1. ZionSolutions, LLC Letter, Daly to NRC, "Submittal of an ASME NOG-1 Exception Request and Update to the Amendment to Approve Methods of Analysis, use of the Upgraded Fuel Handling Building Crane System as a Single-Failure Proof Crane and Approval of a NUREG 0612 Compliant Heavy Loads Handling Program," dated April 4, 2013

Reference:

2. ZionSolutions, LLC Letter, Daly to NRC, "Apparent Cause Evaluation for Analysis Errors Associated with the Request for License Amendment for an Upgraded Fuel Handling Building Crane System," dated April 4, 2013

Reference:

3. ZionSolutions, LLC Letter, Daly to NRC, "Update to the Rail Clip Analysis Supplementing the Request for Amendment to Approve Methods of Analysis, use of the Upgraded Fuel Handling Building Crane System as a Single-Failure Proof Crane and Approval of a NUREG 0612 Compliant Heavy Loads Handling Program," dated March 4, 2013

Reference:

4. ZionSolutions, LLC Letter, Daly to NRC, "Response to Requests for Additional Information for Questions 1, 2, 4 and 5," dated February 21, 2013

Reference:

5. ZionSolutions, LLC Letter, Daly to NRC, "Response to Requests for Additional Information for Questions 3 and 6 and Schedule for Submittal of Remaining Responses," dated January 22, 2013

Reference:

6. ZionSolutions, LLC Letter, Daly to NRC, "Update to the Supplement for the Request for Amendment to Approve Methods of Analysis, use of the Upgraded Fuel Handling Building Crane System as a Single-Failure Proof Crane and Approval of a NUREG 0612 Compliant Heavy Loads Handling Program," dated January 17, 2013 101 Shiloh Boulevard, Zion

• IL 60099 (224) 789-4016 - Fax: (224) 789-4008 - www.zionsolutionscompany.com

ZionSolutions, LLC ZS-2013-0194 Page 2 of 5

Reference:

7. ZionSolutions, LLC Letter, Daly to NRC, "Additional Information Supplementing the Request for Amendment to Approve Methods of Analysis, use of the Upgraded Fuel Handling Building Crane System as a Single-Failure Proof Crane and Approval of a NUREG 0612 Compliant Heavy Loads Handling Program," dated December 20, 2012

Reference:

8. ZionSolutions, LLC Letter, Daly to NRC, "Request for Amendment to Approve Methods of Analysis, use of the Upgraded Fuel Handling Building Crane System as a Single-Failure Proof Crane and Approval of a NUREG 0612 Compliant Heavy Loads Handling Program," dated October 25, 2012

Reference:

9. ZionSolutions, LLC Letter, Daly to NRC, "Request for Amendment to Approve Methods of Analysis, use of the Upgraded Fuel Handling Building Crane System as a Single-Failure Proof Crane and Approval of a NUREG 0612 Compliant Heavy Loads Handling Program," dated May 31, 2012 ZionSolutions, LLC (ZS) is in the process of decommissioning the Zion Nuclear Power Station.

One of the major activities to complete decommissioning is to place the spent fuel into spent fuel storage casks which must be moved from the Spent Fuel Pool area to a new on-site Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) in order to allow timely decommissioning and dismantlement of the Fuel Handling Building. A total of 61 transportable storage canisters (TSCs) will be loaded with spent fuel and moved to the ISFSI. In order to perform this activity, the existing Fuel Handling Building overhead crane will be upgraded to a single-failure proof lifting system to ensure the canister loading and preparation activities are performed safely and without the need to postulate a cask handling accident during any part of the cask movement by the Fuel Handling Building lifting system.

Reference 9, superseded by Reference 8, contained the information to support the initial NRC Review of the License Amendment Request. In the course of that review, analyses supporting the seismic design of the crane and Fuel Handling Building structure were found to require correction. One of those errors led to a modification to the bridge runway clip connections and a supporting calculation as described in Reference 3. Another of the errors led to a reanalysis of the runway girder splice connection to the Fuel Handling Building structure and a description of that analysis is included as well. As a result of these errors, ZS performed an apparent cause evaluation (ACE) and common cause evaluation (CCE) for deficiencies identified in analyses and in design output documents (drawings, specifications, etc.) respectively, (Reference 2) and determined that correction of the errors and additional reviews by both ZS and the contractor were necessary prior to the final reporting of seismic analysis results. The calculations have been updated and finalized, additional reviews have been performed as required by the corrective actions prescribed by the ACE and CCE; this LAR contains the summaries of the final analyses.

The NRC in the course of its review, provided requests for additional information (RAIs), which ZS responded to in References 1, 4 and 5. The RAI responses included a request for exception from ASME NOG- 1 requirements on wind loading, which has also been incorporated into this submittal. The salient portions of the remaining responses to those RAIs have also been incorporated into the text of this LAR. In addition, the results from Appendix B of ZION001-

ZionSolutions, LLC ZS-2013-0194 Page 3 of 5 CALC-002 describing the Crane Runway Girder Runway Plate, End Support, and Interior Support Evaluation Summary and calculation (ZIONOO1-CALC-037) that includes a summary of the Crane Runway Girder Support at Column. Line X are provided, since these calculations have been completed since the last ZS stratus letter was submitted.

The attached License Amendment request provides information that summarizes the calculations supporting the new single failure proof crane. The information is drawn from analyses revised from the submittal of Reference 2, and incorporates the findings of analyses already reported to the NRC in Reference 1 - 7. In some cases additional analyses have been performed since the cited references were provided to the NRC. As a result, some previously reported values may have changed. In no case, is there an interaction ratio greater than 1.0 reported.

This submittal supersedes our earlier request of Reference 8 with the information described above. Changes from Reference 8 are identified by change bars in the margin for ease of review.

The drawings provided in Reference 8, however, have not been reproduced for this submittal and should still be considered as part of this request for amendment.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90 "Applications for amendment of license or construction permit" and 10 CFR 50.59 "Changes, tests, and experiments," ZS, is requesting a change to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48 for Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (ZNPS). The proposed changes revise the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) to include a description of the new single failure proof Fuel Handling Building lifting system and the methodology associated with that design; describe the NUREG 0612 program commitments; and, describe fuel handling operations using the Fuel Handling Building crane. The analyzed event for a spent fuel cask drop in the cask handling area of the Spent Fuel Pool will be deleted from the DSAR (Section 3.9.5) based on use of the single-failure proof system coupled with implementation of the Heavy Loads Program. These measures will sufficiently preclude spent fuel cask drops and the need to explicitly analyze for such an event in or near the Spent Fuel Pool by reducing the probability of a drop event to an acceptably low value, as described in NUREG 0612. No portion of the Fuel Handling Building structure will be adversely affected by the replacement of the Fuel Handling Building Crane. Accordingly no analysis is required or provided for failures of the FHB, its roof or associated structure over the spent fuel pool nor does any effect of building failure on the crane need to be analyzed.

The FHB overhead bridge crane was manufactured by Harnischfeger/P&H as original equipment at ZNPS. It has a 125-ton rated main hoist and a 15-ton rated auxiliary hoist, both of which operate from the same trolley. The FHB overhead crane is characterized as Important-to-the-Defueled-Condition (ITDC) in the DSAR. An ITDC structure, system or component functions and/or supports a spent fuel or radiation protection safety function in the defueled condition.

The lifting system modifications include replacement of the existing trolley on the overhead crane with a new trolley and single-failure proof main hoist and new crane controls. The existing trolley and hoists have been replaced with a new trolley and hoists manufactured by Konecranes Nuclear Equipment & Services, LLC. The new trolley has a new 125-ton rated single-failure proof main hoist and a new 15-ton rated non-single-failure proof auxiliary hoist.

ZionSolutions, LLC ZS-2013-0194 Page 4 of 5 It was necessary to make a structural modification to the existing runway. Rail clips have been added to the runway rails to assure proper anchoring of the rails during a seismic event with a suspended critical load as described in Reference 3.

Associated lifting devices and interfacing lift points will also conform to the guidance in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 in order to ensure that the entire Fuel Handling Building lifting system is single-failure proof for each heavy load lift made in or around the Spent Fuel Pool or in or around a cask loaded with spent fuel or a lift of a cask loaded with spent fuel. The heavy loads safe load paths are identified and additional staging areas in the Fuel Handling Building to facilitate spent fuel transfer are identified as part of this license amendment request. Operator training and procedures will also conform to the recommendations of the regulatory guidance.

A seismic analysis was performed in accordance with ASME NOG- 1 "Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder)" (ASME NOG-1) for the new trolley. Analysis was also performed to include the existing bridge and new trolley, coupled with the supporting FHB structure that confirmed the overhead crane system will be able to safely control the Maximum Critical Load during a seismic event (SSE).

This License Amendment Request is arranged as follows:

" Attachment 1 provides a description and an evaluation of the proposed change;

" Attachment 2 provides a list of Regulatory Commitments, Proposed Operating License Page Markups, Proposed DSAR Page Markups;

" Attachment 3 provides a copy of the Draft ZS Heavy Loads Program;

" Attachment 4 provides a matrix identifying compliance with NUREG 0612;

• Attachment 5 provides a matrix identifying compliance with ASME NOG- 1;

" Attachment 6 provides a matrix identifying compliance with NUREG 0554;

" Attachment 7 provides drawings associated with the runway rail clip modifications which had been originally provided in Reference 3. The remaining drawings included in Attachment 7 to Reference 8 remain applicable.

The proposed change has been reviewed by the ZNPS Station Review Committee in accordance with the requirements of the ZNPS Technical Specifications.

ZS is notifying the State of Illinois of this request for change to the operating license by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Official.

_1 1 , ctfuilly , **.

-Patrick Daly Senior Vice President and eral Manager ZionSolutions, LLC cc: John Hickman, USNRC Senior Project Manager Service List

ZionSolutions, LLC ZS-2013-0194 Page 5 of 5 Attachments: Affidavit Attachment 1: Description and Safety Analyses for the Proposed Change Attachment 2: Regulatory Commitments, Proposed Operating License Changes and Proposed DSAR Changes Attachment 3: Copy of the Draft ZS Heavy Loads Program Attachment 4: NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Attachment 5: ASME NOG- ICompliance Matrix Attachment 6: NUREG 0554 Compliance Matrix Attachment 7: Drawings associated with the Design Change

STATE OF ILLINOIS )

)SS COUNTY OF LAKE )

Patrick T. Daly, being duly sworn according to law deposes and says:

I am Senior Vice President and General Manager of ZionSolutions, LLC, and as such, I am familiar with the contents of this correspondence and the attachments thereto, concerning the Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, and the matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. 1.

7 Subscribed and Sworn to before me this Of* 9'2013 Notary Public of Illinois LINDA CHOU OFFICIAL SEAL PulicState of Illinois NolaV I\X~~7IMY Commission Expires December 07~,2 5 1

Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 and 2 License Transfer Service List cc:

Patrick T. Daly Dan Shrum Senior VP and General Manager Senior VP Regulatory Affairs ZionSolutions, LLC EnergySolutions 101 Shiloh Boulevard 423 West 300 South, Ste. 200 Zion, IL 60099 Salt Lake City, UT 84101 Patrick Thurman, Esq. Russ Workman VP Regulatory Affairs, Licensing & General Counsel Document Control EnergySolutions ZionSolutions, LLC 423 West 300 South, Ste. 200 101 Shiloh Boulevard Salt Lake City, UT 84101 Zion, IL 60099 Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety Gary Bouchard Office of Nuclear Facility Safety VP Engineering, Ops & Nuclear Security 1035 Outer Park Drive and Decommissioning Plant Manager Springfield, IL 62704 ZionSolutions, LLC 101 Shiloh Boulevard Kent McKenzie Zion, IL 60099 Emergency Management Coordinator Lake County Emergency Management Agency Alan Parker 1303 N. Milwaukee Avenue President Projects Group Libertyville, IL 60048-1308 EnergySolutions 1009 Commerce Park Drive, Ste. 100 Regional Administrator Oak Ridge, TN 37830 U.S. NRC, Region III 2443 Warrenville Road John Christian Lisle, IL 60532-4352 President of Logistics, Processing and Disposal (LP& D) Group John E. Matthews EnergySolutions Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1750 Tysons Boulevard, Suite 1500 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Mclean, VA 22102 Washington, DC 20004 Description and Safety Analyses for the Proposed Change

1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION ZionSolutions, LLC (ZS), is decommissioning the Zion Nuclear Power Station. One of the major activities is to transfer the spent fuel from the Spent Fuel Pool to a new on-site Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) in order to allow decommissioning and dismantlement of the Fuel Handling Building. A total of 2,226 spent fuel assemblies and fuel assembly pieces and parts will be loaded into 61 MAGNASTOR transportable storage canisters (TSCs) in the Spent Fuel Pool. When filled, each canister will be moved in a transfer cask to the canister preparation area inside the Fuel Handling Building where it will be drained, dried, backfilled with inert gas and welded shut before it is moved to a storage cask and placed on a low profile cask rail transporter inside the Fuel Handling Building truck bay in preparation for transport to the ISFSI.

In preparation for this activity, the existing 125-ton capacity, non-single-failure proof Fuel Handling Building overhead crane will be upgraded to be single-failure proof and heavy load handling will be performed in accordance with a new Heavy Loads Program. These actions will improve the assurance that the canister loading and preparation activities are performed safely and to achieve a very low probability of occurrence for a canister drop event thus effectively precluding the need to postulate a heavy load handling accident in or around the Spent Fuel Pool, or in or around a cask loaded with spent fuel, or a lift of a cask loaded with spent fuel.

The existing trolley on the overhead crane will be replaced with a new trolley with a single-failure proof main hoist and upgraded crane controls. No structural modifications are required for the existing bridge or the support structure with one exception regarding the runway rail clips described below. The design rated load and maximum critical load for the main hoist will remain at 125 tons.

A detailed description of the trolley and hoist replacement and runway modifications are provided below. The proposed changes to the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) along with the Heavy Loads Program are also discussed. The DSAR page markups and draft ZS Heavy Loads Program are provided in Attachments 2 and 3, respectively to this submittal.

A technical evaluation discussing the existing plant condition and existing cask drop analysis is provided. The single-failure proof Fuel Handling Building lift system upgrade is consistent with NUREG-0554 "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0554) and Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder)"

(ASME NOG-1). One exception to the NOG-I code is identified with respect to wind loads.

This lift system and the associated implementation of heavy load procedures will substantially lower the probability of a cask drop event (as described in NUREG-0612 "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants: Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-36" (NUREG-0612) and eliminates the need for discrete analysis of a drop of a heavy load in or around the Spent Fuel Pool, or in or around a cask loaded with spent fuel, or a lift of a cask loaded with spent fuel.

The Zion Station Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) defines only a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) for the facility which is equivalent to the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) response used as the original design basis for the facility. The current licensing basis does not identify an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) or Safe Shutdown (SSE) although the seismic response information that was used in the original facility design is available and used in some Page 1 of 53

analyses where the OBE response is necessary to conform to the design code. The upgraded crane system meets the ZNPS design basis earthquake ( response spectra for the Fuel Handling Building and the crane lift system. However, an evaluation of existing clips on the runway rails during DBE with the crane loaded to its maximum critical load showed the clips to be overloaded. Accordingly, modification of the clip arrangement has been performed. A description of the analyses is included in this Attachment in the section on Seismic Requirements and Analysis, subsection h. The summary is described under "Calculation ZIONO I-CALC-034, Fuel Handling Building (FHB) 125 Ton Crane Rail Clip Modification and Rail Evaluation" which was previously submitted (Reference 3). The drawings associated with this change are included in Attachment 7. A discussion of any impacts to the remaining accident analyses for a plant undergoing decommissioning is also provided.

A regulatory evaluation discusses how the modifications meet the guidance provided in ASME NOG-1, NUREG-0554, and NUREG-0612. Detailed compliance matrices are provided for each of these guidance documents. The proposed addition of a new license condition to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 licenses and proposed changes to the DSAR are discussed. Also included are a basis for a "no significant hazards consideration" declaration, a statement of environmental considerations and a list of commitments needed to implement the modifications.

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2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 Introduction

Background

The existing trolley on the overhead crane will be replaced with a new trolley with a single-failure proof main hoist and upgraded crane controls compliant with NUREG-0554, ASME-NOG- I with one exception), and NUREG-0612 as applicable. No structural modifications will be required for the existing bridge or support structure except for the modification of the clip arrangement for the runway rails. The description of the supporting analysis and design is included in this Attachment in the section on Seismic Requirements and Analysis. The drawings associated with this change are included in Attachment 7. Associated lifting devices and interfacing lift points will also meet the guidance in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 in order to ensure that the entire Fuel Handling Building lift system is single-failure proof for each heavy load lift in or around the Spent Fuel Pool, or in or around a cask loaded with spent fuel, or a lift of a cask loaded with spent fuel. The design rated load and maximum critical load for the main hoist will remain at 125-tons. The heavy lifts will use safe load paths including any additional staging areas needed in the Fuel Handling Building to facilitate spent fuel transfer. Operator training and procedures will also conform to the recommendations of the regulatory guidance.

Fuel Handling Building The Fuel Handling Building (FHB) at the Zion Nuclear Power Station is located between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Containment Buildings. The Fuel Handling Building, as described in the DSAR, is a Seismic Class I structure and is characterized as Important-to-the-Defueled-Condition (ITDC). A structure, system or component that supports a fuel safety or radiation protection safety function is designated as Important to the Defueled Condition (ITDC). The seismic qualification of this structure ensures that a structural failure in the building will not result in an increase in the severity of any accident postulated to occur in the defueled condition, thus the entire structure is classified as Seismic Class I. As such, the FHB complies with Section C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification," and Paragraph 11.8 of NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan," Section 3.7.2. The west end of the FHB has a Truck Bay at grade that also provides railway access. Shield doors at the north end of the Truck Bay open into an extension with a roll-up door at the north end opening to the outside.

Spent Fuel Pool The Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) has space in the storage racks for 3,012 assemblies. A total of 2,226 spent fuel assemblies, one failed spent fuel rod storage basket, and one damaged fuel assembly skeleton containing 15 spent fuel rods in the guide tubes are stored in the SFP. A cask load pit, a discrete area in the SFP, has plan view dimensions of 9.5 feet by 9.5 feet with a floor that is approximately 39 feet below the nominal water level of the SFP. The SFP and storage racks are characterized as Important-to-the-Defueled-Condition (ITDC) in the DSAR. The spent fuel will be characterized as damaged or undamaged fuel in accordance with the NRC approved loading Page 3 of 53

requirements for the NAC MAGNASTOR contents. Damaged fuel assemblies as well as the failed rod storage basket and the damaged fuel assembly skeleton will be placed inside damaged fuel cans and loaded into the NAC MAGNASTOR Transportable Storage Canisters (TSC). Each canister holds up to 37 fuel assemblies.

Overhead Crane The existing FHB overhead bridge crane was manufactured by Hamischfeger/P&H as original plant equipment. It has a 125-ton rated main hoist and a 15-ton rated auxiliary hoist, both of which operate from the same trolley. The FHB overhead crane is characterized as ITDC in the DSAR.

As demonstrated in the attached compliance matrices, the crane upgrade generally conforms to the applicable criteria as listed in NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612 Appendix C. ASME NOG 2004 (NOG-1) is used as the design and construction standard to satisfy NUREG-0554 requirements. Any deviations are explained in the compliance matrix, including any requests for exceptions, alternative approaches or justifications as appropriate.

2.2 Bridge Modifications The following modifications will be made to the bridge:

1. Replacement of control panels.

2. Addition of a bridge mounted load cell readout visible from the refueling floor and also a readout in the crane cab and on the radio receiver.

3. Addition of an isolation transformer for the new flux vector and frequency controls.

4. Addition of new radio controls with load cell readout. The existing cab master switches which will remain as an alternate means of crane control.

5. New festoon electrification for the trolley and an additional ground conductor bar for bridge electrification.

6. Modifications to interface with the crane existing main disconnect, crane lighting systems, and crane warning systems.

7. Addition of a cutoff switch that removes power from the crane in the event of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake.

8. Modifications of the bridge limit switch arrangement to enforce end of travel and restricted zone travel and eliminate the existing retractable bridge and trolley stops.

9. Modification of the runway rail clip arrangement that, without considering friction, assure that the clips will not be overstressed during SSE with the crane loaded to its maximum with the hook up.

The bridge has been evaluated with regard to the ASME NOG-l structural design criteria for use as part of the single failure proof crane system, with one exception, and no structural modifications to the bridge have been determined to be required.

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2.3 Trolley and Hoist Replacement The existing trolley and hoists will be replaced with a new trolley and hoists manufactured by Morris Material Handling/P&H. The new trolley will have a new 125-ton rated single-failure proof main hoist and a new 15-ton rated non-single-failure proof auxiliary hoist. The ASME NOG- I Type I main hoist unit with Type I main hoist components is designed and arranged to prevent a "two-blocked" condition consistent with the NRC and industry guidance. Also included are new hoist hooks, new carbon steel wire rope, lower block and other components affixed to the trolley. The 125-ton hook will attach directly to the specially-designed yoke for the MAGNASTOR Transfer Cask (MTC). Means and equipment are provided for manually positioning the new upgraded trolley in case of loss of all external AC power.

The existing crane motor controls will be replaced with new alternating current (AC) flux vector main and auxiliary hoist controls and new AC adjustable frequency bridge and trolley controls.

New motor controllers and radio controls interface with the existing main line disconnect and magnetic contactor, existing cab master switches, existing crane lighting systems, existing crane warning systems, and existing travel limit switches.

The replacement trolley generally conforms to the applicable design requirements of ASME NOG-1. The main hoist and trolley unit is a NOG Type I design, with the auxiliary hoist being a NOG Type III design. Any deviations or exceptions from ASME NOG-1 are explained in the ASME NOG-1 compliance matrix (Attachment 5). A summary of the upgraded crane performance requirements is provided in Table 1. Table I also provides a listing of the key components and dimensions of the new trolley and hoist assemblies. Operating procedures and training will provide operating instructions and limitations for crane operations to assure design limitations are met. Further details of the design are provided as follows:

Travel Length -

1. The north/south (N/S) and east/west (E/W) end of travel limits of the 125-ton hook are the same as the existing end of travel limits and lift lengths are the same or greater than those for the existing hoist.

2. The size of the existing load path restricted zone will be reduced to exclude the new fuel vault. The revised restricted zone will incorporate the Spent Fuel Pool and Transfer Canal plus margin to prevent the MTC from travelling over those areas.

Reeving -

In addition to the requirements of NOG-1, the main hoist is provided with a balanced redundant reeving system such that the load block does not twist in the un-loaded or loaded condition. Reverse bends are not used in the main hoist.

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I. The main hoist reeving and arrangement of mechanical components are such to permit lifting at an angle of three degrees in either direction along the centerline of the hoist, parallel with the girders. This off-angle pulling is required for the possible upending of the dry cask storage system components, which will require alternate operations of hoisting and trolley traversing. The arrangement ensures that the hoisting ropes do not rub against the trolley frame when lifting at this angle. Hoist drums are provided with a means to ensure that the ropes are in the drum grooves. A monitoring system shuts down the main hoist crane drive if a wire rope becomes dislodged from its proper groove.

2. The main hoist wire ropes are selected to provide a 10-to-I design factor when supporting the maximum critical load (MCL) plus the weight of the load block, including an increase to accommodate for degradation due to wear (5%).

3. The auxiliary hoist has a standard double-reeved system providing a true vertical lift.

4. All rope parts of both the main and auxiliary hoist reeving systems are provided with equalizer sheaves or bars to ensure equal rope load.

5. Main hoist fleet angles do not exceed 3 1/2 degrees except for the last three feet of maximum lift elevation.

Hooks -

1. The main hoist dual prong (sister) hook is made of forged alloy steel (similar to SAE 4340) designed for a safety factor of 10-to-i, static plus dynamic, including margin for wear, such that this design margin is maintained when lifting from either the hook prongs or center pin hole. The design of the lower center pin hole requires that the sides of the hook at the pin hole are parallel with a flush face surface. Safety latches bridge the two hook prong openings. To ensure hook mating with the fuel transfer lifting devices, all latch components are narrower than the hook width and do not interfere with pins sized to rest in the valley of the hook prongs.

2. The auxiliary hoist single-prong (fishhook) hook is made of forged carbon steel with a safety latch to bridge the hook prong opening.

3. All hooks rotate 360 degrees and have punch marks to measure the hook prong throat openings. All safety latch components are of a non-corrosive material.

Load Blocks -

1. Critical components of the main hoist upper and lower blocks are designed for a safety factor of 10-to-I, static plus dynamic loading.

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2. The main hoist load block is expected to be immersed in the SFP, and is designed accordingly.

Drip Pans -

1. All oil-lubricated components of the main hoist, auxiliary hoist, and trolley are provided with drip pans. Grease-lubricated components which do not have a structure beneath them (such as the trolley deck) also are provided with drip pans to retain any excess lubricant. Drip pans are sized to hold 1.1 times the total quantity of lubricant that could leak.

Lubricants -

1. Lubricants for components immersed in the Spent Fuel Pool are selected to be non-water soluble and free of halogenated compounds, halogens, mercury, and other deleterious materials to ensure compatibility with the pool chemistry.

Hoist Controllers -

1. New main and auxiliary hoist controllers are of the AC "Flux Vector" closed loop variable frequency type, specifically meeting the criteria of NOG-1 Paragraph 6417 and Item 6417. 1.

Bridge and Trolley Controllers -

1. New bridge and trolley controllers are of the AC open loop variable frequency type.

These controllers meet the criteria of ASME NOG- IParagraph 6417.

Motors -

1. Motor features are:

a. The hoist motors are 460v, 3ph, 60 Hz AC vector duty induction motors. Each motor is in accordance with National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) MG I Part 31 as applicable for vector duty.

b. The bridge and trolley drive motors are 460v, 3 phases, 60 Hz AC inverter duty motors. Each traverse motor is in accordance with NEMA MG 1 Part 31 as applicable for inverter duty.

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c. Maximum motor revolutions per minute (RPM) for any motor is 1800, with bridge motors being selected to interface with the existing bridge drive gear case and shafting.

d. External Motor Branch-Circuit Overload Protection Each new motor is provided with an automatic resetting three phase bi-metallic thermal overload relay.

e. Motor Branch-Circuit Short-Circuit Protection Each new motion controller is provided with a separate 3-pole molded case thermal magnetic (inverse-time) circuit breaker.

Hoist Holding Brakes and Emergency Brakes -

1. The brake features are:

a. The main hoist is provided with two shoe-type holding brakes, one on each of the redundant gear trains. Each brake is sized to hold 150% of the rated load hoisting torque.

b. An eddy current brake (Magnetorque) is provided on the common motor drive shaft. This brake allows the load to be lowered at a controlled speed under emergency conditions.

c. Each main hoist holding brake is provided with a means for manual releasing to provide emergency lowering of the load controlled by the Magnetorque eddy current brake in case of loss of all external AC power.

d. The auxiliary hoist is provided with two holding brakes. Each brake is sized for 100% of the rated load hoisting torque.

e. All holding brakes for normal operating modes engage upon returning the motion controller to the neutral ("off") position, upon opening the mainline magnetic contactor, or upon loss of power. An emergency brake (and as appropriate, the normal operating brakes), engage upon the predetermined emergency conditions, such as rope failure.

Bridge and Trolley Brakes -

Each new traverse motion controller motor is furnished with a motor mounted disc brake.

Brakes are sized for 100% of the drive torque that can be developed at the point of application and are field adjustable to be capable of stopping the drive within the distances specified in NOG-1. Each brake is furnished with a means for manual brake release. The disc brake of each new traverse motor serves as the emergency brake and as the holding (parking) brake. Each brake engages upon returning the motion controller to the neutral Page 8 of 53

("off') position, upon opening the mainline magnetic contactor (as can be accomplished by pressing the emergency stop button), upon loss of power, or upon any emergency or faulted condition as detected by the traverse motion controller. Controlled braking for each traverse motion is furnished as a function of the AC variable frequency control.

Hoist Limit Switches -

Each hoist is provided with an upper and lower geared limit switch wired to the hoist control circuit and with a second back-up upper limit switch of the block actuated type. For each hoist, a second back-up lower limit switch is provided based on the load weighing system detecting a slack rope condition. Upon tripping an initial hoist limit switch, only motion in the reverse direction is permitted. Actuation of a second limit switch requires operator action to reset the control system before the control system will allow further motion.

Overload Limiting Device & Load Cell Readout -

Each new hoist controller is furnished with a field adjustable overload limiting device which senses the lifted load (independent of any electronic sensing features of a flux vector hoist control) to prevent lifting overloads which could cause permanent damage. The set point is adjustable, with the high setting approximately 120% of the heaviest lifted load (i.e., loaded and flooded TSC with a lid inside a Transfer Cask and including the Lifting Yoke) to provide a margin for acceleration of the lifted load. A means for bypassing the overload limiting device is furnished in order to perform the field load tests. A digital readout is furnished for the crane cab and a large readout on the bridge will be visible from the refueling floor. The display permits load readout of either the main or auxiliary hoist.

A readout is also provided on the radio control system. Operating procedures and training will implement administrative control of the load limit controls.

Radio Controls -

1. The radio control features are as follows:

a. A new radio control system is furnished as the primary means for controlling the crane. A selector switch is furnished in one of the bridge mounted control enclosures to select either radio or cab operation. The cab master switches have the same control functions as the radio.

b. The Magnatek/Telemotive radio system has Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) such that it does not produce electromagnetic emissions that will interfere with other devices and will not be interfered with by the electromagnetic emissions of other devices.

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c. The radio system has a receiver within its own RFI shielded NEMA 12 enclosure, Magnetek SLTX lever type belly box transmitter, receiving antenna, three rechargeable NiCad battery packs, and 120v AC battery charger. The system is digitally encoded and is failsafe upon loss of power or low battery. The system meets Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations for a Part 90 licensed system.

d. The Magnetek SLTX transmitter with internal antenna has a transmitter "on" and low-battery LED, key lock transmitter-on switch (removable in the "off' position only), emergency stop button (operating the mainline magnetic contactor), warning horn button, switch for the existing crane lights, main or auxiliary hoist load cell readout, and four (4) separate motion master switches (one for each crane function).

Each crane motion master switch has 5 speed steps in each direction. The transmitter is capable of transmitting the master command, all motion commands, and all auxiliary function commands simultaneously. Energizing the transmitter and closing the mainline magnetic contactor illuminates a new "red" under-walkway "power on" light.

e. All radio master switches for motion controllers spring return to the "off' (neutral) position.

Welding Requirements -

Welding is performed in accordance with American Welding Society (AWS) D 14.1. The vendors welding procedures comply with both AWS D. 1.1 and D. 14.1, where applicable.

Load Testing -

The trolley was load tested at the factory. Based on the factory load test of the trolley and the original load test of the bridge, the crane will be put back into service on an interim basis after installation and functional testing but prior to approval of this license amendment. Travel restrictions will be in place during the interim period consistent with the 50.59 screening for the modification. This will limit operations of the crane to be consistent with the exiting DSAR requirements until the license amendment is approved.

During the interim period a 'cold proof load test will be performed to determine the lower operating temperature limitation for the existing bridge in accordance with NUREG-0554.

This load test will be limited to the truck bay and mezzanine area.

Seismic Requirements and Analysis -

A seismic analysis performed in accordance with NOG-1 (with one exception described below), including the existing bridge and new trolley, coupled with the supporting FHB structure confirmed that the overhead crane system can safely control the Maximum Page 10 of 53

Critical Load during a design basis seismic event ZS is taking exception to the wind loading requirements of Section 4140. That exception request is described below.

The results confirmed that the existing bridge and FHB support structure are adequate.

Drawings associated with this design change are included in Attachment 7. Details of the seismic requirements and assumptions are summarized below.

I. General A seismic qualification was performed of the new trolley unit, existing bridge, and new components that are mounted on the bridge and trolley. The building structure, up to and including the runway rails was qualified, using a seismic model including the new trolley. The following seismic features are included in the design and analysis:

a. The trolley is provided with suitable restraints so that it remains on the bridge rails during an earthquake.

b. The rail clips attaching the runway rail to the runway girder have been analyzed and modifications have been installed and no part of the bridge or trolley will become detached or fall during or after an SSE earthquake.

c. The main hoist will remain in place and support the maximum critical load during or after a seismic event.

d. The auxiliary hoist will remain in place with or without a load during a seismic event, but is not required to support that load, because procedural controls will restrict placing a load on the auxiliary hook that could impact stored fuel or a loaded cask.

e. The design does not provide for the hoists to remain operational during or after an earthquake consistent with the provisions of NUREG-0554.

f. The seismic analysis of the crane and building does not include the effect of the maximum credible tornado combined with a lift at the full rated capacity of the crane. (An exception to ASME NOG-1, identified above has been requested.) The FHB is designed to withstand the effects of the design basis tornado and associated missiles. Procedural provisions shall be made to prevent FHB Overhead Crane operations during a tornado watch or warning. This procedure revision to AOP-8.4 has already been issued.

2. Seismic Analysis Summary The trolley and bridge are qualified to the existing Zion seismic environment described in the DSAR by utilizing dynamic analysis techniques in accordance with the recommendations contained in ASME NOG- 1 Paragraph 4150.

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The seismic analytical work was performed using computer codes that are commercial off the shelf (COTS) products used in the NRC licensed nuclear industry and controlled by the individual vendors QA programs. Note that there are two different programs used for the main seismic calculations (ANSYS & STAAD). This is because the evaluation of the existing bridge and new trolley was performed by a separate vendor than the evaluation of the FHB. As such there is no overlap in the evaluations. The list of software used in the calculations includes:

a. Seismic analysis of the miscellaneous bolted connections on the trolley was performed with MathCad 14 and some section properties were calculated using AutoCad 2007.

b. Seismic analysis of the Main Hoist Reeving System was performed with MathCad 14 and some section properties were calculated using AutoCad 2007.

c. MathCAD 14 software was used to calculate the trolley frame critical weld stresses.

d. The structural analysis of the bridge and trolley was performed with ANSYS 12 software. The analysis was performed for the crane operational load combinations required by ASME NOG-1 Section 4140 and seismic load cases (three trolley positions with hook up, hook down and no load on the hook configurations) in accordance with ASME NOG-1 Section 4150.

e. The Fuel Handling Building crane and crane supporting structure are modeled as a coupled system using a combination of common finite element practices and a stick model of the crane and analyzed using STAAD. Pro V8i. The seismic loads on the Fuel Handling Building are generated from a dynamic, artificial time history analysis and are used to evaluate the structural integrity of the building.

f, The time history analysis is also used to generate response spectra at the runway rail (crane wheels) using the computer code Spectrum V2.0. The response spectra are used by the crane manufacturer as input to the bridge calculation and to verify input values used for the trolley calculations are bounded.

3. The licensing and design basis for the Fuel Handling Building in the ZNPS DSAR do not require (nor provide for) combining operating or design wind loads nor tornado wind loads with the earthquake loads or crane live loads. The building design however is analyzed for the dead load, live load, thermal loading, and design wind loads. It is also analyzed for dead load, thermal loading, and tornado wind loads. In no case do the required analyses include the design basis earthquake combined with design or tornado wind loads.

Section 4140 of ASME NOG-1, 2004, "Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes," identifies the loads and load combinations applicable to the analysis performed for Type I cranes (which includes the proposed FHB crane modification).

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The Operating Wind Load (designated as Pwo in NOG- 1 and which is not included in DSAR Table 3-5), Design Wind Load (designated as P,,,d in NOG-1 and is stipulated to be W in the DSAR Table 3-5) and Tornado Wind Load (designated as Pv, in NOG-l and is stipulated to be W' in the DSAR Table 3-5) are not combined with earthquake loads or crane live loads in DSAR Table 3-5 or proposed Table 3-5A load cases, which reflects the design basis of the Zion Station.

The calculations perfornmed for the proposed crane modification are consistent with the above stated station load combinations. Therefore, since the calculations provided for acceptance of this crane to NOG-1 standards do not contain the full set of load combinations, ZS requests NRC approval of an exception to ASME NOG-l Section 4140 consistent with the existing NRC approved licensing basis to not include the wind loads as part of the analysis of the crane. Note that the original design basis of the building includes design and tornado wind loads as described above and this exception does not affect the analysis of the crane itself since it is an indoor crane. Proposed updates to Page 23 of 44 of the License Amendment Request and NOG Compliance Matrix sections 4134 and 4140 are provided herewith.

ZS has proposed administrative controls and established procedures to limit the likelihood of having a load suspended from the hook during a tornado.

4. Allowable Stress Criteria Allowable stresses for the trolley are in accordance with NOG-I Paragraph 4300 with mechanical component stresses in accordance with ASME NOG-1 Section 5000.

Allowable stresses for the existing bridge were also evaluated in accordance with ASME NOG-1 Paragraph 4300 requirements.

5. Detailed Analysis Descriptions The following descriptions provide a summary of the calculations that include modeling of existing plant configurations coupled with the new trolley design that documents compliance with the requirements of ASME NOG-1 2004, (primarily Section 4000) with one exception, NUREG 0612, and NUREG 0554 requirements.

a. KNES Calculation No. 36675-01: Simplified Crane Model for Coupled Analysis Summary: This calculation provides the data required to build a stick model of the ZS overhead bridge crane.

Model

Description:

The crane mathematical model meets the requirements of NOG

-I para. 4153.3 and 4154.1. The boundary conditions meet the requirements of NOG-1 para. 4153.6 and Table 4154.3-1. The model includes the following elements:

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Ropes: Spring stiffness is calculated to represent the ropes and simulate the pendulum effect. Hook up and hook down positions are included.

Bridge: The bridge is modeled with beam elements. The density of the beam elements is adjusted to arrive at the overall weight of the bridge. Girder dimensions and end tie dimensions along with the sections that correspond to each segment are used.

Trolley: The trolley is modeled as a lumped mass with the mass moment of inertia at the center of gravity (CG) of the trolley, connected with the bridge using rigid beam elements. The trolley CG and mass moment of inertia details are modeled.

The South and North end positions are identified as well as the mid position, and the two quarter positions.

Boundary Conditions: Bridge boundary conditions and trolley-bridge interface boundary conditions are applied per ASME NOG-1 Table 4154.3-1.

Assumptions: The trolley center of gravity is in-line with the main hook, since the difference between them is only 0.5 inches. This assumption will not adversely affect the results.

Results: The model is used to determine results found in ZIONOOI -CALC-002.

b. Enercon Calculation ZIONOO 1-CALC-002 Fuel Handling Building (FHB) 125 Ton Crane Upgrade Evaluation Summary: This calculation demonstrates that the FHB will continue to perform its safety function of supporting the new 125 ton single failure proof loaded crane following SSE and will meet the requirements of criteria as specified in Section C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29. This is accomplished by evaluating the static and dynamic analysis along with the subsequent code check of all primary structural members of the Fuel Handling Building superstructure. A modification was required to the FHB to support crane operations. This modification involved installation of crane runway rail clips. The design description of these clips is included in this Attachment in the description of ZIONOO1-CALC-034.

Model/Methodology

Description:

The mathematical model of the FHB is coupled with the crane model. This combined model has been analyzed for different loading conditions, which include the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE, also referred to as the Design Earthquake in the Zion seismic design criteria) and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE, also referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake or DBE in the DSAR and the Maximum Credible Earthquake or MCE in the Zion seismic design criteria).

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The seismic loads are generated from artificial linear time history analysis per ASME NOG-1-2004 (Section 4153.2). In addition to the self weight, in accordance with NUREG 0800, SRP 3.7.2, the mass equivalent to a floor load of 50 pounds per square foot to account for miscellaneous dead loads, 25% of floor design live load and 75% of roof design snow load is included in the dynamic model.

Load cases and load combinations for the Fuel Handling Building structural components, excluding crane components above the runway rail, are in accordance with the Zion DSAR Table 3-5. All applicable combinations are modified to include the rated capacity of the crane, including impact, and live load occurring simultaneously with earthquake. The load combinations are also modified to conform to NUREG-800, which invokes the combinations provided in ACI 349-97 for reinforced concrete and AISC N690-1994 for steel design. The load cases and load combinations for the crane, including all components above the runway rails, are in accordance with ASME NOG-1-2004 (Section 4140 for Type 1 Crane). Note that tornado load is not combined with a loaded crane, resulting in controls over crane operations discussed elsewhere in this document.

Zion DSAR Table 3-5 lists the seismic Class I load combinations for the Fuel Handling Building (FHB). The design wind load (W) and maximum credible tornado wind load (W') are not combined with earthquake loads in DSAR Table 3-5 or proposed Table 3-5A load cases. Since the wind loads are not included in seismic load cases, calculation ZIONOOI -CALC-002 does not analyze the wind loading. The original FHB calculations continue to be the design basis for the SAR required building wind load evaluations. Calculation ZIONOO I -CALC-002 Revision 2 evaluated the effect of the additional new trolley weight (approximately 3600 lb.) on the original wind load analyses and determined the extra mass to be negligible compared to the combined mass of the bridge, trolley, and live load. The resulting change to the building members is therefore insignificant. In addition, ZS recognizes this limitation of the evaluation and has committed to control heavy load movements if a tornado watch or warning has been declared for the site by the National Weather Service.

The Fuel Handling Building superstructure is analyzed with the crane bridge at the most critical locations along the runway girder to maximize shear and moments.

Additional locations are also considered for maximum axial load delivered to the columns, or for an increase in torsional effects on the superstructure. A total of seven bridge locations are modeled including a position to maximize accelerations for evaluation of the crane itself.

Seven bridge positions were evaluated to provide either the most limiting or representative loads as follows:

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Position #1, Maximum Moment:

Bridge centered between column lines R and P (east end of Fuel Handling Building (FHB)). This position provides the maximum positive and negative moment. This center position coincides approximately with the western most crane wheel positioned at 0.2L east of column line R corresponding to the maximum moment influence provided in the original FHB design calculations.

Position #2, Maximum Shear Load:

Center of the western most end truck positioned over column line R with the end truck wheels centered equidistant from the column. This location corresponds to the maximum shear influence provided in the original FHB design calculations.

Position #3, Maximum Axial Load:

Crane centerline (and corresponding hook centerline) positioned over column line R with the end trucks centered equidistant from the column. This location corresponds to the maximum of the combined shears on either side of the column as provided in the original FHB design calculations. This position is bounding for axial loads on the column because the cross sectional area for compressive stress and section modulus for bending stress is smaller than the other built up column section comprised of plate girders.

Position #4, Maximum Load Effects to Column Line W:

Centerline of the western most bridge girder 6'-3 1/2" from column line W, as indicated in P&H drawing 105A3002, Sheet 2, that corresponds to the travel limit for the crane, will provide the maximum force effect to column line W, as well as at the wall along column line 17 at the shield door discontinuity between column lines W and V.

Position #5, Maximum Crane Response:

For the purposes of determining the seismic response of the crane, the bridge located with the crane and hook centered directly over column line V, with both end trucks equidistant from the column line is the bounding response scenario. This is scenario judged bounding because the bridge is positioned over the center of the column and located near the stiffer shear wall boundary condition, the crane will see maximum accelerations based on axial stiffness of the column and lateral stiffness adjacent to Wall W. Stiffer locations of the structure take more energy to dissipate inertial forces causing higher accelerations. This is evident in typical response spectra where there tends to exist a plateau of maximum response correlating to elements or structures that behave in a more rigid fashion (high Page 16 of 53

frequencies and low periods of vibration), such as concrete and masonry structures, as opposed to steel framing systems which vibrate at much longer periods.

Position #6, Maximum Load Effects to Column Line X-17:

For the purposes of determining maximum load to the concrete columns at column line X-I17 and S-17 that support the steel columns, the crane will be centered over column line X- 17 similar to the way the crane was centered for position 3. This position (Position 6) will be bounding for load effects to both column line X- 17 and S-l17 since these concrete columns are identical.

Position # 7, Maximum Load Effects to Column Line U-23:

For the purposes of determining maximum load to the concrete column at column line U-23 that supports the steel column, the crane will be centered over column line U-23 similar to the way the crane was centered at Position 3. In addition, longitudinal impact loads will be mirrored since the trolley is positioned along the South extreme end as will the ASME NOG-1 specified boundary conditions. This will fix the North-South translation along column line 23 delivering the maximum force to the column.

Trolley positions considered include both extreme ends, both quarter points, and the mid-point on the bridge girders. For the purposes of analyzing the superstructure, the bounding trolley position is determined to be the north extreme end with the hook loaded in the up position, except where noted above. This position provides the largest center of mass shift from the building center of rigidity. The mid-point, south quarter point, and south extreme end trolley positions are considered bounding for determining the seismic response of the crane. Placing the trolley closer to the stiffer wall (south wall at Column Line 23) provides higher response accelerations. These three positions are modeled with the hook up loaded and unloaded and the hook down loaded and unloaded per the requirements of NOG-I Section 4153.7.

The crane interface with the FHB and crane support structure is in accordance with the boundary conditions provided in ASME NOG-1-2004 Figure 4154.3-1 and Table 4154.3-1. The crane wheels are modeled as rigid members connected to the runway girder rail and the boundary conditions are applied at the base of the wheels. The girder rail is also modeled as a rigid member offset and positioned from the runway girder by the height of the rail to obtain force effects to the runway structure due to the load at the base of the wheels to the top of the rail. The runway girder, connections and associated framing along the remaining load path are as provided in site drawings.

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Both crane support structure and FHB structure are composed of reinforced concrete, bolted, riveted and welded steel members. Structures constructed of reinforced concrete and welded steel have damping equal to 2% and 5% of critical for the Design Earthquake and Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE),

respectively, as provided in the ZS Seismic Design Criteria. The bolted connections between the steel beams and the floor are rigid components designed to transfer significant loads to the concrete and as such do not have damping that is significantly higher than that for welded steel. Any bolted connections associated with the crane are local to the crane and do not impact the dynamic response of the structure. Therefore, the use of 2% and 5% damping for the purposes of evaluating the structure at all modes is appropriate.

The structural steel member code check is performed in accordance with AISC 9'h Edition. The design methodology, parameters, and allowable stresses provided within the AISC 91h Edition are identical, or have been expanded upon due to advancements in research, to those provided in the original code of record for the Fuel Handling Building, AISC 6 1h Edition. Independent steel connection evaluations are performed in accordance with the original code of record, AISC 6 th Edition.

Concrete member stresses are checked for enveloped SSE loads (conservative) in accordance with ACI 318-63, which is the original reinforced concrete code used for design of the structure. Anchor bolt analysis is performed utilizing Concrete Capacity Design (CCD) methodology per ACI 349-97, which is supplemented by USNRC Reg. Guides 1.142 and 1.199.

Based on the time histories developed in CALC-002, response spectra at the crane bridge wheels are developed in Enercon Calculation ZIONOO 1-CALC-025 using the computer code SPECTRUM and provided to the crane manufacturer (Konecranes) to evaluate the crane and new trolley system. The response spectra curves provided to the crane vendor use a damping value of 4% of critical damping for MCE, which is lower than 7% required per ASME NOG-1-2004, Section 4153.8.

Assumptions:

• The Spent Fuel Pool walls per Zion site drawing B- 113 and floor slab per drawing B-1 18 are considered rigid and will resist any deflections which would cause P-Delta effects at the base of the columns. Rotational and translation springs are not included for foundation effects to provide conservatism in the internal member stresses and to reduce damping effects providing higher accelerations.

" The response effect of sloshing in the spent fuel pool is not considered to affect the response of the steel frames at the level of the crane rail supports.

" It is considered that the values provided in Zion's original seismic analysis are accurate for contribution of building systems not modeled in full detail. Since the plant is not operating, mass values are assumed to have decreased relative Page 18 of 53

to live loads used in the original design bases thereby providing values that are conservative.

Results: The highest loads and stress values of different components along with allowable values are listed below:

Steel Members and Connections: (Ref. Section 7.2 and Appendix A of CALC-002)

Main Body of Calculation (Section 7.2): The code check for the majority of the steel members was performed as part of the STAAD dynamic evaluation. All of these members pass the code check with the exception of six IRs that were greater than 1.0 which were individually evaluated. These six cases are described below:

" The AMG girder along column line P, STAAD member 55, had interaction ratios (IR's) for shear capacity of 1.038 and 1.048, for two of the models in the initial code check. This member is the segment between the crane runway beam and the column line as shown in drawing B-402. This segment has 1/2" thick gusset plates either side of the AMG girder that extend for 8'-8" in the direction of the governing shear force as shown in drawing B-403, Detail E.

The gussets were not included in the model and are shown in the calculation to contribute an additional 1064 kips of shear capacity. The IR with additional shear capacity included is 0.204 for the worst case (previously 1.048) with the other case (previously 1.038) determined to be less than 0.204 by comparison.

" The other four cases are for two W14x43 bracing members along column line 23 at the crane girder elevation as shown on drawings B-402 and B-403. In two load cases, the code check of these two members resulted in IR's of 1.041, 1.108, 1.197, and 1.274. The two load cases are for OBE forces. The Zion DSAR requires allowable stresses for OBE to be in accordance with the AISC specification. A 1/3 allowable stress increase is permitted for earthquake forces per the specification. The allowable stress increase is applied in the calculation and the resultant IR's are shown to be 0.78, 0.83, 0.90, and 0.96 respectively.

Appendix A: Plate girders with web depth to thickness ratio greater than 960/'IFy and various other components are not directly checked in STAAD and are evaluated independently in Appendix A. A summary of these items is tabulated below including the forces or stresses and allowables for the highest interaction ratios:

Horizontal Bracing Max. enveloped force at connection Allowable OBE 55.15 kips 72.16 kips SSE 58.67 kips 72.16 kips Page 19 of 53

Beam Members Max. resultant load at connection Allowable OBE 53.04 kips 66 kips SSE 82.16 kips 90 kips Girder Connections Max. resultant load at connection Allowable OBE 269.9 kips I 282 kips SSE 275.96 kips 282 kips Column Connections Max. Weld Stress Allowable OBE 13.839 ksi 14.847 ksi SSE 16.306 ksi 20.786 ksi Vertical Bracing Max. enveloped force at connection Allowable OBE 269.02 kips 270.6 kips SSE 190.62 kips 207 kips Plate Girders* Max. Interaction Ratio - Max. Interaction Ratio -

Bending Shear OBE 0.602 0.637 SSE 0.663 0.667

• For plate girders the interaction ratios are presented as formulas that combine stresses per AISC requirements. This is also true for some other components in Appendix A.

However, given the complexity of the formulas for the plate girders, in this case it is simpler to present the IR in lieu of extracting values to present vs. allowables.

Column Base Plates* Provided Base Plate Thickness Required Thickness Required to Resist Flexure due to 2.25" 1.664" Compression

• Base plates are analyzed for the net forces and moments from all members framing into them using SSE loads with OBE allowable stresses and this methodology is considered bounding for both OBE and SSE load combinations.

Crane Runway, Rail and Connections: (Ref. Appendix B of CALC-002)

The purpose of this appendix is to check the crane runway connections which could not be checked with the STAAD.Pro V8i code check in section 7.2 of the main calculation. For evaluation of the rails and the rail clips, see ZION001-CALC-034. For the evaluation of the spliced connection between the crane girders (G8B) at column line X, see ZIONOOI-CALC-037. Connections for members adjacent to the crane rails and girders are checked in Appendix A. A crane Runway Girder Runway Plate, End Support, and Interior Support Evaluation summary is tabulated below:

The member and connections were evaluated using member end forces and moments from STAAD.Pro V8i output from either the maximum envelope of Page 20 of 53

forces and moments from all of the load combinations or the critical resultant forces and moments from each of the load combinations. The allowable for the loads and moments are calculated in accordance with the DSAR (Ref 3.1. 1) and subsequently the AISC 6 th edition for all connections excluding bolts and rivets in extreme (SSE) load cases. The allowable stress for bolts and rivets in the SSE cases is obtained from Ref. 3.1.7. Member section allowable stresses are in accordance with the AISC 9 th edition to remain consistent with the main calculation.

SSE loads are used in combination with OBE allowable stresses to provide conservative bounding results for both the SSE and OBE load combinations unless otherwise stated.

Crane Girder Runway Plate Allowable Maximum Plate Shear Stress O.B.E. 14.2 ksi 14.4 ksi Maximum Plate Shear Stress S.S.E. 14.84 ksi 20.16 ksi Crane Runway Girder End Support (Member G7) Allowable Maximum Combined Shear 214 kips 410 kips Crane Runway Girder Interior Support (Member G8A) Allowable Maximum Combined Bolt Shear 33.45 kips 54.12 kips (Girder Support Col. Cap Plate)

T-Beam Stem Bolt Shear (2 Bolts) 7.757 kips 23.56 kips T-Beam Fig. Bolt Tension 7.757 kips 62.84 kips Web Angles to Web Stiffener Plate Bolt Shear (13 81.24 kips 234.52 kips Bolts Double Shear)

Web Angle to Bldg. Col. Tension per Rivet 3.787 kips 15.71 kips Maximum Fastener I.R. 0.618 1 Girder Web Stiffener Plate to Girder Web Weld 131.13 kips 317. 35 kips Combined Shear T-Beam Stem (Top Connection) Tension 7.757 kips 33.75 kips T-Beam Stem (Top Connection) Compression 7.757 kips 59.51 kips Bearing Stiffener Compression 567.68 kips 659.37 kips Anchor Bolts, Concrete Columns and Shear Walls: (Ref. Appendix C of CALC-002)

The Zion Station Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) defines only a Design Basis Earthquake for the facility that is currently undergoing decommissioning and the seismic response curves for the facility provided in the DSAR are equivalent to the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) response used as the original design basis for the facility. There is no Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) or Safe Shutdown (SSE) identified.

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Although only one calculation is needed to conform to the DSAR, for the purpose of performing calculations on the building structure, the contractor for ZionSolutions, LLC (ZS) has used the SSE and OBE responses from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and in most cases, the SSE and OBE have been analyzed in accordance with the SRP. However, in some cases, the SSE loads have been evaluated against the OBE working stress allowables, rather than perform both calculations (conservative). If the interaction ratio (IR) for this case was 1.0 or less, then no further analysis was performed. If the IR of the SSE loads vs. OBE working stress allowables was greater than 1.0, then the SSE and OBE cases were both evaluated.

Additional results that differentiate between OBE and SSE load cases related to the building structural analysis are provided below.

In the case of the crane analysis, per ASME NOG-1-2004 Section 4140, both operating basis earthquake and safe shut down earthquake are defined as extreme environment conditions and for this reason they have the same allowable values.

Since operating basis earthquake response spectra are enveloped by safe shut down earthquake response spectra and both events have the same allowable values, OBE event is enveloped by SSE event and no further evaluation is carried out for an OBE event.

Anchor Bolts:

The capacity of the anchor bolts was evaluated for tension and shear as identified in the first two columns. Reactions were calculated at the column baseplates for both OBE and SSE loads using both working stress and ultimate strength load combinations. The anchor bolts were evaluated against the resultant worst case tension and shear loads.

[Anchor Bolts Allowable Max. Tension in Single Anchor OBE 89.45 kips 129.41 kips (Type R Base Plate configuration)

Max. Tension in Single Anchor 104.70 kips 129.41 kips Tension SSE (Type R)

Max. Tension in Group of 178.81 kips 229.11 kips Anchors OBE. (Type R)

Max. Tension in Group of 209.28 kips 229.11 kips Anchors SSE (Type R)

Shear Max. Shear in Single Anchor 7.99 kips 68.45 kips OBE (Type R) 7.99 kips _68.45_kip Page 22 of 53

Anchor Bolts Allowable Max. Shear in Single Anchor SSE 51.9skips 68.45 kips (Type T)

Max. Shear in Group of Anchors 15.93 kips 161.20 kips OBE (Type R)

Max. Shear in Group of Anchors 100.41 kips 137.50 kips ESF (Type T)

Maximum Interaction, Combined Tension and Shear 0897 1.0 OBE (Type R)

Maximum Interaction, Combined Tension and Shear 0.95 1.0 SSE (Type R)

Concrete Columns:

The capacity of the concrete columns was evaluated in accordance with the original code for the design, ACI 318-63. Enveloped forces from the SSE load combinations were used and verified using working stress design (OBE allowable forces and stresses) as opposed to ultimate strength (SSE allowable forces and stresses). The results are bounding for the OBE case.

Axial and moment interaction diagrams from the, "Reinforced Concrete Design Handbook, Working Stress Method", Third Edition, ACI Publication SP-3 were used to compare forces to capacity.

Concrete Columns Allowable Max. Axial Load 711.49 kips 3617 kips Max. Shear Stress 21.9 psi 70 psi Max. Bearing Stress 207.3 psi 1000 psi Max. Moment 18351 kip-in 18951 kip-in Shear Walls:

The capacity of the concrete shear walls was evaluated for shears, moments, and axial loads as identified in the first column. The most limiting cases of evaluations of SSE Loads compared to working stress allowables are identified in the second and third column. The working stress method of ACI 318-63, the original design code of record, was used to evaluate the walls for the enveloped SSE loads. Where acceptable, this bounds the OBE load case. Isolated cases exist where SSE loads were evaluated using ultimate strength design allowables. In all but one case (described in the note to the table below), where SSE loads are evaluated using ultimate strength allowables, OBE loads were evaluated using working stress allowables.

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Shear Walls OBE SSE OBE Allowable Allowable Allowable (Working (Ultimate (Working Stress) Strength) Stress)

Maximu m Out of 70 psi 77 psi 64.8 psi Plane Shear 70 psi Shear 108 psi Shear Wall 70 psi Conc. Wall P7 Wall P4 P4 Shear Stress Maximu 28.578 n Out of k-in. 30 k-in.

Plane Shear 34 k-in. Shear 66.15 k-in. Shear Wall 27 k-in.

Moment Wall Wall P3 Per I" P8A Width Maximu SSE vs. OBE vs.

m In- 68 psi SSE OBE Plane Shear 70 psi enveloped Shear Wall d by by SSE vs.

Stress SSE vs. OBE OBE SSE vs. OBE Vs.

Maximu 1,073,1 SSE OBE in In- 50. k-in. 1,097,317 envelope enveloped Plane Shear k-in. d by by SSE vs.

Moment Wall P3 SSE vs.

OBEOBE Maximu 68.86 314 kips 230 kips Load kips Shear 255.36 Load Per Shear 96 kips Wall 345 kips Shear Wall kips Ft. of Wall P4 P P11 Wall I I

• SSE Max. Moment - 30 k-in per in./OBE Working Stress Allowable Moment - 27 k-in.

per in. (IR= 1.111). The SSE load case was subsequently evaluated independently and the satisfactory results are tabulated above. Based on the analysis and the results tabulated in Attachment 51 of the ZIONOO1-CALC-002, SSE forces and stresses are larger than OBE; therefore by comparison, the wall is acceptable under OBE conditions.

c. KNES Calculation No. 36675-05 (Rev.01): Zion Bridge Structural Calculations Summary: This analysis evaluates the crane structural steel member stresses and deflections and demonstrates that they meet the NOG- 1-2004 Section 4300 design criteria, along with the buckling requirements.

Page 24 of 53

Model/Methodology

Description:

Although not required for the existing bridge, NOG- 1-2004 design criteria are followed for the bridge structural evaluation as it has more stringent rules than EOCI/CMAA and to be consistent with the other calculations.

A finite element model of the crane is developed using ANSYS 13.0 to solve for the applicable load cases. The bridge and end trucks are represented by beam elements and the trolley is represented by shell elements.

With respect to NOG-1-2004 paragraph 4140, the crane model is analyzed for crane operational loads and extreme environmental loads. SSE is considered for extreme loading conditions as it envelopes OBE. For the operational load case, the bridge girders are evaluated with the trolley at mid-span and the end trucks are evaluated with the trolley at the end of the span. 12 combinations of trolley location, hoist position, and load are evaluated for the extreme environmental case. A set of load cases is run at the mid-height hook position in addition to the nine cases required by NOG-l Table 4153.7-2 (trolley at end, 1/4, and mid-span for hook unloaded, hook up with load, and hook down with load). Boundary conditions are in accordance with NOG-1 Figure 4154.3-1 and Table 4154.3-1.

Assumptions:

• End tie bolts take only shear load. The bridge end truck connection is assumed to consist of bolts at the location only where the girder rests on the end truck.

• Conservatively, the bridge end truck connection is assumed to consist of bolts at the location only where the girder rests on the end truck.

Compliance to Section 4300 of NOG- 1: The following paragraphs from NOG 2004 design criteria (paragraph 4300) are applicable to the analysis:

NOG -I Section 4311: Calculations per Section 4330 show that the members are not controlled by buckling. Therefore the allowable values from Table 4311-1 are applicable.

NOG -1 Section 4313: The girders conform to the dimensional criteria outlined in Section 4333 of NOG-1, therefore bending stress allowables need not be altered.

NOG -1 Section 4321: This paragraph addresses the combined axial compression and bending. When there is a combination of axial compression (P) and bending (M), the interaction between them increases the bending stress. If a transverse load causing bending (M) produces a deflection d, then the axial compression (P) results in an additional moment Pd. A common practice in the codes is to include the contribution of axial compression to bending through an amplification factor. Since the bridge has a camber, which brings the bridge close to flat during normal operation, the deflection of the bridge with respect to horizontal level will be close to zero and therefore, the Pd moment will be close to zero. Bending stress on the Page 25 of 53

plates about the minor axis will be insignificant, as the transverse load causing bending about the minor axis does not include the live load. Since the bending is less, the Pd effects will be insignificant in this case, too. Therefore, the stress values are combined per equation (3). This equation is used in ANSYS to compute the axial stress. Therefore, the finite element analysis results are compliant with paragraph 4321.

NOG -I Section 4322: Allowable bending stress and allowable axial stress are taken as 0.5 times the yield strength according to Table 4311-1. With this data, the denominator of equation (3) in paragraph 4321 of NOG-1 becomes 0.5Sy. Equation (3) computes the resultant normal stress as the sum of axial stress and bending stress due to bending in two orthogonal directions. This interpretation suggests that comparing the normal stress output from the finite element analysis with 0.5Sy allowable is equivalent to using equation (3).

NOG -1 Section 4323: Bolts are evaluated per this Section.

NOG -1 Section 4324: Shear stress is computed by including the effect of direct bending, and shear stress and compared with 0.4 times the yield strength. This is equivalent to comparing the shear stress output from the finite element analysis with O.4Sy allowable.

NOG -I Section 4330: Buckling is checked in accordance with this Section.

NOG -1 Section 4341: The girder deflection from the finite element analysis is compared with the requirements of this Section.

==

Conclusion:==

The stresses and deflections of the structural steel members of the crane bridge were evaluated and it was demonstrated that they meet the NOG 2004 design criteria (paragraph 4300) including buckling requirements. Stress and deflection values are tabulated below against their respective allowables.

Operational Load Case Bridge Girder Allowable Normal Stress 16.565 ksi 18 ksi Shear Stress 2.728 ksi 14.4 ksi Deflection 0.881 in 0.981 in End Truck Allowable Normal Stress 4.518 ksi 18 ksi Shear Stress 2.866 ksi 14.4 ksi Page 26 of 53

Connections Allowable End Tie Bolt Shear Stress 1.35 ksi 17.85 ksi End Truck Bolt Normal Stress 2.08 ksi 39.6 ksi End Truck Bolt Shear Stress 6.01 ksi 20.4 ksi Extreme Environmental (SSE) Load Case Bridge Girder Allowable Normal Stress (Hook up, Trolley @ mid) 17.378 ksi 32.4 ksi Shear Stress (Hook up, Trolley @ 1/4) 4.901 ksi 18 ksi End Truck Allowable Normal Stress (Hook up, Trolley @ mid) 6.228 ksi 32.4 ksi Shear Stress (Hook up, Trolley @/41/4) 3.379 ksi 18 ksi Connections Allowable End Tie Bolt Shear Stress (Hook up, Trolley @ 1/4) 6.79 ksi 27.3 ksi End Truck Bolt Normal Stress (Hook up, Trolley @ end) 4.0 ksi 60 ksi End Truck Bolt Shear Stress (Hook up, Trolley @ mid) 23.0 ksi 31.2 ksi

d. KNES Calculation No. 036675-09 NOG-1 2004 Single Failure Proof Trolley Structural Analysis Summary: This calculation analyzes the stress distribution of the trolley per the load cases presented in NOG-1 2004 and the existing Zion Station design.

Model/Methodology

Description:

An ANSYS 13 software package, which has been qualified by Konecranes Nuclear Equipment and Services QA program, is used to build and analyze the model. The shell model of the trolley is built in ANSYS 12 and meshed with the SHELL63 elements. Since the trolley is a plate structure, it was decided that the 3D shell model would be the most accurate and efficient finite element model to build and analyze. Mid surfaces of the plates are used to create the shell model. The beam elements are used to model the drum and gear cases. Motor and platform weights are included as lumped masses at their locations. Beam 188 elements are used to model the bridge. Spring elements are used to represent the ropes which are also capable of providing the pendulum frequencies. Applied rope stiffness values for various hook positions are calculated.

Constraint equations (rigid regions) are created to tie the components such as drum, motors and gear cases to trolley and trolley wheels to the bridge.

Finite element models are generated for three trolley positions on the bridge (mid span, quarter span and end span) in combination with hook up, hook down, hook mid and no load on the hook configurations. The set of load cases run at the mid-Page 27 of 53

height hook position is in addition to the nine cases required by NOG-1 Table 4153.7-2. Boundary conditions are in accordance with NOG-1 Figure 4154.3-1 and Table 4154.3-1.

The response spectrum method is used for qualification of the trolley during the seismic event. From the coupled building crane evaluation, 24 response spectra at crane rail level are generated from ZIONOOI -CALC-002 Rev 0. Enveloping response spectra for each direction are regenerated from the 24 broadened spectra provided. Results of the seismic analysis are combined per ASME NOG- 1 Table 4153.7-2 by using SRSS method for all three directional responses along with an absolute value of 1 G static load. All three directional combined normal and shear stresses are determined and compared with NOG- 1 allowable values, von Mises stresses are also plotted to show the critical regions. von Mises stress (also called equivalent stress) is used in design work because it allows any arbitrary three-dimensional stress state to be represented as a single positive stress value.

Equivalent stress is part of the maximum equivalent stress failure theory. The purpose of providing the von Mises stress is to show the combined stresses and critical regions in one plot, instead of 6 different plots for normal and shear stresses.

Crane operational load cases in section 4140 of the ASME NOG-1 PcI: Pdb + Pdt + Plc: enveloped by Pc2.

Pc2: Pdb+ Pdt + Plc + Pv,: analyzed under section 5.1 of this report.

Pc3: Pdb+ Pdt + Pc + Phi: analyzed under section 5.1 of this report.

Pc4: Pdb + Pdt + P~c + Phi: analyzed under section 5.1 of this report.

Pc5: Plant operation induced loads and static test pressure loads. Not applicable The trolley positions are addressed in Table 4153.7-2 for extreme environment conditions and all the applicable extreme environment conditions are addressed in the report. Impact loads in section 4133 are defined for operating condition loads and they are not required during seismic application as described in section 4140.

For this reason, impact loads are applied only on the mid position, which is the most critical case for operational load case.

Load cases Pc6, Pc7, Pc8 and Pc9 are not performed in this analysis, since construction loads are not applicable for this crane. ZS requests an exception to the Operating Wind Pwo, Design Wind Load Pwd, and Tornado Wind Load Pwt, since this crane is used indoors and these loads are not part of the facility design basis for the crane itself. Since the tornado wind load is not evaluated in combination with the crane live load in the original plant design basis, procedural provisions have been made to lower the likelihood of fuel transfer operations during a tornado watch or warning.

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Crane seismic event loads in section 4140 of the ASME NOG-1 PcI0: Pdb+Pdt+Pcs+Pe Pc IH:Pdb+Pdt+Pe' P,,: Credible critical load for SSE = 250,000 lbs.

P,-: SSE loads Per NOG- 1 Section 4140, both operating basis earthquake and safe shut down earthquake are defined as extreme environmental conditions; and for this reason, they have the same allowable values. Since operating basis earthquake response spectra are enveloped by safe shut down earthquake response spectra (and both events have the same allowable values), the OBE event is enveloped by the SSE event and no further evaluation is carried out for OBE event.

Compliance to Section 4300 of NOG-1 NOG -1 Section 4311 - Members Not Controlled by Buckling. It is shown that the members are not controlled by buckling. Therefore, the allowable values in Table 4311-1 are used.

NOG -1 Section 4313 - Bending Stress: Section 4313 states that: "The allowable bending stress for members other than those girders conforming to the dimensional criteria outlined in paragraph 4333 shall conform to AISC "Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, Allowable Stress Design and Plastic Design" Chapter F divided by 1.1 2N for the different loading conditions."

This section reduces the flexural strength to avoid lateral torsional buckling due to bending. However, if the member is a compact section, the plastic moment corresponding to the plastic section modulus can be used as the limit state. This is the same as the tension and compression allowable stress provided in NOG- 1. Since the trolley plates are compact sections with several lateral stiffeners supporting them to avoid lateral torsional buckling, section 4313 is not applicable to the compact trolley plates.

NOG -1 Section 4321 - Section 4321 addresses the combined axial compression and bending. When there is a combination of axial compression (P) and bending (M), the interaction between them increases the bending stress. If a transverse load causing bending (M) produces a deflection 6, then the axial compression (P) results in an additional moment P8. The common practice in the codes is to include the contribution of axial compression to bending through an amplification factor. The trolley is built using plates that are short (taking credit for the presence of stiffeners), wide and thick. The only significant bending stress present in the trolley is about the major axis and this bending is caused by the application of live load.

Because the plates are wide, the moment of inertia about the major axis is usually a large number resulting in a large bending stiffness for a short plate. Therefore, any Page 29 of 53

deflection caused by bending will be insignificant resulting in negligible increase in bending stress due to the P8 effects. Bending stress on the plates about the minor axis will be insignificant, since the transverse load causing bending about the minor axis does not include the live load. Since the bending stress is insignificant, the P6 effects will be insignificant in this case as well. Therefore, the stress values are combined per equation 3 of section 4321.

NOG -1 Section 4322 - Members subjected to Axial Tension and Bending:

Allowable bending stress and allowable axial stress are taken as 0.5 times the yield strength according to Table 4311-1 and Section 4322. With this data, the denominator of equation (3) in section 4321 becomes 0.5Sy. A closer look at the equation (3) shows that it computes the resultant normal stress as the sum of axial stress and bending stress due to bending in two orthogonal directions. From this interpretation it is concluded that comparing the normal stress output from ANSYS with 0.5Sy is identical with equation (3).

NOG -l Section 4323 - Members subjected to Shear and Tension: Section 4323 addresses computing the combined stresses on bolts. Bolts are evaluated in miscellaneous item calculation 36675-14.

NOG -1 Section 4324 - Members subjected to Shear and Bending: As per section 4324, shear stress is computed by including the effects of direct, bending, and shear stress and compared with 0.4 times the yield strength. This is identical to comparing the shear stress output from ANSYS with O.4Sy.

NOG -1 Section 4330 - Buckling: Buckling is evaluated in accordance with this section.

Results: Seismic responses are computed by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the maximum representative values of the co-directional responses caused by each of the three components of earthquake motion at each node, plus an additional I G static load.

All three directional normal and shear stresses are within the allowable limits defined in Table 4311-1 for all trolley and hook positions during seismic conditions and operating conditions. The stresses resulting from the hook up position are higher than the stresses in the hook down position, hook mid position and no load on the hook condition.

The table below shows the summary of combined maximum normal and shear stresses that are observed on the trolley for the governing hook up position.

Page 30 of 53

Max. Normal 1 Max. Shear Allowable Stress Stress Operating Case Trolley at Mid Span 16.8 25 8 20 Seismic Cases Trolley at Mid Span 19.2 45 7.9 25 Trolley at / Span 21.5 45 7.5 25 Trolley at End Span 19.2 45 7.8 25

e. KNES Calculation No. 036675-10 Trolley Critical Weld Stress Calculation Summary: This calculation determines the trolley frame critical weld stresses in order to demonstrate that those stresses are within allowable stress values.

Model/Methodology

Description:

Analysis of welds is performed per NOG- I Section 4314, which states that the allowable stresses in welds shall be as specified in AWS DI .1, and may be increased by a factor of 1.50 for extreme environmental load combinations.

The trolley frame (per NOG-1 Section 4432.1) shall be designed to resist all loading imposed by the lifted load and the load combinations specified in NOG- 1 Section 4140. For this analysis, the worst case load combinations are conservatively used.

Many welds in the calculation are evaluated by symmetry or by comparison to identical welds with higher loading. The welds for the 'drum catcher' support plates are considered to be acceptable by engineering evaluation. These welds will be subjected to compressive loading in the event of a drum shaft failure, but the stress on the welds will be minimal due to the presence of the top plate and the stiffeners underneath. Some girt plate welds were also considered acceptable by engineering evaluation. These welds were not considered in the evaluation of the primary girt plate welds leading to a conservative analysis.

Assumptions:

• The live load will not participate in the horizontal direction seismic calculations. Due to the low frequency of the ropes only the vertical seismic loads are considered for the live load.

" The forces transmitted to the welds due to seismic horizontal accelerations are negligible. The dead loads of the members are small.

• Net vertical seismic acceleration of 2.Og (including Ig for earth's gravity) was conservatively assumed in this calculation.

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Results: The calculated weld stresses are within the allowable values. The table below presents the maximum stresses versus the allowable stresses.

Maximum Weld Stress Allowable Weld Stress Operating Load Case 12.47 ksi 15.79 ksi Seismic Load Case 21.696 ksi 23.69 ksi

f. KNES Calculation No. 036675-14 Seismic Analysis of Miscellaneous Items Summary: This calculation evaluated the miscellaneous trolley connections to ensure their integrity during a seismic event Model/Methodology

Description:

Material properties are given as a minimum and meet the ASTM or referenced standard.

Seismic stresses are calculated by applying a force equivalent to the component weight multiplied by a directional seismic factor at the estimated center of gravity of the component Tensile forces on bolts due to moments were conservatively calculated at the point in the connection furthest away from the component center of gravity (e.g. at the location of the nut instead of the shear plane location).

NOG- I allowable bolt stresses are based upon AISC specifications, which are based upon the nominal diameter of the bolt. Therefore, in this calculation the bolt nominal diameter is used in calculating bolt stresses.

The analysis of bridge mounted components is limited to those weighing above 300 lbs. This assumption limits the analysis to the electrical panel assemblies, electrical enclosures, and isolation transformer.

Assumptions:

" Seismic acceleration values (vertical and horizontal) are from Zion DSAR seismic response curves. These values are then multiplied by a 1.5 multimodal factor. Vertical down net acceleration has Ig added for gravity, and vertical uplift net acceleration has I g subtracted. These seismic values were verified to envelope the accelerations determined in the new seismic analysis.

" All bolted connections are considered to be bearing type connections.

" The weld and bolt stresses are combined directly, which is conservative.

" The centers of gravity of the enclosures and enclosure assemblies are assumed to be at half of their height.

" In the calculations for the electrical platform assemblies only the welds at the bottom of the platform are considered to be holding the platform in place. The Page 32 of 53

connections on the rear of the assembly are conservatively ignored in order to simplify the calculation process.

• Similarly, in the enclosure bolt stress calculations, only the bolts at the bottom of the enclosure are considered to be holding the enclosure in place. The connections at the rear of the enclosures are conservatively ignored in order to simplify the calculation process.

Results: All analyzed components meet the allowable stress values of the applicable NOG-l Section. The maximum stresses versus allowable values are presented in the table below. This calculation was only performed for the Extreme Environmental Load Case (SSE).

All values are in ksi Calculated Stress Allowable Stress Max. Weldment Shear Stress 7.17 25 Max. Weldment Tensile Stress 39.48 45 Max. Bolt Shear Stress 38.21 42 Max. Bolt Tensile Stress 47.07 58.73 Max. Combined Weld Stress 26.6 31.5

g. KNES Calculation No. 036675-23 Main Hoist Reeving Stress Summary: The hoist reeving system is evaluated for normal operation, broken rope and safe shutdown conditions. The components are designed for three times normal load along with 15% impact factor. The equalizer load pin is rated for five times specified lifted load.

Methodology: The components in the main hoist load path are evaluated against applicable NUREG-0612 and NOG- I requirements. A 15% wear factor is added where applicable per NUREG-0554 requirements. A 5% wear factor is used for the main hoist wire rope due to limited anticipated wear (refer to NUREG-0554 Compliance Matrix).

The main hook is evaluated using straight beam theory in accordance with NOG-1 Section 5477(b). Equations from ASME BTH- 1-2005 are used for the pinhole.

Material properties are given as a minimum and meet the ASTM or referenced standard.

Assumptions:

• Net vertical seismic acceleration of 2.Og (including Ig for earth's gravity) was conservatively assumed in this calculation.

" Design is for a minimum of three times the load with a 15% impact factor.

This results in an allowable stress of 0.2898 x yield strength for the operational load case. The allowable stress in the seismic load case would be Page 33 of 53

0.9 x yield. With a vertical equivalent seismic acceleration factor of 2 the effective allowable yield stress is 0.45 x yield. Therefore the operational load case envelopes the seismic case. Critical components were designed for 6:1 on yield, which further envelopes the seismic load case.

Similarly, for emergency conditions (i.e., broken rope), the allowable stress for mechanical components per NOG-1 Section 5321.2 is 75% of the yield strength. When one rope fails, the maximum increase in load would be 3x (2x normal load with 1.5x impact). Critical components were designed to take 6x the actual load with permanent deformation. Therefore the induced stress is less than 16.67% of the yield strength. Hence, if the load triples and the load path does not change, the induced stress will be less than 50% (3x 16.67%=50%) of the yield strength, which is less than the 75% allowed for the emergency condition. Therefore critical components that do not get into a different load path need not be checked for a single rope failure.

Results: All hoist reeving components including bearings meet the applicable NOG- I and NUREG-0612/0554 requirements.

Individual evaluations include:

Hook Assembly Meets NUREG-0612 & NOG-1-2004 (5428.1 (b)) requirements Max. Normal or Tensile Stress 11.27 ksi < 15.83 ksi per NOG-1 (Tensile Through Shank) 11.27 ksi <11.50 ksi per NUREG 0612 Max. Shear Stress (Tearout at 5.13 ksi < 9.14 ksi per NOG-1 Pinhole) 5.13 ksi < 6.64 ksi per NUREG 0612 Rope Rope is selected based on the most stringent of NOG-Para. 15425.1 Rrequirements. 5% degradation is applied to account for wear.

33.99 kip < 38.52 kip per 5425(b)(2)

Max. Operational Load 3(more limiting than (b)(1)

Max. Impact Load 100.36 kip < 154.8 kip per 5425(b)(3)

Max. Seismic Load 69.61 kip < 154.8 per 5425(b)(4)

Max. displacement was also calculated to be 1.69" during a single rope break.

Bottom Block Allowable stresses are per NOG-1 Table 4311-1 or NUREG-0612/0554.

Calculated Stress Allowable Stress Max. Bending Stress (Sheave Pin) 13.73 ksi 15 ksi Max. Shear Stress (Crosshead) 2.59 ksi 3.75 ksi Max. Bearing Stress(Sheave 13.33 ksi 37.50 ksi Pin/Plate)

Max. Weld Stress (Crosshead) 8.46 ksi 18.90 ksi Page 34 of 53

Allowable stresses are per NOG-l Table 4311-1 or NUREG-0612/0554. The limiting values listed below are from the broken rope load case.

Calculated Stress Allowable Stress Max. Bending or Normal Stress 34.25 ksi 37.50 ksi (Equalizer Frame Plate 2)

Max. Shear Stress (Tearout at 21.65 ksi Equalizer Frame Plate 2 Hole)

Max. Weld Stress 15.27 ksi 28.35 ksi 15.27 ksi 28.35 ksi (Equalizer Frame Plate 2)

The Drum Shell is designed per NOG-1 Para 5411.5 with allowable Drum stresses per Figure 5474-1 & 2.The Drum Shaft is designed per NOG- I Para.5415.1 with allowable stresses and load combinations per NOG-1 Table 5415.1-1.

Calculated Stress Allowable Stress Max. Drum Stress vs. Allowable:

Combined Crushing and Bending 8.51 ksi 8.91 ksi Stress in Shell Max. Drum Shaft Stress: Combined Bending and Shear (Load 18.65 ksi 40.85 ksi Combination 1)

Max. Drum Weld Combined Stress 6.49 ksi 18.90 ksi

h. Calculation ZIONOO1-CALC-034, Fuel Handling Building (FHB) 125 Ton Crane Rail Clip Modification and Rail Evaluation Summary: Calculations performed in calculation ZIONOO -002, Appendix B, demonstrated that the original runway rail and rail clip design were not adequate for the new design basis load case for a seismic event with a load on the hook.

This new calculation evaluates the rail clips and the runway rail with the modification installed.

Model/Methodology

Description:

Simplified hand calculations are used to design a new crane rail clip assembly using MathCad 15. Governing crane wheel forces at the top of the crane rail for all crane and trolley positions for each of the load combinations from Attachment 56 of Ref. 3.7 are considered in the calculation for the new rail clip design.

As-built survey data of the crane runway rail determined the maximum existing clip center to center spacing to be 2fi.-7in. The majority of the existing clips are 2 ft.-0 in. center to center spacing. The new rail clips are installed between two existing rail clips providing generally the same center to center spacing (2 ft. -0 in.) as the existing design.

Page 35 of 53

Conservatively, the new clips are designed for full wheel forces applied to a single rail clip without relying on the distribution of forces to the adjacent existing clips providing unanalyzed margin.

When a horizontal seismic load from the crane wheel is applied to the head of the crane rail, the force is decoupled into a bearing force on one edge of the crane rail base (bottom flange) along with the corresponding shear force and an uplift force on the opposite edge of the crane rail base (bottom flange). There are rail clips on each edge of the base (bottom flange) of the crane rail.

Therefore each clip will either see force from shear with corresponding bearing or force from uplift. No credit is taken for friction between the bottom flange of the rail and the girder. On the bearing side, clips and bolts are designed for the applied shear force. On the uplift side rail clips and bolts are designed for the bending moment due to the rail bearing on the rail clip support.

The crane rail is checked for the applied forces for web shear, web bending and local rail base (bottom flange) bending.

The rail clip is connected to the top flange of the bridge runway girder. A local stress check of the crane runway girder flange for the applied rail clip forces is also performed. Crane girder global analysis for the applied new rail clip forces is not within the scope of this calculation. Calculation ZION001-CALC-002 describes the crane runway girder analysis.

Assumptions: None Results: The highest loads and stress values along with allowable values are listed below. Note there are two clip styles; Clip I is the standard clip, Clip 2 is located at column tie-backs. The values below are for the limiting clip style for each load type.

Component/Load Description Load/Stress Allowable Bending in clip due to uplift (Clip 2) 34.516 ksi 37.5 ksi Shear in clip due to uplift at reduced 7.055 ksi 20 ksi section (Clip 1)

Bearing in clip at bolt location (Clip 1) 23.383 ksi 45 ksi Block shear in clip (Clip 1) 72.34 kip 122.891 kip Bolt Tension (Clip 1) 17.515 kip 53.7 kip Bolt Shear (Clip 1) 36.17 kip 39.8 kip Girder flange local bending due to tension 5.015 ksi 27 ksi in clip Girder flange local bending due to 25.973 ksi 27 ksi compression Page 36 of 53

Component/Load Description Load/Stress Allowable Girder flange local bearing 14.289 ksi 32.4 ksi Girder flange local block shear 72.34 kip 299.334 kip Crane rail local web shear 9.114 ksi 20 ksi Crane rail local web bending 32.427 ksi 37.5 ksi Crane rail minor axis bending 31.325 ksi 37.5 ksi Crane rail bottom flange local bending 20.094 ksi 37.5 ksi

i. Enercon Calculation ZIONOOI-CALC-037 Fuel Handling Building and Crane Runway Girder Connection at Col. Line X Evaluation Summary: The Fuel Handling Bldg. Model Files, described in ZIONOO1-CALC-002 (CALC-002), are updated in this calculation, to reflect the crane runway girder splice at Col. Line X, by adding a member end release for My & Mz at this location. The connection was modeled as fixed in the CALC-002 analysis. The effects of the modeling change to the results from the original design analysis in calculation CALC- 002 are shown to be insignificant, therefore, the results of calculation CALC-002 remain valid. The building members, connections, and crane response from the original calculation, CALC-002, are bounding and do not change.

The evaluation of the connection of runway girder G8B at Col. Line X contained in this calculation supersedes the evaluation of this connection in calculation CALC-002. The connection for Girder G8B at Col. Line X is acceptable for the loads provided in this calculation with the joint pinned.

Model/Methodology

Description:

The STAAD Models from CALC-002 were re-run with the crane girder member ends released at Col. Line X to determine the adverse effects this may have on the results of the other sections of the original design calculation, CALC-002. Two more crane bridge locations were added to the STAAD Models to address the full positive moment on the runway girders in the spans adjacent to Col. Line X resulting from releasing the moments at the end connection.

STAAD structural software was utilized to verify the I.R.'s of the structural members for the code check are in accordance with the AISC 9th Edition Manual of Steel Construction. This code check will verify that the moment released due to the new boundary condition will not overstress the crane runway girders in the spans adjacent to Col. Line X.

Hand calculations were performed to evaluate the girder splice connection at Col.

Line X in accordance with the AISC 6th Edition Manual of Steel Construction.

AISC N690-1994 is used, as required, in accordance with NUREG-0800, to provide allowable overstress factors for bolts. The design loads for evaluation of the girder splice are the maximum envelope end forces for girder member G8B from worst Page 37 of 53

case SSE results. SSE loads are used in combination with OBE allowable stresses to provide conservative bounding results for both the SSE and OBE load combinations unless stated otherwise.

The time history acceleration response of the crane at the wheels was compared to the original model of CALC-002 to determine any affects on the spectral accelerations used for the crane analysis.

Assumptions: Reference assumptions description for CALC-002.

Results: All the structural members pass the Allowable Code Check with the exception of members 55, 15291, and 2864 which are the same members originally identified in calculation, CALC-002, with IRs higher than 1.0. The IRs, as calculated are equal to or lower than the IRs in the original model. Additional evaluation of the members in the original calculation (CALC-002), has been performed and shows the members with I.R.'s greater than 1.0 to be less than 1.0.

Accordingly, The IRs analyzed in this calculation are similarly acceptable.

The highest loads and stresses for the crane runway girder horizontal web stiffener and the components of the girder splice at Col. Line X are reported below:

Crane Girder Runway Plate @ Col. Line X Allowable Maximum Plate Shear O.B.E. 76.824 kips 88.94 kips Maximum Plate Shear S.S.E. 92.406 kips 124.52 kips Crane Runway Girder Interior Support @ Col. Line X Allowable (Member G8B)

Maximum Combined Bolt Shear with Reduction of the Shear Allowable for Bolt Tension (Girder Support Col. Cap Plate) 10.85 kips 52.99 kips T-Beam Stem Bolt Shear (2 Bolts) 8.23 kips 23.56 kips T-Beam Flg. Bolt Tension (2 Bolts) 8.23 kips 62.84 kips Web Angle to Col. Connection Plate Bolt Shear with Reduction of the Shear Allowable for bolt 37.21 kips 211.05 kips Tension (26 Bolts Single Shear)

Web Angle to Girder Bolt Shear based on Compression in Girder and Girder Bearing (13 Bolts Double Shear) 234.17 kips 234.52 kips Girder End Plate to Col. Fig. Connection Bolt Tension (2 Rows of 13 - 7/8 in. Dia. Bolts) 74.42 kips 625.3 kips Girder Stiffener Plate to End Plate Weld Connection 74.42 kips 389.47 kips Girder Stiffener Plate Horiz. Tension 74.42 kips 372.6 kips Girder Stiffener Plate Horiz. Compression 74.42 kips 517.87 kips Page 38 of 53

Crane Runway Girder Interior Support @ Col. Line X Allowable (Member G8B)

T-Beam Stem (Top Connection) Tension 8.23 kips 33.75 kips T-Beam Stem (Top Connection) Compression 8.23 kips 59.51 kips Girder Web Clip Angle Leg Tension 39.91 kips 248.4 kips Girder Web Clip Angle Leg Compression 101.67 kips 380.54 kips Bending Stress of One Angle Leg Against Girder Due to Forces in Z-Direction 24.8 ksi 27.0 ksi Girder Support Col. Cap Plate Weld Combined 23.5 kips 201.35 kips Shear Girder Bearing Stiffener Compression 229.75 kips 296.44 kips Girder Bearing Stiffener Bearing 229.75 kips 360.45 kips Changing the boundary condition at the two isolated girder splice locations at Col.

Line X has no significant impact to evaluations of all the remaining structural elements and connections performed in ZION-CALC-002 aside for the connection of the crane girder at Col. Line X evaluated here. Therefore the evaluations for the other structural elements in calculation CALC-002 are bounding and remain valid.

The time history accelerations at the crane wheels from the CALC-037 model file, are similar when compared with the time history file of the same model of CALC-002 for all three component directions (X,Y, and Z). The maximum delta between the two models is 0.004g in the Z-direction or 1.6%. This change is negligible.

The location of the crane in this model is centered over column line V. As justified in CALC-002, this position is bounding for seismic input response to the crane. The primary mode of vibrations and frequencies do not change with respect to crane/trolley location, loading condition, and hook position as described in CALC-002, therefore the file selected is bounding for all model files and there is no adverse impact to the seismic accelerations provided to the crane vendor in calculation CALC-025.

2.4 Heavy Loads Program ZionSolutions, LLC has developed a heavy loads program that satisfies the guidelines provided in NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." In NUREG-0612, the guidelines for control of heavy load lifts provide assurance for the safe handling of heavy loads in areas where a load drop could impact on stored spent fuel, fuel in the reactor core, or equipment required to achieve safe shutdown or permit continued decay heat removal. Based on the permanently defueled state of the ZNPS, and the length of time the spent fuel has been stored in the Spent Fuel Pool, the areas applicable to NUREG-0612 guidelines are in or around the Spent Fuel Pool, or in or around a cask loaded with spent fuel, or a lift of a cask loaded with spent fuel There is no safe shutdown equipment associated with the handling of heavy loads.. The heavy loads program will prohibit travel with a heavy load over the Spent Fuel Pool, exclusive of the Page 39 of 53

cask loading area, without the appropriate administrative controls. To further reduce the probability of a load handling accident, ZS will use a single-failure proof crane to improve reliability through increased factors of safety and through redundancy in certain active components for activities near the fuel pool and the handling of spent fuel casks. ZS has followed the guidance for designing single-failure proof cranes provided in NUREG-0554, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants" as supplemented by NUREG-0612 Appendix C and NRC Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2005-25 (including Supplement 1).

In NRC Bulletin 96-02, Movement of Heavy Loads over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment, dated April 1996, the NRC Staff requested licensees to provide specific information detailing the extent of their compliance with the guidelines and their licensing basis. In response to NRC Bulletin 96-02, Exelon provided confirmation that all heavy load handling activities that were planned at that time were within existing regulatory guidelines.

Existing plant crane procedures implement the heavy load activities. Furthermore, the response indicated that if any subsequent activities identified an unreviewed safety question per the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, a license amendment request would be submitted. This proposed license amendment request and the associated heavy loads program, as revised, are intended to satisfy that commitment.

ZS has chosen to satisfy the guidance in Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.6 as detailed in the attached NUREG 0612 compliance matrix (Attachment 3). This matrix includes a discussion on meeting the additional guidance provided in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-25, "Clarification of NRC Guidelines on Control of Heavy Loads," issued in October 2005 and as supplemented in May 2007.

The draft Heavy Loads Program is attached to this document and will be approved and implemented by ZS prior to handling heavy loads and revised as needed in accordance with station procedures.

Required Load Lifts -

Each transportable storage canister (TSC) will be placed in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) and removed from the pool using a transfer cask. Once a TSC has been loaded with spent fuel and processed it is lowered into a Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC) for transport to the ISFSI. The general steps to fill and process each TSC inside the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) are as follows:

1. Place an empty MAGNASTOR Transfer Cask (MTC) in the FHB Truck Bay or Cask Decontamination Pit (CDP).

2. Place an empty TSC inside the MTC.

3. Transfer the empty MTC/TSC to a staging area on the north side of the SFP.

4. Fill the TSC with water.

5. Lift the flooded MTC/TSC assembly from the staging area to the cask loading pit in the SFP.

6. Fill the TSC with spent fuel.

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7. Place the TSC lid on the loaded TSC.

8. Lift the loaded MTC/TSC assembly from the SFP to the CDP.

9. The TSC's internal volume is dewatered, vacuum-dried, lid closure-welded, and filled with inert gas.

10. Lift the MTC/TSC assembly over to the Truck Bay.

11. Place the loaded MTC/TSC assembly on top of an associated Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC)/Transfer Adaptor.

12. Lower the loaded TSC from the MTC into the VCC.

13. Remove the empty MTC from the top of the VCC and place it in the FHB Truck Bay or CDP.

14. Remove the Transfer Adaptor from the VCC and install the VCC Lid.

The Transfer Cask weighs 108,500 lbs. and a fully loaded TSC with a lid weighs 102,000 lbs.

The combined weight of the loaded and flooded TSC with a lid inside a Transfer Cask and including the Lifting Yoke is 228,000 lbs. The Fuel Building Crane is rated at 125 tons.

The safe load path for handling the loaded cask will be shown in revised DSAR Figure 3-34.

Handling of the MTC will be performed using a specially designed yoke as specified by NAC and described in the MAGNASTOR Safety Analysis Report. Safe load paths for other lifts listed above will be controlled as required by the Heavy Loads Program attached.

This sequence of cask lifts/movements will be performed during both dry run and normal spent fuel transfer operations until all the spent fuel assemblies are removed from the SFP, placed into TSCs lowered into their associated VCCs and transported to the ISFSI.

The FHB overhead crane will also be used to lift/move auxiliary equipment and components (e.g., welding system, vacuum drying system, shielding devices, lifting yokes, etc.) throughout the FHB in preparation for and during spent fuel transfer operations.

2.5 Installation The crane has been designed, assembled and will be installed using processes compliant with a 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Program. The installation of the single failure proof crane will be performed during the summer months of calendar year 2012 which is prior to receipt of NRC approval for use of the crane crediting its single failure proof features. Crane installation will be restricted to areas removed from the spent fuel, such that a failure of the crane or its lifting mechanism will not affect stored spent fuel. Once installed, the heavy loads program will be utilized for heavy load lifts in the FHB, however, administrative and physical prohibitions will remain in effect until approval for use as a single failure proof crane is obtained from the NRC.

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2.6 DSAR Changes In addition to proposing a new license condition for upgrading the Fuel Handling Building overhead bridge crane, DSAR changes are proposed to reflect the design changes to the crane and the implementation of the NUREG-0612 heavy loads program. These proposed changes also remove the existing cask drop event analysis and update the safe load path in the DSAR. Any postulated drops of radioactive components outside of the Fuel Handling Building are compared against the radioactive waste handling accident in the DSAR. The DSAR changes are provided in Attachment 2 and will be implemented upon approval of the proposed license amendment in compliance with 10 CFR 50.7 1(e).

TABLE I - UPGRADED FUEL HANDLING BUILDING OVERHEAD BRIDGE CRANE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS Bridge Capacity (MCL & Design Rated Load) 125 Tons Auxiliary Hoist Capacity 15 Tons Main Hoist Speed (Maximum with MCL) 5 fpm Main Hoist Speed (Maximum with no Load) 7.5 fpm Auxiliary Hoist Speed (Maximum with Rated Load) 20-24 fpm Auxiliary Hoist Speed (Maximum with No Load) 30-36 fpm Trolley Speed (Maximum with MCL Rating) 50 fpm Bridge Speed (Maximum with MCL Rating) 50 fpm Main Hoist Lift 52'-0" Auxiliary Hoist Lift 74'-1" Trolley Height 5'-4" Trolley Gage 13' Trolley Wheel Base 8' Page 42 of 53

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Existing Design Bases The general design criteria followed in the initial design of ZNPS were developed as performance criteria which define or describe safety objectives and procedures. Along with these performance criteria, the Station was designed to comply with Commonwealth Edison's understanding of the intent of the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) proposed General Design Criteria, as published for comment by the AEC in July 1967. The Zion Construction Permit, which established many of the ZNPS safety-related design criteria, was issued in December

.1968. The ZNPS FSAR, which presented the detailed design of the plant, was submitted in December 1970. Subsequent to this submittal, the AEC's final General Design Criteria was published as Appendix A to IOCFR50 in July 1971.

The performance criteria used in the design of ZNPS that remain applicable in the defueled condition are specifically addressed in the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR). There, the performance criteria are quoted and are followed by a brief summary of the resulting design or procedures. These performance criteria provide compliance with the intent of the AEC's proposed General Design Criteria, as published in July 1967. The following GDCs are currently applicable to the Fuel Handling Building overhead crane.

GDC 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena The Fuel Handling Building and the structures used to protect and handle the spent fuel, such as the Spent Fuel Pool and overhead bridge crane are designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as an earthquake and tornado winds.

GDC 61 - Protection Against Radioactivity Release From Spent Fuel and Waste Storage Containment of fuel and waste storage is provided if an accident could lead to release of undue amounts of radioactivity to the public environs.

All fuel storage and spent fuel handling activities are performed within the Fuel Handling building and the facility design is such that accidental releases of radioactivity directly to the atmosphere will not exceed the limits of I OCFR100. All operations with the spent fuel are conducted underwater. This provides visual control of the operation at all times and also maintains low radiation levels. The storage pool is filled with borated water which assures sub-criticality at all times, though maintenance of boron in the pool is not required by the ZNPS Technical Specifications. This water also provides adequate cooling for the spent fuel. The spent fuel storage pool is supplied with a cooling system for the removal of the decay heat of the spent fuel. Racks are provided to accommodate the storage of up to 3012 fuel assemblies in a vertical array ensuring appropriate geometry (spacing of assemblies) to maintain subcritical conditions even with unborated water for fuel with for fuel having a maximum loading of 57.4 grams U-235 per axial centimeter of fuel assembly length. The water level maintained in the pool will provide sufficient shielding to permit normal occupancy of the area by operating personnel. Postulated Page 43 of 53

accidents involving the release of radioactivity from the fuel and waste storage and handling facilities are shown in Chapter 5 of the DSAR to result in exposures well within the limits of I OCFR 100. The spent fuel storage pool is a reinforced concrete structure with a corrosion resistant liner. This structure is designed to withstand the anticipated earthquake loadings. The liner will prevent leakage even in the event the reinforced concrete develops cracks.

The following GDC is frequently considered applicable to evaluation of heavy loads handling systems is no longer considered applicable at ZNPS and accordingly not to the Fuel Handling Building Crane for the stated reasons.

GDC 4 - Dynamic Effects Design Bases No high energy systems remain at ZNPS, thus dynamic events need not be considered with respect to the Fuel Handling Building crane.

The following GDC are frequently considered applicable to evaluation of heavy loads handling systems but are no longer considered applicable at ZNPS. The design and installation of the crane system however satisfies the bases of these GDC.

GDC-I - Quality Standards and Records No SSCs are designated as safety related at ZNPS and both reactors are permanently defueled. A designation of Important to the Defueled Condition (ITDC) as opposed to safety related is described by the DSAR for system, structures or components (SSCs) that require additional quality controls based on the current ZNPS conditions. The ITDC quality program is discussed in the Quality Assurance Program Plan. However, the crane design, fabrication and installation have been contracted with KoneCranes Nuclear Equipment & Services LLC who will apply an approved a 10CFR50 compliant QA program equivalent to the ASME NQA- I program to the crane.

GDC Sharing of Equipment and Components Important to Safety There is no requirement for safe shutdown of the units since the units are permanently defueled and no SSCs are designated as safety related. Accordingly, there is no requirement associated with shared equipment to assure safe shutdown. The Fuel Handling Building and Spent Fuel Pool are designed to prevent the release of undue amounts of radioactivity to the public. The accidents currently applicable in the defueled condition are a loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling, a loss of Spent Fuel Pool inventory, a fuel handling accident, and a radioactive waste handling accident. The DSAR also contains an analysis that shows for a cask drop handling event in the Fuel Handling Building that the spent fuel pool is not damaged. Although GDC 5 is not directly applicable, no single failure of the new lifting system that will be installed will impact the capability of the spent fuel pool to perform its function in its current condition since no new event is credible that affects the existing analyses.

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3.2 Existing Safety Analysis The accidents and events that remain applicable to ZNPS in its permanently defueled condition as currently described in the DSAR are:

- Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Building

- Spent Fuel Pool Events/Operational Occurrences

- Radioactive Waste Handling Accident

- Spent Fuel Cask Drop Those associated uniquely with the Fuel Building are:

Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Building An analysis has been performed for the Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Building (involving the drop of a single, irradiated fuel assembly into the pool). This analysis indicates that off-site doses (without mitigation) are much lower than previously evaluated and, thus, well within the 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) and 10 CFR 100.11 exposure guidelines. The dose to Control Room personnel remains within the limits specified in 10 CFR5 0, Appendix A, GDC-19 under these same conditions. These results are primarily due to the fact that the spent fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool have undergone more than ten years of radioactive decay and there is an insignificant amount of radioactive iodine left in the fuel assemblies. This accident is discussed in Chapter 5 of the DSAR.

Spent Fuel Pool Events/Operational Occurrences Potential events associated with the Spent Fuel Pool while in the defueled condition are limited to those related to the loss of pool cooling or the loss of pool water inventory. An analysis for the loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling concludes that a loss of forced Spent Fuel Pool cooling does not constitute an excessive risk for ZNPS. Analysis of a loss of spent fuel inventory concluded that a rupture in the Spent Fuel Pool cooling return line (the limiting break) does not constitute an unacceptable risk for ZNPS. In both cases this is due to the extremely slow rate of Spent Fuel Pool water boil off. Adequate time is available to initiate corrective measures for restoration of malfunctioning components, or to institute an alternative method of cooling using onsite or offsite water supplies without significant radiological consequences for plant workers in the fuel handling building. This accident is discussed in Chapter 5 of the DSAR.

Spent Fuel Cask Drop The Spent Fuel Cask Drop analysis is used only for structural considerations to demonstrate that impact of a swinging spent fuel cask that is dropped from the maximum allowed height will not result in damage to the Spent Fuel Pool such that uncontrolled water loss occurs. The permanently defueled condition of the plant does not change this analysis or its conclusions.

This event is discussed in section 3.9.5 of the DSAR.

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The DSAR does not identify a failure of any portion of the Fuel Handling Building. The absence of this discussion demonstrates that the Fuel Handling Building structure does not result in an adverse consequence in the event of a seismic occurrence. As such the FHB complies with Section C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification," and Paragraph 11.8 of NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan," Section 3.7.2.

3.3 Accident Analysis Impacts Upgrading the Fuel Handling Building overhead crane to a single-failure proof crane and performing operations in accordance with a the proposed heavy loads program will permit elimination of the postulated spent fuel cask drop event analysis from the ZNPS safety analysis (DSAR Section 3.9.5) since the probability of occurrence of a drop will be very low as described in NUREG 0612. The existing cask drop event analysis, as described in DSAR Section 3.9.5, does not envelope the MAGNASTOR cask and yoke which will be used to load the spent fuel from the pool for transport to the ISFSI. A fully loaded MAGNASTOR cask, filled with water, including the transfer cask and the lifting yoke weighs approximately 115 tons under the hook.

The existing DSAR cask drop event analysis is for a cask which weighs 110 tons including the yoke and lifting cables.

The existing fuel handling accident, Spent Fuel Pool loss of cooling or pool drain down, and the radioactive waste handling accident as presently described in the DSAR are not affected by the crane upgrade. The fuel handling accident will remain applicable until all spent fuel has been removed from the pool and transported to the ISFSI. The Spent fuel Pool Events and the radioactive waste handling accident will remain applicable until the pool components and low level radioactive waste respectively have been removed from the site during decommissioning.

3.4 Upgraded Crane Safety Analysis ZS will no longer consider a cask drop to be credible because the use of a single failure proof crane and associated handling programs as described in NUREG 0612 reduces the probability of a canister or cask drop event to acceptably low levels as to effectively preclude the event. ZS specifically commits to meet the guidance of Section 5.1., 5.1.2 and 5.1.6 ofNUREG-0612 as discussed in the NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix (Attachment 4) which is a part of this submittal. This matrix includes a discussion on meeting the additional guidance provided in RIS 2005-25 and clarification of NRC Guidelines on Control of Heavy Loads, issued in October 2005 and as supplemented in May 2007. A list of commitments is also provided in Attachment 1.

ZS is upgrading the Fuel Handling Building overhead bridge crane to a single-failure proof crane, which minimizes the probability of a heavy load handling accident in or near the Spent Fuel Pool by improving crane reliability through increased factors of safety and through redundancy in certain active components. ZS has followed the guidance for designing single-failure proof cranes located in NUREG-0554, Single-FailureProofCranes for Nuclear Power Plants, ASME NOG-1, and NUREG-0612 Appendix C. The Fuel Handling Building and the upgraded crane will withstand the safe shutdown earthquake as described in the DSAR by safely holding the maximum critical load during and after an earthquake. The FHB, as a result of the design basis earthquake, will not adversely impact ITDC structures, systems or components, Page 46 of 53

such as the fuel pool and stored fuel, and the upgraded crane will have the ability to safely lower the heavy load either with or without power to an area on the safe load path.

The DSAR will be revised to remove the existing cask drop analysis (DSAR Section 3.9.5) and add a discussion to reflect the design changes to the crane and the implementation of the NUREG-0612 heavy loads program. The DSAR changes are provided in Attachment 2.

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4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The DSAR and plant procedure changes required to implement dry spent fuel storage at the Zion Nuclear Power Station have been evaluated to determine whether applicable requirements and regulations continue to be met with this proposed modification. ZS has determined that the proposed amendment does not require any exemptions or relief from regulatory requirements and does not affect conformance with any 10 CFR 50, Appendix A General Design Criterion (GDC) differently than described in the DSAR.

NRC regulatory guidance applicable to this proposed amendment includes NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.6 and Appendix C, NUREG-0554, 'Single-failure Proof Cranes'(Reference 2), ASME NOG-1-2004, which has been endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2005-25, Supplement I (Ref.7) as an acceptable means of meeting the criteria in NUREG-0554 "Single-failure Proof Cranes", and ANSI N 14.6- 1993, "American National Standard for Radioactive Material - Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 lbs (4500 kg) or More".

The current DSAR licensing basis includes an analysis of the handling of a spent fuel shipping cask in the cask area of the Spent Fuel Pool. Additionally, the movement of the shipping cask from the cask area to the transport area is currently provided in plan view. The licensing basis for the handling of the shipping cask in the cask area of the Spent Fuel Pool will be replaced by use of the single-failure proof crane handling system and the associated heavy loads program.

Accordingly, the prevention of a drop and the handling methods identified in the DSAR remain bounding for the handling of the loaded MAGNASTOR Transfer Cask since the single-failure proof design of the crane precludes events in the cask area of the Spent Fuel Pool, due to the very low probability of occurrence of such drops, and on the movement path to the transportation loading area. Because the Fuel Building Crane is integral to the Fuel Building, this amendment request is governed by the regulations in 10 CFR Part 50.

NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix (Attachment 4)

As a means of demonstrating conformance to the NUREG-0612 criteria for operations, maintenance, testing and administrative procedures, ZS has compiled a point by point evaluation of the heavy load handling controls with the provisions ofNUREG-0612 and presents it in to this Amendment Request. The basis for the individual evaluation is provided and referenced to a specific procedure or administrative control or technical document that provides or will provide demonstration of that basis when completed.

ASME NOG-l Compliance Matrix (Attachment 5)

Since the NRC has endorsed ASME NOG- 1 2004 as an acceptable means of satisfying the Guidelines of NUREG-0554, ZS has compiled a point by point evaluation of the design of the replacement trolley with the provisions of ASME NOG- I and presents it in Attachment 5 to this Page 48 of 53

Amendment Request. The basis for the individual evaluation is referenced to a technical document that provides demonstration of that basis. If a specific deviation or an exception is taken relative to a provision, a basis for that deviation is provided.

NUREG-0554 Compliance Matrix (Attachment 6)

The replacement trolley has been designed to ASME NOG-1 criteria, with one exception, which satisfies the NUREG-0554 criteria. To demonstrate that the entire crane system, bridge, bridge rails and supporting building structure meet the guidelines of NUREG-0554, ZS has compiled a point by point evaluation of the design of the crane system with the provisions of NUREG-0554 and presents it in Attachment 6 to this Amendment Request. The basis for the individual evaluation is referenced to a technical document that provides demonstration of that basis. If a specific deviation is taken relative to a provision, a basis for that deviation is provided.

The above references contain appropriate commitments to ANSI NI14.6, "American National Standard for Radioactive Material - Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 lbs (4500 kg) or More," and B30.9 2003 "Slings" to ensure compliance with the associated recommendations.

The NRC staff has endorsed (RIS 2005-05 as supplemented) the application of the criteria for Type 1 cranes from ASME NOG- 1-2004, "Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes," to the design of new overhead heavy load handling systems as an acceptable method for satisfying the guidelines of NUREG-0554, "Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants. Further, rigging that conforms with the guidance of N14.6-1993, "Radioactive Materials -

Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More,"

will be used for recurrent load movements of spent fuel casks. The lifting device will have a single load path with twice the design safety factor specified by ANSI 14.6 for the load. ZS has provided information showing conformance with these standards as well as developing administrative controls (Heavy Loads Program) consistent with NUREG-0612 to control the operations, maintenance, testing and administrative controls of handling heavy loads.

Accordingly, the use of the single-failure proof crane with the application of the Heavy Load Program procedures provides the basis for approval of use of the crane and precluding the possibility of a drop due to the low probability afforded by these actions.

4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination The subject License Amendment Request seeks NRC approval for the methods of analyses, installation of a new trolley on the existing bridge rails in the Fuel Building, approval of the administrative controls to be used for control of heavy loads and certification of the crane and its supporting structure as a single-failure proof crane for use in spent fuel packaging operations.

The License Amendment Request further requests that the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) be changed to include a description of the crane and its supporting structure and to delete the spent fuel dropped cask event analysis (DSAR Section 3.9.5), which is no longer applicable and to add a section on the control of heavy loads.

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Specifically ZionSolutions, LLC requests the following:

" Approval of the analyses and methods used to design the new ASME NOG-l trolley and evaluation of the existing bridge and supporting structures including the existing runway rails and Fuel Building structure as being acceptable for qualification of the Fuel Building Crane as single-failure proof as described by ASME-NOG- 1 as endorsed by Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-25, Supplement 1, "Clarification of NRC Guidelines for Control of Heavy Loads," (RIS 2005-25) as a means of satisfying the requirements of NUREG-0554.

• Approval that operations, maintenance, testing and administrative procedures developed in accordance with NUREG-0612 provide the necessary controls for the handling of heavy loads at the Zion Nuclear Power Station.

• Approval to revise the DSAR to include: a description of the Fuel Building Crane; a section to describe the Control of Heavy Loads; and deletion of the spent fuel dropped cask analysis.

The use of the new single-failure crane in the Fuel building has been evaluated and the analysis has concluded:

This change does not involve a significant increasein the probability or consequences of an accidentpreviously evaluated.

The existing DSAR analysis assumes that a spent fuel cask drop occurs. In this analysis, the physics of the drop, coupled with concrete bumpers on the cask loading pit and pool edge were used to demonstrate that a postulated drop of the spent fuel cask near the Spent Fuel Pool neither impacted the spent fuel directly nor damaged the pool structure in a manner that adversely affected the spent fuel, when a cask was to be handled in the cask loading pit.

The proposed License Amendment Request to operate a single-failure proof Fuel Building Crane demonstrates that no analysis is required for the cask drop event based on the design and the associated programmatic controls. A drop of the spent fuel cask handled with a single-failure proof crane (designed to ASME NOG- land compliant with NUREG 0554), operated in accordance with the administrative controls of NUREG 0612, has an acceptably low probability so as to effectively preclude consideration of the event. No aspect of the Fuel Handling Building seismic design adversely affects the ability of the crane to support the load and the cask drop is therefore not considered. The risk of such a drop event using the new single-failure proof crane operated in accordance with the Heavy Loads Program procedures, qualitatively, is lower than the event previously analyzed which postulate the event without evaluation of its likelihood.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

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This change does not create the possibili.v of a new or different kind of accidentpreviously evaluated.

The location and design functions of the Fuel Building crane are not changed from those currently described in the DSAR. Because the new crane has a single-failure proof design the uncontrolled lowering, or drop, of a heavy load will not be considered credible. Evaluations show that individual malfunctions or component failures of the crane will not result in load drop.

The new single-failure proof crane primary use will be used to move a loaded or unloaded MAGNASTOR transfer cask between the cask loading pit, the decontamination pit, and transfer to the low profile cart rail transport in the Fuel Handling Building. No components that are classified as Important to the Defueled Condition, other than the Fuel Building crane, will be affected by these movements. Based on the design and programmatic controls on the crane no load will lower uncontrollably or drop in or around the spent fuel pool or near an open cask containing spent fuel nor will a cask containing spent fuel drop or be lowered uncontrollably during operation of the crane. Hence no new accidents will be initiated.

Therefore, the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Does not involve a significant reduction in a margin ofsqfety.

This proposed License Amendment Request involves the replacement of the existing non-single-failure proof Fuel Building Crane with a new single-failure proof crane. The new crane has been designed to meet the specifications found in ASME NOG-1-2004, which has been endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2005-25, as supplemented, as an acceptable means of meeting the criteria in NUREG-0554, "Single-failure Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants." to provide adequate protection and safety margin against the uncontrolled lowering of the lifted load. The occurrence of a cask load drop accident is considered not credible when the load is lifted with a single-failure proof lifting system meeting the guidance in NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," Section 5.1.6, "Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems." As a result, the proposed change, replacing the existing non-single-failure proof crane, has no adverse impact on stored spent fuel, or structural integrity of the pool.

The configuration of the crane and the primary load, a spent fuel cask containing spent fuel, is changed from that of the DSAR. The specific analysis dealing with a drop of the cask will no longer be applicable and removed from the DSAR, since the new single-proof crane makes that event of low enough probability to not be considered credible. The maximum critical lift capacity of the crane has not been changed, though the load to be lifted is larger. The structural analyses of the crane and its support structure, show acceptable margin under the acceptance criteria of NOG-1 for operation of the crane.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Based on the above, ZS concludes that the proposed License Amendment Request presents no significant hazards considerations under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is warranted.

Page 51 of 53

4.4 Environmental Assessment ZS has evaluated the proposed change against the criteria for identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21, "Criteria for and identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessments." ZS has determined that the proposed change meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22, "Criterion for categorical exclusion; identification of licensing and regulatory actions eligible for categorical exclusion or otherwise not requiring environmental review," paragraph (c)(9), and as such, has determined that no irreversible consequences exist in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," paragraph (b).

This determination is based on the fact that this change is being proposed as an amendment to a license issued pursuant to 10 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," which changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, and the amendment meets the following specific criteria:

(i) The proposed change involves no significant hazards consideration.

As demonstrated in Section 5.1, the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

(ii) There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amount of any effluent that may be released offsite.

The proposed change will allow use of a single-failure proof methodology that includes hardware and operational procedures and processes to replace an existing drop analysis approach. As a result of this approach no changes in consequences occur because of the change.

As a result there will be no significant increase in the amounts of any effluents released offsite since no event need be postulated to occur. The proposed change does not increase the production, nor alter the flow path or method of disposal of radioactive waste or byproducts.

Therefore, the proposed change will not affect the types or increase the amounts of any effluents released offsite.

(iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The proposed change will not result in changes in the configuration of the facility. There will be no change in the level of controls or methodology used for processing of radioactive effluents or handling of solid radioactive waste, nor will the proposal result in any change in the normal radiation levels within the plant. Therefore, there will be no increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure resulting from this change.

Page 52 of 53

5.0 References

1. NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants: Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-36

2. NUREG-0554 Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants

3. ASME NOG-1-2004 Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder)

4. Crane Manufacturer's Association of American (CMAA) Specification No. 70-1975

5. American Welding Society (AWS) D14.1 Industrial Mill Crane Welding

6. NRC Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2005-25, Clarification of NRC Guidelines for Control Of Heavy Loads, October 31, 2005

7. NRC Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2005-25 Supplement 1, Clarification of NRC Guidelines for Control Of Heavy Loads

8. NRC Bulletin 96-02, Movement of Heavy Loads over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment, dated April 1996

9. John B. Hosmer (CornEd) letter to U.S. NRC, CornEd Response to NRC Bulletin 96-02, "Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," dated May 13, 1996

10. ANSI N 14.6, "American National Standard for Radioactive Material - Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 lbs (4500 kg) or More" Page 53 of 53 Regulatory Commitments, Proposed Operating License Changes and Proposed DSAR Changes

List of Regulatory Commitments This table identifies actions discussed in this letter that ZionSolutions, LLC commits to perform.

Any other actions discussed in this submittal are described for the NRC's information and are not commitments.

TYPE COMMITMENT ONE-TIME CONTINUING ACTION COMPLIANCE Notify the NRC when the single-failure proof modifications to the Fuel Handling Building overhead crane are complete All heavy load lifts in or around the Spent Fuel Pool or in or around a cask loaded with spent fuel or a lift of a cask loaded with spent fuel the Spent Fuel Pool made using the upgraded Fuel Handling Building crane lifting system will meet the guidance in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, as follows:

" Special lifting devices, as defined in ANSI N 14.6 will meet the guidance in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(1 )(a) and ANSI N14.6-1993, as clarified in the NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix attached to this License Amendment Request (LAR).

• Lifting devices not specially designed for the MAGNASTOR casks will meet the guidance in NUREG 0612, Section X 5.1.6(1)(b) and ASME B30.9-2003, as clarified in the NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix attached to this LAR.

" The Fuel Handling Building overhead crane will meet the guidance in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6(2) and Appendix C and NUREG-0554 as clarified in the NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix and NUREG-0554 compliance matrix attached to this LAR.

• Interfacing lift points will meet the guidance in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6(3), as clarified in the NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix attached to this LAR.

Crane operator training will meet the guidance in ASME B30.2-1976. X Crane maintenance and inspections will meet the guidance in ASME X B30.2-1967.

Lift height limits consistent with the crane single failure analysis and NAC MAGNASTOR technical specifications will be included in the X crane operating procedures.

Revise DSAR Sections 3.2.4.1, 3.9.2.2, 3.9.3.2.3, 3.9.3.2.4, 3.9.5, and 3.9.12 to replace the dropped cask analysis and travel restrictions over the Spent Fuel Pool with a description of the single-failure proof crane modifications to the Fuel Handling Building overhead crane.

Page 1 of 4

TYPE COMMITMENT ONE-TIME CONTINUING ACTION COMPLIANCE Heavy load movements using the Fuel Handling Building (FHB)

Overhead Bridge Crane are not permitted if a tornado watch or warning has been declared for the site by the National Weather X Service. If heavy load handling with the OBC is in progress when any of these criteria are met, the load will be placed in a safe location as soon as possible and the crane secured.

The auxiliary hoist will be administratively controlled to prevent placing a load on the auxiliary hook that could impact stored fuel or a X cask containing spent nuclear fuel.

Page 2 of 4

Unit 1 Proposed Operating License Change (e) The appropriate section of the decommissioning trust agreement shall state that the trustee, investment advisor, or anyone else directing the investments made in the trust shall adhere to a "prudent investor" standard, as specified in 18 CFR 35.32(a)(3) of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's regulations.

(15) ZS shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the decommissioning trust is maintained in accordance with the application for approval of the transfer of the Zion, Unit 1, license and the requirements of the Order approving the transfer,

3. This amended license is issued without prejudice to subsequent licensing action which may be taken by the Commission.

4. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on April 6, 2013.

FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Original signed by Roger S. Boyd A. Giambusso, Deputy Director For Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing Date of Issuance: October 19, 1973 Amendment xxx Page 3 of 4

Unit 2 Proposed Operating License Change (e) The appropriate section of the decommissioning trust agreement shall state that the trustee, investment advisor, or anyone else directing the investments made in the trust shall adhere to a "prudent investor" standard, as specified in 18 CFR 35.32(a)(3) of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's regulations.

(15) ZS shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the decommissioning trust is maintained in accordance with the application for approval of the transfer of the Zion, Unit 1, license and the requirements of the Order approving the transfer,

3. This amended license is issued without prejudice to subsequent licensing action which may be taken by the Commission.

4. This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on Nov 14, 2013.

FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Original signed by Roger S. Boyd A. Giambusso, Deputy Director For Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing Date of Issuance: October 19, 1973 Amendment xxx Page 4 of 4

ZION STATION DSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 3.9 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING 3-26 3.9.1 New Fuel Storage 3-26 3.9.1.1 Design Basis 3-26 3.9.1.2 New Fuel Storage Facility Description 3-26 3.9.1.3 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition 3-26 3.9.2 Spent Fuel Storage 3-26 3.9.2.1 Design Basis 3-26 3.9.2.1.1 Prevention of Fuel Storage Criticality 3-26 3.9.2.1.2 Fuel Storage Decay Heat 3-27 3.9.2.1.3 Spent Fuel Storage Radiation Shielding 3-27 3.9.2.1.4 Protection Against Radioactivity Release 3-28 from Spent Fuel Storage 3.9.2.1.5 Monitoring Fuel Storage 3-28 3.9.2.2 Spent Fuel Facility Description 3-28 3.9.2.3 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition 3-31 3.9.3 Fuel Handling Systems 3-31 3.9.3.1 Design Basis 3-31 3.9.3.2 System Description 3-32 3.9.3.2.1 Failed Fuel Cans 3-32 3.9.3.2.2 Spent Fuel Pool Bridge 3-32 3.9.3.2.3 Fuel Building Crane 3-33 3.9.3.2.4 Fuel Building Crane Interlocks 3-33 3.9.3.2.4.1 Interlock/Limit Switch Function 3-33 3.9.3.2.4.2 Hoist Limit Switches-Operation 3-34 3.9.3.3 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition 3-35 3.9.4 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System 3-35 3.9.4.1 Design Basis 3-35 3.9.4.1.1 Fuel and Waste Storage Decay Heat 3-35 3.9.4.1.2 Codes and Classifications 3-35 3.9.4.2 System Description 3-36 3.9.4.3 Components 3-36 3.9.4.3.1 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers 3-36 3.9.4.3.2 Spent Fuel Pool Pumps 3-37 3.9.4.3.3 Spent Fuel Pool Filters 3-37 3.9.4.3.4 Spent Fuel Pool Strainers 3-37 3.9.4.3.5 Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizers 3-37 3.9.4.3.6 Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer 3-37 3.9.4.3.7 Spent Fuel Pooling Cool System Valves 3-37 3.9.4.3.8 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Piping 3-37 3.9.4.3.9 Spent Fuel Pool Sump Recessed Area 3-37 3-iii 3-iii Auaguset-1-O ay2O1 2

ZION STATION DSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE Spent Fuel Pool Make-Up Capability 3-38 D Features Important to the Defueled Condition 3-38 m in~ Control of Heavy Loads 3-39

/Introduction!

Licensing Background 3-39

-aeyBasis340 3.10 PLANT SUPPORT SYSTEMS 3-43a 3.10.1 Spent Fuel Pool Secondary Loop Cooling System 3-43a 3.10.1.1 Design Basis 3-43a 3.10.1.2 System Description 3-43a 3.10.1.3 Components 3-43b 3.10.1.3.1 Cooling Tower 3-43b 3.10.1.3.2 Cooling Pumps 3-43b 3.10.1.4 Design Feature Important to the Defueled Condition 3-43b 3.10.2 Service Water System 3-46 3.10.2.1 Design Basis 3-46 3.10.2.2 System Description 3-47 3.10.2.3 Design Features Important to the Defueled Condition 3-48 3.10.3 Ventilation Systems 3-49 3.10.3.1 Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and 3-49 Air Conditioning System 3.10.3.1.1 Design Basis 3-49 3.10.3.1.2 System Description 3-49 3.10.3.1.3 Normal Operation 3-49 3.10.3.1.4 Design Features Important to the 3-50 Defueled Condition 3.10.3.2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation 3-50 3.10.3.2.1 Design Basis 3-50 3.10.3.2.2 Normal Operation 3-50 3.10.3.2.3 Design Features Important to the 3-51 Defueled Condition 3.10.3.3 Containment Purge3-51 3.10.3.3.1 Design Basis 3-51 3.10.3.3.2 Normal Operation 3-51 3-iv 3-iOtbeFr 2040May 2012

ZION STATION DSAR LIST OF TABLES TABLE TITLE 3-1 List of Missiles for Which Seismic Class I Structures Have Been Designed 3-2 Zion Auxiliary-Turbine Bldg, Time-History vs Response Spectrum Analysis, Comparison of Accelerations at Various Elevations 3-3 Seismic Class I Systems and Components 3-4 Summary of Concrete and Reinforcing Steel Stresses 3-5 Seismic Class I Load Combinations for the Fuel Handling and Auxiliary Buildings, the Crib House, and Reactor Building Internal Structures 3-6 Maximum Soil Pressures and Actual Factors of Safety 3-7 Quality Assurance Records to be Maintained for Containment Vessel 3-8 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Code Requirements 3-9 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Component Design Data 3-10 (Deleted) 3-11 (Deleted) 3-12 (Deleted) 3-13 (Deleted) 3-14 Service Water System Flow Requirements 3-15 AC and DC Power Data 3-vi iOoebe-2O0OMay 2012

ZION STATION DSAR LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE TITLE 3-1 Removable Slab - Tie Down Details 3-2 Removable Slab - Tie Down Details 3-3 Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) Response Spectra 3-4 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 642' Auxiliary-i rurbine-Diesel Generator Building 3-5 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 630' Auxiliary-i rurbine-Diesel Generator Building 3-6 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 617' Auxiliary-i Eurbine-Diesel Generator Building 3-7 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 592' Auxiliary-i Eurbine-Diesel Generator Building 3-8 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 580' Auxiliary Building 3-9 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 560' Auxiliary-Turbine Building 3-10 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 542' Auxiliary Building 3-11 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 617' Fuel Handling Building 3-12 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 602' Fuel Handling Building 3-13 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 592' Fuel Handling Building 3-14 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 617' Reactor Building 3-15 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 590' Reactor Building 3-16 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 581'-10" Reactor Biological Shield 3-17 Response Spectra - DBE Elevation 568' Reactor Building 3-18 Response Spectra - DBE Containment Vessel Elevation 626'-3" 3-19 Response Spectra - DBE Crib House Elevation 594' Operating Floor Slab 3-20 Response Spectra - DBE Crib House Elevation 552' Pump Room Floor 3-21 Response Spectra - DBE Outdoor Equipment 3-22 Comparison - Actual Spectrum and Site Spectrum (DBE) 3-23 Reactor Building Framing Section B-B 3-24 Crib House Section A-A West Area 3-25 Fuel Handling Building Roof Framing Plan West Area 3-26 Fuel Handling Building Wall Plan El. 617'-0" East Area 3-27 Auxiliary Building Sections & Details Sheet 16 3-28 Auxiliary Building Concrete Beam Schedule 3-29 Concrete Block Shield Wall-Tie Down Details 3-30 Combined Interaction Model for Reactor and Auxiliary Buildings 3-31 Spent Fuel Storage Pool 3-32 Snent Fuel Pnol Cnolinn and Cleanun System 3-33 3-34 3-35 3-36 3-37 3-38 3-vii Oeteber..20May 2012

ZION STATION DSAR 3.2.4 Structures, Systems and Components Important to the Defueled Condition (ITDC) 3.2.4.1 General SSC classification involves a determination that an SSC is, or is, not safety related 1 .

SSCs classified as safety-related are treated differently by regulation than other SSCs 2 .

SSC's were originally classified according to the safety function they performed during power operation. Clearly, the first two parts of the safety-related definition in 10 CFR 50.2 (ensuring integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown) are not applicable to a permanently defueled plant.

The third part of the safety-related definition (prevent or mitigate consequences of accidents comparable to 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) or 10 CFR 100.11 guidelines) is also not applicable. This is primarily due to the fact that the present day source terms are significantly reduced.

The accidents and events that remain applicable to Zion Station in its permanently defueled condition are:

• Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Building

• Spent Fuel Pool Events/Operational Occurrences

• Radioactive Waste Handling Accident A new analysis has been performed for the Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Building.

This analysis indicates that off-site doses (without mitigation) are much lower than previously evaluated and, thus, well within the 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) and 10 CFR 100.11 exposure guidelines. The dose to Control Room personnel remains within the limits specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC-1 9. These results are primarily due to the fact that the spent fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool have undergone in excess of a year of radioactive decay and there is an insignificant amount of radioactive iodine left in the fuel assemblies. This accident is discussed in Chapter 5.

1. Safety related SSCs are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events to ensure: a). the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; b). the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and c). the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to guidelines of 10 CFR 100.

2. 1OC FR 50, Appendix B notes that "The pertinent requirements of this appendix apply to all activities affecting the safety-related functions of..." SSCs.

3-9

ZION STATION DSAR The Spent Fuel Pool Events are a loss of forced cooling and a loss of water level. Both cases result in a loss of forced cooling and a loss of inventory such that boiling in the pool eventually occurs. Based on the reduced heat load in the Spent Fuel Pool (due to the elapsed time since both reactors were shutdown), the evaluations of these events demonstrate that, in both cases, the loss of inventory is very slow. For both the loss of Spent Fuel Pool forced cooling and the loss of Spent Fuel Pool inventory, a significant period of time will elapse from the loss of forced cooling until boiling and boiloff of the pool occurs until the water level drops to approximately 3.9 feet above the stored fuel assemblies. At this water level, the resultant radiological dose at the edge of the Spent Fuel Pool is approximately 3.6 R/hr. In either of the above cases, adequate time is available to initiate corrective measures for restoration of malfunctioning components, or to initiate an alternative method of cooling using onsite or offsite water supplies, without significant radiological consequences to plant workers in the Fuel Handling Building or to members of the general public. These events are discussed in Chapter 5.

An evaluation of an accident associated with a container of radioactive resins generated during decontamination activities has been performed. This evaluation indicated that, based upon a curie content of waste significantly higher than would be allowed in a shipping container, an accident that results in the airborne release of dewatered resin will not result in a dose at the EAB in excess of the USEPA Protective Action Guidelines or 10 CFR 100 limits. This accident is described in Chapter 5 (Radioactive Waste Handling Accident).

Based on the above, it is concluded that no SSC's are required to be classified as safety-related at Zion in its permanently defueled condition. This results in two areas of interest:

1. Zion's "nuclear grade" processes are based largely upon quality assurance (10 CFR 50, Appendix B) requirements. Reclassifying all SSCs as non-safety related could lead to the elimination of most management controls in situations where maintaining management controls is desired.

2. Zion recognizes that certain functions remain important to safety in the defueled condition.

3-10 August 1999 May".2012

ZION STATION DSAR In the unlikely event that some leakage from the spent fuel pool were to occur, protective features have been provided to prevent radioactive material release to the environs from either loss of water from the storage pool or mechanical damage to the irradiated fuel.

The below listed features were incorporated in the design of the spent fuel pool to meet the design intent of AEC Safety Guide 13:

1. All spent fuel storage facilities are located in a Seismic Class I structure. In addition, the spent fuel racks within the fuel pool are Seismic Class I.

2. Although no longer required to be functional or credited in any accident analysis, the ventilation system provided in the Fuel Handling Building is equipped with filtration devices to limit the potential release of radioactive materials.

3. All piping connections to or from the spent fuel pool are above the level of the spent fuel racks.

4. Level instrumentation, with alarms, and radiation monitoring devices have been provided for the spent fuel pool.

5. Makeup water for the pool is available from a tank onsite. Backup sources are available from additional water supplies.

6. Interlocks are provided to prevent t main hoist ftW ,arrying heavy loads the area of the s ent fuel pool where fuel is stored These interlocks are 3-30

ZION STATION DSAR 3.9.3.2.3 Fuel Building Crane pI ne structural design Iconforms to the applicable requirements of the Electrical Overhead Crane Institute, Inc. (EOCI) Specification and applicable portions of the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC Specification for all desian Drovisions not covered bv the EOCI SDecification 3-33

ZION STATION DSAR 4-33

ZION STATION DSAR New

ZION STATION DSAR 3.9.3.2.4 Fuel Building Crane Interlocks The fuel buildin crane has been designed with safety interlocks and limit switches, d against any over-travel of both the bridge and trolleyi limit both the upper and lower travel of the hoist.

These switches are activated whenever the crane apparatus goes beyond these limits and whenever a hiah radioactivity sianal is transmitted by the radiation monitor.

The interlocks provided are further described below.

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ZION STATION DSAR ZION STATION DSAR 3.12 References, Section 3.0

1. Spent Fuel Pool Modification for Increased Storage Capacity, Revision 0, dated November 15,1991.

2. Zion Station Calculation No. 22S-0-11 OS-0060, "Evaluation of the Zion Spent Fuel Pool for an Accident Temperature of 212 Degrees F."

3. November 18, 1996 ComEd Response to NRC Final Report on Spent Fuel Storage Pool Safety Issues.

4. Gould Co. Calculation SO 7-0432124-EQ dated 1-8-71.

5. Power Conversion Inc. letter dated 5-25-71 and Gaynes Testing Lab report on Job #7115, dated 3-11-71.

6. General Electric Co. letter dated 2-26-71.

7. General Electric Co. Report #701CS101, dated 2-18-71.

8. Gould Co. Calculation SO 7-043123-EQS, dated 1-8-71.

9. Gould Co. letter dated June 14, 1971 summarizing results of test performed by TII Testing Lab, Inc., College Point, NY.

10. Gaynes Testing Lab Report #71448A dated November 9, 1971.

11. AIEE/IPCEA Power Cable Ampacities, Volume I - Copper Conductors, (AIEE Publication No. S-135-1, IPCEA Publication No. P-46-426) - 1962.

12. Zion Station Calculation No. 22S-B-123M-0080, "SFNI Cooling Tower and HVAC Lightning Evaluation."

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AuGUsT is ZionSolutions Draft Heavy Loads Program

ZIONSOLUTIONSLLC AnEnM~SOMIOns CWWVn ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use Heavy Loads Program Draft - September 6, 2012 ZionSolutions Project sP IEW 1 of 16

ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use Summary of Changes in this Revision:

0 Rev. 0 - This is initial issuance of this procedure.

2 of 16

ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use

1. PURPO SE AND SCO PE ................................................................................................. 5 1.1. PURPOSE ............................................................................................................ 5 1.2. SCOPE ........................................................................................................................ 5

2. RESPO NSIBILITIES ........................................................................................................ 5 2.1. ZionSolutions Fuel Transfer & Dry Cask Storage Engineers - are responsible for:..5 2.2. Heavy Load Handling Personnel (Supervisor, Craft and Contractors) - are responsible for: ...................................................................................................... 5 2.3. Planners - are responsible for: ............................................................................... 5 2.4. W ork Control - is responsible for: ......................................................................... 6 2.5. Shift Supervisor - is responsible for: .................................................................... 6 2.6. Fuel Transfer Operations - is responsible for: ...................................................... 6 2.7. Fuel Transfer & Dry Fuel Storage Maintenance Supervisor - is responsible for: ...... 6 2.8. Occupational Health Services - are responsible for: ............................................. 6

3. DEFINITIO N S ....................................................................................................................... 6 3.1. Dedicated Rigging ................................................................................................. 6 3.2. Restricted Area ...................................................................................................... 6 3.3. Handling Equipm ent ............................................................................................... 6 3.4. Heavy Load Handler ............................................................................................... 6 3.5. Heavy Load ......................................................................................................... 7 3.6. Rigging ........................................................................................................................ 7 3.7. Safe Load Path ........................................................................................................ 7 3.8. Single-Failure-Proof ............................................................................................. 7 3.9. Special Lifting Device .......................................................................................... 7

4. MATERIALS, SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT SERVICES ..................... 7 4.1. M aterials: ........................................................................................................... 7 4.2. Tools and Equipm ent: ............................................................................................. 7 4.3. Support Services ................................................................................................... 8

5. PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND PREREQUISITES ...................................... 8

5.1. Precautions

......................................................................................................... 8 5.2. Lim itations: ......................................................................................................... 8

5.3. Prerequisites

....................................................................................................... 8

6. M AIN BO DY ........................................................................................................................ 10 6.1. Handling Equipm ent Inspection .......................................................................... 10 6.2. Handling Equipm ent M aintenance ...................................................................... 11 6.3. General Handling Requirem ents ........................................................................... 11

7. RE TURN TO NO RM AL ............................................................................................... 13

8. REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 13 8.1 Procedures ................................................................................................................. 13 8.2 Com m itm ents ........................................................................................................ 13 8.3 NRC Guidance ...................................................................................................... 14 3 of 16

ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use

9. RECORDS ............................................................................................................................ 14 9.1. Vendor Supplied Certificates of Test .................................................................... 14 9.2. Handling equipment inspection records ................................................................ 14 9.3. Crane operator and qualified person(s) qualification records .............................. 14 9.4. Crane operator medical evaluations ...................................................................... 14

10. ATTACHM ENTS ................................................................................................................ 14 10.1. Attachment 1 - Table, Heavy Loads Equipment Certification ............................ 14 10.2 Attachment 2 - Figure, Fuel Handling Building Restricted Area (top down view).. 14

11. FORM S ................................................................................................................................. 14 4 of 16

ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1. PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide administrative controls for safely handling heavy loads in, around and over the spent fuel pool or a loaded spent fuel canister. It is intended to be used in conjunction with approved site procedures, FHI-22, Fuel Building Overhead Crane Procedure/Checklist, and ZAP 510-13 Safe Rigging Practices.

1.2. SCOPE The scope of this procedure applies only to the Fuel Handling Building Overhead Crane.

This procedure is applicable to all personnel involved with moving heavy loads in the Fuel Handling Building using the Fuel Handling Building overhead crane.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1. ZionSolutions Fuel Transfer & Dry Cask Storage Engineers - are responsible for:

- Generating and controlling Safe Load Paths for fuel transfer within Fuel Handling Building.

- Qualifying heavy load handling personnel in accordance with requirements of ANSIASME B30.2-1976, with the support of the Training Department.

2.2. Heavy Load Handling Personnel (Supervisor, Craft and Contractors) - are responsible for:

- Performing heavy load handling operations

- Maintaining, controlling, and inspecting heavy load equipment.

- Identifying/validating heavy loads lifts, assuring heavy load lifts activities are planned and scheduled to ensure risk may be evaluated and communicated.

- Requesting assistance from Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Engineering as necessary.

- Following the Heavy Load Lift procedure and work package requirements.

- Ensuring appropriate work order is approved for work to be performed.

- Notify Shift Supervisor or designee approval prior to the lift.

2.3. Planners - are responsible for:

- Identifying heavy load lifts.

- Requesting assistance from Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Engineering as necessary.

- Assuring heavy load lifts activities are planned and scheduled so that risk may be evaluated and communicated

- Following Heavy Load Lift procedural and work package requirements.

- Developing an appropriate work order.

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ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use 2.4. Work Control - is responsible for:

- Based on the results of the risk evaluation, identifying the redundant/diverse equipment important to the defueled condition to be relied upon, should a load drop occur.

- Scheduling the heavy load lift such that diverse equipment will be available at the time of the lift.

2.5. Shift Supervisor - is responsible for:

- Approving Work Orders.

- Overall safety of work activities performed.

2.6. Fuel Transfer Operations - is responsible for:

- Ensuring that any required diverse equipment is "available" at the time of the lift.

2.7. Fuel Transfer & Dry Fuel Storage Maintenance Supervisor - is responsible for:

- Performing a risk evaluation for conditions that do not screen out per Section 5, Spent Fuel Pool and High Risk Activity Management of the Work Management Manual Guide (Ref. 8.1.1). High Risk will screen out if the following conditions occur:

• Single Failure Proof Crane or hoist, and Rigging are used, or

• The Work Management Manual Guide, Section 5, Spent Fuel Pool and High Risk Activity Management, does not indicate a high risk.

2.8. Occupational Health Services - are responsible for:

- Certifying the medical qualifications of personnel in accordance with ANSI/ASME B30.2 and ZNPS Policies.

3. DEFINITIONS 3.1. Dedicated Rigging Rigging that is certified for handling a specific load or loads.

3.2. Restricted Area An area below a suspended heavy load where, if the heavy load were dropped or lowered, unacceptable damage would occur to irradiated fuel.

3.3. Handling Equipment All load bearing components used to lift a load, including the crane, hoist, the lifting device, and interfacing load lift points.

3.4. Heavy Load Handler A person that has successfully completed heavy loads training for the fuel transfer project.

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ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use 3.5. Heavy Load A load carried in the Fuel Handling Building that contains irradiated fuel that weighs more than the combined weight of a spent fuel assembly and its associated handling tool (NUREG 0612). A load that weighs more than 1800 pounds over or near the spent fuel pool is considered a heavy load.

3.6. Ri,,in2 Chain, hooks, shackles, links, wire rope, slings, eye bolts, chain blocks and other such portable items.

3.7. Safe Load Path A path defined for transport of a heavy load that will minimize adverse effects, if the load is dropped, in terms of releases of radioactive material and damage to spent fuel. The path follows, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc, such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. Safe Load Paths are indicated on safe load path drawings or by other approved drawings/ methods.

3.8. Single-Failure-Proof A single failure-proof lifting system consists of:

1.) Cranes, meeting the requirements of NUREG 0554.

2.) Special lifting devices, meeting the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1993 (Section Titled "Special Lifting devices for Critical Loads").

3.) Slings and rigging components use redundant rigging or use rigging that has double the factor of safety and meets the requirements of ASME B30.9-1971.

3.9. Special Lifting Device A lifting device that is designed specifically for handling a certain load or loads, such as the lifting device for the spent fuel cask. Special lifting devices shall be used when normal rigging is not adequate. Special lifting devices shall be designed, tested and maintained in accordance with ANSI N 14.6.

4. MATERIALS. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT SERVICES

4.1. Materials

- The following are some of the materials needed to keep the Fuel Handling Building overhead crane in good working order:

" Wire rope lubricant (per vendor recommendation)

• Hydraulic brake fluid (per vendor recommendation)

• Bearing grease (per vendor recommendation)

" Gear case lubricant (per vendor recommendation) 4.2. Tools and Equipment:

- Special tools and rigging devices will be provided by NAC to lift the Transportable Storage Cask, Transfer Cask and Concrete Cask during fuel transfer.

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ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use 4.3. Support Services

- Vendor will provide support services for the Fuel Handling Building crane upgrade including load testing, maintenance and operating procedures and training to the crane operators.

- NAC will provide support services for using the special tools and rigging devices for spent fuel transfer including guidance on operating procedures and cask fuel handling training.

5. PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND PREREQUISITES

5.1. Precautions

None

5.2. Limitations

- This procedure only applies to moving heavy loads in the Fuel Handling Building using the Fuel Handling Building overhead crane.

5.3. Prerequisites

- Personnel Qualification and Certification:

1.) Crane Operators shall successfully complete a medical evaluation or equivalent per ES-SH-PR-602, Operation and Inspection of Overhead Cranes (Ref. 8.1.7) and ZS-SA-01, Zion Restoration Project Health and Safety Plan (Ref. 8.1.12).

A. Crane Operators whose medical certification is not current shall not operate heavy load handling equipment until re-certification is completed.

B. Physical restrictions, such as the need to wear corrective lenses, shall be strictly adhered to and is the responsibility of the crane operator to ensure compliance.

C. Occupational Health Services personnel shall maintain records of crane operator medical qualifications for the period of qualification.

2.) Crane operators shall attend and successfully complete Crane Operator Training for the new Fuel Handling Building overhead crane per ZionSolutions training program requirements.

A. The training status of each crane operator shall be maintained by the ZionSolutions Training Department.

3.) Heavy Load Handling Personnel other than crane operators shall attend and successfully complete a training brief that contains the job performance measures for heavy load handling.

A. The training status of each qualified person shall be maintained by the Training Department.

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ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use

- Crane maintenance records are up-to-date and previous inspections completed and documented.

Handling Equipment Certification:

1.) Heavy load handling equipment should be identified with unique identification numbers.

A. Identification for permanent and portable heavy load handling equipment for spent fuel transfer shall be controlled and issued by the Fuel Transfer & Dry Cask Storage Engineers.

B. Identification shall be traceable to the vendor supplied equipment's Certificate of Test, including other information relevant to certification.

2.) A vendor supplied "Certificate of Test" shall be available and traceable to each piece of heavy load handling equipment and rigging to verify compliance with applicable ANSI standards.

A. Heavy load handling equipment shall be certified in accordance with applicable ANSI standard as listed on Attachment 1.

B. Special lifting devices shall be certified in accordance with ANSI N 14.6 or alternate inspection and load test criteria approved by the Fuel Transfer & Dry Cask Storage Engineers.

C. Completion of a Load Test Procedure may be used in lieu of a Certificate of Test for portable or manually operated heavy load handling equipment and rigging.

D. Designated Fuel Transfer & Dry Cask Storage Engineers shall be responsible for control and certification of rigging and special lifting devices.

E. Certificates of Test (or Alternate Test Procedures) and the Test Reports shall be maintained.

- Safe Load Path:

1.) Safe Load Paths shall be established to designate avenues for movement of heavy loads by handling equipment to minimize the potential for damage from those heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel. Safe Load Paths shall be developed in accordance with NUREG-0612. The current safe load paths for the loaded transfer cask are shown in DSAR Figure 3-33 (vertical view) and in the attached figure, Fuel Handling Building Restricted Area (top down view) (Attachment 2). Safe load paths for other heavy lifts shall be shown on applicable drawings and/or procedures.

2.) Changes to Safe Load Paths shall be identified by drawings and available for general facility use.

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ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use A. Safe Load Path drawings shall be approved by Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Engineering.

B. Safe Load Path drawings shall be in approved spent fuel transfer procedures.

3.) In situations where a Safe Load Path does not exist, cannot be followed, or the transient load will depart from the Safe Load Path, an alternate Safe Load Path shall be established.

A. Alternate Safe Load Paths shall be determined in accordance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1 (1).

B. Alternate Safe Load Paths shall be evaluated and approved by Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Engineering before use.

C. Alternate Safe Load Paths shall be documented and included with the Work Package.

D. Heavy load handling operations requiring deviation from Alternate Safe Load Paths shall be rigged Single-Failure-Proof or a load drop analysis shall be performed.

E. Perform 10CFR50.59 Screening/Evaluation per ZAP 100-06, 10 CFR 50.59 Review Process.

6. MAIN BODY 6.1. Handling Equipment Inspection 6.1.1 Inspections of heavy load handling equipment shall be controlled by designated Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Engineering personnel and performed in accordance with Fuel Handling Building overhead crane inspection procedures (Ref. 8.1.2 to 8.1.5).

6.1.2 Inspection frequency for heavy load handling equipment shall be in accordance with approved Fuel Handling Building overhead crane and rigging procedures for fuel transfer.

6.1.3 Pre-Operational Inspections of slings, rigging, and hooks performed in accordance with Fuel Handling Building overhead crane and rigging procedures for fuel transfer shall satisfy periodic inspection requirements.

6.1.4 A schedule for inspections of heavy load handling equipment including rigging and special lifting devices shall be maintained by the Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Department to ensure timeliness of inspection.

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ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use 6.1.5 Inspection records shall be maintained electronically or by hard copy.

6.2. Handling Equipment Maintenance 6.2.1 Maintenance shall be performed by ZNPS personnel or an approved service vendor.

6.2.2 Permanent heavy load handling equipment shall be maintained in accordance with the applicable ANSI standard as identified on Attachment 1.

6.2.3 Load bearing components of heavy load handling equipment which have been extensively repaired, repaired by welding, or otherwise modified shall be re-certified before being placed into service in accordance with applicable ANSI criteria.

1.) Test criteria used for re-certification shall be the same criteria used for the original certification unless otherwise stated by Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Engineering.

6.2.4 Non-permanent heavy load handling equipment shall be stored in areas to protect it from damage or adverse environments either in the Fuel Handling Building or an enclosed building onsite.

6.3. General Handling Requirements 6.3.1 Heavy load lifts shall be assessed by the Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Department for impact to components important to the defueled condition following the guidance in the Work Management Manual Guide (Ref. 8.1.1).

6.3.2 Heavy load handling operations shall be performed in accordance with approved load handling procedures (Ref. 8.1.2 to 8.1.5).

6.3.3 Heavy load handling operations shall be performed by qualified crane operators and qualified persons assigned by the responsible Supervisor.

1.) Operators of heavy load handling equipment shall be familiar with the procedures, height / weight restrictions, and Safe Load Path applicable to the handling operations.

6.3.4 Heavy load handling operations shall be conducted in accordance with the height / weight restrictions at the lowest height practicable defined in approved procedures.

1.) Heavy load handling operations requiring deviation from height / weight restrictions shall be evaluated by Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Engineering prior to starting the heavy load handling operation.

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ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use 2.) Single-Failure-Proof Rigging shall be required for all heavy load handling over the Spent Fuel Pool with spent fuel in the racks.

6.3.5 Heavy load rigging used shall be determined by Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Engineering to be adequate for the weight of the item to be handled based upon the weight of the item with allowance for dynamic loading for non-single-failure-proof configurations.

6.3.6 For all configurations, lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with station procedure ZAP 510-13, Safe Rigging Practices. In selecting the proper sling, the load should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating on the sling should be greater than the combined maximum static and dynamic load. For purposes of selecting the proper sling, loads imposed by the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) need not be included in the dynamic loads imposed on the sling or lifting device.

6.3.7 Refer to station procedure, ZAP 510-13, Safe Rigging Practices, for the proper method used in selecting a sling with the appropriate rating for the static and dynamic load lift to be performed.

6.3.8 Handling equipment attachments to permanent station equipment (beams, etc.) shall not be made until evaluation and approval of the attachment is completed by the Engineering Director.

6.3.9 Verification of heavy load handling equipment inspection shall be made before each use.

6.3.10 Heavy loads handling operations, where no load drop analysis has been performed, that are bounded by an existing load drop analysis, require the same accident mitigators as the analyzed load drop.

6.3.11 Handling of heavy loads over irradiated fuel within the scope of NRC Bulletin 96-02, and not previously evaluated, shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Based on the results of these evaluations, the appropriate actions shall be taken as required by NRC Bulletin 96-02. This would only apply if a non-single-failure-proof crane was used to handle heavy loads over the spent fuel pool.

6.3.12 Procedures for heavy load handling operations shall include the following Precaution/Limitation:

"Heavy load movements using the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Overhead Bridge Crane (OBC) are not permitted if a tornado watch or warning has been declared for the site by the National Weather Service. If heavy load handling with the OBC is in progress when any of these criteria are met, then the load will be immediately lowered to a safe location and the crane secured." (Ref. 8.2.6) 12 of 16

ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use

7. RETURN TO NORMAL None

8. REFERENCES 8.1 Procedures 8.1.1 ZAP 400-16, Work Management Manual Guide 8.1.2 ZAP 510-13, Safe Rigging Practices 8.1.3 MDAI 10-51-1, Crane Inspections 8.1.4 ZAP 510-02, Fuel Transfer and Dry Fuel Storage Plant Modifications 8.1.5 FHI-22, Fuel Building Overhead Crane Procedure/Checklist 8.1.6 ES-SH-PG-600, Hoisting and Rigging Programs 8.1.7 ES-SH-PR-602, Operation and Inspection of Overhead Cranes 8.1.8 ES-SH-PR-603, Operation and Inspection of Mobile Cranes 8.1.9 ES-SH-PR-604, Operation and Inspection of Hoists 8.1.10 ES-SH-PR-605, Non-Standard Lift Plans 8.1.11 ES-SH-PR-606, Safe Use and Inspection of Rigging Equipment 8.1.12 ZS-SA-01, Zion Restoration Project Health and Safety Plan 8.2 Commitments 8.2.1 DSAR Sections 3.9 and 5.2 8.2.2 NRC Bulletin 96-02, "Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel In The Reactor Core Or Over Safety-Related Equipment" 8.2.3 GL 85-11, "Completion of Phase II of Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0612" 8.2.4 John B. Hosmer (Coined) letter to U.S. NRC, "ComEd Response to NRC Bulletin 96-02, "Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," dated May 13, 1996.

8.2.5 Patrick Daly (ZS) letter to U.S. NRC, "Request for Amendment to Approve Methods of Analysis, Use of a Single-failure Proof Crane and Approval of a NUREG 0612 Compliant Heavy Loads Handling Program," dated May xx, 2012.

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ZAP-510-19 Revision 0 Information Use 8.2.6 NOG-1 Compliance Matrix, P&H SUPERSAFETM Single Failure Proof Upgrade for Zion Fuel Handling Crane, February 2012.

8.3 NRC Guidance 8.3.1 NUREG 0554, "Single Failure Proof Cranes For Nuclear Power Plants" 8.3.2 NUREG 0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants"

9. RECORDS The following documents shall be maintained electronically or by a hard copy for the retention period identified in document control:

9.1. Vendor Supplied Certificates of Test 9.2. Handling equipment inspection records 9.3. Crane operator and qualified person(s) qualification records 9.4. Crane operator medical evaluations

10. ATTACHMENTS 10.1. Attachment 1 - Table, Heavy Loads Equipment Certification 10.2 Attachment 2 - Figure, Fuel Handling Building Restricted Area (top down view)

11. FORMS None 14 of 16

ZAP-510-19 Attachment 1 Revision 0 Heavy Loads Equipment Certification Information Use Handling ANSI/ ASME Equipment Type Inspection Standard Overhead and Gantry Cranes B30.2-1976 Slings and Rigging B30.9-1971 Hooks B30.10-2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda Below-the-Hook Lifting Devices B30.20-2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda Rigging Hardware B30.26-2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda Special Lifting Devices N 14.6-1993 15 of 16

ZAP-510-19 Attachment 2 Revision 0 Figure - Fuel Handling Building Restricted Area Information Use FIGURE 3-34 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING SAFE LOAD PATH ANG RESTRICTED AREA

-SAFE LOAD PATH FOR LOADED TRANSFER CASK

-FUEL HANDLING BUILDING RESTRICTED AREA FUEL HANDLING BUILDING SAFE L[An PATH AND RESTRICTED FARE NOTEo LOAD PATHS FOR OTHER CRITICAL LOADS WILL BE DEVELOPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEAVY LOAD PROGRAM.

REFERENCE:

1. FHI-22

2. B-lOS. B-113. B-114 & B-115 KEY PLAN:3 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING RESTRICTED AREA

- SAFE LOAD PATH FOR LOADED TRANSFER CASK 16 of 16 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Section Guidance Evaluation Notes NUREG-0612 Safe load paths should Safe load paths for heavy loads have The safe load path for the loaded Section 5.1.1(1) be defined for the been defined at the Zion Nuclear cask in the Fuel Handling Building movement of heavy Power Station (ZNPS). Spent fuel overhead crane as defined in the loads to minimize the cask handling will not require the draft Heavy Loads Program ZAP-potential for heavy transfer cask containing the 510-19 will be included in Section loads, if dropped, to Transportable Storage Cask (TSC) to 5.2 of Zion procedure FHI-22, Fuel impact irradiated fuel in be suspended over irradiated fuel. The Building Overhead Crane the reactor vessel and TSC lid is the sole heavy load handled Procedure/ Checklist. Other safe in the spent fuel pool, or by the Fuel Handling Building load paths will be developed in to impact safe overhead crane single-failure-proof accordance with the Heavy Loads shutdown equipment. lifting system that must be suspended Program over exposed spent fuel in the loaded canister to properly conduct spent fuel NAC MAGNASTOR Technical loading operations. The transfer cask, Specification 4.3.1.h (MAGNASTOR TSC and TSC lid will be handled with draft Certificate of Compliance the single-failure proof Fuel Building Amendment 3) limits the height for a overhead crane single-failure-proof loaded concrete cask to less than or lifting system, including lifting devices equal to 24 inches.

and lift points.

NUREG-0612 Procedures should be The ZNPS heavy loads control Lift height limits consistent with the Section 5.1.1(2) developed to cover load program includes procedures to single failure analysis and NAC handling operations for address load handling operations for MAGNASTOR FSAR draft heavy loads that are, or heavy loads handled by the Fuel Certificate of Compliance could be handled over, Handling Building overhead crane amendment 3) (FSAR) will be or in proximity to single-failure-proof lifting system. included in the operating irradiated fuel or safe procedures, as appropriate.

shutdown equipment.

1 of 10 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Section Guidance Evaluation Notes NUREG-0612 Crane operators should Crane operators are trained in the ZNPS currently meets ANSI B30.2-Section 5.1.1(3) be trained, qualified, area of heavy load handling, safe load 1967. The training program will be and conduct paths, and the potential consequences upgraded to meet the guidance in themselves in of load drops over the spent fuel pool. Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976.

accordance with Training will meet the guidance of Chapter 2-3 of ANSI Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976.

B30.2-1976.

NUREG-0612 Special lifting devices The special lifting devices used to lift The transfer cask lifting yoke and Section 5.1.1(4) should satisfy the and handle the spent fuel transfer crane hook extension meets the guidelines of ANSI cask and other heavy load requirements of ANSI N14.6-1993 N14.6-1978. components are part of the Fuel per MAGNASTOR FSAR Sections Handling Building overhead crane 2.4.4, 2.6.6, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3.

single-failure-proof lifting system. The evaluation of these devices is discussed under NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(1)(a) in this matrix.

NUREG-0612 Lifting devices that are The lifting devices used to lift and ZNPS Procedures will be prepared Section 5.1.1(5) not specially designed handle the spent fuel transfer cask and include the guidance of ANSI should be installed and and other heavy load components that B30.9-2003 for slings as used in accordance are not specially designed are part of requirements for heavy load lifts in with the guidelines of the Fuel Handling Building overhead the Fuel Handling Building.

ANSI B30.9-1971. crane single-failure-proof lifting system. The evaluation of these devices is discussed under NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(1)(b) in this matrix.

2 of 10 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Section Guidance Evaluation Notes NUREG-0612 The crane should be The Fuel Handling Building overhead ZNPS currently meets ANSI B30.2-Section 5.1.1(6) inspected, tested and crane is inspected, tested, and 1967. The inspection, test and maintained in maintained in accordance with maintenance program will continue accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1967. The to meet the guidance in Chapter 2-2 Chapter 2-2 of ANSI crane trolley and controls are being of ANSI B30.2-1967.

B30.2-1976. upgraded and will meet the inspection, testing and maintenance guidance in ANSI B30.2.

NUREG-0612 The crane should be The Fuel Handling Building overhead The NOG-1 and NUREG-0554 Section 5.1.1(7) designed to meet the crane is being upgraded to a single- Compliance Matrices also discusses applicable criteria and failure-proof design through compliance with applicable portions guidelines of Chapter 2- replacement of the crane trolley and of CMAA-70.

1 of ANSI B30.2-1976 an upgrade of the crane controls. The and CMAA-70 or existing crane bridge will be used as suitable alternative is. The design codes and standards provided the intent of used for the upgraded crane trolley, ANSI B30.2 and CMAA- bridge and controls are a combination 70 is satisfied. of CMAA-70-1975, ASME NOG 2004, and original plant design codes as discussed in more detail under NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(2) in this matrix. Compliance with these codes and standards will ensure the crane, as a whole, meets the intent or the applicable criteria and guidelines of ANSI B30.2-1976and CMAA-70-1975.

3 of 10 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Section Guidance Evaluation Notes NUREG-0612 For the spent fuel pool The Fuel Handling Building overhead Section 5.1.2(1) area of a PWR plant, crane and associated lifting devices the overhead crane and used to lift and handle the spent fuel associated lifting transfer cask and other heavy loads devices used for associated with spent fuel cask handling heavy loads in handling operations are designed to the spent fuel pool area be a single-failure-proof lifting system.

should satisfy the See the discussion of compliance with single-failure-proof NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 in this guidelines in Section matrix.

5.1.6 of this report.

NUREG-0612 These sections provide The upgraded Fuel Handling Building Sections 5.1.2(2) acceptable alternatives overhead crane and associated lifting through 5.1.2(4) to meeting the single- devices will meet the guidance in failure-proof guidance Section 5.1.2(1). The guidance in in Section 5.1.2(1) for these sections is not applicable.

the overhead crane and associated lifting devices.

NUREG-0612 For the containment The upgraded Fuel Handling Building Section 5.1.3 building of a PWR overhead crane and associated lifting plant, this section devices do not have access to the provides guidance on ZNPS Unit 1 or Unit 2 containment heavy load control. buildings. The guidance in this section is not applicable.

NUREG-0612 For the reactor building ZNPS is a PWR plant so the guidance Section 5.1.4 of a BWR plant, this in this section is not applicable.

section provides guidance on heavy load control.

4 of 10 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Section Guidance Evaluation Notes NUREG-0612 This section provides Spent fuel cask handling operations The heavy load transport path will Section 5.1.5(1) guidance on protecting occur in the Fuel Handling Building. also avoid, to the extent possible, safe shutdown There is no safe shutdown equipment traversing over the spent fuel racks equipment. in the Fuel Handling Building or in the in the pool.

heavy load transport path to the ISFSI.

Therefore, this section is not applicable.

NUREG-0612 This section provides Spent fuel cask handling operations Section 5.1.5(2) guidance on protecting occur in the Fuel Handling Building.

safe shutdown There is no safe shutdown equipment equipment. in the Fuel Handling Building.

Therefore, this section is not applicable.

NUREG-0612 Special lifting devices The lifting yoke used to lift the transfer The NAC MAGNASTOR FSAR, Section that are used for heavy cask is a special lifting device and is Sections 3.1.2, 3.1.3, and 3.4.3 5.1.6(1)(a) loads in the area where designed and fabricated in states that the hook assembly is the crane is to be accordance with ANSI N14.6-1993. designed with a safety factor of 10:1.

upgraded should meet The rated load of the lift yoke is 117 ANSI N14.6-1978, tons. The design and safety factors for including Section 6 of the lifting yoke are based on a static that document. If only a plus dynamic load of 110% of the single lifting device is rated load. The safety factors for the provided instead of dual lifting yoke are 6:1 against the yield devices, the special strength of the material and 10:1 The safe load path for the Fuel lifting device should against the ultimate strength of the Handling Building overhead crane as have twice the design material. These safety factors are defined in the draft Heavy Loads safety factor as appropriate for a lifting device Program ZAP-510-19 will be required to satisfy the designed with increased stress design included in Section 5.2 of Zion guidelines of NUREG- factors instead of a dual load path in procedure FHI-22, Fuel Building 0612, Section 5.1.1(4) accordance with ANSI N14.6-1993, Overhead Crane Procedure/

5 of 10 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Section I Guidance Evaluation Notes Section 7.2.1. Checklist.

From RIS 2005-25, Supplement 1: There are no other intervening lift A special lifting device devices between the crane hook and that satisfies ANSI the transfer cask lifting trunnions for N14.6-1993, these lifts.

"Radioactive Materials NAC MAGNASTOR FSAR, Section

- Special Lifting 10.1.2.1, Load Testing of Transfer Devices for Shipping Casks, states that the lifting and Containers Weighing handling of the transfer cask and 10,000 Pounds (4,500 loaded TSC are the critical lifting kg) or More," should be loads. The transfer cask lifting used for recurrent load trunnions, shield doors and door rails movements in critical are designed to higher safety factors areas (i.e., reactor and are load tested to 300% of the heads, reactor vessel maximum service load for each internals, and spent fuel component.

casks). The lifting device should have either dual, independent load paths or a single load path with twice the design safety factor specified by ANSI N14.6 for the load.

6 of 10 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Section Guidance Evaluation Notes NUREG-0612 Lifting devices that are Section not specifically ZNPS procedures will be prepared 5.1.6(1 )(b) designed and that are and include the guidance of ANSI Other lifting devices not specifically used for handling heavy designed, such as slings, wire ropes, B30.9-2003.

loads in the area where etc., that will be used for heavy load the crane is to be handling (e.g., spent fuel storage upgraded should meet racks) with the Fuel Handling Building ANSI B30.9-1971, overhead crane system will meet the "Slings" as specified in guidance in ANSI B30.9-2003 for the NAC MAGNASTOR FSAR Table NUREG-0612, Section 9.1-1, Major Auxiliary Equipment, particular load being lifted. This is 5.1.1(5), except that controlled through the ZNPS heavy states redundant sling systems (two one of the following load control program and procedures. 3-legged slings) are used to transfer should also be satisfied a TSC into a concrete cask or a unless the effects of the transfer cask and meets the drop of the particular ZNPS may use slings made of metallic guidance of ANSI N14.6. Alternative load have been or synthetic material in making heavy TSC handling systems will comply analyzed and shown to load lifts with the Fuel Handling with the ZNPS heavy loads program satisfy the evaluation Building overhead crane system, developed per NUREG-0612.

criteria of NUREG- based on the nature of the lift and the 0612, Section 5.1: lifting location. When synthetic slings are used, the rigging of those slings is controlled by procedure to avoid the (i) Provide dual or redundant slings or types of sling failure modes described lifting devices such in RIS 2005-25 (Supplement 1).

that the failure of a single component failure or malfunction in the sling will not result in uncontrolled lowering of the load; 7 of 10 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Section Guidance I Evaluation Notes OR (ii) In selecting the proper sling, the load used should be twice what is called for in meeting NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(5).

From RIS 2005-25, Supplement 1:

Slings should satisfy the criteria of ASME B30.9-2003, "Slings" and be constructed of metallic material (chain or wire rope). The slings should be either (a) configured to provide dual or redundant load paths or (b) selected to support a load twice the weight of the handled load.

8 of 10 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Section Guidance Evaluation Notes NUREG-0612 New cranes should be The Fuel Handling Building crane is Section 5.1.6(2) designed to meet being upgraded to a single-failure-NUREG-0554. proof design through replacement of the crane trolley and controls. See the NUREG-0554 compliance matrix for a point-by-point compliance discussion of each guideline in NUREG-0554 as it pertains to the upgraded Fuel Handling Building crane.

NUREG-0612 Interfacing lifting points, When the empty or loaded TSC is Section 5.1.6(3) such as lifting lugs or inside the transfer cask, the transfer cask trunnions should cask is lifted and handled with a lifting also meet one of the yoke attached to the transfer cask following for heavy upper lifting trunnions. The transfer loads handled in the cask upper lifting trunnions are area where the crane is considered a non-redundant, dual lift to be upgraded unless point system. The upper lifting the effects of the drop trunnions and trunnion sleeves are of the particular load designed and fabricated in have been analyzed accordance with the ANSI N14.6-1993 and shown to satisfy guidance for non-redundant the evaluation criteria of interfacing lift points. The safety NUREG-0612, Section factors for the transfer cask upper 5.1: lifting trunnions are 6:1 against the yield strength of the material and 10:1 (a) Provide redundancy against the ultimate strength of the or duality such that a material. This safety factor meets the single lift point failure safety factor specified in NUREG-will not result in 0612 for a non-redundant lift point uncontrolled lowering system. The loaded transfer cask to of the load; lift point be used at ZNPS weighs a maximum 9 of 10 NUREG 0612 Compliance Matrix Section Guidance Evaluation Notes should have a design of 125 tons in its heaviest safety factor with configuration.

respect to ultimate strength of five (5) times the maximum When the empty TSC is lifted for initial combined concurrent insertion into the transfer cask, it is static and dynamic lifted by lifting lugs attached to the load after taking the inside of the canister shell. These single lift point failure. lifting lugs are considered interfacing lift points for these lifts. The TSC lifting OR lugs are not designed with the safety factors specified in NUREG-0612.

However, these lifts occur only with no (b) A non-redundant or fuel in the TSC and in the truck bay in non-dual lift point the Fuel Handling Building. There is system should have a design safety factor no safe shutdown equipment on site.

of ten (10) times the Therefore, a drop of the empty TSC maximum combined will have no unacceptable concurrent static and consequences.

dynamic load.

10 of 10 ASME NOG- 1 Compliance Matrix

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix Single Failure Proof Upgrade for Zion Fuel Handling Crane Crane Serial Number: CN-36675 NOG- 1 Compliance Matrix Page 1 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix TABLE OF CONTENTS Purpose of the N OG -1 Com pliance M atrix ............................................................................... 3 References ....................................................................................................................................... 3 1000 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 5 2000 Quality Assurance .................................................................................................................. 8 3000 Coatings and Finishes ........................................................................................................... 9 4000 Requirem ents for Structural Com ponents ......................................................................... 12 5000 M echanical ........................................................................................................................... 47 6000 Electrical Com ponents .................................................................................................... 95 7000 Inspection and Testing ....................................................................................................... 130 8000 Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handling ................................................. 153 9000 Planned Engineering Lifts .................................................................................................. 154 Page 2 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix Purpose of the NOG-1 Compliance Matrix The purpose of this report is to verify that the design of the new single failure proof crane upgrade meets the requirements of ASME NOG- 1, 2004. This report meets the intent of the matrix for reconciling the trolley design to single failure proof criteria per NOG-1, 2004.

Compliance with the requirements of NOG-1, 2004 is provided for the new trolley and associated upgrades in this document. All other components of the crane are addressed in the NUREG-0554 Compliance Matrix, which demonstrates the crane system as single failure proof by evaluation to the requirements of NUREG 0554.

References ASME NOG- 1, 2004 (Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder))

Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 P&H Drawing 28A1 1377 (Welded Box Girder)

P&H Drawing 29E5235 (Earthquake Restraint & End Stop)

P&H Drawing 29E5236 (Earthquake Restraint & End Stop)

P&H Drawing 105A3002 (Bridge Layout)

P&H Drawing I0F8 569 (Trolley Wheel Idler Axle)

P&H Drawing 10F7747F 1 (Bridge Wheel Drive Axle)

P&H Drawing 10F7748 (Bridge Wheel Idler Axle)

MMH Document 36675-02 (B22 Painting Specification)

MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations)

MMH Document 36675-06 (Electrical Calculations)

MMH Document 36675-07 (Factory Acceptance Test Procedure)

MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis)

MMH Document 36675-10 (Trolley Weld Calculation)

MMH Document 36675-11 (Critical List)

MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure)

MMH Document 36675-14 (Seismic Analysis of Misc. Items)

MMH Document 36675-15 (Crane Installation Procedure)

MMH Document 36675-17 (QA Document Binder)

MMH Document 36675-18 (Main Hoist Gearing Analysis)

MMH Document 36675-20 (Operation & Maintenance Manual)

MMH Document 36675-22 (NUREG-0554 Compliance Matrix)

MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report)

MMH Document MOP 18.1 (Preservation and Packaging)

MMH Drawing QR82460 (Main Hoist Hook Assembly)

MMH Drawing QR89592 (Main Hoist Gear Case Assembly)

MMH Drawing R94424 (Top Level Crane Assembly)

Page 3 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix MMH Drawing R94603 (Main Hoist Drum Assembly)

MMH Drawing QR94604 (Main Hoist Drum Machining)

MMH Drawing QR94709 (Main Hoist Motor)

MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly)

MMH Drawing R94780 (Main Hoist Machinery Assembly)

MMH Drawing QR94824 (Main Hoist Wire Rope Assembly)

MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly)

MMH Drawing R95005 (Main Hoist Bottom Block Assembly)

MMH Drawing R95253 (Trolley Wheel Assembly - Drive.)

MMH Drawing QR95370 (Trolley Frame Weldment)

MMH Drawing 54214604 (Interconnection Wiring Diagram)

MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic)

MMH Drawing R95797 (Conduit Layout)

Page 4 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 1000 Introduction 1100 GENERAL Cranes covered under this Standard shall be designed in accordance The crane is designed in accordance with this Standard's requirements.

with the Standard's requirements, but not necessarily with its recommendations. The word shall is used to denote a requirement, the word should is used to denote a recommendation, and the word may is used to denote permission, which is neither a requirement nor a recommendation.

1110 Scope This Standard covers electric overhead and gantry multiple girder The crane is an electric overhead, multiple-girder crane with a top cranes with top running bridge and trolley used at nuclear facilities running bridge and trolley for use in a nuclear facility and is covered by and components of cranes at nuclear facilities, this Standard.

1120 Applications This Standard applies to the design, manufacture, testing, This standard is applied to the design, manufacture, testing, inspection, inspection, shipment, storage, and erection of the cranes covered shipment, storage, and erection of the crane.

by this Standard.

1130 Responsibility The cranes covered by this Standard are classified into three Crane type, environmental conditions of service, performance types (see para. 1150, Definitions, crane types) depending requirements, type and service level of coatings and finishes, and degree upon crane location and usage of the crane at a nuclear facility, of Quality Assurance are detailed in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. The The owner shall be responsible for determining and specifying equipment design is in accordance with the specific needs of the end the crane type. The owner shall also be responsible for user, yet still employs the highest quality standards and engineering determining and specifying the environmental conditions of evaluations to determine that all safety systems are maintained.

service, performance requirements, type and service level of coatings and finishes, and degree of Quality Assurance.

Determining the extent to which this Standard can be used, either in part or in its entirety, at other than nuclear facilities, shall be the responsibility of those referencing the use of this Standard.

1140 Environmental Conditions (Types I, II,and III Cranes) 1141 Radiation (a) The purchase specification shall specify the accumulated (a) Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 details the accumulated radiation Page 5 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance radiation dosage expected to be seen by the crane in the life of the dosage expected to be seen by the crane in the life of the nuclear facility.

nuclear facility. (b) Components whose normal life could be reduced by the effects of the (b) Components whose normal life could be reduced by the effects specified radiation will be inspected and replaced as necessary per the of the specified radiation shall be tabulated and submitted to the recommendations in MMH Document 36675-20 (Operation &

crane purchaser. Maintenance Manual).

(c)Components whose failure, due to radiation, could result in loss (c) Components whose failure, due to radiation, could result in loss of one of one of the single failure-proof features which hold the load either of the single failure-proof features which hold the load either are either shall be designed to withstand the specified radiation or shall have designed to withstand the specified radiation or will have specific a specific replacement period. Where state-of-the-art is such that inspection and replacement procedures detailed in MMH Document sufficient data are not available, periodic inspections shall be made 36675-20 (Operation & Maintenance Manual).

by the purchaser to determine when replacement should be made.

See Note 1.

1142 Temperature (a) The purchase specification shall specify the following (a) Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 details the maximum and minimum temperature requirements in the area where the crane operates: operating temperatures in the area where the crane operates.

(1) maximum operating temperature, Construction temperatures are not provided since the crane is not used (2) minimum operating temperature, for construction (3) ambient temperature for motors, (b) The trolley is designed to withstand the effects of the specified (4) maximum construction temperature, and temperatures. Any limitations of the trolley design due to the specified (5) minimum construction temperature. temperature conditions will be provided in MMH Document 36675-20 (b) The crane shall be designed to withstand the effects of the (Operation & Maintenance Manual).

specified temperatures, or the limitations of the crane's design concerning these temperature conditions shall be specified by the See Note 1.

crane designer.

1143 Pressure (a) The purchase specification shall specify the following pressure (a) Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 details the normal operating pressure requirements in the area where the crane operates: conditions in the area where the crane operates.

(1) normal operating pressure and (b) The trolley is designed to withstand the effects of the specified (2) any test or abnormal event of these pressures including pressures. Any limitations of the trolley design due to the specified the rate of change. pressure conditions will be provided in MMH Document 36675-20 (b) The crane shall be designed to withstand the effects of the (Operation & Maintenance Manual). Enclosed components that are specified pressures, or the limitations of the crane's design exposed to changes in pressure are vented.

concerning these pressure conditions shall be specified by the Page 6 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof ReqUirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance manufacturer. Specifically where there are changes in pressure, See Note 1.

enclosures shall be vented.

1144 Humidity (a) The purchase specification shall specify the humidity conditions (a) Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 details the normal operating humidity in the area where the crane operates. conditions in the area where the crane operates.

(b) The crane shall be designed to withstand the effects of the (b) The trolley is designed to withstand the effects of the specified specified humidity, or the limitations of the crane's design humidity. Any limitations of the trolley design due to the specified concerning the humidity condition shall be specified by the humidity conditions are provided in MMH Document 36675-20 manufacturer. (Operation & Maintenance Manual).

See Note 1.

1145 Chemical (a) Spray Systems (a) N/A - The crane is not subject to any spray systems (1) If the crane may be subject to any spray systems, then (b) Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 details the Zion spent fuel pool the chemistry of the spray shall be specified in the purchase chemistry. The load block and wire rope are immersed in the pool and specification. Any restrictions on the use of materials due to associated lubricants are selected to be non-water soluble and free of the effects of the spray shall also be specified. Specifically, halogenated compounds, halogens, mercury, and other deleterious where a corrosive spray is present the possibility of H2 materials to ensure compatibility with the pool chemistry. MSDS will be generation exists and, therefore, the use of exposed provided for all chemicals used, including coatings and lubricants. Any aluminum, magnesium, galvanized steel, and zinc is to be limitations of the crane design due to the pool chemistry and lubrication minimized. requirements will be provided in MMH Document 36675-20 (Operation &

(2) The crane shall be designed to withstand the effects of Maintenance Manual).

the specified spray and shall not use the specified restricted materials. Any limitations of the crane's design concerning the spray condition and the use of any restricted materials shall be specified by the manufacturer prior to the manufacture of the crane.

(b) Pools (1) If the crane's load block and wire rope are to be immersed, then the chemistry of the pool shall be specified in the purchase specification. Requirements for the materials and lubricants of the load block and wire rope shall also be specified to insure compatibility with the pool Page 7 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance chemistry. In reactor and fuel pools, the lubricants shall basically be nonwater-soluble and shall be free of halogenated compounds, halogens, mercury, and other deleterious materials.

(2) Load blocks and wire ropes that are to be immersed shall be lubricated with a lubricant that meets the specified lubrication requirements. Any limitations of the crane design concerning the pool chemistry and lubrication requirements shall be specified by the manufacturer.

1150 Definitions

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified definitions are used to properly describe the equipment or process.

1160 References The following is a list of codes and standards referenced in NOG-1. The Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley system complies with the codes and These codes and standards apply to the extent invoked at the point standards to the extent invoked at the point of reference.

of reference.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

1170 Nomenclature The nomenclature used in this Standard is listed and defined in the Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

Section in which it is used.

1180 Conversion Factors Conversion factors, including metric equivalents, are provided in All calculations take unit systems and conversion factors into the Mandatory Appendix I. consideration.

2000 Quality Assurance 2100 REQUIREMENTS (a) The quality assurance program of the Manufacturer of Types I (a) The quality assurance program used for the manufacture of Type I and II cranes shall meet the Basic and Supplemental Requirements Cranes is a 10 CFR 50 compliant QA program equivalent to the ASME of ASME NQA-1, or shall meet the Quality Assurance Requirements NQA-1 program. This program is audited for compliance. Ref. MMH specified by the owner. Document 36675-11 (Critical List) for items covered under this program.

(b) A specific quality assurance program for manufacturers of Type (b) N/A - This is a Type I Crane III cranes is not required unless specified in the procurement (c) N/A - This is a Type I Crane documents. (d) A quality assurance program for electrical components is not specified (c) A specific quality assurance program for mechanical components per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

Page 8 of 154

NOG- I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single FailUre Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance for Type II cranes is not required unless specified in the procurement documents. (e) Specific quality assurance requirements for Type I structural and (d) A specific quality assurance program for suppliers of electrical mechanical components not listed in Table 7200-1 are not specified per components for Types I and II cranes is not required unless Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. This is not a Type II crane.

specified in the procurement documents.

(e) A specific quality assurance program for suppliers of Type I crane (f)The quality assurance program for packaging, shipping, receiving, structural and mechanical components which are not listed in Table storage, and handling of the crane upgrade components is in 7200-1, and for Type II crane structural components which are not conformance with Section 8000.

listed in Table 7200-2, is not required unless specified in the procurement documents.

(f) The quality assurance program for packaging, shipping, receiving, storage, and handling of Types I and II cranes shall be in conformance with Section 8000.

3000 Coatings and Finishes 3100 COATING SERVICE LEVELS The owner shall specify either coating service level I or II as defined A coating service is not specified per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003, so a below. service level II coating is used.

(a) Coating Service Level I. For use in areas where coating failure (a) N/A - A service level II coating is applied to the trolley.

could adversely affect the operation of post-accident fluid systems (b) A service level II coating is applied to the trolley to provide corrosion and, thereby, impair safe shutdown. With few exceptions, coating protection and decontaminability in those areas outside primary service level I applies to coatings inside a nuclear power plant's containment subject to radiation exposure and radionuclide primary containment. contamination. Ref. MMH Document 36675-02 (B22 Painting (b) Coating Service Level II. For use in areas where coating failure Specification).

could impair, but not prevent, normal operating performance. The function of coating service level II coatings is to provide corrosion See Note 1.

protection and decontaminability in those areas outside primary containment subject to radiation exposure and radionuclide contamination. Coating service level II also applies to coatings in nonradiation areas.

3200 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR COATING SERVICE LEVELS 3210 Requirements for Coating Service Level I (a) Coating requirements for coating service level I shall be in accordance with ASTM D 5144, Standard Guide for Use of (a-c) N/A - A service level II coating is applied to the trolley.

Page 9 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance Protective Coating Standards in Nuclear Power Plants.

(b) In accordance with ASTM D 5144, coating service level I requires See Note 1.

a quality assurance program.

(c) Inspection and testing of coatings for coating service level I shall be in accordance with para. 7700. Specific coating inspections shall be specified by the owner, dependent upon the coating system being used. See ASTM D 5161, Standard Guide for Specifying Inspection Requirements for Coating and Lining Work (Metal Substrates), for selecting and specifying the appropriate inspection requirements.

3220 Requirements for Coating Service Level II (a) Coating requirements for coating service level II shall be as (a) N/A - Coating requirements are specified per Zion Specification SP-ZS-specified by the owner. The owner may invoke applicable sections FH-003 of ASTM D 5144, Standard Guide for Use of Protective Coating (b) N/A - Quality assurance requirements for coating service level II are Standards in Nuclear Power Plants. not specified per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 (b) Quality assurance requirements for coating service level II shall (c) Inspection and testing requirements for coating service level II are in only apply as specified by the owner. accordance with this standard.

(c) Inspection and testing requirements for coating service level II shall be in accordance with para. 7700. See Note 1.

3230 Additional Requirements Applicable to All Coatings Additional requirements for coatings and finishes are listed in (a) Ref. MMH Document 36675-02 (B22 Painting Specification) for the through (o) below. Further information for coatings and finishes is following items.

provided in Nonmandatory Appendix A, Section A3240. (a) A service level II coating is applied to the trolley, which exceeds the (a) If not specified by the owner, the type of coating will be requirements of Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

determined by the manufacturer to meet the specified (b) Welding through coatings is prohibited.

environmental conditions of service and coating service level. (c) Surfaces exposed to the environment, but inaccessible after assembly Specifically, the selected coatings shall be suitable for any specified are coated prior to assembly.

radiation, temperature, and chemical immersion or chemical spray (d) Interior or enclosed surfaces of the equipment are, at a minimum, environment. primed or coated with appropriate preservatives.

(b) Welding through coatings shall not be allowed unless the (e) Contact surfaces of friction-type joints to be joined by high-strength coating system is specifically designed and formulated as a bolts are prepared in accordance with AISC "Specifications for Structural weldable system and documentation can be provided by the Joints Using ASTM A325 or A490 Bolts." Coating systems prohibited by coating manufacturer to attest to this capability. The use of these para. 1145 are not used.

Page 10 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance coatings shall be approved by the owner. (f) Machined mating surfaces and other surfaces not normally protected (c) Surfaces exposed to the environment, but inaccessible after by the specified coating system are protected by means of appropriate assembly, such as wheel wells and hubs, shall be coated prior to preservative for shipment and storage. Any preservatives that must be assembly. removed prior to operation are identified.

(d) Coating of interior or enclosed surfaces of the equipment, such (y) Forced curing or drying is not used unless recommended by as inside a welded box section, is not required by this Standard. manufacturer.

(e) Contact surfaces of friction-type joints to be joined by high- (h) Fillers, sealants, and caulking compounds arecompatible with the strength bolts shall not be coated with specified coating system coating system.

except for organic or inorganic zinc coating systems not prohibited (i) Finished components are furnished with conventional coatings unless by para. 1145. otherwise specified by the owner.

(f) Machined mating surfaces and other surfaces not normally (j) N/A - A service level II coating is applied to the trolley.

protected by the specified coating system, such as hooks, hook (k) Nameplates and warning labels of factory finished components that nuts, wheel treads, rails, gears, shafts, pinions, couplings, drum are recoated are masked to preserve legibility.

grooves, sheave grooves, and brake wheels, shall be protected by (I) Items such as fasteners and conduit are coated, galvanized or plated means of an appropriate preservative for shipment and/or storage. and comply with the chemical requirements of para. 1145.

The manufacturer shall specify which preservatives must be A list of galvanized and plated items can be provided upon request.

removed by the owner for proper operation of the equipment. (mn) Any surface contaminants detected are removed after surface Other preservatives may be removed by the owner after installation preparation to comply with the requirements of the Steel Structures of the equipment. Paining Council (SSPC) Painting Manual.

(g) Forced curing or drying of the coating system shall not be (n) Any surfaces with visible deterioration beyond the specified SSPC performed unless recommended by the coating manufacturer. preparation are re-prepared.

(h) Fillers, sealants, and caulking compounds shall be compatible (o) When touchup is required on small surfaces where conventional with the coating system. blasting is not desirable, vacuum blasting, power tool cleaning, or hand (i) Finished components, such as motors, brakes, gear reducers, sanding is used as specified.

limit switches, electrical dials and gauges, control enclosures, brake rectifier cabinets, control masters, safety switches, auxiliary See Note 1.

heaters, push-button stations, transformers, manual magnetic disconnects, light fixtures, reactors, resistor banks, protective guards, cross-shaft bearing blocks, unitized hoists, interior of control cabinets, festoon trolley cable spacer systems cab interiors, and radio control equipment, may be furnished with conventional coatings unless otherwise specified by the owner.

(j) For coating service level I applications, the equipment Page 11 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance manufacturer shall supply the estimated surface area of exposed parts provided with conventional coatings.

(k) Nameplates and warning labels of factory finished components that are recoated shall be masked to preserve legibility.

(I) Items such as fasteners and conduits shall be supplied with the specified coating system, galvanized, or plating. Galvanizing or plating shall be subject to the requirements of para. 1145. When specifically requested by the owner, a list of galvanized or plated parts shall be provided by the equipment manufacturer.

(m) Surface contaminants, such as grease and oil, detected after blasting shall be removed to produce the surface conditions required by the appropriate Steel Structures Painting Council (SSPC) surface preparation requirement.

(n) If there is visible deterioration of the surface beyond the specified SSPC preparation, repreparation of the surface shall be required.

(o) Preparation of surface shall be accomplished by the methods originally used, except that small areas requiring repair or touchup where conventional blasting is not desirable may be reprepared by one of the following methods. These methods are listed in descending order of effectiveness.

(1) Vacuum blasting to clean an abrasive finish with a minimum 2.0 mil profile; the minimum blasting air pressure shall be 50 psi at the blasting nozzle.

(2) Power tool cleaning using grinding wheels, sanding discs, or other devices to provide a minimum 2 mil profile in accordance with SSPC SP-3; the use of a needle gun to roughen the surface after grinding is recommended.

(3) Hand sanding to obtain as clean a surface as possible in accordance with SSPC SP-2; or wire brushing in accordance with SSPC SP-2.

4000 Requirements for Structural Components 4100 GENERAL Page 12 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 4110 Scope Section 4000 specifies the design criteria, design, materials, and The structural components are designed, procured and manufactured per fabrication procedures for the structural components of Types I, II, the requirements of Section 4000.

and III cranes. The structural components of the crane are identified in para. 4400.

4120 Nomenclature The nomenclature listed herein is used in the equations in 4000. For Calculation documentation adheres to the nomenclature used in Section further information on nomenclature, application, and units of 4000 to the extent practical. Any alternative nomenclature used in measurement, see the Section 4000 references noted in calculations is accompanied by complete descriptions.

parentheses.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

4130 Description of Loads The loads described herein are the loads to be used for the analysis All loads used for the analysis and design of the structural components of and design of the structural components of the crane. The loads are the crane are detailed in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 except for the to be combined as outlined in para. 4140. All loads described, trolley dead load, which is provided in MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley except the crane dead loads, shall be stated by the purchaser in the Assembly). The loads are combined as outlined in para. 4140 for purchase specification. applicable calculations.

4131 Dead Loads (a) Trolley Pdt: the total weight of the trolley including all machinery (a) The total weight of the trolley is provided in MMH Drawing R94779 and equipment attached thereto. (Trolley Assembly) and is used in applicable calculations.

(b) Bridge or Gantry Frame Pdb : the total weight of the bridge or (b) The total weight of the bridge structure is determined from gantry frame structure including all machinery and equipment documentation provided by the customer and is used in applicable attached thereto, trucks, wheels, and end ties. calculations. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

4132 Live Loads (a) Rated Load Pr. The design rated load to be lifted and Ref. Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 for the following items:

transported by the crane which by definition is not considered as (a) The design rated load to be lifted and transported by the crane is the critical load. An allowance for lifting accessories which are not provided. Allowance for lifting accessories which are not part of the part of the crane, such as yokes, spreader beams, etc., is to be crane are included in the design rated load.

included in the design rated load. (b) Critical loads and lifting accessory weights are provided The duration (b) CriticalLoad Pkg. For the definition of critical load, see para. the critical load is expected to be on the hook was not included in Zion 1150. In addition to listing each critical load, the purchaser shall Specification SP-ZS-FH-003, however is expected to be less than 150 furnish the duration in hours per year that each critical load is hours per year, which is well under usage assumed in NOG-1 Section expected to be on the crane hook. An allowance for lifting 4350.

Page 13 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1,Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance i

accessories is to be included in each critical load. (c) N/A - This crane is not used for construction (c) Construction Load Pcn. The maximum expected construction load (d) The credible critical load is specified as the maximum critical load to be lifted and transported by the crane during the plant (MCL), which is equivalent to the design rated load. This load is used in construction phase, prior to its use as a plant operating crane. combination with the spectra provided for the safe shutdown earthquake (d) Credible CriticalLoad Pco, Pcs. Pca is the weight of lifted load (SSE), which envelopes the operating basis earthquake (OBE).

which may be considered in combination with the operating basis earthquake (0BE). P, is the weight of lifted load which may be considered in combination with the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

Alternatively, Po and P, may be defined to be lifted loads in credible combinations with seismic events other than OBE and SSE.

If this alternative method is used, the appropriate substitution for Pe and Pe, shall be made in load combinations Pc1 o and Pc12.

The loads and seismic events shall be specified by the Purchaser.

4133 Impact Loads (a) Vertical Impact Load Pv. Shall be taken as 15% of the maximum Ref. MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) and MMH Document lifted load. 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report) for the following items:(a)

(b) Transverse Horizontal Load Pht. The horizontal load transverse to 15% of the maximum lifted load is used for vertical impact loads.

the bridge is induced by the acceleration or deceleration of the (b) The horizontal load transverse to the bridge is taken as 5% of the bridge crane or gantry crane along its runway and shall be taken as combined bridge dead load, the trolley dead load, and the maximum 5% each of the bridge or gantry frame dead load, the trolley dead lifted load.

load, and the maximum lifted load. (c) The horizontal load longitudinal to the bridge is taken as 10% of the (c) LongitudinalHorizontalLoad Phi. The horizontal load longitudinal trolley dead load and the maximum lifted load.

to the bridge is induced by the acceleration or deceleration of the trolley on the crane bridge girder rails and shall be taken as 10% of the trolley dead load and the maximum lifted load.

4134 Wind Loads The following wind loads are to be considered to act in any (a) N ZS requests an exception to Section 4140 for inclusion of Operating direction. Wind Pw, in the load combinations since this crane is used indoors and (a) Operating Wind Pw,. The maximum wind load under which the Operating Wind P,, is not part of the facility design basis.

crane will be permitted to operate. If none is stipulated by the (b) ZS requests an exception to Section 4140 for inclusion of Design Wind purchaser, then the nominal wind load specified in CMAA 70 shall Pwd in the load combinations for the crane analysis since this crane is be used. used indoors.

Page 14 of 154

NOG-I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (b) Design Wind Pwd. The plant design basis wind load resulting from (c) ZS requests an exception to Section 4140 for inclusion of Tornado the 100 year recurrence, "fastest mile of wind." Under this loading, Wind P,, in the load combinations for the crane analysis since this crane the crane will not be operational, but be secured. is used indoors. Procedural provisions shall be made to prevent fuel (c) Tornado Wind P,. The plant design basis tornado loads. Tornado transfer operations during a tornado watch or warning.

pressure differentials associated with the plant design basis tornado shall be included in the loading. Tornado-generated missiles shall be considered. The purchaser shall be responsible for the missile parameters and method of evaluation of tornado loads and tornado-generated missiles. Under these loadings, the crane will not be operational, but be secured. Indoor cranes may be subjected to the design basis tornado if the building enclosures have been designed to fail.

i 4135 Normal Plant Operating Loads (a) Plant OperationInduced Loads Pp. The loads imposed on the (a) N/A - Plant operation induced loads are not specified.

crane through the supporting structure due to normal operation of (b) N/A Static test pressure loads are not specified.

plant equipment. The crane is not operating.

(b) Static Test PressureLoad Ptp. The over-pressure imposed on the crane due to the static test pressure load for the structure enclosing the crane. This load applies only to those cranes housed within containments. The crane is not operating.

4136 Seismic and Abnormal Events Loads (a) Safe Shutdown Earthquake Pe" The site SSE parameters shall be (a) Response spectra for safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) are provided in used in the seismic analysis of the bridge crane or the gantry crane Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 and ENERCON Calculations ZION001-following the procedures outlined in para. 4140. CALC-002, -025 & 4 and are used for the seismic analysis of the crane (b) Operating Basis Earthquake Pe. The site OBE parameters shall be following the procedures outlined in para. 4140.

used in the seismic analysis of the bridge crane or the gantry crane Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH following the procedures outlined in para. 4140. Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

(c) Abnormal Event Loads P,. Loads caused by failure of plant (b) N/A - SSE loads are used, which envelope the OBE loads.

equipment which impose jet or missile loads on the crane. The (c) N/A - Abnormal event loads are not specified.

Purchaser shall be responsible for the effects of, and shall establish the criteria for, these loads.

-i 4140 Load Combinations The followingv tabulated loads and their designations w

are described ZS requests an exception to this section for inclusion of the Operating Page 15 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance in para. 4120. The various load combinations, using the load Wind P, Design Wind Pwd and Tornado Wind P,,t for the crane analysis, designations, are listed herein. All load combinations are applicable since this crane is used indoors. Note that wind loads are included in the to Types I and II cranes, whereas the Crane Operational Loads and design basis for the building structure.

the Construction Loads combinations are applicable to the Type III cranes. Procedural provisions shall be made to lower the likelihood of fuel

[Text and/or equations omitted] transfer operations during a tornado watch or warning.

The various load combinations specified are used for applicable calculations. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

4150 Seismic Analysis for Types I and II Cranes 4151 Methods of Analysis A dynamic analysis method (e.g., response spectrum or time-history The response spectrum method was used for the dynamic seismic method) shall be used to establish the response of the crane to a analysis.

seismic event.

4152 Seismic Input Data The seismic input data for the crane seismic analysis shall be The rail level response spectra are provided by ZionSolutions and applied provided in the specification for the crane. The seismic input shall using the response spectrum method. The credible critical load is be specified as broadened floor response spectra or time histories specified as the maximum critical load (MCL), which is equivalent to the of acceleration, displacements, or velocities defined at an design rated load. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress appropriate level in the structure supporting the crane. Calculations) and MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

For analysis of a crane with a suspended critical load, the specification for the crane shall provide the credible critical load.

The basis for determining the credible critical load will be studies of site seismicity and expected crane usage (see para. 4132).

4153 Linear Analysis 4153.1 Response Spectrum Method The crane shall be considered to respond as a linear elastic system The linear response spectrum method is used for seismic evaluation of when using the response spectrum method. The undamped natural the crane. Modal solution is performed and un-damped natural modes modes and frequencies shall be computed using a model acceptable and frequencies are determined for use in the spectrum analysis. Ref.

under the rules of this Section. These outputs shall serve as the MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH basis for mode-by-mode computation of the response of the crane Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

to each of the three components of seismic input.

Page 16 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 4153.2 Time-History Analysis Time histories of structural response at the appropriate level may N/A - The response spectrum method was used instead of a time-history be used for analysis of the crane. The time histories shall be analysis.

provided by the purchaser, and shall account for parametric variation in the supporting structure. Procedures for assembling the mathematical model shall be in accordance with this Section. The effects of the three components of ground motion shall be combined in accordance with the following requirements.

(a) The representative maximum values of the structural responses to each of the three components of earthquake motion shall be combined by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the maximum representative values of the co-directional responses caused by each of the three components of earthquake motion at a particular point of the structure or of the mathematical model.

(b) The maximum value of a particular response of interest for design of a given element may be obtained through a step-by-step method. The time-history responses from each of the three components of the earthquake motions may be obtained separately and then combined algebraically at each time step, or the response at each time step may be calculated directly, owing to the simultaneous action of the three components. The maximum response is determined by scanning the combined time-history solution. When this method is used, the earthquake motions specified in the three different directions shall be statistically independent.

4153.3 Crane Mathematical Model (a) The crane shall be represented by a generalized three- Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH dimensional system of nodes. The model's geometry shall reflect Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) for the following items:

the overall size, length, connectivity, and stiffnesses of the various (a) A detailed finite element representation of the crane structure is structural members. An appropriate element representation of generated that represents the overall size, length, connectivity, and each member shall be used to describe all components which stiffness of the various structural members. Shell elements are used to contribute significantly to the stiffness of the crane. The elements represent the trolley-and beam elements are used to represent the bridge shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following structures, including the end ties and end trucks. A combination of beam Page 17 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single.Failure Proof Requirements -I-Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance structural members: bridge girders, trolley frame, gantry legs, end and shell elements is used to model the drum. Gear cases, motors, ties, end trucks, platform supports, and cab supports; and for bottom blocks, electrical enclosures, platforms, and wheels are cranes required to be analyzed for credible critical loads, drum, contributed as lumped mass. Line elements emanating from the end upper block supports, and hoist ropes. Line elements emanating trucks are used to represent the connectivity of the wheels of the crane from the end truck shall be used to represent the connectivity of to the runway rail.

the wheels of the crane to the runway rail. (b) End trucks are directly bolted to the bridge girders, so pinned (b) For cranes using bogeyed wheel trucks, pinned connections shall connections are not applicable. Where various connected structural be specified for line elements which represent the attachment of members of the crane do not have intersecting centroidal axes, stiff line the end trucks to the bridge girders or gantry legs. Where various elements are used to represent the offset. These elements have connected structural members of the crane do not have stiffnesses an order of magnitude higher than the most stiff structural intersecting centroidal axes, stiff line elements shall be used to member of the crane.

represent the offset. These elements shall have stiffnesses which (c) A detailed shell model of the trolley structure is used instead of a are an order of magnitude higher than the most stiff structural simplified stiff line model to represent the exact response of the member of the crane. structure.

(c) A simplified finite element representation of the trolley structure using stiff line elements may be used for the crane dynamic model, provided it can be shown by rational analyses that the actual trolley structure responding as an uncoupled system has natural frequencies above 33 Hz. The model used for seismic analysis should be evaluated and revised if required to account for higher frequencies if plant operations induce such frequencies.

4153.4 Location and Number of Dynamic Degrees of Freedom Dynamic degrees of freedom shall be assigned to a sufficient number of node points, and in such locations that the real mass and Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH stiffness distribution of the crane are simulated. Structural Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) for the following items:

members subject to concentrated loads shall be provided with A detailed finite element model of the crane is generated using computer additional nodes at the points where a concentrated load or its software with a significant number of nodes to accurately simulate the equivalent mass is positioned. Crane components to be modeled as real mass and stiffness of the crane. Crane components such as upper and mass points (concentrated loads) shall include, but not be limited lower blocks, gear cases, motors, brakes, control cabinets, cab, wheels, to, upper and lower blocks, gear cases, motors, brakes, heavy etc. are modeled as mass points and connected at their respective electrical control cabinets, cab, wheel assemblies, and trunnion locations to represent the exact behavior of the crane. Missing mass pins. The total number of masses, or degrees of freedom, selected applications are performed to justify that additional degrees of freedom shall be considered adequate when additional degrees of freedom do not result in more than 10% increase in response. Dynamic coupling is Page 18 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance do not result in more than a 10% increase in responses. Dynamic accounted for.

coupling shall be accounted for.

4153.5 Decoupling Criteria for the Crane Runway The crane and runway shall be evaluated to determine if the crane (a-c) Coupled building-crane analysis was performed by a ZionSolutions can be represented as a separate model or a model coupled with vendor (ENERCON) for evaluation of the building. From the coupled the runway. For the crane to be considered decoupled from the analysis, ENERCON also generated the response spectra at crane rail level runway, the criteria of (a) or (b) below shall be met. for Konecranes to evaluate the trolley and bridge. MMH Document (a) If Rm < 0.01, decoupling can be done for any Rf. 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) addresses the new response spectrum data (b) If 0.01*5 Rm *0.1, decoupling can be done if Rf*5 0.8 or if Rf 2 generated from the coupled building-crane model.

1.25.

(c) If Rm > 0.1, or 0.8 < R*<_ 1.25, an approximate model of the runway system shall be included with the crane model.

Rm and Rfare defined as:

Rm = total mass of the crane / mass of the runway system Rf = fundamental frequency of the crane / frequency of the dominant runway motion The purchaser shall determine the mass and frequency characteristics of the crane runway.

4153.6 Boundary Conditions at Trolley and Runway Rails The crane bridge (including gantry legs, if applicable) and trolley The bridge and trolley are provided with seismic restraints that prevent shall be provided with devices so that they remain on their them from leaving their respective rails during and after a seismic event respective runways during and after a seismic event. Characteristics as shown in P&H Drawing 29E5235 (Earthquake Restraint & End Stop),

of these devices that influence the dynamic behavior of the crane P&H Drawing 29E5236 (Earthquake Restraint & End Stop), and MMH shall be included as boundary conditions in the model of the crane. Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly). The seismic restraints are considered The restraint devices shall be considered to be in contact with the to be in contact with the resisting structure in establishing boundary resisting structure in establishing boundary conditions used in the conditions used in MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) analysis for the crane. The restraint device and resisting structure and MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis), and the resisting shall be designed for the maximum load resulting from the structures are designed for the maximum resulting load. Displacement boundary condition considered. The crane shall be modeled with boundary conditions are applied in the analysis with respect to Figure Page 19 of 154

NOG- 1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof ReqUirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance the boundary conditions specified in Fig. 4154.3-1, unless additional 4154.3-1 and Table 4154.3-1.

restraining, driving, or holding mechanisms exist. Basic boundary conditions for the crane model shall be consistent with the figure and the rational displacements, deformations, and forces in the structure under consideration.

4153.7 Trolley Locations and Hoist Positions The crane (bridge and trolley) shall be analyzed under two separate The analysis procedures in MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress loading conditions: Calculations) and MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) use three (a) credible critical load on hook different trolley positions that correspond to: the trolley at its extreme (b) no load on hook end positions on the bridge span; the trolley at the 1/4 point of the span The analysis procedure shall use three different trolley positions. positions; and the trolley at mid-span. The hook is also analyzed with (b)

These correspond to: the trolley at its extreme end positions on the no load and with (a) the credible critical load at the high hook and low bridge span; the trolley at the 1/4 point of the span positions; and hook positions as specified in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. The seismic the trolley at mid-span. In calculating the 1/4 and mid-span response for each direction and for each node is vector summed and positions, a location on the trolley which is approximately equal to added to the absolute value of the response observed during static the center between the closest trolley wheel to the loaded hook loading.

shall be positioned at the appropriate point on the span. Two positions of the loaded hook shall also be analyzed: hook up and hook down. The hook positions shall be specified by the purchaser.

Table 4153.7-1 shows 21 independent load cases which are to be considered. The maximum combined structural responses SRmax at each node, in terms of displacement, forces, moments, stresses, is SRmax = largest of SR 22, SR 23, .. ., SR 29, SR30 4153.8 Damping Values The response of each mode is determined from the amplified response The response of each mode shall be determined from the amplified spectra provided in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 for the appropriate response spectra for the appropriate values of structural damping. values of structural damping.

A damping value of 7% of critical damping shall be used for the The structure, both crane support structure and SFP building structure, crane when the SSE is used in the analysis. A damping value of 4% are composed of reinforced concrete, bolted, riveted and welded steel of critical damping shall be used when the OBE is used in the members. Structures constructed of reinforced concrete and welded analysis. steel have damping equal to 2% and 5% of critical for the Design Page 20 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance Earthquake and Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE), respectively, as provided in the Zion Seismic Design Criteria, DC-SE-002-ZI. The bolted connections between the steel beams and the floor are rigid components designed to transfer significant loads to the concrete and as such do not have damping that is significantly higher than that for welded steel. Any bolted connections associated with the crane are local to the crane and do not impact the dynamic response of the structure. Therefore, the use of 2% and 5% damping for the purposes of evaluating the structure at all modes is appropriate.

Additionally, response spectra curves for time histories at the bridge crane wheels are provided to the crane vendor at 4% damping of critical for MCE, which is lower than 7% required per ASME NOG-1-2004, Section 4153.8, for the crane vendor's evaluation of the Overhead Bridge Crane.

A damping value of 7% of critical damping is used for the crane when the SSE is used in the analysis, which envelopes the OBE loading. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

4153.9 Number of Modes Required for Seismic Analysis Modal solution is performed up to 33 Hz and all mode shapes are It is not generally necessary to include the contributions of all extracted. A 0.001 default threshold value for mode participation is used.

modes to the seismic response of the crane. A modal participation Above the 33 Hz value, missing mass method is performed to justify that factor shall be used with the modal frequencies to select significant additional modes do not result in more than 10% increase in response.

modes. Since high frequency modes may respond strongly in some The missing mass method constitutes the total effect of all system mass cases, it is not sufficient to limit the modal analysis to the first that is not included in the modes with frequencies above 33 Hertz.

several modes computed. Additional modes shall be computed until Additional response due to the missing mass is calculated by performing a the inclusion of additional modes does not result in more than a static analysis for an applied load that is equal to the missing mass 10% increase in response. multiplied by the highest gravitational acceleration value (ZPA) above 33 Hertz in the provided spectrums. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

4153.10 Combination of Modal Responses In combining the static and dynamic responses, it shall be assumed Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH that the dynamic responses have the sign which yields the worst Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) for the following items:

Page 21 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance case for the combination being considered. The loading conditions Dynamic responses are assumed to have the sign which yields the worst for the static and dynamic load cases which are required to be case for the combination being considered.

considered, and the corresponding structural responses (SR1, SR2, (a) When the results of the modal dynamic analysis show that the crane etc.) are listed in Table 4153.7-1. modes are not closely spaced, the crane's response to each of the three (a) With No Closely Spaced Modes. When the results of the modal components of seismic input are combined by taking the square root of dynamic analysis show that the crane modes are not closely spaced, the sum of the squares (SRSS).

the crane's. response to each of the three components of seismic (b) When the results of the modal dynamic analysis show that some or all input shall be combined by taking the square root of the sum of the of the modes are closely spaced, modal responses for each of the three squares (SRSS). components for seismic input are combined using the grouping method (b) With Closely Spaced Modes. When the results of the modal as described.

dynamic analysis show that some or all of the modes are closely (c) The representative maximum values of the structural responses of spaced (two consecutive modes are defined as closely spaced if each of the three directional components of earthquake motion are their frequencies differ from each other by 10% or less of the lower combined by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the frequency), modal responses for each of the three components for maximum representative values of the co-directional responses caused seismic input shall be combined using one of the following three by each of the three components of earthquake motion at each node of methods. the crane mathematical model. Maximum values for each of the three-(1) Grouping Method. Closely spaced modes shall be divided directional components of earthquake motion are calculated per Table into groups that include all modes having frequencies 4153.7-2. The maximum combined structural response at each node is between the lowest frequency in the group and a frequency determined as specified.

10% higher [see Note (1) below]. The representative maximum value of a particular response of interest for the design of a given element of a nuclear power plant structure, system, or the crane attributed to each such group of modes shall first be obtained by taking the sum of the absolute values of the corresponding peak values of the response of the element attributed to individual modes in that group. The representative maximum value of this particular response attributed to all the significant modes of the structure, system, or the crane shall then be obtained by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of corresponding representative maximum values of the response of the element attributed to each closely spaced group of modes and the remaining modal responses for the Page 22 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance modes that are not closely spaced.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(2) Ten-Percent Method

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(3) Double-Sum Method

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(c) Combination of Three Components of Earthquake Motion. The representative maximum values of the structural responses of each of the three directional components of earthquake motion shall be combined by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the maximum representative values of the co-directional responses caused by each of the three components of earthquake motion at each node of the crane mathematical model. Table 4153.7-2 lists the representative maximum values (SR 22, SR23, etc.) for each of the three-directional components of earthquake motion which are required to be calculated.

The maximum combined structural response (SRmax) at each node, in terms of displacements, forces, moments, and stresses, is the largest of the representative maximum values of the structural responses of each of the three-directional components of earthquake motion, i.e.,

SRmax = largest of SR 22, . . ., SR 29, SR 30 4154 Nonlinear Time History for Slack Rope Condition For the case when the credible critical load is being supported by Slack rope condition is not observed with the provided spectrums.

the hoist ropes, and the results of the linear analysis of para. 4153 Accordingly, non-linear time history analysis of the ropes is not required.

indicate a slack rope condition, that is, rope going into compression, Ref. MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) and MMH Document the nonlinear time-history method of analysis shall be used to 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

determine the maximum rope tension loads resulting from a slack rope condition. These loads shall be used for the sizing of the rope only.

Nonlinear analysis concerns the performance of a dynamic analysis of the crane, when subjected to earthquake-induced forces, taking Page 23 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG 1 Single: Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance into account the nonlinear properties (for example, tension only of the hoist ropes). To perform such an analysis, computer programs are available to solve the equations of motion via direct integration techniques at discrete time intervals over the time history of the earthquake.

4154.1 Crane Mathematical Mode The crane finite element model shall be similar to the one described Slack rope condition is not observed with the provided spectrums.

in para. 4143.3 for the linear analysis, except that the crane trolley Accordingly, non-linear time history analysis of the ropes is not required.

and bridge geometry may be simplified if justification can be Ref. MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) and MMH Document provided that the coupling effects of those degrees of freedom that 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

are omitted from the three- dimensional model are not significant.

A nonlinear spring (tension member only) shall be used to represent the hoist ropes.

4154.2 Location and Number of Dynamic Degrees of Freedom Dynamic degrees of freedom shall be assigned to a sufficient number of node points and in such locations that the real mass and Slack rope condition is not observed with the provided spectrums.

stiffness distribution of the crane is simulated. An important Accordingly, non-linear time history analysis of the ropes is not required.

consideration for modeling the crane for the nonlinear analysis is Ref. MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) and MMH Document that the fundamental frequency of the crane system in its unloaded 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

(no load on the hook) configuration approximates that determined by the linear analysis.

4154.3 Boundary Conditions at Trolley and Runway Rails Boundary conditions for the crane model shall be consistent with Slack rope condition is not observed with the provided spectrums.

those specified in para. 4153.6, Fig. 4154.3-1, and Table 4154.3-1. Accordingly, non-linear time history analysis of the ropes is not required.

Ref. MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) and MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

4154.4 Trolley Locations and Hoist Positions A combined trolley and loaded hook position shall be selected so as Slack rope condition is not observed with the provided spectrums.

to result in a crane system frequency which produces the severest Accordingly non-linear time history analysis of the ropes is not required.

slack rope conditions. Trolley locations and hoist positions specified Ref. MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) and MMH Document in para. 4153.7 shall be considered. 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

4154.5 Damping Values A critical damping ratio of 7% shall be used for the rope for Slack rope condition is not observed with the provided spectrums.

Page 24 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance determining the damping parameters required to form the damping Accordingly, non-linear time history analysis of the ropes is not required.

matrix. Higher values may be used with adequate justification. Ref. MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) and MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

4160 Tolerances Dimensions of welded beams, girders, and built-up members shall Welded beams, girders, and built-up members are within the tolerances be within the tolerances specified by AWS D1.1. All measurements specified by AWS D14.1. Procedures qualified under AWS D1.1 are shall be based on 70'F ambient temperature and be taken at the acceptable under AWS D14.1 per Section 9.1.4. Measurements are taken manufacturer's plant prior to shipment, unless otherwise specified. during the fabrication process and any deviations from specifications are A minimum dimensional check of a member will consider included in MMH Document 36675-17 (CIA Document Binder).

straightness, camber, lateral deviation of web to flange center lines, and depth. Overall crane dimensions shall be in accordance with the Overall crane dimensions are detailed in MMH Drawing R94424 (Top crane manufacturer's clearance drawing of the crane. Dimensions Level Crane Assembly) and are in accordance with the crane on the clearance drawings are the maximum dimensions of the manufacturer's clearance drawings. Crane clearances will be verified and crane and shall not be exceeded by the manufacturer. Height and documented in MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test end dimensions shall be shown in relationship to the top of the Procedure). Height and end dimensions are shown in relationship to the runway rail center line. Cumulative measurements of crane top of the runway rail center line in MMH Drawing R94424 (Top Level components are permitted. The accuracy of the runway rail Crane Assembly).

dimensions shall be the responsibility of the purchaser. The runway rails shall be straight, parallel, level, and at the same elevation The accuracy of the runway rail dimensions, including tolerances specified within the tolerances given in Fig. 4160-1. The crane manufacturer in Fig. 4160-1, will be verified by ZionSolutions.

shall design the crane to operate properly within the runway rail tolerances given in Fig. 4160-1. The trolley is designed to properly operate within the rail tolerances given in Fig. 4160-1, as applied to the bridge rails.

See Note 1.

4200 MATERIALS AND CONNECTIONS All materials of the structural components of the crane shall be an The materials selected for the trolley are industry specified in accordance accepted type, suitable for the purpose for which the materials are with such standards as ASTM and AISC. The specification for each to be used, and shall be in compliance with any additional material is available for review and public inspection. Materials are requirements specified herein for the materials, clearly designated on individual component drawings.

See Note 1.

4210 Base Materials Page 25 of 154

NOG-I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 4211 Material (a) The base materials listed in Table 4211-1 are considered (a) Structural components selected for the trolley are primarily ASTM A36 acceptable for the structural components identified in para. 4400 of and A572 materials, which are approved under Table 4211-1. Materials Types I and II cranes when they meet the requirements of para. are clearly designated on individual component drawings.

4212. The manufacturer shall report the materials actually (b) N/A - Structural components for the trolley are selected to be in employed to the purchaser. Other suitable materials, which are in compliance with Table 4211-1 compliance with the other provisions for materials specified herein, may be acceptable subject to approval by the purchaser. See Note 1.

(b) The base materials for the components of cranes not included in (a) above shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70.

4212 Fracture Toughness (a) Material for the structural components defined in para. 4211(a) (a) Material for the trolley structural components defined in para. 4211(a) for Types I and II cranes shall be impact tested in accordance with is impact tested in accordance with (a)(1) below, except as provided in (b)

(a)(1) below, except as provided in (b) below. Materials for Type III below. Minimum operating temperatures are provided in Zion cranes shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. The Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

purchaser shall specify the minimum operating temperature as (1) Material greater than 5/8 in. thick is Charpy V-notch tested in defined in para. 1150. accordance with (a)(3).

(1) For material greater than 5/8 in. thick, Charpy V-notch (2) N/A - Charpy V-notch testing is used instead of drop weight tests shall be performed in accordance with (a)(3) below, or testing.

drop weight tested in accordance with (a)(2) below. (3) Charpy V-notch testing is performed in accordance with the (2) The drop weight test shall be performed in accordance specified requirements. MMH Document 36675-11 (Critical List) with ASTM E 208 using specimen type P-1, P-2, or P-3. The details the required components, procedures, and temperatures sampling shall be in accordance with ASTM A 20 when for testing, and results are provided in MMH Document 36675-17 applicable or ASTM A 673 frequency P except for the type (QA Document Binder).

of specimen. The specimen depth shall be at least as far (b) Materials are exempted from impact testing as required in (a) above from the material surface as that specified for tensile test for the following conditions:

specimens in the material specification. The nilductility (1) the nominal thickness is 5/8 in. or less; transition temperature shall be a minimum of 30°F below (2) the nominal cross-sectional area is 1 sq in. or less; the minimum operating temperature. (3) the maximum tensile stress (including residual stresses if the (3) The Charpy V-notch test shall be performed in component is not postweld heat treated) under all conditions of accordance with ASTM A 370 using full-size specimens if loading required in para. 4100 does not exceed 6000 psi; possible. For Type I, cranes the sampling shall be in (4) the component is fabricated from an austenitic stainless steel accordance with ASTM A 673 frequency P. For Type II or a nonferrous material not subject to a ductile brittle transition; Page 26 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance cranes, the sampling shall be in accordance with ASTM A (5) the component is fabricated from normalized ASTM A 516 673 frequency H for specified minimum yields of 55 ksi or Grade 70 steel and the required test temperature or the lowest less, and frequency P for higher strength steels. The test service temperature is greater than 0°F; temperature shall be a minimum of 30*F below the (6) the component is fabricated from normalized ASTM A 537 minimum operating temperature. The acceptance criteria Class 1 steel and the required test temperature or the lowest shall be as shown in Table 4212-1. The results obtained with service temperature is greater than -30°F.

sub-size Charpy V-notch specimens shall be converted to full-size specimens in accordance with ASTM A 673 Table 1 See Note 1.

before comparison with the acceptance criteria.

(b) The base material shall be exempt from impact testing as required in (a) above provided one of the following is met:

(1) the nominal thickness is 5/8 in. or less; (2) the nominal cross-sectional area is I sq in. or less; (3) the maximum tensile stress (including residual stresses if the component is not postweld heat treated) under all conditions of loading required in para. 4100 does not exceed 6000 psi; (4) the component is fabricated from an austenitic stainless steel or a nonferrous material not subject to a ductile brittle transition; (5) the component is fabricated from normalized ASTM A 516 Grade 70 steel and the required test temperature or the lowest service temperature is greater than 07F; (6) the component is fabricated from normalized ASTM A 537 Class 1 steel and the required test temperature or the lowest service temperature is greater than -30°F.

4220 Fastener Materials 4221 Material (a) The fastener materials in Table 4221-1 are considered (a) Structural fasteners for the trolley are selected to be in compliance acceptable for the structural interconnections of Types I and II with Table 4221-1. Materials are designated on assembly drawings.

cranes. The manufacturer shall report the materials actually (b) N/A - Structural fasteners for the trolley are selected to be in employed to the purchaser. compliance with Table 4221-1 (b) The fastener materials for structural components of cranes not (c) N/A - Structural fasteners for the trolley are selected with plain Page 27 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance included in (a) above shall be in accordance with Specification (uncoated) finishes CMAA 70. (d) Structural connections are designed per AISC and take into account (c) When not restricted by para. 1145, the fastener materials in the fastener finishes and tolerances where applicable.

Table 4221-2 may be galvanized or coated with zinc-rich paints.

Fastener materials with a hardness higher than 320 BHN shall not See Note 1.

be galvanized.

(d) The fastener finish and tolerances shall be suitable for the type of connection in which it is employed.

4222 Fracture Toughness (a) Fastener materials for connections defined in 4221(a) shall be (a) N/A - Fastener used on .the trolley are exempt from impact testing per impact tested in accordance with (a)(1) below except as provided in (b).

(b) below. The purchaser shall provide the minimum operating (b) Fasteners used on the trolley are 1 in. diameter or less, exempting temperature as defined in para. 1150. them from impact testing.

(1) Charpy V-notch tests shall be performed in accordance with ASTM A 370. For bolts and studs, the sampling shall be See Note 1.

in accordance with ASTM A320. For nuts, the sampling shall be in accordance with ASTM A 194. The test temperature shall be equal to or less than 30°F below the minimum operating temperature as defined above. The acceptance criteria shall be as shown in Table 4222-1.

(b) Fastener materials shall be exempt from impact testing as required in (a) above, provided the nominal size of the bolt or stud is 1 in. or less.

4230 Welding Materials 4231 Material All welding materials shall be in compliance with the requirements Welding materials for the trolley are specified in MMH Nuclear Operating of AWS D1.1 and the additional requirements specified herein. Procedure #5.0.1, which complies with both AWS D14.1 and D1.1 where (a) Matching filler metal of adequate toughness per para. 4232 shall applicable. Procedures qualified under AWS D1.1 are acceptable under be used. For the shielded metal arc welding (SMAW) process, low AWS D14.1 per Section 9.1.4. Welding materials are specified on hydrogen type electrodes shall be used for the structural individual welding drawings.

connections of Types I and II cranes per para. 4400. (a) Matching filler metal of adequate toughness per para. 4232 is used.

(b) The filler metal for the structural connections of cranes not SMAW process is not used for this crane included in (a) above shall be as specified. (b) N/A - All filler metal is included in (a) above.

Page 28 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (c) If the SMAW process is employed for connections per (b) above (c) N/A - SMAW process is not used for this crane but one of the base metals is on a component per para. 4211(a) that is over 2-1/2 in. thick, and is subject to applied tensile stresses See Note 1.

in excess of 6000 psi, low hydrogen type electrodes shall be used.

4232 Fracture Toughness (a) The filler metal defined in para. 4231(a) shall be impact tested in (a) Filler material used for critical welds on nuclear cranes is specifically accordance with (a)(1) below except as provided in (b) below. The segregated and purchased under a nuclear purchase order. The filler purchaser shall provide the minimum operating temperature as metal is tested to verify the material composition and impact tested as defined in para. 1150. specified. This documentation is maintained by the Quality Department.

(1) Charpy V-notch tests shall be performed in accordance (b) N/A - All filler material used for critical welds on nuclear cranes is with the filler metal specification. The difference between impact tested per (a).

the minimum operating temperature and the test temperature shall be in accordance with Table 4232-1. See Note 1.

(b) The filler metal shall be exempt from impact testing as required in (a) above, provided:

(1) the base materials are exempt per paras. 4212(b)(1), (2),

(3) or (4); or (2) the effective throat of the nominal weld is 5/8 in. or less.

4240 Welded Studs Welded studs shall not be employed for the connections of the N/A - Welded studs are not used in the trolley design structural components defined in para. 4400. Studs welded to the structural components of the crane shall comply with the See Note 1.

requirements for studs specified in AWS D1.1, and shall be compatible with the base material.

4250 Connections 4251 Welded Connections Welded connections shall comply with the requirements of AWS Welding is performed per MMH Nuclear Operating Procedure #5.0.1, D1.1 except as specified herein, which complies with both AWS D14.1 and D1.1 where applicable.

Procedures qualified under AWS D1.1 are acceptable under AWS D14.1 per Section 9.1.4.

See Note 1.

4251.1 Welding Procedures Page 29 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance All welds for Types I and II cranes shall be performed in accordance Welding is performed per MMH Nuclear Operating Procedure #5.0.1, with written procedures that establish limitations which complies with both AWS D14.1 and D1.1 where applicable.

of variables consistent with AWS D1.1. These welds may be either Procedures qualified under AWS D1.1 are acceptable under AWS D14.1 prequalified or qualified in accordance with AWS D1.1. per Section 9.1.4. This document contains both pre-qualified and qualified weld procedures.

See Note 1.

4251.2 Qualification Impact Tests The weld procedure qualification shall be exempt from impact (a-c) All weld filler metal for the trolley has been impact tested. Test testing as required per Mandatory Appendix I, para. 14251.2, results are included in MMH Document 36675-17 (QA Document Binder).

provided one of the following is met:

(a) the base materials are exempt per para. 4212(b); or See Note 1.

(b) the base materials are in Material Group 1 of Table 3.1 of AWS D1.1, the weld is made by shielded metal arc welding, submerged arc welding, gas metal arc welding, or flux cored arc welding, and the filler metal is exempt per para. 4232(b); or (c) the base materials are in Material Group 1 of Table 3.1 of AWS D1.1, the weld is made by shielded metal arc welding, submerged arc welding, gas metal arc welding, or flux cored arc welding, and the weld is postweld heat treated per para. 4251.5.

4251.3 Combination of Weld Types If two or more of the general types of welds (groove, fillet, plug, The allowable capacity of each weld group is calculated separately if two slot) are combined in a single joint, the allowable capacity of each or more general types of welds are combined in a single joint.

shall be separately computed with reference to the axis of the group in order to determine the allowable capacity of the See Note 1.

combination.

4251.4 Nondestructive Examination Requirements All welds shall be visually inspected over their entire lengths. All welds are visually inspected over their entire length. Additional weld Additional inspection and testing of the joints of the three types of inspections are carried out per MMH Document 36675-11 (Critical List) cranes shall be as stated below. Examination and acceptance and as dictated on individual drawings as required. Examination and criteria of welds and repairs shall be in accordance with AWS D1.1 acceptance criteria of welds and repairs are in accordance with AWS unless otherwise stated below. D14.1. Procedures qualified under AWS D1.1 are acceptable under AWS (a) Types I and II Cranes. The following inspections and tests shall be D14.1 per Section 9.1.4.

Page 30 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance applied to welded structural connections. Percents of welds (a) The following inspections and tests are applied to welded structural specified for inspection are measured along each face. This doubles connections. Percents of welds specified for inspection are measured the length for fillet welds on both sides of a joint. The length subject along each face. The length subject to examination of other welds is to examination of other welds shall be considered as doubled when considered as doubled when welds are made from both sides. Areas welds are made from both sides. Areas examined shall be randomly examined are randomly distributed along the weld length.

distributed along the weld length. (1) N/A - There are no full penetration butt welds.

(1) Full penetration butt welds: 100% volumetric (2) All critical welds are 10% magnetic particle tested. There are examination by either radiographic or ultrasonic testing no trolley load girt welds with an effective throat over 3/8 in.

unless the specification for the crane stipulates which (3) N/A - Additional weld inspections and tests are not specified method to use. (4) N/A - There are no highly restrained welded connections (2) Other welds with an effective throat over 3/8 in.: dye subject to weld shrinkage strains.

penetrant or magnetic particle testing as follows unless the (b) N/A - This is a Type I Crane specification for the crane stipulates which method to use:

(a) 100% of each of trolley load girt welds See Note 1.

(b) 10% of each of the cover plate or flange to web welds of crane girders (3) Other welds as stipulated in the crane specification.

(4) Base materials (greater than 5/8 in. thick) with highly restrained welded connections subject to weld shrinkage strains in a through-thickness direction shall be ultrasonically tested per Mandatory Appendix I, para.

14251.4 (b) Types III Cranes. Nondestructive examination requirements for welds and base metal shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70 and the manufacturer's standards unless otherwise stated in the specification for the crane.

4251.5 Postweld Heat Treatment (a) Types I and II Cranes. Welded connections shall be postweld (a) Welded connections are postweld heat treated (stress relieved) in heat treated (stress relieved) in accordance with AWS D1.1 except accordance with AWS D1.1 for welded structures listed in MMH where exempted by Table 4251.5-1. However, exempted material Document 36675-11 (Critical List) and stress relieving is specified on the may be postweld heat treated at the manufacturer's option. Times applicable drawings. Local postweld heat treating and vibratory and temperatures per AWS D1.1 shall be employed, conditioning are generally not performed.

When it is not practical to postweld heat treat an entire assembly, (b) N/A - This is a Type I Crane Page 31 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance local postweld heat treatment shall be employed. Local postweld heat treatment shall be accomplished by heating a band of metal See Note 1.

that includes the joint. Heating may be obtained by any method that will ensure sufficient uniformity without harming the material.

The width of the heated band on each side of the greatest width of the finished weld shall be at least twice the effective throat of the weld. The material outside the heated band shall be protected to avoid harmful temperature gradients. When postweld heat treating is employed, the following shall be observed.

(1) All required postweld heat treating shall be covered by a written procedure.

(2) Localized postweld heat treating may be employed as stated above, when approved by the design engineer. A written procedure must address the same seven points outlined in (a)(3) below for furnace postweld heat treating.

(3) For furnace postweld heat treating, the procedure must address the following:

(a) temperature at start of thermal cycle; (b) rate of heating; (c) maximum allowable variation of temperature throughout the portion of the part being treated; (d) maximum temperature tolerance at stress relief temperature; (e) holding time at stress relief temperature; (f) rate of cooling to temperature suitable for removal of work from the furnace; and (g) location of thermocouples and the number required.

Vibratory conditioning to improve dimensional stability may be used at the option of the Manufacturer. The conditioning shall be done in accordance with the recommendations and procedures established by the manufacturer of the equipment.

(b) Type III Cranes. The manufacturer shall determine the need for Page 32 of 154

NOG-I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance postweld heat treatment. When used, PWHT shall comply with AWS D1.1.

4251.6 Stud Welding The welding of studs shall be in accordance with AWS D1.1. The N/A - Welded studs are not used in the trolley design thickness of the base material to which studs are welded shall equal or exceed 20% of the nominal stud diameter to minimize See Note 1.

burnthrough.

4252 Bolted Connections 4252.1 Structural Joints Using ASTM A 325 or A 490 Bolts Structural joints for structural components identified under para. Structural joints for the trolley are designed and installed in accordance 4400 using ASTM A 325 or A 490 bolts shall be designed and with the AISC "Specification for Structural Joints Using ASTM A 325 or A installed in accordance with the AISC "Specification for Structural 490 Bolts." This includes drilling or reaming holes to 1/16" diameter Joints Using ASTM A 325 or A 490 Bolts." Bolts holes shall be greater than the nominal bolt size. Slotted bolt holes for structural joints subpunched and reamed or drilled. Standard holes shall have a are not used.

diameter nominally 1/16 in. in excess of the nominal bolt diameter.

Slotted bolt holes shall not be used except for connections which See Note 1.

may require field adjustment for fitting the crane to the runway.

4252.2 Structural Joints Using Bolts Other Than ASTM A 325 or A 490 Structural joints using bolts other than ASTM A 325 or A 490 shall N/A - Only ASTM A 325 or A 490 bolts are used for the trolley structural be bearing type and shall comply with the requirements for non- connections.

high-strength bolts specified in the AISC "Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, Allowable Stress Design and Plastic Design." All bolts See Note 1.

shall be torqued to a pre-tension load on the bolt of 60% to 70% of the minimum yield strength of the bolt material. Standard holes shall have a diameter nominally 1/16 in. in excess of the nominal bolt diameter, except for bound bolts.

4252.3 Pitch and Edge Distances The minimum pitch between centers of bolt holes and minimum Hole patterns used for structural bolts meet the minimum pitch edge distances from the center of a bolt hole to any edge shall be as requirements as stipulated in the AISC "Specification for Structural Steel stipulated in the AISC "Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, Buildings, Allowable Stress Design and Plastic Design."

Allowable Stress Design and Plastic Design."

See Note 1.

Page 33 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 4252.4 Bolt Identification The bolting of the structural joints of the Types I and II cranes shall The structural fasteners used for the trolley have industry standard be identifiable. A unique marking system shall be used to identify markings as required to identify their specific type and/or grade. These type and/or grade of bolts and nuts used. fasteners are also purchased with a certificate of conformance.

See Note 1.

4253 Field Connections All field connections of structural components shall be bolted unless All field connections of structural components for the trolley will be otherwise approved by the purchaser. The manufacturer shall bolted. These connections are detailed on the applicable assembly provide sufficient information on drawings or in installation drawings.

manuals on the requirements for all field connections.

See Note 1.

4300 DESIGN CRITERIA 4310 Basic Allowable Stresses for Structural Steel Members 4311 Members Not Controlled by Buckling For members not controlled by buckling, the basic allowable For members not controlled by buckling, the basic allowable stresses in stresses in structural steel members of the crane shall not exceed structural steel members of the crane do not exceed the values specified values in Table 4311-1. in Table 4311-1. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

4312 Compression Members Controlled by Buckling

[Text and/or equations omitted] N/A - There are no structural compression members controlled by buckling. Structural components are fabricated from welded plates, which are covered by paras. 4331 and 4332.

4313 Bending Stress The allowable bending stress for members other than those girders The allowable bending stress for members other than those girders conforming to the dimensional criteria outlined in para. 4333 shall conforming to the dimensional criteria outlined in para. 4333 conform to conform to AISC "Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, AISC "Specification for Structural Steel Buildings, Allowable Stress Design Allowable Stress Design and Plastic Design" Chapter F divided by and Plastic Design" Chapter F divided by 1.12N for the different loading 1.12N for the different loading conditions. conditions.

4314 Welds Basic allowable stresses in welds shall be as specified in AWS D1.1. Trolley weld calculations are provided in MMH Document 36675-10 Allowable stresses for all types of welds may be increased for (Trolley Weld Calculation) using allowable stresses specified in AWS D1.1.

Page 34 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance severe environmental load combinations by a factor of 1.33, and for Allowable stresses for extreme environmental load combinations are extreme environmental load combinations by a factor of 1.50. increased by a factor of 1.5.

See Note 1.

4315 Bolts (a) ASTM A 325 or A 490 Bolts. Allowable working stresses for Ref. MMH Document 36675-14 (Seismic Analysis of Misc. Items) for the operational or construction loads shall be in accordance with AISC following items:

"Specification for Structural Joints Using ASTM A 325 or A 490 (a) Allowable working stresses for operational loads are in accordance Bolts." Allowable working stresses for other loadings shall be as with AISC "Specification for Structural Joints Using ASTM A 325 or A 490 follows. Bolts." Allowable working stresses for bearing type joints are increased by (1) Bearing-Type Joints. Allowable working stresses for a factor of 1.50 for extreme environmental loadings. Allowable working bearing-type joints may be increased by a factor of 1.33 for stresses for friction type joints are not increased for severe or extreme severe environmental loadings, and by a factor of 1.50 for environmental loadings.

extreme environmental loadings. (b) Allowable stresses for bolts other than ASTM A 325 or A 490 are in (2) Friction-TypeJoints. Allowable working stresses for accordance with Table 4315-1.

friction-type joints may not be increased forsevere or extreme environmental loadings. See Note 1.

(b) Bolts Other Than ASTM A 325 or A 490. Allowable stresses shall be in accordance with Table 4315-1.

4320 Combined Stresses 4321 Axial Compression and Bending

[Text and/or equations omitted] Discussions are provided in MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) to demonstrate that the results of the software analysis are in accordance with the requirements of this section.

4322 Axial Tension and Bending Members subject to both axial tension and bending stresses shall Discussions are provided in MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress satisfy the requirements of Eq. (3). The computed bending tensile Calculations) and MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) to stress, taken alone, shall not exceed the applicable value according demonstrate that the results of the software analysis are in accordance to para. 4311. with the requirements of this section.

4323 Shear and Tension (a) Boltssubject to combined shear and tension shall be so (a) N/A - There.are no bolts in combined shear and tension.

proportional that the tension stress, psi, produced by forces applied (b) N/A - There are no friction-type joints.

Page 35 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance to the connected parts, shall not exceed the following.

[Text and/or equations omitted] See Note 1.

(b) For bolts used in friction-type joints, the shear stress allowed in para. 4315 shall be reduced so that:

[Text and/or equations omitted]

4324 Shear and Bending The maximum combined shear stress due to shear, bending, and Discussions are provided in MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress direct stresses shall not exceed the allowable values for shear as Calculations) and MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) to given in para. 4311, except that in severe and extreme demonstrate that the results of the software analysis are in accordance environmental conditions, the allowable shear stress may be with the requirements of this section.

increased by 20%.

4330 Buckling 4331 Local Buckling or Crippling of Flat Plates The structural design of the crane must guard against local buckling Calculations for local buckling or crippling of flat plates are performed in of plates such as webs and coverplates of girders, etc., by limiting MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations). The basic the allowable compression stress along opposite edges and the allowable stresses in the structural steel members do not exceed the uniformly distributed shear stress assumed to be acting around all values specified in para. 4332.1. Members are not controlled by buckling.

edges of the plate or a combination of both.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

4332 Combined Compression and Shear Buckling

[Text and/or equations omitted] Combined compression and shear buckling calculations are performed inside the buckling section of MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

4332.1 Design Factors in Plate Buckling (DFB)

[Text and/or equations omitted] Design factors for plate buckling are applied as required in MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

4333 Proportion for Fabricated Box Girders

[Text and/or equations omitted] Proportions for fabricated box girders are sufficient and are documented in MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

4334 Spacing of Transverse Stiffeners

[Text and/or equations omitted] The spacing of transverse stiffeners in the girders is sufficient and is documented in MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

4335 Stiffness of Longitudinal and Transverse Stiffeners Page 36 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance The required stiffness of the longitudinal stiffener and the stiffness The required stiffness of the longitudinal and transverse stiffeners is in of the transverse stiffeners shall be in accordance with Specification accordance with Specification CMAA 70 and is documented in MMH CMAA 70. Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

4340 Allowable Deflections and Cambers 4341 Girder Deflection The total vertical deflection of the girder during operational loading Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) for the for the rated live load plus trolley (Pdt + Pir), and not including following items:

impact or dead load of the girder, shall not exceed 1/1000 of the The total vertical deflection of the girder during operational loading for span. the rated live load plus trolley (Pdt + P/r), and not including impact or dead The total vertical deflection of the girder during constructional load of the girder, does not exceed 1/1000 of the span.

loading for the construction load plus trolley (Pdt + P,,), and not Vertical deflection during constructional loading is not applicable since including impact or dead load of the girder, shall not exceed 1/600 the crane is not used for construction.

of the span. The total vertical or lateral deflection of the girder Vertical and lateral deflections of the girder during environmental loading during environmental loading shall be limited such that are not severe enough to cause the girder or any of its attachments to displacements do not cause the girder or any of its attachments to become dislodged or to leave the crane.

become dislodged or to leave the crane.

4342 Girder Camber Girders shall be cambered an amount equal to the dead load See Note 1.

deflection plus one-half of the deflection caused by the live load plus trolley [camber = A (Pdb) + 0.5 A(Pdt + PIr]

4343 Trolley Frame Deflection The trolley frame shall be of rigid construction such that lifted loads The trolley frame is sufficiently rigid such that lifted loads do not cause do not cause deflections that impair the proper operation of deflections that impair the proper operation of machinery. Ref. MMH machinery. Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

4344 Miscellaneous Structure Deflection Deflections of components such as end ties, end trucks, saddles, Deflections of components such as end ties, end trucks are not severe and equalizer beams shall not impair the functions for which they enough to impair the functions for which they were designed or cause were designed or cause any attachments to the crane to become any attachments to the crane to become dislodged or to leave the crane.

dislodged or to leave the crane. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

Page 37 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 4345 Gantry Frame Deflection In addition to the preceding criteria, the following criteria shall (a-c) N/A - This is not a gantry crane apply to the gantry frame.

(a) The total vertical deflection of the girder shall not exceed 1/1000 of the span between the gantry legs for the rated live load plus trolley (Pdt + P1r) when the deflection is calculated as a simply supported beam.

(b) The total vertical deflection of the girder cantilever shall not exceed 1/500 of the cantilever length for the rated live load plus trolley (Pdt + P1r) when the deflection is calculated as a fixed end cantilever beam.

(c) Side thrust at the runway rail due to gantry leg spreading caused by girder span or cantilever deflection or thermal movement shall be held at an acceptable level by providing adequate clearance between the rail head and the wheel flanges, or by means of other design features incorporated into the gantry structure.

4350 Fatigue Requirements Cranes used for nuclear power plants are normally used relatively N/A - There are no additional requirements specified by the purchaser for few times during the entire life of the plant, as compared to typical additional fatigue cycles.

structural fatigue criteria. The number of times a typical crane is cycled from no live load to full capacity load seldom exceeds 20,000 cycles during the entire life of the crane. Because of the combined effect of low full-load cycles and low allowable stresses during normal operation, the allowable stresses for the structural members, as specified in para. 4310, need not be reduced due to fatigue. If the Purchaser determines that greater than 20,000 full-load cycles are required, the Purchaser shall then specify the cycles and load class per Specification CMAA 70. The allowable stresses for the appropriate service level in Specification CMAA 70 shall be used, but shall not exceed the basic operating stress allowables specified in para. 4310.

4400 COMPONENT DESIGN 4410 General Page 38 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 4411 Venting Closed sections used in structures which are subject to changes in N/A - Venting is not required since the crane is not subject to pressure pressure shall be vented. If used, vent openings shall be sized to changes.

equalize the internal closed section (or compartment) pressure with its external environmental pressure. Pressure rate of change tables or graphs may be required to determine maximum flow requirements. Where internal full depth diaphragms extend from the top flange to the bottom flange, the compartment formed by a pair of diaphragms shall be vented.

4412 Drainage Box sections when required by environmental conditions shall be N/A- The environmental conditions do not require that box sections drained to prevent moisture from accumulating. Where internal full require drainage; however, the bridge girders do have drain holes. Ref.

depth diaphragms extend from the top flange to the bottom flange, P&H Drawing 28A11377 (Welded Box Girder).

the compartment formed by a pair of diaphragms shall be drained.

Holes shall be provided in the bottom flange of the box girder for draining the whole box girder or each compartment formed by the diaphragms.

4413 Stress Concentrations Consideration shall be given to points where high stresses might be All re-entrant corners of the plates are designed to be notch free with a encountered, such as (but not limited to) at ends of stiffeners, radius greater than 1/2 in. Sharp corner cuts and abrupt changes in intermittent welds, points of attachment, cut-outs, and reentrant section properties are avoided. Cut-outs are made with rounded corners.

corners. All reentrant corners shall be shaped notch free to a radius The analysis of the trolley also envelops these critical stress concentration of at least L/2 in. Sharp corner cuts are to be avoided, as are abrupt locations. Ref. MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

changes in section properties. Cut-outs, where necessary, shall be made with rounded corners, and their edges shall be analyzed for See Note 1.

reinforcement.

4420 Bridge Girders 4421 General The crane girders (bridge girders) shall be fabricated of structural The crane girders are constructed from welded plates to form a box steel. Structural steel materials shall comply with the requirements section using structural steel that complies with para. 4210. Ref. P&H of para. 4210. Construction of the crane girders can be of several Drawing 28A11377 (Welded Box Girder).

types, namely, welded plates to form box sections, box sections fabricated from rolled shapes with or without plates, single-rolled Page 39 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance shapes, or built-up single web plate girders.

4422 Loading Criteria Bridge girders shall be designed to resist the load combinations The bridge girders are designed to resist the load combinations specified specified in para. 4140. When bridge girders and end ties are in para. 4140 and the assembly is analyzed as a rigid frame for transverse moment-connected in the horizontal plane, the assembly shall be horizontal loads. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress analyzed as a rigid frame for the transverse horizontal loads. Calculations).

4423 Fabricated Box Girders 4423.1 Proportions Proportions for fabricated box girders shall be as specified in para. Girder proportions are as specified in para. 4333. Ref. MMH Document 4333. 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

4423.2 Stiffeners The requirements of longitudinal and vertical stiffeners are given in Longitudinal and vertical stiffeners for the bridge girders meet the para. 4330. Internal full depth diaphragms are required at requirements of para. 4330. Internal full depth diaphragms are provided machinery attachment points, bridge drive supports, and line shaft at machinery attachment points, bridge drive supports, and line shaft bearing supports. The diaphragms may also be considered to meet bearing supports. External stiffeners adjacent to the diaphragms are the requirements of the vertical stiffeners. External stiffeners provided to transmit forces from the attachments into the girder. Ref.

adjacent to the diaphragms may be required to transmit forces MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and P&H Drawing from the attachments into the girder. 28AI1377 (Welded Box Girder).

4423.3 Diaphragms All internal diaphragms shall be fitted to bear against the top cover All internal diaphragms are fitted to bear against the top cover plate to plate to support the trolley rail, and shall be welded to the web support the trolley rail, and are welded to the web plates to transfer the plates to transfer the rail load directly to the box girder webs. rail load directly to the box girder webs. Ref. P&H Drawing 28A11377 (Welded Box Girder).

4423.4 Diaphragm Spacing Short diaphragms shall be placed between full depth diaphragms... Short diaphragms are placed between full depth diaphragms to minimize

[Text and/or equations omitted] the bending stress in the girders. The girder top plate is not considered as The top cover plate of the box girder shall not be considered as contributing to the bending properties of the trolley rail. Ref. MMH contributing to the bending properties of the trolley rail. Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and P&H Drawing 28AI1377 (Welded Box Girder).

4423.5 Diaphragm Thickness The thickness of the diaphragm plate shall be sufficient to resist the The diaphragm thickness is sufficient to resist the trolley wheel load in trolley wheel load in bearing, on the assumption that the wheel bearing. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

load is distributed over a distance equal to the width of the rail base Page 40 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance plus twice the distance from the rail base to the top of the diaphragm plate.

4424 Single Web Girders Single web girders may be standard rolled beams or plate girders, N/A - This crane uses welded box section girders.

reinforced with angles, channels, or plates. Where necessary, auxiliary girders shall be used to support overhanging loads to minimize torsional moments and lateral deflections on the single web girder. The analysis required for single web girders shall be the same as required for the plate box girder in para. 4423. The design shall be in accordance with the AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings, but with the allowable stresses set forth in para. 4310.

4430 Trolley Frames 4431 Construction The trolley frame shall be constructed of structural steel. If field The trolley frame is constructed from structural steel that complies with assembly of the trolley structure is required, the connections shall para. 4210. Field assembly of the trolley structure is not required. Ref.

be designed to ensure proper alignment of the components. MMH Drawing QR95370 (Trolley Frame Weldment).

4432 Design 4432.1 Trolley Frame The trolley frame shall be designed to resist all loading imposed by The trolley frame is designed to resist the loading imposed by the motor, the motor, gearing, lifted load, and the load combinations specified gearing, lifted load, and the load combinations specified in para. 4140.

in para. 4140. Ref. MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

4432.2 Load Girt The load girt(s) shall be designed to carry the load to the side The load girts are designed to carry the load to the side frames. The frame frames. Care shall be taken that the load girt deflections do not has been designed as a welded fixture with low stresses to minimize adversely affect the machinery alignment, deflection that would adversely affect machinery alignment. Ref. MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

4433 Axle Failure Provisions shall be made to prevent a drop of more than 1 in. in The trolley end trucks are designed to prevent a drop of more than 1 in.

case of an axle failure. in case of an axle failure. Ref. MMH Drawing QR95370 (Trolley Frame Weldment).

4440 End Trucks and End Ties Page 41 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 4441 End Trucks 4441.1 General The end truck is the assembly consisting of wheels, bearings, axles, End trucks consisting of wheels, bearings, axles, and structural frames and structural frame that supports the crane bridge, that support the crane bridge are provided. Ref. P&H Drawing 105A3002 (Bridge Layout).

4441.2 Construction The end trucks shall be constructed of structural steel. The end trucks are constructed from structural steel that complies with para. 4210 (Ref. P&H Drawing 31A5302/3).

4441.3 Design The end truck shall be designed to support the maximum crane end The end trucks are designed to support the maximum crane end reactions reactions for the load combinations specified in para. 4140. for the load combinations specified in para. 4140. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

4441.4 Axle Failure Provisions shall be made to prevent a drop of more than 1 in. in The bridge end trucks are designed to prevent a drop of more than 1 in. in case of an axle failure. case of an axle failure.

4441.5 Wheel Base The wheel base of the end trucks of four-wheel cranes, or center- The wheel base of the outermost bridge wheels is not less than 1/7 of the to-center of outermost wheels of multiple end trucks for cranes girder span. Ref. P&H Drawing 105A3002 (Bridge Layout).

with more than four wheels, shall be not less than one-seventh of the girder span.

4441.6 Rail Sweeps A rail sweep shall be provided in front of each outside wheel. The Rail sweeps are provided in front of each outside wheel. The rail sweeps rail sweep shall project below the top of the bridge runway rail. project below the top of the bridge runway rail.

4442 End Ties 4442.1 Construction The end tie shall be constructed of structural steel. The end ties are constructed from structural steel that complies with para. 4210.

4442.2 Types End ties for cranes with more than four bridge wheels can be either End ties for this crane are of the rigid type. Equalizer bridge trucks are the flexible or rigid type. If equalizer bridge trucks are incorporated not used. Ref. P&H Drawing 105A3002 (Bridge Layout) into the end carriage design to promote equal sharing of bridge wheel loads, and equalizer pins are provided between the equalizer trucks and equalizer beam and/or the rigid bridge frame structure, a Page 42 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance rigid type end tie may be used. If equalizer pins are not provided between the equalizer trucks and equalizer beam and/or the rigid bridge frame structure, a flexible end tie must be used.

4442.3 Design End ties shall be designed to resist the loads due to crane The end ties are designed to resist the loads due to crane movement and movement and the load combinations specified in para. 4140. the load combinations specified in para. 4140. A rigid frame analysis is A rigid frame analysis shall be used to determine the proportions of used to determine the proportions of the loads resisted by the end ties the loads resisted by the end ties and by the girders. The flexible and by the girders. Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress end tie shall be designed to accommodate up to 1/4 in. difference in Calculations).

elevation of the bridge rail between any wheels or pair of wheels without exceeding allowable stresses. See Note 1.

4450 Gantry Frames 4451 General Gantry frames shall be fabricated of structural steel. The structural N/A - This is not a gantry crane members assembled to form the gantry frame may include, but are not limited to, the following: girders, end ties, legs, trucks, sills, struts, saddles, and equalizer beams. Structural steel materials used in the gantry frame members shall comply with the requirements of para. 4210.

4452 Loading Criteria Gantry frames shall be designed to resist the load combinations N/A - This is not a gantry crane specified in para. 4140. The gantry frame assembly shall be analyzed as a three-dimensional structure.

4453 Gantry Legs Gantry legs shall be designed to withstand the load combinations N/A - This is not a gantry crane specified in para. 4140. The legs shall be constructed of structural steel, and their configuration may vary according to the clearance and overall crane geometry required. Gantry legs constructed of box sections shall be provided with diaphragms to maintain the leg geometry. The legs shall be stiffened to meet the requirements of para. 4330.

4454 Struts and Sills Struts and sills are used to connect the legs and joining members. N/A - This is not a gantry crane Page 43 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance They shall be designed to resist the load combinations specified in para. 4140. Struts and sills shall be constructed of structural steel.

4455 Saddles and Equalizer Beams Saddles and equalizer beams are used to support the crane N/A - This is not a gantry crane structure and are themselves supported by the gantry trucks. Their purpose is to distribute the loading at one corner of the crane equally to the bridge wheels at that corner. They shall be constructed of structural steel. Saddles and equalizer beams shall be designed for the load combinations specified in para. 4140.

Plates or hubs used in saddles or equalizer beams to support trunnions and rotating pins shall be designed to meet the bearing stress specified in Section 5000.

4456 Gantry Wheel Base The wheel base of the end trucks of four-wheel gantry cranes, or N/A - This is not a gantry crane center-to-center of extreme wheels of multiple end trucks for gantry cranes with more than four wheels, may be required to exceed that ratio specified in para. 4441.5. The gantry structure height may necessitate an increased wheelbase in order to gain gantry stability and to reduce gantry skewing.

4457 Gantry Stability The gantry crane shall have a safety factor of not less than 1.5 N/A - This is not a gantry crane against overturning when used in the unrestrained operating condition and subjected to the load combinations specified in para.

4140. During severe environmental, extreme environmental, or abnormal event loading, the gantry crane shall have a safety factor of not less than 1.1 against overturning. Restraints may be used to prevent overturning.

4460 Rails 4461 Requirements All bridge and trolley rails required to transmit vertical down and The bridge and trolley rails conform to the Bethlehem & U.S. Steel horizontal loads due to normal and construction loads only shall standard crane rail specifications as listed in Table 5452.3-1. Seismic conform to the ASCE, ARA, or AREA Specifications. When these rails restraints are installed on the bridge and trolley and only interact with are used on Types I and II cranes, secondary restraints which are the rail support structures during a seismic event. Ref. MMH Document Page 44 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance not necessarily in contact under normal loading conditions shall be 36675-14 (Seismic Analysis of Misc. Items). The seismic restraints do not provided to resist the vertical up and horizontal loads due to severe interact directly with the rails.

environmental and extreme environmental loading conditions. Rails required to transmit vertical up and/or horizontal loads due to severe environmental and extreme environmental loading conditions shall meet all of the requirements of a structural steel member as covered in paras. 4200 and 4300.

4462 Fastening Bridge and trolley rails shall be joined by standard joint bars or The trolley and runway rails are joined by standard joint bars. Trolley rails welded. For other than polar crane runway rails, provision shall be are provided with positive stops at the ends of the rails to prevent made to prevent creeping of the rails by means of a positive stop at creeping. Rails are securely fastened with rail clips to maintain center-to-the ends of the rail. Rails shall be securely fastened in place to center distance. Horizontal and vertical (uplift) forces on the rail and maintain center-to-center distance of rails. Fastening of rails to the corresponding fasteners are not evaluated since the seismic restraints supporting structure shall be appropriate to transfer the calculated interact directly with the girder structures.

horizontal and vertical forces.

See Note 1.

4470 Footwalks, Handrails, Platforms, Stairs, and Ladders 4471 General Platforms and footwalks shall be provided as required for access Platforms and foot walks are provided for access and maintenance of the and maintenance. Dimensions and clearances for footwalks, bridge. Platforms and foot walks are not provided for the trolley since it handrails, platforms, stairs, and ladders shall be in accordance with is not a normally accessed location. Platforms and foot walks comply the latest edition of OSHA. with the latest edition of OSHA.

4472 Materials Materials for construction of footwalks, handrails, platforms, stairs, Materials for new construction of foot walks, handrails, platforms, stairs, and ladders shall meet the requirements of para. 4200, except that and ladders meet the requirements of para. 4200, with the exception of the requirements of para. 4212 need not be considered. ASTM A para. 4212.

569 is an acceptable material for metal bar grating.

See Note 1.

4473 Design Footwalks, handrails, platforms, stairs, and ladders shall be Existing bridge foot walks, handrails, platforms, stairs and ladders will be designed for the appropriate dead load and the live loads as reused. Design for new construction shall be in accordance with para.

specified in the OSHA Standards. Structural design shall be in 4300.

accordance with para. 4300.

Page 45 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance See Note 1.

4480 Operator's Cab 4481 General (a) The standard location of the operator's cab shall be at one end Ref. P&H Drawing 105A3002 (Bridge Layout) for the following items:

of the crane bridge on the driving girder side unless otherwise (a) The cab is located at the end of the crane bridge on the driving girder specified. It shall be so located as not to interfere with the hook side and does not interfere with the hook approach. The cab is an open approach. The operator's cab shall be open type for indoor service type for indoor service with dimensions that are in accordance with unless otherwise specified. Dimensions and clearances shall be in OSHA.

accordance with the latest edition of OSHA. (b) The cab is provided with a ladder leading to the bridge footwalk.

(b) Cabs shall be provided with ladder or stairway leading to the (c) Any new controls furnished for the cab are submitted for approval.

bridge footwalk. (d) The cab is designed for maximum operator visibility.

(c) The arrangement of equipment in the cab shall be approved by (e) N/A - The cab does not have heating, ventilating, and/or air the purchaser. conditioning.

(d) Cabs shall be designed for maximum operator visibility. A (f) The operator's cab has a clear height, with equipment installed, of visibility diagram shall be furnished to the purchaser for approval, more than 7 ft. Existing cab equipment will be reused to the extent (e) If specified by the purchaser, the cab shall be provided with possible and any upgrades are submitted to the user for approval. The heating, ventilating, and/or air conditioning. existing swivel seat is reused.

(f)The operator's cab shall have a clear height, with equipment installed, of not less than 7 ft. Provision shall be made in the operator's cab for placement of the necessary equipment, wiring, and fittings. All cabs should be provided with a swiveled seat unless otherwise specified.

4482 Materials Materials for construction of the operator's cab shall meet the See Note 1.

requirements of para. 4200, except that the requirements of para.

4212 need not be considered.

4483 Design The operator's cab shall be designed for appropriate dead and live See Note 1.

loads. Structural design shall be in accordance with para. 4300.

4484 Construction 4484.1 Enclosed Cabs Enclosed cabs shall have watertight plate roofs which slope to the N/A - An open cab is used instead of an enclosed cab Page 46 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance rear and shall be provided with sliding, hinged, or drop windows on the three sides, and with sliding or hinged doors. Steel plates for enclosing sides, when used, shall be not less than 1/8 in. thick. The window sash shall be equipped with clear shatterproof glass installed from the inside so that if it is dislodged it will fall in the cab. Drop windows shall be protected from breakage by a 1/8 in.

sheet steel guard, extending to within 2 in. of the floor, and shall be provided with handles and stops which will prevent catching the user's hands or toes when operating the windows. Drop windows shall be counter weighted.

4484.2 Open Cabs Open cabs shall be enclosed with panels not less than 1/8 in. thick The cab is enclosed with standard hand rails, midrails, and toe plates. Ref.

or standard railing 42 in. high. Railing enclosures shall be provided P&H Drawing 105A3002 (Bridge Layout).

with midrail and steel toe plate. Where the top rail, or top of the panel, interferes with the operator's vision, it may be lowered, with the purchaser's approval.

5000 Mechanical 5100 GENERAL 5110 Load Spectrum Crane Classification 5111 Type I Cranes (a) The design of the mechanical components of the crane is based (a) The design of the mechanical components of the crane is based on the on the loading conditions, the operating frequency, and the loading conditions, the operating frequency, and the operating cycle in operating cycle in respect to the function within the facility. This respect to the function within the facility. The specific load spectrum specific load spectrum information, or a realistic estimate of the information and the necessary information to perform a complete seismic anticipated load spectrum, shall be conveyed to the crane analysis are provided in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

manufacturer by the Purchaser. (b) The service life and usage requirements of the crane are provided in (b) For a crane having a specific operating cycle such as a typical Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. Service and maintenance requirements polar crane, the service condition (load spectrum) can be are provided in MMH Document 36675-20 (Operation & Maintenance determined by the number of operating cycles per hour, the type Manual).

and magnitude of applied loads, the distance of travel motion, and (c) Design for fatigue is considered for the critical mechanical components the number of operating hours by given time period. The user shall of the crane. Ref. MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress also establish the service life and reliability requirements for the Report).

crane, considering such factors as technical, economic, (1) Mechanical components in the critical load path are designed Page 47 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance environmental, and probability of obsolescence. This information is per the applicable sections of this standard, which generally important so that the designer can then provide for the fatigue provides infinite fatigue life due to high safety factors.

strength for the components of the crane to meet the requirements (2) Travel drives are not considered for infinite fatigue life.

of the intended service. The information will provide the basis for (3) Fatigue analysis is based on the maximum rated load.

the fatigue strength and fatigue life data criteria of the component (4) Failure of catalog-purchased components will not result in design, which will require that a numerical documentation of the facility unacceptable excursion of the critical load.

crane service requirements be in a form that will represent the duty cycle for the crane. This duty cycle or service data for each individual motion of the crane shall be recorded on the Crane Service Data Record Form 1.00 (see Fig. 1-5111), and shall become part of the contract between the crane manufacturer and the Purchaser.

(c) The design for fatigue analysis shall be considered for the critical components of the crane mechanical components. The cumulative fatigue usage factors shall reflect the effects of all loads sustained from both the construction and operating periods. In absence of a complete certified crane load cycle or load spectrum, the following criteria shall govern.

(1) All mechanical components in the critical load path, or whose failure could result in uncontrolled movement of a critical load, shall be designed for infinite fatigue life.

(2) Travel drives are exempted from infinite fatigue analysis where the maximum excursions due to any postulated failure are facility acceptable.

(3) Fatigue analysis shall be based on crane maximum rated load.

(4) Design consideration shall be taken to ensure that the failure of catalog-purchased components during the projected life of the crane will not result in facility unacceptable excursion of the critical load.

5112 Types II and III Cranes The load spectrum of Types II and III cranes shall be in accordance N/A - This is a Type I Crane with Specification CMAA 70 classifications.

Page 48 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 5120 Hoisting Units 5121 Type I Cranes (a) The hoist components shall meet the requirements of this (a) The hoist components are designed to meet the requirements of this Standard, as applicable. Standard, as applicable.

(b) The hoist drive system shall be designed to provide assurance (b) Assurance that a failure of a single hoist mechanism component would that a failure of a single hoist mechanism component would not not result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load is result in the uncontrolled movement of the lifted load. This can be accomplished by the application of a dual hoist drive system (Fig. 5416.1-accomplished by the application of a single (Fig. 5416.1-1) or dual 2). Load sharing between the gearboxes is assumed to be 75%/25% for (Figs. 5416.1-2 and 5416.1-3) hoist drive unit. normal operation. For single failure overload events, each gearbox is (1) The wire rope drum is exempted from this requirement. designed to hold 100% load in MMH Document 36675-18 (Main Hoist (2) The hook, hook nut, trunnion, and load block load Gearing Analysis).

structure may be exempted from dual load path criteria by (1) The wire rope drum is exempted from this requirement and is doubling the design service factor. designed according to the applicable sections of this document.

(c) Critical load excursions due to failure in the dual load path shall (2) The hook, hook nut, cross head, and load block are designed be determined and certified as to facility acceptability. according to the applicable sections of this document.

(d) Hooks for critical loads shall have dual attaching points. (c) Critical load excursions due to failure in the dual load path are analyzed in the broken rope section of MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

(d) The main hoist hook is a sister hook design with dual attaching points.

Ref. MMH Drawing QR82460 (Main Hoist Hook Assembly).

5122 Types II and III Cranes Hoist components of Types II and III cranes shall be in accordance N/A - This is a Type I Crane with Specification CMAA 70, except as specified herein.

5130 Bridge and Trolley Drives 5131 Type I Cranes (a) Drive components shall meet the requirements of this Standard, (a) The drive components are designed to meet the requirements of this as applicable. Standard, as applicable.

(b) In travel drives, single failure-proof features are generally not (b) The bridge and trolley travel drive arrangements are not single failure required. However, in those cases where a failure in the braking proof and are not required to be single failure proof.

mode could result in a facility unacceptable excursion, the design shall incorporate single failure-proof features to ensure that the crane can be brought to a safe stop.

5132 Types II and III Cranes Page 49 of 154

NOG- I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance Drive components shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA N/A - This is a Type I Crane 70, except as specified herein.

5140 General Mechanical Components 5141 Type I Cranes Couplings, wheels, axles, drive shafts, bearings, fasteners, gear Couplings, wheels, axles, drive shafts, bearings, fasteners, gear cases, cases, enclosures, guards, bumpers, stops, and limit switches shall enclosures, guards, bumpers, stops, and limit switches are designed to meet the requirements of this Standard, as applicable, meet the requirements of this Standard, as applicable.

5142 Types II and III Cranes General mechanical components shall be in accordance with N/A - This is a Type I Crane Specification CMAA 70, except as specified herein.

5150 Critical Items (a) Critical items for a single failure-proof handling system on a Type (a) MMH Document 36675-11 (Critical List) specifies the critical items, I crane are those components which are located between the load required tests per Table 7200-1, and acceptance criteria per para. 7100.

and the source of energy holding the load.

(1) These components require special consideration as to material, design, control of manufacturing processes, and examination of final product.

(2) Table 7200-1 lists the tests and the inspections that are to be applied to critical items in accordance with the requirements of Section 7000.

(3) The acceptance criteria for all items listed in Tables 7200-1 and 7200-2 shall be in accordance with para. 7100.

5160 Nomenclature The following nomenclature is used in Section 5000 and is listed Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

according to the article heading where it appears.

5161 Drum Shell Design (Para. 5411.5)

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

5162 Allowable Strength Horsepower - P0 t(Gearing) [Para.

5413.1(a)]

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

5163 Allowable Durability Horsepower - Pac (Gearing) [Para.

5413.1(b)]

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

Page 50 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 5164 Allowable Momentary Overload - Wo, (Gearing) [Paras.

5413.1(c) and 5413.1(d)]

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

5165 Gearing Efficiencies [Para. 5413.1(g)]

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

5166 Reeving Efficiency (Para. 5429)

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

5167 (Table 5452.3-1)

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

5168 Nomenclature (Analytical Procedures; Para. 5472)

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

5169 Analytical Method for Hook of Approximate Trapezoidal Shape (Para. 5477)

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

5200 MATERIALS 5210 Material (Type I Crane)

Materials with less than 15% elongation shall not be used for any Materials with less than 15% elongation are not used for any mechanical mechanical component except electrical motors and hydraulic components other than electrical motors and hydraulic components.

components.

See Note 1.

5220 Material (Types IIand III Cranes)

Materials shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5300 DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 5310 Load Combinations (a) The individual mechanical components of the overhead or (a) The individual mechanical components are designed with safety gantry crane shall be designed to provide a design factor specified factors to resist the forces resulting from the combination of loading for that component to resist the forces resulting from the specified. Resultant load combinations determined in the electrical and combination of loading specified for the component. The load structural sections are applied to the components as applicable.

combinations that must be considered for the individual (b) Since this is a Type I crane, seismic loading is applied to mechanical components vary with the component, and frequently include components to ensure retention of the load and will prevent any maximum loadings calculated in the electrical or structural section, component from becoming a missile. MMH Document 36675-09 i.e., motor torque of a motor or live load including wind and impact. (Seismic Analysis) provides the location, magnitude, and direction of the Page 51 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane.TrolleyCompliance (b) Certain components must be designed for seismic loading as a G-forces to be used as equivalent static loading. These loads will be part of the load combinations. If a lump mass approach is used in applied to components such as gear cases, drums, reeving systems, etc. in the seismic design, the methods of structural design calculations MMH Document 36675-14 (Seismic Analysis of Misc. Items) and MMH within Section 4000 will provide the values of the dynamic analysis Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

which will be determined for location, magnitude, and direction for forces to be used as equivalent static loading. The extent of seismic consideration necessary for the three types of cranes is as follows.

(1) For Type I Cranes. Seismic loading shall be only to ensure retention of the load and the prevention of any component from becoming a missile that would be detrimental to the facility's safety related equipment.

(2) For Type II Cranes. Seismic considerations shall be made to ensure that no component of the crane could become a missile that would be detrimental to the facility's safety related equipment.

(3) For Type III Cranes. Seismic analysis is not required unless specified by the purchaser.

5311 Design Loads - Hydraulic Components (a) For Types I, II, and III Cranes. The design selection for hydraulic (a) N/A - Hydraulic components are not used on this crane components shall be based on the rated load.

5320 Allowable Stresses 5321 Type I Cranes 5321.1 Normal Operating Conditions All load combinations and factors including stress concentrations The trolley is designed for all load combinations using a minimum service shall have a service factor of 1 or more based on the design fatigue factor (allowable stress / design stress) of 1 based on the design fatigue allowable stress limit of the material, except as otherwise specified allowable stress limits of the materials used.

in Section 5000.

See Note 1.

Service Factor x Design Stress _ Allowable Stress 5321.2 Emergency Conditions For all emergency loads such as load hang-up, seismic loads, using The trolley is designed for emergency loads using a minimum service the gross cross-section excluding the stress concentration factors, factor (allowable stress / design stress) of 1 based on an allowable stress the service factor shall be not less than 1 based on an allowable equal to 75% of the yield strength.

Page 52 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance stress equal to 75% of the yield strength, unless specifically exempted elsewhere in Section 5000. See Note 1.

5322 Type II Cranes 5322.1 Normal Operating Conditions All load combinations and factors including stress concentrations N/A - This is a Type I Crane shall have service factors as stated for the design of specific mechanical components.

5322.2 Emergency Conditions (if Applicable)

All emergency loads such as load hang-up shall have specific factors N/A - This is a Type I Crane as stated for the design of specific mechanical components.

5323 Type III Cranes 5323.1 Normal Operating Conditions Allowable stresses shall be in accordance with the provisions of N/A - This is a Type I Crane Specification CMAA 70.

5323.2 Emergency Conditions Not applicable for this type of crane. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5324 Hydraulic Components - Allowable Stresses 5324.1 Types I, II, and III Cranes Stresses imposed by the maximum rated load shall not exceed 20% N/A - Hydraulic components are not used on this crane of the average ultimate strength of the material or components.

5330 Motion Speeds Rated load speeds for hoist, bridge, and trolley shall be such as to Rated load speeds for hoist, bridge, and trolley are selected to allow allow controlled handling of those loads for which the crane is controlled handling of those loads for which the crane is designed. See designed. These speeds depend on the nature of the load, load paras. 5331, 5332, 5333 for individual requirements.

clearances, position of operator, weight of load, positioning accuracy required, and type of drive. Design rated load speeds recommended in paras. 5331, 5332, and 5333 have been established based on typical operator reaction time and drive performance which will allow the load to be stopped and held.

5331 Hoist Speeds 5331.1 Type I Hoists (a) The performance speed and speed tolerance of the hoist with Ref. the variable frequency drive parameters specified in MMH Drawing rated load shall be specified by the purchaser. The rated load test R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

Page 53 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance.

(125% rated load or as specified by purchaser) speed criteria shall (a) The performance speed of the main hoist with 100% rated load is 5 be as specified by the manufacturer. ft/min per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. Since a speed tolerance is not (b) Rated load recommended hoisting speeds are given in Table specified, +/-10% is selected per (b). The 125% rated load test speed is 5331.1-1 for slow, medium, or fast service for various capacities. limited to the 100% rated load speed by the variable frequency drive.

The design tolerance for rated load hoisting speed is +/-10%. (b) The rated load main hoist speed is equivalent to the recommended (c) Hoisting speed for a critical load less than the rated load shall be value for slow service given in Table 5331.1-1. The design tolerance for limited to 125% of the rated load hoisting speed. rated load hoisting speed is +/-10%.

(d) Empty hook and light load speed-up controls are permitted. (c) The variable frequency drive for the main hoist limits hoisting speed to Refer to para. 6320(e). within +/-10% of the rated load hoisting speed for all loads.

(e) When precise positioning capability is required, and the principal (d) Speed-up controls are provided for both hoists per Zion Specification control system is incapable of providing lowering speed control of SP-ZS-FH-003 to allow 150% of the rated load hoisting speed for unloaded 0.5 ft/min with the load as specified by the purchaser, the hoist and light loads. The unloaded/light load speeds are 7.5 ft/min for the system shall be equipped with an auxiliary system. The positioning main hoist and 30 ft/min for the aux hoist.

capability speed should be 0.5 ft/min. for a distance of 2 ft within (e) N/A - The variable frequency drive for the main hoist has 5 speed the final position. steps per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 and is capable of lowering at (f) The lowering speed for any critical load shall be limited to 125% 0.5 ft/min with the load as specified.

of the rated load hoisting speed. (f) An over speed protection device on the main hoist ensures the lowering speed of any critical load is limited to 125% of the rated load hoisting speed.

5331.2 Types II and III Hoists Recommended rated load speeds should be as specified in either The performance speed of the aux hoist with 100% rated load is 20 ft/min Table 5331.1-1 or the Speed Table given in Specification CMAA 70. per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. This speed is equivalent to the recommended value for slow service given in Table 5331.1-1.

5332 Trolley Speeds 5332.1 Type 1 Cranes (a) The performance speed and speed tolerance of the trolley with Ref. the variable frequency drive parameters specified in MMH Drawing rated load shall be specified by the purchaser. Rated load test speed R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

(125% rated load) criteria shall be specified by the manufacturer. (a) The performance speed of the trolley with 100% rated load is 50 (b) Rated load recommended trolley speeds are given in Table ft/min per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. Since a speed tolerance is not 5332.1-1 for various capacities. The design tolerance for a design specified, +/-10% is selected per (b). The 125% rated load test speed is rated load speed shall be +/-10%. limited to the 100% rated load speed by the variable frequency drive.

(c) The trolley control shall provide an operating speed range of at (b) The rated load trolley speed is equivalent to the recommended value least 10 to 1 under all loading conditions or be equipped with an for slow service given in Table 5331.1-1. The design tolerance for rated Page 54 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance auxiliary system to provide precise positioning capabilities, load trolley speed is +/-10%.

(d) Trolley speed for a critical load less than rated load shall be (c) The speed control with the variable frequency drive is better than 10:1 limited to 125% of the rated load trolley speed. under all loading conditions.

(e) Empty hook and light load speed-up controls are permitted. (d) The variable frequency drive for the trolley limits travel speed to Refer to para. 6340(c). within +/-10% of the rated load trolley speed for all loads.

(e) Empty hook and light load speed-up controls are not provided for the trolley and are not required.

5332.2 Types II and III Cranes Recommended rated load speeds should be as specified in either N/A - This is a Type I Crane Table 5332.1-1 or the Speed Table given in Specification CMAA 70.

5333 Bridge Speeds 5333.1 Type I Cranes (a) The performance speed and speed tolerance of the bridge with Ref. the variable frequency drive parameters specified in MMH Drawing rated load shall be specified by the purchaser. Rated load test speed R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

(125% rated load) criteria shall be specified by the Manufacturer. (a) The performance speed of the bridge with 100% rated load is 50 (b) Rated load recommended bridge speeds are given in Table ft/min per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. Since a speed tolerance is not 5333.1-1 for various capacities. The design tolerance for a design specified, +/-10%is selected per (b). The 125% rated load test speed is rated load speed shall be +/-10%. limited to the 100% rated load speed by the variable frequency drive.

(c) The bridge control shall provide an operating speed range of at (b) The rated load bridge speed is less than the recommended value for least 10 to 1 under all loading conditions, or be equipped with an slow service given in Table 5331.1-1, and therefore more conservative.

auxiliary system to provide precise positioning capabilities. The design tolerance for rated load bridge speed is +/-10%.

(d) Bridge speed for a critical load less than rated load shall be (c) The speed control with the variable frequency drive is better than 10:1 limited to 125% of the rated load bridge speed. under all loading conditions.

(e) Empty hook and light load speed-up controls are permitted. (d) The variable frequency drive for the bridge limits travel speed to Refer to para. 6320(c). within +/-10% of the rated load bridge speed for all loads.

(f) For cranes with circular polar-type bridges, the recommended (e) Empty hook and light load speed-up controls are not provided for the speeds shall be the tangential speeds at the runway rail. bridge and are not required.

(f) N/A - This is not a polar crane 5333.2 Types II and III Cranes Recommended rated bridge speeds should be as specified in either N/A - This is a Type I Crane Table 5332.1-1 or the Speed Table given in Specification CMAA 70.

5334 Pendant Hoist and Travel Speeds 5334.1 Traversing Page 55 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion StationFHB Crane Trolley Compliance Motorized travel speed for this motion should be 30 ft/min. N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant 5334.2 Vertical Travel of Control Pendant Motorized travel speed for this motion should be 30 ft/min. N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant 5335 Powered Hook Rotation (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

(a) Speed of rotation shall be specified by Purchaser. (a-c) N/A - This crane does not have powered hook rotation (b) Rotation limit shall be specified by Purchaser.

(c) Single failure-proof features are not required.

5400 COMPONENT DESIGN 5410 Hoist System 5411 Drum 5411.1 Description (Type I Cranes)

The drum shall be of cylindrical type, varying in length and The main hoist drum is of cylindrical type and is designed as to ensure the diameter, and shall be so designed as to ensure the accumulation of accumulation of the entire length of rope in one single layer. Ref. MMH the entire length of rope in one single layer. Drawing R94603 (Main Hoist Drum Assembly) 5411.2 Size (Type I Cranes)

The pitch diameter of the drum shall be not less than 24 times the The main hoist uses high strength wire rope that is 8 x 25 construction hoist rope diameter for 6 x 37 rope construction, or not less than 30 and has a manufacturer's minimum recommended ratio for drum groove times the hoist rope diameter for 6 x 19 rope construction. minor diameter to rope diameter of 20:1. The actual main hoist ratio for drum pitch diameter to rope diameter is 26:1, which is more conservative than the manufacturer's recommendations, as well as the requirements specified for 6 x 37 rope construction. Ref. MMH Drawing QR94604 (Main Hoist Drum Machining) 5411.3 Construction (Type I Cranes)

The drum shell shall be of rolled or centrifugal cast steel The main hoist drum shell is a rolled steel structure with flanged ends. It construction with flanged ends. It shall be designed to withstand is designed to withstand combined crushing and bending loads as combined crushing and bending loads. Equations (1), (2), and (3) specified. Ref. MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress may be used to determine the stress in the drum shell. The drum Report).

gear shall be pressed on and keyed to the periphery of the shell, hub, or shaft of the drum, or be bolted with close fitting bolts (para. The drum gear is pressed on and keyed to the periphery of the drum 5456) to the flange on the drum, in which case the bolts transmit shell. Ref. MMH Drawing R94603 (Main Hoist Drum Assembly) only torque.

5411.4 Grooves (Type I Cranes)

Drum grooves shall be machined to a minimum depth equal to The minimum drum groove depth, the groove radius, and the pitch for Page 56 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single. Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance three-eighths of the diameter of the hoist rope, and a pitch equal to the main hoist drum are within the requirements of this section. Ref.

1.14 x rope diameter or rope diameter + 1/8 in., whichever is MMH Drawing QR94604 (Main Hoist Drum Machining) smaller. The groove radius shall be 1/32 in. larger than the radius of the rope. With the hook at its lowest position, there are no less than 2 wraps on the Rope shall be secured to the drum as follows: No less than two main hoist drum at each anchorage point. There are two clamps on each wraps of the rope shall remain on the drum at each anchorage to rope that are tightened per the manufacturer's recommend torque. Ref.

the hoisting drum when the hook is in its extreme low position. MMH Drawing R94603 (Main Hoist Drum Assembly)

Rope end shall be anchored by a minimum of two clamps attached to the drum, or by a socket arrangement specified by the crane or rope manufacturer. The rope clamp bolts shall be tightened evenly to the manufacturer's recommended torque.

5411.5 Drum Shell Design (Type I Cranes)

[Text and/or equations omitted] The main hoist drum shell is designed in accordance with this section. Ref.

MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

5411.6 Drum (Types II and III Cranes)

The size, construction, and grooving for Types II and III crane drums The size, construction, and grooving for the aux hoist drum is in shall be established in accordance with the provisions of accordance with the provisions of Specification CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Specification CMAA 70. Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5411.7 Single Failure-Proof Features (Type I Cranes)

(a) Single failure-proof features are not required for the drum shell. (a) Single failure proof features are not provided for the main hoist drum (b) In the event of failure of a drum shaft or bearing, the drum must shell and are not required.

be retained on the trolley in a manner which precludes (b) A drum retainer is installed on both ends of drum to prevent disengagement of any gearing or brake acting on the drum and disengagement or load retaining function of any gearing or brake acting precludes disablement of the load-retaining function of these on the drum. Ref. MMH Drawing QR95370 (Trolley Frame Weldment).

components. (c) N/A - This item is identical to (b)

(c) In the event of failure of a drum shaft or bearing, the drum must be retained on the trolley in a manner which precludes disengagement of any gearing or brake acting on the drum and precludes disablement of the load-retaining function of these components.

5411.8 Single Failure-Proof Features (Types IIand III Cranes)

Single failure-proof features are not required for the drum. Single failure proof features are not provided for the aux hoist drum shell and are not required.

Page 57 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 5412 Drive Motors 5412.1 Type I Cranes Each hoist drive system, such as those indicated in Figs. 5416.1-1 The main hoist drive system, similar to Figure 5416.1-2, is provided with a through 5416.1-3, shall be provided with a hoist drive motor(s) for hoist motor for lifting and lowering loads. The motor is selected to lifting and lowering loads. Motors shall be selected per para. 6470. comply with para. 6470. Motor fasteners are selected to comply with Motor fasteners shall be per para. 5456. para. 5456. Ref. MMH Drawing QR94709 (Main Hoist Motor).

5412.2 Types II and III Cranes Motors shall be selected per para. 6470. The aux hoist motor is selected to comply with para. 6470. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5413 Gearing 5413.1 Type I Cranes Gearing shall be designed and manufactured in accordance with the (a-i) Gearing for the main hoist is designed and manufactured in procedures presented by the American Gear Manufacturers accordance with the procedures presented in AGMA as modified by this Association (AGMA) as modified by this Section. The gearing shall Section. The gearing is designed for strength, durability, and momentary be designed for strength, durability, and momentary overload overloads, including Increased vertical loads imposed during a seismic which includes the loads imposed during a seismic excursion. Unless excursion. Parallel shaft gearing is straddle mounted with two outboard positive control of accurate alignment under varying loads can be bearings to provide adequate support. Ref. MMH Document 36675-18 ensured, parallel shaft gearing, both enclosed and open, shall be (Main Hoist Gearing Analysis).

straddle mounted; that is, each shaft shall be supported by two outboard bearings. (The intent is to preclude inadequately supported or inaccurately aligned overhung gears or pinions, shafts with three bearing supports, and combination gear reducer/wire rope drum shafts.)

(a) Allowable Strength HorsepowerPt.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(b) Allowable Durability HorsepowerP,,.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(c) Allowable Momentary Overload Tooth Load Wtov.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(d) Crane Class FactorSfd (durability)

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(e) Allowable Stresses Sy Sac, Say

[Text and/or equations omitted]

Page 58 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix

1. NOG-1 SingleFailure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (f) Load DistributionFactors Ki,, Cm.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(g) Gear Efficiencies.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(h) Gearing Forms and Quality.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(i) Lubrication.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

5413.2 Types II and III Cranes Gearing for Types II and III cranes shall be established in accordance Gearing for the aux hoist is in accordance with provisions in Specification with provisions in Specification CMAA 70. CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5414 Brakes - Load and Holding 5414.1 Hoist Control Braking Means (Types I, II, and III Hoists)

An electrical control braking means or a mechanical braking means capable of maintaining controlled lowering speeds shall be Electrically controlled dynamic braking is provided for the main and aux provided. Electrically controlled braking means include hoists and is designed per para. 6400. Mechanical control braking is not regenerative, dynamic, countertorque, and eddy current. Brake provided and is not required. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical sizing and design are specified in para.6400. Schematic).

Mechanical load brakes, if used as the control braking means, shall be provided with sufficient thermal capacity to accommodate lowering of the rated load at full speed through the expected operating distance.

5414.2 Hoist Holding Brakes (Type I Hoists)

Two holding brakes shall be provided, mounted such that the failure Similar to Fig. 5416.1-2, two mechanical holding brakes are provided for of any hoist shaft or coupling will not disengage both of the hoist the main hoist and are mounted directly to the gearbox input shafts. Ref.

holding brakes. Under normal operating conditions, the brakes will MMH Drawing R94780 (Main Hoist Machinery Assembly). Failure of any be automatically applied on power removal with the application of hoist shaft or coupling will not disengage both of the hoist holding brakes.

one brake delayed to minimize shock to the hoist drive train. Brake Under normal operating conditions, the brakes are automatically applied sizing and design is specified in para. 6400. on power removal with the application of one brake delayed to minimize shock to the hoist drive train. Brake sizing and design is per para. 6400.

5414.3 Hoist Holding Brakes (Types II and III Hoists)

Hoist holding brakes shall be selected in accordance with para. Holding brakes for the aux hoist are selected in accordance with para.

6420. 6420. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

Page 59 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 5415 Load Combinations - Hoist Drive Shafting (Types I, II,and III Cranes) 5415.1 Load Combinations, Allowable Stresses, and Service Factors The hoist drive machinery shafting shall be designed to resist the following load combinations with corresponding values of allowable The main and aux hoist drive machinery shafting is selected to resist the stresses and service factors. Combinations of the various types of load combinations specified in Table 5415.1-1 with corresponding values loading are shown in Table 5415.1-1. of allowable stresses and service factors. This conclusion is based on existing, proven designs for similar applications.

5415.2 Computation - Analysis Analytical stress computations shall be performed according to Stress calculations are performed according to procedures in para. 5470 procedures in para. 5470. based on the load cases specified in Table 5415.1-1.

5416 Single Failure-Proof Features 5416.1 Type I Cranes The hoist drive system shall be designed to provide assurance that a The main hoist drive system is designed to provide assurance that a failure of a single-hoist mechanism component would not result in failure of a single-hoist mechanism component does not result in the loss the loss of the lifted load. This can be accomplished in several ways. of the lifted load. This is accomplished by using a dual-hoist drive as Typical applications of single- and dual-hoist drive units are shown shown in Figure 5416.1-2.

in Figs. 5416.1-1 and 5416.1-2, respectively, and are defined below. (a) N/A A dual-hoist drive is used.

(a) Single-Hoist Drive. The single-hoist drive may have one gear (b) The dual-hoist drive for the main hoist has two gear trains with a train with a single drive motor and two holding brakes. One holding single drive motor and two mechanical holding brakes located on the brake may be located at the drive motor shaft or any intermediate cross shaft between the gear trains, with one of the holding brakes acting shaft (including the drum shaft axis), and the second brake may be as a back-up with a delayed setting. The torque rating of each holding located at the drum with the drum brake to act as a back-up with a brake is 150% of the required full-load drive torque at the brake location delayed setting or in cases of malfunction. The torque setting of in normal operation per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003, which is more each holding brake shall not be less than 125% of the required full- conservative than the requirements of this para. Each gear train is sized load drive torque at brake location in normal operation. for the total full-load drive torque of the motor.

(b) Dual-HoistDrive. The dual-hoist drive may have two gear trains with drive motor(s) and at least two holding brakes located on the cross shaftexternal or between the gear trains, with one of the holding brakes to act as a back-up with a delayed setting. The torque rating of each holding brake shall not be less than 125% of the full-load drive torque required at the brake location in normal operation. Each gear train shall be sized for the total full-load drive Page 60 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance torque of the motor.

5416.2 Types II and III Cranes Single failure proof features are not required. Single failure proof features are not provided for the aux hoist drive system and are not required.

5420 Reeving System (a) Type I Cranes.The design of the rope reeving system shall be (a) The design of the main hoist rope reeving system is such that a single such that a single rope failure will not result in the loss of the lifted rope failure will not result in the loss of the lifted load. A load balance is load. A load balance shall be provided on each rope system. In the provided on each rope system and the ropes are guided by the weight-event of a hook over travel, where the lower block contacts the operated limit switch so that ropes are not cut or crushed in the event of crane structure, the ropes shall not be cut or crushed. The wire rope a hook over travel. The wire rope and fleet angle requirements are in and fleet angle requirements shall be in accordance with paras. accordance with paras. 5425.1 and 5426, respectively. Ref. MMH Drawing 5425.1 and 5426, respectively. R94779 (Trolley Assembly).

(1) Single Failure-ProofFeatures.Single failure proof (1) Single failure proof mechanical features are provided for the mechanical features for the reeving system shall consist of main hoist reeving system and include the following:

the following. (a) The reeving system is divided into two separate load (a) Reeving system shall be divided into two paths so that either path will support the load and separate load paths so that either path will support maintain vertical alignment in the event of rope breakage the load and maintain vertical alignment in the or failure in the rope system.

event of rope breakage or failure in the rope (b) Upper blocks and load blocks are designed such that system. Figure 5420-1 shows one such reeving each attaching point is able to support a load of three system. Other reeving systems that meet the above times the load (static and dynamic) being handled requirements are acceptable. without permanent deformation of any part of the block (b) Upper blocks and load blocks shall be designed assembly. Components in the lower block that do not such that each attaching point will be able to provide a dual load path will be designed with double the support a load of three times the load (static and service factor in accordance with 5121(b)( 2). These dynamic) being handled without permanent assemblies are designed so that the sheaves are deformation of any part of the block assembly. contained in the event a sheave support pin fails.

These assemblies shall be designed so that the (b) Reeving system components for the aux hoist are in accordance with sheaves will be contained in the event of failure of Specification CMAA 70. The aux hoist is double-reeved with multiple the sheave support pin. parts. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

(b) Types II and III Cranes. Reeving system components for Types II (1) N/A - The aux hoist is double-reeved.

and III cranes shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. (2) The aux hoist is double-reeved with both ends of the rope Hoist reeving may be either single or double and may be one or attached to the drum in accordance with Fig. 5420-2(b). The drum Page 61 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance multiple parts. is grooved with left and right grooves beginning at both ends of (1) On single-reeved hoists, one end of the rope is attached the drum, then grooving toward the center of the drum. The load to the drum and the other end is dead ended on a block follows a true vertical path as the ropes wind toward or stationary portion of the hoist. Continuous drum grooving away from each other onto or off the drum.

runs in one direction. The load block moves laterally in the (3) Single failure proof features are not provided for the aux hoist direction of the axis of the drum as the rope winds onto or and are not required.

off of the drum. Refer to Fig. 5420-2, sketch (a).

(2) On double-reeved hoists, both ends of the rope are attached to the drum. The drum is grooved with left and right grooves beginning at both ends of the drum, then grooving toward the center of the drum. The load block will follow a true vertical path (true vertical lift) as the ropes wind toward or away from each other onto or off the drum.

Refer to Fig. 5420-2, sketch (b).

(3) Single failure-proof features are not required for Type II and III cranes.

5421 Upper Block 5421.1 Type I Cranes (a) The upper block, in conjunction with the load block, shall be (a) The main hoist upper block, in conjunction with the load block, is designed to maintain a vertical load balance about the center of the designed to maintain a vertical load balance about the center of the lifted lifted load and shall have a reeving system of dual design. load and has a reeving system of dual design. Ref. MMH Drawing R94779 (b) All design loads and allowable stresses for mechanical and (Trolley Assembly).

structural components of the upper block shall be in accordance (b) All design loads and allowable stresses for mechanical and structural with paras. 5300 and 4310, respectively. The upper block shall be components of the main hoist upper block are in accordance with paras.

accessible from above the trolley floor. 5300 and 4310, respectively. Ref. MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

5421.2 Types II and III Cranes Upper blocks for Types II and III cranes shall be established in The aux hoist upper block is designed in accordance with the provisions of accordance with the provisions of Specification CMAA 70. Specification CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5422 Load Block 5422.1 Type I Cranes (a) The load block frame shall be constructed of rolled steel and Ref. MMH Drawing R95005 (Main Hoist Bottom Block Assembly) for the shall be entirely enclosed except for the rope openings. The hook(s) following items:

Page 62 of 154

NOG- I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance shall be free to swivel on antifriction or sleeve bearing so (a) The main hoist load block frame is constructed of rolled steel and is constructed as to exclude dirt and also shall be provided with a entirely enclosed except at the top for the rope openings. The hook means for lubrication. Refer to para. 5460 for data relating to swivels on an antifriction thrust bearing that excludes dirt and provides lubrication. easy access for re-lubrication per para. 5460.

(b) Welding of trunnions for critical load handling load blocks shall (b) N/A - The main hoist load block does not use trunnions. A cross head, not be permitted. fabricated from structural steel, is welded directly to the load block 5422.2 Types II and III Cranes Load blocks for Types II and III cranes shall be established in The aux hoist load block is designed in accordance with the provisions of accordance with the provisions of Specification CMAA 70. Specification CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5423 Equalizer Systems 5423.1 Type I Cranes (a) Where separate rope equalizing is required, either an equalizer (a) The main hoist reeving system consists of two separate and complete bar or a sheave will be acceptable. In either case, two separate and reeving systems, each with an equalizer bar assembly accessible from the complete reeving systems shall be provided. The equalizer, where trolley floor and capable of swiveling to align with the pull of the ropes.

possible, should be designed to be accessible from the floor of the Ref. MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly).

trolley and be made in such a manner that it can turn or swivel to (b) N/A - Equalizer bars are used instead of sheaves.

align itself with the pull of the ropes. (c) The main hoist rope equalizer system is designed to meet the required (b) Equalizer sheaves, when used, shall have a pitch diameter not criteria. Ref. MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress less than one-half of the diameter of the running sheaves. Report) and MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly) for the following (c) Rope equalizer systems shall be designed to meet the criteria as items:

delineated herein. (1) Reeving equalization is not restricted under normal operating (1) Reeving equalization shall not be restricted under conditions.

normal operating conditions. (2) Adequate free movement to compensate for operational (2) Adequate free movement to compensate for block swing and/or normal rope stretch is provided.

operational blockswing and/or normal rope stretch shall be (3) Sensing and automatic signaling of excessive rope provided, displacement to either side is provided with the weigh system, (3) Sensing and automatic signaling of excessive rope which monitors the individual loads on the equalizer trunnions displacement to either side shall be provided, using strain gages. Excessive rope displacement to one side (4) Sensing and automatic signaling of a broken causes an unbalanced load fault, which disables hoisting and reeving shall be provided, applies the brakes.

(5) In the event of a broken rope, the remaining intact (4) Sensing and automatic signaling of a broken rope is provided reeving system shall not be loaded to more than 40% of the with the weigh system, which monitors the individual loads on breaking strength of the wire rope, including the dynamic the equalizer trunnions using strain gages. A broken rope causes Page 63 of 154

NOG- 1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance effects of the load transfer. an unbalanced load or underweight fault, which disables hoisting (6) The vertical displacement of the load following a rope and applies the brakes.

failure shall be minimized. (5) 1 n the event of a broken rope,, the remaining intact reeving (7) The vertical displacement of the load following a rope system is not loaded to more than 40% of the breaking strength failure shall be calculated and reported to the purchaser. of the wire rope, including the dynamic effects of the load (8) The effects of a broken rope on the entire system transfer including the equalizer assembly shall be analyzed. (6) The vertical displacement of the load following a rope failure is minimized.

(7) The vertical displacement of the load following a rope failure is calculated and reported to the purchaser.

(8) The effects of a broken rope on the entire system including the equalizer assembly are analyzed.

5423.2 Types IIand III Cranes Equalizer bars or sheaves of Types II and III cranes shall be The aux hoist equalizers are designed in accordance with the provisions of established in accordance with the provisions of Specification CMAA Specification CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

70.

5424 Sheave Pins 5424.1 Type I Cranes (a) Sheave pins for the upper block and load block shall be designed Ref. MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report) for the to withstand the combined line pull of the live load, plus the dead following items:

load of the load block. (a) Main hoist sheave pins are designed to withstand the combined line (b) Seismic effects shall be included in the analysis. pull of the live load, plus the dead load of the load block.

(c) Analytical stress computation shall be performed in accordance (b) Seismic effects are enveloped by the broken rope condition since the with para. 5470. increased load due to a rope break condition is significantly higher than (d) Service factors shall be applied in accordance with para. 5320. the seismic loading.

(e) Grease lubricated sheave bearings should be provided with (c) Analytical stress computation is performed in accordance with para.

individual lubrication fittings if the pin size is sufficiently large to 5470.

provide the space for these fittings. (d) Service factors will be applied in accordance with para. 5320. Load block sheave pins will have the design service factor doubled since they do not provide a dual load path.

(e) Individual lubrication fittings are provided in the main hoist sheave pins for grease lubricated sheave bearings.

5424.2 Types IIand III Cranes Page 64 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance Sheave pins for Types II and III cranes shall be in accordance with The aux hoist sheave pins are designed in accordance with the provisions the provisions of Specification CMAA 70. of Specification CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5425 Rope Construction, Loads, and Design Factors 5425.1 Type I Cranes (a) Rope Construction.The hoist rope shall be of a construction for Ref. MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report) and crane service, such as improved or extra-improved plow steel MMH Drawing QR94824 (Main Hoist Wire Rope Assembly) for the grades, 6 x 37 class construction (6 strand, 27 to 49 wires per following items:

strand), right regular lay with independent wire rope core. Other (a) The main hoist uses high strength EEIPS wire rope of 8 x 25 materials, strength grades, rope constructions, type of cores, and construction specifically designed for crane service. Right and left regular lay may be used where application or future development in wire lay are used per the manufacturer's recommendations.

rope technology indicates.

(b) Selection of Ropes. Hoisting ropes shall be selected based on the (1) The rated load (without impact), plus the weight of the load more stringent of the following requirements. block divided by the total number of parts of rope per system, (1) The rated load (without impact), plus the weight of the does not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's published breaking load block divided by the total number of parts of rope per strength.

system, shall not exceed 20% of the manufacturer's (2) The maximum critical load is equivalent to the rated load, published breaking strength. which does not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's published (2) The maximum critical load (without impact), plus the breaking strength on the total system or 20% on each of the dual weight of the load block divided by the total number of systems.

parts of rope, shall not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's (3) The impact load in the transfer of the maximum critical load published breaking strength on the total system or 20% on from one of the dual hoisting rope systems to the other, in the each of the dual systems. event of rope failure, does not exceed 40% of the manufacturer's (3) The impact load in the transfer of the maximum critical published breaking strength.

load from one of the dual hoisting rope systems to the (4) The seismic load (para. 4130) with all parts of rope intact does other, in the event of rope failure, shall not exceed 40% of not exceed 40% of the manufacturer's published breaking the manufacturer's published breaking strength. strength.

(4) The seismic load (para. 4130) with all parts of rope intact (c) The breaking strength of rope conforms to the manufacturer's shall not exceed 40% of the manufacturer's published published values based upon the minimum values determined by actual breaking strength. tensile tests performed on new ropes. The theoretical strengths based (c) Breaking Strength of Ropes. The breaking strength of rope shall upon material properties and net metal cross-section are not used.

conform to the manufacturer's published values based upon the minimum values determined by actual tensile tests performed on Page 65 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance new ropes. The theoretical strengths based upon material properties and net metal cross-section shall not be used.

5425.2 Types II and III Cranes Rope construction, loads, and design factors for Types II and III The aux hoist wire rope construction, loads, and design factors are in cranes shall be established in accordance with the provisions of accordance with the provisions of Specification CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Specification CMAA 70. Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5426 Fleet Angles 5426.1 Type I Cranes (a) The rope fleet angle to the drum grooves shall be limited to 3- Ref. MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly) for the following items:

1/2 deg, except at the last 3 ft of the maximum lift elevation it shall (a) The maximum fleet angle for the main hoist drum is < 3-1/2' be limited to 4 deg. Refer to Fig. 5426-1 for fleet angle throughout the hoisting range, except at the last 3 ft of maximum lift measurement to the drum groove, elevation, where it is < 40.

(b) The rope fleet angle for sheaves shall be limited to 3-1/2 deg, (b) The maximum fleet angle for the main hoist sheaves is < 3-1/2' except at the last 3 ft of the maximum lift elevation it shall be throughout the hoisting range, except at the last 3 ft of maximum lift limited to 4-1/2 deg. Refer to Fig. 5426-2 for fleet angle elevation, where it is < 4-1/20.

measurement to the sheaves.

5426.2 Types II and III Cranes The operating fleet angle for Types II and III cranes shall be in The aux hoist wire rope fleet angles are in accordance with Specification accordance with CMAA 70. CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5427 Sheaves 5427.1 Type I Cranes Ref. MMH Drawing R95005 (Main Hoist Bottom Block Assembly) for the Sheaves shall be of steel and provided with antifriction or sleeve following items:

bearings. Proper provision for the effects of thrust shall be made The main hoist sheaves are high-strength, low-weight Nylatron material where applicable. Figures 5427.1-1 and 5427.1-2 are recommended specifically designed for sheave application. The sheaves are provided for running sheave proportions only. The pitch diameter of all with sleeve bearings and are separated using washers to prevent galling sheaves except equalizer sheaves shall be not less than 24 times the and accommodate thrust loads. Sheave dimensions are in accordance diameter of the hoist rope for 6 x 37 rope construction, or not less with the manufacturer's recommendations, but follow Figures 5427.1-1 than 30 times the hoist rope diameter for 6 x 19 rope construction. and 5427.1-2 whenever possible. The main hoist uses high strength wire Sheave journals requiring external lubrication shall be provided with rope that is 8 x 25 construction and has a manufacturer's minimum individual grease lines, with the fittings located such that they will recommended ratio for sheave groove minor diameter to rope diameter be protected from damage (see para. 5460). Means shall be of 20:1. The actual main hoist ratio for sheave pitch diameter to rope provided to prevent the wire rope from leaving the sheave grooves, diameter is 22:1, which is more conservative than the manufacturer's recommendations. The main hoist sheave sleeve bearings are solid with Page 66 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley ComplianCe lubricant inserts, so there are no external grease lines. Means are provided to prevent the wire rope from leaving the sheave grooves. The bottom block is designed with metal bars that prevent the rope from leaving the sheave grooves.

5427.2 Types II and III Cranes Sheaves for Types II and III cranes shall be established in accordance The aux hoist sheaves are in accordance with the provisions of with the provisions of Specification CMAA 70. Specification CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5428 Hooks 5428.1 Single Failure-Proof Features (Type I Cranes)

Type I cranes shall be provided with (a) hook(s) that either: (a) The main hoist hook is a sister hook design that provides two load-.

(a) provide(s) two load-attaching points designed such that each attaching points designed such that each attaching point can support a attaching point will be able to support a load of three times the load of three times the critical load (static and dynamic) being handled critical load (static and dynamic) being handled without permanent without permanent deformation of the hook, other than localized strain deformation of the hook, other than localized strain concentration concentration in areas for which additional material has been provided in areas for which additional material has been provided for wear, for wear. Ref. MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress or Report).

(b) provide(s) one load-attaching point designed such that it will be (b) The main hoist hook also has a pinhole, which is a single attachment able to support a load of six times the critical load (static and point that is able to support a load of six times the critical load (static and dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation of the dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation of the hook.

hook, other than localized strain concentration in areas for which Ref. MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

additional material has been provided for wear.

5428.2 Single Failure-Proof Features (Types II and III Cranes)

Single failure-proof mechanical features are not required. Single failure proof features are not provided for the aux hoist hook and are not required.

5428.3 Analytical Procedure for Curved Beams Hook stresses are calculated using the curved beam method N/A - Straight beam method is used for the main hoist sister hook in described by A.M. Wahl in The Journal of Applied Mechanics, pp. A- accordance with Section 5477(b). The aux hoist hook is purchased from a 239 to A-242, September 1946. For hook configuration and manufacturer and has a published load rating and safety factor calculation procedures, see para. 5470. appropriate for the load.

5429 Reeving Efficiency (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

The reeving efficiencies are based on the total number of ropes Reeving efficiency is determined as required with additional input from supporting one load block either double reeved or single reeved. Specification CMAA 70. Section 5.2.9.1.1.1 provides a breakdown of The values of the reeving efficiencies are determined from Eq. (12). efficiencies based on the use of antifriction vs. sleeve bearings and oil Page 67 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crone Trolley Compliance

[Text and/or equations omitted] lubrication for internal reductions vs. grease lubrication for external reductions. Ref. MMH Document 36675-18 (Main Hoist Gearing Analysis).

5430 Trolley Drives (a) Type I Cranes. Trolley drives shall consist of one of the following Ref. MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly) for the following items:

arrangements, which are shown in Fig. 5430(a)-i. Each four-wheel (a) The trolley drive consists of the A-4 arrangement described in (6) and trolley shall use a drive arrangement that provides drive to at least is approximately shown in Fig. 5430(a)-i. The four-wheel trolley uses a 50% of the wheels. Trolleys having more than four wheels shall drive arrangement that provides drive to at least 50% of the wheels. The have at least 25% of the wheels driven. motor and gearbox are purchased as a combination unit from and are In trolley travel drives, single failure-proof features are generally located near each end of the trolley without torque shafts. The motors not required. However, in those cases where a failure of a are connected (internally) to self-contained gear reduction units by component could result in a facility unacceptable excursion, the means of flexible couplings. The gear reduction units slip on to the trolley design shall incorporate single failure-proof features to ensure that wheel axles and torque is transmitted by means of a torque arm. Since the trolley can be brought to a safe stop. the gear reduction units are directly supported by the shafts, (1) A-1 Drive. The motor is located near the center of the misalignment is not possible and flexible couplings are not required.

trolley and is connected by means of a flexible coupling to a Single failure proof features are not provided for the trolley drive system self-contained gear reduction unit also located at the center and are not required.

of the trolley, which shall be connected to the line shaft by (b) N/A - This is a Type I Crane solid or half-flexible couplings. The line shaft is in turn connected to the trolley wheel axles by means of floating shafts with half-flexible couplings.

(2) A-1A Drive. Same as A-1 drive, except the self-contained gear reduction unit is located closer to one of the trolley wheel axles.

(3) A-1B Drive. Same as A-1 drive, except the self-contained gear reduction unit is located outside the trolley frame close to one of the trolley wheel axles.

(4) A-2 Drive. The motor is connected by means of a flexible coupling to a self-contained gear reduction unit located at the center of the trolley. The trolley wheels shall be driven through gears which are either pressed or keyed to their axles or which are attached directly to the wheel. Floating shaft couplings shall be half-flexible type at wheel and reducer connections. If splicing of floating shafts is Page 68 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements . Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance required, couplings shall be of the solid type.

(5) A-3 Drive. The motor is located at the center of the trolley and is connected directly to the line shaft by half-flexible couplings. Self-contained gear reduction units located near each end of the trolley shall be connected to the trolley wheel axles by means of floating shafts with half-flexible couplings or directly with full-flexible couplings.

(6) A-4 Drive. The motors are located near each end of the trolley without torque shafts. The motors shall be connected to self-contained gear reduction units by means of flexible couplings. The gear reduction units shall be connected to the trolley wheel axles by means of floating shafts with half-flexible couplings or directly coupled by means of full-flexible couplings.

(7) A-5 Drive. The motor is located near the center of the trolley and is connected by means of a flexible coupling to a self-contained gear reduction unit located near the center of the trolley. This reduction unit shall be connected by sections of line shaft having solid or half-flexible couplings to self-contained gear reduction units located near each end of the trolley, and these in turn connect to trolley wheel axles by means of floating shafts with half-flexible couplings or directly by means of full-flexible couplings.

(8) A-6 Drive. The motors are located near each end of the trolley and are connected with a torque shaft. On the drive end, the motors shall be connected to self-contained gear reduction units by means of flexible couplings. Gear reduction units are to be connected to trolley wheel axles by means of floating shafts with half-flexible couplings. High speed shafts between motors shall be connected by means of half-flexible couplings. All other couplings shall be of the solid type.

(b) Types II and III Cranes. Arrangement of trolley drives is the same Page 69 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements: ZioIn Station FHB CraneTrolleyCompliance as for Type I cranes.

5431 Motors - Trolley 5431.1 Type I Cranes Each motor in a trolley drive arrangement (refer to para. 5430) shall The trolley drive is an A-4 arrangement that includes individually driven connect directly or indirectly to two opposite wheels for traversing wheels with motors driving opposite wheels. The motors are selected per the trolley, or, if individually driven wheels are used, a motor shall para. 6400. Ref. MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly).

be provided to drive opposite wheels. Motors are to be selected per para. 6400.

5431.2 Types II and III Cranes Trolley drive motors shall be selected in accordance with para. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 6400.

5432 Trolley Travel Gearing 5432.1 General - Type I Cranes Trolley travel gearing shall be designed in accordance with para. The motor and gearbox are purchased as a combination unit and the 5413 except for the areas delineated in this Section. The actual gearbox meets or exceeds the applicable requirements of AGMA for the horsepower imposed on the gearing shall be considered as the respective size, which complies with Section 5413. The actual rated motor horsepower at its normal time rating as defined in horsepower imposed on the gearing is considered as the rated motor Section 6000. If 60-minute series wound motors are used, then horsepower at its normal time rating (60 minute minimum) as defined in special consideration shall be given to the short time torque ratings Section 6000. Ref. MMH Document 36675-06 (Electrical Calculations).

of such motors. 60-minute series wound motors are only applicable to DC motors. Since this is an AC motor, special considerations for short time torque ratings do not apply.

5432.2 Types IIand III Cranes Gearing for trolley travels shall be established in accordance with N/A - This is a Type I Crane the provisions of Specification CMAA 70.

5433 Trolley Brakes 5433.1 Type I Cranes (a) Service Brakes. A trolley drive system shall be provided with a (a) Dynamic braking through the variable frequency drive is provided for service braking means which may be satisfied by the emergency the trolley to satisfy the service brake requirement. Service brake brake, a separate control brake, or as part of the motor controls. requirements, brake sizes, and brake designs comply with Section 6000.

Service brake requirements, brake sizes, and brake designs are (b) Friction-type brakes are provided for all trolley motors to satisfy the specified in Section 6000. emergency and parking brake requirement. Brake sizing and design (b) Emergency and Parking Brakes. Each primary trolley drive motor complies with Section 6000.

Page 70 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion StatiOn FHB Crane Trolley Compliance shall be provided with an emergency and a parking brake. Brake sizing and design are specified in Section 6000.

5433.2 Types II and III Cranes Trolley brakes shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5440 Bridge Drives (a) Type I Cranes. Bridge drives shall consist of one of the following (a) The bridge drive consists of the A-2 arrangement described in (2) and arrangements, which are shown in Fig. 5440(a)-i. Each four-wheel is approximately shown in Fig. 5440(a)-i. The eight-wheel bridge uses a bridge shall use a drive arrangement that has at least 50% of the drive arrangement that provides drive to at least 25% of the wheels. Ref.

wheels driven. Bridges having more than four wheels, such as eight- P&H Drawing 105A3002 (Bridge Layout).

wheel, twelve-wheel, or sixteen-wheel, shall have at least 25% of Single failure proof features are not provided for the bridge drive system the wheels driven. and are not required.

In bridge travel drives, single failure-proof features are generally The motor is connected by means of a flexible coupling to a self-not required. However, in those cases where a failure of a contained gear reduction unit located at the center of the bridge. The component could result in a facility unacceptable excursion, the bridge wheels are driven through gears that are keyed and press fitted.

design shall incorporate single failure-proof features to ensure that Line shaft couplings at the center reducer are solid. The reduction pinion the bridge can be brought to a safe stop. is pressed onto the end of the drive shaft, which is supported by a bearing (1) A-1 Drive. The motor is located near the center of the and does not require a coupling. All other couplings are of the solid type.

bridge and is connected by means of a flexible coupling to a (b) N/A - This is a Type ICrane self-contained gear reduction unit also located at the center of the bridge, which shall be connected to the line shaft by solid or half-flexible couplings. The line shaft is in turn connected to the bridge wheel axles by means of floating shafts with half-flexible couplings [see (a)(7) below, Note].

(2) A-2 Drive. The motor is connected by means of a flexible coupling to a self-contained gear reduction unit located at the center of the bridge. The bridge wheels shall be driven through gears which either are press fitted or are attached directly to the wheel. Line shaft couplings at the center reducer shall be either solid or half-flexible. Line shaft couplings at the truck reduction pinion shall be of the half-flexible type. All other couplings shall be of the solid type

[see (a)(7) below, Note].

(3) A-3 Drive. The motor is located at the center of the Page 71 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance bridge and is connected directly to the line shaft by means of half-flexible couplings. Self-contained gear reduction units located near each end of the bridge shall be connected to the bridge wheel axles by means of floating shafts with half-flexible couplings. All other couplings shall be of the solid type.

(4) A-4 Drive. The motors are located near each end of the bridge without torque shafts. The motors shall be connected to self-contained gear reduction units by means of flexible couplings. The gear reduction units shall be connected to the bridge wheel axles by means of floating shafts with half-flexible couplings or directly coupled by means of full-flexible couplings.

(5) A-5 Drive. The motor is located near the center of the bridge and is connected by means of a flexible coupling to a self-contained gear reduction unit located near the center of the bridge. This reduction unit shall be connected by sections of line shaft having solid or half-flexible couplings to self-contained gear reduction units located near each end of the bridge, and these, in turn, shall be connected to bridge wheel axles by means of floating shafts with half-flexible couplings [see (a)(7) below, Note].

(6) A-6 Drive. The motors are located near each end of the bridge and are connected with a torque shaft. On the drive end, the motor shall be connected to a self-contained gear reduction unit by means of flexible couplings. Gear reduction units are to be connected to bridge wheel axles by means of floating shafts with half-flexible couplings. High speed shafts between motors shall be connected by half-flexible couplings. All other couplings shall be of the solid type.

(7) Typical bridge drive arrangements for polar cranes are shown in Fig. 5440(a)-2. These drives use the A-4 drive Page 72 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requiremefits Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance arrangement with the axis of bridge wheel rotation passing through the center of the crane runway diameter.

(b) Types II and III Cranes.Arrangement of bridge drives is the same as for Type I cranes.

5441 Motors - Bridge 5441.1 Type I Cranes Each bridge drive arrangement, as described in para. 5440 and The bridge drive is an A-2 arrangement that uses a single motor. The shown in Figs. 5440(a)-1 and 5440(a)-2, shall use one or more motor is selected per para. 6400. Ref. P&H Drawing 105A3002 (Bridge motors for traversing the bridge. Motor(s) shall be selected in Layout) accordance with para. 6400.

5441.2 Types II and III Cranes Bridge drive motors shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA N/A - This is a Type I Crane 70.

5441.3 Ratings If 60-min series wound motors are used, then special consideration N/A minute series wound motors are only applicable to DC motors.

shall be given to the short time torque ratings of such motors. Since this is an AC motor, special considerations for short time torque ratings do not apply.

5442 Bridge Travel Gearing 5442.1 Type I Cranes Bridge travel gearing shall be designed in accordance with para. The existing bridge motor is replaced by a new bridge motor with the 5413, except for the areas delineated in this Section. The actual same horsepower and dimensions. The actual horsepower imposed on horsepower imposed on the gearing shall be considered as the the gearing is considered the rated motor horsepower at its normal time rated motor horsepower, at its normal time rating, unless 60-min rating (60 minute minimum) as defined in Section 6000.

series wound motors are used (see para. 5441.3).

See Note 1.

5442.2 Types II and III Cranes Gearing for bridge travels shall be established in accordance with N/A - This is a Type I Crane the provisions of Specification CMAA 70.

5443 Bridge Brakes 5443.1 Type I Cranes (a) Service Brakes. A bridge drive system shall be provided with a (a) Dynamic braking through the variable frequency drive is provided for service braking means that may be satisfied by the parking brake, a the bridge to satisfy the service brake requirement. Service brake separate control brake, or as part of the motor controls. Service requirements, brake sizes, and brake designs comply with Section 6000.

Page 73 of 154

NOG-I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance brake requirements, brake sizes, and brake designs are specified (b) Friction-type brakes are provided for all bridge motors to satisfy the under Section 6000. emergency and parking brake requirement. Brake sizing and design (b) Emergency and ParkingBrakes. Each primary bridge drive motor complies with Section 6000.

shall be provided with an emergency and a parking brake. Brake sizing and design are specified under Section 6000.

5443.2 Types II and III Cranes Bridge brakes shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5450 General Mechanical Components 5451 Couplings (Types I, II, and III Cranes) 5451.1 General Ref. MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly) and P&H Drawing (a) Couplings connecting the motor(s) to the hoist and travel(s) shall 105A3002 (Bridge Layout) for the following items:

be the flexible type. Grease lubricated couplings are preferred with (a) Grease-lubricated flexible couplings are used between the motors and gear types. gear cases for the hoist, trolley drive, and bridge drive.

(b) Cross-shaft couplings, other than the flexible type, shall be steel (b) Solid compression type couplings are used for the bridge drive shafts, as specified by the coupling manufacturer. The coupling (other than including at each end truck and at each side of the motor gear reducer.

flexible) may be compression, sleeve, or flange type. Couplings shall There are no solid type couplings on the trolley.

be provided at each end truck and each side of the motor gear reducer. Additional couplings may be installed as necessary.

5451.2 Selection (a) Coupling selection shall be based on the manufacturer's rating (a-b) Coupling selection for the trolley is based on the manufacturer's and applicable service factors for crane motions compared to the rating and applicable service factors for crane motions compared to the applied torque on the coupling, giving consideration to the applied torque on the coupling with consideration for requirements listed following: in (a) as applicable.

(1) motor output (2) gear ratio See Note 1.

(3) efficiency of system (4) wheel slippage with maximum operating wheel load (friction -p= = 0.2)

(5) dynamic effects (6) brake torque (b) In no case do all of the loading conditions occur simultaneously, and consideration should be given to the applicable conditions, such as minimum wheel slippage or motor output torque.

Page 74 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Cranie Trolley Compliance 5452 Wheels - Bridge and Trolley 5452.1 General Unless other means of restricting lateral movement are provided, Double flanged wheels with straight machined treads are used for both wheels shall be double flanged with treads accurately machined, the bridge and trolley per MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly) and Wheels may have either straight treads or tapered treads P&H Drawing 100A4381-S9 (Truck Assembly). Trolley wheel tread assembled with the large diameter toward the center of the span. diameter is machined within a minimum of 0.010 in. so that all wheels Drive wheels shall be matched pairs within 0.001 in./in. of diameter, accurately match. Flangeless wheel and side roller assemblies are not or a total of 0.010 in. on the diameter, whichever is smaller. When used on this crane.

flangeless wheel and side roller assemblies are provided, they shall be of a type and design recommended by the crane manufacturer. See Note 1.

5452.2 Material Wheels shall be rolled or forged from steel for Type I cranes. Types The trolley wheels are forged from steel and the treads are hardened to II and III cranes may have wheels cast of carbon or alloy steel. 57-62 Rc (58 Rc equals approximately 615 BHN).

Wheel treads shall have a minimum surface hardness of 300 BHN.

See Note 1.

5452.3 Loading Wheels shall be designed to carry the maximum wheel load under Wheels are designed to carry the maximum wheel load under normal normal conditions. The allowable maximum wheel load is conditions per the requirements of this section. Maximum wheel loads determined by dividing the allowable wheel load in Table 5452.3-1 are determined in MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations).

by the appropriate speed factor of Table 5452.3-2. The allowable wheel load shown in Table 5452.3-1 is that load produced with trolley handling the rated load in the position to produce the maximum load and shall be used for determining wheel sizes.

Impact loading due to handling rated load is not included in the allowable wheel loads.

5452.4 Clearances (a) Bridge Clearances.Wheel treads shall be a minimum of 3/4 in. Ref. P&H 100A4381-$9 (Truck Assembly), and MMH Drawing R94779 wider than the rail head for nontapered wheels. (Trolley Assembly) for the following items:

(b) Trolley Clearances.Wheel treads shall be a minimum of 3/8 in. (a) Bridge wheel treads are not tapered and are a minimum of 3/4 in.

wider than the rail head for nontapered wheels. wider than the rail head.

(c) Tapered Wheel Clearances.Tapered tread wheels may have a (b) Trolley wheel treads are not tapered and are a minimum of 3/8 in.

clearance over the rail head of 150% of the clearance provided for wider than the rail head.

straight tread wheels, or as recommended by the crane (c) N/A - Tapered wheels are not used for this crane.

Page 75 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance manufacturer. (d) N/A - There are no special conditions for wheel clearances.

(d) Special Conditionsfor Wheel Clearances.Wheel tread clearances may be greater than those specified in Fig. 5452.4-1, if determined See Note 1.

necessary to meet runway expansion requirements caused by excessive temperature and pressure. Refer to Section 1000. For guidance on wheel width and height, refer to Table 5452.4-1.

5452.5 Axle Fits When rotating axles are used, wheels shall be mounted on the axle Wheels are press fit onto axles with keys. Wheel hubs are thick enough with a press fit alone or press fit and keys. All wheels shall have to permit the use of keys.

sufficient hub thickness to permit the use of keys.

5452.6 Overhung Wheels Overhung wheels shall not be used. Overhung wheels are not used on this crane.

5453 Axles - Bridge and Trolley 5453.1 General - Type I Cranes Axles may be either of the fixed or rotating type. Ref. MMH Drawing R95253 (Trolley Wheel Assembly - Drive), P&H (a) Load Combinations,Allowable Stresses, and Service Factors.The Drawing 10F8569 (Trolley Wheel Idler Axle), P&H Drawing 10F7747F1 bridge and trolley axles shall be designed to resist the load (Bridge Wheel Drive Axle), and P&H Drawing 10F7748 (Bridge Wheel Idler combinations of Table 5453.1(a)-i with corresponding values of Axle) for the following items:

allowable stresses and service factors. Rotating axles are used on the bridge and trolley wheels.

(b) Computation - Analysis. Analytical stress computations shall be (a) Bridge and trolley axles are selected to resist the load combinations of performed according to procedures in para. 5470. Table 5453.1(a)-i with corresponding values of allowable stresses and service factors.

(b) Axle sizing is based on existing, proven designs for similar applications.

5453.2 General - Type II Cranes Axles shall be designed according to Specification CMAA 70. N/A - This isa Type I Crane 5453.3 General - Type III Cranes Axles shall be designed according to Specification CMAA 70. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5454 Drive Shafts - Bridge and Trolley 5454.1 General - Type I Cranes Page 76 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance Drive shafting shall be designed for the rated load maximum wheel N/A - Drive shafting is not used for the trolley since the trolley travel load in combination with the required torque. The magnitude of the drives slip directly onto the trolley wheel axles.

torque shall be based on the drive output torque, skid torque, or braking torque, whichever is limiting. See Note 1.

(a) Computation - Analysis. Analytical stress computations shall be performed according to procedures in para. 5470.

(b) Service Factors.Service factors shall be applied according to para. 5320.

(c) Torsional Deflection. The torsional deflection of the cross-shafts and floating shafts shall not exceed the values, shown in Table 5454.1(c)-i. The types of drives referred to in this table are defined in para. 5440. The percent motor torque is the portion of the full-load torque of the drive motor(s) at its normal time rating for the service involved, increased by any gear reductions between the motor and the shaft. If 60-min series wound motors are used, short time rating torques should be considered. The allowable angular deflection is expressed in degrees per foot (deg/ft).

5454.2 General - Types II and III Cranes Drive shafting shall be designed according to Specification CMAA N/A - This is a Type I Crane 70.

5455 Bearings 5455.1 Antifriction Bearings (Type I Cranes)

(a) The type, size, and mounting of bearings shall be determined by Antifriction bearings are provided for the trolley wheels, main hoist gear criteria outlined in this Section. Computations confirming the cases, and main hoist hook. Ref. MMH Drawing R95253 (Trolley Wheel adequacy of the bearing to meet the criteria shall be included as Assembly - Drive), MMH Drawing R95005 (Main Hoist Bottom Block part of the crane analysis. Assembly), and MMH Drawing QR89592 (Main Hoist Gear Case (b) Bearings with a calculable predicted life expectancy of a Assembly).

minimum of 5000 hr shall be selected. (a) Bearings are selected based on existing, proven designs that comply (1) Bearing life expectancy shall be determined from the with the requirements of this section. Computations confirming the bearing manufacturer's published data or certified adequacy of bearings are included in MMH Document 36675-23 (Main extension of published data. Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

(2) Bearing life expectancy shall be expressed as the (b) Bearings are selected based on existing, proven designs with a number of hours of operation in which 90% of the bearings minimum life expectancy of 5000 hours0.0579 days <br />1.389 hours <br />0.00827 weeks <br />0.0019 months <br /> in accordance with the Page 77 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance are expected to operate without failure. requirements of this section. (c) Bearings are selected to withstand the (3) Analytical procedures may be based on L10 or B10, as maximum forces imposed with respect to the manufacturer's published defined by the AFBMA. static capacities. Ref. MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving (4) Infrequent loads, such as impact or seismic, need not be Stress Report).

considered in bearing life computation. (d) Mounting fits and internal clearances are designed as recommended (5) Bearing life computations shall be based on the full by the manufacturer.

rated speed except as exempted herein. (e) Gear case bearings are bathed in oil for lubrication. Wheel bearings (a) Bearing life computations may be based on less and the main hoist hook bearing are pre-lubricated with grease and have than full rated speed only if confirmed by the load fittings for re-lubrication.

spectrum, unless otherwise specified by the (f) Gear case bearings are sealed within the gear case. Wheel bearings purchaser. are contained inside a machined steel housing to exclude dust and (6) Bearing life computations shall be based on the minimize grease leakage.

following minimum percentages of maximum load and load (g) Deflections in assemblies under load are minimized to prevent combinations. abnormal bearing loads. Deflection for major frame components is (a) Bridge drive bearings shall be computed using calculated in MMH Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis).

75% of the maximum load, and shall be computed (h) N/A - Bearings are selected to comply with the manufacturer's with no load acting against the wheel flange. published speed ratings.

(b) Trolley drive and wheel bearings shall be (i) The main hoist hook bearing uses non water-soluble grease and has an computed using 65% of the maximum load, and easily accessible grease fitting for re-lubrication.

shall be computed with no load acting against the wheel flange. See Note 1.

(c) Hoist bearings shall be computed using 65%.of the full rated load.

(c) Bearings shall be selected to withstand the maximum forces that may be imposed.

(1) Bearing capability shall be determined from the manufacturer's published data or certified extension of published data.

(2) The basic static capacity of the bearing shall not be exceeded by load combinations as outlined herein.

(a) All bearings shall be sized to resist the maximum operating force which can be imposed by the driving motors.

Page 78 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (b) Wheel bearings shall be designed to resist forces due to the maximum wheel load.

(3) Loads imposed by the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) shall not exceed 90% of the bearings' minimum fracture limit.

(d) Mounting fits and internal clearances shall be as recommended by the bearing manufacturer.

(e) All bearings shall be provided with proper lubrication or means of lubrication.

(f) Bearing enclosures shall be designed as far as practical to exclude dirt and prevent leakage of oil or grease.

(g) Assemblies shall be analyzed to confirm that deflection under load does not exceed that which the bearing can accommodate.

(h) Special consideration shall be given to bearings which operate at speeds above or below the manufacturer's published data. Certified confirmation of the bearing's capacity beyond published rating must be obtained from the manufacturer.

(i) For bearings of load blocks that are to be immersed:

(1) lubricants of these bearings shall be compatible with the chemistry of the liquid (refer to Section 1000 for special environmental conditions);

(2) provisions shall be made for relubricating the bearings once the block has been removed from the liquid.

5455.2 Antifriction Bearings (Types II and III Cranes)

(a) Refer to Specification CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly) for the following items:

(b) For bearings of load blocks that are to be immersed: (a) Antifriction bearings for the aux hoist are in accordance with (1) lubricants of these bearings shall be compatible with the Specification CMAA 70.

chemistry of the liquid (refer to section 1000 for special (b) The aux hoist hook bearing uses non water-soluble grease and has an environmental conditions); easily accessible grease fitting for re-lubrication.

(2) provisions shall be made for relubricating the bearings once the block has been removed from the liquid.

5455.3 Sleeve Bearings (Type I Cranes)

(a) Only bearings with published and/or certified properties shall be Self-lubricating brass alloy sleeve bearings are provided for the bottom Page 79 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance used. block sheaves per MMH Drawing R95005 (Main Hoist Bottom Block (b) The PV (pressure velocity) rating of the bearing shall not be Assembly).

exceeded for any combination of operating loads. (a) Sleeve bearings with published and/or certified properties are used.

(c) Forces induced by the SSE shall not exceed 90% of the allowable (b) Operating loads for sleeve bearings do not exceed PV ratings.

compressive strength of the bearing. (c) Forces due to a rope break condition, which envelopes seismic (d) All bearings shall be provided with proper lubrication or means loading, do not exceed 90% of the allowable compressive strength of the of lubrication. bearing. Ref. MMH Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress (e) Mounting fits and clearances shall be as recommended by the Report).

bearing manufacturer. (e) Mounting fits and clearances are designed based on the bearing (f) Bearing enclosures shall be designed as far as practical to manufacturer's recommended values and standard design practices.

exclude dirt and prevent leakage of oil or grease. (f) Sleeve bearings are self-lubricating, so oil and grease leakage is not applicable. Clearances for sleeve bearings are minimized to exclude dirt where practical.

5455.4 Sleeve Bearings (Types II and III Cranes)

Refer to Specification CMAA 70. N/A - Sleeve bearings are not used on the aux hoist.

5456 Fasteners - Mechanical Components 5456.1 Fastener Restraints (a) Types I and II Cranes Ref. Applicable assembly drawings, MMH Document 36675-15 (Crane (1) Fasteners shall not loosen under normal operating loads Installation Procedure), and MMH Document 36675-07 (Factory and vibration. Acceptance Test Procedure) for the following items:

(2) Cranes which travel over the reactor pool or fuel pool (a) shall use fasteners which do not depend upon lock washers (1) Fasteners are provided with chemical locking compound, lock unless they are so located as to be caught upon removal by nuts, or lock wires and torqued to prevent loosening under drip pans or crane structure. For these cranes, when other normal operating loads and vibration. These items are specified than high strength bolts are used, preferred locking for applicable fasteners on the respective assembly drawings.

methods are thread-upsetting fasteners, plastic insert (2) Lock washers are not used. Fasteners are provided with fasteners, tack welding, cementing, or lock wire. High- chemical locking compound, lock nuts, or lock wires and torqued.

strength bolts are considered restrained when torqued in High strength bolts are torqued in accordance with AISC as accordance with the AISC method. required. These items are specified for applicable fasteners on (b) Type III Cranes. Fasteners shall be in accordance with the respective assembly drawings.

Specification CMAA 70. (b) N/A - This is a Type I Crane See Note 1.

Page 80 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 5456.2 Allowable Stresses (a) Types I and II Cranes. Maximum combined stresses induced in (a) Maximum combined stresses induced in the fasteners by normal loads the fasteners by normal operating loads (but not including (but not including pretensioning loads) do not exceed 20% of the ultimate pretensioning loads) shall not exceed 20% of the ultimate strength strength of the fasteners. Maximum combined stresses induced in the of the fasteners. Limiting loads (such as seismic, stall torque, and fasteners by limiting loads (such as seismic, stall torque, and load hang-load hang-up) shall induce combined stresses (not including up, but not including pretensioning stresses) do not exceed 90% of the pretensioning stresses) which do not exceed 90% of the yield yield strength of the fasteners.

strength of the fasteners. Stresses in bolts for the hoisting machinery and seismic restraints are (b) Type III Cranes. Maximum combined stresses induced in the analyzed in MMH Document 36675-14 (Seismic Analysis of Misc. Items).

fasteners by normal operating loads (not including pretensioning (b) N/A - This is a Type I Crane loads) shall not exceed 20% of the ultimate strength of the fasteners. See Note 1.

5456.3 Mounting of Machinery (a) Types I and II Cranes (a) Ref. MMH Drawing QR95370 (Trolley Frame Weldment) for the (1) Mounting surfaces for machinery (except for bridge) following items:

shall be machined for direct mounting or with allowance for (1) Mounting surfaces on the trolley for machinery are machined shimming as dictated by the design. with allowance for shimming.

(2) Single machinery elements such as motors and gear (2) Supports for machinery elements are welded to the trolley reducers shall not be mounted on multiple support frame and then machined together to create a single rigid structures which can deflect relative to each other unless support structure for all components.

the design specifically allows for this deformation. (3) Trolley machinery does not depend on friction to maintain (3) Machinery or machine parts whose alignment is alignment, but instead uses different methods including jacking important to its operation shall not depend on friction but bolts and/or shear bars. Ref. MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley shall use positive means such as dowel pins, shear bars, or Assembly).

fitted bolts to maintain alignment. (4)Gear cases and the supporting structural framework are (4) Gear engagements shall be protected such that sufficiently rigid to prevent gear disengagement that would drop equipment deformation could not cause disengagement the load. This is verified by the rated load test performed per and drop the load. MMH Document 36675-07 (Factory Acceptance Test Procedure).

(5) Machinery weights shall be increased by appropriate (5) Static analysis for fastener mounting loads, including the dynamic factors and analyzed by the static method to increases in machinery weight due to dynamic factors from the determine fastener mounting loads. Allowable stresses shall seismic analysis results, is provided in MMH Document 36675-14 be in accordance with para. 5456.2. (Seismic Analysis of Misc. Items). Allowable stresses are in (b) Type III Cranes accordance with Section 5456.2 Page 81 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (1) Mounting surfaces for machinery (except for bridge (b) N/A - This is a Type I Crane cross-shafting) shall be machined for direct mounting or with allowable for shimming as dictated by the design. See Note 1.

(2) Single machinery elements such as motors and gear reducers shall not be mounted on multiple support structures which can deflect relative to each other unless the design specifically allows for this deformation.

(3) Machinery or machine parts whose alignment is important to its operation shall not depend on friction but shall use positive means such as dowel pins, shear bars, or fitted bolts to maintain alignment.

(4) Gear engagements shall be protected such that equipment deformation could not cause disengagement and drop the load.

5457 Gear Cases, Enclosures, and Guards 5457.1 Gear Cases (Type I Cranes)

(a) All gears except final reduction gears shall be completely Ref. MMH Drawing QR89592 (Main Hoist Gear Case Assembly) for the enclosed in gear cases. All gear cases shall be oil-tight and sealed following items:

with compound or gaskets. (a) All gears for the main hoist and trolley travel drive except for the final (b) Unless otherwise approved by the owner, the hoist motion gear reduction gears are completely enclosed in gear cases. All gear cases are case base shall be split in one plane through the bearing center oil-tight and sealed with compound or gaskets.

lines above the oil level except in microdrives and worm drives. (b) The main hoist gear cases are split in one horizontal plane through the (c) Openings when provided shall be provided in the top section for bearing center line above the oil level.

the inspection of gearing at .mesh lines. Covers for these inspection (c) Openings are provided in the top section of the main hoist gear cases holes shall be sealed to prevent leakage. for the inspection of gearing at mesh lines. Covers with seals are provided (d) Splash oil lubrication of bearings may be used unless otherwise to prevent leakage. The trolley travel drive does not have inspection specified. ports.

(e) Oil pumps shall be used if vertical gearing exceeds two (d) Splash oil lubrication of bearings is used for the main hoist and trolley reductions. The oil level on horizontally arranged gearing shall be travel drive gear cases.

high enough to immerse the bottom portion of at least two gears. (e) Oil pumps are not used in the main hoist gear. Oil levels are high (f) Solid oil seals should be selected to allow replacement with split enough to immerse the bottom portion of at least two gears.

seals, if possible. (f)Solid oil seals are split to allow replacement, where possible.

(g) Easily accessible drain plugs and breathers shall be provided. (a) Easily accessible drain plugs and breathers are provided for the main Page 82 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (h) All hoist gear cases shall be mounted on machined surfaces. hoist and trolley travel drive gear cases.

(i) Gear cases shall be provided with lugs or other means of lifting. (h) The main hoist gear cases are mounted on machined surfaces of the (j) Means for checking oil level shall be provided, trolley frame.

(i) The main hoist and trolley travel drive gear cases are provided with lugs or other means of lifting.

(j) An oil dip stick is provided for each gear case.

See Note 1.

5457.2 Gear Cases (Types II and III Cranes)

Gear cases shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. Gear cases for the aux hoist are in accordance with Specification CMAA

70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5457.3 Enclosures for Gears (Type I Cranes)

(a) All gears not enclosed in gear cases shall be provided with Ref. MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly) for the following items:

guarded enclosures. This is primarily for the final gear reduction at (a) All gears not enclosed in gear cases, including the gear reductions at the hoist drum and travel motion drive wheels. the hoist drum, are provided with guarded enclosures.

(b) All gear enclosures shall be designed to retain lubricant. (b) Gear enclosures are provided with seals to retain lubricant.

(c) Openings shall be provided in the top section for the inspection (c) Openings with seals and cover plates are provided in the top section to of the gearing at the mesh lines. Covers for these inspection holes inspect the gearing at the mesh lines.

shall be sealed to prevent leakage. (d) Openings for shafts or other rotating parts are provided with seals to (d) Openings for shafts or other rotating parts such as drums shall retain the lubricant.

be provided with means to retain the lubricant. (e) Gear enclosures are provided with lugs for lifting.

(e) Gear enclosures shall be provided with lugs or other means of lifting. See Note 1.

5457.4 Enclosures for Gears (Types II and III Cranes)

Gear enclosures shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5457.5 Guards for Moving Parts (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

(a) Exposed moving parts such as gears, set screws, projecting keys, Ref. P&H Drawing 105A3002 (Bridge Layout) for the following items:

chains, chain sprockets, and reciprocating components, which may (a) Guards for exposed moving parts are not provided on the trolley since constitute a hazard, shall be guarded. this is not a normally accessed location for personnel. Guards for bridge (b) Guards shall be securely fastened. components are reused.

(c) Each guard shall be capable of supporting the weight of a 200 lb (b) All guards are securely fastened.

person without permanent deformation, unless the guard is located (c) All guards that can be stepped on are fabricated from heavy gage steel where it is impossible for a person to step on it. and can handle the weight of a 200 lb person without permanent Page 83 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance deformation.

5457.6 Guards for Hoisting Ropes (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

(a) If hoisting ropes run near enough to other parts to make fouling (a) Guards are not provided since hoisting ropes do not run near enough or chafing possible under normal operating conditions, guards shall to other parts to make fouling or chafing possible under normal operating be installed to prevent this condition. conditions.

(b) A guard shall be provided to prevent contact between bridge or (b) A guard is provided on the bridge to prevent contact between the runway conductors and hoisting ropes if they can come into contact ropes, bottom block, and runway conductor bars.

under normal operating conditions.

5458 Bumpers and Stops 5458.1 Bridge Bumpers (Type I Cranes) (a-d) The existing bridge bumpers and stops are reused.

(a) Bumpers shall be sized to limit impact and critical load (e) N/A - This crane is not a polar crane.

excursions to facility acceptable magnitudes.

(b) A crane shall be provided with bumpers. These bumpers shall See Note 1.

have the following minimum characteristics:

(1) energy absorbing (or dissipating) capacity to stop the crane when traveling with power off in either direction at a speed of at least 40% rated load speed (refer to para. 5459 on limit switches for limiting speed upon bumper impact);

(2) capable of stopping the crane (not including load block and lifted load unless guided. vertically) at a rate of deceleration not to exceed an average of 3 ft/sec2 when traveling with power off in either direction at 20% of rated load speed; (3) mounted such that there is no direct shear on bolts upon impact.

(c) Bumpers shall be designed and installed to minimize parts falling from the crane in case of breakage or loosening of bolted connections.

(d) When more than one crane is located and operated on the same runway, bumpers shall be provided on their adjacent ends to meet the requirements stated above.

(e) Bumpers are not required on polar cranes unless limited rotation is desired.

Page 84 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 5458.2 Bridge Bumpers (Types II and III Cranes)

Bridge bumpers shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5458.3 Trolley Bumpers (Type I Cranes)

(a) Bumpers shall be sized to limit impact and critical load Ref. MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly) for the following items:

excursions to facility acceptable magnitudes. (a) Trolley bumpers are sized to limit impact and critical load excursions (b) A trolley shall be provided with bumpers. These bumpers shall to facility acceptable magnitudes.

have the following minimum characteristics: (b) Trolley bumpers are provided that:

(1) energy absorbing (or dissipating) capacity to stop the (1) have the energy absorbing capacity to stop the trolley when trolley when traveling with power off in either direction at a traveling with power off in either direction at 50% of the rated speed of at least 50% rated load speed (refer to para. 5459 load speed.

on limit switches for limiting speed upon bumper impact); (2) are capable of stopping the trolley at a rate of deceleration (2) capable of stopping the trolley (not including load block less than 4.7 ft/sec 2 when traveling with power off in either and lifted load unless guided vertically) at a rate of direction at one-third of rated load speed.

deceleration not to exceed an average of 4.7 ft/sec 2 when (3) are mounted such that there is no direct shear on bolts upon traveling with power off in either direction at one-third of impact.

rated load speed; (c) Bumper support structures are welded directly to the trolley frame to (3) mounted such that there is no direct shear on bolts eliminate the concerns of bolted connections. Bumpers are thru bolted to upon impact. the supports with chemical locking means to minimize parts falling due to (c) Bumpers shall be designed and installed to minimize parts falling breakage or loosening.

from the crane in case of breakage or loosening of bolted (d) N/A - There is only one trolley on the runway.

connections.

(d) When more than one trolley is located and operated on the same bridge, bumpers shall be provided on their adjacent ends to meet the requirements stated above.

5458.4 Trolley Bumpers (Types II and III Cranes)

Trolley bumpers shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5458.5 Trolley Stops (Type I Cranes)

(a) Stops shall be provided at the limits of travel of the trolley. Ref. MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly) for the following items:

(b) Stops shall be designed to withstand the forces applied to the (a) Stops are provided to limit the trolley travel bumpers as specified in para. 5458. (b) Stops are designed to withstand the forces applied to the bumpers per (c) If a stop engages the tread of the wheel, it shall not be of a para. 5458.

height less than the radius of the wheel. Stops engaging other parts (c) Stops do not engage the tread of the wheel, but instead engage a of the crane are recommended. dedicated bumper that is attached to the trolley.

Page 85 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (d) Stops shall be mounted such that there is no direct shear on the (d) Stops are directly welded on to eliminate a bolted connection bolts upon impact.

5458.6 Trolley Stops (Types II and III Cranes)

Trolley stops shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5459 Limit Switches 5459.1 Limit Switches (Type I Cranes)

(a) Track type for bridge and trolley travel motion (see Section 6000 Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

for application and function). (a) Proximity and rocker arm type limit switches are provided for bridge (b) Geared type for upper and lower travel hoist motion (see and trolley travel motion.

Section 6000 for application and function). (b) Geared limit switches are provided on the main hoist for upper and (c) Weight and paddle-operated type for upper travel hoist motion lower hoisting limits.

(see Section 6000 for application and function). (c) A weighted limit switch is provided on the main hoist for upper travel (d) A trolley track-type limit switch or other device shall be provided hoist motion.

and positioned to ensure that, under operating conditions, the (d) The limit switches for trolley travel motion control a relay that stops trolley speed cannot exceed 50% of rated load speed on engaging the trolley and sets the brakes so that the trolley does not contact the the trolley stops and bumpers. bumpers.

(e) A bridge track-type limit switch or other device shall be provided (e) The limit switches for bridge travel motion control a relay that stops and positioned to ensure that, under operating conditions, the the bridge and sets the brakes so that the bridge does not contact the bridge speed cannot exceed 40% of rated load speed on engaging bumpers.

the bridge stops and bumpers.

5459.2 Limit Switches (Types II and III Cranes)

Limit switches shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. Limit switches for the aux hoist are in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

5459.3 Clearances For determining clearances between the trolley structure and the Allowances are provided for the lift, trip and drift of the bottom block.

load block in its high position, allowance shall be made for lift, trip, Available lift is detailed in MMH Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly) and and drift as shown in Figs. 5459.3-1 and 5459.3-2. the trip and drift will be adjusted and verified per MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure).

5460 Lubrication 5461 Type I Cranes (a) Sheave bearings shall be individually lubricated and accessible (a) The main hoist sheave bearings are sleeve type with lubrication inserts for lubrication from the trolley deck for the head block assembly and do not require additional lubrication. The thrust bearing is provided and the operating floor for the load block assembly. Load blocks with water-insoluble grease and is easily accessible for relubrication as Page 86 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements. Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance that are immersed in water shall have special provisions to prevent required. Ref. MMH Drawing R95005 (Main Hoist Bottom Block loss of lubricant to the water (refer to para. 1100). Assembly). Ref. MMH Drawing QR94824 (Main Hoist Wire Rope (b) Hoisting ropes, except for stainless steel ropes (consult Assembly).

manufacturer), shall be lubricated. When ropes are immersed in (b) The main hoist wire rope is provided with lubrication that is designed water, the lubricant type shall be selected to reduce the loss of for immersion in water.

lubricant to the water. (c) Lubricants for gears, bearings, and wire ropes are selected to be (c) Lubricants for gears, bearings, and wire ropes shall resist effects compatible with facilities that handle radioactive material.

of gamma or neutron radiation when such effects are present, or (d) N/A - Lubricants can be conveniently changed per MMH Document facilities shall be provided for changing of the lubricants. 36675-20 (Operation & Maintenance Manual).

(d) If lubricants cannot be conveniently changed, but are subjected (e) Provisions to prevent lubricants falling from the crane include oil seals to neutron or gamma radiation, then lubricants shall be NLGI Grade for lubricated parts and oil-tight drip pans under gearboxes. Ref. MMH 0 oil containing molybdenum disulfate or NLGI Grade 11/2 grease Drawing R94779 (Trolley Assembly).

with sodium aluminate thickener. They shall be oxidation and rust (f) Lubricants are selected with consideration for the environmental inhibited with the exception of wire rope lubricants. conditions in Section 1000.

(e) Provisions shall be made to prevent lubricants falling from the crane. See Note 1.

(f) For all above paragraphs, refer to Section 1000.

5462 Types II and III Cranes Lubrication shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70, The aux hoist components are provided with lubrication means in unless the crane is subjected to radiation. If Types II and III cranes accordance with Specification CMAA 70. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux are subjected to radiation, then the provisions of para. 5461 apply. Hoist Assembly).

5470 Analytical Procedures It is the purpose of para. 5470 to apply common language for the (a) Basic stress formulas and symbols are used as defined in this Standard terms, symbols, data, and formulas that apply most frequently in as applicable. All other formulas and symbols used in design calculations the process of mechanical crane engineering. The effects of service conform as far as possible to the method outlined and shown. The given and stress concentrations are treated separately from the allowable data is applied to low and medium carbon steel and to heat treated alloy stresses to conform with actual service conditions and actual design steel.

geometry. (b) Material strength properties are treated on the basis of ultimate (a) The basic stress formulas have been listed to achieve uniformity strength where applicable.

in recording and combining of design stresses throughout the (c) The design criteria of this Standard are applied to the crane to prevent industry. Where applicable, formulas and symbols shall be used as progressive fatigue failure.

defined in this Standard. All other formulas and symbols used in Page 87 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance design calculations shall conform as far as possible to the method outlined and shown. The given data apply to low and medium carbon steel (usually used as hot rolled and normalized) and to heat treated alloy steel (usually used as quenched and tempered).

(b) Material strength properties have been treated on the basis of ultimate strength because it has a good relationship to the fatigue strength. No differentiation has been made between various materials because of the wide scatter of fatigue strength for each individual heat or each finished component. Heat treated alloy bar has, on the average, higher fatigue strength than medium carbon steel of the same ultimate tensile strength.

(c) Progressive fatigue failure represents the most common mode of failure in crane machinery. The design criteria of this Standard are, therefore, directed mainly to the prevention of accumulative damage to the material of mechanical crane components.

5471 Stress Concentration Factors (Type I Cranes)

(a) Stress concentration factors KNB, KNS, KNT for shafting in bending, (a) Stress concentration factors are factored into the design of the crane shear, and torsion may be obtained from Stress Concentration components where applicable.

Factors by R. E. Peterson.' These factors shall give consideration to (b) Combinations of stress concentration factors are factored into the the effects on the fatigue strength of fillet radii, as well as keyways, design of the crane components where applicable.

combined with heavy press fits. Stress concentration factors for all other forms of notches (such as lubrication holes, threads, grooves) as well as other modes of stressing must also be considered and may be obtained from Stress Concentration Factors.1 (b) A combination of stress concentration factors must take place when two or more stress concentrations superimpose in one location - for example, keyway and/or press fit extending in the critical region of a shaft fillet. The proper stress concentration factors KNB or KNN must be applied in calculating ox or oa stresses, depending on whether ox or oa are basically bending or tension-compression stresses. Stress concentration factors must be entered into calculation even if equal to 1.0.

5472 Nomenclature Page 88 of 154

NOG- 1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance

[Text and/or equations omitted] Specified nomenclature is used for applicable design parameters.

5473 Working Stresses The maximum working stresses in Class I crane machinery Maximum working stresses for machinery components do not exceed the components shall not exceed the maximum allowable stresses 0 BA, maximum allowable stresses as specified. Maximum working loads GNA, GXA, GyA, A, or tTA unless otherwise specified by the Purchaser.

T include service and stress concentration factors, dead loads, maximum The working stresses (oB, ON, GEBN, GEB, GEN, oX, oy, OEXy, GEXVrl, TX, IT, live loads, and acceleration and deceleration forces which result from T

ET, TXy and OEXyI) are uniaxial, biaxial, shear, combined, or equivalent normal operation of the crane.

stresses, which are induced in a mechanical component by the working (operational) loads. The maximum working loads shall include dead loads, maximum live loads, and acceleration and deceleration forces which result from normal operation of the crane. The maximum calculated working stresses shall include both service and stress concentration factors.

5474 Allowable Stresses The allowable stresses GBA, oNA, TA, and T TA,which shall be obtained Allowable stresses are selected from Figs. 5474-1 through 5474-3 as from Figs. 5474-1 through 5474-3, vary with the minimum ultimate required with respect to the ultimate tensile strength and fluctuation tensile strength OUT of the material in use, as well as with the ratios of the working stresses.

fluctuation ratios RB, RN, Rs, RT of the working stresses. 0 XA and GyA shall be selected from Figs. 5474-1 or Fig. 5474-2, depending upon whether oxor oy are basically bending or tension-compression stresses. T TA shall be selected directly from Fig. 5474-3.

5475 Service Factors Service factors KSB, KSN, Kss, and KST are to be based on para. 5320. Service factors are based on para. 5320 and give consideration to the Not all components within a crane drive system are necessarily following:

subjected to the same service. Service factors shall give (a) risk and consequences of potential failure; consideration to the following: (b) indeterminate load reactions; (a) risk and consequences of potential failure; (c) unpredictability of operation; (b) indeterminate load reactions (for example, trolley with rigid (d) dynamic effects.

frame supported on four track wheels);

(c) unpredictability of operation conditions - for example, unexpected accidents within the building; (d) dynamic effects - for example, impacts in hoist mechanisms and seismic effects.

Page 89 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 5476 Basic Stress Equations (a) Where applicable, Eqs. (13) through (27) must be used in (a-f)The basic stress equations outlined in this para. are applied as determining basic stresses in crane machinery components. For applicable to the crane machinery components using the maximum determining size of machinery components, maximum working operational load combinations.

(operational) moments and shear loads, as well as critical section moduli, must be entered into these formulas.

(b) Sign convention must be observed when entering ox and oy in Eqs. (25), (26), and (27). (Tension is positive, compression is negative.)

(c) Only stresses which do occur simultaneously at the location where stress is being calculated should be combined.

(d) In Eqs. (19) through (27), anisotropy and stress fluctuation have been given consideration in a simplified manner for easier use in the design engineering process.

(e) For sample calculation, refer to Nonmandatory Appendix B, para. B5476.

(f) The following are the basic stress equations:

[Text and/or equations omitted]

-i 5477 Analytical Method for Hook of Approximate Trapezoidal Shape (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

(a) Method of Analysis. The analytical method given in this section (a) N/A - The aux hoist hook is purchased from a manufacturer and has a is intended to apply to hooks with cross-sections having a shape as published load rating and safety factor appropriate for the load.

shown by the full line of Fig. 5477-1, which does not deviate (b) The method of analysis and design of the main hoist sister hook is significantly from a trapezoidal form. This includes a large number made using the straight beam configuration for the hook. Ref. MMH of practical crane-hook sections, such as shown in Fig. 5477-2. This Document 36675-23 (Main Hoist Reeving Stress Report).

method, while approximate, is much faster than the numerical (c) References are consulted as necessary.

integration method, and, in the cases to which it has been applied, it has given close agreement with the latter method.

Essentially, the analytical method is based on the assumption of an equivalent trapezoidal section having an area equal to that of the actual section. The stress computed in this way is then corrected for the stress increase in the neutral section resulting from the fact that the fibers nearest the center of curvature are farther from the Page 90 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance neutral axis than in the case of the equivalent trapezoidal section. It is assumed that the resultant load on the hook passes through the center of curvature of the curved part and that the critical section is at 90 deg to the resultant load.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(b) The method of analysis and design of a sister hook shall be made using the straight beam configuration for the hook.

(1) Figure 5477-4 shows the general outline and a shade of a sister hook without a pin hole.

(2) Figure 5477-5 shows the general outline and shape of a sister hook with a pin hole.

(c) References for para. 5477 (1) Strength of Materials,S. Timoshenko, Second Edition, Part 2, D. Van Nostrand Co., New York, NY, 1941, p. 65.

(2) Stresses in Curved Bars, H. C. Perkins, Transactions of ASME, Vol. 53, 1931, p. 201.

(3) Mathematical Methods in Engineering, Thomas von Karman and M. A. Biot, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1940, p. 5.

(4) Stress ConcentrationFactors, R. E. Peterson, John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, 1974.

5480 Seismic Analysis 5481 Type I Cranes (a) Analysis confirming that the critical load will not be dropped as a Ref. MMH Document 36675-05 (Bridge Stress Calculations) and MMH result of the forces generated by seismic events shall be performed Document 36675-09 (Seismic Analysis) for the following items:

(see Section 4000). (a) Analysis confirming that the critical load will not be dropped as a (1) The analysis may be static if it includes loads equivalent result of the forces generated by a seismic event is provided.

to those which would be imposed by the seismic event (1) N/A - The analysis is performed dynamically.

specified. (2) Loads due to vertical and horizontal motions act together and (2) Loads due to vertical and horizontal motions shall act are combined in accordance with para. 4100.

together and shall be combined in accordance with para. (3) All elements which support the critical load are analyzed, not 4100. including material fatiguing, stress concentration factors, and Page 91 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (3) All elements which support the critical load shall be infinite life criteria.

analyzed as follows and should not consider material (a) The stress level at all critical points is determined.

fatiguing, stress concentration factors, and infinite life (b) The gross cross-section is used to determine the stress criteria. levels.

(a) The stress level at all critical points shall be (c) The maximum stress levels do not exceed 90% of the determined. material yield strength.

(b) The gross cross-section shall be used in (4) Computations are based on the bulk cross-section of the determining the stress level. material and the seismic forces are combined per para. 5300.

(c) The maximum stress level shall not exceed 90% (b) An analysis will be provided that confirms that those components of the yield strength of the material. which would damage safety related equipment if dropped will remain in (4) All computations are to be based on the bulk cross- place during the seismic event. Ref. MMH Document 36675-14 (Seismic section of the material without consideration to any Analysis of Misc. Items).

fatiguing effects of stress risers, or to the endurance limits (c) Components whose major resonant frequencies are greater than 30 of the material. The seismic forces according to the rules in Hz are analyzed as a lumped mass.

para. 5300 are to be algebraically added to the forces and (1) Analysis determining the stress level of the mounts when torques under normal operation. applying maximum dynamic forces to the center of gravity is (b) Analysis shall be performed to confirm that those components detailed in Ref. MMH Document 36675-14 (Seismic Analysis of which would damage safety related equipment if dropped will Misc. Items).

remain in place during the seismic event. (2) Vertical and horizontal loads are combined in accordance with (c) Components whose major resonant frequency is greater than 30 para. 4100, as in (a)(2) above.

Hz may be analyzed as a lumped mass. (d) Components whose major resonant frequency is less than 30 Hz are (1) Analysis shall consist of the determination of the stress analyzed dynamically.

level of the mounts when applying maximum dynamic forces to the center of gravity of the item.

(2) Loads shall be combined as in (a)(2) above.

(d) Components whose major resonant frequency is less than 30 Hz shall be analyzed dynamically.

5482 Type II Cranes (a) Analysis shall be performed to confirm that those components (a-c) N/A - This is a Type I Crane which would damage safety related equipment if dropped will remain in place during the seismic event.

(b) Such components shall be delineated by the bidding documents.

(c) Analysis shall be as listed in para. 5481.

Page 92 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station'FHB CraneTrolley Compliance 5483 Type III Cranes Seismic analysis is not required unless specified by the purchaser. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5500 MISCELLANEOUS 5510 Pendant Hoist and Travel Drives (Types I, II, and III Cranes) 5511 Crane Pendant Mounting The crane purchaser shall prescribe whether pendant control stations, if furnished, are to be mounted from the trolley frame, N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant fixed positions on the bridge, or a messenger trace on the bridge.

The purchaser shall also prescribe whether the crane is to be pendant controlled from several elevations in the building.

Whenever possible, the pendant should be suspended in a manner that minimizes undue strains on the electrical conductor cable. A chain or wire rope strain relief should be provided, unless the pendant is suspended directly from a motorized cable reel.

5512 Messenger Track System (a) The track itself should consist of a commercially available profile N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant section, such as a rolled I-beam or an extrusion. A guide wire arrangement commonly known as a Tag-Line System shall be unacceptable for Type I cranes.

(b) Messenger trolleys shall be compatible with the track and shall be of sufficient load carrying capacity to suspend the combined weights of the pendant, cables, and accessories, as well as the pull which could be developed while maneuvering the control station.

Messenger trolley rollers shall be mounted on sealed antifriction bearings and shall be provided with lubrication fittings unless bearings are lubricated for life. Individual messenger trolleys should be interconnected by strain relief chains or cables to reduce strains on the electrical control cables when traversing.

5513 Motorized Traversing The crane purchaser shall prescribe whether pendant traversing is N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant required. If furnished, the traversing tractor shall be controlled from the pendant station. If cable reels are suspended from a messenger track, consideration should be given to a motorized traversing Page 93 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance system. Consideration should also be given to ensure that the pendant station is accessible to the operator after it has been lifted or lowered by a reel.

5514 Vertical Travel of Control Pendant In cases where pendant crane control is required from several N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant elevations, the purchaser shall specify such requirements. Methods of raising and lowering the pendant shall be determined and specified by the purchaser, depending on prevailing conditions.

Commonly used and readily available lifting and lowering devices consist of spring-operated load balancing reels, or motorized cable reels. In cases where motorized cable reels are used, the pendant shall be suspended directly from the electrical cable, without a strain relief rope.

5515 Speeds For pendant hoist and travel speeds, refer to para. 5334. N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant 5520 Load Weighing Devices (Types I, II, and III Hoists)

(a) Load weighing devices for a hoist unit shall be provided if (a) A load weighing device is provided for the main and aux hoists.

requested by the purchaser. (b) Requirements for the load weighing system are provided in Zion (b) Weighing accuracy, location and type of readout, and Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

increments of the readout shall be specified by the purchaser. (c) Overload devices are in accordance with Section 6000.

(c) Refer to Section 6000 for overload devices.

5530 Welded Construction 5531 Type I Cranes All welding design and procedures shall conform to the current Welding design and procedures for the trolley are specified in MMH issue of AWS D1.1. Where special steels or other materials are used, Nuclear Operating Procedure #5.0.1, which complies with both AWS the manufacturer shall provide welding procedures. D14.1 and D1.1 where applicable. Procedures qualified under AWS D1.1 are acceptable under AWS D14.1 per Section 9.1.4. Procedures for special materials are also contained in this document.

See Note 1.

5532 Types II and III Cranes Welding shall be in accordance with Specification CMAA 70. N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5540 Hydraulics (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

Page 94 of 154

NOG-I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (a) Hydraulic components and fluids shall be selected to withstand (a-c) N/A - Hydraulic components are not used on this crane maximum facility lifetime radiation exposure, unless a detailed maintenance program shall be supplied.

(b) Critical loads or facility equipment shall be protected from leakage.

(c) Commercial industrial hydraulic components in the critical load path shall be selected and rated to not exceed 20% of the average ultimate strength of the material.

5550 Ordering Information Orders for cranes under this Standard shall include the following The following items are detailed in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003:

information. (a) Load spectrum information (a) Load Spectrum Information. Refer to para. (b) N/A - This is a Type I Crane 5111(a). (c) Hoist speeds (b) Seismic Considerationfor Type III Cranes, If Required. Refer to (d) Trolley speeds para. 5310(b)(3). (e) Bridge speeds (c) Hoist Speeds. Refer to para. 5331.1(a). (f) N/A- Powered hook rotation is not required (d) Trolley Speeds. Refer to para. 5332.1(a). (g) N/A - Bearing life computation requirements in addition to para.

(e) Bridge Speeds. Refer to para. 5333.1(a). 5455.1 are not specified (f) Powered Hook Rotation. Refer to paras. 5335(a) and (b). (h) N/A - This is a Type I Crane (g) Bearing Life Computations. Refer to para. 5455.1(b)(5)(a). (i) N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant (h) Seismic Analysis for Type III Cranes, If Required. Refer to para. (j) N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant 5483. (k) N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant (i) Crane Pendant Mounting. Refer to para. 5511. (I) Loading weighing devices (j) Motorized Traversing. Refer to para. 5513.

(k) Vertical Travel of Control Pendant. Refer to para. 5514.

(I) Loading Weighing Devices. Refer to paras. 5520(a) and (b).

6000 Electrical Components 6100 GENERAL (a) The specification for each crane shall state which crane The following items are detailed in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003:

classification applies (para. 1130). Types are summarized from para. (a) A Type I Crane is specified 1150 as follows: (b) The specification details all requirements for materials, coatings, (1) Type I Cranes: single failure-proof features and seismic radiation exposure, environmental conditions, and quality assurance.

considerations; (c) Generally available equipment which conforms to industry standards, Page 95 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (2) Type II Cranes: seismic considerations only; such as those of NEMA, is used unless special designs are necessary.

(3) Type III Cranes: neither single failure-proof features nor (d) Electrical equipment does not qualify as IEEE 323 Class 1E, and is not seismic considerations. required to.

(b) The specifications for each crane shall include any special (e) N/A - This is a Type I Crane requirements for components in accordance with the following:

(1) limiting the use of aluminum, zinc, mercury, and other specified materials (para. 6130);

(2) painting (para. 6140);

(3) life at specified values of radiation exposure (para.

6150);

(4) environmental conditions (para. 6160);

(5) quality assurance (para. 6170).

(c) Generally available equipment which conforms to industry standards, such as those of NEMA, shall be used unless special designs are necessary.

(d) The electrical equipment is not required to qualify as IEEE 323 Class 1E.

(e) The specification for each Type Ill crane shall state whether Section 6000 or CMAA 70 is to be invoked for electrical components.

6110 Single Failure-Proof Features (Type I Cranes)

(a) The electrical system shall be designed so that it is possible for Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

the operator to stop and hold a critical load regardless of the failure (a) The electrical system is designed to be failsafe so that the load is of any single component used in normal operation. automatically stopped and held in the event of a single component (b) There shall be means at the operator's location that will allow failure. The operator may also stop and hold the load manually at any him to remove power from all drive motors and brakes by opening time by activating the emergency stop.

or de-energizing a power device that is not required to close and (b) A master control relay is provided that opens the power circuit to all open during normal "run-stop" operations. motors and sets all brakes when the operator depresses the emergency (c) Any inadvertent short circuit or ground shall be considered a stop on either the radio or cab controls. Under normal operations, the single component failure. master control relay does not change state.

(d) The avoidance of two-blocking shall be accomplished by the use (c) Any short circuit or ground causes a fault in the drive or circuit breaker of single failure-proof features and shall not rely on any action by and safely shuts down the system.

the operator. The normal hoist limit switch shall be supplemented (d) Each hoist is equipped with two independent upper limit switches that Page 96 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance by an independent final hoist limit switch operated by the load do not rely on action by the operator.

block to remove power from the hoist motor and brakes. The first gear-type limit switch is supplemented by a second weigh-operated limit switch that removed hoist power and sets the brakes when contacted by the load block.

6120 Seismic Considerations (Types I, II,and III Cranes)

(a) Type I Cranes. The user shall provide the equipment that shall (a) ZionSolutions is responsible for supplying an appropriate means to de-energize the crane power supply in the event of either a Safe disconnect the power supply in case of a seismic event. ZionSolutions Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) or an Operational Basis Earthquake will install an automatic system to de-energize the crane power supply in (OBE). The hoist brakes shall be capable of holding the credible load the event of either a safe Shutdown or an Operational Basis Earthquake.

during an SSE or OBE event, as determined in accordance with para. The hoist brakes are capable of holding the credible load during a seismic 6422.1(b). All electrical equipment shall remain on the crane during event. New control cabinets, raceway, junction boxes, and conduit will be these seismic events. secured to withstand forces due to the specified seismic events.

(b) Type // Cranes. Requirements are the same as for Type I cranes, (b) N/A - This is a Type I Crane except that the brakes need not be capable of holding the load (c) N/A - This is a Type I Crane during a seismic event.

(c) Type Ill Cranes. Seismic considerations are not required for Type III cranes.

6130 Limiting the Use of Specified Materials (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

(a) If the crane specifications require that the content of certain (a) N/A - There are no special requirements for limiting electrical specified materials for use on a crane be kept at a minimum [para. materials per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

1145(a)], but it is not practical to eliminate these specified materials (b) Galvanized conduit is used on the crane and is not specifically completely, the electrical supplier shall tabulate their weight or prohibited.

surface area or the content of an alloy under the following categories:

(1) exposed, as in the head of a master switch; (2) bare, within a ventilated enclosure, as in the shaft fan and rotor bars of a ventilated squirrel cage motor; (3) bare, within a nonventilatedenclosure, as in a totally enclosed nonventilated squirrel cage motor; (4) covered, as in insulated windings within a nonventilated motor, lighting transformer, reactor, etc.

(b) Galvanized conduit may be used except when specifically Page 97 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance prohibited by the crane specifications.

6140 Painting (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

When the crane specifications include special painting There are no special painting requirements per Zion Specification SP-ZS-requirements, the electrical items are exempt from the special FH-003. Electrical items are furnished with a standard industrial finish per painting requirements and shall be furnished with a standard para. 3230. Ref. MMH Document 36675-02 (B22 Painting Specification).

industrial finish [see para. 3230(i)].

6150 Radiation Exposure [Types I, II, and III Cranes (para. 1141)]

(a) If the crane is in a location where radiation levels are likely to be Ref. Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 for the following items:

a factor in the life of the electrical equipment, the maximum rate of (a) The total accumulated radiation exposure for the life of the crane is radiation and the total accumulated exposure at the crane elevation provided.

shall be stated in the crane specifications. (b-c) N/A - The total accumulated radiation exposure for the life of the (b) Insulation in rotating machines, brakes, and magnetic device crane does not pose a risk for the electrical components.

coils may be required to meet an accumulated dosage of 107 rad in 40 years. Components, such as regulator cards, that can be removed without disconnecting wiring may be required to meet an accumulated dosage of only 10 4 rad, on the basis that such components can be removed and stored in a location where they will not be exposed to more than normal atmospheric radiation during the long time intervals in which the crane will not operate after the power plant has been placed in service. If the user prefers not to remove the components, it will be permissible to establish a routine maintenance procedure of installing new components after they have accumulated a total exposure of 10 4 rad.

(c) The electrical equipment supplier shall submit data demonstrating that the type of insulation used in the equipment being supplied meets the radiation requirements in the crane specifications.

6160 Environmental Conditions (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

(a) The electrical equipment specifications shall state (a) Environmental conditions that are applicable to all crane components,.

environmental conditions to which that equipment may be including humidity, temperature, pressure, and chemical sprays, are subjected, such as: provided in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

(1) high humidity or high or low temperatures during prolonged intervals when the crane is in storage or not in Page 98 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Prooft Requirements Zion Station FHB Crone Trolley Compliance use; (2) outside service:

(a) temporary - during construction only (b) continuous (3) pressure (para. 1143):

(a) maximum pressure (b) rate of change in pressure (4) spray [para. 1145(a)];

(5) ambient temperature (para. 1142):

(a) rated (b) short time exposure to temperatures outside rated ambient range (6) humidity (para. 1144).

6170 Quality Assurance (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

There shall be no Quality Assurance Program requirements for There are no Quality Assurance Program requirements for activities activities covered by Section 6000, except for those specifically covered by Section 6000 detailed in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

required in the electrical procurement documents (see para. 2100). Quality Assurance for packaging, shipping, receiving, storage, and handling of components is provided in accordance with para. 2100.

6180 Duty Cycle or Duty Class (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

The specifications shall state the duty cycle requirements in Electrical duty class is provided for each motion in Zion Specification SP-accordance with para. 6418.2 or the electrical duty class that ZS-FH-003 per Table 6472.3(b)-i. The crane is not being used for applies to each motion as determined by Table 6472.3(b)-i. If the construction or prolonged operation at reduced speed.

crane is to be used for construction purposes, the duty cycles or classes required for that service shall be specified. In addition, any requirements for prolonged operation at reduced speed shall be specified.

6200 WIRING MATERIALS AND METHODS (TYPES I, II, AND III CRANES) 6210 General (a) Applicable Standards: Ref. MMH Document 36675-06 (Electrical Calculations) and MMH (1) National Electrical Code (NEC, Article 610, "Cranes and Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

Hoists") (a) Wiring materials and methods meet or exceed NEC Article 610, ASTM (2) American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) B 8 B8, ASTM B174, and NEMA ICS-1.

Page 99 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance and B 174 (b) N/A - Wiring materials and methods meet the requirements of (a) for (3) National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA), all components.

Pub. No. ICS 1 (c) The crane controls are pre-wired and will be tested at the factory per (b) The provisions of this Section apply to interconnecting wiring MMH Document 36675-07 (Factory Acceptance Test Procedure). The both within and external to control panel enclosures. It does not trolley and controls are shipped with as much of the wiring connected as apply to wiring which forms an integral part of equipment such as possible to minimize start up or reconnection errors in the field. Wire motors, individual control components - for example, contactors, that is integrated into existing raceway, junction boxes, or conduit is cut transformers, and relays - and electronic control subassemblies. to approximate length and bound in coils marked for the circuit for which (c) The complete raceway system including wire shall be assembled it applies.

on the crane at the crane manufacturer's facility. Where (d) The wiring system meets or exceeds the requirements of NEC Article disassembly is necessary for shipment, components shall be match- 610.

marked for ease of field erection. Where any portion of a raceway (e) New control cabinets, raceway, junction boxes, and conduit are run must be disconnected or dismantled to permit shipment, the secured to withstand forces due to the specified seismic events.

wire shall not be pulled through that raceway during shop (f) N/A - This crane is not inside containment.

assembly. Wire not pulled shall be cut to approximate length and bound in coils marked for the circuit for which it applies. See Note 1.

(d) The wiring system shall meet the applicable requirements of NEC, Article 610.

(e) For Types I and II cranes, the raceway system shall be secured and braced to withstand forces due to specified seismic events.

(f)For cranes located inside the containment, consideration shall be given to rapid pressure changes as required by the specification.

Pressure relief openings in electrical enclosures shall be provided where necessary to equalize these pressures.

6220 Materials 6221 Conductors (a) Individual conductors including those in multiconductor cables Ref. MMH Document 36675-06 (Electrical Calculations) and MMH shall have a maximum operating temperature rating not less than Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

167°F. (a) The standard wire used for electrical panelboards and in conduit is (b) Multiconductor cable shall be permitted in wiring the crane. XHHW-2/SIS, which has a 90* C (1940 F) temperature rating.

Uses of the cable shall comply with the National Electrical Code. (b) Multiconductor cable used in the wiring of the crane meets or exceeds Multiconductor cable used in flexing service shall be Type SO, Type the requirements of NEC. Multiconductor cable used in flexing service is W, or a purchaser-approved alternative. Type SO or Type W.

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NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (c) All control conductors and cables used with AC inverter type (c) All control conductors and cables with operating voltages less than controls and having operating voltages less than 110 V shall be of a 110 V are shielded.

shielded type. (d) Minimum conductor sizes meet or exceed the requirements as (d) Minimum sizes of conductors shall be as follows: specified.

(1) No. 14 AWG for power and lighting circuits (e) Conductors are annealed copper with stranding in accordance with (2) No. 16 AWG for control circuits ASTM specifications for flexing and nonflexing service.

(3) No. 18 AWG for electronic circuits (f) Color coding, where specified, is per NEMA Part ICS 1-112.64.

(e) Conductors shall be annealed copper with minimum stranding as follows: See Note 1.

(1) ASTM B 8 Class B for nonflexing service (2) ASTM B 174 Class K for flexing service (f) Color coding, if specified, shall be per NEMA Part ICS 1-112.64.

6222 Raceways (a) Wiring external to control panel enclosures or assemblies of Ref. MMH Drawing R95797 (Conduit Layout) for the following items:

control panels with integral raceways shall be installed in rigid (a) All wiring external to control panel enclosures are installed in rigid metal conduit except as otherwise permitted in this Section or as galvanized steel conduit.

specifically approved by the purchaser. (b) Short lengths of open conductors are used as required at collectors (b) Short lengths of open conductors shall be permitted at and within enclosures or guards for resistors, reactors, and transformers.

collectors and within enclosures or guards for resistors, reactors, (c) Conduit smaller than 3/4 in. diameter trade size is not used.

and transformers. (d) Raceways, including pull boxes and wire troughs, are provided with (c) Conduit smaller than 3/4 in. diameter trade size shall not be drain holes or are liquid-tight with gaskets and seals.

used. (e) Flexible metal conduit is used to enclose conductors to stationary or (d) An electrically continuous system, either liquid-tight or properly infrequently moved devices such as motors, brakes, master switches, and drained, shall be used. For a liquid-tight system, gaskets, bushings limit switches, or to equipment subject to vibration. Length of flexible and seals shall be used where appropriate. conduit sections does not exceed 3 ft.

(e) Flexible metal conduit may be used to enclose conductors to (f) Connections to moving parts are made by flexible cable not enclosed in stationary or infrequently moved devices such as motors, brakes, conduit.

master switches, and limit switches, or to equipment subject to (g) Conduit is rigidly attached to the crane by conduit supports that are vibration. The length of flexible conduit shall not exceed 3 ft. bolted or welded in accordance with para. 4230. Conduit is not directly (f) Connections to moving parts (e.g., bridge to trolley, bridge or welded.

trolley to pendant push-button station) may be made by flexible cable not enclosed in conduit. See Note 1.

(g) Conduit shall be rigidly attached to the crane by conduit Page 101 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance supports. Welding of conduit shall not be permitted. Conduit supports may be welded to structural members; welding shall be in accordance with para. 4230.

6230 Wiring Methods (a) All conductors shall be identified at each termination by marking Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic) and MMH Drawing with a number to correspond to the schematic diagram. 54214604 (Interconnection Wiring Diagram) for the following items:

(b) Conductors shall be run from terminal to terminal without (a) All conductors are identified at each termination with a number splices except at devices with integral leads or within junction boxes corresponding to the schematic diagram.

where connections shall be made with bolted ring-type pressure (b) Conductors are run from terminal to terminal without splices except connectors. at devices with integral leads or within junction boxes where connections (c) Pressure-type connectors shall be provided on all wires are made with bolted ring-type pressure connectors.

connected to terminals not equipped with means for retaining (c) Pressure-type connectors, such as ferrules, are provided on all wires conductor strands. connected to terminals not equipped with means for retaining conductor (d) All external conductors for control circuits shall be routed strands.

through terminal blocks with no more than two conductors (d) All external conductors for control circuits are routed through terminated at each connection point, terminals blocks and no more than two conductors are terminated at (e) Panel wiring shall be neatly routed and supported in a manner each connection point.

that will not interfere with inspection and maintenance of devices. (e) All panel wiring is neatly routed and supported in a manner that does (I)Control conductors external to AC inverter controls that connect not interfere with inspection and maintenance of devices.

to components subject to detrimental effects, due to (f) Control conductors that connect components sensitive to EMI are electromagnetic interference induced in the conductor from other shielded, routed separately from power and high energy sources, and are conductors or electrical equipment, shall be of a design or installed not spliced.

in such a manner that prevents such effects. Examples include the following: See Note 1.

(1) Use individually shielded twisted pair conductors for tachometer or encoder connections.

(2) Route such conductors through a separate conduit.

(3) Refrain from splicing connections.

6300 PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS (TYPES I, II, AND III CRANES) 6310 General (a) The rated load speeds recommended in paras. 5331, 5332, and 5333 are normal speeds based on the rated capacity of the crane. (a) Rated load speeds for all motions are provided in Zion Specification The characteristics of drive systems can vary widely with respect to SP-ZS-FH-003. The variable frequency drives provide constant speed, Page 102 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance speeds at other than rated load and with respect to lowering regardless of load.

speeds at any load. Drive systems shall be chosen to conform to any (b) Performance criteria for the radio control and cab control are speed - load constraints stated in the specifications. provided in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 (b) If more than one control station is required - for example, cab control and radio remote control - performance criteria for each of the stations shall be specified.

6320 Hoist (a) Hoist design rated load speed and speed load characteristics Ref. the variable frequency drive parameters specified in MMH Drawing shall be in accordance with para. 5331. The corresponding rated R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

load lowering speed shall not exceed 125% of the hoisting speed. (a) Hoist design rated load speed and speed load characteristics are in (b) The maximum lowering speed with 125% capacity test load shall accordance with para. 5331. The corresponding rated load lowering not exceed the maximum lowering speed with rated load by more speed does not exceed 125% of the hoisting speed.

than 10%. (b) The variable frequency drives for the main and aux hoists limit (c) Auxiliary hoists on Type I cranes shall meet the requirements of hoisting speed to within +/-10% of the rated load hoisting speed for all single failure-proof design if they handle critical loads. If, through loads.

administrative control or other means, assurance is provided that (c) The auxiliary hoist does not handle critical loads and is not single no critical load will be handled by an auxiliary hoist, it shall meet the failure proof. The aux hoist meets the hoist requirements in the performance requirements of hoists for Type II cranes. applicable sections for Type II cranes.

(d) The hoist drive characteristics shall be such that the peak (d) Peak accelerations and decelerations for the main and aux hoists are acceleration and deceleration of the load does not exceed 5 ft/sec2 . set to not exceed 5 ft/sec 2.

(e) On Type I crane hoists that handle critical loads, control with a (e) Speed-up controls are provided for the main hoist to allow 150% of high-speed, light-load feature shall be equipped with a means of the rated load hoisting speed when unloaded. The unloaded speed is 7.5 locking out this feature when handling a critical load. ft/min. The load weighing system detects when a load is on the hook and (f) The stopping distance for various hoist designs is variable. On disables this feature.

Type I crane hoists that handle critical loads, the stopping distance (f) The stopping distance for the main hoist with dynamic braking does shall not exceed 5 in. while lowering the maximum critical load at its not exceed 5 in. while lowering the maximum critical load at its maximum maximum speed unless specified otherwise by the purchaser. speed.

6330 Bridge (a) The bridge design rated load speed and speed load Ref. the variable frequency drive parameters specified in MMH Drawing characteristics shall be in accordance with para. 5333. R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

(b) Bridge acceleration rates with rated loads should be limited to (a) The bridge design rated load speed and speed load characteristics are the values shown in Table 6472.2(b)-i. The operator should have in accordance with para. 5333.

Page 103 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance control of deceleration to minimize load swing and avoid wheel slip. (b) Bridge acceleration rates with rated loads are limited to the values In emergency situations such as emergency stop, overspeed, and shown in Table 6472.2(b)-i. Deceleration rates are automatically limit trips, the deceleration rate may exceed the selected controlled by the variable frequency drives to minimize load swing and acceleration rate and normal deceleration rates. avoid wheel slip. In emergency situations, the brakes set immediately and (c) Type I crane bridge control with a high-speed, light-load feature deceleration may exceed the selected acceleration rate and normal shall be equipped with a means of locking out this feature when deceleration rates as permitted.

handling a critical load. (c) N/A - A high-speed, light load feature is not provided for the bridge and is not required.

6340 Trolley (a) The trolley design rated load speed and speed load Ref. the variable frequency drive parameters specified in MMH Drawing characteristics shall be in accordance with para. 5332. R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

(b) Trolley acceleration rates with rated load should be limited to (a) The trolley design rated load speed and speed load characteristics are the values shown in Table 6472.2(b)-i. The operator should have in accordance with para. 5332.

control of deceleration to minimize load swing or wheel slip. In (b) Trolley acceleration rates with rated loads are limited to the values emergency situations such as emergency stop, overspeed, and limit shown in Table 6472.2(b)-i. Deceleration rates are automatically trips, the deceleration rate may exceed the selected acceleration controlled by thevariable frequency drives to minimize load swing and rate and normal deceleration rates. avoid wheel slip. In emergency situations, the brakes set immediately and (c) Type I crane trolley control with a high-speed, light-load feature deceleration may exceed the selected acceleration rate and normal shall be equipped with a means of locking out this feature when deceleration rates as permitted.

handling a critical load. (c) N/A - A high-speed, light load feature is not provided for the trolley and is not required.

6400 COMPONENT SELECTION (TYPES I, II,AND III CRANES) 6410 Controllers 6411 General 6411.1 Applicable Standards Controllers shall conform to NEC, ASME B30.2, and NEMA Parts ICS Controllers conform to the requirements of NEC and ASME B30.2.

2-213, 3-442, 3-443, and 6-110.

ICS 2-213 is superseded by ICS 9, Part 2, which is superseded by ICS 8, Part 11. ICS 8, Part 11 deals with resistors and rheostats. Dynamic braking resistors are tested by the manufacturer in accordance with NEMA ICS 8 Part 11, Section 9.3.

ICS 3-442 is superseded by ICS 8, Part 1. ICS 8, Part 1 deals with general Page 104 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requiremints Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance standards for crane controllers rated 600 volts AC/DC or less. All crane controllers conform to ICS 8, Part 1.

ICS 3-443 is superseded by ICS 8, Parts 2 - 5. ICS 8, Part 2 deals with constant-voltage DC magnetic controllers for motors on cranes, which are not applicable. Part 3 deals with adjustable-voltage DC controllers for motors on cranes, which are not applicable. Part 4 deals with magnetic controllers for AC wound-rotor motors on cranes, which are not applicable. AC contactor ratings used on the crane conform to the requirements of Part 4. Part 5 deals with static controllers for AC wound-rotor motors on cranes, which are not applicable.

ICS 6-110 is superseded by ICS 6. ICS 6 deals with NEMA enclosure ratings (i.e. 12, 4, 4X, etc.). Required tests to validate NEMA ratings are conducted by the enclosure manufacturer.

See Note 1.

6411.2 Voltage Variations At an ambient temperature between 32°F and 100°F, the controller Variable frequency drives are capable of operating at a deviation of +/-

shall be capable of operating at a deviation not more than 10% 10% from the rated nameplate value per the vendor manuals provided in from rated nameplate value, except that for systems using MMH Document 36675-20 (Operation & Maintenance Manual). Electrical semiconductor power converters, the deviation may be limited to components are designed for a maximum ambient temperature of 1100 F not more than 10% above or 5% below rated name-plate value. per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003, which exceeds the specified requirements. Ref. MMH Document 36675-06 (Electrical Calculations).

6411.3 Ambient Temperature Ambient temperature shall be above 32°F but shall not exceed Ambient temperature is specified as between 400 F to 110' F per Zion 100°F. If the specifications state that the equipment is to be Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. Controllers are selected to operate within the operated at ambient temperatures outside this range, the control temperatures specified.

manufacturer shall be consulted.

6411.4 Enclosure Requirements The enclosures, if required, shall be in accordance with NEMA, Part The enclosures are NEMA Type 12, 4X, 3 or 3R in accordance with NEMA ICS 6. Consideration shall be given to high humidity or washdown Part ICS 6, which complies with the requirements of this section.

locations, pressure equalization requirements, and outdoor usage Page 105 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance requirements when enclosures are selected. See Note 1.

6411.5 Protection Against Condensation Unless otherwise specified, enclosed control panels in high humidity Space heaters are not provided for the control panels and are not locations shall have space heaters to reduce the possibility of specified per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

condensation. If heaters are used, they should be energized when the crane is to be out of service for more than 8 hr.

6411.6 Hoists (a) All hoists shall be provided with controlled lowering capable of (a) All hoists use variable frequency drives and dynamic braking resistors meeting the performance specifications in para. 6300. to provide controlled lowering capabilities in accordance with para. 6300.

(b) Hoisting shall take place only when the master switch is in a (b) Hoisting and lowering is performed manually and occurs only when hoisting position. For all loads up to rated load, lowering shall take the master control switch is moved to the corresponding position.

place only when the master switch is in a lowering position. (c) The emergency stop is directly in front of the operator on both the (c) For Type I hoists, the devices necessary to comply with the radio and cab controls. Depressing the pushbutton is the only required emergency stop requirements of para. 6110(b) shall be within reach action to implement the emergency stop.

of the operator in any operating position. It shall not be necessary (d) In the event of an emergency stop, the brakes are immediately set.

to complete a circuit in order to implement these emergency stop (e) The hoist brakes use AC rectified DC shunt coils. Both AC and DC sides provisions, are opened when the brake is de-energized.

(d) In the event of an emergency stop or other emergency (f) The radio and cab controls are provided with nameplates that indicate conditions, the two brakes required by para. 6422.1(a) shall be de- hoisting direction. The direction of travel indicated on the nameplates is energized without intentional time delay. verified in MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure).

(e) Both sides of shunt brake coil circuits on hoists shall be opened Encoders are also provided for the hoist motors to provide directional when the brake is de-energized. feedback to the variable frequency drives.

(f) Type I hoists shall be provided with an indication at the operator's control location to confirm the selected direction of load movement. This indication shall be taken from the drive train motion and electrically separated from the control circuit.

6412 Type Selection The type of control supplied shall result in operation complying with Variable frequency drives are selected for the controls that comply with the performance specifications in para. 6300, taking into the performance specifications in para. 6300 and Zion Specification SP-ZS-consideration any supplemental requirements stated in the crane FH-003 specifications. Any of the following types of control that will meet those requirements shall be supplied.

6413 Constant Potential DC Page 106 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 6413.1 Hoist (a) Series motors and series brake(s) shall be used. Control shall (a-b) N/A - Constant potential DC hoist motors are not used on this crane provide dynamic braking lowering and include a spring-closed off position dynamic braking contactor to provide self-excitation of the motor series field in the lowering direction.

(b) For Type I hoists, provision shall be made to comply with the maximum hoisting and lowering speed limitations when handling critical loads, as specified in paras. 5331 and 6320, with the overspeed protection specified in para. 6444. Control shall provide that the series brakes cannot be energized unless there is a path for braking current in the motor armature. These provisions are to include the following.

(1) A double set of conductors and collectors shall be provided in the part of the armature lowering circuit not connected to the series field series brake circuit.

(2) Any resistance in the armature circuit when lowering shall have a continuous rating equal to the motor rated current.

(3) If the dynamic lowering contactor in the armature circuit is not closed when the master switch is in any lowering position, the spring-closed emergency dynamic braking contactor shall remain closed.

(4) Temperature-sensitive devices in the motor shall warn the operator when the temperature approaches a value that could be iniurious to the insulation.

+

6413.2 Travel The travel control shall be the reversing, contactor-resistor type N/A - Constant potential DC travel motors are not used on this crane with controlled plugging.

Page 107 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 6414 Constant Potential AC 6414.1 Hoist (a) Speed control may be achieved by the following: (a-b) N/A - Constant potential AC hoist motors are not used on this crane (1) contactors and resistance in the secondary of the wound rotor motor; (2) static power devices such as saturable reactors or thyristors in the secondary of the wound rotor motor; (3) contactor(s), and resistance in the primary of a squirrel cage motor (4) an electrical load brake; or (5) a combination of these methods.

(b) Type I cranes shall be provided with the following:

(1) open and reverse phase protection; (2) a circuit to ensure that power is applied to the hoist motor(s) before the brakes (para. 6422) are released; (3) a circuit to de-energize the hoist motor and to set the brakes if the electrical load brake is not energized sufficiently to limit the speed when the control is in a position requiring electrical load brake torque; (4) temperature-sensitive devices in motors and load brakes to warn the operator when the temperature of a motor or load brake approaches a value that could be injurious to the insulation or could interfere with meeting the performance specifications in para. 6300.

6414.2 Travel (a) Speed control may be achieved by the following: (a-b) N/A - Constant potential AC travel motors are not used on this crane (1) contactors and resistance in the secondary of the wound rotor motor; (2) static power devices such as saturable reactors or thyristors in the secondary of the wound rotor motor; (3) contactor(s) and resistance in the primary of a squirrel cage motor; Page 108 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (4) an electrical load brake; or (5) a combination of these methods.

(b) Control shall include controlled plugging.

6415 Adjustable Voltage DC (a) Control shall include a contactor that will disconnect power to (a-d) N/A - Adjustable voltage DC motors are not used on this crane any drive not in use.

(b) Control shall include controlled electrical braking and may include a feature that will keep the electrical braking circuit energized until the motor approaches zero speed when the operator wishes to stop.

(c) A contactor shall be provided in the DC motor armature circuit if a generator is the source of DC power, but the contactor can be in either the AC or DC power circuit if static power conversion is used.

(d) Motor field loss protection shall be provided.

6415.1 Hoist (a) Hoists with static power supplies shall include means to (a-b) N/A - Adjustable voltage DC hoist motors are not used on this crane automatically remove power from the motor and to set the brake(s) if the drive does not develop braking torque as required when lowering a load or when the operator attempts to reduce speed.

(b) In addition to (a) above, hoists handling critical loads on Type I cranes shall be provided with the following:

(1) provisions to maintain proper field excitation to comply with the speed limitation in para. 6300. Activation of this speed-limiting feature shall be the responsibility of the designated person responsible for moving critical loads [see para. 6320(e)].

(2) a protective circuit to ensure current flow in motor armature circuit before brakes can be energized (current check circuit or torque proving circuit);

(3) a temperature-sensitive device in the motor to warn the operator when temperature approaches a value that could be injurious; (4) temperature-sensitive devices in or near the resistors Page 109 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance that are required to absorb "pump back energy" to warn the operator when the resistors approach a value that could cause them to fail.

6415.2 Travel (a) Field loss protection is not required on travel drives having (a-b) N/A - Adjustable voltage DC travel motors are not used on this crane motor field reversing and designed to permit coasting.

(b) When two or more motors connected in parallel are used, provision shall be made at the control panel to permit isolating any motor and to continue operation with the remaining motor(s) with normal protection features, if agreed to by the user, crane builder, and electrical equipment supplier(s).

6416 Adjustable Voltage AC (a) Speed control may be achieved by static power devices such as (a-b) N/A - Adjustable voltage AC motors are not used on this crane saturable reactors or thyristors in the primary circuit.

(b) Control shall include controlled electrical braking and may include a feature that will keep the electrical braking circuit energized until the motor approaches zero speed when the operator wishes to stop.

6416.1 Hoist (a) The secondary may have a fixed impedance, although a means (a-c) N/A - Adjustable voltage AC hoist motors are not used on this crane may be provided to increase the resistance in the secondary of the wound rotor motor for operation at reduced speeds for prolonged periods or if frequent deceleration is anticipated.

(b) An electrical load brake may be used with the above.

(c) Type I cranes shall have protection as required in para. 6414.

6416.2 Travel (a) The secondary may have a fixed impedance, although a means (a-b) N/A - Adjustable voltage AC travel motors are not used on this crane may be provided to increase the resistance in the secondary to permit prolonged operation at reduced speed or to reduce motor heating when plugging.

(b) When two or more motors are used, provision shall be made at the control panel to permit isolating any motor and to continue operation with the remaining motor(s) with normal protection Page 110 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion StatiOn FHB Crane Trolley Compliance features if agreed to by the purchaser, crane builder, and electrical equipment supplier(s).

6417 AC Variable Frequency (a) Control shall consist of a variable frequency drive (VFD) with a Ref. vendor manuals provided in MMH Document 36675-20 (Operation &

full load ampere (FLA) rating equal to, or greater than, the FLA of Maintenance Manual) for the following items:

the corresponding motor(s). (a) Variable frequency drives have a full load ampere rating equal to, or (b) Control shall include, as a minimum, the following protective greater than, the FLA of the corresponding motors. Ref. MMH Document features: MMH Document 36675-06 (Electrical Calculations).

(1) output phase loss, (b) Variable frequency drives have protective features including output (2) under voltage, phase loss, under voltage, over voltage, motor thermal overload, and VFD (3) over voltage, overheat.

(4) motor thermal overload, and (c) Variable frequency drives provide dynamic control braking.

(5) VFD overheat. (d) Variable frequency drives have a minimum of 150% overload (c) Control shall provide a control braking means using dynamic capability for 1 min.

braking or line regeneration. (e) Standard practices and designs, including the use of line reactors, (d) Control shall have a minimum of 150% overload capability for 1 isolation transformers, and shielded cables, are used to prevent min. detrimental effects due to harmonic and EMI/RFI emissions produced by (e) The cable power supply and electronic equipment shall be inverters. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

protected from detrimental effects due to harmonic and EMI/RFI emissions produced by inverters.

6417.1 Hoist (a) The VFD control shall incorporate a speed feedback device to Ref. the variable frequency drive manuals in MMH Document 36675-20 sense loss of speed control during any motor operating condition. (Operation & Maintenance Manual) for the following items:

Hoists with mechanical load brakes are exempt from this (a) Encoders are provided for the main and aux hoist motors and provide requirement. speed feedback to the variable frequency drives.

(b) Control dynamic braking shall be sized for a minimum of 150% (b) External resistor banks used for hoist dynamic braking are sized in of motor full load torque, but shall not, under any circumstances, be MMH Document 36675-06 (Electrical Calculations) to acquire the less than the torque (or corresponding current) limit setting of the necessary motor power to resist 150% of motor full load torque. This VFD in the hoisting direction. torque level is not less than the torque limit setting of the variable (c) Control shall sense sufficient motor torque (or corresponding frequency drive.

current) before releasing holding brake(s) (i.e., torque proving). (c) Variable frequency drives used for the hoists have a torque-proving Hoists with mechanical load brakes are exempt from this circuit that prevents the release of the holding brakes until sufficient requirement. motor torque is generated.

Page 111 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements - Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (d) In lieu of the design tolerance para. 5331.1(b), control shall (d) Variable frequency drives used for the hoists maintain speed control maintain speed control under all motor operating conditions to under all motor operation conditions within 5% of the commanded within +/-5% of the commanded speed. speed.

(e) If specified by the owner, control shall be capable of operating (e) Speed-up controls are provided for both hoists per Zion Specification at higher than base speed as a function of load (constant SP-ZS-FH-003 to allow 150% of the rated load hoisting speed when horsepower operation) for loads less than 100% rated load. unloaded.

(f)Type I cranes shall have controls with the following capabilities: (f) Warning devices are not provided for the motor or dynamic braking (1) A warning device shall be provided to warn the operator resistors since overheating faults will automatically shut down power to of a pending motor overheat condition. the system and set the brakes. Operator input is not required.

(2) A warning device shall be provided to warn the operator that the dynamic braking resistors have overheated.

6418 Sizing Procedure Control ratings shall be in accordance with NEMA Standards with Control ratings are in accordance with NEMA Standards with the the following qualifications, following qualifications.

6418.1 Hoists That Handle Critical Loads on Type I Cranes As a minimum, contactor, resistor, thyristor, and reactor ratings Contactor, resistor, and reactor ratings have a continuous rating equal to shall have a continuous rating equal to the greater of the steady the greater of the steady state currents in those devices when hoisting or state currents in those devices when hoisting or lowering rated load lowering rated load at full speed. Accelerating resistors are not used for at full speed. Accelerating resistors, if used, shall be NEMA Class 90 this crane. Mechanical load brakes are not used as the control braking (see NEMA, Part ICS 2-213). means.

Mechanical load brakes shall not be used as the control braking means.

6418.2 Types I, II, and III Cranes The crane specifications shall state all required repetitive duty cycle Operational and duty cycle information is provided in Zion Specification operations or prolonged operations in terms of load, distance, SP-ZS-FH-003. Control components are checked to ensure that they speed, time, and frequency of repetition. All the control comply with the requirements of the specification. Ref. vendor manuals components (including the control braking means) shall be checked provided in MMH Document 36675-20 (Operation & Maintenance by the supplier to ensure that they are adequate for that Manual).

specification.

6420 Friction Brakes 6421 General (Types 1,11, and III Cranes)

This Section covers the requirements for friction-type brakes for Friction-type brakes provided for the crane comply with the requirements purposes of holding, emergency, parking, and service brakes. of this section.

Page 112 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 6421.1 Applicable Standards The brake selections shall be in accordance with the definitions and Brake selections comply with the requirements of ASME B30.2, this brake requirements of ASME B30.2, with further specific Section, and para. 6100.

requirements as covered by this Section and para. 6100.

6421.2 Brake Operation The brakes shall have a thermal capacity for the frequency and Brakes have sufficient thermal capacity for the frequency and duration of duration of the specified operations to prevent over-heating of the the specified operations to prevent overheating of the brake wheel, disks, brake wheel, disks, brake linings, and other parts. Brake manual brake linings, and other parts. Since friction brakes are only used for release mechanisms shall be furnished to permit drive movement holding brakes, heat generation is minimal in these devices. Brakes are during power outages, and shall be of the manual-release-self-reset provided with manual-release-self-reset mechanisms to permit type, operative only when held manually in the release position. movement during power outages. Ref. MMH Document 36675-20 (Operation & Maintenance Manual).

6421.3 Electric Brakes (a) The electrical operating and excitation system shall have a Ref. the vendor manuals in MMH Document 36675-20 (Operation &

thermal rating for the frequency and duration of the specified Maintenance Manual) for the following items:

operations, and the thermal time rating shall equal or exceed the (a) The electrical operating and excitation system are designed to have corresponding drive motor time rating. thermal ratings that meet or exceed the corresponding drive motor time (b) Brakes with DC shunt coils shall release at 80% and operate ratings.

without overheating at 110% of the rated excitation system voltage. (b) The hoist brakes use AC rectified DC shunt coils that release at 80%

Whenever DC shunt coils are used on hoist brakes, the combination and can operate without overheating up to 110% of the rated excitation of the brake coil and excitation system shall result in a quick system voltage for a short period of time. The combination of the brake response of brake release and set. coil and excitation system results in a quick response of brake release and (c) Brakes with AC coils shall release at 85% and operate without set.

overheating at 110% of rated excitation system voltage. (c) The trolley and bridge travel brakes use AC coils that release at 85%

and can operate without overheating up to 110% of the rated excitation system voltage for a short period of time.

6421.4 Brake Lining, Friction Material Brake lining material shall permit brakes to maintain adequate Brake lining material allows the brakes to maintain adequate torque for torque for the specified environmental conditions and at the lining the specified environmental conditions and at the lining temperatures temperatures resulting from the frequency and duration of the resulting from the frequency and duration of the specified operations.

specified operations. Manual or automatic means shall be provided The brakes automatically provide for brake lining wear.

to adjust the brake operating mechanism to compensate for the effect of lining wear.

Page 113 of 154

NOG- 1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 6422 Hoist Brakes (Types I, II, and III Cranes) 6422.1 Hoists That Handle Critical Loads on Type I Cranes (a) A minimum of two holding brakes shall be provided. These (a) Two shoe-type holding brakes are provided for the main hoist that are brakes shall comply with AISE TR No. 11 or have an alternative each sized to hold 150% of the full rated load hoisting torque. Ref. MMH design specifically approved by the Purchaser. Each holding brake Document 36675-18 (Main Hoist Gearing Analysis). The main hoist shoe shall have a torque rating not less than 125% of the full brakes comply with AISE TR-11.

(rated) load hoisting torque at the point of brake application. (b) The main hoist brakes are sized to hold the credible critical load during (b) Determination shall be made that if the holding brakes are a seismic event as specified. Ref. MMH Document 36675-18 (Main Hoist mounted and adjusted, and linings run in properlyfor the torque Gearing Analysis).

settings required in (a) above, the brake system shall be capable of (c) An eddy current brake (magentorque) is provided on the main hoist stopping and holding the credible critical load during an SSE or OBE for emergency lowering of the critical load at a constant speed. The shoe-event. The values used for this determination shall be based on the type holding brakes must be manually released to lower the load and can maximum acceleration forces at the brake(s) computed for the be reset as required to hold the load. Lowering speed is determined by crane SSE or OBE specifications, and the total torque required on using a hand held tachometer. Depending on the height that the load the brake system to hold the credible critical load. must be manually lowered, intermittent lowering may be required to (c) Provision shall be made for emergency lowering of the critical allow the magnetorque to cool. Ref. MMH Document 36675-20 load by an alternative means of operation of the holding brakes. (Operation & Maintenance Manual) for emergency lowering procedures.

The alternative release mechanisms shall permit control of the (d) N/A - The total accumulated radiation exposure for the life of the braking torque and shall also provide the ability to restore the crane does not pose a risk for the brake lining material.

"brake set" condition promptly, thereby allowing the operators of the alternative release mechanisms to control the lowering speed.

A device for indicating lowering speed shall be located at the emergency release station. Intermittent lowering shall be allowed to provide time for cooling the brake mechanism to obtain adequate heat dissipation and to prevent reduction in braking torque that can occur as the result of excessive heat.

(d) The detrimental effects of radiation exposure on the brake linings shall be determined and a routine replacement procedure established so as to maintain an adequate torque.

6422.2 Hoists on Types II and III Cranes and Hoists That Do Not Handle Critical Loads on Type I Cranes At least one holding brake shall be provided. Each brake shall have (a-c) The aux hoist is provided with one holding brake on the gear case not less than the following percentage of the rated load hoisting and one holding brake on the hoist motor, in addition to the dynamic Page 114 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance torque at the point where the brake(s) is applied: control braking provided by the variable frequency drive. Each holding (a) 125% when used with a control braking means other than brake is sized to a minimum of 100% rated load hoisting torque at the mechanical; point of application. Ref. MMH Drawing R94965 (Aux Hoist Assembly).

(b) 100% when used with a mechanical control braking means; (c) 100% if two holding brakes are provided.

6423 Trolley and Bridge Brakes (Types I, II, and III Cranes) 6423.1 Application (a) All travel drives shall have service braking means. (a) Service braking is provided for all trolley and bridge travel motors.

(b) When a friction brake is used for service braking, the brake (b) N/A - Dynamic control brakes are used instead of friction brakes for torque shall be sufficient to stop the drive within a distance in feet service braking.

equal to 10% of the rated load speed in feet per minute when (c) Friction-type emergency brakes are provided for all trolley and bridge traveling at full speed with rated load. travel motors that set automatically upon power failure and are capable (c) Emergency brakes shall be of the friction-type that will set of stopping within the distance specified in (b).

automatically upon power failure and shall be capable of stopping (d) N/A - Separate brakes are provided for service and emergency the drive within the distance specified in (b) above, braking.

(1) For Type I Cranes. Emergency and parking brakes shall be provided for the travel drives. Parking brakes shall be automatically applied and shall be provided with time delay relays, if necessary, to eliminate interference with service brake operation.

(2) For Types II and III Cranes. Emergency brakes shall be provided when required by the specification.

(d) Any combination of service, emergency, and parking functions may be performed by a single friction brake, provided the emergency and parking functions can be obtained without having power available.

6423.2 Trolley Brake Sizing Procedures (a) On cab-operated cranes, trolley service braking shall be (a) Trolley travel service brakes are provided as required by para.

provided as required by para. 6423.1(a) with sufficient torque to 6423.1(a) with sufficient torque to satisfy the deceleration requirements satisfy the deceleration requirements of para. 6423.1(b). of para. 6423.1(b).

(b) On floor-, remote-, or pulpit-operated cranes, trolley emergency (b) Trolley travel emergency brakes are provided with sufficient torque to brakes with torque rating to satisfy the deceleration requirements satisfy the deceleration requirements of para. 6423.1(b).

of para. 6423.1(b) shall be provided.

Page 115 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 6423.3 Bridge Brake Sizing Procedures (a) On cab-operated cranes with cab on bridges, bridge service (a) Bridge travel service brakes are provided as required by para.

braking shall be provided with sufficient torque to satisfy the 6423.1(a) with sufficient torque to satisfy the deceleration requirements deceleration requirements of para. 6423.1(b). of para. 6423.1(b).

(b) On cab-operated cranes with cab on trolley, bridge emergency (b) N/A - There is no cab on the trolley.

brake(s) with torque rating to satisfy the deceleration requirements (c) Bridge travel emergency brakes are provided with sufficient torque to of para. 6423.1(b) shall be provided in addition to bridge service satisfy the deceleration requirements of para. 6423.1(b).

braking.

(c) On floor-, remote-, or pulpit-operated cranes, bridge emergency brake(s) shall be provided with torque rating to satisfy the deceleration requirements of para. 6423.1(b).

6430 Disconnecting Means 6431 General (Types I, II, and III Cranes) The crane disconnecting devices are selected and installed as required by 6431.1 Applicable Standards NEC Article 610; ASME B30.2, Section 2-1.10.5; and NEMA ICS 8, Parts 1-5.

All crane disconnecting devices shall be selected and installed as NEMA ICS 3-442 is superseded by ICS 8, Part 1 and ICS 3-443 is required by NEC Article 610; ASME B30.2, Section 2-1.10.5; and superseded by ICS 8, Parts 2-5.

NEMA Parts ICS 3-442 and 3-443.

6432 Main Disconnects 6432.1 Runway Disconnects (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

A circuit breaker or motor circuit switch selected in accordance with A circuit breaker is provided in the leads to the runway conductors in NEC 610-31 shall be provided in the leads to the runway accordance with NEC 610-31. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical conductors. Schematic).

6432.2 Crane Disconnect (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

All cranes shall have a main line disconnect in accordance with NEC The crane main line disconnect is in accordance with NEC 610-32 and NEC 610-32, and shall be rated in accordance with NEC 610-33 plus any 610-14(E), which envelopes NEC 610-33. The disconnect is enclosed as additional continuous load. This disconnect shall be enclosed as required by environmental conditions. Over current protection is required by environmental conditions. Unless overcurrent incorporated into the main line disconnect. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 protection is provided by other means, it shall be incorporated in (Electrical Schematic).

this main line disconnect and the user shall specify available rms symmetrical short circuit current.

6432.3 Motor Power Circuit Disconnecting Device (Type I Cranes)

A device shall be furnished to open the power circuit to all crane drive motors. This device shall be capable of being opened from all A master control relay is provided that opens the power circuit to all Page 116 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance operator stations. The device shall open automatically upon failure motors and sets all brakes when the operator depresses the emergency and shall be unable to reclose until a reset function is performed. stop on either the radio or cab controls. The master control relay opens The minimum size of this device shall be not less than that required automatically upon failure and cannot be reset until the emergency stop by NEC 610-33. The opening of this device shall cause the holding is manually repositioned. The master control relay is sized per NEC 610-and emergency brakes to set. 14(E), which envelopes NEC 610-33. Ref. MMH Document 36675-06 (Electrical Calculations).

6432.4 Motor Power Circuit Disconnecting Device (Types II and III Cranes)

Unless a device (para. 6432.3) is supplied, the crane disconnect N/A - This is a Type I Crane (para. 6432.2) must be accessible for opening by the operator and must be connected in a way that the functional protection required by para. 6432.3 is provided.

6432.5 Motion Power Disconnecting Devices (Type I Cranes)

Control shall include a separate disconnecting means for each crane Controls include a separate disconnecting means for each crane motion motion. as shown in MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

6433 Auxiliary Disconnects (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

The crane manufacturer shall provide disconnecting means in the Circuit breakers are provided as required by NEC to protect and form of fused safety switches or circuit breakers as required by NEC disconnect all auxiliary equipment, including:

to protect and disconnect all auxiliary equipment supplied by the (a) lighting, manufacturer or specified by the purchaser. Auxiliary equipment (b) signal systems, may include: (c) heating/ventilating/air conditioning, (a) lighting, (d) convenience outlet, and (b) signal systems, (e) special devices when applicable.

(c) heating/ventilating/air conditioning, Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

(d) convenience outlet, and (e) special devices when applicable.

Ground fault circuit interrupters, if required for convenience outlets, shall be a part of the user's specifications.

6440 Limit Switches 6441 General (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

A limit switch is defined as a switch that is operated by some part or Limit switches are provided for the following:

motion of a power driven machine or equipment to alter the (a) hoist overtravel, Page 117 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance electric circuit associated with the machine or equipment. This (b) hoist overspeed, Section includes the following limit switch requirements for nuclear (c) hoist overload, power plant cranes: (d) hoist drum rope mis-spooling, and (a) hoist overtravel, (e) bridge and trolley overtravel limits.

(b) hoist overspeed, Limit switch requirements are detailed in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

(c) hoist overload, Phase reversal protection is provided for the crane. Ref. MMH Drawing (d) hoist drum rope mis-spooling, and R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

(e) bridge and trolley overtravel limits.

Limit switch requirements, if any in addition to the above, shall be incorporated in the specifications. AC cranes shall have phase reversal protection.

6442 High Limits 6442.1 Type I Cranes Hoists that handle critical loads shall include two separate overhoist A geared limit switch and a weighted limit switch are provided as two limit switch systems as required in paras. 6442.2 and 6442.3. separate upper limits for the main hoist. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

6442.2 First High Limit (Type I Cranes)

The first upper hoisting limit shall be a control circuit device such as The first upper hoisting limit switch for the main hoist is a geared-type a geared-type, weight-operated, or paddle-operated switch. that relies on a relay set to remove power from the raise control circuit Actuation of this switch shall result in the removal of power from and sets the hoist brakes when tripped. This switch does not affect the the motor and setting the hoist brakes. The operator may lower or lowering control circuit. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical back out of this tripped switch without further assistance. Schematic).

6442.3 Final Overtravel High Limit (Type I Cranes)

Hoists that handle critical loads shall include, in addition to the first The second upper hoisting limit switch for the main hoist is a weight-upper limit switch as specified in para. 6442.2, a final power circuit operated type that physically removes power to the drive contactor and hoisting limit switch. Actuation of this switch shall remove power sets the hoist brakes when tripped. Actuation of this limit switch from the hoist motor directly without relying on the sequencing of prevents further hoisting or lowering. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 any devices and shall set the hoist brakes. Actuation of this limit (Electrical Schematic).

switch shall prevent further hoisting or lowering.

6442.4 High Limits (Hoists on Types II and III Cranes and Hoists That Do Not Handle Critical Loads on Type I Cranes)

One high limit switch shall be provided. The aux hoist is provided with two limit switches. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

Page 118 of 154

NOG- 1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 6443 Hoist Low Limits (Type I Cranes)

Hoists that handle critical loads shall include two separate low A geared limit switch and the load weighing system are provided as two limits, as required in paras. 6443.1 and 6443.2. separate low limits for the main hoist. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

6443.1 First Low Limit (Type I Cranes)

Each hoist that handles critical loads shall include an overtravel low The first lower hoisting limit switch for the main hoist is a geared-type limit switch. This switch may be of the control circuit type. that removes power from the lowering control circuit and sets the hoist Actuation of this switch shall stop the lowering motion and set the brakes when tripped. This switch does not affect the raising control hoist brakes. The operation of this switch shall not prevent hoisting. circuit. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

6443.2 Final Overtravel Low Limit (Type I Cranes)

Hoists that handle critical loads shall include, in addition to a first The second lower hoisting limit switch for the main hoist is integrated low limit as specified in para. 6443.1, a final lowering limit switch of into the load weighing system and removes power from the lowering the control circuit type that shall be mechanically and electrically control circuit and sets the hoist brakes when an underweight/slack rope independent of the first low limit. Operation of this limit switch condition is met. This system is mechanically and electrically shall de-energize a power device other than the device operated by independent from the first limit switch. Actuation of this limit switch the first low limit to interrupt all power to the hoist motor and the prevents further hoisting or lowering. The controls are reset by entering a hoist brakes. Actuation of this limit switch shall prevent further back out mode in which hoisting is permitted, but lowering is still lowering or hoisting. When this occurs, a person knowledgeable in prevented. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

the hoist control system shall determine and correct the cause of tripping of the final low limit switch. That person shall direct the raising out of the final low limit after establishing a back out mode which shall prevent further lowering. The first low limit shall be tested for proper operation before making any additional lifts.

6443.3 Low Limits (Hoists on Types IIand III Cranes and Hoists That Do Not Handle Critical Loads on Type I Cranes)

A low limit shall be furnished: (a-b) The aux hoist is provided with two limit switches identical to the (a) as recommended by ASME B30.2, 2-1.10.5(e), when specified in main hoist switches described in paras. 6443.1 and 6443.2, which exceeds the crane specifications, or the requirements of this section. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical (b) when required by ASME B30.2, 2-1.11.3(c)(1). Schematic).

6444 Hoist Overspeed Limits (Type I Cranes)

(a) Hoists that handle critical loads shall include an overspeed limit Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic) for the following items:

switch. When handling a critical load, hook speeds over 115% of the (a) An overspeed switch is provided for the main hoist. Hook speeds over design rated load lowering speed for any critical load shall trip this 115% of the design rated load speed for any load will trip this switch and Page 119 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance switch, causing all holding brakes to set without intentional time immediately set all brakes. The operator must center the master switch delay. Operation of this switch may also initiate any control braking and depress the start/reset pushbutton to resume operation.

means normally used for stopping of the load. It shall be necessary (b) The overspeed limit switch is disabled whenever there is no load on to center the master switch and to manually reset the overspeed the hoist.

limit switch (or the overspeed circuit) before operation can be (c) N/A - A clutch is not used for this crane.

resumed.

(b) On drives which provide high-speed, lightload features, provisions shall be made to permit override of this overspeed limit switch when handling noncritical loads.

(c) When specified, clutched-in-slow-speed hoist drives may include a bidirectional overspeed switch to shut down hoisting or lowering if drive speed exceeds 115% of the rated full load slow lowering speed.

6445 Hoist Load Limits 6445.1 Overloading (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

Overloading, including load hang-up, of hoists that handle critical A load weighing system is provided for the main and aux hoists in loads on Type I cranes shall be detected by means of a load sensing accordance with para. 6466 and Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 to detect system, or the equivalent, in accordance with para. 6466. The high- overloading. The high-load limit prevents lifting more than the rated load, load limit shall be set to prevent sustained lifting of more than rated but allows lowering. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

load, but to permit lowering. Specifications shall designate any load limit requirements for Types II and III cranes.

I 6445.2 Unbalanced Load Limits (Type I Cranes)

Dual reeved hoists that handle critical loads on Type I cranes shall The main hoist equalizer system includes separate load cells to detect the include a device to detect excessive movement of the equalizer load on each rope. Excessive movement of the equalizer presents mechanism. Tripping of this device shall initiate a flashing warning different loads to each load cell, causing an unbalanced load fault that light visible to the crane operator and shall shut down the hoisting disables the hoisting circuits. A bypass switch is provided to allow use of motion. Means shall be provided to allow the use of hoist under the hoist under administrative control. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 administrative control. Reeving shall then be corrected before (Electrical Schematic).

returning hoist to additional service.

6446 Hoist Drum Rope Mis-Spooling Limits 6446.1 Hoist Drum Rope Mis-Spooling Limits (Type I Cranes)

Hoists that handle critical loads shall include a hoist drum rope mis- Two rope mis-spooling limit switches are provided for the main hoist spooling limit switch to detect improper threading of hoist rope in drum to detect improper threading of rope in the drum grooves. The limit Page 120 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance hoist drum grooves, switches disable the hoisting circuits and set the holding brakes when Actuation of this switch shall result in removal of power from the tripped. A bypass switch is used to enable lowering out of the mis-hoist motor and setting the hoist holding brakes. spooled condition, and further hoisting is prevented until the mis-spooled Actuation of this limit device shall prevent further hoisting or condition is corrected. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

lowering until a key-operated bypass is used to enable lowering out of the mis-spooled condition, with further hoisting prevented until the mis-spooled condition is corrected. The limit shall be tested for proper operation before making any additional lifts.

6446.2 Hoist Drum Rope Level Wind Limits (Types II and III Cranes)

Hoist drum rope misspooling limits shall be furnished in accordance with 6446.1 when so specified in the crane specifications. N/A - Mis-spooling limit switches are not provided for the aux hoist and are not required.

6447 Bridge and Trolley Overtravel Limits (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

Bridge and trolley overtravel limits shall be furnished when Bridge and trolley over travel (end of travel) limits are furnished. Ref.

specified. Refer to paras. 5131(b) and 5459.1(d) and (e). MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

6448 Restricted Handling Path (Type I Cranes)

On some Type I cranes, it may be essential that the hook follow a N/A - Restricted critical load handling paths are not required per restricted critical load handling path. The requirements for such Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. However the main hook travel paths vary widely with individual nuclear plant designs. The crane over the spent fuel area (exclusive of the Cask Load Pit) will be specifications shall designate the required accuracy, positions restricted and will require by-pass in accordance with ZS operational

• where redundancy is required, and any test and signal system requirements.

required.

6450 Master Switches, Pushbuttons, and Radio Controls (Types I, II, and III Cranes) 6451 General 6451.1 Applicable Standards All such devices shall comply with ASME B30.2. All applicable devices comply with ASME B30.2 6452 Contact Ratings Page 121 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof ReqUirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance Contacts in master switches, pushbuttons, and radio control ICS 2-125 is superseded by ICS 5, Part 1. ICS 5, Part 1 deals with general interface panels should be heavy duty rated per NEMA ICS 2-125. standards for control-circuit and pilot devices. Contacts in the master See Table 1 or 2, for appropriate application. Multispeed pendant switches, pushbuttons, and radio control interface panels conform to pushbuttons shall be rated per NEMA A150 or N300. these standards and are tested accordingly by the manufacturer.

Multispeed pendant pushbuttons are rated per NEMA A150. Ref. vendor manuals in MMH Document 36675-20 (Operation & Maintenance Manual).

6453 Voltage Ratings The voltages in pushbuttons, master switches, and similar control Pushbuttons, master switches, and similar control circuit devices are circuit devices shall not exceed 150 V AC or 300 V DC. designed to operate at 120 V AC. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

6454 Radio Controls If radio control of cranes in the containment area has been N/A - This crane is not used for construction provided for construction operation, that equipment shall be removed before the crane is certified for service in the operating plant unless the effect of radio transmission on reactor plant instrumentation has been analyzed.

6460 Auxiliary Equipment (Types I, II, and III Cranes) 6461 General Auxiliary electrical equipment shall be provided as specified. All Auxiliary electrical equipment is provided as specified. All necessary necessary mounting hardware, wiring, disconnecting means, and mounting hardware, wiring, disconnecting means, and associated control associated control means shall be included. For Types I and II means is included. All auxiliary equipment is mounted and secured so as cranes, all auxiliary equipment shall be mounted and secured so as not to become dislodged or to fall from the crane during a seismic event.

not to become dislodged or to fall from the crane during a seismic Ref. MMH Document 36675-14 (Seismic Analysis of Misc. Items).

event.

6462 Light Fixtures Light fixtures shall be as specified in the crane specifications. Existing crane lighting is reused per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 6463 Signal Systems Signal systems shall be as specified in the crane specifications. Signal systems are designed in accordance with Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 6464 Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning shall be as specified in the There are no requirements for heating, ventilation, and air conditioning crane specifications. per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 Page 122 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements': Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 6465 Convenience Outlets Convenience outlets shall be as specified in the crane specifications. Existing convenience outlets on the crane are reused per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

6466 Load Sensing Devices Load sensing devices shall be as specified in the crane A load weighing system is provided for the main and aux hoists per Zion specifications. When load sensing devices provide control functions Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 and is powered from the control circuit of the such as load limiting, as covered in para. 6445.1, they shall be associated drive. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

powered from the control circuit of the associated drive.

6467 Power for Auxiliary Equipment Except as stated in para. 6466 or unless otherwise specified, power A utility circuit is provided for the crane with a separate disconnect for all auxiliary equipment shall be from a separate protected means upstream of the main drives so that power is available to auxiliary branch circuit(s) connected ahead of the main drive motor equipment when the main drives are shut down. Ref. MMH Drawing disconnecting means, so that power is available to auxiliary R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

equipment when the main drives are shut down.

6468 Wiring for Auxiliary Equipment All wiring for auxiliary equipment shall be in accordance with NEC. All wiring for auxiliary equipment is in accordance with NEC. All All equipment shall be grounded. equipment is grounded. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

6470 Motors (Types I, II, and III Cranes) 6471 General (a) Direct CurrentMotors. DC motors shall be in accordance with (a) N/A - DC motors are not used on this crane either NEMA MG-1 or AISE TR No. 1. (b)

(b) Alternating Current Motors (1) AC squirrel cage motors used on this crane are specifically (1) Definite Purpose Inverter-FedMotors. AC squirrel cage designed for inverter duty and conform to NEMA MG-1, Part 31.

motors applied to variable frequency drives (VFDs) shall be (2) N/A - AC wound rotors are not used on this crane.

specifically designed for inverter duty and shall conform to (3) N/A - AC squirrel cage motors are used on this crane.

NEMA MG-1, Part 31, or other standard as approved by the (c) All motors have enclosures and time ratings as required for the duty owner. and environmental conditions per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

(2) Definite Purpose Wound Rotor Induction Motors. AC wound rotor motors shall conform to NEMA MG-1, Part 18.501 through 18.520.

(3) OtherAC Motors. All other AC motors not already described shall conform to NEMA MG-1.

Page 123 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (c) All AC or DC motors shall have enclosures and time ratings as required for the duty and environmental conditions.

6472 Motor Size Selection, AC or DC (a) The motor size selection is determined by the duty class or duty (a) Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 provides the most severe duty cycle for each motion, not the Type I, II, or III crane classification, requirements, which are used to design the motors and controls.

Because of the large variety of crane drives available and the (b) Motors are designed with class H insulation and for operation in difference in the effects of those drives on the thermal adequacy of ambient temperatures of 1100 F per Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

the motors under consideration, any attempt to develop a procedure for selecting motor ratings becomes quite involved.

Whenever possible, the specifications should indicate the most severe repetitive duty (or duties) that each motor will be required to meet, especially including intervals of slow speed operation, if any. The supplier shall be responsible for selecting ratings that will meet the specified duty with the type of control specified. In the absence of duty cycle requirements, the specifications shall clearly identify the duty class to be used for each motion in the procedure described herein. The rating of auxiliary devices (such as mechanical or electrical load brakes) must also be selected to meet the specified duty or duty class.

(b) For ambient temperatures above 100*F, the motor design (frame size, insulation class, enclosure, and ventilation) shall be selected to compensate for the increased ambient so the total insulation temperature will not exceed the value allowed by NEMA for the selected insulation class. For example, in a 140°F ambient, a motor with Class F insulation rated at Class B rise might be selected.

6472.1 Hoists The hoist motor shall be so selected that its nameplate rating will Hoist motors are sized as specified. Ref. MMH Document 36675-18 (Main not be less than that given by the following formula: Hoist Gearing Analysis).

hp = KsWV/33,OOOE

[Text and/or equations omitted]

6472.2 Bridge and Trolley (a) The force required to drive the bridge or trolley consists of that (a-f) The trolley motors are sized to meet the requirements of this necessary to overcome rolling friction, and that necessary to section, including all referenced equations and tables, with respect to the Page 124 of 154

NOG- 1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance accelerate the crane. The rolling friction is proportional to the total speeds defined in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003. The new bridge weight of the crane and is assumed to be constant at all speeds. motors are sized to meet the performance requirements of the existing Unless otherwise specified, a friction factor per Table 6472.2(a)-i motors that are being replaced.

shall be used for anti-friction bearing cranes. Mechanical (g) N/A - This is not a polar crane.

efficiencies are included in these factors.

(b) Unless otherwise specified, the acceleration rate with rated load for either AC or adjustable voltage (AV) drives is to be selected from the slow values shown in Table 6472.2(b)-i.

(c) The size of the bridge and trolley motor shall not be less than the computed from Eq. (2):

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(d) After selecting an approximate motor by Eq. (2), obtain data on the Wk2 of the motor, brake wheel, couplings, and pinion. The sum of these values is the rotating WkR2 . Calculate the equivalent Wk 2 of the load by the following equation.

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(e) If the motor is being selected for a duty class rather than a specified duty cycle, the motor rating should not be less than

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(f) The speed ratio for bridge and trolley drives will be determined as shown in para. 6473, computing the free-running hp from Eq. (5):

[Text and/or equations omitted]

(g) Polar Cranes:horsepower for bridge drives

[Text and/or equations omitted]

6472.3 Service Factors (a) As stated in para. 6472(a), the most severe requirements should (a) Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003 provides the most severe duty be stated in the specifications whenever possible so the supplier requirements, which are used to design the motors and controls. (b) N/A can check the specific motor and control required. - A specific duty is specified.

(b) If the crane specifications do not indicate a specific duty but state the duty class for each motion, the Ks values for Eqs. (1), (2),

and (4) are listed in Table 6472.3(b)-i. There is no guarantee that these values will result in the optimum motor selection, but they do indicate relative ratings.

Page 125 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance

+/-

6472.4 Calculation of Motor Heating (a) When definite operating requirements have been specified, the (a-c) The motor manufacturer (Name) verifies the thermal adequacy of time, motor torque, and average motor speed can be calculated for each motor and determines the appropriate size based on the required each step of acceleration, running, and deceleration. The procedure application as part of his design documentation.

for checking the thermal adequacy of the motor will vary, depending on the type of motor and motor enclosure. For totally enclosed series wound AISE TR No. 1 DC mill motors used for constant-potential DC control at 230 V, published curves may permit determining whether or not the allowable percent time-on exceeds the actual percent time-on. If the same type of motor is used at more than 230 V, the motor manufacturer shall be consulted to evaluate the effect of the increased core losses and friction and windage losses.

(b) On adjustable voltage DC drives, self- and forced-ventilated shunt motors can be checked by comparing the calculated rms current and average speed against curves of allowable rms current versus average rpm for the motors being checked. In totally enclosed motors, the losses (armature, field, core, brush, friction, windage, and stray load) shall be summarized to see if the total is below the dissipating capability of the selected motor operating over the repetitive cycle. Similarly, in AC motors, losses are divided into fixed and variable. As an approximation, the variable losses can be considered to be proportional to secondary current squared.

Also, for a given value of secondary resistance, the secondary current can be calculated by

[Text and/or equations omitted]

all on a per unit basis. (If the calculated per unit / is less than the corresponding per unit T, use the per unit Tvalue. Also, in order to take into consideration the primary copper losses at very low values of torque, the value of per unit / shall not be less than 0.4.)

(c)The AC motor thermal evaluation could be performed as follows.

Establish a duty cycle with the time and torque for each step calculated. Convert torque to per unit current using Eq. (11) or the Page 126 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance torque-current speed characteristics of the type of control to be used. Add the square of the per unit current x time (in seconds) x per unit variable losses to the operating time (in seconds) x per unit fixed losses. If that total is less than the sum of the seconds x the dissipation factors for each step in the cycle, the motor has adequate thermal capacity. The variable losses, fixed losses, and dissipation factors are to be obtained from the selected motor manufacturer, or the cycle summary shall be submitted to the.

manufacturer. See para. B6472.4 for an example of AC motor heating calculation.

6472.5 Duty in Excess of Class 4 (a) Above 50% time-on or more than 45 cycles per hour, the (a-b) N/A - Duty in excess of class 4 is not specified.

required duty cycle capability shall be stated by the specification writer, who should consider the possible advantages of self-ventilated, forced-ventilated, or air-over-frame motor construction, depending upon the atmospheric conditions at each installation.

The acceptable type(s) shall be indicated in the specifications.

(b) If prolonged (over 30 sec) or repetitive operation at reduced speed is required, it shall be specified. Any reduced speed operations which fall below 5% speed for prolonged periods or which are repetitive shall not be evaluated by the procedures in para. 6472.4 without consulting the electrical manufacturer.

(c) Because variations in motors and controls can be appreciable, ratings selected by any duty cycle calculations shall be checked by the electrical manufacturer after an order has been placed.

6473 Drive Speed Ratios Drive speed ratios shall be determined as follows: (a) N/A - 230 V DC series motors are not used on this crane.

[Text and/or equations omitted] (b) N/A - AC wound rotor motors are not used on this crane.

(a) For 230 V DC series motors, the manufacturer's characteristic (c) N/A - DC adjustable voltage shunt motors are not used on this crane.

curves for 230 V shall be used. At a constant-potential voltage other (d) Characteristic curves for AC squirrel cage motors provided by the than 230 V, obtain an equivalent 230 V hp by multiplying the free- motor manufacturer are used.

running hp by 230 divided by the applied voltage. From the curves, use this equivalent hp to obtain the motor speed at 230 V. Calculate Page 127 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance the approximate Nf by multiplying the rpm so obtained by the applied voltage divided by 230.

(b) For AC wound rotor motors, the typical characteristic curves for wound rotor motors in Fig. 6473(b)-i shall be used, taking into consideration the total secondary resistance at full speed. The curves are based on motors providing 3% slip at rated torque with rings shorted and with rated voltage applied to the primary,

[Text and/or equations omitted]

At the calculated per unit hp, read per unit torque from appropriate hp-resistance curve and then read per unit synchronous speed at that torque on the speed curve for the same resistance. The dash line is an example at 0.75 per unit hp and 20% total resistance, resulting in approximately 0.88 per unit torque and 0.82 per unit synchronous speed.

(c) For DC adjustable voltage shunt motors, obtain manufacturer's rated speed for armature voltage and field strength used.

(d) For AC squirrel cage motors, use the motor's specific characteristic curves, to be supplied by the motor manufacturer.

6480 Conductor Systems (Types I, II, and III Cranes) 6481 General (a) Conductor types and sizes shall be in accordance with NEC, (a) Conductor types and sizes are in accordance with NEC, taking into taking into consideration the voltage drop limitations affecting the consideration the voltage drop limitations affecting the allowable voltage allowable voltage variations at the controller specified in para. variations at the controller specified in para. 6411.2. Ref. MMH Document 6411.2. 36675-06 (Electrical Calculations).

(b) If insulated, the insulation shall be rated for the radiation dose (b) N/A - The total accumulated radiation exposure for the life of the specified, if any. crane does not pose a risk for conductor insulation.

(c) Each multiconductor control cable shall include spare (c) Each multiconductor control cable is sized to have at least 10%

conductors. The quantity of spares shall be approximately 10% of additional spare conductors with a minimum of two extra conductors.

the total, but not less than two and not more than five being (d) Bending radii for the bridge conductor cables and cable support required. system are not less than the minimum manufacturer recommendations.

(d) For repeated flexing service, the bending radius for the cable The bridge conductor system uses a rigid cable carrier that minimizes and the cable support system shall be not less than the minimum stress in the cables during movement.

recommended for the cable by its manufacturer. Means shall be Page 128 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance provided for supporting, extending, and retracting the cable to allow movement without exceeding the stress limit in the cable as stated by the cable manufacturer.

6482 Conductor System Categories Conductor systems shall be considered in the following three Conductor systems are categorized as either runway systems, bridge general categories, systems, or auxiliary systems.

6482.1 Runway Systems Conduct power from the building supply to the crane. Components that conduct power from the building supply to the crane are categorized as runway systems.

6482.2 Bridge Systems Conduct power and control between the bridge and trolley portions Components that conduct power and control between the bridge and of the crane. trolley portions of the crane are categorized as bridge systems.

6482.3 Auxiliary Systems Such as pendant pushbutton, communication, remote control, and Components for pendant pushbuttons, communications, remote control, instrumentation cables. and instrumentation are categorized as auxiliary systems.

6483 Conductor System Types (a) When AC variable frequency controls are used, the runway and (a) The runway and bridge conductor systems include grounding bridge conductor systems shall include a grounding conductor. conductors. Ref. MMH Drawing R95399 (Electrical Schematic).

(b) The following three general types of conductor systems shall be (b) considered to meet the needs of the three categories in para. 6482. (1) Rigid conductor bars are provided for the main line runway (1) Contact Conductor. These systems may consist of either system and include two spring-loaded contact shoes per phase.

a rigid bar or taut wire with a sliding or rolling collector. To Low contact resistance is not required for the main line.

ensure continuous contact on Type I, II, or III systems that (2) N/A - Brush-type cable reels are not used for this crane.

use AC variable frequency drives or DC motor drives, there (3) A cable carrier with flexible continuous conductors is used for shall be at least two spring-loaded contact shoes per phase the bridge system.

on main line systems in the primary circuit of AC motors and in any DC motor armature circuit that does not supply current to a series brake. Adequate expansion means shall be incorporated to allow for building expansions and contractions as specified. Where low-contact resistance is required for low current or low-voltage pilot devices, such as tachometer generators, a combination of conductor and collector materials shall be suitable for that usage.

Page 129 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (2) Brush-Type Cable Reel. These systems consist of a cable, which is payed out off of a reel, and uses a slip-ring and brush arrangement to maintain electrical contact. Where low-contact resistance is required for low-current or low-voltage pilot devices, such as tachometer generators, a combination of slip-ring and brush materials shall be suitable for that usage.

(3) Flexible Continuous Conductor. These systems consist of a continuous flexible cable, either flat or round, that is suspended in a festooned arrangement from a trolley and track system or in a cable carrier.

6500 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT TESTING REQUIREMENTS (TYPES I, II, AND III CRANES)

All electrical equipment shall be tested in accordance with Section Electrical equipment is tested in accordance with Section 7000 per MMH 7000. Document 36675-07 (Factory Acceptance Test Procedure) and MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure).

7000 Inspection and Testing 7100 TESTS AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The following list identifies the specific tests and acceptance criteria Ref. MMH Document 36675-11 (Critical List) for testing requirements of for the inspections and tests specified by Tables 7200-1 and 7200-2. individual components as specified by Table 7200-1. Testing (a) Drop weight test per ASTM E 208 or Charpy impact test per requirements are also specified on applicable component drawings.

ASTM A 370. The owner or the owner's designated representative Testing results are documented in MMH Document 36675-17 (QA shall establish the acceptance criteria unless stated otherwise in Document Binder) this Standard. (a) Charpy impact testing is performed per ASTM A370. Acceptance (b) 100% radiographic test (RT) or ultrasonic test (UT) of buttwelds criteria complies with Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

in accordance with AWS D1.1. Acceptance criteria shall be in (b) Radiographic or ultransonic testing of buttwelds and acceptance accordance with AWS D1.1. criteria are in accordance with AWS D14.1. Procedures qualified under (c) 10% magnetic particle test (MT) or dye penetrant test (PT) of the AWS D1.1 are acceptable under AWS D14.1 per Section 9.1.4.

linear feet of each weld that exceeds 10 in. in length unless stated (c) Magnetic particle or dye penetrant testing of welds and acceptance otherwise in this Standard. Technique and acceptance criteria shall criteria are in accordance with AWS D14.1. Procedures qualified under be in accordance with AWS D1.1. AWS D1.1 are acceptable under AWS D14.1 per Section 9.1.4.

(d) UT Volumetric Test (d)

(1) UT volumetric tests are in accordance with ASTM A (1) UT volumetric testing and acceptance criteria for plate Page 130 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance 435/A 435M-90 for plate material. Acceptance criteria for material are in accordance with ASTM A435/A435M-90.

plate material shall be in accordance with ASTM A 435/A (2) UT volumetric testing of wrought or forged material is in 435M-90. accordance with ASTM E114 and A338/A338M-01. Acceptance (2) UT volumetric tests are in accordance with ASTM E 114 criteria is as specified.

and ASTM A 388/A 388M-01 for wrought or forged material (e) Proof load testing of hooks and acceptance criteria are in accordance after forging and before machining. with ASME B30.10 (a) Acceptance criteria for forged material shall be (f) Wire rope breaking strength testing is performed on a sample of the in accordance with the following requirements: furnished rope by the manufacturer. The breaking strength meets or (1) Straight Beam. A forging or bar shall be exceeds the manufacturer's published data.

unacceptable if the results of straight beam (g) Magnetic particle or dye penetrant testing is in accordance with ASTM examinations show one or more reflectors A275/A275M, E709, and/or E165. Acceptance criteria is as specified.

that produce indications accompanied by a complete loss of back reflection not See Note 1.

associated with or attributable to geometric configurations. Complete loss of back reflection is assumed when the back reflection falls below 5% of full calibration screen height.

(2)Angle Beam Rule. A forging or bar shall be unacceptable if the results of angle beam examinations show one or more reflectors that produce indications exceeding the amplitude reference line from the appropriate calibration notches.

(b) Acceptance criteria for the tensioned area of Type I crane hooks shall be in accordance with the following:

(1) Discontinuity indications in excess of the response from a 5/64 in. diameter flat-bottomed hole at the estimated discontinuity depth shall not be acceptable.

(2) Discontinuity indications in excess of the response from a 5/64 in. diameter flat- bottomed hole at the estimated discontinuity depth shall not Page 131 of 154

NOG-I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance have their indicated centers closer than I in.

(3) Elongated (stringer) type defects in excess of 1 in. in length shall not be acceptable if at any point along the length the discontinuity indication is equal to or greater than the response from a 5/64 in. diameter flat-bottomed hole.

(c) Acceptance criteria for material without parallel surfaces (such as sheave pins and shafts) shall be in accordance with (d)(2)(b) above.

(e) Proof load test of hooks including dimensional inspection as described in ASME B30.10. Acceptance criteria shall be in accordance with ASME B30.10.

(f) Wire rope breaking strength test. Breaking strength shall meet or exceed published breaking strength in accordance with Federal Specification RR-W-410 or wire rope manufacturer's published data.

The sample used for the test shall be taken from the wire rope furnished.

(g) MT or PT (1) MT or PT shall be performed in accordance with ASTM A 275/A 275M, E 709, and/or E 165.

(2) Nonrepairable transverse indications shall be in accordance with the following:

(a) Indications with any dimension of 1/16 in. are unacceptable on material under 2 in. thick; on material 2 in. and over, indications with any dimension over 1/8 in. are unacceptable.

(b) Four or more indications of any size separated by less than 1/16 in. edge-to-edge are unacceptable on material under 2 in. thick; on material 2 in. and over, less than 1/8 in. edge-to-edge are unacceptable.

(c) Ten or more indications of any size in any 6 in.2 determined with the major dimension taken in the Page 132 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance most unfavorable location relative to the indications but not exceeding 6 in. in length, are unacceptable.

(d) Indications may be explored to determine if they are the result of material discontinuities, material properties or part geometry. Only indications resulting from material discontinuities shall be considered unacceptable; however, all indications identified that exceed the criteria in (a) through (c) above shall be recorded in the test report.

(3) Nonrepairable transverse indication shall be unacceptable within the tensioned sections of the hook.

Repairs by welding on the hook shall not be acceptable.

7200 MANUFACTURING Inspections and testing of Types I and II cranes shall conform to this Inspection and testing of the crane conforms to this Standard.

Standard. Assurance of implementation of the requirements of this Implementation of the requirements of this Subsection is in accordance Subsection for Types I and II cranes shall be in accordance with with Section 2000 Section 2000. The manufacturer's standard inspection and testing program shall apply to Type III cranes if not otherwise specified in this Standard or contract document.

7210 Receipt and In-Process Inspection and Testing Requirements (a) Receipt inspection and testing shall be performed for those items listed in Table 7200-1 for Type I cranes and Table 7200-2 for (a) MMH Document 36675-11 (Critical List) details the inspection and Type II cranes. In-process inspection and testing shall be performed testing required per Table 7200-1. Results are included in MMH in accordance with Table 7200-1 for Type I cranes and Table 7200-2 Document 36675-17 (QA Document Binder).

for Type II cranes. (See para. 7100 for definitions of inspections and (b) Documentation required by Table 7200-1 is listed in MMH Document tests required by tables.) 36675-11 (Critical List). These items are reviewed and accepted prior to (b) Documentation required by Table 7200-1 or Table 7200-2 shall assembly. Results are included in MMH Document 36675-17 (QA be reviewed and accepted by the crane manufacturer prior to the Document Binder).

assembly of any item listed in these tables. (c) All structural welds are visually inspected per AWS D14.1. Procedures (c) All structural welds shall be visually inspected over their entire qualified under AWS D1.1 are acceptable under AWS D14.1 per Section lengths for any type crane. Acceptance criteria of welds and repair 9.1.4. Results are included in MMH Document 36675-17 (QA Document shall be in accordance with AWS D1.1. Binder).

Page 133 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance See Note 1.

7220 Electrical Documentation On Type I cranes, reports of standard NEMA tests shall be furnished NEMA MG-1 motor reports for all hoist and travel motors, including by the electrical equipment manufacturer for hoist and travel integrated brakes, are provided in MMH Document 36675-17 (QA motors and brakes. Document Binder) 7230 Assembly Inspection Requirements The crane shall be sufficiently assembled to ensure that parts are The trolley is completely assembled and wired and will be tested per properly fitted. Permanent wiring, other than that normally done at MMH Document 36675-07 (Factory Acceptance Test Procedure). All field erection, shall be complete. Control panels and rigid conduit control panels and rigid conduit for the trolley are installed. Items that shall be installed. It is not required to reeve the drum and blocks, to interface with the bridge and building are assembled, wired, and tested attach the cab, or to erect on gantry legs. to the extent possible prior to installation on site. Inspections are Inspections of the work shall be performed by the crane performed as required.

manufacturer. The owner or the owner's designee may verify that crane components are being installed, assembled, or connected in compliance with the latest appropriate drawings, codes, standards, and procedures.

7240 Electrical Inspection Requirements Inspections shall be performed at the crane manufacturer's plant to Inspections will be performed at the factory and on site per MMH verify the following: Document 36675-07 (Factory Acceptance Test Procedure) and MMH (a) terminal connections for tightness; Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure) to verify the (b) panels and resistors are properly placed; following:

(c) required fuses are installed; (a) terminal connections are tight; (d) panels, switches, resistors, and other parts and materials are in (b) panels and resistors are properly placed; accordance with job drawings and are properly identified; (c) required fuses are installed; (e) raceways are properly installed, and race-ways to be removed (d) panels, switches, resistors, and other parts and materials are in for shipment are to be properly fitted for field installation; accordance with job drawings and are properly identified; (f) no interferences involving electrical items exist when trolley (e) raceways are properly installed, and race-ways to be removed for moves through its full range; shipment are properly fitted for field installation; (g) electrical items do not protrude beyond the confines of the (f) no interferences involving electrical items exist when trolley moves crane as established by the job drawings; through its full range; (h) electrical items requiring routine maintenance are accessible; (g) electrical items do not protrude beyond the confines of the crane as (i) no wiring is touching resistor heating parts; established by the job drawings; Page 134 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB .CraneTrolley Compliance (j) portions of conductor systems which are designed to move in (h) electrical items requiring routine maintenance are accessible; order to accommodate crane motion move freely; (i) no wiring is touching resistor heating parts; (k) ancillary electrical items are properly installed; (j) portions of conductor systems which are designed to move in order to (I) pendant cable strain relief is properly installed on pendant push- accommodate crane motion move freely; button station-operated cranes; (k) ancillary electrical items are properly installed; (in) overload relay current sensing elements are in accordance with (I) N/A - Radio controls are specified instead of a pendant job drawings; (m) overload relay current sensing elements are in accordance with job (n) motor connections are properly made; drawings; (o) contactors and electromechanical relays whose armatures are (n) motor connections are properly made; accessible operate freely by hand; (o) contactors and electromechanical relays whose armatures are (p) electrical enclosures are correct NEMA type and panel doors accessible operate freely by hand; operate properly; (p) electrical enclosures are correct NEMA type and panel doors operate (q) brushes are properly seated; properly; (r) electrical holding brakes are adjusted to correct torque settings; (q) brushes are properly seated; and (r) electrical holding brakes are adjusted to correct torque settings; and (s) conductors are identified at each termination by being marked (s) conductors are identified at each termination by being marked to to correspond to the schematic diagram. correspond to the schematic diagram.

7250 Shop No-Load Test A shop no-load test shall be performed at the crane manufacturer's A shop no-load test will be performed for the trolley at the facility. Procedure(s) shall be prepared and used by the crane manufacturer's facility under the direction of the manufacturer. Testing is manufacturer in conducting the shop no-load test. specified in MMH Document 36675-07 (Factory Acceptance Test If subsequent manufacturing or associated activities affect the Procedure) and will not be performed until manufacturing of all items validity of this test or portions thereof, the appropriate portion of that affect the validity of the test are completed. Nonconformances the test shall be repeated. found during the shop no-load test are treated as required by this The crane manufacturer's personnel shall direct the test following Standard.

the appropriate procedure(s).

Nonconformances found during the shop no-load test shall be treated as required by this Standard.

7251 Prerequisites Prior to conducting the shop no-load test, the crane or applicable Prior to conducting the shop no-load test, the trolley is assembled and portions to be tested shall be assembled and wired subject to the wired and will be subject to the following. Ref. MMH Document 36675-07 following. (Factory Acceptance Test Procedure).

(a) The crane or its applicable portions need not be completely (a) The trolley is completely assembled, wired, and coated with primer as Page 135 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance assembled, wired, or painted at time of testing if subsequent work a minimum for the shop no-load test.

will not influence or alter the results of the test. (b) Temporary electrical connections for items that interface with the (b) Temporary electrical connections for test purposes are crane will be used to test the system.

acceptable for normally installed field wiring. Where conductor bar (c) N/A - A temporary controller is not used.

systems are used, only enough of the conductor bar lengths need (d) When testing electrical portions of the crane, the crane will be tested be installed to set collector shoes and check trolley operations. with the actual crane controls (c) When testing the operation of mechanical portions of the crane, the use of a temporary controller is acceptable.

(d) When testing electrical portions of the crane, the crane will be tested with the actual crane controls unless specifically excepted by the purchaser.

7252 Mechanical Requirements As a minimum, the following mechanical functions shall be verified: The following mechanical functions will be verified during in MMH (a) traverse of the trolley frame with wheel assemblies and other Document 36675-07 (Factory Acceptance Test Procedure) and MMH trolley-to-bridge interface items for tracking and clearances on the Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure).

bridge (powered operation is preferable if conditions permit); (a) traverse of the trolley frame with wheel assemblies and other trolley-(b) powered operation of bridge and trolley drive and hoist units; to-bridge interface items for tracking and clearances on the bridge; (c) operation of miscellaneous mechanical components such as (b) powered operation of bridge and trolley drive and hoist units; brake and rail clamps in accordance with design criteria. (c) operation of miscellaneous mechanical components including the brakes 7253 Electrical Requirements A test of the crane electrical system shall be made to verify proper The functionality of all electrical crane controls will be tested in MMH operation of the controls. Document 36675-07 (Factory Acceptance Test Procedure) and MMH For radio controlled cranes, the transmitter-receiver system need Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure).

not be used for this test. An alternate means of operation of the receiver driven relay panel is acceptable.

7260 Preparation for Shipment Requirements As a minimum, the preparation for shipment of Types, I, II, and III The preparation for shipment of the crane will meet the requirements of cranes shall meet the requirements of Section 8000. Coatings shall Section 8000. Coatings are inspected in accordance with para. 7700.

be inspected in accordance with para. 70.

7270 Final Verification of Document Requirements The owner or the owner's authorized representative shall verify the The owner or owner's authorized representative will verify the documentation which has been compiled by the manufacturer as documentation compiled by the manufacturer as required by para. A-Page 136 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHBCraneTrolley Compliance required by para. A-7613. 7613, that will be contained in MMH Document 36675-17 (QA Document Binder).

7300 RECEIPT AND STORAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR STORAGE FACILITY AND/OR SITE Assurance of implementation of the requirements of this There is no storage of equipment at Zion Station. Equipment is shipped Subsection for Types I and II cranes shall be in accordance with directly from the factory to the site for immediate installation following Section 2000. delivery and receipt inspection. ZionSolutions will execute the receipt requirements of this section in accordance with the Section 2000 requirements.

7310 Receiving Inspection This Subsection defines requirements for the receipt inspection of Storage and reshipment are N/A. ZionSolutions is the organization cranes to be fulfilled by the organization responsible for performing responsible for performing the handling of the equipment at the site and the handling, storage, and reshipment of the equipment. These is therefore responsible for the receiving inspection at the site. Criteria requirements outline the criteria involved in the inspection to verify will be established as described in the sections below to verify that the that the crane components have been received in accordance with crane components have been received in accordance with contractual contractual requirements. The receipt inspection verifies that the requirements and that the quality of the crane has not been reduced due quality of the crane has not been reduced due to corrosion, to corrosion, contamination, deterioration, or physical damage resulting contamination, deterioration, or physical damage resulting from its from its being shipped.

being shipped.

7311 Requirements The following minimum requirements for receipt inspection apply ZionSolutions will prepare requirements for receipt inspections as to Types I, II, and III cranes. described in the following sections.

7311.1 Receiving Inspection Plan A Receiving Inspection Plan shall be prepared by the owner or (a-e) ZionSolutions will prepare a Receiving Inspection Plan which will owner's designated representative. The plan shall provide provide receiving instructions for the following activities:

instructions for performing receiving inspection covering the (a) documentation, following activities: (b) visual inspection, (a) documentation, (c) marking and tagging, (b) visual inspection, (d) testing, and (c) marking and tagging, (e) preparation for storage (d) testing, and Page 137 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (e) preparation for storage.

7311.2 Receiving Inspection Plan Implementation Receiving inspection shall be initiated upon notification that the ZionSolutions receiving inspection will be initiated once the crane has crane has arrived at the designated area. This inspection shall be arrived at the designated area at the Zion Station site and the inspection carried out in accordance with the Receiving Inspection Plan. performed in accordance with the Receiving Inspection Plan..

7312 Conformance to Documentation A review shall be made to ensure that a correlation exists between The Receiving Inspection Plan will include criteria to review and ensure the item received and its supporting documentation. The review that a correlation exists between the item received and its supporting shall include a comparison of the release for shipment documents, documentation and will include a comparison of the release for shipment equipment identification numbers, purchase order document documents, equipment identification numbers, purchase order document numbers, and other item identification. numbers, and other item identification..

7313 Visual Examination 7313.1 Preliminary Inspection A preliminary inspection shall be performed prior to unloading to (a-e)The Receiving Inspection Plan and associated inspection criteria to identify damage that may have occurred. Observations for unusual perform a preliminary inspection prior to unloading to identify damage conditions shall include: that may have occurred. Unusual conditions that will be included in the (a) Fire. Charred paper, wood, or paint, indicating exposure to fire inspection criteria for checking include:

or high temperature. (a) Fire (b) Excessive Exposure. Weather-beaten, frayed, rusted, or stained (b) Excessive Exposure containers indicating prolonged exposure during transit. (c) Environmental Damage (c) EnvironmentalDamage. Water or oil marks, damp conditions, (d) Tie Down Failure dirty areas, or salt film (indicating exposure to seawater or winter (e) Rough Handling road salt chemicals).

(d) Tie Down Failure. Shifted, broken, loose, or twisted shipping ties, and worn material under ties.

(e) Rough Handling. Splintered, torn, or crushed containers indicating improper handling; review of impact recording instrument readings, when required.

7313.2 Item Inspection ZionSolutions will perform item inspection at the designated receiving Item inspection shall be performed at the designated receiving area. The Receiving Inspection Plan will ensure that the following criteria area. Unless the package marking prohibits unpacking, the contents are met: Unless the package marking prohibits unpacking, the contents of all shipments shall be visually inspected to ascertain compliance of all shipments shall be visually inspected to ascertain compliance with with specified packing and shipping requirements. Items packaged specified packing and shipping requirements. Items packaged in separate, Page 138 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance in separate, moisture-proof, transparent bags shall be visually moisture-proof, transparent bags shall be visually inspected without inspected without unpacking. Inspections shall be performed in a unpacking. Inspections shall be performed in a manner to avoid manner to avoid contamination of the item during inspection, contamination of the item during inspection.

7314 Marking and Tagging Items shall be inspected to verify that the markings and tags are ZionSolutions will prepare a Receipt Inspection Plan and associated affixed in accordance with Section 8000 and the purchase order criteria to inspect items to verify that the markings and tags are affixed in documents. The Receiving Inspection Plan shall identify these accordance with Section 8000 and the purchase order documents.

marking and tagging requirements.

7315 Testing In those cases where the purchase order documents and para. 7100 require testing during receiving inspection, the Receiving Inspection Subsequent to receipt inspection, the equipment will be tested in Plan shall delineate the test requirements and provide accordance with MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test documentation instructions. Procedure) prior to being released for use.

7316 Preparation for Storage When the receiving inspection of an item has been completed, the item should be in satisfactory condition for storage. Assurance N/A There is no storage of equipment. Equipment is shipped directly should be made that pipe caps or covers removed for receiving from the factory to the site for immediate installation following delivery inspection are replaced, machined surfaces are protected, and and receipt inspection.

crated items have been recrated in accordance with original purchase order requirements and para. 7260, governing preparation for shipment and storage.

7320 Handling Inspection This Subsection defines requirements for the handling inspection of cranes to be fulfilled by the organization responsible for performing Subsequent to receipt inspection, the equipment will be tested in the handling, storage, and reshipment of the equipment. These accordance with MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test requirements outline the criteria involved in the inspection to verify Procedure) prior to being released for use. This testing will ensure no that the crane components have been handled in an acceptable deleterious effects from site handling.

manner. The handling inspection verifies that the quality of the crane has not been reduced due to unacceptable methods and procedures for handling the crane.

7321 Requirements An inspection program shall be established by the owner or the owner's designated representative for equipment and rigging in ZionSolutions will prepare an inspection program for equipment and Page 139 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance accordance with Section 8000. rigging in accordance with Section 8000.

7330 Storage Inspection Prior to the commencement of storage activities, the owner or the N/A There is no storage of equipment. Equipment is shipped directly owner's designated representative shall establish and maintain a from the factory to the site for immediate installation following delivery storage inspection program consistent with the requirements of and receipt inspection.

this Standard. The program shall specify the inspection surveillance intervals for these requirements.

7331 Requirements Inspections and examinations shall be performed on a planned and N/A There is no storage of equipment. Equipment is shipped directly systematic basis consistent with the requirements of Types I, II, and from the factory to the site for immediate installation following delivery III cranes to verify that the integrity of the stored item and its and receipt inspection.

protective cover, as provided for in para. 7260, are being maintained. Verification during the inspection activity shall be in accordance with Section 8000.

7340 Preparation for Reshipment This Subsection defines the requirements for preparation for N/A There is no reshipment of equipment. Equipment is shipped reshipment of cranes to be fulfilled by the owner or the owner's directly from the factory to the site for immediate installation following authorized representative, delivery and receipt inspection.

7341 Requirements The following minimum requirements for reshipment apply to N/A There is no reshipment of equipment. Equipment is shipped Types I, II, and III cranes. Measures shall be established and directly from the factory to the site for immediate installation following documented to ensure that the equipment has been maintained delivery and receipt inspection.

and preserved in accordance with established instructions, procedures, or drawings to prevent damage, deterioration, and loss as per paras. 7320 and 7330.

Prior to reshipment, the requirements of para. 7260 shall be verified or reestablished. The owner may waive specific requirements if waiving them is not adverse to quality, and provided the minimum requirements of para. 7310 are met.

The documentation generated as requirements of paras. 7310 through 7340 shall be completed prior to reshipment and retained as specified in para. A-7620.

7400 SITE Page 140 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance Assurance of implementation of the requirements of this Section Implementation of the requirements of this Section follows the applicable for Types I and II cranes shall be in accordance with Section 2000. quality assurance programs specified in Section 2000.

7410 Installation 7411 Preinstallation Verification 7411.1 General Prior to the actual installation of Types I, II, and III cranes, there are Preliminary walk downs that include inspections, checks and other similar certain preliminary inspections, checks, and similar activities that activities are performed on the crane to verify that the crane and the shall be completed to verify that the crane and the installation area installation area conform to specified requirements, and that the conform to specified requirements, and that the necessary necessary resources are available to assure that the quality of the crane resources are available to assure that the quality of the crane will will be maintained as the installation proceeds.

be maintained as the installation proceeds.

The quality requirements and quality assurance actions that are The crane will be installed in accordance with MMH Document 36675-15 necessary during installation shall be planned and reviewed so that (Crane Installation Procedure). This procedure will include the quality they are understood by the responsible individuals, requirements and quality assurance actions that are necessary during installation , and the procedure will be reviewed with the customer prior to installation so the requirements are understood by the responsible individuals.

7411.2 Identification (for Type I Cranes)

Checks shall be made to verify that the identity of received The crane will be installed in accordance with MMH Document 36675-15 equipment has been maintained and is in accordance with the (Crane Installation Procedure). This procedure will include the necessary latest approved-for-construction drawings, equipment lists, verification of component identification and marking.

specifications, and established procedures. If these checks disclose apparent loss of identification, the identity shall be reaffirmed prior to release for installation. Checks shall be made to verify that a control system for maintaining identification of items throughout installation has been established. Provisions shall be made for an alternative system for equipment identification to drawings, specification, or records when identification or markings must be destroyed, hidden, or removed from an item.

7411.3 Processes and Procedures (Types I and IICranes)

Consistent with the construction activities schedule, inspections or Inspections or checks are performed to verify that procedures are ready checks shall be performed to verify that procedures are ready when when needed during the installation of the crane components. These Page 141 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance needed for use in the installation of the crane components. These inspections or checks include the following items.

inspections or checks shall include the verification of the following (a) Only approved procedures, drawings, manuals, or other work items. instructions are used for installation and testing.

(a) Approved procedures, drawings, manuals, or other work (b) Special instructions and checklists are provided where required.

instructions are provided to the installer at the construction site. (c) Approved procedures and instructions for any special processes such (b) Special instructions and checklists as required are available at as coating, welding, and nondestructive examination are available at the the installation area or attached to the item. site.

(c) Approved procedures and instructions for special processes such (d) All personnel are qualified to perform their assigned tasks. Installation as coating, welding, and nondestructive examination are available procedures are reviewed and approved by the owner.

at the site. (e) Installation preparations are completed prior to install.

(d) Where applicable, personnel, procedures, and instructions shall (f) Special equipment for installation is tested prior to being used.

have been qualified through the preparation of workmanship (g) Material handling equipment is available at the site and is appropriate standards, samples, or mockups that simulate actual job conditions. for the intended use.

(e) Installation preparations have been completed, including such (h) Warnings and safety notices applicable to the installation will be tasks as removal of packaging, conditioning, cleaning, and specified in MMH Document 36675-15 (Crane Installation Procedure).

preliminary positioning. Warnings and safety notices applicable to the facility are the (f) Jigs, fixtures, and equipment for special processes, if required, responsibility of the owner.

are available at the site and conform to specified requirements.

(g) Equipment for handling and placement of items is available at the site and is adequate to perform the work in accordance with specified requirements.

(h) Warnings and safety notices, appropriate to the activity, are posted.

7411.4 Physical Condition and Record Review (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

Inspections or checks, as appropriate, shall be performed to verify Inspections or checks, as appropriate, will be performed by the owner that the crane items are in accordance with the specified and manufacturer before and after installation to verify that the crane requirements and that quality has been maintained. These items are in accordance with the specified requirements and that quality inspections or checks shall include the following verifications, has been maintained. Ref. MMH Document 36675-07 (Factory (a) Protective measures and physical integrity during storage have Acceptance Test Procedure), MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance been maintained in conformance with paras. 7330, 7430, and Test Procedure), MMH Document 36675-15 (Crane Installation Section 8000. Procedure), and MMH Document 36675-17 (O.A Document Binder).

(b) Nonconformances have been satisfactorily disposed of or These inspections or checks include the following verifications.

Page 142 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance controlled. (a) N/A - There is no storage of equipment. Equipment is shipped directly (c) Items have been cleaned in accordance with specified from the factory to the site for immediate installation.

requirements. (b) Nonconformances are satisfactorily disposed of or controlled.

(c) Items are cleaned in accordance with specified requirements.

7411.5 Site Conditions (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

Inspections or checks, as appropriate, shall be performed to verify Inspections or checks, as appropriate, are performed during the crane that conditions of the installation area conform to specified walk down and during installation per MMH Document 36675-15 (Crane requirements and precautions have been taken to prevent Installation Procedure) to verify that conditions of the installation area conditions that will adversely affect the quality of the item during conform to specified requirements, and precautions are taken to prevent installation. These inspection checks shall verify the following, conditions that will adversely affect the quality of the item during (a) Protection from adjacent construction activities is being installation. These inspection checks verify the following.

provided, including implementation of appropriate exclusion and (a) N/A - There are no construction activities adjacent to the installation area cleanness requirements. area (b) Protection from inclement weather and other ambient (b) Protection from inclement weather and other ambient conditions conditions adverse to quality is being provided, adverse to quality is being provided.

(c) Materials that may be deleterious to the crane items being (c) Materials that may be deleterious to the crane items being installed installed are controlled. are controlled.

(d) Installation of the crane will not adversely affect the subsequent (d) Installation of the crane does not adversely affect the subsequent installation of other equipment, and repair or rework on any installation of other equipment, and repair or rework on any nonconforming items can be performed satisfactorily, nonconforming items can be performed satisfactorily.

(e) Permanent crane runway (or approved temporary) supports and (e) Permanent crane runway supports and mountings that will properly mountings that will properly interface with the crane have been interface with the crane are installed.

installed. (f) Servicing or maintenance activity related to installation has been (f) Servicing or maintenance activity related to installation has been performed.

performed.

7412 Control During Installation For Types I and II cranes, checking, inspection, examination, or Checking, inspection, examination, or testing activities will be performed testing activities shall be performed during the installation of crane during the crane installation to ensure that the crane is assembled in components to ensure that the crane is being assembled in accordance with prescribed procedures. These activities are performed in accordance with prescribed procedures. These activities shall be a systematic manner to ensure surveillance throughout the installation performed in a systematic manner to ensure surveillance process. MMH Document 36675-15 (Crane Installation Procedure) throughout the installation process. A procedure shall be provided provides the coordination and sequencing of these activities at for the coordination and sequencing of these activities at established inspection points during successive stages of installation.

Page 143 of 154

NOG-l Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance established inspection points in successive stages of installation. Engineering and design changes are documented and any new revisions A method shall be implemented to ensure that engineering and of applicable documents are officially transmitted to the owner.

design changes are documented and controlled during installation.

7413 Process and Procedure Control For Types I and II cranes, checks shall be made to verify that a The manufacturer and owner jointly provide quality checks to ensure that system of controls has been established and is being maintained at installation and start up on site are performed per appropriate the construction site to assure the following, procedures for the items listed. Ref. MMH Document 36675-15 (Crane (a) The applicable revisions of approved procedures, drawings, and Installation Procedure) and MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance instructions are being followed. Test Procedure (b) Qualified and approved processes, materials, tools, and other (a) The applicable revisions of approved procedures, drawings, and equipment are being used by qualified personnel. instructions are controlled separately by both the manufacturer and (c) The status of installation, inspections, examinations, or tests is owner. All new document revisions are officially transmitted to the clearly indicated or identified in inspection records. owner.

(d) The installation, inspection, and testing sequence are being (b) Qualified and approved processes, materials, tools, and other maintained. equipment are being used by qualified personnel.

(e) Identification, appropriate segregation, and disposition of (c) The status of installation, inspections, examinations, or tests is clearly nonconforming items are being controlled. indicated or identified in inspection records.

(f) Inspection and test reports are current, accurate, and complete. (d) The installation, inspection, and testing sequence are maintained.

(e) Identification, appropriate segregation, and disposition of non-conforming items are controlled.

(f) Inspection and test reports are current, accurate, and complete.

7414 Examination Nondestructive examinations, when required, shall be performed in Nondestructive examinations, when required, will be specified on accordance with para. 7100. applicable drawings, in MMH Document 36675-15 (Crane Installation Procedure) or in MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure), and will be performed in accordance with para. 7100.

7415 Inspection (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

Inspections of the work areas and the work in progress shall be MMH Document 36675-15 (Crane Installation Procedure) provides performed to verify that crane components are being located, assurance that crane components will be located, installed, assembled, or installed, assembled, or connected in compliance with the latest connected in compliance with the latest approved for construction approved for construction drawings, manufacturer's instructions, drawings, instructions, codes, installation instructions, and procedures.

codes, installation instructions, and procedures. Inspections performed shall include as appropriate the following: Inspections performed include the following as applicable:

Page 144 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (a) identification; (a) identification based on MMH drawing numbers (b) location and orientation of components; (b) location and orientation of components (c) leveling and alignment; (c) leveling and alignment (d) clearances and tolerances; (d) clearances and tolerances (e) tightness of connections and fasteners; (e) tightness of connections and fasteners (f) fluid levels and pressures; (f) fluid levels are proper (g) cleanness; (g) cleanness (h) welding operations including materials and process controls; (h) welding is performed per proper procedures and (i) N/A - The facility is already constructed (i) adequacy of housekeeping, barriers, and protective equipment to ensure that items will not be damaged or contaminated as a result of adjacent construction activities.

7416 Assembled Inspection (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

Checks shall be performed to verify that all components have been The installed system is carefully checked to verify that all components correctly installed. If construction or associated activities affect the have been correctly installed. Checkout procedures to verify correctness results of these checks, the checks shall be repeated if necessary to of installation and ability to function will be provided in MMH Document assure that the quality has not been adversely affected. 36675-07 (Factory Acceptance Test Procedure), MMH Document 36675-Checkout procedures to verify correctness of installation and ability 13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure), MMH Document 36675-15 (Crane to function shall include the following mechanical elements: Installation Procedure), and in applicable assembly drawings.

(a) proper positioning of mating parts, such as couplings; (b) completion of proper greasing or lubrication; These procedures include:

(c) priming, venting, and filling of casings, reservoirs, etc.; (a) proper positioning of mating parts, such as couplings; (d) proper installation of seismic anchors and restraints; (b) completion of proper greasing or lubrication; (e) reeving to conform to manufacturer's instructions; (c) priming, venting, and filling of casings, reservoirs, etc.;

(f) recording camber of girders with trolley(s) at midpoint of span; (d) proper installation of seismic anchors and restraints; (g) control of special bolting method; (e) reeving to conform to manufacturer's instructions; (h) inspection of electrical connections for good contact and (f) recording camber of girders with trolley(s) at midpoint of span; conformance with wiring diagram; and (g) control of special bolting method; (i) inspection of bridge conductor-collector system for proper (h) inspection of electrical connections for good contact and conformance alignment, with wiring diagram; and (i) inspection of bridge conductor-collector system for proper alignment.

7420 Preoperational Testing and Inspection This Subsection defines requirements for pre-op testing and This crane is not used for construction. Pre-operational testing will be Page 145 of 154

NOG-I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requiremenits Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance inspection to ensure that the equipment will perform as required performed per MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test for handling of items during construction. A pre-op testing and Procedure).

inspection program shall be established to demonstrate that the crane will perform satisfactorily in service. The preop testing shall be performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance criteria contained in applicable documents, which include applicable manufacturer recommendations. The owner or the owner's designated representatives shall conduct and be responsible for the pre-op tests called for in these procedures, shall furnish all facilities necessary for the performance of such tests, and shall ensure that proper communications are established for control of testing.

Pre-op testing and inspection requirements discussed in this Subsection shall be applicable to Types I, II, and III cranes; these testing requirements shall be completed after the equipment has been installed and prior to construction-operational use of the crane.

7421 No-Load Test A no-load test will be performed on cranes, after the power supply No-Load testing will be performed per MMH Document 36675-13 (Site has been verified to be in conformance with the crane Acceptance Test Procedure) to ensure:

specifications, to verify the following: (a) motor rotation is correct (a) motor rotation is correct; (b) all applicable components are lubricated (b) lubrication and cooling systems are in service; (c) limit switches are properly operating (c) limit switches, interlocks, and stops are properly adjusted and (d) instrumentation is calibrated and in service as required set; (e) controls are adjusted properly for all hoist, trolley, and bridge drives (d) instrumentation is calibrated and in service as required; and (e) controls are adjusted properly for all drives for hoist, trolley, and bridge through the speed ranges.

7421.1 Additional Requirements At the same time the no-load testing is being performed, the The following items will be recorded or observed per MMH Document following information shall be recorded or observed: 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure):

(a) Electricalfor(Full-Speed Conditions) (a) Electricalfor (Full-Speed Conditions)

(1) motor volts (1) motor volts Page 146 of 154

NOG-I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance (2) motor amps (2) motor amps (3) motor rpm (3) motor rpm (b) Mechanical (b) Mechanical (1) noise level (1) noise level (2) oil leaks (2) oil leaks (3) excessive vibration (3) excessive vibration (4) complete check of crane to certified clearance drawing (4) complete check of crane to certified clearance drawing (5) gear alignment and engagement (5) gear alignment and engagement (c) Structural (c) Structural (1) overall clearances (1) overall clearances (2) trolley end approaches (2) trolley end approaches 7422 Full-Load Test The crane shall be statically loaded at mid-span to a maximum of MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure) details the 100% of hoist manufacturer's rating, and the deflection of the static loading of the crane at mid-span to a maximum of 100% of the bridge at its center shall be measured and recorded. With this load, rated load, and recording the deflection of the bridge at its center. With the crane shall be operated through all drives for hoist, trolley, and this load, the crane will be operated through all drives for hoist, trolley, bridge, and through all speed ranges to demonstrate speed controls and bridge, and through all speed ranges to demonstrate speed controls and proper function of limit switches, locking, and safety devices. and proper function of limit switches, locking, and safety devices. This For Type I cranes, the manual critical load lowering device(s) shall procedure also includes testing the manual critical load lowering devices be tested. For Type I cranes, each holding brake shall be tested and individually testing the holding brakes to verify that each will stop individually to verify that it will stop and hold the test load. and hold the test load.

7423 Rated Load Test After the no-load test and full-load tests are completed, and prior to Ref. MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure) will use of the crane to handle loads, the crane shall be rated load control testing of the for the following items:

tested. (a) The trolley is load tested to 125% during the factory acceptance test.

(a) The crane shall receive a rated load test of 125% (+5%, -0%) of The crane will be load tested to 125% (+5%, -0%) of the rated load to the manufacturer's rated load. establish a minimum operating temperature in accordance with NUREG-(b) The rated load test shall consist of the following operations as a 0554 guidance.

minimum requirement. (b) The load test consists of the following operations:

(1) Lift the test load a distance to ensure that the load is (1) Lifting the test load a distance to ensure that the load is supported by the crane and held bythe hoist brakes. supported by the crane and held by the hoist brakes.

(2) Transport the test load by means of the trolley from one (2) Transporting the test load by means of the trolley from one Page 147 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance end of the crane bridge to the other. The trolley shall end of the crane bridge to the other, approaching the limits of approach the limits of travel as close as is practical in the travel as close as is practical.

event use area restrictions are imposed. (3) Transporting the test load by means of the bridge for the full (3) Transport the test load by means of the bridge for the length of the runway in one direction with the trolley as close to full length of the runway in one direction with the trolley as the extreme right-hand end of the crane as is practical, and in the close to the extreme right-hand end of the crane as is other direction with the trolley as close to the extreme left end of practical, and in the other direction with the trolley as close the crane as is practical.

to the extreme left end of the crane as is practical. (4) Lowering the test load, stopping, and holding the load with (4) Lower the test load, stop, and hold the load with the the brakes.

brakes. (5) Verifying that the nameplate reflects the load rating per (a)

(5) Verify that the nameplate reflects load rating per (a) above.

above.

7424 Certification A written report confirming that the crane has successfully passed MMH Document 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure) details the the rated load test load rating of the crane shall be furnished. This load testing procedures. This document will be signed by representatives report shall be signed by representatives of all parties participating of all parties participating in the test upon successful completion.

in the test.

7430 Cranes Used for Construction (Types I, II, and III Cranes)

Temporary use of cranes to which this Standard applies that are to (a-d) N/A - This crane is not used for construction become part of the completed project may be desirable. However, authorization for such usage shall be as provided for in the contract or by written approval from the responsible organization. Such use shall not subject the crane to conditions for which it was not designed. The temporary use authorization shall include:

(a) conditions of use; (b) maintenance requirements; (c) inspections and test as required to maintain operability and quality during periods of temporary use of the crane; and (d) requirements for maintaining operating and maintenance logs.

When temporary use is completed, conditions of temporary use shall be evaluated to verify that the crane continues to satisfy the specified requirements for its permanent intended use.

7500 QUALIFICATION FOR PERMANENT PLANT SERVICE Page 148 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance Assurance of implementation of the requirements of this N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does not Subsection for Types I and II cranes shall be in accordance with require additional qualification for permanent plant service after Section 2000. construction use.

7510 Construction Use Record Review 7511 Requirements Measures shall be established and implemented for the reviewing (a-b) N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does of construction use records for Types I, II, and III cranes. As a not require additional qualification for permanent plant service after minimum, the following construction use records shall be reviewed construction use.

by qualified personnel:

(a) maintenance log and (b) operating log.

7512 Documentation Documentation to substantiate that construction use record review N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does not has been completed as required by para. 7511 shall be validated, require additional qualification for permanent plant service after This documentation shall be maintained in accordance with para. A- construction use.

7630. These records shall be considered valid only if stamped, initialed, signed, or otherwise authenticated and dated by authorized personnel.

7520 Inspection Prior to Performance Testing This Subsection is intended to outline the inspection requirements N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does not necessary to qualify Types I, II, and III cranes for permanent plant require additional qualification for permanent plant service after service after construction use. construction use.

7521 Requirements Systems and procedures shall be established by the owner or the N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does not owner's designee to ensure that the inspection requirements as require additional qualification for permanent plant service after delineated within this Section are accomplished and documented construction use.

by qualified personnel. These requirements are minimums and may be added to after review of construction use records if applicable.

Discrepancies shall be corrected and reinspected in accordance with this Standard.

7521.1 General (a) Prior to making mechanical and electrical inspections, the (a-b) N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does construction use logs shall be reviewed as required by para. 7510 of not require additional qualification for permanent plant service after Page 149 of 154

NOG- I Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance this Standard. Special attention shall be given to inspection of construction use.

problem areas as noted in construction use logs.

(b) Cranes shall be checked for cleanness. Dirt and foreign material shall be removed prior to inspection.

7521.2 Mechanical Inspection (a) Inspection covers shall be cleaned and opened, and exposed (a-u) N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does components shall be inspected for physical damage. not require additional qualification for permanent plant service after (b) Oil in reservoir shall be visually inspected for cleanness, filling to construction use.

proper level, and foreign material.

(c) Gears shall be rotated so that all teeth on all gears can be inspected for pitting, featheredges at the tips of teeth, and misalignment.

(d) Bolts shall be inspected for tightness.

(e) Couplings shall be inspected for tight bolts, elongation of bolt holes, and tightness of keys in keyways.

(f) Bridge and trolley drive and idler wheels shall be inspected for excessive flanging and flat spots. See Fig. 7521.2(f)-i.

(g) External welds listed in Tables 7200-1 and 7200-2 shall be visually examined.

(h) All structural members shall be visually inspected by a qualified person for damage resulting from abuse or neglect.

(i) Verify camber and compare with recording made per para.

7416(f).

(j) Sheaves shall be inspected for wear and defects that could damage wire rope.

(k) Bumpers and stops shall be verified as intact and operable.

(I) Bearing housings shall be inspected for integrity, lubrication, and cleanness.

(m) Trolley rail clips and trolley rails shall be inspected for tightness, excessive wear, and alignment.

(n) Cab glass shall be inspected and replaced as necessary.

(o) Wire rope shall be inspected for broken wire, strands, twists, kinks, or signs of wear.

Page150 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance i

(p) Capacity signs shall be inspected for visibility from the operating floor.

(q) Hoist drums shall be inspected for wear and defects that could damage wire rope. If groove root diameter is worn in excess of one-fourth the rope diameter, drum shall be replaced.

(r) Hook shall be inspected in accordance with ASME B30.10. Hook dimensions shall be validated. A record of this validation shall be maintained in accordance with para. A-7630.

(s) Top nut on hook shank shall be verified to be secure and not turned on shank.

(t) Hook shall be inspected to see that it swivels easily and that thrust bearing is lubricated and in good condition.

(u) All hydraulic and pneumatic systems shall be inspected for leaks and damage.

i 7521.3 Electrical Inspection (Visual) While Crane Is Immobile A qualified electrician shall be assigned to the electrical inspection. (a-c) N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does All electrical power to the crane is to be locked out and under the not require additional qualification for permanent plant service after control of the inspector. construction use.

(a) Motors (1) Inspect all brushes for wear, even contact, and damage.

(2) Inspect springs for tension on brushes.

(3) Inspect slip rings for pitting and wear.

(4) Inspect wires and terminals for tightness.

(5) Inspect insulation on wires for cracks or brittleness.

(6) Verify that motor bearings are properly lubricated.

(b) Other ElectricalComponents (1) Inspect connections for tightness.

(2) Inspect collector system for physical damage.

(3) Inspect insulators for cracks.

(4) Inspect contactor and relay contacts forwear, pitting, and burning (does not apply to sealed relay contacts).

(5) Verify that timers are functioning and properly set.

(6) Verify that all panel doors shut properly and door seals Page 151 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance are intact.

(7) Inspect resistors for burned-out sections, breaks, or cracks in insulation.

(8) Inspect disconnect switches and overload devices.

(9) Inspect master switch(es) or pendant pushbutton station contacts for operation, tight connections, and wear or pitting (unless contacts are sealed).

(10) Inspect limit switches for operation, tight connections, and wear or pitting (unless contacts are sealed).

(11) Inspect electrical enclosures for cleanness.

(c) Verify the integrity of electrical enclosures and conduit systems.

7530 Testing Requirements N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does not The crane shall be tested in accordance with para. 7420. require additional qualification for permanent plant service after construction use.

7540 Modification and Changes N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does not Modifications and changes in design shall be reviewed and require additional qualification for permanent plant service after approved by the owner or owner's designated representative, construction use.

These changes in design shall be inspected and tested in accordance with this Standard.

7550 Recertification The crane is not used for construction and is certified in accordance with 7551 Crane Not Used for Construction para. 7420. No recertification is required.

When the crane has not been used for construction and has been certified in accordance with para. 7420, it requires no recertification.

7552 Crane Used for Construction N/A - This crane is not used for construction and, therefore, does not When used for construction, the crane, including any components require additional qualification for permanent plant service after installed subsequent to construction usage, shall be recertified by a construction use.

qualified individual in accordance with paras. 7420 and 7500. The record of successful completion of these tests shall be signed by all participating parties.

7600 DOCUMENTATION The requirements for the collection, storage, and maintenance of The owner shall define, in its purchase documents, the documentation applicable to procurement, design, manufacture, requirements for the collection, storage, and maintenance of shipment, receipt, storage, installation, and startup of cranes covered by Page 152 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance documentation applicable to procurement, design, manufacture, this Standard are detailed in Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003.

shipment, receipt, storage, installation, and startup of cranes This specification includes requirements for assembly and outline covered by this Standard. Guidance for determining documentation drawings; electrical schematics and wiring diagrams; acceptance test requirements to be specified in the owner's purchase documents is plans and procedures; software test plans for controls; operating provided in Nonmandatory Appendix A. instructions; maintenance instructions; and software programs.

As a minimum, design and manufacturing documentation to be Installation documentation will be provided as required in MMH specified in the owner's purchase documents for all cranes shall Document 36675-15 (Crane Installation Procedure), and MMH Document include assembly and outline drawings; electrical schematics and 36675-13 (Site Acceptance Test Procedure) details the results of end-to-wiring diagrams; acceptance test plans and procedures; software end electrical tests, final system adjustment data, acceptance test results, test plans for controls; operating instructions; maintenance and load tests. Various calculations and load summary reports for the instructions; and software programs. Installation documentation to electrical and mechanical crane systems are listed in the references be specified in the owner's purchase documents for all cranes shall section.

include records of high strength bolt torquing, data sheets or logs ZionSolutions will define the permanent quality assurance records in on equipment installation, inspection and alignment, lubrication accordance with its Quality Assurance Program records, documentation of testing performed after installation and prior to acceptance, results of end-to-end electrical tests, final system adjustment data, acceptance test procedures and results, and load tests. Additionally, for Type I and II cranes, system calculations and load summary reports shall be included.

The owner's quality assurance program shall define which of these quality assurance documents are permanent records. Assurance of the implementation of the quality assurance documentation requirements contained in the owner's purchase documents for Type I and II cranes shall be in accordance with Section 2000.

8000 Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handling 8100 GENERAL The packaging, shipping, receiving, storage, and handling of Types I The crane is packaged in accordance with ASME NQA-1, Part II, Subpart and II nuclear facility cranes shall be governed by the applicable 2.2 and the modifications listed in Table 8000-1, or meets the quality Sections of ASME NQA-1, Part II,Subpart 2.2 and the modifications assurance requirements specified by the owner. Any special instructions of this Section, as listed in Table 8000-1, or shall meet the quality are transmitted to the owner prior to arrival. MMH Document MOP 18.1 assurance requirements specified by the owner. Type III cranes shall (Preservation and Packaging) is the local control document.

meet requirements of procurement documents.

Receiving, storage, and handling functions, per Table 8000-1, are Page 153 of 154

NOG-1 Compliance Matrix NOG-1 Single Failure Proof Requirements Zion Station FHB Crane Trolley Compliance normally applicable to organizations other than crane manufacturers who perform under the requirements of this Standard.

9000 Planned Engineering Lifts

[Text and/or equations omitted] N/A - There are no planned engineering lifts that exceed the rated load of the crane.

Note 1. Compliance with the requirements of NOG- 1, 2004 is only provided for the new trolley and associated upgrades in this document. Bridge structural stress evaluation was conservatively performed in accordance with NOG-1 and is addressed where applicable. All other components of the crane are addressed in the NUREG-0554 Compliance Matrix, which demonstrates the crane system as single failure proof by evaluation to the requirements of NUREG 0554.

Page 154 of 154 NUREG 0554 Compliance Matrix

Safety Analysis Report (NUREG 0554 Compliance Matrix)

For Single Failure Proof Trolley Zion Fuel Handling Crane Crane Serial Number: CN-36675 Page 1 of 63

PURPOSE OF SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT The purpose of this report is to verify the design of the new Zion Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Crane meets the requirements of NUREG 0554. This report demonstrates the compliance of the crane design to NUREG 0554.

BACKGROUND The FHB crane is one of the first tools used in getting the fuel to the pad. The crane handles each cask and accurately positions it underwater in the cask loading area next to the spent fuel racks where it is filled with spent fuel. Once each cask is filled, the crane is used to perform a number of steps to assemble the cask, and then lifts and transports each cask to the cask preparation area where it is drained, backfilled with inert gas, and prepared for transport to the ISFSI. These moves of cask components and the assembled cask require numerous heavy loads that are transported near the spent fuel racks or open canister. Therefore, the spent fuel loading process needs to meet the guidance of NUREG 0612.

NUREG 0612 provided guidance for users to define the requirements of the overhead crane, specifically the Single Failure Proof Criteria, but implemented standards that are approximately 30 years old. NUREG 0612 provided one path for the user to make the crane a Single Failure Proof device per the requirements of NUREG 0554. NUREG 0554 provided the user direction, but was very qualitative in nature, leaving design areas open to interpretation. Two major steps which occurred to help eliminate this ambiguity included the issuance of ASME NOG-1 2004 and the endorsement of NOG-1-2004 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-25, Supplement 1, "Clarification of NRC Guidelines for Control of Heavy Loads,. For plants with existing cranes, this provided a quantifiable and detailed direction for the implementation of Single Failure Proof Criteria plus a path to use their original design basis to meet the regulator's requirements. The most common solution is to replace the trolley with a NOG-1-2004 compliant assembly, and then qualify the bridge to NUREG 0554. The plant can then bundle the entire crane into a NUREG-0554 compliant assembly to enable them to proceed with Spent Fuel Cask handling.

Page 2 of 63

REFERENCES Fuel Handling Building Overhead Bridge Crane Upgrade Services, Specification SP-ZS-FH-003, Rev. 01 NUREG 0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants", published by Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1980 ASME NOG-1-2004, "Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder," published by The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Issued May 16, 2005.

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-25, Supplement 1, Clarification of NRC Guidelines for Control of Heavy Loads, published by Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 29, 2007.

MMH Calculation #36675-23, ZionSolutions Fuel Handling Building Crane Reeving Stress Calculation.

CMAA-70-2004, Specifications for Top Running Bridge and Gantry Type Multiple Girder Electric Overheat Traveling Cranes MMH Procedure #36675-07, Factory Acceptance Test Procedure MMH Procedure #36675-08, Main Hook and Nut Test Procedure MMH Calculation #36675-10, Trolley Stress CriticalWeld Stress Calculation MMH Calculation #36675-05, Zion Bridge Structural Calculations MMH Calculation #36675- 09, Trolley Structural Analysis MMH Procedure #36675-24, Bridge Inspection Procedure MMH Document #36675-11, Critical List MMH Procedure #36675-12, Main Hoist Wire Rope Test Procedure MMH Procedure #36675-13, Site Acceptance Test MMH Procedure #36675-16, Magnetorque Emergency Lowering Test Procedure MMH Drawing R95399 Electrical Schematic MMH Drawing 54214604 Interconnect Diagram (Electrical)

Page 3 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested INTRODUCTION ANTRODUCTION gZionSolutions single failure proof crane system utilize specially designed equipment operation of light-water reactors is that that ensures safe and user friendly operation, fuel storage and handling systems be 10 designed normal andto accident ensure adequate safety conditions. under Overhead including the handlingSpecial nuclear applications. of critical loads in design 1.0 nconsiderations as outlined in NUREG 0554 are cranes are used to lift and transfer heavy incorporated into the design of the Zion Fuel None None None component and reactor parts vesselsuch as spent heads. When fuel casks a load Handling Hnln Building uligsnl single failure alr proof ro rn crane beng heandlrvessed by eadneanbea ldie o system to insure maximum safety, durability, being handled by a crane can be a direct or a d t o b ef e e v c h n h n ln and trouble free service when handling indirect cause of release of radioactivity, nuclear materials, including critical loads.

the load is called a critical load.

NRC has licensed reactors on the basis that ZionSolutions single failure proof crane the safe handling of critical loads can be system utilizes various safety features to accomplished by adding safety features to handle critical loads in nuclear power the handling equipment, by adding special generation facilities, and are designed to features to the structures and areas over ensure that a single failure of the crane which the critical load is carried, or by a system will not result in the loss of the combination of the two. When reliance for capability of the system to safely retain a the safe handling of critical loads is placed load. This is achieved through safety on the crane system itself, the system enhancements, safety margins, conservative should be designed so that a single failure design and redundancies. Controls None None None will not result in the loss of the capability of procedures and processes are utilized during the system to safely retain the load. This all phases of design, fabrication, installation, report identifies features of the design, inspection, testing, and operation of the fabrication, installation, inspection, testing, single-failure-proof crane system to ensure and operation of single-failure-proof safe handling of critical loads. ZionSolutions overhead crane handling systems that are single failure proof crane system complies used for handling critical loads. These with all applicable aspects of NUREG 0554 features are limited to the hoisting system including all referenced codes and standards Page 4 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested and to braking systems for trolley and as clarified in this document.

bridge. Other load-bearing items such as girders should be conservatively designed but need not be considered single failure proof.

ZionSolutions single failure proof crane system complies with the general standards and quality levels contained in CMAA #70 and ANSI B30.2.0-1967. Other supplemental requirements and enhancements are further The general value of existing standards is outlined in this report.

recognized in this report, and reliance is placogniedonquality lev indricated

, CM In The crane bridge was originally built and Spleificaton #70lityande ind A B30.

in 967 tested to EOCI-61 and ANSI B30.2.0-1967. None None Specification #70 and in ANSI B30.2.0-1967 None CMAA-70 superseded EOCI-61.

as supplemented by the recommendations in the following sections of this report. The structural design of the new trolley was performed per NOG-1-2004 and is the new Code of record for the trolley. No structural modifications were made to the bridge and therefore no deviation to the original Code of Record has occurred.

The typical plant layout for pressurized The scope of this work is limited to the Fuel water reactors (PWR's) is such that two Handling building crane at Zion. There is one different cranes may be required to handle crane, which is shared between the two units critical loads. One of these cranes is located and traverses the length of the building and None None in the spent fuel storage and transfer area over the spent fuel pools on a common where the largest critical load would be a runway.

spent fuel shipping cask. The other crane is Page 5 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested located inside the containment structure over the reactor vessel where it is used to lift the reactor vessel head during refueling periods; this crane is called a polar crane because of the circular track for the bridge structure.

In the plant layout for the majority of the boiling water reactors (BWR's) designed and built, a single crane handles critical loads near the reactor vessel and at the spent fuel storage area. However, for recent BWR plant designs (BWR Mark 6),

two cranes could be needed to handle critical loads.

Construction and Operating Periods The scope of this modification and upgrade are only for operational performance. Issues When an overhead crane handling system dealing with new construction are not will be used during the plant construction applicable.

phase prior to its intended service in the operating plant, separate performance Allowable design stress limits (range) for the specifications may be needed to reflect the crane are based on, and are in compliance 2.1 duty cycles and loading requirements for with NOG-1-2004 and therefore encompass None None each service. At the end of the construction Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 of CMAA Specification #70, period, changes to the crane system may including the appropriate duty cycle. These be required to reflect the specifications for stress levels are documented in MMH the permanent operating plant condition. Calculations #36675-23 Reeving Stress For example, if the specification for the size Report, 36675-09 Seismic Analysis, 36675-05 of the hoist drive motor differs sufficiently Bridge calculation, and 36675-10 Trolley for the two applications, the motor and the Weld Calculation. The sum of the Page 6 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions J Tested affected control equipment would have to simultaneously applied loads (static and be replaced or changed for the operating dynamic) is evaluated to ensure that they do plant phase. Features and functions needed not result in stress levels causing permanent for the cranes during the plant construction deformation, other than localized strain period are not considered in this report concentration, in any part of the handling except where the use of the crane during system. The control system is a Variable construction may influence its design and Frequency Control system and therefore operation for the permanent plant reverse plugging and dynamic impact due to operation. jogging are not applicable.

If the load lifts during construction are The structural design of the new trolley was heavier than those for plant operation, the performed per NOG-1-2004 and is the new performance specifications should include Code of record for the trolley. No structural design criteria for a permanent crane for modifications were made to the bridge and construction as well as for operation. therefore no deviation to the original Code of Record has occurred.

The allowable design stress limits for the crane intended for plant operation should be those indicated in Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 of CMAA Specification #70 and reflecting the appropriate duty cycle in CMAA Specification #70. The sum total of simultaneously applied loads (static and dynamic) should not result in stress levels causing permanent deformation, other than localized strain concentration, in any part of the handling system during either the construction or the operating phase.

The effects of cyclic loading induced by jogging or plugging 3 an uncompensated Page 7 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested hoist control system should be included in the design specification.

Maximum Critical Load A single-failure-proof crane should be designed to handle the maximum critical load (MCL) that will be imposed. However, a slightly higher design load should be The Maximum critical load (MCL) and the selected for component parts that are Design Rated Load (DRL) are both 125 tons subject to degradation due to wear and per the design specification (3.1.3{1}) Since exposure. This will provide a margin in the they are the same, only the MCL will be crane's load-handling ability before it drops displayed.

below its MCL capacity. An increase of approximately 15% of the design load for The crane components have been evaluated these component parts would be a for the applicability of the 15% degradation reasonable margin. The MCL rating should factor and results of the evaluation are 2.2 be clearly marked on the crane. identified on Attachment 1. None None None Certain single-failure-proof cranes may be Since the fleet angles for the wire rope are required to handle occasional non-critical limited, the equipment is indoors, the rope is loads of magnitude greater than the MCL lubricated, the rope is inspected to a defined during plant maintenance periods. For such criteria per ASME B30.2, and the limited use cases, the maximum non-critical load will the crane will see at rated load, a 5% wear be the design rated load (DRL). The design factor was used in their sizing (see of certain components may be decided to a Attachment 1).

greater extent by the MCL rating even though standard commercial practice may be used for the DRL rating. The DRL rating should be marked on the crane separately from the MCL marking. A .1 4 Page 8 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested Operating Environment The operating environment, including The indoor environmental conditions for the maximum and minimum pressure, Fuel Handling Building Crane are stated in the 2.3 maximum rate of pressure increase, Design Technical specification. These temperature,corrsiv humidity, and emergency orhazrdos coditons shuld parameters have been used in the design of None None None corrosive or hazardous conditions, should the crane.

be specified for the crane and lifting fixtures.

For cranes inside the containment This crane is not in containment and structure, the closed box sections of the therefore this item is not applicable.

crane structure should be vented to avoid collapse during containment pressurization. Note that the only box section would be the None None None Drainage should be provided to avoid trolley end trucks and they are vented to the standing water in the crane structure. atmosphere the Fuel Handling Building.

Material Properties The structural components of the trolley are made of A572 Grade 50, which conforms to Cranes are generally fabricated from the requirement of carbon steel.

structural shapes and plate rolled from carbon steel (no alloying elements except Designated structural materials of thickness for 1% manganese in heavier section) or 2Y2 in. to >5/8in. shall be impact tested by the Those pieces of low-alloy steel (less than 5% total alloy Charpy V-notch test in accordance with structural steel These will be tested 2.4 content). Some of these steel parts exceed Section ND-2300 of the ASME Code or the designated as 12 mm (1/2 in) in thickness and may have drop-weight test in accordance with Section None critical per the per ASME Boiler Code and nd brittle-fracture tendencies when exposed NC-2300 of the Code. Materials of thickness Critical List and to lower operating temperatures so that greater than 2Y2 in. shall be impact tested by the weldment testing of the material toughness becomes the drop-weight test in accordance with drawings.

necessary. When low-alloy steels are used, Section NC-2300 of the ASME Code. The test weld metal toughness is of greater concern requirements are documented on the Critical than the base metal. List, #36675-11, plus the drawings that show Page 9 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested the critical items have the required test requirements & inspections clearly delineated in the lower right hand corner. All test results are fully documented and provided in the QA documentation package.

However, it may be impractical to perform toughness tests for cranes that have pro-gressed too far in the manufacturing sequence or for cranes already built and operating. Such cranes should therefore be tested by subjecting the crane to a test lift at the lowest anticipated operating temperature. It is desirable to include the The trolley will be a new fabrication and crane manufacturer in the planning of the conform to the impact testing as defined test. above. A minimum operating temperature of 40 degrees F was specified for the new Minimum operating temperatures should trolley.

be specified in order to reduce the None None None possibility of brittle fracture of the ferritic Since toughness test data is not available for load-carrying members of the crane. In the existing bridge, a cold proof load test will order to ensure resistance to brittle be performed to establish the minimum fracture, materials.for structural members operating temperature for the crane as essential to structural integrity should be discussed below.

tested in accordance with the following impact test requirements. Either drop weight test per ASTM E-208 or Charpy tests per ASTM A-370 may be used for impact testing The minimum operating temperature based on the drop weight test should be obtained by following Page 10 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested procedures in paragraph NC-2300 of Section III of the ASME Code. The minimum operating temperature based on the Charpy V-notch impact test should be obtained by following the procedures in paragraph ND-2300 of Section III of the ASME Code. Alternative methods of fracture analysis that achieve an equivalent margin of safety against fracture may be used if they include toughness measurements on each heat of steel used in structural members essential to structural integrity. In addition, the fracture analysis that provides the basis for setting minimum operating temperatures should include consideration of stress levels; quality control; the mechanical checking, testing, and preventive maintenance program; and the temperatures at which the DRL test is run relative to operating temperature.

These toughness recommendations were Designated trolley structural materials of developed at a time-when typical material thickness >5/8in. shall be impact tested by section thickness for crane girders was a the Charpy V-notch test in accordance with Those pieces of maximum of 51 mm (2 in). However, later Section ND-2300 of the ASME Code or the structural steel These will be tested information indicates that material drop-weight test in accordance with Section designated as thicknesses of 102 mm (4 in) or more may NC-2300 of the Code. Materials of thickness None critical per the and the be needed for some applications. The rules greater than 2Y in. shall be impact tested by Critical List and NOG1.

for ASME Code Class 3 charpy testing do the drop-weight test in accordance with the weldment not make any adjustments for thicknesses Section NC-2300 of the ASME Code. drawings.

Page 11 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested greater than 64 mm (2 1/2 in), and for this reason it is felt that the NC-2300 and ND-2300 requirements give equivalent requirements only for the smaller thicknesses. For thicknesses over 64 mm (2 1/2 in), it is recommended that the NC-2300 requirements be used exclusively.

This requirement is being addressed for the As an alternative to the above bridge by performing a cold proof loa.d test recommendations, the crane and lifting after installation. The trolley has been fixtures for cranes already fabricated or fabricated in accordance with the toughness operating may be subjected to a cold proof testing requirements stated above and will test consisting of a single dummy load test be load tested at the factory. If the minimum as follows: Metal temperature of the operating temperature of 40 degrees F is not structural members essential to the achieved in the structural steel of the bridge structural integrity of the crane handling A load test procedure during the cold proof load test, the system should be at or below the minimum will be prepared to component temperatures recorded during operating temperature. The corresponding load test the crane at the test will become the limiting temperature dummy load should be equal to 1.25 times Load test the low temperature.

for those components. An inspection of the the MCL. If the desired minimum operating None bridge will be bridge girders and end trucks will be temperature cannot be achieved during the performed Bridge inspection after performed after the cold proof load test.

test, the minimum operating temperature the load test will be should be that of the test until the crane is performed per P&H MMH Procedure #36675-24, Bridge retested at a lower temperature. The cold Procedure 3675-24.

Inspection Procedure provides detailed proof test should be followed by a instructions on how to perform the nondestructive examination of welds inspection and what welds to visually inspect.

whose failure could result in the drop of a critical load. The nondestructive ZionSolutions will implement future examination of critical areas should be inspections per their site operating repeated at 4-year intervals or less.

instructions for NDE of the critical areas at < 4 Page 12 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested year intervals Cranes and lifting fixtures made of The following materials are not used in the low-alloy steel such as ASTM A514 construction of ZionSolutions single failure should be subjected to the cold proof test proof crane system:

in any case.

Cast iron should be used Cationot hudntb for sdfrused. - Low-alloy steels such as ASTM A514 are not None NoeNone None load-bearing components such as rope drums.

dusuh Cast iron may be used for items elcric Cast mor fmeusead boratems - Cast iron is not used for load-bearing such as electric motor frames and brake c m o et drums. components Seismic Design ZionSolutions single failure proof crane systems are designed to retain control of, and Overhead cranes may be operating at the hold a critical load during a seismic event.

time that an earthquake occurs. Therefore, The bridge and trolley wheels are held the cranes should be designed to retain captive to their respective runways with control of and hold the load, and the bridge heavily constructed seismic restraints that and trolley should be designed to remain in are designed to prevent the wheels from place on their respective runways with leaving the runway. A detailed 3D ANSYS 2.5 their wheels prevented from leaving the shell model of the trolley is developed in tracks during a seismic event. If a seismic addition with a 3D model of the existing None None None event comparable to a safe shutdown bridge. Crane rail level response spectra earthquake (SSE) occurs, the bridge should which is generated from a coupled crane remain on the runway with brakes applied, building analysis is used and response and the trolley should remain on the crane spectrum analysis is performed to calculate girders with brakes applied, the dynamic response of the trolley and bridge to show that they complied with NOG-The crane should be designed and I and NUREG 0554. (P&H Documents constructed in accordance with regulatory #36675-09 and 5.)

Page 13 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested position 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29, The seismic design criterion for the crane "Seismic Design Classification." The MCL system is position 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29, plus operational and seismically induced "Seismic Design Classification." Seismic pendulum and swinging load effects on the analysis of the crane system was in crane should be considered in the design of accordance with NOG-1-2004. The MCL plus the trolley, and they should be added to operational and seismically induced the trolley weight for the design of the pendulum and swinging load effects on the bridge. crane are taken into consideration. During the horizontal direction seismic event, the natural frequencies of the ropes are much smaller than the natural frequencies of the crane. As a result, the motion of the crane with a smaller period does not amplify the motion of the rated load and thus the pendulum effect is insignificant. This condition is also seen in Table 4135.7-1 of NOG-1 as: "Increase in the load due to pendulum effect need not be considered due to the relatively small displacements of the load."

Lamellar Tearing ZionSolutions single failure proof trolley is designed to eliminate the potential for Bridge and trolley structures are generally problems that could occur with weld joints A Certified Weld fabricated by welding structural shapes between rolled structural members, such as Critical welds as Inspector following the 2.6 together. Problems have been experienced subsurface lamellar tearing, resulting in designated on requirements of NOG-1 with weld joints between rolled structural reduced strength of the material. All weld None the Critical List perform weld members. Specifically, subsurface lamellar joints are carefully analyzed and designed to and the inspections. These are tearing has occurred at the weld joints limit the possibility of this occurrence. individual documented in the during fabrication, and the drawings. Quality Documentation through-thickness strength of the material To insure weld adequacy, all welds are Package.

Page 14 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested has thus been reduced. When weld joints visually examined, and all weld joints whose are carefully designed and fabricated, failure could result in the drop of a critical lamellar tearing is not expected to occur, load are nondestructively examined. Any but for certain weld joints it may be weld joint subject to lamellar tearing is necessary to examine the joint by nondestructively tested by ultrasonic means radiography or ultrasonic inspection, as to ensure the absence of lamellar tearing in appropriate, to ensure the absence of. the base metal and the soundness of the lamellar tearing in the base metal and the weld metal. In addition, weldments where soundness of the weld metal. laminar tearing can occur are stress relieved after welding. The trolley will be stress All weld joints whose failure could result in relieved.

the drop of a critical load should be nondestructively examined. If any of these For the new trolley, the weld inspection weld joint geometries would be susceptible requirements are specified in the Critical List to lamellar tearing, the base metal at the (Document #36675-11.) They are governed joints should be nondestructively by the vendor's (MMH's) approved welding examined. and inspection procedures. The visual weld inspection of the bridge was governed by the Bridge Inspection Procedure (Document

1. 36675-24) and performed by the MMH inspection team.

Structural Fatigue The crane is designated as a Class A crane per CMAA-70. The trolley weld calculation (MMH Since each crane loading cycle will produce Calc #36675-10) takes into account this Class, cyclic stress, it may be necessary to but applies a more conservative allowable to 2.7 investigate the potential for failure of the ensure that the actual usage of the crane is metal due to fatigue. If a crane will be used enveloped for fatigue. None None None during the construction period, it will experience additional cyclic loading, and For mechanical components, the crane was these loads should be added to the designed to NOG-1 and therefore fatigue has_

Page 15 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested expected cyclic loading for the permanent been incorporated where required. One plant operation when performing the example includes the strength and durability fatigue evaluation. calculations for the gearing.

A fatigue analysis should be considered for the critical load-bearing structures and components of the crane handling system.

The cumulative fatigue usage factors should reflect effects of the cyclic loading from both the construction and operating periods.

Low alloy steels have not been used for the ZionSolutions crane as indicated in Paragraph Welding Procedures 2.4. All welding on the ZionSolutions single failure proof crane system is completed by Problems with welding of low-:alloy steels AWS certified welders, in compliance with can occur if the base metal temperature is pre-certified weld procedures that conform not properly controlled during welding and to AWS D1.1 "Structural Welding Code." To the post weld heat treatment.

control the possibility of welding problems, preheat temperatures and post weld Preheat temperatures and post weld 2.8 heat-treatment (stress relief) temperatures heat-treatment (stress relief) temperatures for all welds is controlled by the use of weld None None None for all weldments should be specified in the procedures that define preheat and post weld procedure. Welds described in the weld heat-treatment temperatures. Welds recommendations of Section 2.6 should be described in the recommendations of Section post weld heat treated in accordance with 2.6 of NUREG 0554 are post weld heat Sub-article 3.9 of AWS D1.1, "Structural treated in accordance with Sub-article 3.9 of Welding Code."

AWS D1.1 for the trolley and similar AWS standards for the bridge. (Zion Specification SP-ZS-FH-003)

Page 16 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested SAFETY FEATURES ZionSolutions single failure proof crane General system employ safety features to maximize crane safety of all items including structural, Numerous applications have been reviewed mechanical, and electrical components that by the NRC staff, and the need for inclusion are needed to lift, hold and transfer a load, of certain safety features and the of crtan saetyfeauresandtheprincipal including critical nuclear loads. Primary or load-bearing components, magnitudes provdeadeqatesafty of specific operational limits to prnipalnload-bearing hve eenequipment, components, and subsystems such as the Hoist provide, adequate safety have been drive equipment, drums, rope reeving 3.0 systems, hooks, blocks, control systems, and 3.1 A crane handling system includes all the braking systems are analyzed and provisions structural, mechanical, and electrical are included in the ZionSolutions single None None None components that are needed to lift and failure proof design to ensure maximum safety such as redundancy, conservative transfer a load frm one from tranfer on loatio tosaeyucasrdnnyosrvte lod location todesign, enhanced safety margins and other another. Primary or principal load-bearing design considerains ary or special design considerations. Primary or components, equipment, and subsystems principal parts are designed to insure that a such as the driving equipment, drum, rope reeving system, hooks, blocks, control single failure does not result in the loss of the systemseandving systemhoks, c rould capability of the system to retain the load.

systems, and braking systems should Key safety features are further outlined in receive special attention. this report.

Auxiliary Systems All auxiliary hoisting systems of the main On this crane, the Auxiliary hoist will not crane handling system that are employed handle critical loads and is a standard 3.2 to lift or assist in handling critical loads commercial hoist.

should be single failure proof. None None None Auxiliary systems or dual components should be provided for the main hoisting Page 17 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested mechanism so that, in case of subsystem or component failure, the load will be retained and held in a stable or immobile safe position.

ZionSolutions single failure proof crane Electric Control Systems system is designed to provide safe operation, and prevent the release of radioactivity in The following It is important to prevent the release of case of failure, malfunction, or loss of power.

items are radioactivity in case of failure, malfunction, Special features are included in the tested:

or loss of load. It may be necessary to equipment design to preclude system include special features and provisions to incidents that would result in release of Load cell preclude system incidents that would result radioactivity. This is shown in the MMH in release of radioactivity. drawings R95399 (Schematic) and 54214604 Weighted Limit (Interconnect.)

switch The automatic controls and limiting devices should be designed so that, when disorders The first part of the control system is based Geared due to inadvertent operator action, on the hoisting system and direct inputs to a All of these items will 3.3 upper/lower component malfunction, or relay based control system. In the first layer be checked in the None limit switch disarrangement of subsystem control of safety, the system does not depend on a Factory Acceptance functions occur singly or in combination PLC, scanning rates, or programming. All load Procedure, 36675-07.

Over-speed during the load handling, and assuming no cells and limit switches are "hard-wired" to switch components have failed in any subsystems, activate safety systems. Some of the special these disorders will not prevent the controls include:

Variable handling system from stopping and holding Frequency the load. An emergency stop button should Load Cells - located in series with each wire Drives be added at the control station to stop all rope, they are used in a number of safety motion. functions including broken rope detection, Mis-spooling over load, load hang-up and "two-blocking."

detection Up limit switches - Stops bottom blocks up travel to prevent "two-blocking."

Page 18 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested Geared Limit switch - Stops bottom block from traveling too far in the up or down direction.

Over speed switch - ensures that the load is always in control or the brakes are applied.

Special Ergonomic controls per CMAA 70 and B30.2 to minimize operator errors.

-Phase reversal relay-to monitor incoming power and protect in case of a change.

Mis-spooling switches - detects overwrap of the wire rope on the drum.

In addition, the Smartorque DriveTM has many safety features that provide additional layers of safety:

Quick Stop Function - provides an automatic Alternate Deceleration at Stop Command.

This feature differs from the normal deceleration time and is applied only when the run command is removed.

Travel Limit - this function automatically slows and stops the hoist when it reaches the travel limits.

Load Check - this function is a load-limiting feature that ensures the programmed load limit of the hoist is not exceeded. It prevents the lifting (and potential loss) of a load that is overweight. When the drive detects an Page 19 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested Howitistested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS overload condition, it prevents any further raising. However, the load can be lowered at a specified speed.

Torque Limit - function dynamically controls the torque output of the motor at all times.

The Torque Limit Function limits the amount of motor torque on all four quadrants of vector control operation.

No-Load Brake Hoist mode provides a special start/stop sequence designed specifically to prevent the movement of the load when initially starting, specifically an overhanging heavy load. Using a series of timers and counters that monitor parameter feedback, the drive begins by building up torque in the motor to a predefined level prior to releasing the brakes.

Weight Calculation - weight measurement calculation is based on motor torque at a constant speed.

Slack Cable Detection - this condition is detected when the torque output is drastically reduced and has dipped below a set point.

Maintenance Timer - a maintenance feature that will alert an operator, for example, when Page 20 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested the bearings need to be greased based on total running time.

Emergency Stop buttons - Emergency stop buttons are included on each operators control station.

The drive also has many functions to detect problems within the drive and provide a safe method to control the load and inform the operator of the condition.

Motor Overload Under Voltage Level Reference Detection Torque Detection Hardware Protection Motor Overheating Phase Loss Emergency Repairs The ZionSolutions single failure proof crane The emergency system is designed to significantly reduce the lowering of the A crane that has been immobilized because possibility of the crane becoming immobilized 100% load using The Magnetorque will of malfunction or failure of controls or because of malfunction or failure of controls the be checked in the components while holding a critical load or components while holding a critical load. Magnetorque. Factory Acceptance 3.4 should be able to hold the load or set the Nevertheless, provisions are included to None Procedure, 36675-07.

load down while repairs or adjustments are allow the crane to hold the load or set the Will test the made, This can be accomplished by load down, in a controlled manner, while emergency Test will be performed inclusion of features that will permit repairs and/or adjustments are made during movement of per MMH document manual operation of the hoisting system the unlikely occurrence of such an the bridge and #36675-13 and the bridge and trolley transfer immobilization, trolley during mechanisms by means of appropriate the Site Page 21 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested emergency devices. The hoisting system includes an emergency Acceptance lowering system that allows the load to be Test.

Means should be provided for using the safely lowered with, or without, power. The devices required in repairing, adjusting, or emergency lowering system uses an eddy replacing the failed component(s) or current brake to provide emergency lowering subsystem(s) when failure of an active in a controlled and safe manner. The eddy component or subsystem has occurred and current brake develops a regenerative the load is supported and retained in the electrical field during the emergency lowering safe (temporary) position with the handling process to safely control the lowering speed system immobile. As an alternative to of the hoist. Detailed instructions describing repairing the crane in place, means may be the complete process of safe emergency provided for safely transferring the lowering are located on the hoist near the immobilized hoisting system with its load to emergency lowering system. In addition, if a safe lay down area that has been there was a problem with the eddy current designed to accept the load while the brake, there are additional procedures that repairs are being made. are used to lower the load using just the shoe brakes.

The design of the crane and its operating area should include provisions that will not The crane bridge and trolley are provided impair the safe operation or safe shutdown with means to provide emergency transport of the reactor or cause un-acceptable by using a mechanical driving mechanism.

release of radioactivity when corrective Both the bridge and trolley can be manually repairs, replacements, and adjustments are moved by spinning the motor shaft or pulling being made to place the crane handling with a come-a-long. To facilitate the use of system back into service after component the emergency hoist lowering system, or failure(s). bridge and trolley emergency transport system, operators' platforms and/or personnel safety tie offs are located at each device. Detailed instructions describing the emergency bridge & trolley transport process Page 22 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested are located directly on the crane in close proximity to each emergency input drive shaft.

Reeving System The ZionSolutions single failure proof hoist reeving system includes special provision to Component parts of the vertical hoisting ensure maximum safety and reliability. To mechanism are important. Specifically, the reduce the possibility of accelerated wire rope reeving system deserves special rope wear, the load-carrying rope system is consideration during design of the system. carefully designed to assure proper wire rope The load-carrying rope will suffer selection, proper wire rope alignment, accelerated wear if it rubs excessively on conservative sheave pitch diameters, and the sides of the grooves in the drum and conservative fleet angles at all times. The sheaves because of improper alignment or wire rope construction is carefully analyzed large fleet angles between the grooves. The for each specific application (Reeving Stress Mis-reeving detection load-carrying rope will furthermore suffer Report, MMH #36675-23), in order to provide system will be tested excessive loading if it is partly held by the most suitable wire rope. The reeving Mis-reeving per the Factory 4.1 friction on the groove wall and then system design carefully evaluates the rope None detection Acceptance Procedure suddenly released to enter the bottom of alignment on the wire rope drum to insure system

- P&H document the groove. The rope can be protected by that the wire rope properly tracks to the

1. 36675-07 the selection of conservative fleet angles. correct position of each drum groove. Correct Ropes may also suffer damage due to wire rope alignment is achieved by using excessive strain developed if the rope conservative sheave pitch diameters, construction and the pitch diameter of the conservative fleet angles, proper alignment sheaves are not properly selected. Fatigue of all components, and operational testing to stress in ropes can be minimized when the insure proper wire rope tracking using the pitch diameter of the sheaves is selected requirements of B30.2 and NOG-1. Site large enough to produce only nominal specific operation, inspection and stress levels. The pitch diameter of the maintenance procedures are also provided to sheaves should be larger for ropes moving insure that operations personnel understand at the highest velocity near the drum and all aspects of the reeving system including Page 23 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested can be smaller for sheaves used as inspection and maintenance intervals using equalizers where the rope is stationary. the guidance of the Wire Rope Protection against excessive wire rope Manufacturers Guidelines.

wear and fatigue damage can be ensured through scheduled inspection and Misreeving protection is also provided with a maintenance. sensing system that disables power to the hoist if a misreeved condition is detected (such as an over wrap on the drum). This is shown in the MMH Drawing R95399 (Schematic).

Design of the rope reeving system(s) should The ZionSolutions single failure proof reeving be dual with each system providing system utilizes a single drum, dual load path separately the load balance on the head wire rope reeving system to achieve reeving The Python rope and load blocks through configuration of redundancy. Each load path is independent breaking strength will ropes and rope equalizer(s). Selection of and separately balanced to insure smooth be tested during the the hoisting rope or running rope should and balanced load transfer in the unlikely rope test at the rope include consideration of the size, vendor and event of a wire rope failure. The wire rope construction, lay, and means or type of used on the trolley is special Python Super 8- documented in lubrication, if required, to maintain CD EEIPS, 1-5/8" diameter rope with a procedure 36675-12, efficient working of the individual wire breaking strength of better than 192.6 tons. None Rope breaking which is the Quality strands when each section of rope passes There are four separate ropes; 2 right lay and strength tested documentation over the individual sheaves during the package for the trolley hoisting operation. The effects of impact for degradation and on each loadpl) modification. The rope loadings, acceleration, and emergency individual wire rope in the dual reeving vendor is a qualified stops should be included in selection of system with the MCL attached does not nuclear supplier per rope reeving systems. The maximum load exceed 10% of the manufacturer's published the crane vendor's (including static and inertia forces) on each breaking strength (Reeving Stress Report, (P&H's)10 CFR 50 App.

individual wire rope in the dual reeving MMH #36675-23). B program.

system with the MCL attached should not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's Page 24 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested published breaking strength.

It is recognized that the ratio of wire rope yield strength to ultimate strength may vary sufficiently for different production runs to influence the wire rope rating in such a The ratio of wire rope yield strength to manner that the initial safety margin selected ultimate strength may vary sufficiently for would be too small to prevent the critical The Python rope different production runs to influence the load from straining the wire rope material breaking strength is wire rope rating in such a manner that the beyond the yield point under abnormal tested during the rope initial safety margin selected would be too conditions. To preclude the possibility of this test at the rope vendor small to prevent the critical load from occurrence, each lay of wire rope is proof Rope breaking and documented in straining the wire rope material beyond the load tested to determine actual properties None strength tested procedure 36675-12, yield point under abnormal conditions. It and to ensure that the desired margin on which is the Quality would, therefore, be prudent to consider rope strength are sufficient. The rope vendor documentation the wire rope yield strength as well as the is required to document that the cables package for the trolley ultimate strength when specifying wire provided for the crane is from the same reel modification.

rope in order to ensure the desired margin as the proof test. In addition, each rope on rope strength. assembly with the fitting attached is also tested. The rope drawing specifies the required tests (MMH #QR94824 and all test results are fully documented per MMH Main Hoist Wire Rope Test Procedure (#36675-12.)

The maximum fleet angle from drum to The ZionSolutions single failure proof wire lead sheave in the load block or between rope reeving system uses conservative fleet individual sheaves should not exceed 0.061 angles. The maximum fleet angle from the rad (3-1/2°) at any one point during drum to trunnions in the upper block does None None None hoisting except that for the last 1 m (3 ft) of not exceed 3.5° except at the last 1 meter maximum lift elevation the fleet angle may where it approaches 4°. Reverse bends are increase slightly. The use of reverse bends not present in the reeving system.

Page 25 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested for running wire ropes should be limited, and the use of larger sheaves should be The ZionSolutions equalizer system uses an considered for those applications where a equalizer beam design. The dual rope reeving disproportionate reduction in wire rope system uses four (4) individual attaching fatigue life would be expected from the use points as a means for balancing or of standard sheave diameters for reverse distributing the load between the two bends. operating rope reeving systems of the redundant reeving system. Each independent The equalizer for stretch and load on the reeving system is designed, to hold the critical rope reeving system may be of either beam load and transfer the critical load without or sheave type or combinations thereof. A excessive shock in the unlikely occurrence of dual rope reeving system with individual the failure of one of the other rope systems.

attaching points and means for balancing Safe load transfer during a wire rope failure is or distributing the load between the two achieved since there are two independent operating rope reeving systems will permit rope systems per side of the beam, resulting either rope system to hold the critical load in virtually no hook movement during the and transfer the critical load without unlikely occurrence of wire rope transfer, excessive shock in case of failure of the should one of the wire rope systems fail.

other rope system. Hook movement is documented in P&H Document 36675-23.

The pitch diameter of running sheaves and The pitch diameter of running sheaves and drums should be selected in accordance drums for ZionSolutions single failure proof with the recommendations of CMAA crane system is selected in accordance with Specification #70. The dual reeving system the recommendations of CMAA Specification may be a single rope from each end of a #70 and the Python rope manufacturer's drum terminating at one of the blocks or recommendations. The pitch diameter is 42 None None None equalizer with provisions for equalizing inches for the drum and 36 inches for the beam-type load and rope stretch, with each sheaves in the bottom block which is more rope designed for the total load. conservative than CMAA-70. The Alternatively, a 2-rope system may be used ZionSolutions dual reeving system uses four Page 26 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested from each drum or separate drums using a ropes with independent (redundant) wire sheave equalizer or beam equalizer or any rope load paths. The wire ropes are equalized other combination that provides two in an upper block equalizer assembly that is separate and complete reeving systems. designed to allow safe load transfer, with virtually no hook movement, during the unlikely occurrence of a failure of one of the four wire rope systems.

Drum Support Proper support of the rope drums is ZionSolutions's single failure proof crane necessary to ensure that they would be system uses captive drum support systems to prevented from falling or disengaging from ensure that the drum is prevented from their braking and control system. falling or disengaging from their braking and control system. The drum support system 4.2 The load hoisting drum on the trolley includes a heavily constructed, close fitting None None None should be provided with structural and cradle that safely limits drop of the drum and mechanical safety devices to limit the drop thereby prevent it from disengaging from its of the drum and thereby prevent it from holding brake system during the unlikely disengaging from its holding brake system occurrence of a drum shaft or bearing failure if the drum shaft or bearings were to fail or or fracture.

fracture.

Head and Load Blocks The fuel handling cranes' head and load block reeving systems use a symmetrical, dual load The head and load blocks should be path (redundant), designed to maintain Hook Travel is Will be tested per the 4.3 designed to maintain a vertical load vertical load balance about the center of lift None vertical Site Acceptance Test balance about the center of lift from load from load block through head block. Adual (SAT) MMH document block through head block and have a load path redundant reeving system is #36675-13 reeving system of dual design. utilized.

Page 27 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested The load-block assembly utilizes (2) two load attached points and is comprised of a sister hook with a 2nd center, pin hole, load attachment point. The load blocks including the individual sister hook prongs are conservatively designed to support a load greater than three times the MCL (static and dynamic) being handled without permanent The load-block assembly should be deformation of any part of the load-block provided with two load-attaching points assembly, other than localized strain (hooks or other means) so designed that concentration in areas for which additional each attaching point will be able to support material has been provided for wear. The a load of three times the load (static and hook pinhole has double the above safety dynamic) being handled without factor in accordance with NUREG-0612 App.

permanent deformation of any part of the None None None C and NOG-i since it is a single attachment load-block assembly-other than localized point.

strain concentration in areas for which additional material has been provided for It is important to note that there are some wear.

issues when comparing NOG-1, NUREG 0612 and 0554. Therefore, we will be using a safety factor for those items on the hook that are based on a single failure mode such as the hook throat on Attachment 2. It is important to note that issues exist when comparing NOG-2, NUREG 0612 and NUREG 0554. Therefore, a safety factor is provided for those items that are based on a single failure mode such as the hook throat on Page 28 of 63

NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested Attachment 2 to this matrix factor of 1.30 was conservatively applied to safety factors for both ultimate and yield strengths to account for dynamic load and degradation.

The individual component parts of the vertical hoisting system components, The individual component parts of the including the head block, rope reeving vertical hoisting system components, which system, load block, and dual load-attaching include the head block, rope reeving device, are designed to support a static load system, load block, and dual load-attaching greater than 200% of the MCL. A 200%

device, should each be designed to support static-type load test is performed on each a static load of 200% of the MCL. A 200% The main hoist hook load-attaching hook assembly and static-type load test should be performed and nut assembly will measurements of the geometric for each load-attaching hook. be tested to 200%

configuration of the hooks are made before Measurements of the geometric coupled with multiple and after load testing per B30.10. After configuration of the hooks should be made NDE tests. This is completion of load testing, nondestructive before and after the test and should be Main Hoist documented in MMH examination of the hook is completed, None followed by a nondestructive examination Hook testing procedure #36675-08 consisting of volumetric and surface that should consist of volumetric and with associated examinations to verify the soundness of surface examinations to verify the documentation in the fabrication and ensure the integrity of the soundness of fabrication and ensure the Quality Documentation hooks. The results of all testing are integrity of the hooks. The load blocks package for the trolley documented. The hook geometry is also should be nondestructively examined by modification.

checked after load testing to ensure that surface and volumetric techniques. The hook deformation has not occurred. All test results of examinations should be results are fully documented per B30.10.

documented and recorded.

Note that the hook and nut (assembly) are tested together to the 200%. This will be documented in Hook and Nut Test, MMH procedure #36675-08.

Page 29 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested Hoisting Speed ZionSolutions's single failure proof crane system utilizes a maximum hoisting speed for critical load handling that is limited to the Maximum hoisting speed for the critical theThe Main Hoist speed load should be limited to that given in the Teed specif T he Des Main Hoist will be checked in the "slow" column of Figure 70-6 of CMAA Techn seifiction T a load limt and are7.55 speed checks Site Acceptance FPM for the main hoist with #36675-13. Test, Specification #70. FPM without a load (express speed) and are within the requirements of Figure 70-6 of CMAA-70-1975.

Selection of hoisting speed is influenced by such items as reaction time for corrective action for the hoisting movement and the potential behavior of a failed rope. To prevent or limit damaging effects that may result from dangerous rope spin-off in case of a rope break, the hoisting speed should be limited. The rope traveling speed at the Since the ZionSolutions reeving system is a drum is higher than at other points in the two part system (for each of the 4 individual The Main Hoist speed reeving system, and the potential for Main Hoist will be checked in the damage due to rope failing and the the rop orspeed hook speed, v10 fpm. Thissionl de is well under speed checks Site Acceptance Test, interference with other parts of the system the requirement of 50 fpm. #36675-13.

should be considered. Conservative industry practice limits the rope line speed to 1/4 m/s (50 fpm) at the drum.

Page 30 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested Design Against Two-Blocking ZionSolutions single failure proof crane Testing of the: Two-block prevention system provides two-block protection by 1. Geared upper various redundant methods. Three (3) limit switch will be tested on the A potential failure of a hoist travel-limit system at slow and 45 switch incidentcould in the in and result a "two-block" cutting or crushing of separate protectionand areindependent provided, including of methodsa control 2. Weighted normal the Factoryspeeds as per Acceptance circuit upper limit switch, a weight operated None operated Limit 4.5 the wire rope. In order to protect the wire Procedure - MMH rope, the reeving system should be upper limit switch, and an overload limit switch document #36675-07.

designed to prevent the cutting or crushing bottom block are designed to prevent the 3. Overload The test consists of of the wire rope two-blocking incident weet if acu.rope rottomfromblocrushed tonprevent(thed3.eOverloadt being crushed (and thus (load cell) limitswth.

checking the limit weakened) between the two structures. switch.

The mechanical and structural components The two block protection system exceeds the of the complete hoisting system should protection requirements of NUREG 0554 by have the required strength to resist failure providing three (3) distinctly different levels if the hoisting system should "two-block" or of two-block protection. The two block if "load hang-up" should occur during protection system consists of the following 1. Geared upper Two-blocking will be hoisting. The designer should provide levels of protection. limit switch tested on the system means within the reeving system located at slow and normal on the head or on the load-block Control Circuit Upper Limit Switch (1st level 2. Weighted speeds as per the Site combinations to absorb or control the of defense) Operated Limit Acceptance Procedure kinetic energy of rotating machinery during The control circuit upper limit switch is the 1t None switch - MMH document the incident of two-blocking. As an alterna- level of defense. This system uses a rotary #36675-13. The test tive, the protective control system to control circuit limit switch that is calibrated 3. Overload consists of checking prevent the hoisting system from to disable control circuitry to the hoist motor (load cell) limit the limit switches.

two-blocking should include, as a minimum, at a pre-set upper and lower elevation. This switch.

two independent travel-limit devices of system is completely independent of all other different designs and activated by separate two-block protection systems.

mechanical means. These devices should de-energize the hoist drive motor and the Weight Operated Upper Limit Switch (2 nd main power supply. The protective control level of defense)

Page 31 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane { Exceptions Tested system for load hang-up, a part of the The weight operated upper limit switch is the 2 nd level of defense. This system uses a hook overload protection system, should consist of load cell systems in the drive train or block actuated weight operated limit switch motor-current-sensing devices or that is calibrated to disable power to the mechanical load-limiting devices. The hoist motor at a preset upper elevation that location of mechanical holding brakes and is higher than the control circuit limit switch their controls should provide positive, elevation. This system is completely reliable, and capable means to stop and independent of all other two-block hold the hoisting drum(s) for the conditions protection systems described in the design specification and in this recommendation. This should include Overload (Load Cell) Limit System ( 3 rd level capability to withstand the maximum of defense) torque of the driving motor if a malfunction Four (4) individual load cells are mounted in occurs and power to the driving motor series with each of the four individual wire cannot be shut off. The auxiliary hoist, if ropes to monitor lifting conditions, and supplied, should be equipped with two assure that the crane is operating within the independent travel-limit switches to operating limits of the MCL. The overload prevent two-blocking. system is present to detect an overload condition at a preset value of the MCL. When an overload condition is detected the load cell sends a signal to the hoist motor control circuit and immediately disables hoisting. This system provides two block and load hang-up protection. Note: P&H recommends the pre-set value be as low as possible, within the band of 105% to 120%, but high enough to prevent inadvertent trips due to dynamic effects.

i- F- I 4.6

__________ L Lifting Devices

- U _____________ _________________ ________________________

Page 32 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria How it is tested CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane I- .1-Lifting devices that are attached to the load Lifting devices used on the ZionSolutions None block such as lifting beams, yokes, ladle or single failure proof crane system that attach trunnion-type hooks, slings, toggles, and to the load block are site specific and will be clevises should be conservatively designed in accordance with NUREG-0612 and the with a dual or auxiliary device or ZionSolutions Heavy Loads Program.

combinations thereof. Each device should be designed or selected to support a load of three times the load (static and dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation.

Wire Rope Protection ZionSolution's single failure proof crane application is carefully analyzed to evaluate Sideloads would be generated to the the possibility of sideload lifting scenarios.

reeving system if hoisting were done at If sideloading occurs, the design of the rope angles departing from a normal vertical lift attachment points prevents mis-alignment and resulting damage could be incurred in since the torque arm limits movement.

the form of excessive wear on sheaves and The mis-reeving wire rope. A potential would also exist for Since side loading can lead to the wire rope detection system will the wire rope to be cut by jumping its double wrapping on the drum, misreeving Mis-reeving be tested in the 4.7 groove barrier on the drum. If sideloads protection. is provided with a sensing system None detection Factory Acceptance cannot be avoided, the reeving system that disables power to the hoist if a system Procedure - MMH should be equipped with a guard that misreeved condition is detected. This system document #36675-07 would keep the wire rope properly located is in lieu of guards and is superior since it in the grooves on the drum. minimizes wear on the wire rope. Coupled with this protection, rope inspections per ASME B30.2 would be performed in the event of a misreeving to verify no rope damaged had occurred.

Page 33 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested ZionSolutions's single failure proof crane system is manufactured in accordance with MMH procedures and processes to insure that all quality objectives are achieved. To ensure a robust and stable platform for the Machinery Alignment hoisting equipment is assured, the trolley is conservatively designed and the trolley Power transmission gear trains are often weldment is stress relieved after welding and supported by fabricated weldments of prior to machining. The trolley is then structural parts. The proper alignment of machined including all motor, gearbox and shafts and gears depends on the adequacy eddy current brake (Magnetorque) mounting of bearings and their supports to maintain pads. Alignment of shafts and gears is correct alignment of all components. The controlled by following procedures that proper functioning of the hoisting define tolerances for all machinery.

4.8 machinery during load handling can best be None None None Alignment is further verified as part of ensured by providing adequate support routine checks and inspections that are strength of the individual component parts performed and documented during the entire and the welds or bolting that binds them fabrication and assembly process. All together. Where gear trains are interposed connection hardware and welds are analyzed between the holding brakes and the and inspected to ensure proper strength and hoisting drum, these gear trains should be durability. Gear trains interposed between single failure proof and should be of dual the holding brakes and the hoisting drums, design.

are of dual design, each capable of holding the load and therefore are single failure proof. If there is a problem with one side of the drive train, including brake, shafts, gear box, bearings, seals, ect., the other side is fully functional to handle the load and safely Page 34 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested lower the load.

The shoe brakes ZionSolutions's single failure proof crane are tested a Hoist Braking System system utilizes dual (redundant) failsafe number of ways holding brakes in the hoisting system (raising including:

Mechanical holding brakes in the hoisting and lowering) that are automatically The shoe brakes will be system (raising and lowering) that are auto- activated when electric power is off, or by 1.100% tested in the Factory matically activated when electric power is oela eie ntehitn ytmt mrec etdi h atr 4.9 off or mechanically tripped by over-speed to None emergency Acceptance Procedure off or m ehan ical ip by ovspeed ensure safe handling of critical loads, stops. -MMH document devices or overload devices in the hoisting including the unlikely occurrence of a single -MHdcmn system will help ensure that a critical load inldnthulkeyocrneofasge#3650 rope failure. Note that this safety system 2. 125% load #36675-07 will be safely held or controlled in case of faillube failure safey in theindividald the individual oa load-bearing aroing artse o

parts does a PLC and therefore not go throughotaeerr ntssetbet rsa is tests of te histig mchinry.not susceptible to software errors or scan of the hoisting machinery,.ae.3 mrec rates. 3. Emergency lowering Each of the two redundant holding brakes of The shoe brakes are tested number a of ways Each holding brake should have more than the ZionSolutions single failure crane system are designed for a minimum of 150% full-load including:

full-load stopping capacity but should not have excessive capacity that could cause stopping capacity, but has insufficient The shoe brakes will be damage through sudden stopping of the overcapacity to cause damage through 1.100% tested in the Factory hoisting machinery. A minimum brake sudden stopping of the hoisting machinery' None emergency Acceptance Procedure capacity of 125% of the torque developed A time delay has been included in the control None e Aea Pocure during the hoisting operation at the point system to activate the first brake and then stops. - MMH document

1. 36675-07 of brake application has been determined activate the second brake. Calculations are 2. 125% load to be acceptable. completed and verified to assure proper tests brake capacity. The brake torques are factory set and documented on the detail drawing. 3. Emergency Page 35 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested lowering Load control braking is accomplished by the variable frequency drive and an associated dynamic braking unit. Two (2) shoe type The minimum hoisting braking system mechanical hoist holding brakes are included should include one power control braking in the hoist braking system each rated at no The shoe brakes system (not mechanical or drag brake type) less than 150% of full load hoisting torque at and two holding brakes. The holding brakes the point of application. The holding brakes arte a should be applied when power is off and are applied when power is off, or during the number of ways should be automatically applied on unlikely event that an overspeed situation is overspeed to the full holding position if a encountered. In addition, an eddy current The shoe brakes will be malfunction occurs. Each holding brake brake (Magnetorque) brake is provided that 1.e100%y tested in the Factory should have a torque rating not less than activates on loss of power or when brakes are None emergency Acceptance Procedure 125% of the full-load hoisting torque at engaged to slowdown the motor. The 3 stops. - MMH document point of application (location of the brake component braking system is designed to 2. 125% load #36675-07 in the mechanical drive). The minimum ensure that the minimum number of braking tests number of braking systems that. should be systems that are operable for emergency operable for emergency lowering after a lowering after a single brake failure is two 3. Emergency single brake failure should be two holding brakes to stop and control drum rotation. By lowering brakes for stopping and controlling drum using the emergency procedure in the Crane rotation. Technical Manual, the operator can safely lower the load using the eddy current brake (Magnetorque) and one (1) holding brake.

The holding brake system should be single The hoist holding brake system is based on failure proof; i.e., any component or gear the NOG-1, Figure 5416.1-2 design where train should be dual if interposed between independent paths are established so that if None None None the holding brakes and the hoisting drums. one shoe brake fails, the other can fully The dynamic and static alignment of all control the load. The design of the hoisting Page 36 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested hoisting machinery\components, including machinery\components, including gearing, gearing, shafting, couplings, and bearings, shafting, couplings, and bearings, is should be maintained throughout the range conservatively designed with all components of loads to be lifted, with all components anchored to the trolley platform, to maintain positioned and anchored on the trolley alignment throughout the entire range of machinery platform. loads (dynamic and static) that are lifted.

Provisions are included in the brake system design to allow manual operation of the Manual operation of the hoisting brakes hoisting brakes during an emergency may be necessary during an emergency condition through an emergency brake condition, and provision for this should be release lever. After the holding brakes are included in the design conditions. Adequate released the hoisting system utilizes an heat dissipation from the brake should be emergency lowering system that allows the ensured so that damage does not occur if load to be safely lowered with, or without, the lowering velocity is permitted to power. The emergency lowering system uses Test the increase excessively. It may be necessary to an eddy current brake (Magnetorque) to The eddy curent brake emergency stop the lowering operation periodically to provide emergency lowering in a controlled (Magnetorque) will be lowering of the prevent overheating and permit the brake and safe manner. The eddy current brake checked in the Factory None 100% load using to dissipate the excess heat. develops a regenerative electrical field during Acceptance Procedure, the eddy the emergency lowering process to safely 36675-07 using MMH current brake Portable instruments should be used to control the lowering speed of the hoist. procedure 36675-16.

(Magnetorque).

indicate the lowering speed during Detailed instructions describe the complete emergency operations. If a malfunction of a process of safe emergency lowering and are holding brake were to occur and located on the hoist near the emergency emergency lowering of the load become lowering system.

necessary, the holding brake should be restored to working condition before any The eddy current (Magnetorque) brake lowering is started. system does not generate heat on the main holding brakes during the emergency lowering process. Procedures describing how Page 37 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested to safely complete the manual lowering process, including monitoring of the lowering speed by use of portable instruments (tachometer) or visually. Detailed instructions describing the emergency lowering process are located in close vicinity to the hoist brake system.

The bridge and trolley drives utilize SMARTORQUE open loop adjustable M

T frequency control systems that continuously monitor the speed and direction of the crane.

The drive continuously monitors itself and Braking Capacity (Bridge & Trolley) immediately ceases operation and sets the brakes if a fault is detected. The bridge and Failure of the bridge and trolley travel to trolley brakes are self adjusting AC Disc type Bridge and trolley stop when power is shut off could result in and are automatically applied when power is brakes will be tested in uncontrolled incidents. This would be not present or in an over-speed condition. In both the Factory prevented if both bridge and trolley drives addition to a disc brake, the drive also utilizes Test brakes of Acceptance Procedure 5.1 are provided with control and holding dynamic braking resistor(s) which slows and None bridge and -MMH document braking systems that would be stops the respective motion. trolley #36675-07and Site automatically applied when the power is Acceptance Procedure, shut off or if an overspend or overload The SMARTORQUETM system also has the 36675-13.

condition occurs because of malfunction or following features:

failure in the drive system.

Quick Stop Function - provides an automatic Alternate Deceleration at Stop Command.

This feature differs from the normal deceleration time and is applied only when the run command is removed.

Torque Limit - function dynamically controls Page 38 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested the torque output of the motor at all times.

The Torque Limit Function limits the amount of motor torque on all four quadrants of vector control operation.

To avoid the possibility of drive motor over torque within the control system, the Drive motor over torque within the control maximum torque capability of the driving system is avoided by limiting the maximum motor and gear reducer for trolley motion torque capability of the driving motor and and bridge motion of the overhead bridge gear reducer for trolley motion and bridge crane should not exceed the capability of motion of the overhead bridge crane so they gear train and brakes to stop the trolley or do not exceed the capability of gear train and bridge from the maximum speed with the brakes to stop the trolley or bridge from the DRL attached. Incremental or fractional maximum speed with the DRL (and MCL) inch movements, when required, should be attached. Incremental or fractional inch provided by such items as variable speed movements are provided by variable speed controls or inching motor drives. Control controls. Control and holding brakes are each and holding brakes should each be rated at rated at 100% of maximum drive torque that None None None 100% of maximum drive torque that can be can be developed at the point of application.

developed at the point of application. If The bridge and trolley brakes are two mechanical brakes, one for control and mechanically tripped to the "on" or "holding" one for holding, are provided, they should position in the event of a malfunction in the be adjusted with one brake in each system power supply. Provisions are included for leading the other and should be activated manual emergency operation of the brakes.

by release or shutoff of power. This applies The holding brake is designed so that they to both trolley and bridge. The brakes cannot be used as a foot-operated slowdown should also be mechanically tripped to the "on" or "holding" position in the event of a brake.

malfunction in the power supply or an Drag brakes are not used in the P&H design.

overspend condition. Provisions should be made for manual emergency operation of Page 39 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested the brakes. The holding brake should be designed so that it cannot be used as a foot-operated slowdown brake. Drag brakes should not be used. Mechanical drag-type brakes are subject to excessive wear, and the need for frequent service and repair tends to make this type of brake less reliable; they should therefore not be used to control movements of the bridge and trolley.

Opposite-driven wheels on bridge or trolley Opposite-driven wheels on the bridge and that support bridge or trolley on their trolley are matched and have identical runways should be matched and should diameters within manufacturers specified have identical diameters. machining tolerances.

Yes, however, 50 ZionSolutions's single failure proof-crane fpm is equal system utilizes a maximum bridge and trolley to the speed for critical load handling that is limited recommend Trolley and bridge speed should be limited. to 50 FPM. These values come from the ed slow Speeds will be The speed limits indicated for slow specification. Note the CMAA-70-1975 speed operating documented per the Test Trolley and operating speeds for trolley and bridge in table gives for the Trolley at 100 tons, 50 speed from Site Acceptance Test, Bridge speeds specification CMAA #70 are recommended FPM, while the 150 tons, 30 FPM; however, NOG-1 MMH Document for handling MCLs. 50 fpm is equal to the recommended slow Table #36675-13 operating speed from NOG-1 Table 5332.1-1. 5332.1-1.

The bridge speed is within the slow guidelines The bridge of CMAA-70-1975. speed is within the slow Page 40 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested guidelines of CMAA-70-1975.

Safety Stop Limiting devices, mechanical and/or electrical, should be provided to control or Bridge and trolley limiting devices are used to prevent over travel and over-speed of the control the maximum travel capability of the Limit switches trolley and bridge. Buffers for bridge and bridge and trolley on their respective to test include: All of these limit trolley travel should be included at the end runways. Both the bridge and trolley utilize switches will be tested 5.2 of the rails. end stop travel limit switches. These limit None Bridge travel per the Site switches stop the travel motion of the bridge Acceptance Test, MMH Safety devices such as limit-type switches and/or trolley. As a final limiting device, both Trolley travel Document #36675-13.

provided for malfunction, inadvertent the bridge and trolley are mechanically operator action, or failure should be in stopped by substantial end travel end stops.

addition to and separate from the limiting means or control devices provided for operation.

DRIVERS AND CONTROLS The horsepower rating of the hoist driving Driver Selection motor is matched with the calculated requirement that includes the design load The horsepower rating of the hoist driving and acceleration to the design hoisting 6.0 motor should be matched with the speed. Careful consideration is given to the 61 calculated requirement that includes the selection of the hoist motor to avoid None None None design load and acceleration to the design overpowering of the hoisting equipment as hoisting speed. Overpowering of the this would impose additional strain on the hoisting equipment would impose machinery and load-carrying devices by additional strain on the machinery and increasing the hoisting acceleration rate.

load-carrying devices by increasing the Page 41 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested hoisting acceleration rate.

To preclude excessive drive motor torque, To preclude excessive drive motor torque, the maximum torque capability of the the maximum torque capability of the electric electric motor drive for hoisting should not motor drive for hoisting does not exceed the exceed the rating or capability of the rating or capability of the individual individual components of the hoisting components of the hoisting system required system required to hoist the MCL at the to hoist the MCL at the maximum -design maximum design hoist speed. Overpower hoist speed. The controls are designed to Hoist Limit and over-speed conditions should be stop the hoisting movement within <3in. of switches to test considered an operating hazard as they movement so that damage would not occur.

include:

may increase the hazard of malfunction or inadvertent operation. It is essential that The crane system is equipped with Hoist travel up the controls be capable of stopping the mechanical and electrical limiting devices to Each of these limit hoisting movement within amounts of shut off power to the driving motor(s) when Hoist travel up switches and E-stops movement that damage would not occur. A the crane hook approaches the end of travel (back up) will be tested per the maximum hoisting movement of 8 cm (3 in) or when other parts of the crane system None Site Acceptance Test, would be an acceptable stopping distance. would be damaged if power were not shut Hoist travel MMH Document off. These systems are described earlier in down #36675-13.

Normally, a crane system is equipped with other sections of this report.

mechanical and electrical limiting devices Emergency stop to shut off power to driving motors when All operators' control systems are designed to buttons the crane hook approaches the end of operate in the safest possible manner, and travel or when other parts of the crane are designed to return to or maintain a safe system would be damaged if power were holding position in case of malfunction.

not shut off. It is prudent to include safety Electric circuitry design is carefully devices in the control system for the crane, considered so that the controls and safety in addition to the limiting devices, for the devices ensure safe holding of the critical purpose of ensuring that the controls will load when called upon to perform their return to or maintain a safe holding safety function. An emergency stop button is position-in case of malfunction. Electric located at the operator's control station and Page 42 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested circuitry design should be carefully on the radio transmitter.

considered so that the controls and safety devices ensure safe holding of the critical The MCL and the DRL are the same for this load when called upon to perform their crane, so adjustment of set points is not safety function. For elaborate control necessary.

systems, radio control, or ultimate control under unforeseen conditions of distress, an "emergency stop button" should be placed at ground level to remove power from the crane independently of the crane controls.

For cranes with a DRL rating much higher than the MCL rating, it may be necessary to provide electrical or mechanical resetting of overload sensing devices when changing from one operation to the other. Such resetting should be made away from the operator cab location and should be included in an administrative control program.

Driver Control Systems ZionSolutions single failure proof crane The following system is designed to provide safe operation, items are The control systems should be designed as and prevent a radioactive release in case of tested:

a combination of electrical and mechanical failure, malfunction, or loss of power. Special All of these items will systems and may include such items as features are included in the equipment Load cell checked per the 6.2 contactors, relays, resistors, and thyristors design to preclude system incidents that None in combination with mechanical devices would result in release of radioactivity. Weighted Limit Factory Accetanc and mechanical braking systems. The switch Procedure, 36675-7.

control system(s) provided should include Note the ZionSolutions Fuel Handling Crane consideration of the hoisting (raising and will not be lifting individual fuel elements Geared upper lowering) of all loads, including the rated from a reactor vessel or a storage rack. limit switch Page 43 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested load, and the effects of the inertia of the rotating hoisting machinery such as motor The control system is based on the hoisting Over-speed armature, shafting and coupling, gear system and direct inputs to a relay based switch reducer, and drum. If the crane is to be control system. In the first layer of safety, the used for lifting spent fuel elements, the system does not depend on a PLC, scanning Variable control system should be adaptable to rates, or programming. All load cells, limit Frequency include interlocks that will prevent trolley switches, and pressure switches are "hard- Drives and bridge movements while the load is wired" to activate safety systems. Some of being hoisted free of a reactor vessel or a the special controls include:

storage rack, as may be recommended in Load Cells - located in series with each wire Regulatory Guide 1.13, "Spent Fuel Storage rope, they are used in a number of safety Facility Design Basis." functions including broken rope detection, over load, load hang-up and "two-blocking."

Up limit switches - Stops bottom blocks up travel to prevent "two-blocking."

Geared Limit switch - Stops bottom block from traveling too far in the up or down direction.

Over speed switch - ensures that the load is always in control or the brakes are applied.

Special Ergonomic controls per CMAA 70 and B30.2 to minimize operator errors.

In addition, the Smartorque Drive has many M

T safety features that provide additional layers of safety:

Quick Stop Function - provides an automatic Alternate Deceleration at Stop Command.

This feature differs from the normal deceleration time and is applied only when Page 44 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested the run command is removed.

Travel Limit - this function automatically slows and stops the hoist when it reaches the travel limits.

Load Check - this function is a load-limiting feature that ensures the programmed load limit of the hoist is not exceeded. It prevents the lifting (and potential loss) of a load that is overweight. When the drive detects an overload condition, it prevents any further rising. However, the load can be lowered at a specified speed.

Torque Limit - function dynamically controls the torque output of the motor at all times.

The Torque Limit Function limits the amount of motor torque on all four quadrants of vector control operation.

No-Load Brake Hoist mode provides a special start/stop sequence designed specifically to prevent the movement of the load when initially starting, specifically an overhanging heavy load. Using a series of timers and counters that monitor parameter feedback, the drive begins by building up torque in the motor to a predefined level prior to releasing the brakes.

Weight Calculation - weight measurement calculation is based on motor torque at a constant speed.

Slack Cable Detection - this condition is Page 45 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested detected when the torque output is drastically reduced and has dipped below a set point.

Maintenance Timer - a maintenance feature that will alert an operator, for example, when the bearings need to be greased based on total running time.

The drive also has many functions to detect problems within the drive and provide a safe method to control the load and inform the operator of the condition.

Motor Overload Under Voltage Level Reference Detection Torque Detection Hardware Protection Malfunction Protection The following All of these items will items are be checked per the Means should be provided in the motor Various devices are installed on the crane tested: Factory Acceptance control circuits to sense and respond to system to monitor key motor functions, and Procedure, 36675-07.

such items as excessive electric current, to provide a high degree of reliability and Load cell 6.3 excessive motor temperature, over-speed, safety including the following is a summary of None overload, and over travel. Controls should malfunction protections devices. Weighted Limit be provided to absorb the kinetic energy of switch the rotating machinery and stop the An emergency stop button is provided on hoisting movement reliably and safely each operator's station to allow the crane Geared upper through a combination of electrical power operator to immediately stop the load in the limit switch controls and mechanical braking systems case of a malfunction.

Page 46 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions j Tested and torque controls if one rope or one of Over-speed the dual reeving systems should fail or if Motor protections are included in the switch overloading or an overspend condition SMARTORQUE closed loop, motor control should occur. system which monitors excessive electric Variable current, excessive motor temperature, over- Frequency speed, and overload. Drives Over travel protection is provided for all VFD & Thermal motions of the cranes system. The bridge and magnetic circuit trolley over travel protection system includes breaker for stop travel limit switches and mechanical end excessive stops. The hoist travel limit system includes currents for redundant upper and lower limit switches each motion and two-block and load hang-up protection. (instantaneous trip)

Overload (in excess of MCL) is also detected and prevented by a load cell system that Thermal constantly monitors the weight of the lifted overloads in load, and limits the overall lifting capacity to motor coupled maintain safe working conditions. The with separate SMARTORQUE control system also M

T motor overload constantly monitors the crane to detect and for high temp shutdown the hoist if an overcapacity protection situation is encountered.

Trolley and Over speed protection is provided with the bridge end of Smartorque control system which M

T travels continuously monitors the crane speed.

Uncommanded move protection is provided Page 47 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested with the SMARTORQUE control system. If M

T the system detects a move that is inconsistent with the position of the operators control the motion is disabled. The trolley and bridge L.S. will be tested per Two-Block protection is provide by redundant the Site Acceptance travel limit switches, and multiple load cells Procedure, 36675-13.

which disables and protects the hoist system ifa two-block situation is imminent.

Misreeving protection is provided with a sensing system that disables power to the hoist if a misreeved condition is detected.

Slow Speed Drives The use of the variable frequency drive has Inremidenbytdrivesfontrhoist madvanced orihing significantly beyond this discussion.

provided by stepless controls or inching The VFD allows a wide range of speed control motor drive. Ifjogging or plugging is to be whe continuous monitoring e dicon 6.4 used, the control circuit should abrpt o

include hang inof ofite the loatin te rinoof the load. The integration ecod the encoder None None None features to featres peven prevent abrupt change in ensures that the VFD compensates or the motion. Drift point in the electric power brakes are engaged if the commanded system when provided for bridge or trolley direction is different than the actual direction movement should be provided only for the dtce yteecdr lgigo ogn lowetspeds.detected opratig by the encoder. Plugging or jogging lowest operating speeds. is not used.

Safety Devices The ZionSolutions single failure proof crane 6.5 system includes numerous safety devices to None See Section 6.3 See Section 6.3 Safety devices such as limit-type switches protect against malfunction, inadvertent provided for malfunction, inadvertent operator action, or failure, which are in Page 48 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested operator action, or failure should be in addition to and separate from the limiting addition to and separate from the limiting means or control devices provided for means or control devices provided for operation.

operation.

A detailed listing of safety and protection devices is included in paragraph 6.3.

Control Stations The complete operating control system and provisions for emergency controls for the The ZionSolutions crane's primary operation overhead crane handling system should center is the cab control and includes all preferably be located in a cab on the necessary controls to safely operate the bridge. When additional operator stations crane and all of its safety features. In are considered, they should have control addition, a remote radio control is provided systems similar to the main station. Manual that includes the same control functions as The test will be controls for hoisting and trolley movement the main operators control system. Manual Test cab and performed both per may be provided on the trolley. Manual controls for hoisting and trolley emergency radio control to the Factory Acceptance controls for the bridge may be located on and/or maintenance purposes are provided 6.6 None verify cannot Procedure, 36675-the bridge. Remote control or pendant on the trolley. Manual controls for the bridge operate at the 07and in the Site control for any of these motions should be motion for emergency and/or maintenance same time Acceptance Procedure, identical to those provided on the bridge purposes are located on the bridge. To 36675-13.

cab control panel. Cranes that use more preclude the possibility of multiple control than one control station should be stations being operated at the same time provided with electrical interlocks that electrical interlocks are provided that permit permit only one control station to be only one control station to be operable at any operable at any one time. In the design of one time. Emergency stop buttons are the control systems, provision for and included on each operators control station.

locations of devices for control during emergency conditions should be provided.

Page 49 of 63.

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested General Complete and easily comprehendible installation instructions are provided for the Installation instructions should be provided crane system. Detailed crane installation by-the manufacturer. These should include checklists are also provided to properly check a full explanation of the crane handling and verify the construction sequence. The 7.1 system, its controls, and the limitations for installation instructions provide a complete None None None the system and should cover the overview of the entire crane system including requirements for installation, testing, and a full explanation of all items and operating preparations for operation. limitations. The installation manuals also provide specific details regarding installation, testing, operation and maintenance details for the entire system.

Construction and Operating Periods When the permanent plant crane is to be used for construction and the operating requirements for construction are more This crane will not be used for construction severe than those required for permanent and therefore the first part of this section is plant service, the construction operating nothapplicabl e f requirements should be defined separately. not applicable.

7.2 The crane should be designed structurally Comprehensive installation procedures are None None None and mechanically for the construction developed to ensure the correct and safe loads, plant service loads, and their assembly of all items in order to ensure functional performance requirements. At compliance with all design requirements.

the end of the construction period, the crane handling system should be modified as needed for the performance requirements of the nuclear power plant operating service. After construction use, Page 50 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested the crane should be thoroughly inspected by nondestructive examination and load tested for the operating phase. The extent of nondestructive examination, the procedures used, and the acceptance criteria should be defined in the design specification. If allowable design stress limits for the plant operating service are to be exceeded during the construction phase, added inspection supplementing that described in Section 2.6 should be specified and developed.

During and after installation of the crane, the proper assembly of electrical and structural components should be verified.

The integrity of all control, operating, and safety systems should be verified as to satisfaction of installation and design requirements.

General Prior to functional testing a complete inspection of the entire crane system is A complete check should be made of all the conducted to ensure proper assembly and crane's mechanical and electrical systems integrity of all items. The inspection process Factory Factory Acceptance 8.1 to verify the proper installation and to includes a highly detailed checklist of all None Acceptance Testing will be prepare the crane for testing. items including any adjustments or Testing performed per MMH modifications that are required prior to performed. Procedure #36675-07.

Information concerning proof testing on startup of the crane. All results are components and subsystems that was documented and retained for future required and performed at the reference.

Page 51 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested manufacturer's plant to verify the ability of components or subsystems to perform A complete review of all documentation, should be available for the checking and tests results, proof load test certificates etc.,

testing performed at the place of instal- for all components is conducted to ensure lation of the crane system. that all items are in compliance with relevant codes, standards and requirements. All results are thoroughly documented for future reference.

Static and Dynamic Load Tests The entire ZionSolutions crane system will be subjected to extensive testing in accordance The crane system should be static load with comprehensive documented test tested at 125% of the MCL. The tests procedures to ensure proper operation of all should include all positions generating items at the MCL. All test results are recorded maximum strain in the bridge and trolley for future reference. The assembled structures and other positions as trolley will be recommended by the designer and Shop Testing at the MMH factory tested in the The tests will be manufacturer. After satisfactory This testing will consist of fully assembling shop and the performed both per completion of the 125% static test and the trolley and: assembled the Factory Acceptance 8.2 adjustments required as a result of the test, 0 Cycling all the controls using both an None trolley and Procedure, 36675-the crane handling system should be given operator station and the radio. bridge 07and per the Site full performance tests with 100% of theoprtrsainadheaiobigeOnderheSe MCLforuall speedsrm ande mtions with1 thic Two block prevention testing of the (complete crane Acceptance Procedure, the system is designed. This should include main hoist by verifying both sets of system) will be 36675-13.

verifying all limiting and safety control main hoist limit switches work. sted at the devices. The features provided for manual lowering of the load and manual site Performing a 125% rated load test of both loweing te lod ad f maualthe main and auxiliary hoist.

movement of the bridge and trolley during and the auiir main hit an emergency should be tested with the Emergency lowering the main hoist using the MCL attached to demonstrate the ability to Magnetorque with the MCL.

function as intended. Load cell tests for both main and aux hoist.

Page 52 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested H iste

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Testing of all other hoist limit switches and safety systems.

Site Testing This testing will occur after the trolley and all modifications have been installed on the existing bridge and will include:

• Performing a 125% cold proof load test of the bridge.

• Two block testing of the main hoist using the two limit switches.

• Load cell tests for both main and aux hoist.

• Cycling all the controls using both the operator station and the radio.

• Detailed post test inspection to ensure no components have been adversely affected by the testing.

125% load test with manual movement of the bridge and trolley to the extent possible.

• Performing a 125% rated load test of both the main and aux hoist.

• Emergency lowering the main hoist using the Magnetorque with the MCL.

• Load cell tests for both main and aux hoist.

• Testing of all other hoist limit Page 53 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested switches and safety systems.

Clarification #1:

At the Site Acceptance Testing, the bridge and trolley will have very limited travel during the loads tests since there are restrictions on carrying heavy loads. Since the bridge and existing building runway had been load tested when initially installed plus the modifications did not significantly modify the applied loads to the bridge or runway, the original tests are still valid.

Two-Block Test When equipped with an energy-controlling device between the load and head blocks, The assembled the complete thlowed com two-blockduringte hoisting should be hoisting machinery mahThe crane comes with dual upper limit trolley will be allowed to two-block during the hoisting switch; geared limit switch that trips out the tested in the The tests will be typassest(ad).bc lmt, anduce safty dcsldrive, and a weight operated type switch that shop and the performed both per wthist tes, conuctd ato w bypassed) physically removes power to the drive assembled the Factory Acceptance 8.3 speed without load, should provide contactor and sets the hoist brakes when None trolley and Procedure, 36675-assurance of the integrity of the design, the tripped, bridge O7and per the Site equipment, the controls, and the overload trippedt cr ane (complete crane Acceptance07and Procedure Procedure, protection devices. The test should No energy-absorption system is included in system) will be 36675-13 demonstrate that the maximum torque this crane design. tested at the that can be developed by the driving site system, including the inertia of the rotating parts at the over torque condition, will be absorbed or controlled during two-blocking or load hang-up. The complete hoisting Page 54 of 63

NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested machinery should be tested for ability to sustain a load hang-up condition by a test in which the load-block-attaching points are secured to a fixed anchor or an excessive load. The crane manufacturer may suggest additional or substitute test procedures that will ensure the proper functioning of protective overload devices.

The assembled Operational Tests trolley will be Extensive operational tests will be conducted tested in the The tests will be on the entire ZionSolutions single failure Operational tests of crane systems should shop and the performed both per proof crane system in order to verify proper be performed to verify the proper assembled the Factory Acceptance functionality of all items including limit functioning of limit switches and other None trolley and Procedure, 36675-switches and safety devices and procedures safety devices and the ability to perform as bridge 07and per the Site are implemented to safely test overload and designed. However, special arrangements (complete crane Acceptance Procedure, over-speed sensing devices under closely may have to be made to test overload and system) will be 36675-13 supervised surveillance.

over-speed sensing devices. tested at the site Maintenance To ensure the integrity of each ZionSolutions crane system extensive testing is completed After installation, equipment usually suffers prior to turnover for commercial operation.

degradation due to use and exposure. A In the event that any items have sustained certain degree of wear on such moving wear or exposure, a plan is implemented to None None None parts as wire ropes, gearing, bearings, and return those items to acceptable standards to brakes will reduce the original design ensure safe handling of critical loads at the factors and the capacity of the equipment MCL crane capacity. A site specific to handle the rated load. With good customized crane maintenance plan, that maintenance practice, degradation is not thoroughly identifies the maintenance Page 55 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it is tested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested expected to exceed 15% of the design load criteria and maintenance frequency is rating, and periodic inspection coupled implemented at the time of crane turnover to with a maintenance program should ensure operations in order to maintain the crane at that the crane is restored to the design the MCL capacity. The MCL and design rating condition if such degradation is found. are clearly marked on outboard surfaces of Essentially, the MCL rating of the crane each crane girder.

should be established as the rated load capacity, and the design rating for the degradable portion of the handling system should be identified to obtain the margin available for the maintenance program.

The MCL should be plainly marked on each side of the crane for each hoisting unit. It is recommended that the critical-load--

handling cranes should be continuously maintained above MCL capacity.

OPERATING MANUAL The entire ZionSolutions single failure proof crane system is subjected to extensive testing The crane designer and crane manufacturer prior to commercial operations. A should provide a manual of information comprehensive operation and maintenance and procedures for use-in checking, testing, manual is provided which includes detailed and operating the crane. The manual information regarding the entire crane 9.0 should also describe a preventive system including operation, startup, testing, None None None maintenance program based on the maintenance, troubleshooting, parts, approved test results and information diagnostics, and other special instructions obtained during the testing. It should pertinent to the crane system. The manual include such items as servicing, repair and also establishes the MCL margin for replacement requirements, visual degradation of wear-susceptible component examinations, inspections, checking, parts and the process for evaluating the measurements, problem diagnosis, margin.

Page 56 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS J For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions { Tested nondestructive examination, crane performance testing, and special instructions.

The operating requirements for all travel movements (vertical and horizontal movements or rotation, singly or in combination) incorporated in the design for permanent plant cranes should be clearly defined in the operating manual for hoisting and for trolley and bridge travel.

The designer should establish the MCL rating and the margin for degradation of wear-susceptible component parts.

QUALITY ASSURANCE The ZionSolutions single failure proof crane system is built in compliance with an NQA-1 Although crane handling systems for critical compliant quality assurance program. The loads are not required for the direct quality assurance program is applicable to all operation of a nuclear power plant, the aspects of the ZionSolutions crane including nature of their function makes it necessary but not limited to design, fabrication, to ensure that the desired quality level is installation, testing, and operation.

attained. A quality assurance program 10.0 None None None should be established to the extent In addition to the quality assurance program necessary to include the recommendations established for site assembly, installation, of this report for the design, fabrication, and testing of the crane, applicable installation, testing, and operation of crane procurement documents are maintained to handling systems for safe handling of provide a quality assurance program critical loads. consistent with, or enveloping, the pertinent provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.28, "Quality In addition to the quality assurance Assurance Program Requirements (Design Page 57 of 63

Section NUREG 0554 SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF Compliance Criteria Licensee Items to be How it istested

1. CRANES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS For the ZionSolutions Fuel Building Crane Exceptions Tested program established for site assembly, and Construction)," to the extent necessary.

installation, and testing of the crane, The quality control program also addresses applicable procurement documents should all the recommendations in this report. A require the crane manufacturer to provide certificate of compliance, certifying that all a quality assurance program consistent applicable requirements have been met is with the pertinent provisions of Regulatory provided as part of the final quality control Guide 1.28, "Quality Assurance Program documentation package.

Requirements (Design and Construction)," The ZionSolutions Quality Assurance Plan will to the extent necessary. be used to formally accept the crane system for operation at ZNPS.

The program should address all the recommendations in this report. Also Qualification requirements for crane included should bequalification operators are provided in the crane training requirements for crane operators. manual and operator training is provided at the time of crane commissioning.

Page 58 of 63

Attachment 1 NUREG 0554, SECTION 2.2 15% DEGRADATION FACTOR Per NUREG 0554, Section 2.2, "a slightly higher design load should be selected for component parts that are subject to degradation due to wear and exposure.... An increase of approximately 15% of the design load for these component parts would be a reasonable margin."

MMH's opinion is that this requirement is applicable to only those components in the load path and only those components that see relative movement between interfacing surfaces. Based on the location of this crane inside the Fuel Handling Building, which is very protected and has a mild atmosphere, the degradation of the equipment due to "exposure" would have a negligible effect on the structural components. Based on this definition, we have evaluated the following components and determined which should have the 15% applied:

Component MMH Is the 15% factor Discussion Name Drawing # applicable?

Only the seats of the hooks and the pin hole are applicable. In addition to the 15% vertical impact factor per NOG-1, the reeving calculation used Sister Hook QR82460 Yes an additional 15% applied to the MCL to account for degradation and wear and envelopes the requirements in the Technical Specification, Section 4.1.6.8 No relative movement between hook and nut. Wear could only occur at the thrust bearing, and its failure would not drop the load.

Relative motion is between the thrust washer and frame, and its failure Bottom Block Frame QR95495 No would not drop the load. There is no relative motion between the sheave pins and the frame since the pins are keyed to the frame.

Sheaves rotate about the sheave pins, but there is a bushing between the sheave and pin. The bushing will wear before the pin and the structural calculations do not take credit for the bushing. Thus, wear can occur, but does not affect the design basis.

Page 59 of 63

Component MMH Is the 15% factor Discussion Name Drawing # applicable?

Wear of sheave due to rope will not cause a dropped load. The only result Sheaves QR95497 No will be that the sheave will see higher stresses. In addition, the sheave is not designed based on load, but based on the size of rope used on the sheave.

Wire Rope Assembly QR94824 Yes (partially) The calculation uses 5% factor to account for wear since the fleet angles (Qty of 4) are limited, the equipment is indoors, and the ropes lubricated.

Yes, for the interface There are two interfacing items. First, the load cell is keyed to the Upper Block QR95566 between the rope trunnion, so no wear can occur to the trunnion. Second, the pin between Trunnion (Qty of 4) assembly pin and the the rope socket and the trunnion can move and wear can occur to the trunnion only. trunnion. This location will have a 15% increase in the design load.

The load cell is keyed to the Upper Block Trunnion and rotates in a bushing in the equalizer. No wear can occur between the trunnion and the Load Cell (qty of 4) QR95249 No load cell (no relative movement) since they are keyed. Between the load cell and bushing, the bushing will wear before the pin. Thus, wear can occur, but does not affect the design basis.

Upper Block QR95525 No Both interface locations have bushings in them. Since the bushings will Equalizers QR95527 wear first, no negative effect to the design basis will occur.

This pin is keyed into the upper block frame. Since there is no movement between the pin and the frame, no wear can occur. As discussed above, the interface between the pin and the equalizers is a bushing. Since the bushing will wear first, no negative effect to the design basis will occur.

As mentioned above in the discussions for "Upper Block Pin", no wear Upper Block Frame QR95371 No can occur between the pin and the frame since the pin is keyed into the upper block frame.

Gears and Pinions in QR89592 Yes The gears were designed to operate at 75% loading in each box.

Gearbox Therefore, the increase in loading envelopes the 15% requirement.

Page 60 of 63

Component MMI Is the 15% factor Discussion Name Drawing # applicable?

Couplings 18U 100 No There is no movement in the couplings since they are bolted & keyed.

________________ 18U 108 _______________________________

Motor Shafts QR94709 No The motor shafts are held in bearings and bushings. Therefore no wear of R95583 a structural member will occur.

The brakes are oversized to either 125% or 150% already to account for Shoe Brakes QR94714 No abnormalities. In addition, the brakes are self-adjusting and will take up QR76929 for wear of the pads.

The wear of a drum is usually limited to the lands (peaks) and the sides of the grooves due to side loading (excessive fleet angles.) The structural analysis of the drum is based on the base of the groove (section of the drum core), and therefore does not see degradation.

Page 61 of 63

Attachment 2 RECONCILE REQUIREMENTS OF ATTACHMENT PATHS Standard Single Load Attachment Point Two Load Attachment Points NUREG 0554 No discussion (Section 4.3)

"...assembly should be provided with two load attaching points (hooks or other means) so designed that each attaching point will be able to support a load of three times the load (static and dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation of any part of the load block assembly...."

NUREG 0612 (Section 5.1.6 12') (Section 5.1.6 -21)

For operating plants, the crane should be upgraded in Meet the requirements of NUREG 0554 accordance with the implementation guide lines of Appendix C of this report.

(Appendix C, .15 I)

"... at one installation being upgraded, a single attachment sister hook was accepted. However, the safety factor was increased to 10:1 to compensate for loss of the single failure proof feature and to equal the total safety factor of the wire rope. "

NOG-1 (Section 5428.1) (Section 5428.1)

"...provide one load attaching point designed such that it will "'.... provides two load attaching points designed such that each attaching point be able to support a load of six times the critical load (static will be able to support a load of three times the critical load (static and and dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation of dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation of the hook, other than the hook other than localized strain concentration..." localized strain concentration ... "

ZionSohltions (Section 4.1.6.8) (Section 4.1.6.3)

Technical "The main hoist dual prong (sister) hook shall be designed for "Unless specified elsewhere... .allowable stresses of individual mechanical Specification a safety factor of 10-to-I, static plus dynamic, such that this components shall be in accordance with the requirements of NOG- 1 Section SP-ZS-FH-003 design margin is maintained when lifting from either the hook 5000."

prongs or center pin hole."

Reeving Stress Safety factor of 10-to-I, static plus dynamic and including See "Single Load Attachment Point" response Calculation Report degradation factor, based on ultimate strength.

36675-23 Safety factor of 6-to-1, static plus dynamic and including degradation factor, based on yield strength.

Page 62 of 63

Example Stress Levels Hook Material: 34CrNiMo6 Ultimate Strength: Y.= 115 ksi Yield Strength: Oy = 95 ksi Vertical Impact Factor: 1.15 (15%)

Degradation Factor: 1.15(15%)

Impact + Degradation: 1.30 NUREG 0612: (YUc- - 11.5 ksi Safety Factor 10 NOG-1: G(

• Y -- - = 12.18 ksi (Safety Factor) x (Impact + Degradation Factors) 6 x 1.30 ou (YU - OYu au ZionSolutions: - 10 ksi (Safety Factor) x (Impact Factor) 10 x 1.15 MMH Calculation: _ _ _- _ OU - 8.85 ksi (Safety Factor)x (Impact + Degradation Factors) 10 x 1.30

-AND-Oy _=_ Oy - 12.18 ksi (Safety Factor)x (Impact + Degradation Factors) 6 x 1.30 Page 63 of 63 Fuel Handling Building and Auxiliary Buildings Drawings Associated with the Single Failure Proof Crane Upgrade

Fuel Handling Building and Auxiliary Building Plant Structural Drawings B-107, Rev. K, Fuel Handling Bldg. Foundation Plan El. 617'-0" West Area B-108, Rev. P, Fuel Handling Bldg. Foundation Plan El. 617'-0" East Area B-109, Rev. J, Fuel Handling Bldg. Foundation Plan El. 602'-0" West Area B-113, Rev. E, Fuel Handling Bldg. Foundation Plan El. 602'-0" East Area B-i 14, Rev. AD, Fuel Handling Building Foundation Plan Elevation 592'-0" - West Area B-i 15, Rev. N, Fuel Handling Building Foundation Plan Elevation 592'-0" - East Are A B-I 16, Rev. D, Fuel Handling Building Foundation Plan B-i 17, Rev. G, Fuel Handling Building Foundation Car Shed Plan B-i 18, Rev. L, Fuel Handling Bldg. Foundation Section A-A B-i 19, Rev. R, Fuel Handling Bldg. Foundation Section B-B B-120, Rev. N, Fuel Handling Building Foundation-Section C-C B-121, Rev. H, Fuel Handling Bldg. Foundation Section D-D B-122, Rev. E, Fuel Handling Building Foundation-Section E-E B-123, Rev. M, Fuel Handling Bldg. Foundation Section F-F B-124, Rev. P, Fuel Handling Bldg. Foundation Section G-G B-125, Rev. K, Fuel Handling Building Foundation-Section H-H B-126, Rev. M, Fuel Handling Building Fdn. Sections & Details - Sheet 1 B-151, Rev. AB, Auxiliary Bldg. Foundation Plan El. 542'-0" N.W. Area B-283, Rev. N, Turbine Building & Service Building Column Schedule B-284, Rev. F, Auxiliary Bldg. & Refueling Bldg. Column Schedule B-287, Ref. E, Turbine Bldg. & Auxiliary Bldg. Column Details B-291, Rev. H, Column Bracing Rows 15, 5, P, V, W, Y and 38 B-294, Rev. G, Column Bracing Rows 17 & 23 B-295, Rev. G, Column Bracing Sections & Details B-335, Rev. J, Turbine Building Floor Framing Sections & Details Sheet 1 B-365, Rev. Y, Auxiliary Building Framing Plan El. 617'-0" Southwest Area B-366, Rev. Z, Auxiliary Building Framing Plan El. 617'-0" Northwest Area B-375, Rev. H Auxiliary Building Framing Plan El 642'-0" Southwest Area B-376, Rev. D, Auxiliary Building Framing Plan El. 642'-0" Northwest Area B-381, Rev. C, Auxiliary Building Roof Framing Plan El. 668'-0" S.W. Area B-382, Rev. B, Auxiliary Building Roof Framing Plan El. 668'-0" N.W. Area B-391, Rev. A, Fuel Handling Bldg. Transfer Canal Winch Details B-392, Rev. B, Car Shed Roof Framing Plan El. 618'-6" B-401, Rev. C, Fuel Handling And Aux. Bldg. Girder Schedule B-402, Rev. H, Fuel Handling Building Crane Girder and Rail Plan B-403, Rev. F, Fuel Handling Building Crane Girder Sections & Details B-404, Rev. G, Fuel Handling Building Roof Framing Plan West Area B-405, Rev. L, Fuel Handling Building Roof Framing Plan East Area

B-406, Rev. C, Fuel Handling Transfer Canal Gate Sect. & Dets.

B-420, Rev A Fuel Handling Building Wall Plan El 617'-0" West Area B-421, Rev. A, Fuel Handling Building Wall Plan El. 617'-0" East Area B-422, Rev. B, Car Shed Roof & Wall Plan El. 618'-6" B-556, Rev. C, Typical Masonry Wall Details B-634, Rev. N, Auxiliary Building Roof Sections & Details B-654, Rev. G, Fuel Handling Bldg. Ground Fl. Plan - El. 592'-0" B-655, Rev. E, Fuel Handling Bldg. Ground Fl. Sections & Details B-657, Rev. X, Fuel Handling Bldg. Operating Fl. Plan El. 617'-0" B-658, Rev. J, Fuel Handling Bldg. Removable Wall Modification B-659, Rev. E, Fuel Handling Bldg. - Equipment Removal Crosstown Platform B-660, Rev. D, Fuel Handling Bldg. Roof Plan B-661, Rev. C, Fuel Handling Building Equipment Removal Crosstown Cart B-662, Rev. A, Fuel Handling Bldg. Stair No. F-1 B-717, Rev. M, Pipe Chase Framing Plans El. 574'-4 3/4", 598'-3 1/4", & El. 607'-0" B-718, Rev. L, Pipe Chase Framing Plans El. 574'-4 3/4", 598'-3 1/4", & El. 607'-0" B-719, Rev. J, Pipe Chase Framing Sections & Details B-721, Rev. L, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 592'-0" S.W. Area B-722, Rev. J, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 592'-0" N.W. Area B-723, Rev. PP, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 592'-0" S.E. Area B-724, Rev. AG, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 592'-0" N.E. Area B-725, Rev. J, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 601'-3" B-726, Rev. LN, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 617'-0" S.W. Area B-727, Rev. JP, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 617'-0" N.W. Area B-731, Rev. CE, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 642'-0" S.W. Area B-732, Rev. U, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 642'-0" N.W. Area B-733, Rev. MM, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 642'-0" S.E. Area B-734, Rev. YB, Auxiliary Building Wall Plan El. 642'-0" N.E. Area B-740, Rev. F, Auxiliary Building Sections & Details Sheet 1 B-743, Rev. G, Auxiliary Building Sections & Details Sheet 4 B-744, Rev. K, Auxiliary Building Sections & Details Sheet 5 B-747, Rev. V, Auxiliary Building Sections & Details, Sheet 8 B-751, Rev. J, Auxiliary Building Sections & Details, Sheet 12 B-753, Rev. J, Auxiliary Building Sections & Details, Sheet 12 B-754, Rev. J, Auxiliary Building Sections & Details, Sheet 15 B-81 1, Rev. C, Floor Loading Diagram Aux. Bldg. El's. 542', 560', 579' & 592' B-812, Rev. A, Floor Loading Diagram Aux. Bldg. El. 601'-3", 617'-0", 630'-0", 642' B-819, Rev. A, Floor Loading Diagram Diesel Generator & Fuel Hdlg. Bldg ZIONOO1-C-028 Sheet 1 Rev 0 FHB Crane Rail Modification Plan View Sooth Rail

ZIONOO1-C-028 Sheet 2 Rev 0 FHB Crane Rail Modification Plan View North Rail ZIONOOI-C-028 Sheet 1 Rev 2 FHB Crane Rail Modification Details.

THIS PAGE IS AN OVERSIZED DRAWING OR FIGURE, THAT CAN BE VIEWED AT THE RECORD TITLED:

ISFSI PROJECT FHB CRANE RAIL MODIFICATION PLAN VIEW SOUTH RAIL WITHIN THIS PACKAGE... OR, BY SEARCHING USING THE DOCUMENT/REPORT DRAWING NO. ZION001-C-208 D-01

THIS PAGE IS AN OVERSIZED DRAWING OR FIGURE, THAT CAN BE VIEWED AT THE RECORD TITLED:

ISFSI PROJECT FHB CRANE RAIL MODIFICATION PLAN VIEW NORTH RAIL WITHIN THIS PACKAGE... OR, BY SEARCHING USING THE DOCUMENT/REPORT DRAWING NO. ZION001-C-208 D-02

THIS PAGE IS AN OVERSIZED DRAWING OR FIGURE, THAT CAN BE VIEWED AT THE RECORD TITLED:

ISFSI PROJECT FHB CRANE RAIL MODIFICATION DETAILS WITHIN THIS PACKAGE... OR, BY SEARCHING USING THE DOCUMENT/REPORT DRAWING NO. ZION001-C-208 D-03X