ML110060484
| ML110060484 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/2009 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N10-0355 S1.OP-AB.CR-0002(Q), Rev. 24 | |
| Download: ML110060484 (155) | |
Text
PSEG Internal Use Only Page..1. of..1.
PSEG NUCLEAR L.L.C.
SALENUOPERATIONS S1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)- REV. 24 CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION DUE TO FIRE IN THE CONTROL ROOM, RELAY ROOM, 460/230V SWITCHGEAR ROOM, OR4KVSWITCHGEARROOM FIELD COpy EXISTS Biennial Review Performed: Yes No J Change Package(s) and Affected Document Number(s) incorporated into this revision: None DCP No.
N/ADCP Rev. No.
AD No.
AD Rev. No.
The following OTSC(s) were incorporated into this revision: None REVISION
SUMMARY
The following changes were incorporated into this revision:
Deleted previous Step 5.1.7 of Attachment 14 indicating to send an Operator to maintain 1 CC 131, RCP Therm Bar CC Cont Valve in the open position by opening 1 CY2EP5I, RCP Thermal Barrier Return Valve breaker, then ensuring 1 CC 131 in the open position locally utilizing the handwheel. For fires in the Relay Room or Control Room, RCP Seal Injection and RCP Thermal Barrier flow is isolated to ensure thermal shock of the RCP seals is prevented in the event seal injection and CCW flow to the thermal barrier cannot be restored within the prescribed time interval. Isolating seal injection and RCP thermal barrier flow addresses concerns identified in NRC Information Notice 2005-14. This change was incorporated to ensure consistency with the current RCP seal and thermal barrier isolation strategy currently delineated within this abnormal procedure (as incorporated by Rev. 19),
is consistent with guidance currently delineated in S2.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q),
and is considered to be editorial in nature.
[70093889-0020]
IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS Effective Date: 0 \\ \\ -Z<a/ 'Z.CD9 None
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION DUE TO FIRE IN THE CONTROL ROOM, RELAY ROOM, 460/230V SWITCHGEAR ROOM, OR 4KV SWITCHGEAR ROOM 1.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS DATE: ____ TIME: __
1.1 A fire event in any of the following areas requiring shutdown from outside the Control Room:
Control Room Relay Room 460/230V Switchgear Room (Elev. 84')
4Kv Switchgear Room (Elev. 64')
2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 2.1 DO NOT ENTER any EOPs during this procedure.
2.2 TRIP the Reactor.
2.3 ANNOUNCE twice on the Station PA System:
"Fire in Unit 1 Control Room Area. Unit 1 Duty Personnel assemble at the Appendix R Locker in Unit 2 Turbine Building on 120' elevation."
3.0 SUBSEOUENT ACTIONS 3.1 IF the fire is located in the 4Kv Switchgear Room (El. 64'),
THEN ISOLATE all4Kv Vital Buses from Off-site power as follows:
OPEN 13 KV SOUTH BUS BREAKER SECTION A-F breaker.
OPEN 13 KV SOUTH BUS BREAKER SECTION C-D breaker.
Salem 1 Page 1 of 116 Rev. 24
3.2 IF Control Room conditions permit, THEN:
A.
TRIP the Main Turbine.
B.
INITIATE a Main Steam Isolation.
C.
LOWER 13 AFW Pump speed until:
Total AFW flow drops to 22E04 lbmlhr Minimum speed is reached S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
D.
IF the fire is located in either ofthe Switchgear Rooms (El. 64' or 84'),
THEN DIRECT Unit 2 Control Room to align the CVCSIBAST Systems lAW S2.0P-SO.CVC-0023(Q), CVCS Cross-Connect Alignment to Unit 1.
NOTE The following keys are located in the Emergency Key Lock Box in the SM Office:
Appendix "R" Locker Keys Alternate Shutdown Cabinet Keys Unit 1 Security Key Ring (containing seven Security Keys) 3.3 ENSURE the Appendix "R", Alternate Shutdown Cabinet, and Unit 1 Security Keys are obtained from the Emergency Key Lock Box located in the SM Office prior to evacuating the Control Room Area.
3.4 DIRECT Unit 1 Control Room personnel to evacuate from the Control Room Area.
3.5 PROCEED to the Appendix R Locker in Unit 2 Turbine Building on 120' elevation.
Salem 1 Page 2 of 116 Rev. 24
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NOTES The EOPs are not applicable during Control Room Evacuation. They should be used for information or as recommended by the Emergency Coordinator (EC) while performing this procedure.
This procedure is written for the plant initially in Mode 1, 2, or 3. If the plant is in Mode 4, 5 or 6, only those steps to restore shutdown cooling and stabilize the plant systems after evacuation are necessary.
The following keys are located in the Emergency Key Lock Box in the SM Office:
Appendix nRn Locker Keys Alternate Shutdown Cabinet Keys Unit 1 Security Key Ring (containing seven Security Keys)
The use of radio transmitters and cell phones within Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) and Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) sensitive areas should be minimized during evacuation of the Control Room. Areas that prohibit radio or cellular phone use should be considered EMI "Radio Free Zones" unless otherwise specified by the SM/CRS.
3.6 At the Appendix R Locker in Unit 2 Turbine Building on 120' elevation:
Shift Manager (SM), IMPLEMENT Attachment 1.
Shift Technical Advisor (STA), IMPLEMENT Attachment 2.
Control Room Supervisor (CRS), IMPLEMENT Attachment 3 Reactor Operator (RO), IMPLEMENT Attachment 4.
Plant Operator (PO), IMPLEMENT Attachment 5.
No. 1 Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO), IMPLEMENT Attachment 6.
No.2 Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO), IMPLEMENT Attachment 7.
No.3 Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO), IMPLEMENT Attachment 8.
Shift Maintenance Technician (SMT), IMPLEMENT Attachment 9.
Salem 1 Page 3 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q) 4.0 COMPLETION AND REVIEW 4.1 COMPLETE Attachment 15, Sections 1.0 and 2.0, AND FORWARD this procedure to the SM/CRS for review and approval.
4.2 SM/CRS, COMPLETE the following:
Salem 1 A.
REVIEW this procedure with Attachments 1 through 15 for completeness and accuracy.
B.
COMPLETE Attachment 15, Section 3.0.
C.
FORWARD completed procedure to Operations Staff.
END OF PROCEDURE Page 4 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 1 (page 1 of 1)
SHIFT MANAGER 1.0 OBTAIN the following materials:
One full copy of this procedure One radio The Unit 1 Security Key Ring (located in located in the Emergency Key Lock Box in the SM Office) 2.0 DISTRIBUTE the Unit 1 Security Key Ring (containing seven Security Keys) to the Unit 1 CRS.
3.0 PERFORM a briefing with the CRS and STA on plant status and fire impacted area.
4.0 DIRECT Plant Security (X-2222) to open the Technical Support Center (TSC)
AND NOTIFY Plant Security of the following:
Possible loss of electrical power Operators utilizing security keys for access to security zones 5.0 IF Unit 2 Control Room and Conference Room Areas are available, THEN PROCEED to the Operations Support Center (OSC).
6.0 IF both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are in a simultaneous Alternate Shutdown, THEN PROCEED to the Technical Support Center (TSC).
7.0 NOTIFY Radiation Protection (X-2644) of the following:
Unit 1 Control Room Evacuation Personnel will be accessing the Control Point and Unit 1 Contaminated Area between the Mechanical and Electrical Penetration Areas on 78' elevation, unimpeded 8.0 NOTIFY the Electric System Operator (ESO) of the following:
Unit 1 Control Room Evacuation Shutdown of Unit 1 9.0 PERFORM duties of the Emergency Coordinator (EC)
IA W the Event Classification Guide (ECG).
10.0 WHEN relieved by the Emergency Duty Officer (EDO),
COORDINATE plant stabilization/shutdown IA W Attachments 3 through 9.
Salem 1 Page 5 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 2 (page 1 of 1)
SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR 1.0 OBTAIN the following materials:
One full copy of this procedure One radio 2.0 VERIFY the CRS briefs personnel on plant status and fire impacted area.
3.0 VERIFY personnel have the appropriate copies of this procedure:
CRS has a full copy of this procedure RO has Attachment 4 PO has Attachment 5
- 1 NED has Attachment 6
- 2 NED has Attachment 7
- 3 NEO has Attachment 8 Shift Maintenance Technician has Attachment 9.
4.0 IF additional personnel are available, THEN DIRECT personnel to report to the TSC/OSC for ECG implementation.
5.0 IF both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are in a simultaneous Alternate Shutdown, THEN PROCEED to the Technical Support Center (TSC).
6.0 IF Unit 2 Control Room and Conference Room Areas are available, THEN PROCEED to the Operations Support Center (OSC).
7.0 ESTABLISH communication with the CRS.
8.0 IMPLEMENT Attachment 13, CRS/STA TRACKING & OVERVIEW STATUS, to aid in tracking the status of this procedure for establishing Hot Standby conditions.
9.0 WHEN the control of all shutdown systems is reported as established lAW 3, Steps 4.1 through 4.6, NOTIFY the SM that control of the Shutdown Systems required for maintaining Hot Standby is established.
10.0 MONITOR Plant Status/Direction.
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S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 3 (page 1 of 7)
CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR 1.0 OBTAIN the following materials:
One full copy of this procedure One radio One portable emergency light unit Key ring set (JA Master, and E25)
A Security Master Key from the Unit 1 Security Key Ring Tools (adjustable wrench) 2.0 DISTRIBUTE Security Keys located on the Unit 1 Security Key Ring (containing the six remaining Security Keys) to the following individuals:
Reactor Operator (RO) - Attachment 4 Plant Operator (PO) - Attachment 5
- 1 NEO - Attachment 6
- 2 NEO - Attachment 7
- 3 NEO - Attachment 8 Shift Maintenance Technician (SMT) - Attachment 9 3.0 RECORD the location of the fire impacted area.
FIRE IMP ACTED AREA Control Room Elev. 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room Relay Room Elev. 64' 4kV Vital Bus Switchgear Room 4.0 PERFORM a briefing for shift personnel on plant status and fire impacted area.
RO PO SMT
- 1 NEO
- 2NEO
- 3NEO 5.0 PROCEED to the El. 84' Auxiliary Building, Hot Shutdown Panel area.
Salem 1 Page 7 of 116
[C0363]
Rev. 24
ATTACHMENT 3 (page 2 of 7)
CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR NOTE S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
+
If at any time during the performance of this attachment the EDG Operator (RO) reports an Emergency Diesel Generator is tripped because of lack of Service Water, the EDG Operator (RO) will have to be notified upon completion of the alignment of the Service Water System.
+
S1.OP-SO.HSD-0001(Q), Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment, provides guidance for manual component operation to achieve and maintain Hot Standby.
6.0 IMPLEMENT Attachment 13, CRS/STA TRACKING & OVERVIEW STATUS, to aid in tracking the status of this procedure for establishing Hot Standby conditions.
NOTE Communication with the TSC/OSC may not be established at first due to the time needed to staff the facility. This is not a hold point.
7.0 ESTABLISH communication with the TSC/OSC and field personnel via radio.
8.0 IF the Elev. 64' or 84' Switchgear Room is the fire impacted area, THEN:
Salem 1 8.1 DIRECT Unit 2 Control Room to align the CVC and BAST Systems IA W S2.0P-SO.CVC-0023(Q), CVCS Cross-Connect Alignment to Unit 1.
8.2 WHEN the cves Cross-Connect Alignment to Unit 1 is established, COORDINATE 23 Charging Pump SPEED DEMAND with Unit 2 CRS as required to establish Unit 1 Pressurizer level control.
8.3 WHEN HSD Panel 213-1 is aligned to Unit 2 ASDS Inverter Power Supply as reported by the Plant Operator (Attachment 5, Step 12.3),
AND CVCS Cross-Connect Alignment to Unit 1 is established, A.
DIRECT the EDG Operator (RO) to manually TRIP all Unit 1 EDGs by pulling on the Overspeed Trip Handle at each EDG engine.
B.
IF the Elev. 84' Switchgear Room is the fire impacted area, THEN DIRECT the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) to open 4Kv breakers IA W Attachment 6, Step 123.
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ATTACHMENT 3 (page 3 of 7)
CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR NOTE When the Relay Room or Control Room is the fire impacted area, ALL available CFCUs should be started in SLOW SPEED to provide containment heat removal capability for potentially elevated RCP seal leakages.
9.0 IF the Relay Room or Control Room is the fire impacted area, THEN START ALL available CFCUs in SLOW SPEED lAW S1.0P-SO.HSD-000l(Q).
10.0 COORDINATE with other Operators to maintain the following parameters:
Steam Generator Levels - 15% to 33% Narrow Range 11 Steam Generator: LI-1640 12 Steam Generator: LI-1641 13 Steam Generator: LI-1642 14 Steam Generator: LI-1643.
CAUTION Steam Generator Differential Pressure Safety Injection will occur at 100 psi differential pressure.
Steam Generator Pressures - 1005 psig (Tave = 547°F):
11 Steam Generator: PI-1644 12 Steam Generator: PI-1645 13 Steam Generator: PI-1646 14 Steam Generator: PI-1647.
Pressurizer Level 25% to 77% as indicated on LI-1649.
Pressurizer Pressure 2200 psig to 2250 psig as indicated on PI-1648.
11.0 MAINTAIN the plant in HOT STANDBY.
Date/ Time Salem 1 Page 9 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 3 (page 4 of 7)
CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR NOTE This section provides multiple steps to be performed with the assistance from TSC/OSC resources lAW S1.0P-SO.HSD-0001(Q), Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment, and provides guidance to support the transition from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown.
Use of other procedures will be necessary to accomplish various lineups and evolutions throughout the remainder of this procedure. Due to plant conditions many prerequisites, precautions and limitations required by these procedures may not apply.
12.0 WHEN the TSC/OSC is ACTIVATED, DIRECT the OSC Coordinator (OSCC) to implement Attachment 14, Operations Support Center Activity.
13.0 IF the Relay Room or Control Room is the fire impacted area, THEN upon completion of Attachment 14, Step 1.5.1F:
Salem 1 13.1 SEND an Operator to align the VCT to the Charging Pump suction by positioning the following valves as indicated IA W Sl.OP-SO.HSD-0001(Q), Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment:
A.
OPEN lCV40, VCT OUTLET B.
OPEN lCV41, VCT OUTLET C.
CLOSE 1 SJ1, RWST TO CHG PUMPS D.
CLOSE ISJ2, RWST TO CHG PUMPS 13.2 DIRECT an Operator to controllCV55 as required for maintaining the following parameters while in communication with the HSD Panel Operator (PO):
VCT level 14% to 77% at Panel 216-1 (located in Charging Pump Valve Alley)
Pressurizer level 25% to 77% (located in HSD Panel)
Page 10 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 5 of 7)
CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR NOTE The following steps commence cooldown after the SM has so directed. The necessary procedures, steam tables, and etc. may be obtained from the OSCITSC. The following are available at the Hot Shutdown Panel to provide guidance during RCS cooldown:
S1.0P-AB.RC-0004(Q), NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN S1.0P-IO.ZZ-0006(Q), HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN S1.0P-SO.HSD-0001 (Q), FIRE RELATED ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT 14.0 WHEN directed by the SM to commence Plant Cooldown, 14.1 IF ambient conditions in the Inner Penetration Area permit, THEN ESTABLISH Inner Piping Penetration Area manning.
14.2 INITIATE plotting RCS temperature and cooldown rate at least every 30 minutes lAW S1.0P-TM.ZZ-0001(Q),
RCS Pressure/Temperature Curves.
15.0 DIRECT the Operators at the Inner (#3 NEO) and Outer (#2 NEO)
Piping Penetration Areas, as applicable, to slowly raise steam release to the atmosphere through MS 1 Os to establish cooldown rate of 25°F per hour, while maintaining Steam Generator pressures within 50 psig of each other.
16.0 IF 1A 460V Vital Bus Power OR 1 C 460V Vital Extension Bus Power is available, THEN SEND an Operator to complete the following:
16.1 ALIGN the Pressurizer Heater power supplies lAW S1.0P-SO.PZR-OOI0(Q),
Pressurizer Backup Heaters Power Supply Transfer.
16.2 OPERATE the heaters as needed to maintain subcooling margin.
Salem 1 Page 11 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 3 (page 6 of 7)
CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR CAUTION Maintaining a subcooling margin without pressurizer heaters is achieved by control of pressurizer level during RCS cooldown. The inherent pressurizer pressure control feature can be established by balancing the charging rate with the RCS cooldown rate such that pressurizer level is maintained constant. Since any insurge only exacerbates a lowering RCS pressure condition, attempts to raise pressurizer level following an outsurge should be avoided.
17.0 MAINTAIN ~200°F subcooling margin dwing cooldown lAW Sl.OP-TM.ZZ-0001(Q), Pressure/Temperature Curves.
18.0 MAINTAIN Presswizer level between 25% and 77% as indicated on LI-1649.
19.0 IF AT ANY TIME Presswizer level fluctuates, indicating Reactor Vessel Head voids, THEN:
RAISE RCS pressure at least 50 psig, not to exceed maximum allowable lAW S1.0P-TM.ZZ-0001(Q), Pressure/Temperature Curves, for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> before attempting depressurization.
LOWER RCS temperature while maintaining pressurizer level constant and RCS pressure as high as possible to increase the subcooling margin to the maximum achievable.
20.0 WHEN RCS temperature is between 350°F and 360°F AND RCS pressure is maximum allowable lAW Sl.OP-TM.ZZ-0001(Q),
Pressure/Temperature Curves, HOLD these conditions for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to complete RCS soak requirements.
CAUTION
[C0381]
RCS pressure must be maintained greater than 650 psig until all the Accumulator Outlet valves are CLOSED.
21.0 DIRECT the OSCC to CLOSE the following ACCUMULATOR OUTLET VALVES:
llSJ54 12SJ54 13SJ54 14SJ54 Salem 1 Page 12 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 3 (page 7 of 7)
CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR 22.0 WHEN the required soak time is completed AND 11-14SJ54 valves are CLOSED, DEPRESSURIZE the RCS at <750 psig/hour until <375 psig.
NOTE Res depressurization results in lowering of the letdown flow rate.
22.1 OPEN lCV75, Pressurizer Auxiliary Spry Isolation Valve 22.2 CLOSE lCV77, Charging to No. 13 Cold Leg 22.3 CLOSE 1 CV79, Charging to No. 11 Cold Leg 23.0 WHEN RCS is <350°F and <340 psig as indicated on PL-1482, DIRECT the OSCC to initiate RHR lAW Sl.OP-SO.RHR-OOOl(Q),
Initiating RHR.
[C0381]
24.0 WHEN AFW is no longer required for SG inventory control, TRIP #13 AFW Pump.
Date / Time 25.0 WHEN RCS temperature is ~250°F, DIRECT the Operators at the Inner (#3 NEO) and Outer (#2 NED) Piping Penetration Areas, as applicable, to fully open the MS lOs.
26.0 MAINTAIN the following conditions:
RCS temperature <200°F Date / Time Salem 1 Pressurizer level 25% to 77% as indicated on LI-1649 (Refer to Exhibit 1 for a discussion of ACTUAL versus INDICATED level at PZR temperatures less than or equal to 200 OF).
RCS pressure between 320 psig to 350 psig as indicated on PL9876.
RHR in service with at least one RHR pump operating at a flow rate that maintains RCS temperature stable.
Page 13 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 4 (page 1 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 1.0 OBTAIN the following materials:
One copy of this attachment One radio One portable emergency light unit Key ring set (Key #5 [TI12])
A Security Master Key from the Unit 1 CRS (located on the Unit 1 Security Key Ring)
Tools (screwdriver and adjustable wrench).
2.0 OBTAIN information from the CRS on plant status AND RECORD the fire impacted area.
FIRE IMPACTED AREA Control Room Elev. 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room Relay Room Elev. 64' 4kV Vital Bus Switchgear Room 3.0 Is either elev. 64' or 84' Vital Bus Switchgear Room the fire impacted area?
NO I
GO TO Step 72.0 YES-->
V 4.0 PROCEED to El. 84' Auxiliary Building, Charging Pump Area.
5.0 IF the Control Room is the fire impacted area OR Unit 1 Relay Room is the fire impacted area, THEN CLOSE lCV464, Charging Cross Tie Isolation Valve (Unit 2 Aux, 84').
6.0 PROCEED to El. 84' Auxiliary Building, Seal Water Injection Filter Area.
7.0 ENSURE the following Seal Water Injection Valves CLOSED:
lCV83, SEAL WATER FILTER INLET.
lCV89, SEAL WATER FILTER INLET.
lCV95, SEAL WATER FILTER BYPASS.
Salem 1 Page 14 of 116
[C0363]
Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 2 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 8.0 PROCEED to El. 84' Auxiliary Building, Emergency Diesel Generator FOST Area.
NOTE Communication with the TSC/OSC may not be established at first due to the time needed to staff the facility. This is not a hold point.
9.0 ESTABLISH communication with the CRS via radio.
10.0 NOTIFY the CRS and Shift Maintenance Technician of I1SW21 and 12SW21, Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water, valve positions.
11.0 PROCEED to 1 C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Area.
NOTE The following step reinstates all non-SEC trips for the EDG and may result in the diesel tripping if it is operating without service water.
12.0 PLACE the following Keylock switches in BYPASS:
12.1 6911, FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS (Engine Control Panel) 12.2 69/2, FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS (Engine Control Panel) 12.3 69/3, FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS (Engine Control Panel)
NOTE The 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) provides information about Off-site Power availability.
13.0 Is Off-site Power supplying 1C 4Kv Vital Bus?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 16.0 I
V 14.0 DIRECT the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) to remove loads from 1C 4Kv Vital Bus lAW Step 24 of Attachment 6.
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ATTACHMENT 4 (page 3 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 15.0 WAIT until notified by the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) that 1C 4Kv Bus is stripped, 16.0 Is 1C EDG running?
YES NO-->
I GO TO Step 18.0 V
17.0 STOP 1C EDG, by placing the local switch (lC-DF-SS) to the STOP position.
18.0 At Panel1CDC1DA, 1C Diesel Generator Alternate DC Starter Terminal Box:
18.1 PLACE the following breakers in OFF:
A.
1CDC1DA1, Normal DC to 1C EDG Engine Controls from 1CCDC-34 B.
1CDC1DA2, Normal DC to 1C EDG Engine Controls from 1CCDC-36 C.
1CDC1DA5, Normal DC to 1C EDG Exciter from 1CCDC-32 18.2 PLACE the following breakers in ON:
A.
1CDC1DA3, Standby DC to 1C EDG Engine Controls from 1CDCDG-10 B.
1CDC1DA4, Standby DC to 1C EDG Engine Controls from 1CDCDG-7 C.
1CDC1DA6, Standby DC to 1C EDG Exciter from 1CDCDG-9 19.0 PLACE the following breakers at 1CDC2DA, NO lA, 1B, and 1C 125V Salem 1 DC Distribution Cabinet, in ON (located in 1 C EDG Control Area):
19.1 1CDC2DA7, 1C EDG Control & Alarm 19.2 1CDC2DA9, Ie EDG Control & Excitation 19.3 1CDC2DA10, 1C EDG Trip & Breaker Failure Protection 19.4 1CDC2DAX111CDC2DA1 (mechanically interlocked) 1CDCDG 125V DC Distribution Panel Main Breaker.
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S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 4 (page 4 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 20.0 CHECK lC-DF-GCP-l, lC DIESEL GEN LOADING SWindicates AUTO (lSOCR).
21.0 CHECK EXCITER REGULATOR REMOTE MANUAL-AUTOMATIC switch AUTOMATIC lamp is ON.
22.0 Is it necessary to start 1 C EDG?
YES NO-->
GO TO Step 35.0 I
V NOTE Local "ALARM PANEL", alarms MUST be reset first.
23.0 VERIFY the DUTR (lC-DF-GCP-2) is RESET.
24.0 START lC EDG by placing the local switch (lC-DF-SS) to START position.
25.0 CHECK the following lights are illuminated:
IDAE38-LT2 EDG Voltage IDAE38-LT3 EDG Speed 26.0 NOTIFY the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) and the CRS, that lC Diesel is operating and Step 38 of Attachment 6 may be performed.
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ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 5 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR NOTE Adequate time should be allotted for the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) to CLOSE the 1 C EDG Output and 12 Service Water Pump breakers.
CAUTION A diesel may run for up to 30 minutes unloaded with no service water, but will trip in approximately 5 minutes if operating in a loaded condition.
27.0 Is Service Water available as indicated on IDP9632I, 13 Service Water Diesel Gen Lube Oil Cooler & Jkt Wtr Ht Exch DP Ind, on Panel 740-1BB.
NO YES-->
GO TO Step 34.0 I
V 28.0 Is lC EDG operating with a load as indicated on 1 WM180?
NO YES-->
GO TO Step 32.0 I
V 29.0 Has lC EDG been operating without a load for >25 minutes?
NO YES-->
GO TO Step 32.0 I
V 30.0 NOTIFY the CRS and 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) that the SW valve lineup is not correct.
31.0 RETURN TO Step 27.0 Salem 1 Page 18 of 116 Time Time Time Time Rev. 24
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ATTACHMENT 4 (page 6 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 32.0 STOP 1 C EDG as follows:
32.1 DIRECT the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) to open the 1 C EDG Output Breaker.
32.2 WHEN notified by the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) that lC EDG Output Breaker is OPEN, PLACE the local switch (lC-DF-SS) to STOP position.
33.0 WHEN notified by the CRS that the SW valve lineup is correct, RETURN TO Step 23.0.
34.0 NOTIFY the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) that lC EDG Time is available for further loads and Step 39 of Attachment 6 may be performed.
35.0 PROCEED to lA Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Area.
NOTE The following step reinstates all non-SEC trips for the EDG.
36.0 PLACE following Keylock switches in BYPASS 36.1 69/1, FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS (Engine Control Panel) 36.2 69/2, FIRE EMERGENCY BY -PASS (Engine Control Panel) 36.3 69/3, FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS (Engine Control Panel)
NOTE The 4Kv Vital Bus SWitchgear Operator (#1 NEO) provides information about Off-site Power availability.
37.0 Is Off-site power supplying the lA 4Kv Vital Bus?
NO YES-->
GO TO Step 40.0 I
Time V
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ATTACHMENT 4 (page 7 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 38.0 DIRECT the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) to remove loads from lA 4Kv Vital Bus lAW Step 59 of Attachment 6.
39.0 WAIT until notified by the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) that lA 4Kv Bus is stripped.
40.0 Is lA EDG running?
YES NO-->
GO TO Step 42.0 I
V 41.0 STOP lA EDG by placing the local switch (IA-DF-SS) to the STOP position.
42.0 At PanellADCIDA, lA Diesel Generator Alternate DC Starter Terminal Box:
Salem 1 42.1 PLACE the following breakers in OFF:
A.
lADCIDA1, Normal DC to lA EDG Engine Controls from lAADC-26 B.
lADCIDA2, Normal DC to lA EDG Engine Controls from lAADC-28 C.
lADCIDA5, Normal DC to lA EDG Exciter from lAADC-24 42.2 PLACE the following breakers in ON:
A.
lADCIDA3, Standby DC to lA EDG Engine Controls from 1 CDCDG-2 B.
lADCIDA4, Standby DC to lA EDG Engine Controls from 1 CDCDG-4 C.
lADCIDA6, Standby DC to lA EDG Exciter from lCDCDG-3 Page 20 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 4 (page 8 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 43.0 PLACE the following breakers at lCDC2DA, NO lA, lB, & lC l25V DC Distribution Cabinet, in ON (located in lC EDG Control Area):
43.1 lCDC2DA2, lA EDG Trip & Breaker Failure Protection 43.2 lCDC2DA3, lA EDG Control & Excitation 43.3 lCDC2DA4, lA EDG Control & Alarm 44.0 CHECK lA-DF-GCP-l, lA DIESEL GEN LOADING SW indicates AUTO (lSOCR).
45.0 CHECK EXCITER REGULATOR REMOTE MANUAL-AUTOMATIC switch AUTOMATIC lamp is ON.
46.0 Is it necessary to start lA EDG?
YES I
NO-->
GO TO Step 51.0 V
NOTE Local "ALARM PANEL", alarms MUST be reset first.
47.0 VERIFY the DUTR (lA-DF-GCP-2) is RESET.
48.0 START lA EDG by placing the local switch (IA-DF-SS) to START position.
49.0 CHECK the following lights are illuminated on Generator Control Panel:
lDAE4-LT2 EDG Voltage lDAE4-LT3 EDG Speed 50.0 NOTIFY the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) and the CRS that lA EDG is operating and Step 70 of Attachment 6 may be performed.
Salem 1 Page 21 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 9 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 51.0 PROCEED to 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Area.
NOTE The following step reinstates all non-SEC trips for the EDG.
~----------------
52.0 PLACE the following Keylock switches in BYPASS:
52.1 69/1, FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS (Engine Control Panel) 52.2 69/2, FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS (Engine Control Panel) 52.3 69/3, FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS (Engine Control Panel)
NOTE The 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NED) provides information about Off-site Power availability.
53.0 Is Off-site power supplying the 1B 4Kv Vital Bus?
NO YES-->
GO TO Step 56.0 I
V 54.0 DIRECT the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) to remove loads from 1B 4Kv Vital Bus lAW Step 90 of Attachment 6.
55.0 WAIT until notified by the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) that the 1B 4Kv Bus is stripped.
56.0 Is 1B EDG running?
YES NO-->
GO TO Step 58.0 I
V 57.0 STOP 1B EDG by placing the local switch (lB-DF-SS) to the STOP position.
Salem 1 Page 22 of 116 Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 10 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 58.0 At Panel lBDClDA, lB Diesel Generator Alternate DC Starter Terminal Box:
58.1 PLACE the following breakers in OFF:
A.
IBDClDAl, Normal DC to IB EDG Engine Controls from IBBDC-6 B.
IBDCIDA2, Normal DC to IB EDG Engine Controls from IBBDC-8 C.
IBDClDA5, Normal DC to IB EDG Exciter from IBBDC-4 58.2 PLACE the following breakers in ON:
A.
IBDCIDA3, Standby DC to IB EDG Engine Controls from I CDCDG-6 B.
IBDClDA4, Standby DC to IB EDG Engine Controls from I CDCDG-8 C.
lBDCIDA6, Standby DC to IB EDG Exciter from lCDCDG-5 59.0 PLACE the following at ICDC2DA, No lA, IB, & lC 125V DC Distribution Panel, in ON (located in IC EDG Control Area):
59.1 ICDC2DA5, IB EDG Control and Excitation 59.2 ICDC2DA6, IB EDG Trip & Breaker Failure Protection 59.3 lCDC2DA8, IB EDG Control and Alarm 60.0 CHECK IB-DF-GCP-I, IB DIESEL GEN LOADING SW indicates AUTO (ISOCR).
61.0 CHECK EXCITER REGULATOR REMOTE MANUAL-AUTOMATIC switch AUTOMATIC lamp is ON.
Salem 1 Page 23 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 11 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 62.0 Is it necessary to start IB EDG?
YES NO-->
GO TO Step 67.0 I
V NOTE Local "ALARM PANEL", alarms MUST be reset first.
63.0 VERIFY the DUTR (lB-DF-GCP-2) is RESET.
64.0 START 1B EDG by placing the local switch (lB-DF-SS) to START position.
65.0 CHECK the following lights are illuminated:
1DAE23-LT2 EDG Voltage 1DAE23-LT3 EDG Speed 66.0 NOTIFY the CRS and the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) that 1 B EDG is operating and Step 104 of Attachment 6 may be performed.
67.0 NOTIFY the CRS that Steps 1 through 66 of Attachment 4 are completed.
68.0 Are any EDGs operating?
YES NO-->
GO TO Step 77.0 I
V 69.0 INITIATE Diesel Generator Running Checks lAW the applicable procedure for each operating EDG:
S1.0P-SO.DG-000l(Q), lA Diesel Generator Operation S1.0P-SO.DG-0002(Q), IB Diesel Generator Operation S 1.OP-SO.DG-0003(Q), 1 C Diesel Generator Operation Salem 1 Page 24 of 116 Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 4 (page 12 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 70.0 IF any Fuel Oil Day Tank is NOT being maintained greater than 27 inches, THEN OPERATE either Fuel Oil Transfer Pump to maintain all Fuel Oil Day Tank levels greater than 27 inches as follows:
70.1 At lA YIDA No. lA Diesel Generator 230V Vital Control Center:
A OPEN breaker lA YIDA2D, 11 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP.
B OPEN pan door for lA YIDA2D.
C PLACE EMERGINORM switch in the EMERGENCY position.
D CLOSE pan door for lAYIDA2D.
E OPERATE breaker lAYIDA2D as necessary to start and stop 11 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump.
(Red emergency light illuminates when breaker is closed.)
70.2 At IBYIDA No. IB Diesel Generator 230V Vital Control Center:
A OPEN breaker IBYIDA2D, 12 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP.
B OPEN pan door for IBYIDA2D.
C PLACE EMERGINORM switch in the EMERGENCY position.
D CLOSE pan door for IBYIDA2D.
E OPERATE breaker IBYIDA2D as necessary to start and stop 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump.
(Red emergency light illuminates when breaker is closed.)
71.0 WHEN relieved by an NEO, GO TO Step 77.0 Salem 1 Page 25 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 13 of 13)
REACTOR OPERATOR 72.0 IF Unit 1 84' Switchgear Room is the fire impacted area, THEN CLOSE lCV464, Charging Cross Tie Isolation Valve (Unit 2 Aux, 84').
73.0 PROCEED to the Emergency Diesel Generator rooms.
NOTE Communication with the TSC/OSC may not be established at first due to the time needed to staff the facility. This is not a hold point.
74.0 ESTABLISH communication with the CRS.
75.0 WHEN notified by the CRS that the CVCS Cross-Connect and the Alternate Shutdown Transfer Panel (ASTP-l) are aligned:
75.1 At lA EDG engine, TRIP lA EDG by pulling on the Overspeed Trip Handle.
75.2 At IB EDG engine, TRIP IB EDG by pulling on the Overspeed Trip Handle.
75.3 At 1 C EDG engine, TRIP 1 C EDG by pulling on the Overspeed Trip Handle.
76.0 NOTIFY the CRS that all EDGs are TRIPPED lAW Step 75 of Attachment 4.
77.0 PROCEED to the Hot Shutdown Panel.
Salem 1 Page 26 of 116 Rev. 24
~~~~----------------------------------
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S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 5 (Page 1 of 9)
PLANT OPERATOR 1.0 OBTAIN the following materials:
One copy of this attachment One radio One portable emergency light unit Key ring set (JAM, CATI02)
A Security Master Key from the Unit 1 CRS (located on the Unit 1 Security Key Ring)
Tools (screwdriver, adjustable wrench, and fuse puller) 2.0 OBTAIN information from the CRS on plant status AND RECORD the fire impacted area.
FIRE IMPACTED AREA Control Room Elev. 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room Relay Room Elev. 64' 4kV Vital Bus Switchgear Room 3.0 PROCEED to the El. 84' Auxiliary Building, Hot Shutdown Panel area.
NOTE
[C0363]
Communication with the TSC/OSC may not be established at first due to the time needed to staff the facility. This is not a hold point.
4.0 ESTABLISH communication with the CRS via radio.
5.0 Is either the Elev. 64' or 84' Vital Bus Switchgear Room the fire impacted area?
NO I
YES-->
GO TO Step 12.0 Time V
Salem 1 Page 27 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 5 (Page 2 of 9)
PLANT OPERATOR 6.0 At No.1 Unit Service Water Charging Pump Room Cooler Flow Panel 229-1B, OPEN 1 SW185, No. 11 Chg Pump LO Cont Valve, as follows:
6.1 CLOSE manual isolation valve 1 SWI85-AlS, Air supply to ISW185 via SV-605.
6.2 OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator for SV-605.
7.0 At No.1 Unit Service Water Charging Pump Room Cooler Flow Panel 229-1C, OPEN ISWI99, No. 12 Chg Pump LO Cont Valve, as follows:
7.1 CLOSE manual isolation valve ISWI99-AlS, Air supply to ISW199 via SV-607.
7.2 OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator for SV-607.
NOTE 1 CV55 design flowrate in the CLOSED position is 40 GPM with control air supply 1CA2015 in NORMAL position.
1 CV55 fails OPEN on a loss of air.
8.0 VERIFY lCA2015, CONTROL AIR SUPPLY, in NORMAL position.
NOTE The following indications and controls are available for local operation 1FI-128A, Charging Pump Flow Indication 1 PI-142B, 11 and 12 Charging Pump Pressure Indication 1 L T114, VCT Level 9.0 At 11-12-13 Charging Pumps Flow and Pressure Panel 216-1, CONTROL lCV55, Charging Flow Control Valve, as follows:
Salem 1 9.1 At IHC-128G, No. 11 & 12 Charging Pumps Flow to Regen HX, PLACE local EIP Bypass Line Selector Valve in MANUAL.
9.2 ADJUST lCV55 utilizing the installed Manual Hand Air Operator to control Pressurizer Level 25% to 77% as indicated on LI-1649.
by raising air pressure.
Page 28 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 5 (Page 3 of 9)
PLANT OPERATOR 10.0 PLACE the UHFNHF MANUAL TRANSFER SWITCH to EMERGENCY position (directly across from Hot Shutdown Panel).
11.0 GO TO Step 13.0.
12.0 ALIGN the HSD Panel 213-1 to the Unit 2 A8DS Inverter power supply Time as follows:
NOTE The following Hot Shutdown Panel CHANNEL "0" section instrumentation is associated with the AUX SHUTDOWN TRANSFER PANEL (ASTP) power supply transfer alignment:
SG Levels (LI-1640! LI-1641! LI-1642! LI-1643)
SG Pressures (PI-1644! PI-1645! PI-1646! PI-1647)
Pressurizer Pressure (PI-1648)
Pressurizer Level (LI-1649)
Salem 1 12.1 At the No.1 UNIT AUX SHUTDOWN TRANSF PNL, ASTP-l, ISOLATE the lASDS power supply as follows:
A.
UNLOCK AND OPEN the panel door.
B.
OPEN lASTPIB5, SI ASTP PANEL MAIN FEEDER BREAKER.
C.
CLOSE 1 ASTPIB 1, 81 A8TP CROSS-TIE BREAKER.
D.
CLOSE the panel door.
Page 29 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 5 (Page 4 of 9)
PLANT OPERATOR 12.2 At the No.2 UNIT AUX SHUTDOWN TRANSF PNL, ASTP-2, ALIGN the 2ASDS power supply as follows:
A.
UNLOCK AND OPEN the panel door.
B.
VERIFY 2ASTPIB5, S2 ASTP PANEL MAIN FEEDER BREAKER, is CLOSED.
C.
CLOSE 2ASTPIB1, S2 ASTP PANEL CROSS-TIE BREAKER.
D.
CLOSE the panel door.
12.3 NOTIFY the CRS that Hot Shutdown Panel 213-1 is aligned to Unit 2 ASDS Inverter Power Supply.
NOTE The following indications are available for local operation:
- 13 AFW Pump Suction Pressure
- 13 AFW Pump Discharge Pressure
- 13 AFW Pump Steam Pressure
- 2, TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW PUMP RESTORATION, provides guidance to RESET 1 MS52, OVERSPEED TRIP MECHANISM.
13.0 Is any Motor Driven AFW Pump running?
YES I
NO-->
GO TO Step 23.0 Time V
14.0 At 13 AFW Pump-Turbine governor, ADJUST 13 AFW Pump Manual Speed Setting Knurled Knob to minimum.
Salem 1 Page 30 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 5 (page 5 of 9)
PLANT OPERATOR 15.0 At llAFll, No. 11 Steam Generator AFW Inlet Valve:
15.1 Manually ADJUST the hand jack for llAFll to maintain the valve's present position.
15.2 CLOSE the manual isolation valve, lIAFII-A/S to pressure regulator in No.1 Unit Redundant Air Supply llAFll Panel 700-1K.
15.3 OPEN the drain cock ofthe pressure regulator.
15.4 CLOSE llAF11.
16.0 At 12AFl1, No. 12 Steam Generator AFW Inlet Valve:
Salem 1 16.1 Manually ADJUST the hand jack for 12AFl1 to maintain the valve's present position.
16.2 CLOSE manual isolation valve 12AFI1-A/S to pressure regulator in No.1 Unit Redundant Air Supply 12AFll PaneI700-1X.
16.3 OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator.
16.4 CLOSE 12AFl1.
Page 31 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 5 (page 6 of 9)
PLANT OPERATOR 17.0 At 13AF 11, No. 13 Steam Generator AFW Inlet Valve:
17.1 Manually ADJUST the hand jack for 13AFll to maintain the valve's present position.
17.2 CLOSE manual isolation valve 13AFI1-AiS to pressure regulator in No.1 Unit Redundant Air Supply 13AF11 PaneI700-lJ.
17.3 OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator.
17.4 CLOSE 13AFll.
18.0 At 14AFll, No. 14 Steam Generator AFW Inlet Valve:
18.1 Manually ADJUST the hand jack for 14AFll to maintain the valve's present position.
18.2 CLOSE manual isolation valve 14AFll-AiS to pressure regulator in No.1 Unit Redundant Air Supply 14AFll PaneI700-1L.
18.3 OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator.
18.4 CLOSE 14AFll.
19.0 At No. 13 Aux Feedwater Panel 207-1, Salem 1 19.1 OPEN IMS132, Steam Supply to No. 13 AFW Pump Turbine, as follows:
A.
CLOSE the manual air isolation valve IMSI32-AlS to SV-509-1 (inside left door at bottom of panel.
B.
OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator for SV-509-1.
19.2 OPEN IMS53, No. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Governor Valve, as follows:
A.
CLOSE the manual air isolation valve FA-3964-AlS to FA-3964.
B.
OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator for FA-3964.
Page 32 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT :;
(Page 7 of 9)
PLANT OPERATOR 20.0 RAISE speed of 13 AFW Pump with the Manual Speed Setting Knurled Knob until discharge pressure indicates 1500 psig as indicated on PL-1686-1 at Panel 207-1.
21.0 ADJUST AFl1 valves to maintain all Steam Generator levels between 15% and 33%
Narrow Range as indicated on LI-1640 through LI-1643.
22.0 GO TO Step 30.0 23.0 At No. 13 Aux Feedwater Panel 207-1, 23.1 OPEN IMSI32, Steam Supply to No. 13 AFW Pump Turbine, as follows:
A.
CLOSE the manual air isolation valve IMS132-A/S to SV-509-1 (inside left door at bottom).
B.
OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator for SV-509-1.
23.2 OPEN IMS53, No. 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Governor Valve, as follows:
A.
CLOSE the manual air isolation valve FA-3964-A/S to FA-3964.
B.
OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator for FA-3964.
24.0 CONTROL speed of 13 AFW Pump with the Manual Speed Setting Knurled Knob until discharge pressure is :::: 100 psig (PL-1686-1 at Panel 207-1) greater than Steam Generator Pressures at Hot Shutdown Panel 213-1.
25.0 At llAFll, No. 11 Steam Generator AFW Inlet Valve:
25.1 Manually ADJUST the hand jack for l1AFll to maintain the valve's present position.
25.2 CLOSE the manual isolation valve, lIAFII-A/S to pressure regulator in No.1 Unit Redundant Air Supply l1AFll Panel 700-1K.
25.3 OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator.
Time Salem 1 Page 33 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 5 (page 8 of9)
PLANT OPERATOR 26.0 At 12AFll, No. 12 Steam Generator AFW Inlet Valve:
26.1 Manually ADJUST the hand jack for 12AFIl to maintain the valve's present position.
26.2 CLOSE manual isolation valve 12AFII-A/S to pressure regulator in No.1 Unit Redundant Air Supply 12AFli PaneI700-1X.
26.3 OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator.
27.0 At 13AFll, No. 13 Steam Generator AFW Inlet Valve:
27.1 Manually ADJUST the hand jack for 13AFll to maintain the valve's present position.
27.2 CLOSE manual isolation valve 13AFII-A/S to pressure regulator in No.1 Unit Redundant Air Supply 13AFll PaneI700-lJ.
27.3 OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator.
28.0 At 14AFll, No. 14 Steam Generator AFW Inlet Valve:
28.1 Manually ADJUST the hand jack for 14AFll to maintain the valve's present position.
28.2 CLOSE manual isolation valve 14AFII-A/S to pressure regulator in No.1 Unit Redundant Air Supply 14AFll PaneI700-1L.
28.3 OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator.
29.0 ADJUST AFll valves as required to maintain all Steam Generator levels between 15% and 33% Narrow Range as indicated on LI-1640 through LI-1643.
30.0 At the Hot Shutdown Panel, PLACE the Neutron Flux Monitoring 115V AC Pwr XFER switch in the lASDS FIRE PROT position.
31.0 VERIFY neutron count rate is dropping or the reactor is subcritical as indicated on NEUTRON FLUX SR XA-6554I and PR XA-6555J.
Salem 1 Page 34 of 116 Rev. 24
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S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 5 (page 9 of 9)
PLANT OPERATOR 32.0 IF the fIre impacted area is either the Control Room or the Relay Room, THEN at No.1 Unit Redundant Air Supply I1SW122 Panel 700-1H, OPEN I1SW122, CC HX SW Inlet Valve, as follows:
NOTE No. 1 Unit Redundant Air Supply 11 SW122 Panel 700-1 H is located in hallway outside of 11 CC Hx Room.
32.1 CLOSE I1SWI22-A/S manual isolation valve to pressure regulator.
32.2 OPEN the drain cock of the pressure regulator.
33.0 MAINTAIN the following parameters:
Steam Generator Levels - 15% to 33% Narrow Range 11 Steam Generator: LI -1640 12 Steam Generator: LI -1641 13 Steam Generator: LI-1642 14 Steam Generator: LI-1643.
CAUTION Steam Generator Differential Pressure Safety Injection will occur at 100 psi differential pressure.
Steam Generator Pressures - 1005 psig (Tave = 547°F):
11 Steam Generator: PI-1644 12 Steam Generator: PI-1645 13 Steam Generator: PI-1646 14 Steam Generator: PI-1647.
Pressurizer Level 25% to 77% as indicated ofLI-1649.
Pressurizer Pressure 2200 psig to 2250 psig as indicated on PI-1648.
34.0 NOTIFY the CRS that Steps 1 through 33 of Attachment 5 are completed.
Salem 1 Page 35 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (page 1 of 23)
- lNEO 1.0 OBTAIN the following materials:
One copy of this attachment One radio One portable emergency light unit A Security Master Key from the Unit 1 CRS (located on the Unit 1 Security Key Ring)
Electrical gloves Tools (wire cutters, rachet wrench and 5/8" socket) 2.0 OBTAIN information from the CRS on plant status AND RECORD the fire impacted area.
FIRE IMPACTED AREA Control Room Elev. 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room Relay Room Elev. 64' 4kV Vital Bus Switchgear Room 3.0 Is either the Elev. 64' or 84' Vital Bus Switchgear Room the fire impacted area?
YES I
NO-->
GO TO Step 8.0 V
4.0 Is the Elev. 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room the fire impacted area?
YES I
NO-->
GO TO Step 126.0 V
5.0 PROCEED to the Relay Room.
Salem 1 Page 36 of 116
[C0363]
Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 2 of 23)
[UFSAR 9.5.1.4.3]
NOTE Deenergizing the circuitry at the AADC Distribution Cabinet ensures 1 RC40 and 1 RC43, Reactor Head Vent Isolation valves, fail closed.
6.1 At lADC2AX, lAADC 125V DC DISTRIBUTION CABINET, OPEN lADC2AXl, REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVES lRC40 & lRC43.
NOTE Deenergizing the circuitry at the BBDC Distribution Cabinet ensures the following valves fail closed:
1 CV2 and 1 CV277 - Letdown Isolation 1 RC41 and 1 RC42 - Reactor Head Vent Isolation Salem 1 6.2 At IBDC2AX, IBBDC 125V DC DISTRIBUTION CABINET:
OPEN IBDC2AX5, VCT LVL & DEGAS VLVS & RCS LTDWN VLVS lCV2, 35, 243, & 277.
OPEN IBDC2AXl, CONTROL AIR HDR B ISLN VALVE & RX HEAD VENT V ALVES.
Page 37 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (page 3 of 23)
- lNEO NOTE Deenergizing the circuitry at the CCDC Distribution Cabinet ensures:
The following valves fail closed:
1CV131 and 1CV278 - Excess Letdown Isolation 11-14GB4 - SGBD Isolation The trip solenoid for 1MS52, 13 AUX FEED PUMP TRIP VALVE, remains de-energized to facilitate local reset capability.
6.3 At 1 CDC2AX, 1 CCDC 125V DC DISTRIBUTION CABINET:
OPEN 1CDC2AX22, VALVES 1SJ19, 1CV131, 1CV134, & 1CV278.
OPEN 1 CDC2AX23, 13 AUX FEED PUMP CONTROL
& ALTERNATE SUCTION VALVE.
OPEN 1CDC2AX33, 11GB4-14GB4 SG BLDN ISOLATION VALVES.
7.0 GO TO Step 11.0 8.0 PROCEED to Elev. 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room.
9.0 PROCEED to 1A 460VAC Vital Bus AND PERFORM the following:
Salem 1 9.1 OPEN 1AX1AX7X#, 13 CHARGING PUMP BREAKER CONTROL POWER.
9.2 OPEN 1AX1AX7X, 13 CHARGING PUMP.
Page 38 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 4 of 23)
[UFSAR 9.5.1.4.3]
NOTE Deenergizing the AADC Distribution Cabinet ensures 1 RC40 and 1 RC43, Reactor Head Vent Isolation Valves, fail closed.
10.1 At lADCIAX, lA 125V DC BUS, OPEN lADCIAXI9, lAADC 125V DC DISTRIBUTION CABINET (REGULAR).
NOTE Deenergizing the BBDC Distribution Cabinet ensures the following valves fail closed:
1 CV2 and 1 CV277 - Letdown Isolation 1 RC41 and 1 RC42 - Reactor Head Vent Isolation 10.2 At IBDCIAX, IB 125V DC BUS, OPEN IBDCIAX20, IBBDC I25V DC DISTRIBUTION CABINET (REG POWER).
NOTE Deenergizing the CCDC Distribution Cabinet ensures:
The following valves fail closed:
1 CV131 and 1 CV278 - Excess Letdown Isolation 11-14GB4 - SGBD Isolation The trip solenoid for 1MS52, 13 AUX FEED PUMP TRIP VALVE, remains de-energized to facilitate local reset capability.
Salem 1 10.3 At ICDCIAX, IC I25V DC BUS, OPEN lCDCIAX21, lCCDC 125V DC DISTRIBUTION CABINET (REGULAR).
Page 39 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (page 5 of 23)
- lNEO 11.0 PROCEED to Elev. 64' 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Room.
NOTE Communication with the TSC/OSC may not be established at first due to the time needed to staff the facility. This is not a hold point.
12.0 ESTABLISH communication with the CRS, TSC/OSC, and EDG Operator (RO).
CAUTION A fire in the Control Room, Relay Room, or the 84' Switchgear Room could cause a fire induced short in the 4Kv Vital Bus 125V DC control circuits that may lead to spurious breaker operation. Therefore, the 125V DC deion is opened that will prevent spurious breaker operation for the individual 4Kv Vital Bus breakers.
13.0 OPEN the following 125V DC breakers in the back of the cubicle for lA 4Kv Vital Bus 4Kv PT:
lADIAXX1, lA 4Kv Vital Bus Reg Control Power from lADC30.
lADIAXX2, lA 4Kv Vital Bus Emer Control Power from IBDC30.
14.0 OPEN the following 125V DC breakers in the back of the cubicle for IB 4Kv Vital Bus 4Kv PT:
IBDIAXX1, IB 4Kv Vital Bus Reg Control Power from IBDC31.
IBD IAXX2, 1 B 4K v Bus Emerg Control Power from IADC31.
15.0 OPEN the following 125V DC breakers in the back of the cubicle for IC 4Kv Vital Bus 4Kv PTs:
ICDIAXXI, IC 4Kv Vital Bus Reg Control Power from ICDC32.
ICDIAXX2, IC 4Kv Vital Bus Emerg Control Power from IBDC32.
Salem 1 Page 40 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 6 of 23)
- INEO NOTE
+
The only reliable breaker indication is the OPEN - CLOSED indicator inside the cubicle door on the front of each breaker.
+
All breaker operations are accomplished utilizing the Manual Trip or Close button inside each breaker cubicle.
16.0 Is the Elev. 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room the fire impacted area?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 123.0 I
V 17.0 Does breaker lCDIAX13CSD, 13 Station Power Transformer Infeed, indicate CLOSED and voltage is between 4.3Kv and 4.5Kv as indicated on Bus Voltmeter, IVM60, on lC 4Kv Vital Bus 4Kv PT cubicle door?
NO I
V YES-->
GO TO Step 41.0 (Off-site Power Supplying) 18.0 Does breaker lCDIAXI4CSD, 14 Station Power Transformer Infeed, indicate CLOSED and voltage is between 4.3Kv and 4.5Kv as indicated on Bus Voltmeter, IVM60, on lC 4Kv Vital Bus 4Kv PT cubicle door?
NO I
V YES-->
GO TO Step 41.0 (Off-site Power Supplying) 19.0 NOTIFY the EDG Operator (RO) that Off-site power is NOT supplying lC 4Kv Vital Bus.
20.0 PROCEED to breaker lCDIAX4D, lC 460V & 230V VITAL BUS TRANSFORMERS.
21.0 OPEN lCDIAX4D#, 125V DC CONTROL POWER.
Salem 1 Page 41 of 116 Time Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 7 of 23)
- lNEO 22.0 Is 4Kv Infeed to IC 460V and 230V Vital Buses, breaker CLOSED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 24.0 I
V 23.0 CLOSE IC 460V & 230V Vital Bus Transformers breaker as follows:
23.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
23.2 OPERATE eccentric in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates CHGD.
23.3 REMOVE wrench.
23.4 DEPRESS Manual Close control button.
23.S CHECK breaker indicates CLOSED.
Time 24.0 WHEN notified by the EDG Operator (RO) to remove loads from IC 4Kv Vital Bus, 24.1 OPEN the I2SV DC control power AND OPEN each 4Kv breaker listed by depressing the Manual Trip Button:
ICDIAX13CSD, 13 Station Power Transformer Infeed ICDIAX2D, 12 Containment Spray Pump ICDIAX3D,11 Service Water Pump lCDIAXSD, 12 Safety Injection Pump lCDIAX8D, 12 Service Water Pump lCDIAX9D, 12 Charging Pump lCDIAXlOD, 13 Component Cooling Pump lCDIAXI4CSD, 14 Station Power Transformer Infeed 24.2 OPEN the lCDIAX6D#, 12SV DC CONTROL POWER.
24.3 OPEN lCDIAX6D, lC Diesel Generator, 4Kv breaker by depressing the Manual Trip Button....
2S.0 NOTIFY EDG Operator (RO) that the lC 4Kv Vital Bus is stripped.
Salem 1 Page 42 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (page 8 of 23)
- lNEO 26.0 PROCEED to breaker 1CD1AX8D, 12 Service Water Pump, with wrench.
27.0 Does 12 Service Water Pump breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 29.0 I
V 28.0 Inside 12 SW Pump breaker cubicle:
28.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
28.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
28.3 REMOVE the wrench.
29.0 PROCEED to breaker 1CD1AX9D, 12 Charging Pump, with wrench.
30.0 Does 12 Charging Pump breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 32.0 I
V 31.0 Inside 12 Charging Pump breaker cubicle:
31.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
31.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
31.3 REMOVE the wrench.
32.0 PROCEED to breaker 1CD1AX10D, 13 Component Cooling Pump, with wrench.
Salem 1 Page 43 of 116 Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 9 of 23)
- lNEO 33.0 Does 13 Component Cooling Pump breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO I
YES-->
GO TO Step 35.0 V
34.0 Inside 13 Component Cooling Pump breaker cubicle:
34.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
34.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
34.3 REMOVE the wrench.
35.0 PROCEED to breaker lCDIAX6D, lC EDG Output, with wrench.
36.0 Does 1 C EDG output breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 38.0 I
V 37.0 Inside lC EDG breaker cubicle:
37.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
37.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
37.3 REMOVE the wrench.
38.0 WHEN the EDG Operator (RO) reports lC EDG is operational, 38.1 CLOSE lCDIAX6D, lC EDG Output Breaker 38.2 CLOSE lCDIAX8D, 12 Service Water Pump Breaker Salem 1 Page 44 of 116 Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 10 of23)
- INEO 39.0 WHEN notified by EDG Operator (RO) lC EDG is available for further loads, 39.1 WHEN confirmed with the EDG Operator (RO)
RCP Seal Water Injection is isolated, CLOSE lCDIAX9D, 12 Charging Pump Breaker.
39.2 WHEN confirmed with the Control Room Supervisor (CRS)
RCP Thermal Barrier Return (1 CC 131) is isolated, CLOSE lCDIAXI0D, 13 Component Cooling Pump Breaker.
40.0 GO TO Step 50.0.
41.0 NOTIFY the EDG Operator (RO) that Off-site power is supplying lC 4Kv Vital Bus.
42.0 VERIFY lCDIAX4D, lC 460V & 230V Vital Bus Transformers, is CLOSED.
43.0 Is breaker lCDIAX3D, 11 Service Water Pump, CLOSED?
YES NO -->
GO TO Step 46.0 I
V 44.0 VERIFY the following breakers OPEN:
lCDIAX2D, 12 Containment Spray Pump lCDIAX5D, 12 Safety Injection Pump lCDIAX8D, 12 Service Water Pump 45.0 GO TO Step 49.0.
46.0 Is breaker lCDIAX8D, 12 Service Water Pump, CLOSED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 48.0 I
V 47.0 CLOSE breaker lCDIAX8D, 12 Service Water Pump, by depressing the Manual Close button.
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S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 11 of 23)
- INEO 48.0 VERIFY the following breakers OPEN:
lCDIAXSD, 12 Safety Injection Pump lCDIAX3D,11 Service Water Pump lCDIAX2D, 12 Containment Spray Pump 49.0 VERIFY the following breakers CLOSED:
lCDIAX9D, 12 Charging Pump lCDIAXI0D, 13 Component Cooling Pump SO.O NOTIFY the CRS that lC 4Kv Vital Bus and essential loads are energized.
51.0 PROCEED to lA 4Kv Vital Bus.
NOTE The only reliable breaker indication is the OPEN - CLOSED indicator inside the cubicle door on the front of each breaker.
All breaker operations are accomplished utilizing the Manual Trip or close button inside each breaker cubicle.
S2.0 Does breaker lADIAXI3ASD, 13 Station Power Transformer Infeed, indicate CLOSED and voltage is between 4.3Kv and 4.SKv as Salem 1 indicated on Bus Voltmeter, IVM62, on lA 4Kv Vital Bus 4Kv PTcubic1e door?
NO I
V YES-->
GO TO Step 72.0 (Off-site Power Supplying)
Page 46 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 12 of 23)
- INEO 53.0 Does breaker 1AD1AX14ASD, 14 Station Power Transformer Infeed, indicate CLOSED and voltage is between 4.3K v and 4.5K v as indicated on Bus Voltmeter, 1VM62, on 1A 4Kv Vital Bus 4Kv PT cubicle door?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 72.0 I
(Off-site Power Supplying)
V 54.0 NOTIFY the EDG Operator (RO) that Off-Site power is not supplying the 1A 4Kv Vital Bus.
55.0 PROCEED to breaker 1AD1AX4D, 1A 460V & 230V Vital Bus Transformers.
56.0 OPEN 1AD1AX4D#, 125V DC CONTROL POWER.
57.0 Is 1A 460V and 230V Vital Bus Transformers breaker CLOSED?
NO I
YES-->
GO TO Step 59.0 V
58.0 CLOSE 1A 460V & 230V Vital Bus Transformers breaker as follows:
Salem 1 58.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
58.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates CHGD.
58.3 REMOVE wrench.
58.4 DEPRESS Manual Close Control button.
58.5 CHECK breaker indicates CLOSED.
Page 47 of 116 Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (page 13 of 23)
- lNEO 59.0 WHEN notified by the EDG Operator (RO) to remove loads from lA 4Kv Vital Bus, 59.1 OPEN the 125V DC control power AND OPEN each 4Kv breaker listed by depressing the Manual Trip Button:
lADIAX13ASD, 13 Station Power Transformer Infeed lADIAXID, 11 Auxiliary Feed Pump lADIAX2D, 11 Containment Spray Pump lADIAX3D, 15 Service Water Pump lADIAX5D, 11 Safety Injection Pump lADIAX7D, 11 RHR Pump lADIAX8D, 16 Service Water Pump lADIAXI0D, 11 Component Cooling Pump lADIAXI4ASD, 14 Station Power Transformer Infeed 59.2 OPEN lADIAX6D#, 125V DC CONTROL POWER.
59.3 OPEN lADIAX6D, lA Diesel Generator, by depressing the Manual Trip Button.
60.0 NOTIFY the EDG Operator (RO) that lA 4Kv Vital Bus is stripped.
61.0 PROCEED to breaker lADIAX3D, 15 Service Water Pump, with wrench.
62.0 Does 15 Service Water Pump breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO I
YES-->
GO TO Step 64.0 V
63.0 Inside 15 SW Pump breaker cubicle:
Salem 1 63.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
63.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
63.3 REMOVE the wrench.
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S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 14 of23)
- INEO 64.0 PROCEED to breaker lADIAXlOD, 11 Component Cooling Pump, with wrench.
65.0 Does 11 Component Cooling Pump breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 67.0 I
V 66.0 Inside 11 Component Cooling Pump breaker cubicle:
66.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
66.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
66.3 REMOVE the wrench.
67.0 PROCEED to breaker lADIAX6D, lA EDG Output, with wrench.
68.0 Does lA EDG breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 70.0 I
V 69.0 Inside lA EDG breaker cubicle:
Salem 1 69.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
69.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
69.3 REMOVE the wrench.
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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 15 of 23)
- INEO 70.0 WHEN the EDG Operator (RO) reports lA EDG is operational, 70.1 CLOSE IADIAX6D, IA EDG Output Breaker.
70.2 CLOSE IADIAX3D, 15 Service Water Pump.
70.3 WHEN confirmed with the Control Room Supervisor (CRS)
RCP Thermal Barrier Return (ICCI3I) is isolated, CLOSE IADIAXIOD, 11 Component Cooling Pump breaker.
71.0 GO TO Step 81.0.
72.0 NOTIFY the EDG Operator (RO) that Off-site power is supplying IA 4Kv Vital Bus.
73.0 VERIFY lADIAX4D, IA 460V & 230V Vital Bus Transformers, is CLOSED.
74.0 Is breaker lADIAX3D, 15 Service Water Pump, CLOSED?
YES NO -->
GO TO Step 77.0 I
V 75.0 VERIFY the following breakers OPEN:
lADIAXID, 11 Auxiliary Feed Pump lADIAX2D, 11 Containment Spray Pump lADIAX5D, 11 Safety Injection Pump lADIAX7D, 11 RHRPump IADIAX8D, 16 Service Water Pump 76.0 GO TO Step 80.0.
77.0 Is breaker lADIAX8D, 16 Service Water Pump, CLOSED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 79.0 I
V 78.0 CLOSE breaker lADIAX8D, 16 Service Water Pump, by depressing the Manual Close button.
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ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 16 of 23)
- INEO 79.0 VERIFY the following breakers OPEN:
lADIAX7D, 11 RHRPump lADIAX5D, 11 Safety Injection Pump lADIAX3D, 15 Service Water Pump lADIAX2D, 11 Containment Spray Pump lADIAXID, 11 Auxiliary Feed Pump 80.0 VERIFY lADIAXI0D, II Component Cooling Pump, is CLOSED.
81.0 NOTIFY the CRS that lA 4Kv Vital Bus and essential loads are energized.
82.0 PROCEED to IB 4Kv Vital Bus.
NOTE The only reliable breaker indication is the OPEN - CLOSED indicator inside the cubicle door on the front of each breaker.
All breaker operations are accomplished utilizing the Manual Trip or Close button inside each breaker cubicle.
83.0 Does breaker IBDIAXI3BSD, 13 Station Power Transformer Infeed, indicate CLOSED and voltage is between 4.3Kv and 4.5Kv as indicated on Bus Voltmeter, IVM61, on IB 4Kv Vital Bus 4Kv PT cubical door?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 108.0 I
(Off-Site Power Supplying)
V Salem 1 Page 51 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (page 17 of 23)
- INEO 84.0 Does breaker 1BD1AX14BSD, 14 Station Power Transformer Infeed, indicate CLOSED and voltage is between 4.3Kv and 4.5Kv as indicated on Bus Voltmeter, 1VM61, on 1B 4Kv Vital Bus 4Kv PT cubical door?
NO I
V YES-->
GO TO Step 108.0 (Off-Site Power Supplying) 85.0 NOTIFY the EDG Operator (RO) that Off-Site power is not supplying the 1B 4Kv Vital Bus.
86.0 PROCEED to 1BD1AX4D, 1B 460V & 230V Vital Bus Transformers breaker.
87.0 OPEN 1BD1AX4D#, 125V DC CONTROL POWER.
88.0 Is IB 460V & 230V Vital Bus Transformers breaker CLOSED?
NO I
YES-->
GO TO Step 90.0 V
89.0 CLOSE 1B 460V & 230V Vital Bus Transformers breaker as follows:
Salem 1 89.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
89.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
89.3 REMOVE wrench.
89.4 DEPRESS Manual Close Control button.
89.5 CHECK breaker indicates CLOSED.
Page 52 of 116 Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (page 18 of 23)
- INEO 90.0 WHEN notified by the EDG Operator (RO) to remove loads from IB 4Kv Vital Bus, 90.1 OPEN the 125V DC control power AND OPEN each 4Kv breaker listed by depressing the Manual Trip Button:
IBDIAX13BSD, 13 Station Power Transformer Infeed IBDIAXID, 12 Auxiliary Feed Pump IBDIAX3D, 13 Service Water Pump IBDIAX7D, 12 Residual Heat Removal Pump IBDIAX8D, 14 Service Water Pump IBDIAX9D, 11 Charging Pump IBDIAXlOD, 12 Component Cooling Pump IBDIAXI4BSD, 14 Station Power Transformer Infeed 90.2 OPEN IBDIAX6D#, 125V DC CONTROL POWER.
90.3 OPEN IBDIAX6D, IB Diesel Generator, by depressing the Manual Trip Button.
91.0 NOTIFY the EDG Operator (RO) that IB 4Kv Vital Bus is stripped.
92.0 PROCEED to breaker IBDIAX8D, 14 Service Water Pump, with wrench.
93.0 Does 14 Service Water Pump breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 95.0 I
V 94.0 Inside 14 SW Pump breaker cubicle:
Salem 1 94.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
94.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
94.3 REMOVE the wrench.
Page 53 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (page 19 of 23)
- INEO 95.0 PROCEED to breaker IBDIAX9D, 11 Charging Pump, with wrench.
96.0 Does 11 Charging Pump breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 98.0 I
V 97.0 Inside 11 Charging Pump breaker cubicle:
97.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
97.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
97.3 REMOVE the wrench.
98.0 PROCEED to breaker IBDIAXI0D, 12 Component Cooling Pump, with wrench.
99.0 Does 12 Component Cooling Pump breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 101.0 I
V 100.0 Inside 12 Component Cooling Pump breaker cubicle:
Salem 1 100.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
100.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
100.3 REMOVE the wrench.
Page 54 of 116 Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (page 20 of 23)
- lNEO 101.0 PROCEED to breaker IBDIAX6D, IB EDG Output, with wrench.
102.0 Does IB Diesel Generator breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO I
YES-->
GO TO Step 104.0 V
103.0 Inside IB EDG breaker cubicle:
103.1 ATTACH wrench to eccentric hexcharging stud.
103.2 OPERATE eccentric stud in counter-clockwise direction until spring indicates charged.
103.3 REMOVE the wrench.
104.0 WHEN the EDG Operator (RO) reports IB EDG is operational, CLOSE the following breakers:
104.1 IBDIAX6D, IB Diesel Output Breaker 104.2 IBDIAX8D, 14 Service Water Pump Breaker 105.0 IF 11 OR 13 Component Cooling Pump breaker is NOT CLOSED AND the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) has confirmed RCP Thermal Barrier Return (1 CC 131) is isolated, THEN CLOSE IBDIAXlOD, 12 Component Cooling Pump breaker.
106.0 IF 12 Charging Pump Breaker is NOT CLOSED, AND the EDG Operator (RO) has confirmed RCP Seal Water Injection is isolated, THEN CLOSE IBDIAX9D, 11 Charging Pump breaker.
107.0 GO TO Step 120.0.
108.0 NOTIFY the EDG Operator (RO) that Off-site power is supplying IB 4Kv Vital Bus.
109.0 VERIFY IBDIAX4D, IB 460V & 230V Vital Bus Transformers, is CLOSED.
Salem 1 Page 55 of 116 Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (page 21 of 23)
- INEO 110.0 Is breaker IBDIAX3D, 13 Service Water Pump, CLOSED?
YES NO -->
GO TO Step 114.0 I
V 111.0 VERIFY the following breakers OPEN:
1BD1AX1D, 12 Auxiliary Feed Pump 1BD1AX7D, 12 Residual Heat Removal Pump IBDIAXBD, 14 Service Water Pump 112.0 IF 12 Charging Pump is in-service, THEN VERIFY IBDIAX9D, 11 Charging Pump, breaker is OPEN.
113.0 GO TO Step llB.O 114.0 Is breaker 1BD1AXBD, 14 Service Water Pump, CLOSED?
NO YES -->
GO TO Step 116.0 I
V 115.0 CLOSE breaker IBDIAXBD, 14 Service Water Pump, by depressing the Manual Close button.
116.0 IF 12 Charging Pump is in-service, THEN VERIFY 1BDIAX9D, 11 Charging Pump breaker is OPEN.
117.0 VERIFY the following breakers OPEN:
1BD1AX7D, 12 Residual Heat Removal Pump 1BDIAX3D, 13 Service Water Pump 1BDIAXID, 12 Auxiliary Feed Pump Salem 1 Page 56 of 116 Time Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 22 of 23)
- lNEO 118.0 IF 11 OR 13 Component Cooling Pump breaker is NOT CLOSED, AND the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) has confirmed RCP Thermal Barrier Return (ICCI31) is isolated, THEN CLOSE IBDIAXlOD, 12 Component Cooling Pump breaker.
119.0 NOTIFY the CRS that IB 4Kv Vital Bus and essential loads are energized.
120.0 NOTIFY the CRS that Steps 1 through 119 of Attachment 6 are completed.
121.0 Utilizing the guidance contained within S1.0P-SO.HSD-000l(Q),
START CFCUs in SLOW SPEED as directed by the CRS.
122.0 GO TO Step 128.0 123.0 WHEN notified by the CRS that all EDGs are TRIPPED lAW Step 75 of Attachment 4, Salem 1 123.1 At lA 4Kv Vital Bus, OPEN the 125V DC control power AND OPEN each 4Kv infeed breaker listed by depressing the Manual Trip Button:
lADIAXI3ASD, 13 Station Power Transformer Infeed lADIAX6D, lA Diesel Generator lADIAXI4ASD, 14 Station Power Transformer Infeed 123.2 At IB 4Kv Vital Bus, OPEN the 125V DC control power AND OPEN each 4Kv infeed breaker listed by depressing the Manual Trip Button:
IBDIAX13BSD, 13 Station Power Transformer Infeed IBDIAX6D, IB Diesel Generator IBDIAX14BSD, 14 Station Power Transformer Infeed 123.3 At lC 4Kv Vital Bus, OPEN the 125V DC control power AND OPEN each 4Kv infeed breaker listed by depressing the Manual Trip Button:
lCDIAX13CSD, 13 Station Power Transformer Infeed lCDIAX6D, lC Diesel Generator lCDIAXI4CSD, 14 Station Power Transformer Infeed Page 57 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 6 (Page 23 of 23)
- lNEO 124.0 NOTIFY the CRS and EDG Operator (RO) that lA, 1B, and 1C 4Kv Vital Bus switchgear is de-energized by the removal the Off-Site and On-Site power supplies lAW Step 123 of Attachment 6.
125.0 GO TO Step 128.0 126.0 PROCEED to the Relay Room.
NOTE Time Deenergizing the circuitry at the BBDC Distribution Cabinet ensures the 1 CV2 and 1 CV277 -
Letdown Isolation valves fail closed.
127.0 At 1BDC2AX, 1BBDC 125V DC DISTRIBUTION CABINET, OPEN 1BDC2AX5, VCT LVL & DEGAS VLVS & RCS LTDWN VLVS 1CV2, 35, 243, & 277.
128.0 PROCEED to the Hot Shutdown Panel.
Salem 1 Page 58 of 116
[UFSAR 9.5.1.4.3]
Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 7 (Page 1 of 12)
- 2NEO 1.0 OBTAIN the following materials:
One copy of this attachment One radio One portable emergency light unit Key ring set (JA Master, Breaker Key H661, Panels 1016& 1017 KeyT178)
A Security Master Key from the Unit 1 CRS (located on the Unit 1 Security Key Ring)
[C0363]
Tools (screwdriver, fuse puller, and adjustable wrench)
Rope (for blocking open Outer Piping Penetration Area Door in Step 32.0) 2.0 OBTAIN information from the CRS on plant status AND RECORD the fire impacted area.
FIRE IMPACTED AREA Control Room Elev. 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room Relay Room Elev. 64' 4kV Vital Bus Switchgear Room 3.0 PROCEED to the Inner Mechanical Penetration Area, Elev 78'.
4.0 Is either elev. 64' or 84' Vital Bus Switchgear Room the fire impacted area?
NO I
YES-->
GO TO Step 20.0 v
5.0 NOTIFY the CRS of the following valve positions:
11 SW22, 11 Nuc Hdr Inlet (SW Valve Room) 12SW22, 12 Nuc Hdr Isolation Valve (SW Valve Room)
NOTE Communication with the TSC/OSC may not be established at first due to the time needed to staff the facility. This is llQ1 a hold point.
6.0 ENSURE commumcations established with the CRS and TSC/OSC.
Time Salem 1 Page 59 of 116 Rev. 24
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S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 7 (Page 2 of 12)
8.0 CLOSE 1 CC131, RCP THERMAL BARRIER VALVE (SG BID HX Area).
(Breaker 1 CY2EP5I located in 78' Electrical Penetration Area) 9.0 REPORT RCP Thermal Barrier Return (ICCI3l) is isolated to the CRS.
10.0 CLOSE lCV116, SEAL WATER TO VCT VALVE (SG BID HX Area).
(Breaker 1 CY2EP5A located in 78' Electrical Penetration Area)
NOTE The pathway to the Electrical Penetration Area is through the door on Elev. 78' from the Mechanical Penetration Area. Dress out is not required.
The following steps are performed at the 1 A, 1 B, and 1 C East Valves & Misc.
230V Vital Control Centers.
11.0 PROCEED to Elev. 78' Electrical Penetration Area.
12.0 At breaker IBY2EP4E, IPR7 - PORV Stop Valve:
Salem 1 12.1 DEFEAT 1 BY2EP4E door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
12.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, IBY2EP4E-Tl, in EMER position.
12.3 VERIFY IBY2EP4E breaker is CLOSED.
12.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
12.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 BY2EP4E-T2, in EMER CLOSE position.
12.6 CLOSE breaker door.
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S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 7 (page 3 of 12)
- 2NEO 13.0 At breaker 1AY2EP1H, 1PR6 - Pressurizer PORV Stop Valve:
13.1 DEFEAT 1A Y2EP1H door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
13.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, 1AY2EP1H-T1, in EMER position.
13.3 VERIFY 1AY2EP1H breaker is CLOSED.
13.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
13.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1AY2EP1H-T2, in EMER CLOSE position.
13.6 CLOSE breaker door.
14.0 At 1AY2EP6A, 12SW22 - Nuclear Header Isolation Valve:
14.1 OPEN 1AY2EP6A breaker AND OPEN breaker door.
14.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, 1A Y2EP6A-T1, to EMER position.
14.3 IF 12SW22 is CLOSED, THEN manually throttle OPEN 12SW22, Nuc Hdr Inlet Valve, until flow is established.
14.4 DEFEAT 1A Y2EP6A door interlock AND CLOSE breaker.
14.5 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
14.6 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1A Y2EP6A-T2, in EMER OPEN.
14.7 CLOSE breaker door.
15.0 NOTIFY the CRS that 12SW22 is aligned to OPEN.
Salem 1 Page 61 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 7 (page 4 of 12)
- 2NEO 16.0 At breaker 1CY2EP1H, 1SJ13 - Boron Injection Tank Outlet Valve:
16.1 DEFEAT 1CY2EP1H door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
16.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, 1CY2EP1H-T1, in EMER position.
16.3 VERIFY 1CY2EP1H breaker is CLOSED.
16.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
16.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1CY2EP1H-T2, in EMER CLOSE position.
16.6 CLOSE breaker door.
17.0 At breaker 1CY2EP4A, 1CV69 - Charging Header Stop Valve:
17.1 DEFEAT 1CY2EP4A door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
17.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, 1CY2EP4A-T1, in EMER position.
17.3 VERIFY 1CY2EP4A breaker is CLOSED.
17.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
17.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 CY2EP4A-T2, in EMER OPEN position.
17.6 CLOSE breaker door.
18.0 NOTIFY the CRS that Steps 1 through 17 of Attachment 7 are completed.
19.0 GO TO Step 28.0.
20.0 CONTINUE.
NOTE Communication with the TSC/OSC may not be established at first due to the time needed to staff the facility. This is not a hold point.
21.0 ESTABLISH communication with the CRS and TSC/OSC.
22.0 CLOSE 1CV70, Chg Hdr PCV Inlet Valve (lCV71 Inlet).
23.0 VERIFY 1CV73, Chg Hdr PCV BYP Valve (lCV71 Bypass) is CLOSED.
Time Salem 1 Page 62 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 7 (page 5 of 12)
- 2NEO NOTE The pathway to the Electrical Penetration Area is through the door on Elev. 78' from the Mechanical Penetration Area. Dress out is not required.
24.0 PROCEED to Elev. 78' Electrical Penetration Area.
25.0 Is elev. 84' Vital Bus Switchgear Room the fire impacted area?
YES NO-->
GO TO Step 28.0 I
V 26.0 At breaker lCY2EPIH, ISJ13 - Boron Injection Tank Outlet Valve:
26.1 DEFEAT lCY2EPIH door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
26.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, lCY2EPIH-Tl, in EMER position.
26.3 VERIFY lCY2EPIH breaker is CLOSED.
26.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
26.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, lCY2EPIHI-T2, in EMER CLOSE position.
26.6 CLOSE breaker door.
27.0 NOTIFY CRS that Steps 20 through 26 of Attachment 7 are completed.
28.0 At Panel 1016, Time PLACE SWI 12 RCS Loop Power key switch in ASDS ALT SHUTDOWN position to energize TA-14941 and TA-14942 (12 Loop Wide Range Th and Tc).
29.0 At Panel 1017, Salem 1 PLACE SW2 13 RCS Loop Power key switch in ASDS AL T SHUTDOWN position to energize TA-14943 and TA-14944 (13 Loop Wide Range Th and Tc).
Page 63 of 116 Rev. 24
ATTACHMENT 7 (page 6 of 12)
- 2NEO S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q) 30.0 PROCEED to the Elev. 100' Inner Piping Penetration Area.
CAUTION The following steps to perform MSIV Isolation, should be coordinated with the CRS.
IF elevated temperatures in the Inner Penetration Area do NOT allow access, THEN Step 30.2 of this attachment directs closure of valves 11 CA348 and 12CA348 which results in isolation of control air to 11 MS1 0, 11 MS18, 11MS167, 13MS10, 13MS18 and 13MS167 resulting in the respective valves to fail to the closed position.
Salem 1 30.1 IF ambient conditions in the Inner Penetration Area permit personnel access, THEN:
A.
At No. 11 Steam Generator Outlet Steam Valve Control Panel 683-1A, CLOSE I1MSI8-AlS, Manual Air Supply Isolation Valve.
B.
At 11 Steam Generator Press. Control Panel 684-1 A, COMPLETE the following for I1MSI0 Atmospheric Relief Valve:
- 1.
PLACE hand sender to minimum.
- 2.
PLACE the selector valve in EIP bypass line to LOCAL position.
- 3.
OPERATE hand sender in EIP line to ensure PL-8907 indicates zero.
C.
At No. 13 Steam Generator Outlet Steam Valve Control Panel 683-1 C, CLOSE 13MSI8-AlS, Manual Air Supply Isolation Valve.
D.
At 13 Steam Generator Press. Control Panel 684-1C, COMPLETE the following for 13MSlO Atmospheric Relief Valve:
- 1.
PLACE hand sender to minimum.
- 2.
PLACE the selector valve in EIP bypass line to LOCAL position.
- 3.
OPERATE hand sender in EIP line to ensure PL-8909 indicates zero.
(step continued on next page)
Page 64 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q) 30.1 (continued)
ATTACHMENT 7 (Page 7 of 12)
- 2NEO NOTE Each MS18 is equipped with two parallel pressure regulators for valve control.
Opening either drain cock on the parallel pressure regulators will ensure the respective MS18 valve is failed to the CLOSED position.
E.
At 13MS18, OPEN at least one drain cock on the pressure regulators.
F.
At I1MS18, OPEN at least one drain cock on the pressure regulators.
G.
COMPLETE the following to Main Steam Isolate IlMS167, MSISOLVLV:
NOTE It may only be necessary to fail either 11MS169 QR 11MS171 to CLOSE 11MS167.
--I CAUTION Steam hazard when opening 11 MS169 or 11 MS171 because of telltale leakoff drain pinholes downstream of valves.
- 1.
At No.1 Unit Main Stm Vent Vlv Control Panel 688-1A, OPEN IlMS171, MS ISO V STEAM ASSIST, valve as follows:
Salem 1
- a.
CLOSE llMS171-AlS, llMS171 AIR SUPPLY.
- h.
OPEN draincock of pressure regulator for SV-275.
- 2.
At No.1 Unit Main Stm Vent Vlv Control Panel 689-1A, OPEN I1MS169, MS ISOL V STEAM ASSIST, as follows:
- a.
CLOSE llMS169-AlS, llMS169 AIR SUPPLY.
- h.
OPEN draincock of pressure regulator for SV-274.
(step continued on next page)
Page 65 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q) 30.1 (continued)
ATTACHMENT 7 (page 8 of 12)
- 2NEO H.
COMPLETE the following to Main Steam Isolate 13MS167, MSISOLVLV:
NOTE It may only be necessary to fail either 13MS169 OR 13MS171 to CLOSE 13MS167.
CAUTION Steam hazard when opening 13MS169 or 13MS171 because of telltale leakoff drain pinholes downstream of valves.
- 1.
At No. 1 Unit Main Stm Vent Vlv Control Panel 688-1 C, OPEN 13MS171, MS ISO V STEAM ASSIST, as follows:
- a.
CLOSE 13MS 171-AlS, 13MS 171 AIR SUPPLY.
- h.
OPEN draincock of pressure regulator for SV-271.
- 2.
At No. 1 Unit Main Stm Vent Vlv Control Panel 689-1 C, OPEN 13MS169, MS ISOL V STEAM ASSIST, as follows:
- a.
CLOSE 13MS169-AlS, 13MS169 AIR SUPPLY.
- h.
OPEN draincock of pressure regulator for SV -270.
(step continued on next page)
Salem 1 Page 66 of 116 Rev. 24
ATTACHMENT 7 (page 9 of 12)
- 2NEO NOTE S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
Closure of 11 CA348 and 12CA348 results in isolation of control air to 11 MS 10, 11 MS18, 11MS167, 13MS10, 13MS18 and 13MS167 resulting in the respective valves to fail to the closed position.
In addition to isolating control air to the above indicated components, closure of 11 CA348 and 12CA348 also isolates control air to other components in the Inner Penetration Piping Area, Upper Electrical Penetration Area, and Mechanical Penetration Area. For additional clarification of isolated components, refer to of S-C-CA-MEE-1531, Evaluation of Loss of Control Air Due to an Appendix R Fire.
Salem 1 30.2 IF ambient conditions in the Inner Penetration Area do NOT permit personnel access, THEN:
A.
PROCEED to the Elev. 1 ~O' Mechanical Penetration Area near the 11 Steam Generator Blowdown Tank (approx 3' above the floor).
B.
CLOSE 11 CA348, lA HEADER ISOL VALVE.
C.
CLOSE 12CA348, IB HEADER ISOL VALVE.
Page 67 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 7 (Page 10 of 12)
- 2NEO 31.0 PROCEED to the Outer Piping Penetration Area.
NOTE Blocking the Outer Piping Penetration Door open ensures ambient conditions in the Outer Penetration Area will continue to allow personnel access during the event.
The Outer Piping Penetration Area Door may be blocked open utilizing the rope provided (tied between a watertight door hinge and electrical conduit to hold the door open),
or by any other available means (e.g., wood, section of scaffolding, etc.).
32.0 BLOCK OPEN the Outer Piping Penetration Area Door.
CAUTION The following steps should be coordinated with the CRS to perform MSIV Isolation.
33.0 At No.1 Unit Steam Generator Press Control Panel 684-1B COMPLETE the following for 12MSI0 Atmospheric Relief Valve:
33.1 PLACE hand sender to minimum.
33.2 PLACE the selector valve in EIP bypass line to LOCAL position.
33.3 OPERATE hand sender in EIP line to ensure PL-8908 indicates zero.
34.0 At 12 Steam Generator Outlet Steam Valve Control Panel 683-1B, CLOSE 12MSI8-AlS, Manual Air Supply Isolation Valve.
35.0 At 14 Steam Generator Outlet Steam Valve Control Panel 683-1D, CLOSE 14MSI8-AlS, Manual Air Supply Isolation Valve.
36.0 At No.1 Unit Steam Generator Press. Control Panel 684-1D, COMPLETE the following for 14MSI0 Atmospheric Relief Valve:
36.1 PLACE hand sender to minimum.
36.2 PLACE the selector valve in EIP bypass line to LOCAL position.
36.3 OPERATE hand sender in EIP line to ensure PL-891O indicates zero.
Salem 1 Page 68 of 116 Rev. 24
ATTACHMENT 7 (Page 11 of 12)
- 2NEO NOTE S 1.oP-AB.CR-0002(Q)
Each MS18 is equipped with two parallel pressure regulators for valve control.
Opening either drain cock on the parallel pressure regulators will ensure the respective MS18 valve is failed to the CLOSED position.
37.0 At 12MS18, OPEN at least one drain cock on the pressure regulators.
38.0 At 14MS18, OPEN at least one drain cock on the pressure regulators.
39.0 COMPLETE the following to Main Steam Isolate 12MS167, MS ISOL VLV:
NOTE It may only be necessary to fail either 12MS169 QB 12MS171 to CLOSE 12MS167.
CAUTION Steam hazard when opening 12MS169 or 12MS171 because of telltale leakoff drain pinholes downstream of valves.
Salem 1 39.1 Inside No.1 Unit Main Stm Vent Vlv Control Panel 688-1B, OPEN 12MS171, MS ISO V STEAM ASSIST, as follows:
A.
CLOSE 12MS171-AlS, 12MS171 AIR SUPPLY.
B.
OPEN draincock of pressure regulator for SV -281.
39.2 Inside No.1 Unit Main Stm Vent Vlv Control Panel 689-1B, OPEN 12MS169, MS ISO V STEAM ASSIST, as follows:
A.
CLOSE 12MS169-AlS, 12MS169 AIR SUPPLY.
B.
OPEN draincock of pressure regulator for SV-280.
Page 69 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 7 (Page 12 of 12)
- 2NEO 40.0 COMPLETE the following to Main Steam Isolate 14MS167, MS ISOL VLV:
NOTE It may only be necessary to fail either 14MS169 QB 14MS171 to CLOSE 14MS167.
CAUTION Steam hazard when opening 14MS169 or 14MS171 because of telltale leakoff drain pinholes downstream of valves.
40.1 Inside No.1 Unit Main Stm Vent Vlv Control Panel 688-1D, OPEN 14MS 171, MS ISO V STEAM ASSIST, as follows:
A.
CLOSE 14MSI71-AlS, 14MS171 AIR SUPPLY.
B.
OPEN draincock of pressure regulator for SV-285.
40.2 Inside No.1 Unit Main Stm Vent Vlv Control Panel 689-1D, OPEN 14MS169, MS ISO V STEAM ASSIST, as follows:
A.
CLOSE 14MSI69-AlS, 14MS169 AIR SUPPLY.
B.
OPEN draincock of pressure regulator for SV -284.
41.0 NOTIFY the CRS that Steps 28 through 40 of Attachment 7 are completed.
CAUTION When operating hand sender in E/P bypass line, DO NOT exceed a maximum of 20 psig indicated pressure on PL-8908 & PL-8910.
42.0 WHEN directed by the CRS, slowly throttle OPEN 12 & 14MSI0 valves AND MAINTAIN Steam Generator Pressures @ 1005 psig (Tave = 547°P), by operating the hand sender in EIP bypass line at No.1 Unit 12 & 14 Steam Generator Press Control Panels 684-1B and 684-1D respectively.
43.0 CHECK opening of the MSlOs by observing pressure indication on PL-8908 and PL-891O, respectively.
Salem 1 Page 70 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 8 (page 1 of 7)
- 3NEO 1.0 OBTAIN the following materials:
One Copy of this attachment One radio One portable emergency light unit Key Ring set (JA Master, Breaker Key H661)
A Security Master Key from the Unit 1 CRS (located on the Unit 1 Security Key Ring)
Tools (screwdriver and adjustable wrench) 2.0 OBTAIN information from the CRS on plant status AND RECORD the fire impacted area.
FIRE IMPACTED AREA Control Room Elev. 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room Relay Room Elev. 64' 4kV Vital Bus Switchgear Room 3.0 PROCEED to the Main Turbine Front Standard.
4.0 PLACE the Reset-Normal-Trip lever in the TRIP position.
5.0 PROCEED to the 4Kv Group Buses, Elev. 100' Turbine Building.
NOTE
[C0363]
Communication with the TSC/OSC may not be established at first due to the time needed to staff the facility. This is nQt a hold point.
~
6.0 ESTABLISH communication with the CRS via radio.
Salem 1 Page 71 of 116 Rev. 24
ATTACHMENT 8 (Page 2 of 7)
- 3NEO NOTE S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
The only reliable breaker indication is the OPEN - CLOSED indicator inside the cubicle door on the front of each breaker.
All breaker operations are accomplished utilizing the Manual Trip or Close button inside each breaker cubicle.
7.0 At the 4Kv Group Buses, Elev. 100' Turbine Building:
Salem 1 7.1 At Cubicle 1GD1 TBIBGGD, 1B Aux Power Transformer Infeed breaker:
A.
PLACE IGD1TBIBGGD#, CONTROL POWER, to the OFF position.
B.
VERIFY the IGDITBIBGGD 4Kv breaker is in the OPEN position.
7.2 At Cubicle IFDI TBIBFGD, IB Aux Power Transformer Infeed:
A.
PLACE 1FDI TBIBFGD#, CONTROL POWER, to the OFF position.
B.
VERIFY the 1FDI TBIBFGD 4Kv breaker is in the OPEN position.
7.3 At Cubicle 1 GD 1 TB 12GSD, 12 Station Power Transformer Infeed:
A.
PLACE 1GDITBI2GSD#, CONTROL POWER, to the OFF position.
B.
OPEN the IGD1TB12GSD4Kvbreaker.
7.4 At Cubicle IFD1TBI2FSD, 12 Station Power TransformerInfeed:
A.
PLACE IFDI TBI2FSD#, CONTROL POWER, to the OFF position.
B.
OPEN the IFDI TB12FSD 4Kv breaker.
7.5 At Cubicle IHDI TB11HSD, 11 Station Power Transformer Infeed:
A.
PLACE IHDI TB11HSD#, CONTROL POWER, to the OFF position.
B.
OPEN the IHDITBIIHSD 4Kv breaker.
Page 72 of 116 Rev. 24
ATTACHMENT 8 (page 3 of 7)
- 3NEO S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q) 7.6 At Cubicle lEDl TBllESD, 11 Station Power Transformer Infeed:
A.
PLACE lEDl TBllESD#, CONTROL POWER, to the OFF position.
B.
OPEN the lEDlTBllESD4Kvbreaker.
7.7 At Cubicle lEDlTBlAEGD, 1A Aux Power TransformerInfeed:
A.
PLACE 1ED1TB1AEGD#, CONTROL POWER, to the OFF position.
B.
VERIFY the lED1TBlAEGD 4Kv breaker is in the OPEN position.
7.8 At Cubicle lHD1 TBlAHGD, 1A Aux Power Transformer Infeed:
A.
PLACE 1HD1TB1AHGD#, CONTROL POWER, to the OFF position.
B.
VERIFY the 1HD1 TB1AHGD 4Kv breaker is in the OPEN position.
8.0 NOTIFY the CRS that Steps 1 through 7 of Attachment 8 are completed.
9.0 Is either elev. 64' or 84' Vital Bus Switchgear Room the fire impacted area?
NO I
YES-->
GO TO Step 23.0 Time V
10.0 PROCEED to the Circ Water Battery Rooms.
11.0 At the CIRC WATER SWITCHGEAR BLDG l25V DC DISTRIBUTION PANELS, OPEN the following 125V DC Control Power breakers:
lCW1DC-20, CONTROL VOLTAGE TO RACK 1R1002.
2CW1DC-5, CONTROL VOLTAGE TO RACK 1R1005.
Salem 1 Page 73 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 8 (page 4 of 7)
- 3NEO 12.0 PROCEED to Control House Area 1 ofSW Intake, E1112'.
13.0 At lCY1SW2H, 12SW20 - Nuclear Header Supply Valve, breaker:
Salem 1 13.1 OPEN breaker AND OPEN breaker door.
13.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, lCY1SW2H-Tl, to EMERposition.
13.3 Does 12SW20 indicate OPEN?
(SW Bay 1, Elev 94')
NO YES-->
I V
GO TO Step 13.7 13.4 Manually throttle OPEN 12SW20, Nuc Hdr Sup Valve until flow is established.
13.5 DEFEAT door interlock AND CLOSE breaker.
13.6 NOTIFY the CRS that 12SW20 is aligned for opening.
13.7 WHEN directed by CRS, PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, lCY1SW2H-T2, in EMER OPEN.
13.8 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 74 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 8 (Page 5 of 7)
- 3NEO 14.0 PROCEED to IBI Service Water 230V Vital Control Center.
15.0 At Panel 361-1A, PLACE NORMALIEMER key switch in EMER position (located inside left panel, upper right corner) 16.0 At IBY2SW2F, 1SW26 - TGA Header Inlet Valve, breaker:
Salem 1*
16.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
16.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, 1 BY2SW2F-Tl, in EMER position.
16.3 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
16.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
16.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 BY2SW2F-T2, in EMER CLOSE position.
16.6 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 75 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 8 (Page 6 of 7)
- 3NEO 17.0 PROCEED to Control House Area 3 ofSW Intake, EII12'.
18.0 At breaker lAYlSW2H, 14SW20 - Nuclear Header Supply Valve, on lA Service Water Vital Control Center:
18.1 OPEN breaker AND OPEN breaker door.
18.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, lAYlSW2H-Tl, to EMERposition.
18.3 Does 14SW20 indicate OPEN?
NO I
YES-->
GO TO Step 18.7 V
18.4 Manually throttle OPEN 14SW20, Nuc Hdr Sup Valve, Bay 3, Elev 94' until flow is established.
18.5 DEFEAT door interlock AND CLOSE breaker.
18.6 NOTIFY the CRS that 14SW20 is aligned for opening.
18.7 WHEN directed by the CRS, PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, lA Yl SW2H-T2, in EMER OPEN.
18.8 CLOSE breaker door.
19.0 NOTIFY the CRS that Steps 10 through 18 of Attachment 8 are completed AND of the following valve positions:
1 SW26 is CLOSED 14SW20 is OPEN 12SW20 is OPEN Salem 1 Page 76 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 8 (Page 7 of 7)
- 3NEO 20.0 PROCEED to the Station Blackout (SBO) Air Compressor Building.
21.0 START the SBO Air Compressor as follows:
21.1 OPEN both Engine Intake Louvers (located outside bldg on west wall).
21.2 At Panel 126-1, SBO Dryer Pneumatic Control Panel, PLACE SBO Control Air Dryer switch in ON position.
21.3 PLACE Unloader Valve selector switch in START position.
21.4 DEPRESS AND HOLD By-pass valve pushbutton.
21.5 PLACE Engine Ignition switch in START position until engine starts, THEN RELEASE to RUN position.
21.6 WHEN engine oil pressure is > 15 psig, RELEASE Bypass Valve pushbutton.
21.7 PLACE Unloader Valve selector switch in RUN position.
21.8 OPEN lCA1913, SBO Compressor Disch Vlv.
NOTE The following valves are located outside at the North West corner of the Service Building and Unit 2 Reactor Building.
21.9 OPEN lCA1886, Blackout Air Comp Isolation.
21.10 OPEN 2CA584, Yard Control Air Supply Valve.
22.0 NOTIFY the CRS that Step 21 of Attachment 8 is completed.
23.0 PROCEED to the Hot Shutdown Panel for other assignments.
Salem 1 Page 77 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (Page 1 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 1.0 OBTAIN the following materials:
One copy of this attachment One radio One portable emergency light unit Key Ring set (Breaker key H66I).
A Security Master Key from the Unit I CRS (located on the Unit I Security Key Ring)
Tools (screwdriver) 2.0 OBTAIN information from the CRS on plant status AND RECORD the fire impacted area.
FIRE IMPACTED AREA Control Room Elev. 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room Relay Room Elev. 64' 4kV Vital Bus Switchgear Room 3.0 Is the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Room (el. 64') the fire impacted area?
NO YES-->
GO TO Step 39.0 I
V 4.0 Is the 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room (el. 84') the fire impacted area?
NO YES-->
GO TO Step 34.0 I
V 5.0 PROCEED to IC West Valves & Mise 230V Control Center (located on elev. 84' Auxiliary Bldg).
Salem 1 Page 78 of 116
[C0363]
Time Time Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (page 2 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN NOTE Communication with the TSC/OSC may not be established at first due to the time needed to staff the facility. This is not a hold point.
6.0 ESTABLISH communication with the CRS and EDG Operator (RO).
7.0 At lCY2AX7A, I1SW21 Diesel Cooling Service Water Isolation Valve breaker:
7.1 OPEN lCY2AX7A breaker AND OPEN breaker door.
7.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, lCY2AX7A-Tl, to EMER position.
7.3 IF I1SW21 is CLOSED (located inside 11 DFOST room),
THEN manually throttle OPEN 11 SW21, Diesel Clg SW Inlet Valve, until flow is established.
7.4 DEFEAT door interlock AND CLOSE lCY2AX7A breaker.
7.5 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
7.6 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 CY2AX7 A-T2, in EMER OPEN.
7.7 CLOSE breaker door.
8.0 NOTIFY the CRS and EDG Operator (RO) of 11SW21, Diesel Generator Cooling Water, breaker and valve status.
Salem 1 Page 79 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (Page 3 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 9.0 At lCY2AX7E, I1SW22 Nuclear Header Isolation Valve breaker:
9.1 OPEN lCY2AX7E breaker AND OPEN breaker door.
9.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, lCY2AX7E-Tl, to EMER position.
9.3 IF 11 SW22 is CLOSED, THEN NOTIFY the CRS that 11 SW22, Nuc Hdr Isolation Valve, be manually throttled OPEN until flow is established.
9.4 WHEN flow is reported by the CRS as being established via 11SW22 OR the 11 SW22 is reported by the CRS as being OPEN, DEFEAT the door interlock AND CLOSE the lCY2AX7E breaker.
9.S VERIFY the thermal overloads are reset.
9.6 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 CY2AX7E-T2, in EMER OPEN.
9.7 CLOSE breaker door.
10.0 NOTIFY the CRS of 11SW22, 11 Nuc Hdr Isolation Valve, breaker status.
11.0 At 1 CY2AXSH, 1 CC31 - Component Cooling Isolation Valve breaker:
11.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
11.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, lCY2AXSH-Tl, to EMER position.
11.3 VERIFY 1 CY2AXSH breaker is CLOSED.
11.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
II.S PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 CY2AXSH-T2, in EMER CLOSED.
11.6 CLOSE breaker door.
12.0 NOTIFY the CRS of lCC31, 12 Hx To Aux CC Hdr Stop V, breaker status.
Salem 1 Page 80 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (page 4 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 13.0 At lCY2AX5E, 12 Charging Pump Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump, breaker:
13.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
13.2 VERIFY lCY2AX5E breaker is CLOSED.
13.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
13.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, 1 CY2AX5E-Tl, in EMER START position.
13.5 CLOSE breaker door.
14.0 At lCY2AX2A, ISJI - RWST To Charging Pumps Stop Vlv, breaker:
Salem 1 14.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
14.2 PLACE key operated NORMAL/EMER switch, lCY2AX2A-Tl, to EMER position.
14.3 VERIFY 1CY2AX2A breaker is CLOSED.
14.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
14.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 CY2AX2A-T2, to EMER OPEN position.
14.6 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 81 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (Page 5 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 15.0 At lCY2AX4A, lCV40 - Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation Valve, breaker:
15.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
15.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, lCY2AX4A-Tl, to EMER position.
15.3 VERIFY lCY2AX4A breaker is CLOSED.
15.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
15.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 CY2AX4A-T2, to EMER CLOSE position.
15.6 CLOSE breaker door.
16.0 At lCY2AX3A, lCV140 - Charging Pump Recirc Stop Valve, breaker:
Salem 1 16.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
16.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, lCY2AX3A-Tl, to EMER position.
16.3 VERIFY lCY2AX3A breaker is CLOSED.
16.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
16.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 CY2AX3A-T2, to EMER OPEN position.
16.6 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 82 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (page 6 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 17.0 PROCEED to 1A West Valves & Misc 230V Control Center.
18.0 At 1AY2AX6A, 12SW21 - Diesel Cooling Service Water Isolation Valve, breaker:
18.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
18.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, 1A Y2AX6A-Tl, to EMER position.
18.3 VERIFY 1A Y2AX6A breaker is CLOSED.
18.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
18.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1A Y2AX6A-T2, in EMER OPEN.
18.6 CLOSE breaker door.
19.0 NOTIFY the CRS of 12SW21, Diesel Generator Cooling Water, breaker status.
20.0 At lAY2AX4E, lCC30 - Component Cooling Isolation Valve, breaker:
20.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
20.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, lA Y2AX4E-T1, to EMER position.
20.3 VERIFY lA Y2AX4E breaker is CLOSED.
20.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
20.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, lA Y2AX4E-T2, in EMER CLOSED.
20.6 CLOSE breaker door.
21.0 NOTIFY the CRS of 1CC30 Component Cooling Isolation Valve, breaker status.
Salem 1 Page 83 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (page 7 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 22.0 At 1AY2AX2A, 11CC16 - RHR HX Component Cooling Water Outlet Valve, breaker:
22.1 DEFEAT the door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
22.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER, 1AY2AX2A-T1, switch to EMER position.
22.3 VERIFY 1A Y2AX2A breaker is CLOSED.
22.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
22.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1AY2AX2A-T2, to EMER CLOSE position.
22.6 CLOSE breaker door.
23.0 At 1AY2AX2E, 11SJ44 - Containment Sump to RHR Suction Valve, breaker:
Salem 1 23.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
23.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, 1AY2AX2E-T1, to EMER position.
23.3 VERIFY 1A Y2AX2E breaker is CLOSED.
23.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
23.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 A Y2AX2E-T2, to EMER CLOSE position.
23.6 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 84 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (page 8 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 24.0 PROCEED to IB West Valves & Misc 230V Control Center.
25.0 At IBY2AX3E, ISJ12 - Boron Injection Tank Outlet Valve, breaker:
25.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
25.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, IBY2AX3E-Tl, to EMER position.
25.3 VERIFY IBY2AX3E breaker is CLOSED.
25.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
25.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 BY2AX3E-T2, to EMER CLOSE position.
25.6 CLOSE breaker door.
26.0 At IBY2AX3I, 128J44 - Containment Sump to RHR Pump Suction Valve, breaker:
Salem 1 26.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
26.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, IBY2AX3I-Tl, to EMER position.
26.3 VERIFY IBY2AX31 breaker is CLOSED.
26.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
26.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 BY2AX3I-T2, to EMER CLOSE position.
26.6 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 85 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (page 9 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 27.0 At 1BY2AX4I, 12CC16 - RHR Hx Component Cooling Water Outlet Valve, breaker:
27.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
27.2 PLACE key operated NORMAL/EMER switch, 1BY2AX4I-T1, to EMER position.
27.3 VERIFY 1 BY2AX4I breaker is CLOSED.
27.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
27.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1BY2AX4I-T2, to EMER CLOSE position.
27.6 CLOSE breaker door.
28.0 At 1BY2AX5E, 1CV68 - Charging Header Isolation Valve, breaker:
Salem 1 28.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
28.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, 1BY2AX5E-T1, to EMER position.
28.3 VERIFY 1 BY2AX5E breaker is CLOSED.
28.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
28.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 BY2AX5E-T2, to EMER OPEN position.
28.6 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 86 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (Page 10 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 29.0 At IBY2AXSI, lCV139 - Charging Pump Recirc Stop Valve, breaker:
29.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
29.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, IBY2AXSI-Tl, to EMER position.
29.3 VERIFY 1 BY2AXSI breaker is CLOSED.
29.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
29.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 BY2AXSI-T2, to EMER OPEN position.
29.6 CLOSE breaker door.
30.0 At IBY2AX9A, IlSW23 - NUC Header Crossover MOV, breaker:
Salem 1 30.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
30.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, IBY2AX9A-Tl, to EMER position.
30.3 VERIFY 1 BY2AX9A breaker is CLOSED.
30.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
30.S PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, IBY2AX9A-T2, to EMER OPEN position.
30.6 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 87 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 9 (page 11 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 31.0 At 1BY2AX9E, 12SW23 - NUC Header Crossover MOV, breaker:
31.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
31.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, 1 BY2AX9E-T1, to EMER position.
31.3 VERIFY 1 BY2AX9E breaker is CLOSED.
31.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
31.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1 BY2AX9E-T2, to EMER OPEN position.
31.6 CLOSE breaker door.
32.0 NOTIFY CRS that Steps 7 through 31 of Attachment 9 are completed.
33.0 GO TO Step 39.0.
34.0 PROCEED to 1B West Valves & Misc 230V Control Center.
35.0 At 1BY2AX3E, 1S112 - Boron Injection Tank Outlet Valve, breaker:
Salem 1 35.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
35.2 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER switch, 1BY2AX3E-T1, to EMER position.
35.3 VERIFY 1BY2AX3E breaker is CLOSED.
35.4 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
35.5 PLACE key operated EMER OPENINORMIEMER CLOSE switch, 1BY2AX3E-T2, to EMER CLOSE position.
35.6 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 88 of 116 Time Rev. 24
ATTACHMENT 9 (page 12 of 12)
SHIFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 36.0 PROCEED to the Elev. 78' Mechanical Penetration Area.
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q) 37.0 DETERMINE the position of ISJ4 AND ISJ5, BIT INLET VALVES.
38.0 IF either ISJ4 OR ISJ5, BIT INLET VALVE, is OPEN, THEN:
38.1 IF ISJ12, BIT OUTLET VALVE, is OPEN, THEN ALIGN the handwheel AND CLOSE ISJ12.
38.2 IF ISJ13, BIT OUTLET VALVE, is OPEN, THEN ALIGN the handwheel AND CLOSE 1 SJ13.
39.0 PROCEED to the Hot Shutdown Panel for other assignments.
Salem 1 Page 89 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 10 (Page 1 of 6)
TERMINATION OF SBO AIR COMPRESSOR OPERATION 1.0 ALIGN No.1 Emergency Control Air Compressor as follows:
NOTE The same key (H661, Unit 1 Hot Shutdown Key) operates both key switches.
Keys may be obtained from the Work Control Center Key Box (Key #10) or the Alternate Shutdown Equipment Storage Cabinet Key Box Inventory.
The removable maintenance handle that may be required to reset a 460V breaker charging spring at Step 1.11, 1.12, 1.13, or 1.14 is available at the Operations Department Glove Box NO.9 located on the wall opposite the 1AY1AX Vital Bus or from the Alternate Shutdown Equipment Storage Cabinet Inventory.
Salem 1 1.1 PROCEED to lA AlC 230V Vital Control Center on Elev. 122'.
1.2 At lA Y3AX2H, 11 Chilled Water Pump, breaker:
A.
DEFEAT the door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
B.
VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
C.
VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
D.
PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, lAY3AX2H-Tl, in EMER START position.
E.
CLOSE breaker door.
1.3 PROCEED to IB AlC 230V Vital Control Center on Elev. 122'.
1.4 At IBY3AX2H, 12 Chilled Water Pump, breaker:
A.
DEFEAT the door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
B.
VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
C.
VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
D.
PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, 1 BY3AX2H-Tl, in EMER START position.
E.
CLOSE breaker door.
Page 90 of 116 Rev. 24
Salem 1 S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 10 (Page 2 of 6)
TERMINATION OF SBO AIR COMPRESSOR OPERATION 1.5 PROCEED to the El. 100' Electrical Penetration Area (Chiller Room).
1.6 At 11 Chiller Control Panel:
A.
PLACE the key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, lAX1AX13X-T1, inside control panel, to the EMER START position.
B.
VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
C.
PLACE the normal operating switch to RUN.
- 1. 7 At 12 Chiller Control Panel:
A.
PLACE the key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, 1BXIAX13X-T1, inside control panel, to the EMER START position.
B.
VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
C.
PLACE the normal operating switch to RUN.
1.8 At 13 Chiller Control Panel:
A.
PLACE the key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, 1CX1AX13X-T1, inside control panel, to the EMER START position.
B.
VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
C.
PLACE the normal operating switch to RUN.
1.9 At No. 1 Unit Emergency Control Air Compressor Control Panel 342-1:
A.
CLOSE 1 CH216-AlS, Air Supply to SV -615 in Panel 342-1 (located in left side in the rear of panel towards lower center).
B.
OPEN drain cock on pressure regulator to SV-615.
Page 91 of 116 Rev. 24
~-------------------------
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
Salem 1 ATTACHMENT 10 (page 3 of 6)
TERMINATION OF SBO AIR COMPRESSOR OPERATION 1.10 PROCEED to 460/230V Switchgear Room.
1.11 At lAXIAX13X, 11 Chiller, breaker:
A.
OPEN lAXIAX13X#, 11 Chiller Breaker Control Power Deion.
B.
Does 11 Chiller breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES-->
GO TO Step I.IID I
V C.
RESET the spring as follows:
- 1.
INSERT the maintenance handle on the pawl carrier.
- 2.
OPERATE the maintenance handle by pumping until the pawl carrier stops moving.
- 3.
CHECK spring indicates CHARGED.
D.
CLOSE breaker with the Manual Close Lever.
Page 92 of 116 Time Rev. 24
1.12 1.13 Salem 1 S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 10 (Page 4 of 6)
TERMINATION OF SBO AIR COMPRESSOR OPERATION At IBXIAXI3X, 12 Chiller, breaker:
A.
OPEN IBXIAX13X#, 12 Chiller Breaker Control Power Deion.
B.
Does 12 Chiller breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES-->
GO TO Step l.l2D I
V C.
RESET the spring as follows:
- 1.
INSERT the maintenance handle on the pawl carrier.
- 2.
OPERATE the maintenance handle by pumping until the pawl carrier stops moving.
- 3.
CHECK spring indicates CHARGED.
D.
CLOSE breaker with the Manual Close Lever.
At lCXIAX13X, 13 Chiller, breaker:
A.
OPEN lCXlAX13X#, Chiller Breaker Control Power Deion.
B.
Does 13 Chiller breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES-->
GOTOStep1.13D I
V C.
RESET the spring as follows:
- 1.
INSERT the maintenance handle on the pawl carrier.
- 2.
OPERATE the maintenance handle by pumping until the pawl carrier stops moving.
- 3.
CHECK the charging spring indicates CHARGED.
D.
CLOSE breaker with the Manual Close Lever.
Page 93 of 116 Time Time Rev. 24
Salem 1 S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 10 (Page 5 of 6)
TERMINATION OF SBO AIR COMPRESSOR OPERATION 1.14 At ICXIAXI4X, No. I Emergency Control Air Compressor, breaker:
A.
OPEN ICXIAXI4X#, No. I Emergency Control Air Compressor Breaker Control Power Deion.
B.
Does No. I Emergency Control Air Compressor breaker charging spring indicate CHARGED?
NO YES-->
GO TO Step 1.14D I
V C.
RESET the spring as follows:
I.
INSERT the maintenance handle on the pawl carrier.
- 2.
OPERATE the maintenance handle by pumping until the pawl carrier stops moving.
- 3.
CHECK the charging spring indicates CHARGED.
D.
CLOSE breaker with the Manual Close Lever.
1.15 IF 11 and 12 Emergency Control Air Dryers are NOT alternating approximately every four minutes, THEN OPEN lCXIAXI4X, No.1 Emergency Control Air Compressor, breaker.
Page 94 of 116 Time Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 10 (page 6 of 6)
TERMINATION OF SBO AIR COMPRESSOR OPERATION 2.0 IF No. 1 Emergency Control Air Compressor (ECAC) is aligned lAW Section 1.0 of this Attachment, OR No.2 ECAC is providing the CA System support function, THEN PERFORM the following to shutdown the Station Blackout Air Compressor:
NOTE Valves 2CA584 and 1 CA 1886 are located outside the corner of the Service Building and Unit 2 Reactor Building.
2.1 CLOSE 2CA584, Yard Control Air Supply Valve.
2.2 CLOSE 1 CA1886, Blackout Air Comp Isolation.
2.3 PLACE Unloader Valve selector switch in START position.
2.4 CLOSE lCA1913, SBO Compressor Disch Vlv.
2.5 ALLOW engine to run for 5 minutes to cool down.
2.6 PLACE Engine Ignition Switch in OFF position.
2.7 PLACE SBO Control Air Dryer switch in OFF position.
2.8 OPEN lCA1920, Backup Air Comp Drain Valve, to drain any water accumulation, 2.9 CLOSE lCA1920.
2.10 CLOSE both Engine Intake Louvers.
3.0 NOTIFY the CRS of the ECAC and SBO Compressor status.
Salem 1 Page 95 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 11 (page 1 of5)
ABV & SWV SYSTEMS - VENTILATION LINEUP NOTE The same key (H661, Unit 1 Hot Shutdown Key) operates both key switches. Keys may be obtained from the wee Key Box (Key #10) or the Hot Shutdown Panel.
1.0 PROCEED to lA Ventilation 230V Vital Control Center, Electrical Pen Area, EII00'.
2.0 At breaker lAYIEP2D, 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Cooler:
2.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
2.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
2.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
2.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, lAYIEP2D-Tl, to EMER START position.
2.5 CLOSE breaker door.
3.0 At breaker lAYIEP2J, 11 RHR Room Cooler:
Salem 1 3.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
3.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
3.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
3.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, lAYIEP2J-Tl, to EMER START position.
3.5 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 96 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 11 (page 2 of 5)
ABV & SWV SYSTEMS - VENTILATION LINEUP 4.0 PROCEED to IB Ventilation 230V Vital Control Center, Electrical Pen Area, EII00'.
5.0 At breaker IBYIEPIG, 11 Charging Pump Room Cooler:
5.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
5.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
5.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
5.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, IBYIEPIG-Tl, to EMER START position.
5.5 CLOSE breaker door.
6.0 At breaker IBYIEP2D, 12 Component Cooling Pump Room Cooler:
6.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
6.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
6.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
6.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, IBY1EP2D-Tl, to EMER START position.
6.5 CLOSE breaker door.
7.0 At breaker IBY1EP2J, 12 RHR Room Cooler:
Salem 1 7.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
7.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
7.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
7.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, IBYIEP2J-Tl, to EMER START position.
7.5 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 97 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 11 (Page 3 ofS)
ABV & SWV SYSTEMS - VENTILATION LINEUP 8.0 PROCEED to lC Ventilation 230V Vital Control Center, Electrical Pen Area, EII00'.
9.0 At breaker lCYIEPIG, 12 Charging Pump Room Cooler:
9.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
9.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
9.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
9.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, lCYIEPIG-TI, to EMER START position.
9.5 CLOSE breaker door.
10.0 At breaker lCYIEP2D, 11 Component Cooling Pump Room Cooler:
10.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
10.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
10.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
10.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, lCYIEP2D-Tl, to EMER START position.
10.5 CLOSE breaker door.
11.0 PROCEED to lA Service Water Intake 230V Vital Control Center.
12.0 At breaker lAYISW3J, 13 Service Water Vent Fan:
Salem 1 12.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
12.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
12.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
12.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, lAYISW3J-Tl, to EMER START position.
12.5 CLOSE breaker door.
Page 98 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 11 (page 4 of 5)
ABV & SWV SYSTEMS - VENTILATION LINEUP 13.0 PROCEED to IB2 Service Water Intake 230V Vital Control Center.
14.0 At breaker IBYISW2J, 14 Service Water Vent Fan:
14.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
14.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
14.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
14.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, IBYISW2J-Tl, to EMER START position.
14.5 CLOSE breaker door.
15.0 PROCEED to lC Service Water Intake 230V Vital Control Center.
16.0 At breaker lCYISW3J, 11 Service Water Vent Fan:
16.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
16.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
16.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
16.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, lCYISW3J-Tl, to EMER START position.
16.5 CLOSE breaker door.
17.0 PROCEED to IBI Service Water Intake 230V Vital Control Center.
Salem 1 Page 99 of 116 Rev. 24
ATTACHMENT 11 (Page 5 of 5)
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ABV & SWV SYSTEMS - VENTILATION LINEUP 18.0 At breaker IBY2SW2J, 12 Service Water Vent Fan:
18.1 DEFEAT door interlock AND OPEN breaker door.
18.2 VERIFY breaker is CLOSED.
18.3 VERIFY thermal overloads are reset.
18.4 PLACE key operated NORMALIEMER START switch, 1 BY2SW2J-T 1, to EMER START position.
18.5 CLOSE breaker door.
19.0 DIRECT the OSCC to ensure the following Auxiliary Building Ventilation System alignment lAW S1.0P-SO.HSD-000l(Q), Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment:
19.1 One Supply Fan AND two Exhaust Fans are in-service.
NOTE S1.0P-SO.ABV-0001 (Q), Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Operation, may be referred to for additional clarification regarding the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System fan and filter unit required damper alignments.
19.2 Fan and Filter Unit flow path dampers are properly aligned.
19.3 The AFW Pump Room Cooler Dampers are positioned as follows:
lABS2, Room Cooler Supply to TDAFW Pump Enclosure, is OPEN lABS4, Turbine Driven AFW Pump Room Supply, is CLOSED lABS20, TDAFW Pump Enclosure Exhaust, is OPEN 20.0 NOTIFY the CRS that Steps 1 through 19 of Attachment 11 are completed.
Salem 1 Page 100 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 12 (page 1 of3)
TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW PUMP RESTORATION 1.0 RESETTING IMS52 1.1 SEAT tappet nut by slightly pulling Head Lever away from trip linkage
[C0356]
AND CHECK that the Emergency Trip Lever is in its RESET position (horizontal).
NOTE The next three steps are interrelated and should occur at about the same time.
1.2 ROTATE IMS52 handwheel in the closed direction (clockwise).
This will cause the Latch-Up Lever to move up toward the Trip Hook.
1.3 CHECK that as the Latch-Up Lever moves up into position, that it moves to and engages the Trip Hook.
1.4 PULL UP on the Hand Trip Lever to ensure full engagement of the Trip Hook and Latch-up Lever.
CAUTION Extra caution is advised while in the Turbine Driven AFW Pump Room when resetting the AFW Pump with AUTO Start signals locked in. In this condition, the pump will start.
Leaving 1 MS52 backseated may impose more reaction loading on the Trip Hook than the Trip Linkage can overcome, thus rendering the 1 MS52 trip function INOPERABLE.
1.5 Slowly ROTATE IMS52 handwheel in the open direction (counter-clockwise) until the Split Coupling raises and makes contact with the bottom of the Sliding Nut OR the valve comes to rest on the backseat.
1.6 ROTATE 1MS52 handwheel clockwise approximately one turn until handwheel moves freely AND Latch-up lever is in full contact with Trip Hook.
[C0315]
1.7 ENSURE turbine stops spinning (indicates IMS132 is seated).
1.8 ENSURE proper engagement of tappet nut and head lever lAW Attachment 12 Page 2, 13 AF Pump Trip/Throttle Valve & Overspeed Trip Mechanism, Overspeed Trip MechanismIV alve Reset.
Salem 1 Page 101 of 116 Rev. 24
Salem 1 S 1.oP-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 12 (Page 2 of3)
TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW PUMP RESTORATION 13 AF PUMP TRIPffHROTTLE VALVE & OVERSPEED TRIP MECHANISM OVERSPEED TRIP MECHANISMN ALVE RESET HAND lRlP LEVER
-rnIP SOLENtlD EMERGENCY lRlP LEVER GOV DISK Page 102 of 116 I
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molallo I metal I
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Rev. 24
Salem 1 S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 12 (Page 3 of 3)
TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW PUMP RESTORATION 13 AF PUMP TRIPITHROTTLE VALVE & OVERSPEED TRIP MECHANISM OVERSPEED TRIP MECHANISMN ALVE TRIPPED HEAD LEVER,
""P U"I(~/)f
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Rev. 24
1.0 2.0 ATTACHMENT 13 (page 1 of4)
CRS/STA TRACKING & OVERVIEW STATUS S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
RECORD the following valve positions when reported from the various Operators:
VALVE #
POSITION llSW21 (RO: Attachment 4, Step 10)
(SMT: Attachment 9, Step 8) 12SW21 (RO: Attachment 4, Step 10)
(SMT: Attachment 9, Step 19)
I1SW22
(#2 NEO: Attachment 7, Step 5)
(SMT: Attachment 9, Step 10) 12SW22
(#2 NEO: Attachment 7, Steps 5 and 15) 12SW20
(#3 NEO: Attachment 8, Steps 13.7 and/or 19) 14SW20
(#3 NEO: Attachment 8, Steps 18.7 and/or 19)
ISW26
(#3 NEO: Attachment 8, Step 19) lCC31 (SMT: Attachment 9, Step 12) lCC30 (SMT: Attachment 9, Step 21)
RECORD Emergency Diesel Generator Status:
NOTE Service Water Aligned: indicated flow on 1 DP96321, 13 Service Water Diesel Gen Lube Oil Cooler & Jkt Wtr Ht Exch DP Ind, on Panel 704-1 BB.
Diesel Generator Operating: Fire Emergency By-pass Switch in by-pass, DC Control Power transferred to alternate supply, diesel generator is at rated speed and voltage.
Service Water Aligned (YESINO) 1 C Diesel Generator Operating (YESINO) lA Diesel Generator Operating (YESINO) 1 B Diesel Generator Operating (YESINO)
Salem 1 Page 104 of 116 Rev. 24
3.0 4.0 Salem 1 S 1.oP-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 13 (page 2 of 4)
CRS/STA TRACKING & OVERVIEW STATUS RECORD 4Kv Vital Bus Status (.I)
+
lC 4Kv Vital Bus: (Off-site Power) __ (ED G)_
+
lA 4Kv Vital Bus: (Off-site Power) __ (ED G)_
+
IB 4Kv Vital Bus: (Off-site Power) __ (EDG)_
(O/S)_
(O/S)_
(O/S)_
RECORD progress to achieving and maintaining Hot Standby conditions:
4.1 (Reactor Operator)
A.
IF Steps 1 through 66 are completed (Relay Rm OR Control Rm Fire),
THEN the diesel generators are either operating or setup in standby.
B.
IF Step 75 is completed (Switchgear Room Fire),
THEN the diesel generators are tripped to ensure that the 4Kv Vital Switchgear remains de-energized in order to preclude inadvertent component operation due to fire induced hot shorts.
4.2 (Plant Operator)
A.
WHEN Steps 1 through 33 are completed, 13 AFW Pump is in manual-local control 11-14AFll valves are in manual-local control Maintaining HSB conditions B.
IF the Control Room OR the Relay Room is the fire impacted area, THEN:
Charging Pump LO Cooler valves ISW185 and ISW199 are failed OPEN lCV55 is in manual, setup to control normal charging flow for RCS inventory control 11 SW122 is failed OPEN C.
IF either Switchgear Room is the fire impacted area, THEN the Hot Shutdown Panel is aligned from Unit 2 ASDS Inverter Power Supply.
Page 105 of 116 Rev. 24
Salem 1 S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 13 (Page 3 of 4)
CRS/STA TRACKING & OVERVIEW STATUS 4.3 (#1 NEO)
A.
IF Steps 1 through 119 are completed (Relay Rm OR Control Rm Fire),
THEN:
DC power to 4K v Vital Buses is isolated 4Kv Vital Buses and Essential loads are from either off-site power or the EDGs:
- lC 4Kv:
11 or 12 Service Water Pump 12 Charging Pump 13 Component Cooling Pump 4601230V Vital Buses
- lA 4Kv:
15 or 16 Service Water Pump 11 Component Cooling Pump 460/230V Vital Buses
- IB 4Kv:
13 or 14 Service Water Pump 12 Component Cooling Pump 460/230V Vital Buses B.
IF Step 123 is completed (460/230V Switchgear Room Fire),
THEN lA, IB, and lC 4Kv Vital Buses are de-energized and isolated from the EDGs and Off-Site Power by the 4Kv infeed breakers.
4.4 (#2 NEO)
A.
IF Steps 1 through 17 are completed (Relay Rm OR Control Rm Fire),
THEN:
11112SW22 valve position checked 1 CV73 is opened allowing normal charging flow 1 CC 131 is closed to isolate RCP thermal barrier return lCVl16 is closed to isolate RCP seal return Following valves are setup for EMERGENCY operation
- IPR6
.12SW22
- IPR7
- ISJ13
- ICV69 B.
IF Steps 20 through 26 are completed (Switchgear Room Fire),
THEN:
Charging Header is isolated ISJ13 valve is setup for EMERGENCY/CLOSE operation C.
WHEN Steps 28 through 40 are completed, Th and Tc Wide range instrumentation is energized 11-14MSlOs, 18s, and 167s are CLOSED Maintaining plant in HSB via SG Safety Valves Page 106 of 116 Rev. 24
Salem 1 S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 13 (Page 4 of4)
CRS/STA TRACKING & OVERVIEW STATUS 4.5 (#3 NEO)
A.
WHEN Steps 1 through 7 are completed, Turbine is tripped 4Kv Group Buses are isolated B.
IF Steps 10 through 22 are completed (Relay Rm OR Control Rm Fire),
THEN:
DC power to 13 and 14 SPT 13kV infeed breakers is tripped SW valveslbreakers in Service Water Intake are aligned SBO Air Compressor is started 4.6 (Shift Maintenance Technician)
IF Steps 7 through 31 are completed (Relay Rm OR Control Rm Fire),
THEN the following valves are setup for EMERGENCY operation:
.12SW21
- I1SJ44
.ICV40
.12CC16
.llSW21
.IISW23
.llCCI6
.ICC31
.12SJ44
.ICV140
.ICV139
.12SW23 4.7 0 (SBO Compressor Shutdown)
A.
IF No.1 ECAC is available, THEN:
.IISW22
.ISJ12
.ISJ1
.ICV68
.ICC30 Chillers & Chilled Water Pumps are in EMERGENCY Startup of No. 1 ECAC is completed B.
IF No. 1 ECAC OR No.2 ECAC is available, THEN the SBO Compressor is secured.
4.8 1 (ABV & SWI Systems - Ventilation Lineup)
Auxiliary Building Vital Pump Room Coolers are in EMER START Service Water Vent Fans are in EMER START OSCC notified to verify ABV is established Page 107 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 14 (Page 1 of 5)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVITY NOTE This attachment provides multiple steps to be performed in coordination with the CRS lAW S1.0P-SO.HSD-0001 (Q), Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment, and provides guidance to support the transition from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown.
Use of other procedures will be necessary to accomplish various lineups and evolutions throughout the remainder of the procedure. Due to plant conditions many prerequisites, precautions and limitations required by these procedures may not apply.
The following activities may be applicable as determined by the affected fire area and the extent of the fire damage. Field inspections of component status and system alignment is required to be coordinated with the CRS.
1.0 OSC Coordinator (OSCC) EVALUATE the following:
1.1 DIRECT Emergency Services to MONITOR the Battery Rooms for adequate ventilation and hydrogen buildup AND to ESTABLISH the appropriate contingency actions, as required.
1.2 ESTABLISH RCS wide range pressure monitoring as follows:
Salem 1 1.2.1 ESTABLISH a flowpath to PL9876, Heise Gauge at the Primary Sample Area lAW SC.CH-SA.RC-0222(Q).
1.2.2 DIRECT personnel to monitor and report the RCS pressure to the CRS as indicated on 1PI908 at Panel 307-1 (located in Unit 1 Sampling Room, el. 110').
Page 108 of 116 Rev. 24
ATTACHMENT 14 (Page 2 ofS)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVITY S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q) 1.3 ESTABLISH AFWST level monitoring and control as follows:
1.3.1 MONITOR local level on lLL2669 at Panel 802-1 and/or 1LL3443 at Panel 379-1 (located in the AFWST area).
1.3.2 MAINTAIN AFWST level greater than 43.1% as follows:
A.
OPERATE IDR6, DEMIN MAKEUP TO AFWST, as required lAW S1.0P-SO.HSD-0001(Q), Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment.
B.
ALIGN the alternate suction path to the AFW Pump suction lA W S1.0P-SO.AF-0001(Q), Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation.
1.4 ESTABLISH RCS Sampling as follows:
Salem 1 1.4.1 OPEN the following Sampling System valves:
- 11 SS32, 11 Hot Leg Sample
- 13SS32, 13 Hot Leg Sample
- lSS33, Hot Leg Sample
- 1 SS 1 04, Hot Leg Sample
- 1 SS48, Pressurizer Liquid Sample
- 1 SS49, Pressurizer Liquid Sample
- lSS107, Pressurizer Liquid Sample 1.4.2 DIRECT Chemistry Department to initiate hourly RCS and Pressurizer Boron Concentrations sampling in preparation for Cold Shutdown.
Page 109 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 14 (page 3 ofS)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVITY 1.5 IF either the Relay Room or Control Room is the fire impacted area, THEN:
1.5.1 ESTABLISH a Charging and Letdown flow path as follows, NOTE The position of valves listed in Step 1.5.1 will need to be determined and aligned based on plant conditions and system requirements.
A.
ESTABLISH Control Air to the containment:
OPEN l1CA330, lA Control Air Header Containment IV OPEN 12CA330, IB Control Air Header Containment IV B.
VERIFY lCV75, Aux Spray Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
C.
OPEN lCV77, Charging to No. 13 Cold Leg D.
ESTABLISH the CCW to supply LTDN HX flow path:
OPEN 1 CC30, 11 CCHX to Aux CC Hdr Stop Valve OPEN lCC31, 12 CCHX to Aux CC Hdr Stop Valve OPEN lCC71, Letdown Hx CCW Return Flow Control Valve Salem 1 Page 110 of 116 Rev. 24
Salem 1 S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 14 (page 4 ofS)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVITY 1.5.1 (continued)
E.
ESTABLISH a letdown flow path:
POSITION 1CV21, FLOW TO VCT POSITION 1 CV35, FLOW TO VCT OPEN 1CV7, Letdown HX Isolation Valve THROTTLE 1CV18, Letdown Pressure Control Valve CLOSE 1CV3, 45 GPM Orifice Isolation Valve OPEN 1CV4, 75 GPM Orifice Isolation Valve CLOSE 1CV5, 75 GPM Orifice Isolation Valve OPEN 1CV277, RCS Letdown Isolation Valve OPEN 1 CV2, RCS Letdown Isolation Valve F.
ALIGN the BAST System IA W S1.0P-SO.CVC-0006(Q),
Boron Concentration Control.
1.5.2 ALIGN Auxiliary Building Ventilation and Service Water Intake Ventilation Systems IA W Attachment 11.
1.5.3 ESTABLISH Switchgear & Penetration Area Ventilation as required.
1.5.4 ESTABLISH CFCUs as required.
1.5.5 ALIGN the Control Air System IA W Attachment 10.
1.5.6 DETERMINE that adequate RWST inventory is available to support reactivity and RCS inventory control during Res cooldown.
Page 111 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
ATTACHMENT 14 (page 5 of 5)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVITY 1.6 IF either Elev. 84' or 64' Switchgear Room is the fire impacted area, THEN:
NOTE The following activities are required to be completed to support the initiation of RHR, in compliance with 10CFR Part 50 of Appendix R, such that Cold Shutdown conditions are achieved and maintained within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the fire event.
1.6.1 ALIGN the Service Water Test Line to Supply a Unit 1 Nuclear Header from the Unit 2 Service Water System lAW SC.OP-SO.SW-0008(Q),
Service Water Test Line Cross-Connect Alignment.
CAUTION For fires in the 64' Switchgear, 84' Switchgear and 78' Electrical Penetration Areas, flooding of the 11 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Room may occur due to actuation of the associated Fire Protection Sprinkler System.
Salem 1 1.6.2 ESTABLISH portable ventilation and an electrical power supply to the following lAW SC.MD-AB.ZZ-0001(Q), Installation of Temporary 4Kv Power Cables to CCW and RHR Pump Motors:
12 OR 13 CCW Pump motor 11 OR 12 RHR Pump motor Page 112 of 116 Rev. 24
1.0 COMMENTS
ATTACHMENT 15 (page 1 of3)
COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
(Include procedure deficiencies and corrective actions. Attach additional pages as necessary.)
Salem 1 Page 113 of 116 Rev. 24
ATTACHMENT 15 (Page 2 of3)
COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET
1.0 COMMENTS
(continued)
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
(Include procedure deficiencies and corrective actions. Attach additional pages as necessary.)
Salem 1 Page 114 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
2.0 SIGNATURES
Print ATTACHMENT 15 (Page 3 of3)
COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET Initials Signature 3.0 SM/CRS FINAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL:
Date This procedure with Attachments 1-15 is reviewed for completeness and accuracy.
Entry conditions and all deficiencies, including corrective actions, are clearly recorded in the COMMENTS section.
Signature: ________________ _
Date: ____ _
SMiCRS Salem 1 Page 115 of 116 Rev. 24
~
Q;
~
...I fie.
...I
<C
- t 0
<C EXHIBIT 1 (page 1 of 1)
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
COLD SHUTDOWN LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION INDICATION NOTE Pressurizer Level Indicator LI-1649 is calibrated to accurately indicate pressurizer level at NOP/NOT conditions. The following conversion table provides an approximate correlation between ACTUAL and INDICATED pressurizer level for LI-1649 at 68 of and 14.7 psia versus 547 of and 2250 psia (NOP/NOT).
When determining ACTUAL pressurizer level at a temperature of 200 OF versus 68 of, a value of approximately 4% should be added to the ACTUAL level to compensate for less dense pressurizer fluid.
PRESSURIZER. LEVa Cold Indication 55.0%
50.0%
45.0%
40.0%
35.0%
30.0%
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
./
./,/
./ V L /'
./ V
./ V
./ V
./ V
./ V
./ V V
0.0%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
INDICATED % Level Salem 1 Page 116 of 116 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION DUE TO FIRE IN CONTROL ROOM, RELAY ROOM, 460/230V SWITCHGEAR ROOM, OR 4KV SWITCHGEAR ROOM TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT
1.0 REFERENCES
1.1 Technical Documents Salem 1 A.
Salem Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report:
- 1.
Appendix 3A, Reg Guide 1.68.2, Initial Startup Test Program to Demonstrate Remote Shutdown Capability for Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants
- 2.
Section 7.3.2.3, Manual Control of Engineered Safety Features
- 3.
Section 7.4.1, Hot Shutdown Outside the Control Room
- 4.
Section 7.4.2, Cold Shutdown Outside the Control Room
- 5.
Section 7.7.1.2, Operating Control Stations
- 6.
Section 7.7.3.7.1, Control Room Availability
- 7.
Section 9.5.1.4, Safe Shutdown Capability
- 8.
Section 9.5.1.4.4, Alternate Shutdown Capability B.
Salem Generating Station Technical Specifications Unit 2:
- 1.
3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation
- 2.
3.4.4, Pressurizer
- 3.
6.2.2, Facility Staff
- 4.
6.9, Reporting Requirements C.
Configuration Baseline Documentation:
- 1.
DE-CB.HSD-0029(Q), Hot Shutdown Panel D.
Engineering Documents:
- 1.
Salem Generating Station Fire Protection Program Safe Shutdown and Interaction Analyses, Volumes 1 and 2, September 1981
- 2.
DE-PS.ZZ-000l(Q)-A3-SSAR(005), Salem Fire Protection Report-Safe Shutdown Analysis, IFA-AB-64A
- 3.
DE-PS.ZZ-000I(Q)-A3-SSAR(007), Salem Fire Protection Report-Safe Shutdown Analysis, IFA-AB-84A
- 4.
DE-PS.ZZ-000l(Q)-A3-SSAR(059), Salem Fire Protection Report-Safe Shutdown Analysis, 1 FA-AB-lOOA and 12FA-AB-122A
- 5.
NRC Inspection Report 50-272/83-37, Remote Shutdown Capability
- 6.
NLR-N88060, Salem Response to Notice of Violation, Remote Shutdown Capability Page 1 of38 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.CR-0002(Q) 1.1 D Engineering Documents (continued)
- 7.
NLR-N87196, 10CFR50 Appendix R Safety Evaluation
- 8.
Salem Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Fire Protection Program Safe Shutdown and Interaction Analysis, Supplemental Information
- 9.
NC.DE-PS.ZZ-000l(Q)-A8, Fire Protection Regulatory Review Process NRC OPEN 272/83-37-10, Appendix R Fire Protection, Diesel Generator Control Circuits
- 10.
S-C-ABV-MEE-0508, Effect of Loss of Ventilation on Operation of Safe Shutdown Equipment as Postulated by a 1 OCFR50 Appendix R Fire
- 11.
S-C-VAR-CEE-0057, Isolation Transfer Switches and Post-Fire Shutdown Capability
- 12.
BURL-3824, Westinghouse Letter, ESF Pump Operation Without CCW, May 14,1980
- 13.
S-C-ZZ-NEE-0839, Time Analysis of Alternate Shutdown Capability for an Appendix R Fire Scenario
- 14.
S-C-ZZ-NDC-1315, Reactor Cooldown Time for a Postulated Appendix R Fire.
- 15.
S-C-A361-CDS-0125-00, Design Requirements for Safe Shutdown Outside the Control Room.
- 16.
S-C-X500-CDM-0416-00, Cold Shutdown from Outside the Control Room.
- 17.
S-C-A900-CFD-0401-01, Cold Shutdown from Outside the Control Room.
- 18.
Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment Operating Instructions Unit No. 1, Volume 1 and 2.
- 19.
S-C-FP-FEE-1738, FP Regulatory Review of Safe Shutdown Re-Analysis
- 20.
S-C-CBV-MEE-1979, Containment Pressure/Temperature Response with RCP Seal Leakage During Control Room Fire E.
Artificial Island Emergency Plan:
- 1.
Section 2, Assignment of Responsibility
- 2.
Section 3, Organization
- 3.
Section 4, Emergency Response Support and Resources F.
Event Classification Guide:
- 1.
Section 11, Control Room Evacuation
- 2.
Section 14, Fire
- 3.
Section 18, Technical Specification / Plant Status Changes 1.2 Procedures S1.0P-ST.HSD-000l(Q), Instrumentation - Remote Shutdown Panel S1.0P-SO.AF-000I(Q), Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation S1.0P-SO.HSD-OOOl(Q), Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment Salem 1 Page 2 of38 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q) 1.2 Procedures (continued)
S1.0P-SO.RHR-000l(Q), Initiating RHR S 1.0P-SO.RHR-0002(Q), Terminating RHR S1.0P-PT.AF-000l(Q), Service Water to Auxiliary Feedwater Spool Piece Installation S1.0P-ST.AF-00ll(Q), Auxiliary Feedwater l-EOP-TRIP-l, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection NC.EP-EP.ZZ-0202(Q), Operations Support Center (OSC)
Activation and Operations ECG, Event Classification Guide S1.0P-SO.DG-000l(Q), lA Diesel Generator Operation S1.0P-SO.DG-0002(Q), IB Diesel Generator Operation S1.0P-SO.DG~0003(Q), IC Diesel Generator Operation Fire and Emergency Medical Response Manual SI.0P-PT.CM-0002(Q), Sound Power Phone Storage and Alternate Shutdown Equipment S I.RE-RA.ZZ-OO 12(Q), Reactor Engineering Manual NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005(Q), Station Operating Practices SI.0P-SO.CVC-0006(Q), Boron Concentration Control S2.0P-SO.CVC-0023(Q), CVCS Cross-Connect Alignment to Unit 2 SC.OP-SO.13-0001(Z), 13KV Breaker Operation SC.OP-SO.13-0013(Q), 3, 13, and 23 Station Power Transformers Operations SC.OP-SO.13-0014(Q),4, 14, and 24 Station Power Transformers Operations SH.OP-DD.ZZ-0065(Z), Key Control SH.OP-AP.ZZ-OI09(Q), Control of Revisions and Field Books SC.OP-SO.SW-0008(Q), Service Water Test Line Cross-Connect Alignment SC.MD-AB.ZZ-OOOI(Q), Installation of Temporary 4Kv Power Cables to CCW and RHR Pump Motors SH.OP-AS.ZZ-OOOl(Z), Operations Standards SH.OP-AS.ZZ-0002(Z), Shift Technical Advisor Program 1.3 Drawin&s Salem 1 204803, No.1 & 2 Units Auxiliary Buildings El. 122' Reactor Cont.
& Fuel Handling Area EI 130'.
204804, No. I & 2 Units Auxiliary Buildings Reactor Cont.
& Fuel Handling Area Ell 00'.
204805, No.1 & 2 Units Auxiliary Buildings El. 84' Reactor Cont.78' & 81' Fuel Handling Area El 85' & 89'-6".
204806, No.1 &2 Units Aux Bldg. & Reactor Cont. El. 64'.
205216, No.1 & 2 Units Chilled Water 205241, No.1 & 2 Units Diesel Engine Auxiliaries 205201, No.1 Unit Reactor Coolant 205203, No. I Unit Main, Reheat & Turbine By-Pass Steam 205228, No. 1 Unit Chemical & Volume Control Operation Page 3 of38 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q) 1.3 Drawines (continued)
Salem 1 205231, No.1 Unit Component Cooling 205232, No. 1 Unit Residual Heat Removal 205234, No. 1 Unit Safety Injection 205236, No. 1 Unit Auxiliary Feedwater 205242, No.1 Unit Service Water Nuclear Area 205243, No. 1 Unit Auxiliary Building Control Air 205247, No.1 Unit React. Cont. & Penet. Area Control Air 205685, No. 1&2 Units - Panel 216 Controls 203002, No.1 Unit 4160V Vital Buses One Line 203003, No. 1 Unit 460V & 230V Vital & Non Vital Bus One Line Control 221408, No.1 Unit - AADC 125V DC Distribution Cabinet 221409, No.1 Unit - BBDC 125V DC Distribution Cabinet 207902, No.1 Unit-IA Service Water Intake 230V Vital CC One-Line 207903, IB2 Service Water Intake 230V Vital Control Center One-Line 207904, IBI Service Water Intake 230V Vital Control Center One-Line 207905, lC Service Water Intake 230V Vital Control Center One-Line 207910, lA West Valves & Misc 230V Vital Contr. Ctr. One-Line 207911, IB West Valves & Misc 230V Vital Contr. Ctr. One-Line 207912, lC West Valves & Misc 230V Vital Contr. Ctr. One-Line 207931, lA East Valves & Misc. 230V Vital Contr. Ctr. One-Line 207932, IB East Valves & Misc. 230V Vital Contr. Ctr. One-Line 207933, lC East Valves & Misc. 230V Vital Contr. Ctr. One-Line 203007, No.1 Unit 125V DC One Line 265025, No. 1 & 2 Units 13KV Substation South One Line Control 265083, 13KV Substation (South) Bus Section D-E Breaker Control 125V DC 265088, 13KV Substation (South) Bus Section A-B Breaker Control 125V DC 601231, lA-460V Vital Bus One Line 601232, IB-460V Vital Bus One Line 601233, lC-460V Vital Bus One Line 602560, Circ Water Switchgear Building 125V DC Cabinet lCWIDC 602564, Circ Water Switchgear Building 125V DC Cabinet 2CWIDC 219456, No.1 & 2 Units - Auxiliary Building E1. 84' Hot Shutdown Station-Arrangement - Panel 213 - Controls 211505, Unit-Residual Heat Removal Sys. 11&21SJ44, 11&21RH4
& 1&2RH2 Suction Isolation Valves 211507, Residual Heat Removal Sys. No. 12&22SJ44, 12&22RH4
& 1&2RHI Suction Isolation Valves 211529, RHX CW Disch. Iso1. Valve No. 11&21CC16 211530, RHX CW Disch. Iso1. Valve No. 12&22CC16 211564, 1&2CVI40, 1&2CV69 Chg Dish & No. 1&2CV79 Chg Isol VAS.
211566, 1&2CV139 Disch to SW HX & 1&2CV68 Disch to RHX Isol VAS 211578, SJ1 CHG PMP Suct From RWST & CV116 Seal Wtr to VCT IVs 211580, SJ2 CHG PMP Suct From RWST & CV284 Seal Wtr to VCT IVs 211582, CV 40 Volume Control Tank First Discharge Stop Valve Page 4 of38 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q) 1.3 DrawinKs (continued) 211583, CV41 Volume Control Tank Second Discharge Stop Valve 211648, Boron Injection Tk Inlet & Outlet VAS SJ4, SJ12 211650, Boron Injection Tk Inlet & Outlet VAS SJ5, SJ13 218659, Aux Building Ventilation RHR Pump Room Coolers 218660, Aux Building Ventilation Charging Pump Room Coolers 218663, Aux Building Ventilation Component Cooling Pump Room Coolers 218664, Aux Building Ventilation Aux Feedwater Pump Room Coolers 211557, No. 11 Charging Pump & No. 11 Chg. Pmp. Aux. Lube Oil Pump 211559, No. 12 Charging Pump & No. 12 Chg. Pmp. Aux. Lube Oil Pump 211792, Service Water Screen Wash Control Panel 361-1B 203808, IB 230V Vital Bus Isolation Valve No. ISW26 203897, 11 & 12 Service Water Vent Fan & Miscellaneous Damper Controls 203898,13& 14 Service Water Vent Fan & Miscellaneous Damper Controls 224375, Reactor Containment Penetration Area & Aux Bldg-RHRS
& CCS Motor Operated Valves & Misc Equipment 228030, Control Area A.C. Chiller Motors 228031, Control Area A.C. Chilled Water Pumps 226170, Unit 1 Control Room Air Conditioning Chilled Water Panel 356 242881, Pressurizer PORV & Stop VAS & Overpress Prot. Sys. Ch I 242882, Pressurizer PORV & Stop VAS & Overpress Prot. Sys. Ch II 1.4 Conformance Documents A.
C0315, INCI 90-823 Prevents Backseating ofMS52 B.
C0356, AR M04-90-0015 Verification ofMS132 Position During Surveillance C.
C0363, Ability to Access Locked Safety Related Areas D.
C0381, NRC GL 81-21, Low Cooldown Rates, Soak Requirements, and Pressurizer Level Anomalies during Natural Circulation Cooldown.
1.5 Industry Concerns Salem 1 A.
10CFR50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979 B.
NRC INFO 86-55, Delayed Access To Safety Related Areas And Equipment During Plant Emergencies C.
NRC Generic Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements D.
NRC Generic Letter 81-12, Alternative Shutdown Capability E.
NRC I&E INFO 85-09, Isolation Transfer Switches and Post Fire Shutdown Capability F.
NUREG 0050, Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire G.
10CFR50, Appendix A Criterion 19, Control Room H.
10CFR50, Appendix R, Control Room Fire I.
OEP-38898, Ability to Meet 10CFR50 Appendix R III.G.3 Not Analyzed Page 5 of38 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q) 1.6 Other Salem 1 A.
SCI-88-0092, DCR 2EC-2284, Modifications to the Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Control Circuits B.
SCI-91-0261, Alternate Shutdown Operating Instructions Emergency Equipment C.
Letter from Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Salem Nuclear Generating Station, "Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 and 2 Units, Compliance With 10CFR50 Appendix R", March 19, 1981 D.
SCI-91-0286, 10CFR50 Appendix R Procedure Revisions - Loss of Ventilation E.
NRC Inspection Report 50-311187-29, Inspection Conducted to Assess the Salem Unit 2 Ability for Safe Shutdown in the Event of a Fire F.
NRC Inspection Report 50-272/83-37, Inspection for 10CFR50 Appendix R Compliance G.
DCP 2EC-3396, 10CFR50 Appendix R Alternate Shutdown Methodology-Installation of Transfer Switches H.
DCP 2EC-3401l2/3, Unit 2 2A12B/2C Fuel Oil Day Tank Setpoint Change I.
LER 84-014-00, Unit 1 Vital Bus Blackout Actuation.
J.
LER 86-09-00, 2B Diesel Generator Trip on High Jacket Water Temperature.
K.
DCP 2EE-0147, 2CV55 Control Valve Assembly Replacement L.
DCP 2EC-3546, 10CFR50 Appendix R Alternate Shutdown Methodology -
Installation of Transfer Switched and Valve Torque Switch Re-Wiring M.
LER 272/99-009-00, Pressurizer PORV and Block Valves Do Not Meet the Requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R N.
OEP Plant Event #37358, Plant Outside 10CFR Part 50 Appendix R Design Basis Due to Procedural Issues-l
- o.
DCP 80030170, Hot Shutdown Panel Cross-tie.
P.
DCPs 80029150 and 80029155, CVCS Cross-tie Q.
S&L Conceptual Design, Appendix R Cold Shutdown Contingency-Electrical, S&L Project No. 1150-093, Rev. 2, Dated 3/5/02 R.
DCP 80029403, Appendix R - Cold Shutdown Contingencies S.
DCP 80065300, Restoration of 13 Charging Pump T.
Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-04-22, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Performance - Appendix R Compliance and Loss of All Seal Cooling U.
NRC Information Notice 2005-14, Fire Protection Findings on Loss of Seal Cooling to Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pumps V.
SC-RC003-01, Attachment 10.5 Page 6 of38 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q) 2.0 DISCUSSION This procedure provides the direction necessary to achieve and maintain Hot Standby and cooldown to Cold Shutdown from outside the Control Room within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. It is the intent of this discussion to provide the reasoning behind the logic and flowpath of the procedure.
It is not intended to provide additional direction to the procedure.
NOTE Changes to this procedure must be reviewed lAW NC.DE-PS.ZZ-0001 (Q)-A8, Fire Protection Regulatory Review Process, by the Design Engineering Group having programmatic responsibility for "Appendix R".
The scenario specifically addressed by this procedure is the "Appendix R Fire". This scenario imposes certain restrictions on the Operator, including the following:
Safe Shutdown equipment circuitry may be exposed to grounds, opens and/or hot shorts, making complete isolation from the Control Room mandatory.
Non-Safety related associated circuits can sustain fire damage that can affect safe shutdown circuits.
One train of systems and components used to achieve and maintain Hot Standby and Cold Shutdown conditions must be free of fire damage and capable to maintain such conditions for the duration of the Hot Standby condition.
The credited Operator action before Control Room evacuation due to the fire event in the Control Room, Relay Room, or 460/230V Switchgear Room is the Reactor Trip.
The credited Operator actions before Control Room evacuation due to the fire event in the 4Kv Switchgear Room are the Reactor Trip and isolation of the 4Kv Vital Buses from Off-Site Power.
The above conditions must be satisfied with the normal minimum shift manning.
The Licensee must have the capability to initiate actions to place the unit in Cold Shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain Cold Shutdown thereafter.
Salem Generating Station performed a detailed Safe Shutdown and Interaction Analysis in accordance with NRC Guidelines. The identification of safe shutdown systems was accomplished using the following assumptions and conditions:
The postulated fire, with a possible loss of off-site power, is a single event. No other accidents or failures (e.g., struck rods, etc.) other than those induced by the fire shall be considered.
Salem 1 Page 7 of38 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.CR-0002(Q) 2.0 DISCUSSION (continued)
Safe shutdown shall only be examined for the Reactor portion of the plant and associated functions. Equipment needed only for the power production portion of the plant are considered lost.
The capability to safely shutdown the Reactor is required for a fire event.
The following systems were identified as those required to achieve safe shutdown:
Component Cooling (CC)
Chilled Water (CH)
Safety Injection (SI)
Chemical and Volume Control (CV)
Containment Ventilation (Fan Coolers)
Diesel Generators - Electrical Power Distribution Control Air (Emergency and Station Blackout Air Compressors)
Reactor Coolant Pressurizer Main Steam Steam Generators Reactor Coolant Sampling Instrumentation:
Steam Generator Level and Pressure Pressurizer Level and Pressure Reactor Coolant System Temperature Various local indicators.
Engineering Analysis S-C-ZZ-NEE-0839, Time Analysis of Alternate Shutdown Capability for an Appendix R Fire Scenario, has determined that Hot Standby is achieved and maintained within two hours.
Salem 1 Page 8 of38 Rev. 24
S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
PROCEDURE PHILOSOPHY This procedure is developed by a three-fold method. First; complete the immediate actions lAW section 2.0 of the procedure and assemble at the Appendix R Locker, Unit 2 Turbine Building, 120' Elevation (the quickest access point within the immediate vicinity of the Control Area and outside the Control Area fire zone). Second; achieve and maintain Hot Standby from the Alternate Shutdown Stations. Third; achieve and maintain Cold Shutdown.
In accordance with the guidance provided in the response to Question 3.8.4 of NRC Generic Letter 86-10, A reactor trip is the only manual action usually credited in the control room, prior to evacuation. However, for a fire event in the elev. 64' 4Kv Switchgear Room, an additional control room action is deemed necessary prior to evacuation. A demonstration of the capability of performing such actions and assurance that such actions could not be negated by subsequent spurious actuation signals resulting from the postulated fire is provided in the Salem Fire Protection Report - Safe Shutdown Manual Action Feasibility Assessment. No other actions can be relied upon even though every attempt should be made. The philosophy is that every cable which passes through the fire zone, and equipment or any component that is located within the fire zone, is considered lost or unreliable. Unreliable can be exemplified in that a logic circuit could initiate and a spurious operation or hot short could reverse the logic initiation and thus invalidate it. Therefore, even though attempts are made from the Control Room prior to evacuation, all actions must be validated with manual actions to place equipment in a position that cannot be reversed (with exception as previously discussed).
The plan or method of achieving and maintaining Hot Standby is also three-fold. First; When the fire impacted area is the 64' or 84' Switchgear Room, establish RCP seal flow to eliminate the possibility of a LOCA as a result of a loss of Component Cooling and Charging.
When the Relay Room or Control Room is the fire impacted area, RCP seal injection and CCW thermal barrier flows are isolated to prevent thermal shock of the seals which could potentially result in elevated seal leakages as indicated in Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-04-22. Isolating seal injection and thermal barrier flows limits seal leakages. This Rep seal isolation strategy addresses concerns identified in NRC Information Notice 2005-14, and is consistent with the RCP seal isolation strategy delineated in EOP-LOPA-I.
Second; isolate the RCS for positive RCS inventory control. Third; isolate the Steam Generators and initiate AFW for positive decay heat removal. This methodology is accomplished through the distribution of attachments to each Supervisor/Operator to proceed and perform these actions. There are stop points in the attachments for coordination purposes.
AC power may be provided by either off-site power being available or emergency diesel generators when the fire impacted area is either the relay room or main control room.
However, when the fire impacted area is either the 460/230V switchgear room or the 4Kv switchgear room, significant electrical equipment damage is postulated. Therefore, both off-site and on-site emergency diesel power cannot be relied upon due to the potential fire damage to the switchgear and cabling. The Steam Driven AFW Pump, CVCSIBAST System cross-connection, and Hot Shutdown Panel electrical cross-connection are relied upon to achieve and maintain HSB conditions. To achieve and maintain CSD conditions:
The Service Water System Test Line cross-connect capability is provided from Unit 1 SWI Bay #2 or #4.
AC power cross-connect capability is provided from Unit 2 4Kv switchgear to a CCW Pump and an RHR Pump.
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Gaining control of the RCS involves closing PORV Block valves, tripping RCPs for natural circulation, and establish charging and letdown to achieve and maintain Hot Standby.
In order to isolate the Steam Generators, all steam piping must be addressed. Therefore not only are the MSIV s addressed, but also MS 1 Os and MS 18s. Even though MS 1 Os will be utilized at a later time frame, the procedure provides directions to obtain initial control and then later utilizes MSI0s in a controllable manner. Also, part of the Steam Generators control is obviously establishing the AFW System.
The Immediate Actions are: Trip the reactor for a fire event in any of the designated areas, provide notification to field personnel for their response, and evacuation of Unit I Control Room personnel.
The Subsequent Actions include the isolation of all the 4K v Vital Buses from Off-Site power only for a fire event in the 4Kv Switchgear Room. The following provides the reasoning of the action steps in each of the Attachments:
ATTACHMENT 1 (Shift ManaKer)
Step 1 provides for obtaining the necessary materials to perform safe shutdown functions from outside the control room area.
Step 2 ensures the Unit 1 Security Key Ring (containing seven Security Keys) is distributed to the Unit 1 CRS.
Step 3 provides for establishing a briefing with the CRS on plant status and location of the fire. This information is, in turn, communicated to the safe shutdown personnel while the SM makes notifications.
Step 4 directs Security to provide access to the TSC for on-coming support personnel.
Notification of the situation and that security doors could be breached by operations personnel is also provided.
Step 5 provides direction to proceed to the Operations Support Center (OSC) within the Control Room Area, where only Unit 1 safe shutdown from the control room console is impacted due to fire damage. In the postulated fire events where the fire damage is external to the control room envelope, Unit 2 and the area within the Control Room Envelope is available.
Step 6 provides direction to proceed to the Technical Support Center (TSC), should both Units be in a simultaneous Alternate Shutdown due to Control Room habitability or fire damage.
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ATTACHMENT 1 (SM) (continued)
Steps 7 and 8 notifies:
Radiation Protection of the situation and that operations personnel may be ingress\\regressing contaminated areas without monitoring since power may not be available for the respective monitoring equipment.
Electric System Operator (ESO) of the plant conditions.
Step 9 identifies that the SM is required to assume the duties of Emergency Coordinator (EC),
as required by the Emergency Plan during a fire event. The prompt implementation of the Event Classification Guide (ECG) provides the means to activate support personnel that are necessary for achieving and maintaining cold shutdown conditions.
Step 10 identifies that the SM resumes the overall command and control function upon relief by the Emergency Duty Officer (EDO), who assumes the EC duties.
ATTACHMENT 2 (Shift Technical Advisor)
Step 1 provides for obtaining the necessary materials to perform safe shutdown functions from outside the control room area.
Step 2 provides direction to ensure the shift personnel are briefed on plant status and fire location.
Step 3 provides direction to ensure that each crew member is available and has the correct section of the procedure.
Step 4 provides direction to assign any available personnel that are not part of the safe shutdown crew to report to the TSC/OSC for ECG implementation.
Step 5 provides direction to proceed to the Technical Support Center (TSC), should both Units be in a simultaneous Alternate Shutdown due to Control Room habitability or fire damage.
Step 6 provides direction to proceed to the Operations Support Center (OSC) within the Control Room Area, where only Unit 1 safe shutdown from the control room console is impacted due to fire damage. In the postulated fire events where the fire damage is external to the control room envelope, Unit 2 and the area within the Control Room Envelope is available.
Step 7 is to ensure that communications are established with the CRS as the focal point for communications and coordination of plant activities. This also ensures communication continuity with each responder.
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ATTACHMENT 2 (STA) (continued)
Step 8 directs the implementation of Attachment 13 for tracking the progress and status of the actions being simultaneously performed by the various personnel dispatched into the remote shutdown locations of the unit. Upon completion of certain steps by each field Operator, control of hot standby conditions is achieved and maintained.
Step 9 informs the SM when Shutdown System control is established, (when he has control of the systems required to shutdown the plant) and provides information for the Emergency Coordinator in classification of the event.
Step 10 identifies that the STA resumes safe shutdown oversight responsibilities with the SM.
ATTACHMENT 3 (Control Room Supervisor)
Step 1 provides for obtaining the necessary materials to perform safe shutdown functions from outside the control room area.
Step 2 ensures the Security Keys on the Unit 1 Security Key Ring (containing the remaining six Security Keys) are distributed to the RO, PO, #1 NEO, #2 NEO, #3 NEO and SMT.
Step 3 provides direction to record the location of the fire impacted area.
Step 4 provides for briefing the shift personnel on plant status and location of the fire.
Step 5 directs the Control Room Supervisor to proceed to the Hot Shutdown Panel area.
Note prior to Step 6 is provided to (1) ensure continuity between the EDG Operator (RO),
- 3 NEO, and the Shift Maintenance Technician. The diesels may be running without cooling water due to fire induced spurious valve actuation, obstructing flow to the diesels that would warrant the EDG Operator (RO) to trip the diesels. Once the Shift Maintenance Technician and #3 NEO have completed the breaker/switch alignments, the valves are in the required positions for the diesels to be started. (2) Identify where guidance is available for manual component operation.
Step 6 directs the implementation of Attachment 13 for tracking the progress and status of the actions being simultaneously performed by the various personnel dispatched into the remote shutdown locations of the unit. Upon completion of certain steps by each field Operator, control of hot standby conditions is achieved and maintained.
Step 7 is to ensure that communications are established. The CRS is the focal point for communications and coordination of plant activities to achieve and maintain Hot Standby.
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ATTACHMENT 3 (CRS) (continued)
Step 8 provides specific direction for a fire event in either of the Electrical Switchgear Rooms (Elevation 84' or 64').
Steps 8.1 and 8.2 ensure that RCP seal cooling flow and RCS inventory control are maintained, and RCS boration capability is established by notifying the Unit 2 Control Room to align the CVCSIBAST Cross-Connect Systems. Fire damage in either of these areas potentially impacts on-site and off-site power sources and could cause multiple spurious component operations. Off-Site electrical sources are being de-energized by #1 NEO whereby positive control of the plant to achieve and maintain Hot Standby conditions is being established.
Step 8.3 provides guidance to direct the EDG Operator (RO) to trip all the EDGs, and the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) to open the three infeed breakers on each vital bus upon completion of the CVCS Cross-Connect alignment and notification that the ASTP-l is aligned to the Unit 2 ASDS Inverter Power Supply.
At this point, Unit 1 Switchgear is not reliable due to the potential for fire damage.
These actions are not applicable to fire events in the Relay Room or Control Room because the fire damage is limited whereby the Unit 1 components are capable of being powered from the switchgear by the Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators or Off-site power supplies.
Step 9 provides direction when the Relay Room or Control Room is the fire impacted area.
This step starts ALL available CFCUs in SLOW SPEED to provide containment heat removal capability for postulated RCP seal leakages as delineated in S-C-CBV-MEE-1979.
Available CFCUs should be started in SLOW SPEED lAW S2.0P-SO.HSD-0001(Q).
When the Relay Room or Control Room is the fire impacted area, RCP seal injection and CCW thermal barrier flows are isolated to prevent thermal shock of the seals which potentially result in elevated seal leakages as indicated in Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-04-22. Isolating seal injection and thermal barrier flows limits seal leakages.
The RCP seal isolation strategy addresses concerns identified in NRC Information Notice 2005-14, and is consistent with the RCP seal isolation strategy delineated in EOP-LOPA-l.
Step 10 provides guidance on the available parameters that are required to be established for achieving and maintaining Hot Standby conditions. This step can be accomplished with specific Operators that are at various positions in the plant, as identified in the Safe Shutdown Overview Matrix provided at the end of this Technical Bases section.
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ATTACHMENT 3 (CRS) (continued)
Step 11 establishes that Hot Standby conditions should be achieved at this point.
NOTE prior to Step 12 is infonnational in that additional resources of manpower and expertise are available in the perfonnance of the remaining steps of this procedure.
Sl.OP-SO.HSD-OOOl(Q), Fire Related Alternate Shutdown Equipment, provides the necessary details for operation of various equipment that may be necessary for Cold Shutdown.
Steps 12 and 13 are preparatory for going to cold shutdown. They provide the guidance for:
Establishing sampling to ensure shutdown margin; establishes RCS pressure indication and monitoring in preparation for commencing cooldown to cold shutdown conditions by installing a local Heise gauge in the sampling room, since Pressurizer Pressure indicator PI-1648 low range is 1700 psig; Establishing AFWST level monitoring for makeup requirements and provide the contingency for alignment to an alternate water source should adequate makeup capacity be unavailable; Establishing contingency actions upon the loss of Battery Room ventilation.
If either Switchgear Room is the fire impacted area, the following activities are required to be completed to support the initiation ofRHR, in compliance with Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50 Section IILO.3, such that Cold Shutdown conditions are achieved and maintained within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the fire event:
Establish the Service Water Test Line Cross-Connect Alignment from Unit 2.
Establish portable ventilation components from a Salem Unit 2 power source to circulate an air supply prior to energizing a CCW Pump or RHR Pump motor.
Establish an electrical power alignment from a selected Unit 2 4Kv switchgear to a CCW Pump motor andlor an RHR Pump motor.
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ATTACHMENT 3 (CRS) (continued)
If either the Relay Room or the Main Control Room is the fire impacted area, the following activities are addressed:
Maintaining the Control Air System support function.
Establishing ventilation system electrical alignments for the vital pump room coolers and service water bays to support the potential return of electrical power and service water cooling.
Establishing letdown and charging and the pneumatics that may be lost due to the spurious closure of the 11112CA330 valves (Control Air Header Containment Isolation Valves).
Transferring from the RWST to the BAST for a boration source.
Alignment of the SPA V System components and CFCU components.
Steps 14 through 26 parallel existing procedures to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
ATTACHMENT 4 (Reactor Operator)
Step 1 provides for obtaining the necessary materials to perform safe shutdown functions from outside the control room area.
Step 2 provides for a briefing from the CRS on plant status and location of the fire.
Step 3 determines whether the fire impacted area is either of the electrical switchgear rooms, or the main control room and relay room areas.
Step 4 directs the Reactor Operator to proceed to the Charging Pump area within the elevation 84' Auxiliary Building when the fire impacted area is either the Main Control Room or the Relay Room.
Step 5 directs the Reactor Operator to close the PDP Cross Tie Valve, to prevent flow since a hot short could open the motor operated isolation valve, diverting RCS inventory to Unit 2.
Step 6 directs the Reactor Operator to proceed to the Seal Water Injection Filter Area in the 84' Auxiliary Building.
Step 7 directs the Reactor Operator to ensure the Seal Water Injection Inlet and Bypass Valves closed. For fires in the Relay Room or Control Room RCP Seal Injection and RCP Thermal Barrier flow is isolated following evacuation of the Control Room.
In lieu of providing RCP Seal Injection, the normal charging header via CV55 and CV73.
is aligned for RCS inventory control. RCP Seal Injection and RCP Thermal Barrier flows are isolated to ensure thermal shock of the RCP seals is prevented in the event seal injection and CCW flow to the thermal barrier cannot be restored within the prescribed time interval.
Isolating seal injection and RCP thermal barrier flow addresses concerns identified in NRC Information Notice 2005-14, and is consistent with the RCP seal isolation strategy delineated in EOP-LOPA-l.
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ATTACHMENT 4 (RO) (continued)
Step 8 directs the Reactor Operator to proceed to the EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank area within the elevation 84' Auxiliary Building when the fire impacted area is either the Main Control Room or the Relay Room.
Step 9 is to ensure that communications are established. The CRS is the focal point for communications and coordination of plant activities to achieve Hot Standby conditions.
Step 10 reports the position of EDG lube oil and jacket water cooler isolation valves (l1&12SW21) to the CRS. This information will aid the CRS and EDG Operator (RO) in determining if one of these valves needs to be throttled open prior to the 230V breaker soon to be placed into the EMERG position by the Shift Maintenance Technician. Only one valve is necessary to supply all three diesels with adequate service water cooling.
Step 11 directs the Reactor Operator to proceed to the 1 C EDG area where control of the EDGs and vital switchgear will be established by coordination with the 4Kv Vital Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) and the CRS. The lC EDG is selected first because of a Centrifugal Charging Pump, a CCW Pump, and 12SW20 valve availability. Additionally, 1 C Vital Bus is the dedicated power supply for Alternate Shutdown components.
The note prior to Step 12 provides information that positioning of the FIRE EMERGENCY BY -PASS switches removes the SEC associated trip lockouts and thus all normal trip functions are restored. In particular, the 1 C EDG could trip without service water flow available.
Step 12 positions the FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS switches in order to bypass all control room functions and thus defeat any spurious or erroneous signals.
. Step 13 determines whether off-site power or the 1 C EDG is providing power to thelC 4Kv switchgear.
Steps 14 and 15 are applicable where the 1 C EDG is providing power to the 1 C 4 K v bus.
This step removes all loads, with the exception of the 460/230V Transformers, and opens the 1 C EDG output breaker in preparation for stopping 1 C EDG and establishing positive control of the EDG control circuitry.
Step 16 determines whether the 1 C EDG is actually running.
Step 17 is applicable where the 1 C EDG is determined to be running and directs that 1 C EDG is to be stopped in preparation for aligning the 125V DC control circuitry.
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ATTACHMENT 4 m.o) (continued)
Steps 18 and 19 align 1 C EDG control circuitry for establishing positive control of the EDG.
DC control power for lC EDG is transferred from the "Normal" source to the "Alternate" source. Even though the source of the DC control power is the same (lC l25V DC Bus),
there is some "Normal" controls cabling which is routed through the fire zone that must be isolated because it is subject to fire damage.
Steps 20 and 21 verify control circuitry availability by local indication. Indications ensure that any tripes) that may have occurred as a result of the fire or transfer of control power are reset.
Step 22 determines whether off-site power is providing power or if the 1 C EDG is required to provide power to the lC 4Kv vital switchgear.
Steps 23 through 34 are applicable where 1 C EDG is required to provide power to the lC 4Kv vital switchgear. [The Caution prior to Step 23 is an explanation of incident (LER 84-014-00, Unit 1 Vital Bus Blackout Actuation) where the lC Diesel was run, unloaded for thirty minutes with out service water and no damage was detected.
Also explanation of incident (LER 86-09-00) when 2B Diesel tripped on high jacket temperature in some semi-loaded condition, after 5 minutes of operation with no SW.]
The lC EDG is started and loading is coordinated with the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) and the CRS. The EDG output breaker is manually closed and the 460/230V transformers are energized. The 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) immediately manually closes the 12 Service Water Pump breaker to provide cooling for the lC EDG. Additionally, the switching is aligned at the SW Intake structure. After the diesel is started and the EDG output breaker closed (the 460/230V breaker on lC 4Kv Vital Bus is already closed), the 12SW20 valve is positioned to EMERG OPEN. Once the lC EDG is stable, the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) is instructed to manually close the breakers for 12 Charging Pump and 13 Component Cooling Pump. Otherwise, the Operator is directed to proceed to 1 A EDG.
Step 35 directs the Reactor Operator to proceed to the lA EDG area where control of the EDGs and vital switchgear will be established by coordination with the 4Kv Vital Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) and the CRS. The lA EDG is selected as second to establish flow to both SW headers and open l2SW20 via the lA 230V Transformer.
The note prior to Step 36 provides information that positioning of the FIRE EMERGENCY BY -PASS switches removes the SEC associated trip lockouts and thus all normal trip functions are restored.
Step 36 positions the FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS switches in order to bypass all control room functions and thus defeat any spurious or erroneous signals.
Steps 37 determines whether off-site power or the lA EDG is providing power to the lA 4Kv switchgear.
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ATTACHMENT 4 (RO) (continued)
Steps 38 and 39 are applicable where the lA EDG is providing power to the lA 4Kv bus.
This step removes all loads, with the exception of the 460/230V Transformers, and opens the lA EDG output breaker in preparation for stopping lA EDG and establishing positive control of the EDG control circuitry.
Step 40 determines whether the lA EDG is actually running.
Step 41 is applicable where the lA EDG is determined to be running and directs that lA EDG is to be stopped in preparation for aligning the 125V DC control circuitry.
Steps 42 and 43 align lA EDG control circuitry for establishing positive control of the EDG.
DC control power for lA EDG is transferred from the "Normal" source to the "Alternate" source. The "Normal" controls cabling is routed through the fire zone and must be isolated because it is subject to fire damage.
Steps 44 and 45 verify control circuitry availability by local indication. Indications ensure that any tripes) that may have occurred as a result of the fire or transfer of control power are reset.
Step 46 determines whether off-site power is providing power or the lA EDG is required to provide power to the lA 4Kv vital switchgear.
Steps 47 through 50 are applicable where lA EDG is required to provide power to the lA 4Kv vital switchgear. The lA EDG is started and loading is coordinated with the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) and the CRS. The EDG output breaker is manually closed and the 460/230V transformers are energized. The 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NED) immediately manually closes the 15 Service Water Pump breaker to provide cooling for the lA EDG and manually closes the breaker for 11 Component Cooling Pump. Additionally, the switching is aligned at the SW Intake structure. The 14SW20 valve is positioned to EMERG OPEN. Otherwise, the Operator is directed to proceed to 1 B EDG.
Step 51 directs the Reactor Operator to proceed to the IB EDG area where control of the EDGs and vital switchgear will be established by coordination with the 4Kv Vital Switchgear Operator (#1 NED) and the CRS.
The note prior to Step 52 provides information that positioning of the FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS switches removes the SEC associated trip lockouts and thus all normal trip functions are restored.
Step 52 positions the FIRE EMERGENCY BY-PASS switches in order to bypass all control room functions and thus defeat any spurious or erroneous signals.
Steps 53 determines whether off-site power or the IB EDG is providing power to the IB 4Kv switchgear.
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ATTACHMENT 4 (RO) (continued)
Steps 54 and 55 are applicable where the IB EDG is providing power to the IB 4Kv bus.
These steps remove all loads, with the exception of the 4601230V Transformers, and opens the IB EDG output breaker in preparation for stopping IB EDG and establishing positive control of the EDG control circuitry.
Step 56 determines whether the IB EDG is actually running.
Step 57 is applicable where the IB EDG is determined to be running and directs that IB EDG is to be stopped in preparation for aligning the 125V DC control circuitry.
Steps 58 and 59 align IB EDG control circuitry for establishing positive control of the EDG.
DC control power for IB EDG is transferred from the "Normal" source to the "Alternate" source. The "Normal" controls cabling is routed through the fire zone and must be isolated because it is subject to fire damage.
Steps 60 and 61 verify control circuitry availability by local indication. Indications ensure that any tripes) that may have occurred as a result of the fire or transfer of control power are reset.
Step 62 determines whether off-site power is providing power or the 1 B EDG is required to provide power to the IB 4Kv vital switchgear.
Steps 63 through 66 are applicable where IB EDG is required to provide power to the IB 4Kv vital switchgear. The IB EDG is started and loading is coordinated with the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) and the CRS. The EDG output breaker is manually closed and the 460/230V transformers are energized. The 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) immediately manually closes the 14 Service Water Pump breaker to provide cooling for the 1 B EDG and manually closes the breaker for 12 Component Cooling Pump. Additionally, the switching is already aligned at the SW Intake structure to EMERG CLOSE the 1 SW26 valve.
Step 67 establishes that Hot Standby conditions should be achieved at this point and provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration.
Step 68 determines if continued Operator coverage is required for any running EDGs.
Step 69 is applicable where any EDG is determined to be running. Any operating EDG requires implementation of the associated EDG operating procedure so that vital parameters are monitored and detailed directions are provided for continued EDG availability.
Controlled copies of these procedures are maintained locally for implementation.
Step 70 provides direction to monitor the EDG Fuel Oil Day Tanks for adequate level and guidance is provided on EMERGENCY operation of a Fuel Oil Transfer Pump.
Step 71 provides direction to proceed to the Hot Shutdown Panel when properly relieved.
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ATTACHMENT 4 (RO) (continued)
Step 72 directs the Reactor Operator to proceed to the Charging Pump area within the elevation 84' Auxiliary Building when the fire impacted area is 84' Switchgear to close the Unit 2 Cross Tie Valve, to prevent flow since a hot short fire could open the motor operated isolation valve, diverting RCS inventory to Unit 2.
Steps 73 through 76 are applicable only when either elev. 64' or 84' Vital Bus Switchgear Room is the fire impacted area. Instead of proceeding to the DFOST area first, the RO is directed to proceed to the EDG area and mechanically TRIP all three EDGs upon direction from the CRS. These actions ensure positive control of the electrical distribution system for achieving and maintaining hot standby conditions. Postulated switchgear room fires potentially create complex scenarios where components fail to actuate or spuriously actuate.
The post-fire safe shutdown strategy for switchgear room fires is to stabilize and maintain the plant in Hot Standby without reliance on electrical power from the fire affected unit.
This strategy is achieved by utilizing the Turbine Driven AFW Pump, CVCS Cross-Connect System, Hot Shutdown Panel Electrical Cross-Connect (ASTP), and manual valve operations.
The SW System "Test-Line" can be aligned from Unit 2 to provide SW System support for the CCW System and electrical jumper repairs from Unit 2 can restore power to a CCW Pump and RHR Pump for achieving and maintaining Cold Shutdown conditions.
Step 77 provides direction to proceed to the Hot Shutdown Panel when all EDGs are either not required to be running or are tripped.
ATTACHMENT 5 (Plant Operator)
Step 1 provides for obtaining the necessary materials to perform safe shutdown functions from outside the control room area.
Step 2 provides for a briefing from the CRS on plant status and location of the fire.
Step 3 directs the Plant Operator to proceed to the Hot Shutdown Panel area.
Step 4 is to ensure that communications are established. The CRS is the focal point for communications and coordination of plant activities to achieve Hot Standby.
Step 5 determines whether the fire impacted area is either of the electrical switchgear rooms, or the main control room and relay room areas.
Steps 6 through 10 provide specific direction for a fire event in either the main control room or the relay room areas that ensures service water is aligned to the centrifugal charging pump lube oil coolers, the charging pump discharge flow control valve (lCV55) is aligned to maintain at least 40 gpm of normal charging flow for RCS inventory control, and power for the UHF NHF Repeaters are transferred to ensure that communications are available.
The Note section provides information of equipment that is available at the charging station.
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ATTACHMENT 5 (PO) (continued)
Step 11 recognizes that the following steps are not applicable and provides direction to the next applicable step.
Step 12 provides specific direction for a fire event in either of the Electrical Switchgear Rooms (Elevation 84' or 64') to align the HSD Panel 213-1 to the Unit 2 ASDS Inverter power supply via the No. 1 UNIT AUX SHUTDOWN TRANSF PNL, ASTP-l and to notify the CRS upon completion so that any EDGs that are aligned to the energized switchgear may be tripped.
Step 13 determines whether actions are required for low AFW flow or high AFW flow.
Step 14 is entered for high AFW flow rate where the Turbine-driven AFW Pump is set to minimum speed until control of the 11-14AFll valves is obtained. The Steam-driven AFW Pump is selected to maintain decay heat removal. The electric driven pumps are running and will eventually be stopped by the 4Kv Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO).
Steps 15 through 18 remove the control air supply to operate the 11-14AFll valves and provide manual local operation of the valves. (Removing the air supply eliminates any possible erroneous signals to the AF 11 s.) Then, the handwheels are unlocked to place the valves in closed position; thus eliminating feedwater excursion upon starting 13 AFW Pump.
Step 19 removes the air supplies to the 13 AFW Pump inlet steam supply valve (lMS132) and the governor control valve (IMS53) that fails these valves to the open position to supply steam to the 13 AFW Pump Turbine.
Step 20 adjusts the speed of the 13 AFW Pump turbine to maintain discharge pressure.
Step 21 establishes manual control of the steam generator levels.
Step 22 recognizes that the following steps are not applicable and provides direction to the next applicable step.
Step 23 is entered from Step 13 for low AFW flow rate where the Turbine-driven AFW Pump is set to maximum speed until control of the 11-14AFll valves is obtained. The Steam-driven AFW Pump is selected to maintain decay heat removal since the electric driven pumps either did not start due to fire damaged cabling or the 4Kv Switchgear Operator (#1 NEO) has stopped the pumps. The air supplies are isolated to the 13 AFW Pump inlet steam supply valve (IMS132) and the governor control valve (IMS53) that fails these valves to the open position to supply steam to the 13 AFW Pump Turbine.
Step 24 adjusts the speed of the 13 AFW Pump turbine to maintain discharge pressure.
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ATTACHMENT 5 (PO) (continued)
Steps 25 through 28 remove the control air supply to operate the 11-14AFll valves and provide manual local operation of the valves. (Removing the air supply eliminates any possible erroneous signals to the AF 11 s.) Then, the handwheels are unlocked to place the valves in closed position; thus eliminating feedwater excursion upon starting 13 AFW Pump.
Step 29 establishes manual control of the steam generator levels.
Step 30 transfers power for Neutron Monitoring Indication to validate the reactor trip and maintain reactivity monitoring capability.
Step 31 establishes confirmation of the Reactor Trip and neutron flux monitoring capability.
Step 32 provides direction to align Service Water to 11 CCHX when the fire impacted area is either the control room or relay room. This ensures the component cooling system support function is available for the centrifugal charging pumps.
Step 33 provides guidance on the avai1ab~e parameters that are required to be established for achieving and maintaining Hot Standby conditions. This step can be accomplished with specific Operators that are at various positions in the plant, within limitations.
Step 34 establishes that Hot Standby conditions should be achieved at this point and provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration.
ATTACHMENT 6 (#1 Nuclear Equipment Operator)
Step 1 provides for obtaining the necessary materials to perform safe shutdown functions from outside the control room area.
Step 2 provides for a briefing from the CRS on plant status and location of the fire.
Step 3 determines whether the fire impacted area is either of the electrical switchgear rooms, or the main control room and relay room areas. (Main control room and relay room area fires require Step 8 to be implemented.)
Step 4 determines whether the fire impacted area is the 460/230V Electrical Switchgear Room or the 4Kv Switchgear Room. (The 4Kv Electrical Switchgear Room fire requires Step 126 to be implemented.)
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ATTACHMENT 6 (#1 NEO) (continued)
Steps 5, 6, and 7 direct the Operator to proceed to the Relay Room (when the fire impacted area is the 460/230V Switchgear Room) and de-energize specific circuitry at the lAADC, 1 BBDC, and I CCDC 125V DC Distribution Cabinets. De-energizing this circuitry eliminates the potential for fire induced hot shorts to cause spurious component operation (i.e.: 1MS52) and ensures that high-low pressure interface valves are closed (i.e.: ICV2, 1CV277, 1CV131, ICV278, and IRC40-43). The 11-14GB4 valve cabling is also susceptible to fire induced short and therefore are required to be maintained closed for achieving and maintaining hot standby. Additionally; test line valves 1SJ123, ISJ60, 11-14SJ58, and 11-12SJ50 are susceptible to fire induced short that could result in an RCS inventory loss path when the RHR System is aligned to the RCS, and therefore are required to be maintained closed for achieving and maintaining cold shutdown.
Steps 8 thru 10 direct the Operator to proceed to the 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room (when the fire impacted area is either the Control Room or Relay Room) and de-energize 13 Charging Pump and the lAADC, IBBDC, and ICCDC 125V DC Distribution Cabinets from the respective lA, IB, and IC 125V DC Buses. Step 9 trips 13 Charging Pump, if it was running, and prevents any possible spurious starts, by tripping dc control power. The PDP pump is not the pump of choice since there is no local speed control (Circuitry may have been compromised) and thus loss of flow control.
Step 10, de-energizing these cabinets eliminates the potential for fire induced hot shorts to cause spurious component operation (i.e.: IMS52) and ensures that high-low pressure interface valves are closed (i.e.: 1CV2, ICV277, ICV13I, ICV278, and IRC40-43). The 11-14GB4 valve cabling is also susceptible to fire induced short and therefore are required to be maintained closed for achieving and maintaining hot standby. Additionally; test line valves ISJ123, ISJ60, 11-14SJ58, and 11-12SJ50 are susceptible to fire induced short that could result in an RCS inventory loss path when the RHR System is aligned to the RCS, and therefore are required to be maintained closed for achieving and maintaining cold shutdown.
Step II directs the Operator to proceed to the 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear Room when the fire impacted area is either the Main Control Room, Relay Room, or 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room.
Step 12 is to ensure that communications are established. The CRS is the focal point for communications and coordination of plant activities to achieve Hot Standby conditions.
Steps 13, 14, and 15 remove the regular and emergency DC control power sources to a1l4Kv vital buses, and thus places breakers in an established position and eliminates any future spurious breaker operations. With the breakers in a set position, the Operator can trip/close breakers as necessary for equipment operation.
Step 16 determines whether the fire impacted area is the 460/230V Electrical Switchgear Room, or the main control room and relay room areas. (A 460/230V Electrical Switchgear Room fire requires Step 123 to be implemented.)
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ATTACHMENT 6 (#1 NEO) (continued)
Steps 17 and 18 are applicable when the main control room or the relay room is the fire impacted area. These steps determine if lC 4Kv Vital Bus is energized from 13 or 14 Station Power Transformer.
Steps 19 through 40 are applicable when off-site power is not supplying the lC 4Kv Vital Bus. Notification is made to the EDG Operator (RO) that off-site power is not supplying the lC 4Kv Vital Bus; the 460/230V feeder breaker is verified closed and all other IC 4Kv breakers are manually tripped open. While the EDG Operator (RO) transfers 125V DC control power circuits for lC EDG, the essential components (12 SW Pump, 12 CV Pump, 13 CCW Pump, lC EDG) lC Vital Bus 4Kv breaker charging springs are verified charged or are manually charged in preparation for closure when the 1 C EDG reported available for loading.
Upon notification from the EDG Operator (RO) that the EDG is in service and ready to accept load, the IC EDG output breaker is closed to energize the lC 4Kv Vital Bus and 12 Service Water Pump 4Kv breaker is immediately closed to provide cooling for the EDG lube oil and jacket water coolers. Once it is verified that RCP Seal Injection is isolated, the 12 Charging Pump 4Kv breaker is closed to provide the support function for RCS inventory control via the normal charging header. Once it is verified the CCW return from the RCP Thermal Barrier is isolated, the 13 Component Cooling Water Pump 4Kv breaker is closed to provide 12 Charging Pump mechanical seal cooling.
Steps 41 through 49 are applicable when off-site power is supplying the IC 4Kv Vital Bus.
Notification is made to the EDG Operator (RO) that off-site power is supplying the lC 4Kv Vital Bus so that the EDG Operator (RO) can stop the EDG (ifrunning) and transfer I25V DC control power circuits for lC EDG. The essential components (11 or 12 SW Pump, 12 CV Pump, 13 CCW Pump, and 460/230V Transformers) 4Kv breakers are verified closed.
Step 50 establishes that IC 4Kv Vital Bus and essential loads are established at this point and provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration.
Step 51 directs the Operator to proceed to the lA 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear.
Steps 52 and 53 determine if IA 4Kv Vital Bus is energized from 13 or 14 Station Power Transformer.
Steps 54 through 71 are applicable when off-site power is not supplying the lA 4Kv Vital Bus. Notification is made to the EDG Operator (RO) that off-site power is not supplying the IA 4Kv Vital Bus; the 460/230V feeder breaker is verified closed and all other lA 4Kv breakers are manually tripped open. While the EDG Operator (RO) transfers 125V DC control power circuits for lA EDG, the essential components (15 SW Pump, 11 CCW Pump, and IA EDG) 4Kv breaker charging springs are verified charged or are manually charged in preparation for closure when the lA EDG reported available for loading.
Upon notification from the EDG Operator (RO) that the EDG is in service and ready to accept load, the lA EDG output breaker is closed to energize the IA 4Kv Vital Bus and 15 Service Water Pump 4Kv breaker is immediately closed to provide cooling for the EDG lube oil and jacket water coolers. Once it is verified the CCW return from the RCP Thermal Barrier is isolated, the 11 Component Cooling Water Pump 4Kv breaker is closed to provide Charging Pump Mechanical seal cooling.
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ATTACHMENT 6 (#1 NEO) (continued)
Steps 72 through 80 are applicable when off-site power is supplying the lA 4K v Vital Bus.
Notification is made to the EDG Operator (RO) that off-site power is supplying the lA 4Kv Vital Bus so that the EDG Operator (RO) can stop the EDG (ifrunning) and transfer 125V DC control power circuits for lA EDG. The essential components (15 or 16 SW Pump, 11 CCW Pump, and 460/230V Transformers) 4Kv breakers are verified closed.
Step 81 establishes that lA 4Kv Vital Bus and essentia1loads are established at this point and provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration. The 14SW20 will be aligned as soon as the bus is energized and the #3 NEO completes the respective steps in Attachment 8.
Step 82 directs the Operator to proceed to the IB 4Kv Vital Bus Switchgear.
Steps 83 and 84 determine if IB 4Kv Vital Bus is energized from 13 or 14 Station Power Transformer.
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ATTACHMENT 6 (#1 NEO) (continued)
Steps 85 through 107 are applicable when off-site power is not supplying the IB 4Kv Vital Bus. Notification is made to the EDG Operator (RO) that off-site power is not supplying the 1B 4Kv Vital Bus; the 460/230V feeder breaker is verified closed and all other IB 4Kv breakers are manually tripped open. While the EDG Operator (RO) transfers 125V DC control power circuits for 1B EDG, the essential components (14 SW Pump, 12 CCW Pump, and 1B EDG) 4Kv breaker charging springs are verified charged or are manually charged in preparation for closure when the 1 B EDG reported available for loading. Upon notification from the EDG Operator (RO) that the EDG is in service and ready to accept load, the 1B EDG output breaker is closed to energize the IB 4Kv Vital Bus and 14 Service Water Pump 4Kv breaker is immediately closed to provide cooling for the EDG lube oil and jacket water coolers. Once it is verified the CCW return fromthe RCP Thermal Barrier is isolated, the 12 Component Cooling Water Pump 4Kv breaker is closed to provide Charging Pump Mechanical seal cooling.
Steps 108 through 118 are applicable when off-site power is supplying the 1B 4Kv Vital Bus.
Notification is made to the EDG Operator (RO) that off-site power is supplying the 1B 4Kv Vital Bus so that the EDG Operator (RO) can stop the EDG (if running) and transfer 125V DC control power circuits for 1B EDG. The essential components (13 or 14 SW Pump, 12 CCW Pump, and 460/230V Transformers) 4Kv breakers are verified closed.
Step 119 establishes that 1B 4Kv Vital Bus and essential loads are established at this point and provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration. The 1 SW26 will be aligned as soon as the bus is energized and the Shift Maintenance Technician completes the respective step in Attachment 9.
Step 120 establishes that Hot Standby alignment is achieved at this point and provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration.
Step 122 directs the Operator to report to the Hot Shutdown Panel for further assignments.
Step 123 is applicable only when the fire impacted area is the 460/230V Switchgear Room.
The Operator is directed to de-energize the 125V DC control power circuitry and open each infeed from the 13 and 14 SPT to the lA, IB, 1C 4Kv Vital Buses. This step de-energizes all the 4Kv Vital Buses and eliminates the potential for spurious component operation due to fire induced hot shorts. Once control of the plant is achieved and maintained, the fire damage can be assessed and each vital bus may be returned to service in a controlled manner or the Salem Cold Shutdown Contingency for electrical cross-connection from Unit 2 may be applied.
Step 124 establishes that Hot Standby alignment is achieved at this point and provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration.
Step 125 directs the Operator to report to the Hot Shutdown Panel for further assignments.
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ATTACHMENT 6 (#1 NEO) (continued)
Steps 126 and 127 direct the Operator to proceed to the Relay Room (when the fire impacted area is the 4Kv Switchgear Room) and de-energize specific circuitry at the 1BBDC 125V DC Distribution Cabinet. De-energizing this circuitry isolates the normal letdown flow path due to the potential for fire induced hot shorts to cause spurious component operation of the lCV3, 1CV4, and/or 1CV5 letdown orifice isolation valves and ensures that high-low pressure system interface valves are closed (i.e.: lCV2 and 1CV277).
Step 128 directs the Operator to report to the Hot Shutdown Panel for further assignments.
All breakers on the 4Kv Vital Buses will remain in position until physically repositioned.
With the removal of the DC control power, all tripping or closing mechanisms are removed with exception of the manual pushbutton controls on the breakers.
ATTACHMENT 7 (#2 Nuclear Equipment Operator)
Step 1 provides for obtaining the necessary materials to perform safe shutdown functions from outside the control room area.
Step 2 provides for a briefing from the CRS on plant status and location of the fire.
Step 3 directs the Operator to proceed to the Inner Mechanical Penetration Area.
Step 4 determines whether the fire impacted area is either of the electrical switchgear rooms, or the main control room and relay room areas.
Steps 5 through 19 are completed when the fire impacted area is either the Main Control Room or Relay Room.
Step 5 provides information to the CRS who will later forward this information.
If the valves are opened and the control power transferred to local, the valves will remain in the required open position and spurious operation of the MOV is not feasible. If the valves are closed, manual throttling will be required to prevent water hammer.
Step 6 is to ensure that communications are established. The CRS is the focal point for communications and coordination of plant activities to achieve Hot Standby conditions.
Step 7 aligns the normal charging header to allow flow to the RCS for inventory control as the injection path to the RCP seals is isolated. With CV73 (CV7l Bypass) in the open position, the Operator stationed at the lCV55 can adjust flow to maintain PZR and VCT levels within the prescribed bands. RCP seal injection is isolated to ensure thermal shock of the RCP seals is prevented in the event seal injection and CCW flow to the thermal barrier cannot be restored within the prescribed time interval.
Isolation ofRCP seal injection addresses concerns identified in NRC Information Notice 2005-14.
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ATTACHMENT 7 (#2 NEO) (continued)
Step 8 isolates the RCP Thermal Barrier Valve 1 CC 131 to ensure thermal shock of the RCP seals is prevented in the event seal injection and CCW to the thermal barrier cannot be restored within the prescribed time interval. Isolation of CCW from the RCP Thermal Barrier addresses concerns identified in NRC Information Notice 2005-14, and is consistent with the RCP seal isolation strategy delineated in EOP-LOPA-l.
Step 9 reports RCP Thermal Barrier Return (ICC131) is isolated to the CRS.
This information is required when starting CCW pumps in Attachment 6 (#1 NEO)
Step 10 isolates RCP Seal Water Return Valve lCV116. Isolation of lCV116 is consistent with the assumptions made in Calculation S-C-CBV -MEE-1979, and the RCP seal isolation strategy delineated in EOP-LOP A-I.
Note prior to Step 11 provides the directional path for the Operator to follow.
Time is a restraint in this situation and it is assumed that deconning is done after the plant is stabilized.
Steps 11 through 19 are performed in the elevation 78' Electrical Penetration Area at the lA, IB, and lC East 230V Vital Control Centers. Control power circuits are transferred such that cabling which is routed through the affected fire areas is bypassed and the valves are positioned in the required position. (NOTE: Steps 12 and 13 ensure that the pressurizer PORV Block Valves are maintained CLOSED by operation of the transfer switches which separate the block valve controls for alternate shutdown from the control room controls.
Since spurious operation of the PORVs (due to a fire induced short) and failure ofthe PORV Block Valve circuit (due to fire damage) could result in IPRI11PR6 or IPR2I1PR7 providing a pathway for a loss of RCS inventory and RCS pressure control, these actions are prioritized in order to maintain the plant within 10CFR Part 50 Appendix R performance goals for operation within plant design basis.)
(70001776)
Steps 20 through 24 are completed when the fire impacted area is either of the switchgear rooms.
Step 21 is to ensure that communications are established. The CRS is the focal point for communications and coordination of plant activities to achieve Hot Standby conditions.
Steps 22 and 23 isolate the charging system, to ensure that the flow is directed to the RCP seals. With these valves closed, the 23 Charging Pump flow is directed to the RCP seals. This step ensures that charging flow is not misdirected. Later the 1 CV73 valve may be opened to establish charging to RCS, but at this time the only concern is for the RCP seals.
Step 24, and the note immediately preceding it, provides the directional path for the Operator to follow. Time is a restraint in this situation and it is assumed that deconning is done after the plant is stabilized.
Step 25 determines if the 460/230V Electrical Switchgear Room is the fire impacted area.
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ATTACHMENT 7 (#2 NEO) (continued)
Step 26 is only completed when the fire impacted area is the elevation 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room and are performed in the elevation 78' Electrical Penetration Area at the lC East 230V Vital Control Center. The Operator transfers the control for the ISJ13 valve such that the circuitry that is susceptible to fire damage is bypassed and, if power is still available to the MCC, the valve can be electrically secured in the closed position. However, if power is not available at this point, then the circuitry is aligned such that the valve can be manually positioned and should a power supply eventually be restored, the valve will remain in the closed position. Actual position verification will be performed in accordance with at Step 36. Appendix R Fire Area Compliance Assessment, DE-PS.ZZ-OOOl(Q)-A3-SSAR(007) for Fire Area IFA-AB-84A, identifies that the BIT Isolation Valves (1SJ4, ISJ5, ISJ12, and ISJ13) have control power cabling in this fire area that is susceptible to fire induced hot shorts which could cause spurious component operation. The inadvertent opening of anyone BIT inlet valve and anyone BIT outlet valve would challenge the RCP seal cooling flow path and RCS inventory control function.
Step 27 provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration.
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ATTACHMENT 7 (#2 NEO) (continued)
Steps 28 through 40 are completed for any of the four fire impacted area fire impacted areas (main control room, relay room, 4Kv switchgear room, or 460/230V switchgear room).
Steps 28 and 29 are performed in the elevation 78' Electrical Penetration Area.
Inside Panel 1016, the key switch is positioned to transfer power for 12 RCS loop wide range T h and T c indication at the Hot Shutdown Panel. Inside Panel 1017, the key switch is positioned to transfer power for 13 RCS loop wide range Th and Tc indication at the Hot Shutdown Panel.
Step 30 is completed in the elevation 100' Inner Piping Penetration Area where the Main Steam Isolation of 11 and 13 Steam Generators is accomplished by closure of the 11&13MS167, 11&13MSI8, and 11&13MSlO valves. In certain fire scenarios, temperatures in the Inner Penetration Area are expected to rise significantly (> 160 OF) such that personnel access to the area will NOT be permitted. In this situation, Step 30.2 of Attachment 7 directs closure of valves l1CA348 and 12CA348 which results in isolation of control air to 11&13MSI67, 11&13MSI8, and 11&13MSI0 resulting in the respective valves to fail to the closed position.
Steps 31 through 40 are completed in the Outer Piping Penetration Area where the Main Steam Isolation of 12 and 14 Steam Generators is accomplished by closure of the 12&14MSI67, 12&14MS18, and 12&14MSI0 valves. Blocking the Outer Piping Penetration Door open in Step 32 ensures ambient conditions in the Outer Penetration Area will continue to allow personnel access during the event.
Step 41 establishes that Hot Standby alignment is achieved at this point and provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration.
Steps 42 and 43 provide guidance to establish a decay heat removal path via 12&14MSI0 valves, under the direction of the CRS. If temperature conditions in the Inner Penetration Area allow personnel access AND once another Operator is available, the inner penetration is manned and communication established with the Hot Shutdown Panel for coordination to establish a controlled cooldown with all four steam generators.
ATTACHMENT 8 (#3 Nuclear Eguipment Operator)
Step 1 provides for obtaining the necessary materials to perform safe shutdown functions from outside the control room area.
Step 2 provides for a briefing from the CRS on plant status and location of the fire.
Steps 3 and 4 direct the Operator to proceed to the Main Turbine Front Standard and initiate a local-manual main turbine trip as a required backup action to Step 3.2A of the Immediate Actions.
Steps 5 through 7 direct the Operator to proceed to the Turbine Building 4Kv Group Bus area; establish communication with the CRS, and trip open the infeed breakers for each of the four group buses. This will result in loss ofRCPs and place the unit in natural circulation. This also removes other equipment which, if left operating, would cause operational interference.
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ATTACHMENT 8 (#3 NEO) (continued)
Step 8 provides for notification to the CRS that the Main Turbine Trip is confirmed and the 4Kv Group Buses are deenergized.
Step 9 determines whether the fire impacted area is either of the electrical switchgear rooms, or the main control room and relay room areas.
Steps 10 through 19 are applicable when the main control room or the relay room is the fire impacted area.
Steps 10 and 11 direct the Operator to proceed to the Circulating Water Battery Rooms and remove DC control power to 13 and 14 SPT 4Kv infeed breakers (A-F and C-D);
thus failing the breakers to as-is conditions. If off-site power is supplying the 4Kv vital buses, a hot short cannot cause a breaker trip or a breaker closure.
Step 12 directs the Operator to proceed to the Service Water Intake Structure to establish control of both nuclear header isolation (12&14SW20) valves and the TGA isolation (1 SW26) valve.
Step 13 addresses the possibility that the control power fuses have blown for the 11 Nuclear Header Supply valve 12SW20. This step also eliminates any potential future spurious operation of the valve. If the valve is already open, and with the removal of remote control power, no other actions are required since there isn't any motive force. If the valve is closed, then it may be necessary to manually throttle the MOV to the open position to prevent water hammer. The substeps coordinate with the CRS to open 12SW20.
Steps 14 through 18 address the possibility that the control power fuses have blown for the TGA Header Supply valve ISW26 and/or the 12 Nuclear Header Supply valve 14SW20. These steps also eliminate any potential future spurious operation ofthe valves. If either valve is already open, and with the removal of remote control power, no other actions are required since there isn't any motive force. When the MCC is energized, the valve will close. If the valve is closed, then no further actions are required and the valve will remain closed when the MCC is energized.
Step 19 provides notification to the CRS that DC power to the 13KV infeed breakers for 13 SPT and 14 SPT is tripped, and the SW valves and breakers in the SWI are aligned.
Steps 20 and 21 direct the Operator to proceed to the Station Blackout Control Air Compressor and place the unit into service as a proactive action to preclude the loss of control air due to the failure of either the # 1 Emergency Air Compressor and/or the 1 C Emergency Diesel Generator during a station blackout event.
Step 22 establishes that Hot Standby alignment is achieved at this point and provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration.
Step 23 directs the Operator to proceed to the Hot Shutdown Panel for other assignments.
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ATTACHMENT 9 (Shift Maintenance Technician)
Step 1 provides for obtaining the necessary materials to perform safe shutdown functions from outside the control room area.
Step 2 provides for a briefing from the CRS on plant status and location of the fire.
Step 3 determines when the fire impacted area is the el. 64' 4Kv Electrical Switchgear Room that the technician is to proceed to the Hot Shutdown Panel for other assignments, otherwise Step 4 is applicable. (Steps 4 through 38 are not applicable for a fire impacting the 4Kv Switchgear Room because the 4Kv Vital Buses are potentially de-energized by fire damage.
Therefore, the components that are addressed in these steps would not be capable of repositioning electrically as required. Physical visual verification andlor manual operation for each valve is required when aligning a system for service during this post-fire event.)
Step 4 determines whether the fire impacted area is the 460/230V Electrical Switchgear Room, or the main control room and relay room areas. If the 460/230V Electrical Switchgear Room is the fire impacted area, the Technician is directed to bypass Steps 5 through 33, and proceed to Step 34. (Steps 5 through 33 are not applicable for a fire impacting the 460/230V Switchgear Room because the 4601230V Vital Buses are potentially de-energized by fire damage. Therefore, the components that are addressed in these steps would not be capable of repositioning electrically as required. Physical visual verification andlor manual operation for each valve is required when aligning a system for service during this post-fire event.)
Otherwise, Step 5 is applicable.
Step 5 directs the Operator to proceed to the 1C West Valves & Misc 230V Control Center when the fire impacted area is either the Main Control Room or Relay Room.
Step 6 is to ensure that communications are established. The CRS is the focal point for communications and coordination of plant activities to achieve Hot Standby conditions.
Steps 7 through 31 are performed at each of the lA, 1B, and 1C West Valves & Misc 230V Control Centers when the Relay Room or Control Room is the fire impacted area. Control power circuits are transferred such that cabling which is routed through the affected fire areas is bypassed and the components are positioned in the required configuration. These actions are performed to prevent any spurious operations of these components. The 11&12SW21, 11&12SW23, 1SJ1, 1CV139, 1CV140, and 1CV68 valves are positioned in EMER OPEN at the respective 230V breakers; the 1CV40, 1SJ12, 1CC30, 1CC31, 11&12SJ44, and 11&12CC16 are positioned in EMER CLOSED position at the respective 230V breakers.
Additionally, ifthe Centrifugal Charging Pump Lube Oil Pump control circuits are failed, these circuits are bypassed such that the lube oil pumps are started manUally.
Step 32 establishes that Hot Standby alignment is achieved at this point and provides for notification to the CRS to coordinate plant configuration.
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ATTACHMENT 9 (Shift Maintenance Technician) (continued)
Step 33 recognizes that the following steps are not applicable and provides direction to the next applicable Step 39.
Steps 34 through 38 are only applicable when elevation 84' 460/230V Vital Bus Switchgear Room is the fire impacted area. The Appendix R Fire Area Compliance Assessment, DE-PS.ZZ-OOOI(Q)-A3-SSAR(007), determines that control power cabling in this fire area is susceptible to fire induced hot shorts that could cause spurious component operation for the BIT Isolation Valves (1SJ4, ISJ5, ISJ12, and ISJ13). The inadvertent opening of any one BIT inlet valve and anyone BIT outlet valve would challenge the RCP seal cooling flow path and RCS inventory control function.
Steps 34 and 35 direct the technician to proceed to the IB West MCC and transfer the control for the 1 SJ12 valve such that the circuitry that is susceptible to fire damage is bypassed and (if power is still available to the MCC) the valve can be electrically secured in the closed position.
Steps 36 through 38 direct the technician to proceed to the Inner Mechanical Penetration Area to close BIT Outlet Isolation Valves in the event that any BIT Isolation valve spuriously opened and ISJ12 was not successfully closed at Step 35 in this Attachment and 1 SJ13 was not successfully closed by #2 NEO at Step 26 in Attachment 7.
Step 39 provides direction to report to the Hot Shutdown Panel for other assignments.
ATTACHMENT 10 (SBO Compressor Shutdown)
This attachment is implemented by the TSC/OSC at the direction of the Control Room Supervisor upon achieving and maintaining Hot Standby condition.
Section 1 is only applicable when either the main control room or the relay room is the impacted fire area. In order to start the Emergency Air Compressor, the Chilled Water System is required to be available and in service for #1 ECAC. Therefore, the Chilled Water System is established by bypassing the control circuitry and manually placing the Chilled Water System components into service in the EMERGENCY mode.
Section 2 is applicable when either the #1 ECAC is aligned IA W section 1 of this attachment or the #2 ECAC is providing the CA System function. When either of these conditions is satisfied, then the SBO Air Compressor is shutdown IA W this section.
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ATTACHMENT 11 (ABV & SWI Ventilation 230V Systems)
This attachment is implemented by the TSC/OSC at the discretion of the CRS as determined by the affected fire area and component/system availability. It provides the necessary instructions for maintaining the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Room Cooler Fans at various areas of the unit, and Service Water Intake Structure Ventilation System Fans energized when power is available. Bypassing circuitry from the affected fire area results in breaker closure for room cooler/fan start.
ATTACHMENT 12 (Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Restoration)
This attachment is provided as supplemental information to the Plant Operator should resetting the Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Overspeed Trip Mechanism be required.
This attachment provides the required instructions and figures as found in the normal operating procedures.
ATTACHMENT 13 (CRS/STA Trackine & Overview Status)
This attachment is implemented by the CRS and ST A. It provides a check-off sheet to aid in tracking the status of this procedure for establishing Hot Standby conditions.
ATTACHMENT 14 (Operations Support Center Activity)
This attachment is implemented by the OSC Coordinator (OSCC) upon activation of the OSC.
It provides a list of potentially applicable support functions that may be required for establishing Cold Shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. These activities are delegated to the OSCC for evaluation in order to allow the CRS to maintain the command and control function requirements for achieving and maintaining Hot Standby conditions.
The following steps are applicable to all fire areas addressed by this procedure:
Salem 1 Step 1.1 establishes Battery Room monitoring for adequate ventilation and hydrogen buildup when the ventilation system is adversely impacted by fire damage.
Step 1.2 establishes RCS wide range pressure monitoring at the primary sample area because the Hot Shutdown Panel instrumentation is narrow range (1700-2500 psig) for achieving and maintaining Hot Standby conditions.
Step 1.3 establishes AFWST level monitoring and contingency actions for maintaining adequate inventory to support maintaining HSB conditions and subsequent RCS cooldown to CSD conditions. Establishing prompt level monitoring ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, as described in Technical Specification Bases 3/4.7.1.3.
Step 1.4 establishes an RCS sampling flow path and Chemistry Department sampling for boron concentration in preparation for Cold Shutdown.
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ATTACHMENT 14 (continued)
Step 1.5 is applicable to a Control Room or Relay Room fire in support of achieving and maintaining Cold Shutdown conditions within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />s:
Provides direction for maintaining a control air supply lAW Attachment 10.
Provides direction for transferring the control circuitry of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System and Service Water Building Ventilation System lAW Attachment 11 to ensure that the support function is available to support safe shutdown.
Establishes charging and letdown flowpaths, and align the CVCS makeup system from the Boric Acid Storage Tank System to support reactivity and RCS inventory control during cooldown.
The Switchgear & Penetration Area Ventilation System is inspected for adequate ventilation system operation and guidance is provided for the manual operation of components, as applicable.
The Containment Fan Coil Units are inspected for adequate ventilation system operation and guidance is provided for the manual operation of components, as applicable.
Adequate RWST inventory monitoring is established to support reactivity and RCS inventory control during RCS cooldown.
Step 1.6 is applicable to a Switchgear Room fire in the event that a Unit 1 4Kvand 460/230V Vital Power supply cannot be restored for establishing the CCW and RHR Systems to achieve and maintain Cold Shutdown conditions within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />s:
Salem 1 The Service Water System Test-Line can be established as a cross-connection from Unit 2 to supply a selected Unit 1 Service Water Nuclear Header in preparation for establishing the CCW System to support the RHR System.
Portable ventilation and an electrical power supply to a selected CCW and/or RHR Pump(s) can be provided from Unit 2C 4Kv Vital Power Supply to support establishing the CCW and RHR Systems.
Page 35 of38 Rev. 24
S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
EXHIBIT 1 (Cold Shutdown Level Instrumentation Indication)
This exhibit is utilized by the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) to determine ACTUAL versus INDICATED level at PZR temperatures less than or equal to 200 of.
Step 26 of Attachment 3 directs the CRS to maintain RCS temperature <200 of.
Pressurizer Level Indicator LI-1649 is calibrated to accurately indicate pressurizer level at NOPINOT conditions, and NOT at low temperature conditions. The conversion table provides a correlation between ACTUAL and INDICATED pressurizer level for LI-1649 at 68 of and 14.7 psia versus 547 OF and 2250 psia (NOPINOT).
Additional guidance is then provided when determining ACTUAL pressurizer level at a temperature of 200 of versus 68 of, When this condition exists, a value of approximately 4%
should be added to the ACTUAL level to compensate for less dense pressurizer fluid.
Salem 1 Page 36 of38 Rev. 24
ATTI ATT3 (SM)
(CRS)
- Get Mat'l
- Get Mat'l
- BriefSTA
- Brief
&CRS Crew
- Go to
- Notify:
HSD Panel
-Security
-Rad Pro
-ESO
- IF Swgr
-LP Group
- RmFire, Align
- Go to CVIBAST TSC/OSC Cross-Tie
- Initiate ECG Coordinate:
-RCS Coordinate Inventory Shutdown
-RCS Heat Sink via Natural Circulation ATT2
-HSB (STA) conditions
- Get Mat'l
- Brief Crew
- Accounta bility
- Go to TSC/OSC
- Monitor Plant Condition Remain in Remain in Area of TSC/OSC HSD Panel Salem 1 SAFE SHUTDOWN OVERVIEW MATRIX (page 1 of2)
ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING HOT STANDBY (HSB)
ATT4 ATT5 ATT6 ATT7 (RO)
(PO)
(#1 NEO)
(#2 NEO)
- Get Mat'l
- Get Mat'l
- Get Mat'l
- Get Mat'l
- Go to
- Go to
- IF CRor
- IFCRor El84' El84' RRFire, -
- RRFire, AuxBldg AuxBldg Open Infeed
-Report
-lAADC position of:
- IFCRor
- IF CRor
-lBBDC
-11SW22 RR Fire:
- RRFire,
-lCCDC
-12SW22
- Close Align:
- Align 4Kv
- Open 1CV464
-CVCS Swgr:
1CV73
- Close
-l1SW122
.-lC4Kv:
- Close 1CV83 toCCHX
-13 CC Pp 1CC131
- Close
-12 ChgPp
- Close 1CV89
- IF Swgr
-12 SWPp 1CVl16
- Close RmFire, -
-460/230V 1CV95 Align
-Align ASTP
-lA 4Kv:
1A/1BIlC
-Check
-11 CC Pp East MCC:
11/12SW21
- Align:
-15 SWPp
-lPR6 positions
-UHFNHF
-460/230V
-12SW22
-Align 1C
-NI
-lPR7 EDG
-lB 4Kv:
-lSJ13
-Align 1A
- Establish
-12 CC Pp
-lCV69 EDG Decay Heat
-14 SWPp
-Align 1B Removal via
-460/230V
- IF Swgr EDG Natural
- RmFire,
-Monitor Circulation
- IF
-lSJ13 EDGs 460/230V
- Maintain Swgr Fire,
- Energize S/G
- Open DC Wide Range Inventory Bkrs in RR Th&Tc
- IF Swgr
- Align 4Kv RmFire:
- Maintain Swgr:
- Close:
-TRIP ALL RCS
-AIIEDG
-l1MSlO EDGs Inventory Infeeds Open
-13MSlO
-All SPT
-MSI8s
- Maintain Infeeds Open
-MS167s HSB
- IF 4kv
- Close:
- SwgrFire,
-12MSI0
-Open
-14MS10 Remain in BBDC
-MSI8s Area if BkrinRR
-MS167s EDGs liS or Remain in Go to HSD Area of GotoHSD Remain in Panel HSDPanel Panel Area Page 37 of38 S 1.oP-AB.cR-0002(Q)
ATT8 ATT9
(#3 NEO)
(SMT)
- Get
- Get Mat'l Mat'l
- Trip
- IFCRor Turb
- RRFire, Align:
- De-
-lC West energize MCC:
4KvGrp
-12SW21 Buses
-11SW22
-lCC31
- IFCR
-12 CHG orRR LOPP
- Fire,
-lSJ1
-Trip DC
-lCV40 Pwrto
-lCV140 13KV
-lA West Bkrs A-F MCC:
&C-D
-l1SW21
-Align
-lCC30 SWI
-11CC16 MCC:
-l1SJ44
-12SW20
-lB West Open MCC:
-14SW20
-lSJ12 Open
-12SJ44
-lSW26
-12CC16 Close
-lCV68
-Align
-lCV139 SBOA/C
-llSW23
-12SW23
- IF 460/230V Swgr
- Fire,
-ISJ12 Go to GotoHSD HSD Panel Panel Rev. 24
SM/STA
'" Coordinate /
Monitor Plant Shutdown OS/STA
'" Coordinate /
Monitor Plant Shutdown Salem 1 ATT3 (CRS)
'" Direct OSCC:
-sso SID (Att 10)
-Vent Sys (Att 11)
-Chg& Ltdn
-Sampling
-TempASV
-SWX-Tie
-CCWIRHR Elect X-Tie SAFE SHUTDOWN OVERVIEW MATRIX (page 2 of 2)
PREPARATION FOR COLD SHUTDOWN (RO)
(PO)
- lNEO
- 2NEO
'" Assist at
'" Establish:
'" Assist
'" Control:
HSD Panel
-Chg from the
-12MSlO
-RCP seals HSD Panel
-14MSlO w/eCR&RR fire S 1.0P-AB.CR-0002(Q)
- 3NEO SMT
'" Control:
'" Assist
-l1MSlO from the
-13MSlO HSD (IfInner Panel Penetration Area Temp conditions permit)
ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING COLD SHUTDOWN (CSD)
ATT3 RO PO
- lNEO
- 2NEO
- 3NEO SMT (CRS)
'" DirectRCS
'" Assist at
'" Direct:
'" Assist
'" Control:
'" Control:
'" Assist Cooldown HSD Panel
-MSlOs for from the
-12MSlO
-l1MSI0 from the RCS CID HSD Panel
-14MSI0
-13MSI0 HSD Panel
'" Coordinate:
-Chg forPzr (If Inner
-pzr pressure Lvi & Press Penetration
-pzr level Control Area Temp
-RCS soak
-Periodic conditions
-Accum AFWST permit)
Isolation Level
-RCStemp monitoring
-RHR
-RCS Initiation Pressure for
-AFWSID RHR
-MSlOsOpen
-Maintaining
-Maintaining CSD CSD conditions conditions END OF DOCUMENT Page 38 of38 Rev. 24