ML101970337
| ML101970337 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/2010 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Progress Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| 50-261/08-301 50-261/08-301 | |
| Download: ML101970337 (183) | |
Text
HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC Written Written Exam Exam Given the
- 76. Given
- 76. the following:
following:
- The
- plant isis operating The plant operating at at 100% RTP.
100% RTP.
All control
- All
- control systems systems areare in their normal in their normal alignments, alignments, with with the the exception exception of of PC-444J, PC-444J, PZR PZR PRESSURE which PRESSURE which isis in MANUAL.
in MANUAL.
PC-444J is
- PC-444J
- is in in MANUAL MANUAL due due to to erratic erratic control control when when in in AUTO.
AUTO.
The output
- The
- output of of PC-444J PC-444J driftsdrifts down down to to 20-25%.
20-25%.
MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.
AOP-019, MALFUNCTION CONTROL.
AOP-025, RTGB RTGB INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT FAILURE. FAILURE.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the procedure used to mitigate the transient?
A. RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-019. AOP-01 9.
B. RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-025.
C. RCS Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-019.
D. RCS Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-025.
76 76
000008 G2.4.11 000008 G2.4. 11 OOllPZR 001/PZR VAPOR VAPOR SPACESPACE ACCI/l/l/4.0/4.2/SRO/HIGH/43.S/RNP ACCII1!l/4.0/4.2/SROIHIGHI43.5/RNP AUDIT AUDIT - 2007/AOP-019-002
- 20071A0P-019-002 Given the following:
Given The plant
- The
- plant is is operating operating at at 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
All control
- All
- systems are control systems are in in their their normal normal alignments, alignments, with with the the exception exception of of PC-444J, PC-444J, PZR PZR PRESSURE which is PRESSURE is in in MANUAL.
MANUAL.
PC-444J is
- PC-444J
- is in in MANUAL MANUAL due due to erratic erratic control control when in in AUTO.
- The output of
- of PC-444J PC-444J drifts down down to 20-25%.
AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.
AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENTfNSTRUMENT FAILURE. FAILURE.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the procedure used to mitigate the transient?
A RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-019.
A'I AOP-01 9.
B. RCS Pressure increases. Enter AOP-025.
C. RCS Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-019. AOP-01 9.
D. RCSRC5 Pressure decreases. Enter AOP-025.
The correct answer is A.
A: Correct - - As PC-444J output is reduced, it is calling for pressure to be raised. Pressure will rise as heaters turn ON and spray valves CLOSE. Malfunction is on the controller (NOT the instrument), AOP-01 AOP-019 9 should be used.
B: Incorrect - Transient direction is correct, but mitigating procedure is incorrect. (AOP-025 is for instrument failures)
C: Incorrect - Pressure transient direction is incorrect, procedure is correct.
D:
0: Incorrect Incorrect - BOTH
- BOTH transient direction and and procedure areare incorrect.
incorrect.
Exam Question Number: 76
Reference:
AOP-019, AOP-019, PagesPages 3-4;3-4; SD-059, SO-059, Page Page 17, 17, Figures Figures 66 and and 7, 7, AOP-025, AOP-025, Page Page 3.
3.
KA KA Statement:
Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of of abnormal abnormal condition condition procedures.
procedures.
History:
History: Modified Modified from RNP RNP bank changed stem bank - changed
- stem toto make make A A correct SRO SRO - Required
- Required to to assess assess conditions conditions and and select select appropriate appropriate procedure.
Qprocedure.
KA Name:
KAName: PZR V PZR VAPOR SPACE ACCI AFOR SPACE ACCI Tier/Group:
Tier/Group: 1/1 111 Importance Rating:
Importance Rating: 4.0/4.2 4.0/4.2 RO/SRO Level:
RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source:
Source: RNP AUDIT RNP AUDIT - 2007
- 2007 Learning Objective:
Learning Objective: AOP-019-002 AOP-019-002
Rev.
Rev. 13 13 AOP-019 AOP-019 MALFUNCTION MALFUNCTION OF OF RCS RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE CONTROL CONTROL Page Page 33 of of 17 17 Purpose Purpose and and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.
- 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This This procedure provides instructions instructions in in the event event RCS RCS pressure isis higher ORQ. lower than required for for current current plant conditions.
conditions.
This procedure is applicable in Modes 1, 2, and 3.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure may be entered when RCS pressure deviates from the desired control band due to aa fault in pressure control components. (AOP-025 covers Instrument Failure)
- END -
Ai , i.* s,, C 2 AlL /
,/
1_i i/j zJ 7 9> c)
/.__t 7 ,
-;2 z,w,1
Rev.
Rev. 13 13 AOP-019 CONTROL MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL Page 44 of 17 17 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS I RESPONSE NOT RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
NOTE Steps 1 and 22 are Immediate Action steps.
- 1.
- Determine If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed:
- a. Check PZR pressure - LESS
- a. Verify OPEN at least one PZR THAN 2335 PSIG PORV and associated PORV BLOCK Valve:
- PCV-455C AND 2 RC-536 OR
- PCV-456 AND RC-535 WHEN RCS pressure is less than 2335 psig, THEN perform Step Lb.
l.b.
Go To Step 2.
- b. Verify Both PZR PORVs - CLOSED
- b. IF any PZR PORV can NOT Qff be closed, THEN close its PORV BLOCK Valve.
- 2. Control The PZR SPRAY VALVES AND PZR Heaters To Restore RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band
- 3. Check PZR Pressure - UNDER
- IF PZR Pressure approaches a I
OPERATOR CONTROL Reactor Trip Setpoint, THEN trip the Reactor and Go To Path-1.
Path-l.
- Low PZR Pressure - 1844 psig
- High PZR Pressure - 2376 psig
- OT~T OTT - Variable (TR-412)
- (TR-4l2)
SD-059 SD-059 PRESSURIZER PRESSURIZER SYSTEM SYSTEM 5.1.1 PZR 5.1.1 PZR Pressure Pressure Control (PZR-Figure 66 && PZR-Figure Control (PZR-Figure PZR-Figure 7) 7)
Pressure control Pressure control is is accomplished accomplished via via pressure pressure controller controller PC-444A PC-444A which which isis aa Proportional Proportional
++ Integral Integral controller; controller; the the Derivative Derivative section section has has been been defeated.
defeated. This This means means the the controller controller develops an develops an output output signal that is signal that is determined determined by by how how far far pressure is is from from setpoint setpoint (Proportional) and (Proportional) and how long the pressure how long pressure hashas been away away from from setpoint setpoint (Integral).
(Integral).
PT-444 PT -444 sends a pressure signal to PC-444A which is compared to the pressure setpoint PC-444J which is controlled on the RTGB. PC-444J is a Hagan Manual-developed by PC:-444J Auto station with a 10 10 turn pot capable of developing a control setpoint over the entire pressure range of PT PT-444.
-444. PTPT-444
-444 ranges from 2500 to 1700 1700 psig therefore PC-444J is capable of 800 psi range of control. For Example if the operator desires the controller to maintain normal pressure of 2235 psig the pot setting would be determined as follows:
2235 - 1700 ** 10 == 6.69 on the 10 turn pot.
800 PC-4441 (setpoint signal) is sent to PC-444A to be compared to the actual The output of PC-444J pressure. PC-444A has a gain of 2 which effectively cuts in half the range of control of PZR pressure to 400 psi around the setpoint determined by PC-444J. The controller output is then directed to the proportional heaters, spray valves via controllers PC-444C and PC- PC 444D, backup heaters, PZR PORV 456 and PI-458 P1-458 and is displayed on the meter on PC-4441 444J The components operated by PC-444A operate at a fixed deviation from setpoint or controller output as observed on the meter on PC-4441, PC-444J, no matter what setpoint is dialed in on PC-444J. For example the backup heaters are set to turn on 25 psi below set pressure.
If set pressure is 2235 psig, their setpoint would be 2210 psig and the control output when they came on would be as follows:
2210-2035 =
= .4375 or 43.75% demand 400 If the pot on PC-444J were then set at 6.25 this would give a set pressure of 2200 psig.
If When the output of PC-444A PC-444A was at 43.75% the backup heaters would come on, pressure would be 2175 psig; 25 psi below set pressure. The setpoints normally listed for heater, spray, and PCV-456 PCV-456 setpoints are based on a set pressure of 2235 psig where PC-4441 PC-444J is normally set.
As stated stated before, PC-444A PC-444A is is a Proportional + + Integral controller, therefore controller output may not correspond exactly to the pressure monitored monitored by the operator.
operator. If If pressure pressure is away from setpoint for an extended extended period of time the controller output may saturate satunite while increasing increasing its output trying to return pressure to setpoint.
setpoint.
PZR PZR Page Page 17 of 27 17 of 27 Revision 99 Revision INFORMAT INFORMATION ION USE ONLY
PRES SURE CONTROLLER PRESSURE CONTROLLER PZR-FIGURE-6 PZR-FIGURE-6 PZR Press PZR Press Lo Press La Press (213)
(2/3)
< 2000 psiu
<2000 psiO PZR Press PZR Press Channel 445 Channel 445 PZR Press Channel 444 Adjustable Press
}~.-- Re'erence Setpoint Satpoint
, .....;.. . Normal 2236 PZR Control HilLo Press Manual 2310/2185 L-(!) 'I 2336 PZR Press ControBer Controller PCV-455C PCV-4S6 Hi Output BUH', on I-li Output PCV-453C PCV-456 2310 2310 2210 Spray Spray Proportional Proportonat Valva Valve Heaters Helter.
I pzrfoa pzrfO8 I INFORMATION INFORMATION USE USE ONLY ONLY
PC-444A CONTROLLER PC-444A CONTROLLER PZR-FIGURE-7 PZR-FIGURE-7
-2500--
PC+44J P0444J smolm SETPOINT 243m.
)?j/~ \. 2235-170Q535 2235-1700 .. 535
'i:l3fff ' ,,
535/800 ...669 535/B0Q.66Q W!.#4." "
203~ I .660 X
.669 6.69 TO 6.119 X 10 TURN POT=
10 TURN POT=
MAINTAIN 2235 TO MAINTAIN 2235 I
I
,I
\
I
\
1700 1700-- \
\
\
\
\ 2035 - 2435 (pC444J@6.fi9) 1__ ( 400 POUND RANGE) : I I - - -_ _ L_----I-T---~
CONTROL Hill.
MODULATION ON 43.75%
ON-43.75%
- ON -46.25% - 46.25% OPEN - 66.75%
OPEN-Sl.75% 70% 75%
OFF -4625%
OFF-46.25% OFF -53.75%
OFF-5l.75% - 66.25%
CLOSED - 56.25%
OETERMINAT1ON PETERMINATION OF EXPECTED COHTROti.R CONTROlLER OUTPUT
- 1. Btu flU HEATERS --ON ON =2210 3. PCV-4S5C PCV-455C OPENS",
OPENS = 2335 2210-2035 .. 175 2335-2035 ..x 300 300 175/400 '" .4375 OR 43.75% 300/400 300/400 = ....75 75 OR 75%
Z. SPRAY VALVE OPENING
pzrf09 INFORMAT INFORMATION ION USE ONLY
Rev.
Rev. 10 10 AOP-025 AOP-025 RTGB RTGB INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT FAILURE FAILURE Page 33 of Page of 27 27 Purpose &
Purpose & Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.
- 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE ThisThis procedure procedure provides provides instructions instructions for for failure failure of of process process variable transmitters variable transmitters which which provide input iEo RTGB provide input'to RTGB controllers.
controllers.
IF
- j. an applicable transmitter an applicable transmitter fails fails while while the the controller controller is is operating operating in in manual manual OR is is being being fed fed from from an an alternate alternate channel.
channel, THENTHEN entry entry to to this procedure is is NOT required.
This procedure is applicable in Modes 1. 1, 2.
2, 3.
3, and 4.
- 2. CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS Failure of any process variable transmitter which affects Failure automatic operation of RTGB controllers with the following exceptions:
exceptions:
- FT-6O5, RHR Flow FT-605.
- LT-1l5, LT-115. VCT Level
- LT-ll2, LT-112. VCT Level
- PR PR NIS (NI-4l. 43. && 44)
- 42. 43, (NI-41. 42,
- END -
QUESTIONS REPORT for 2007 ROBINSON - REV FINAL
>'3034 034
.i ,,__ c'
\.Allel'tthe following: q4
- The plant is at 100% power.
- All control systems are in their normal alignments, with the exception of the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, which is in MANUAL.
- The Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output drifts to2C. t~~. Lf)
L{J ~D
. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS pressure and the correct procedure actions to mitigate the transient?
pressure increases. Enter AOP-01 9, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control.
AOP-019, erify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually.
RCS pressure increases. Enter AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failures. Verify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually. Place bistables in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
C. RCS pressure decreases. Enter AOP-01 AOP-019,9, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control.
Verify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually.
D. RCS pressure decreases. Enter AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failures. Verify closed PZR PORV PCV-455C and control heaters and spray manually. Place bistables in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
~7b Tuesday, May 27, 2008 2:58:50 PM 4
HLC-08 NRC Written Exam
- 77. Given the following:
- The plant is operating at 100% RTP.
- VCT makeup is in progress.
- BOTH VCT level channels indicate 19 inches.
- The following indications are noted:
- BA Transfer Pump "A"
- A is running.
- PW Pump "A"
- A is running.
- FCV-113A, BA FLOW, OPEN.
FCV-1 1 3B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, CLOSED.
- FCV-113B,
- FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, OPEN.
- FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, CLOSED.
- 45 seconds later:
- APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV alarm has illuminated.
- APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV alarm has illuminated.
Which ONE (1) of the following has caused the alarms and what actions, if any, are required to mitigate the event?
A. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. No actions required. Ensure LCO 3.5.4, RWST OPERABILITY is met.
B. FCV-113B FCV-1 13B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL.
C. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL.
FCV-1 13B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
D. FCV-113B 77
000022 A2.03 000022 001/LOSS OF A2.03 OOllLOSS OFRX MAKE/1/1/3.1/3.6/SRO/HIGHI43.5JNEW - 2008/AOP-003-002 COOL MAKE/1I1I3.1I3.6/SROIHIGHJ43.5INEW RX COOL - 2008/AOP-003-002 Given the Given following:
the following:
The plant
- The
- plant isis operating operating at at 100%
100% RTP.RTP.
VCT makeup
- VCT
- makeup isis in in progress.
progress.
BOTH VCT
- BOTH
- level channels VCT level indicate 19 channels indicate 19 inches.
inches.
The following
- The
- following indications indications areare noted:
noted:
- BA
- Transfer Pump BA Transfer Pump "A" is running.
A is running.
PW Pump
- PW
- Pump "A"A is running.
is running.
FCV-113A, BA FLOW,
- FCV-113A,
- FLOW, OPEN.
- FCV-113B,
- BLENDED MU FCV-1 1 3B, BLENDED MU TO CHGCHG SUCT, SUCT, CLOSED.
CLOSED.
FCV-114A, PRIMARY
- FCV-114A,
- PRIMARY WTR FLOW FLOW DILUTE DILUTE MODE, MODE, OPEN.
FCV-1 14B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, CLOSED.
- FCV-114B, 45 seconds later:
- 4S APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV alarm has illuminated.
- APP-003-DS, APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV alarm has illuminated.
- APP-003-ES, Which ONE (1) of the following has caused the alarms and what actions, if any, are required to mitigate the event?
A. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. No actions required. Ensure LCO 3.5.4, RWST OPERABILITY is met.
3.S.4, FCV-1 1 3B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR B FCV-113B B!'"
MAKEUP CONTROL.
C. The Charging Pump suction has swapped to the RWST. Implement AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL.
D. FCV-113B FCV-1 13B has failed CLOSED. Implement AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
The correct The correct answer answer isis B.B.
A: Incorrect A: Incorrect - Swapover
- Swapover setpoint setpoint isis 12.5 12.5 inches.
inches. NO NO swapover swapover should should have have occurred.
occurred. Action Action isis appropriate for swapover appropriate for swapover on on VCT VCT low low level.
level.
B: Correct B: Correct -- FCV-1 1 3B is FCV-113B is the the ONLY ONLY valve valve listed listed that that isis out out of position. Since of position. Since FCV-113B FCV-1 1 3B isis NOT operating NOT operating as as expected, expected, AOP-003 is is the the correct correct procedure procedure toto use.
use. VCT is is NOT at the swapover setpoint.
NOT setpoint.
C: Incorrect C: Incorrect - Swapover
- Swapover setpoint setpoint isis 12.5 inches. NO 12.5 inches. NO swapover swapover should should have have occurred.
occurred. Action Action isis appropriate for swapover appropriate swapover on on VCT low level.
low level.
- FCV-1 1 3B is D: Incorrect - FCV-113B is the ONLY valve listed that is out of position. Since FCV-113B FCV-1 1 3B isis NOT operating as expected, AOP-003 is is the correct procedure procedure to use.
use. AOP-017 is the appropriate procedure if air header pressure pressure was low, low, but FCV-114A FCV-1 1 4A fails CLOSED on a loss of instrument air.
Exam Question Number: 77
Reference:
APP-003-D5 and E5; AOP-003, Pages 3 and 10, AOP-017, Page 3, ITS 3.5.4.
KA Statement: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Failures of flow control valve or controller.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam.
SRO - Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.
KA Name: LOSS OF RX COOL MAKE Tier/Group: III 1/1 Importance Rating: 3.1/3.6 3.113.6 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH IOCFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43 43.5 Source: NEW - 2008
- Learning Objective: AOP-003-002
APP-003-D5 APP-003-D5 ALARM ALARM BABAFLOW FLOWDEV DEV ***
WILLREFLASH
- WILL REFLASH***
AUTOMATICACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.1. FCV-1 1 3B, BLENDED FCV-113B, BLENDEDMU MUTOTOCHGCHG SUCT, SUCT, CLOSES CLOSES CAUSE CAUSE 1.1. Improper blended Improper blended makeup makeup concentration concentration 2.2. Improper Boric Improper Boric Acid Acid Pump Pump operation operation 3.3. Improper control Improper control of of FCV-113A FCV-1 1 3A or positioner failure or positioner failure (BA (B.A. flow) flow) 4.
- 4. Excessive LIP Excessive AP across across Boric Boric Acid Acid Filter Filter OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.
- 1. Boric Acid Boric Acid Flow Flow (FR-113)
(FR-i 13) 2.
- 2. Position of Position of FCV-113A FCV-1 1 3A 3.
(Tavg) 4.
- 4. Reactor Power Reactor Power ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.
- 1. alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN no other actions are necessary.
IF alarm IF 2.
- 2. required, THEN verify Boric Acid makeup stopped.
IF required, IF 3.
- 3. IF the IF the alarm alarm isis due due to a Malfunction of Makeup Control, THEN Refer to AOP-003.
4.
- 4. IF the IF alarm is the alarm is due to low boron concentration, concentration, THEN take manual control of RCS makeup, makeup, as as required.
required.
DEVICE/S ETPOINTS DEVICE/SETPOINTS 1.
- 1. FC-1 FC-113 13 /+/-0.2 1+/-0.2 gpm (Alarm will activate 45 seconds after Boric Boric Acid flow deviation of of 0.2 0.2 gpm gpm from from the the controller controller setpoint.)
setpoint.)
POSSIBLE POSSIBLE PLANT PLANT EFFECTS EFFECTS 1.
- 1. Inadvertent Inadvertent RCSRCS dilution dilution 2.
- 2. Tavg-Tref Tavg-Tref Deviation Deviation alarm alarm REFERENC REFERENCES ES 1.1. AOP-003, AOP-003, Malfunction Malfunction of of Reactor Reactor Makeup Makeup Control Control 2.2. CWD CWD B-i 90628, Sheet B-190628, Sheet 481, 481, Cable Cable XX IAPP-0 03 APP-003 Rev.
Rev. 37 37 I Page35 Page 35 of of53 I
531
APP-003-E5 APP-003-E5 ALARM ALARM MAKEUP WATER MAKEUP WATER DEV DEV AUTOMATIC ACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.1. DILUTE MODE:
DILUTE MODE: FCV-114B, FCV-114B, BLENDED BLENDED MU MU TOTO VCT, VCT, closes closes 2.
MODE: FCV-113B, FCV-113B, BLENDED BLENDED MU MUTOTO CHGCHG SUCT, AND FCV-114B, SUCT, AND FCV-114B, BLENDED BLENDED MUMU TO VCT, TO VCT, close close 3.
- 3. AUTO MODE:
AUTO MODE: FCV-113B, FCV-113B, BLENDED BLENDED MU MU TOTO CHG CHG SUCT, SUCT, closes closes CAUSE CAUSE 1.
- 1. Improper control Improper control ofof FCV-114A FCV-1 14A or or positioner positioner failure failure (P.W.
(P.W. flow) flow) 2.
- 2. Inadequate flow Inadequate flow from from Primary Primary Water Water Makeup Makeup Pumps Pumps 3.
- 3. Measured PW Measured PW flow flow isis not not within within 55 gpm gpm ofof set set PW PW flow flow (45 (45 sec.
sec. TD).
TD).
OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.
- 1. Primary Water FlowFlow (FR-114)
(FR-i 14)
- 2. Position of FCV-114A Position FCV-i 1 4A for Primary Primary Water FlowFlow
- 3. Primary Water Makeup Pumps operating ACTIONS
- 1. IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN no other actions are necessary.
- 2. IF the alarm is due to a Malfunction of Makeup Control, THEN Refer to AOP-003.
IF DEVICE/S ETPOI NTS DEVICE/SETPOINTS 1..
1 FC-114/+/-5gp FC-114 1+/-5 gpm m POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1.
- 1. AOP-003, Malfunction Malfunction of of Reactor Reactor Makeup Makeup Control Control 2.
- 2. CWD CWD B-i 90628, Sheet B-190628, Sheet 481, 481 , Cable Cable ZZ 1 APP-003 APP-003 Rev.
Rev. 37 37 43 of Page 43 Page 531 of 53
Rev.
Rev. 12 12 AOP-003 AOP-003 MALFUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR REACTOR MAKEUP MAKEUP CONTROL CONTROL Page of 43 Page 33 of 43 Puroose and Purpose and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.
- 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE The purpose The purpose of this procedure of this procedure is is to to provide provide instructions instructions inin the the event of event of aa malfunction malfunction of of the the Reactor Reactor Makeup Makeup Control Control System.
System.
2.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure This procedure is entered upon is entered upon VCT VCT level level OR makeup makeup anomalies.
anomalies.
- END
- END --
Rev.
Rev. 12 12 AOP-003 AOP-003 MALFUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR REACTOR MAKEUP MAKEUP CONTROL CONTROL Page Page 10 10 of of 4343
STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
19.
- 19. (CONTINUED)
(CONTINUED)
.~ e.
- e. II IF FCV-113B FCV-113B has has failed, failed, THEN THEN BLENDED BLENDED MU MU TO TO CHG CHG SUCT SUCT - OPEN
- OPEN perform perform the the following:
following:
1)
- 1) Place Place FCV-114B, FCV-ll4B. BLENDED BLENDED MUMU TO TO VCT, VCT, Control Control Switch Switch toto OPEN OPEN 2)
- 2) Restart Restart Automatic Automatic Makeup Makeup As Follows:
As Follows:
a) a) Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM SYSTEM Switch to STOP b) Momentarily place the b)
RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to START c) Verify Automatic Makeup is initiated d) Return to procedure and step in effect
- f. Verify LCV-115A, LCV-IISA, VCT/HLDP TK DIV Valve - CLOSED (Positioned To The VCT)
- g. Go To Step 21
Rev.
Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP-017 LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page Page 33 of of 61 61 Purpose and Purpose and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.
- 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides instructions instructions in in the the event event aa loss loss of of Instrument Air Instrument Air occurs.
occurs.
~
-*2.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS
~ a. Instrument
- a. Instrument Air Air Header Header pressure pressure less less than than 85 85 psig.
psig.
~ System pipe break.
- b. Instrument Air System
- END -
RWST RWST 3.5.4 3.5.4 3.5 EMERGENCY 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE CORE COOLING COOLING SYSTEMS SYSTEMS (ECCS)
(ECCS) 3.5.4 Refueling 3.5.4 Refueling Water Water Storage Storage Tank Tank (RWST)
(RWST)
LCO 3.5.4 LCO 3.5.4 The The RWST RWST shall shall bebe OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
APPLICABILITY: MODES MODES 1.
1, 2. 3. and 2, 3. and 4.
4.
ACTIONS ACTIONS CONDITION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME A. RWST boron A. A.1 Restore RWST to 88 hours0.00102 days <br />0.0244 hours <br />1.455026e-4 weeks <br />3.3484e-5 months <br /> concentration not OPERABLE status.
- within limits.
OR OR RWST borated water RWST temperature not within 1limits.
imits.
B.
B. RWST RWST inoperable for B.1 8.1 Restore RWST to 11 hour1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> hour reasons reasons other than OPERABLE status.
Condition Condition A.
C.
C. Required Required Action Action and and C.1 C.1 Be in Be in MODE MODE 3.
- 3. 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> hours associated associated Completion Completion Time Time not not met.
met. AND AND C.2 C.2 Be in Be in MODE MODE 5.
- 5. .3636 hours0.0421 days <br />1.01 hours <br />0.00601 weeks <br />0.00138 months <br /> hours HBRSEP HBRSEP UnitUnit No.
No. 22 3.5-10 3.5-10 Amendment No.
Amendment No. 176 176
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 78. During Mid-Loop
- 78. During Mid-Loop operations, operations, the the following following indications indications andand conditions conditions are are noted:
noted:
RHR Pump
- RHR
- Pump "A"A is is operating, operating, FCV-605, FCV-605, RHR HEAT EXCHANGER RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASSBYPASS is is in in AUTO.
AUTO.
FI-605 indicates
- FI-605
- indicates 3600 GPM and 3600 GPM oscillating +/-
and isis oscillating 100 GPM.
+/- 100 GPM.
RHR Pump
- RHR
- Pump discharge pressure is discharge pressure oscillating +/-
is oscillating +/- 30 PSIG.
30 PSIG.
RCS standpipes
- RCS
- standpipes indicate indicate -73 inches inches (RTGB)
(RTGB) and and -74 inches (LOCAL).
inches (LOCAL).
What conditions areare causing causing the oscillations oscillations and and the the actions actions necessary necessary to to stabilize stabilize the the RHR RHR system parameters?
A. is in runout due to excessive flow. Reduce Reduce flow lAW GP-OOS, DRAINING THE REACTOR GP-008, DRAINING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.
B. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Stop RHR Pump "A" A lAW AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
C. is in runout due to excessive flow. Stop RHR Pump "A" A lAW GP-OOS.
GP-008.
D. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Reduce flow lAW AOP-020.
78 78
000025 A2.07 OOllLOSS 001/LOSS OF OF RHR/l/l/3.4J3.7/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW RHRI1/l/3.4/3.7/SRO/HIGHI43.5/NEW - 200S/AOP-020-002
- 2008/AOP-020-002 During Mid-Loop operations, the following indications and conditions are noted:
RHR Pump
- RHR
- Pump "A" A is operating, FCV-605, RHR HEAT FCV-605, RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS BYPASS is in in AUTO.
FI-605 indicates 3600 GPM and is oscillating +/-
- FI-605
- 100 GPM.
+/- 100
- RHR Pump discharge pressure is oscillating +/-
+/- 30 PSIG.
- RCS standpipes indicate -73 inches (RTGB) and -74 inches (LOCAL).
What conditions are causing the oscillations and the actions necessary to stabilize the RHR system parameters?
The RHR PumpPump... ...
A. is in runout due to excessive flow. Reduce flow lAW GP-008, DRAINING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.
Bt B is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Stop RHR Pump "A" A lAW AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
C. is in runout due to excessive flow. Stop RHR Pump "A" A lAW GP-008.
D. is cavitating due to limited suction and vortexing. Reduce flow lAW AOP-020.
The correct answer is B.
A: Incorrect - Flow is NOT excessive, pump runout does NOT occur until greater than the design flowrate of 3750 GPM, therefore reducing flow is NOT necessary.
B: Correct - - Standpipe levels indicate -73 inches, which is below the point where pump cavitation is likely and is an entry condition for AOP-020. The first two steps of AOP-020 direct stopping the RHR pumps if below -72 inches, with flow instability or pump cavitation.
C: Incorrect - Flow is at the upper range, but NOT excessive or at runout conditions.
D: Incorrect - Standpipe levels indicate -73, which is below the point where pump cavitation is likely and is an entry condition for AOP-020. The first two steps of AOP-020 direct stopping the RHR pumps if below -72 inches, with flow instability or pump cavitation, not reducing flow. AOP-020 does NOT direct a reduction of flow.
Exam Question Number: 78
Reference:
SD-003, RHR, Pages 22 and 23, Figure 1; 1; AOP-020, Pages 3-4.
KA Statement: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Pump Cavitation.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam.
SRO - Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.
KA Name:
KAName: LOSS OFRHR LOSS OF RHR Tier/Group:
Tier/Group: III 1/1 Importance Rating:
Importance Rating: 3.4/3.7 3.4/3.7 RO/SRO Level:
RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source:
Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective:
Learning Objective: AOP-020-002 AOP-020-002
SD-003 SD-003 RESIDUAL HEAT RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL SYSTEM SYSTEM limits. The limits. The RHRRHR System System can can be used to be used fast fill to fast fill the the Refueling Refueling Canal.
Canal.
For fast For fast fill fill of of the the refueling refueling cavity, cavity, the the RHR RHR System System isis lined lined upup for for the the RHR RHR PumpsPumps to to take suction take suction from from thethe RWST RWST through through Valves Valves SI-862A SI-862A and and B. B. The The reactor reactor vessel vessel head head isis removed and removed and used used for for shielding.
shielding. TheThe Refueling Refueling Canal Canal isis filled filled by by pumping pumping water water from from the RWST the RWST into theinto the system.
system. TheThe slow fill method slow fill method uses uses thethe SISI pumps pumps through through thethe RCS RCS hot leg.
hot leg.
In order In order to to drain drain thethe Refueling Refueling Canal, Canal, the the system system will will bebe lined lined up up to to take take water water from from thethe RCS hot leg through Valves RCS hot leg through Valves RHR-750 RHR-750 and and RHR-751 RHR-751 and and pump pump itit back back toto the the RWST RWST through Valves through Valves SI-863A SI-863A andand B.
B. When When the the level level in in the the Refueling Refueling Canal Canal isis equal equal toto aa prescribed value, the remainder prescribed value, the remainder of of the the water water in in the the Refueling Refueling CanalCanal will will be be removed removed by by draining to draining to the the Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Drain Drain Tank Tank and/or and/or containment containment sump. sump.
6.5 6.5 Reactor Coolant Reactor Coolant System/RHR System/RHR Level Level Monitoring Monitoring During outage conditions when the RCS/RHR level is is required to be maintained below the vessel flange, the level is monitored by RCS Loop 2 & & 3 standpipes in the containment and LT-403 and LT-404, which indicate level on the RTGB. This monitored level range is from the vessel flange down to the upper core plate (-125"). (-125).
The level at the center line of the RCS piping is -82 inches of water. If the level is
~
lowered below -72 inches, cavitation cavitation_of of the RHR Pumps is likely to occur. RHR pump tIiEtirge pressur iomtored.
discharge pressure is monitored on the IeTby RTGB oy P1-602A PI-602A and PI-602B. Recent Westinghouse studies have shown that vortexing could occur above -72 inches.
Westinghouse 6.6 Initiation of an S S Signal when aligned to the Injection Phase In the event of a SI signal, the RHR pumps A and B B will start and RHR-744 A and B B will open. The system will take suction from the RWST and circulate borated RWST water through the recirc. lines until RCS pressure decreases to a point where RHR pump shutoff head can force open the check valves to the RCS cold legs ( (-130 psig),
130 psig),
or until or until the operator secures the RHR system.
6.7 6.7 Precautions Precautions and and Operational Operational Limitations Limitations on on RHR
- RCS RCS temperature temperature and and pressure pressure shall shall bebe less less than than 350°F 350°F and and 375 375 psig psig before before thethe R}{R RHR System System isis putput in in service, and the service, and the RHR RHR system system will will be be removed removed from from service service before before RCS RCS pressure pressure and and temperature temperature are are raised raised above above these these values.
values.
- ToTo prevent prevent boiling boiling the the CCW CCW liquid liquid contained contained in in an an RHR RHR HX, HX, CCW CCW flowflow should should notnot be isolated be isolated to an RHR to an RHR HX HX when when thethe temperature temperature of of the the RHR RHR System System isis greater greater than than 200°F.
200°F. (CR (CR 95-00565) 95-00565)
RHR RHR Page 22 Page 22 of of45 45 Revision 14 Revision 14 INFORMAT INFORMATION ION USE USE ONLY ONLY
SD-003 SD-003 RESIDUAL HEAT RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL SYSTEM SYSTEM
- Neither RHR-750 Neither RHR-750 nor nor RHR-751 RHR-75 1 will open unless will open unless the following conditions the following conditions areare satisfied:
satisfied:
The breakers
- The
- breakers forfor SI-862A SI-862A && Band B and SI-863 SI-863 A A && BB are are closed.
closed.
The control
- The
- control power power switches switches for SI-862A && Band for SI-862A B and SI-863 SI-863 A A && B B are are in in NORMAL.
NORMAL.
Valves SI-862A
- Valves SI-862A and and B are closed.
B are closed.
Valves SI-863A
- Valves
- SI-863A and and B B are are closed.
closed.
RCS pressure
- RCS
- pressure isis less less than than 445 psig.
445 psig.
- SI-862A &
SI-862A & B, and SI-863A B, and SI-863A && B are interlocked B are interlocked so they cannot so they cannot bebe opened opened unless unless the the RHR loop RHR pressure is loop pressure less than is less than 210 210 psig.
psig.
- When the the Residual Heat Removal System System is providing Core Core Cooling Cooling ANDANTI seal seal injection injection flow is desired desired to maintain a positive AP across a positive L'lP across the Thermal Thermal Barrier of the Reactor Coolant Pumps, letdown flow through HCV-142 and PCV-145 should be maintained to provide makeup to the VCT.
- When RHR-757C or RHR-757D is closed, 3,350 gpm flow, indicated on FI-605, with one RHR pump running or 6,700 gpm flow with two RHR pumps running allowed/required by approved test procedures for shall not be exceeded, except as allowedlrequired which flowrates on FI-605 may be as high as 3800 gpm for one pump or 7600 gpm for two pumps.
~ .* When both RHR-757C and RHR-757D are open, 7Qgptotal as read from FI-605, FI-608A and FI-608B, 3750 gpm total per running pump FI-608B shall not be exceeded, except as allowed/required by approved test procedures for which total flowrates may be as allowedlrequired high as 4200 gpm for one pump or 8400 gpm for two pumps.
- When running R}{R RHR Pumps with SI-863A and/or SI-863B open, RHR-744A and RHR-744B should be closed to prevent excessive RHR pump runout.
- If CCW is not available to the RHR pump seal coolers, the RHR pumps pumps shall not be operated with pump discharge temperature greater than 135 OF. With CCW 135 °F.
available to the RHR pump seal coolers there is no time limit for running aa single pump pump with flow only only through the heatup recirculation line. It It will will be necessary necessary to rotate the the RHR pumps to avoid exceeding the 50°F 50°F ATL'lT limit limit between between RHR loops as stated stated inin GP-007.
GP-007.
~.
- R}IR RHR pumppump flowrates of of less less than than 2,800 2,800 gpm have been gpm have been shown shown toto increase increase pressure pressure and and flow fluctuations fluctuations and and should should bebe avoided avoided when when plant plant conditions conditions permit.
permit. This This does not apply does not apply during during recirculation recirculation operation.
operation. (ACR (ACR 91-078)91-078)
RHR RHR Page Page 23 23 of of 45 45 Revision 14 Revision 14 INFORMAT INFORMATION ION USE ONLY ONLY
RHR RHRSYSTE M-CORE COOL SYSTEM-CORE ING LINEU COOLING LINEUPP RHR-FIGUR E- 1 RHR-FIGURE-l I *.. . 1/1-1-~--,
SI-887 TOTOSI AND SIANO CONTAINM ENT RHR*754B CONTAINMENT SPRAY SPRAYPUMP PUMP SUCTIONS SUCTIONS t.o l,.. -.'4! I FROM RWST
- FROM RWST c¥es r
.;......:..--'-,,-"-FA
. ~~
MINIFLO'NRECIRC FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP RHR. HEAT.UP LINE
~
?"
~
""?"
- t Ul o
FR.OMRCReLOOP FROM LOOP RHR-7448 51.8768 SI875B 2 2HOTHOTLEG lEG rhrfol rhrf01 INFOR MATION USE INFORMATION USE ONLY ONLY
Rev.
Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS RESIDUAL HEAT OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page Page 33 ofof 107 107
__STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
1.
- 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides the the instructions instructions necessary necessary toto mitigate mitigate the the loss of loss of RHR RHR in in all all conditions conditions for for which which RHR RHR can can be be aligned aligned to to provide shutdown provide shutdown cooling.
cooling. This This includes includes loss loss of of RHR RHR cooling cooling for for reasons such as RCS reasons such as RCS leakage, leakage, loss loss of of power, power. loss loss of of Service Service Water Water or Component Cooling or Component Cooling Water, Water, RHR RHR pump pump cavitation, cavitation, and and inadequate inadequate flow or RHR flow abnormal reductions or abnormal reductions in in RHR RHR cooling.
cooling.
This procedure This procedure is is applicable applicable inin Modes Modes 4,4, 5,
- 5. and and 66 when when fuel fuel is is in in vessel.
the vessel.
the 2.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS Direct entry from any condition resulting in a loss of RHR
~ pump(s), ~HR HR pump cavitation, abnormal RHR flow or temperature eF3sive loss control, or excessive If of RCS inventory while RHR is aligned for shutdown cooling.
As directed by the following other procedures:
- AOP-014, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, resulting in stopping of the RHR Pumps while in CSD.
- AOP-016, AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, if less than 200°F and leakage exceeds Charging Capacity.
- END
- END --
Rev.
Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page Page 44 ofof 107 107
STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
1.
- 1. Check RCS Check RCS Level Level - LESS LESS THAN THAN IF IF RCS RCS Level Level becomes becomes less less than than
-72 INCHES
-72 INCHES (69% FULL RANGE (69% FULL RANGE RVLIS)
RVLIS) -72
-72 inches inches (69% FULL RANGE (69% FULL RANGE RVLIS).
RVLIS), THENTHEN verify verify BOTH BOTH RHRRHR Pumps Pumps stopped.
stopped.
Go Go ToTo Step Step 3.
3.
~
- 2.
- 2. Verify BOTH Verify BOTH RHR RHR Pumps Pumps - STOPPED
- STOPPED 3.
- 3. Make PA Make Announcement For PA Announcement For Procedure Entry Procedure Entry NOTE FRP-S.1 is FRP-S.1 is NOT NQI applicable applicable forfor this event unless unless directed by the the CSFSTs.
4.
- 4. From The RTGB.
From RTGB, Verify Reactor IF the reactor does iQ
.LE NOT trip.
trip, Tripped As Follows:
Tripped THEN dispatch an Operator to to the the Rod Drive MG Set Room to to Open Open
- REACTOR TRIP MAIN AND BYP -
REACTOR -
REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS A A AND AND B.B.
OPEN OPEN
- Rod Position Rod Position indication - -
ZERO ZERO
- Rod Rod Bottom Bottom lights - -
ILLUMINAT ILLUMINATED ED 5.
- 5. Check Check RCS RCS Level Level - DECREASIN DECREASING: G: IF either IF either PZR PZR PORV PORV isis failed failed open due open due to to loss loss of of input input from from
position.
Temperature Control.
- RVLIS RVLIS
,IF RHR RHR Pumps Pumps have have been been stopped stopped due to due to loss loss of of Inventory, Inventory. THENTHEN Go To Go To Step Step 6.
6.
- Refueling Refueling Cavity Cavity Watch Watch report report
HLC-08 NRC Written Exam
- 79. Given the following:
in MODE 3.
- The plant is in
- The plant experiences a loss of 480V Bus E-1 and EDG "A"
- A does NOT start.
COW Pump "C"
- CCW
- C breaker has tripped on overload.
- CCW Pump "A"
- A is running.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the required actions?
A. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
B. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.
C. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Restore 11 CCW Train to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
D. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.
79
000026 G2.2.38 000026 G2.2.38 001ILOSS 001/LOSS OF OF CCW/1/1/3.6/4.5/SROIHIGH/43.1INEW CCW/1/1/3.6/4.5/SRO/HIGHJ43. 1/NEW - 2008/CCW-012
- 2008/CCW-012 Given the Given the following:
following:
The plant
- The
- plant isis inin MODE MODE 3. 3.
The plant
- The
- plant experiences experiences aa loss loss of of 480V 480V Bus Bus E-1 E-1 and and EDG EDG "A" A does does NOT NOT start.
start.
COW Pump
- CCW
- Pump "c" breaker has C breaker has tripped tripped on overload.
on overload.
CCW Pump
- CCW
- Pump "A" A isis running.
running.
Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following describes describes the the required required actions?
actions?
A. Enter LCO A. Enter LCO 3.7.6,3.7.6, COMPONENT COMPONENT COOLING COOLING WATER WATER SYSTEM; SYSTEM; Place Place the the plant plant in in MODE MODE 55 within 72 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
hours.
B. Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place B. Enter Place the plant in MODE MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.
Enter LCO C. Enter LCO 3.7.6, COMPONENT COMPONENT COOLING COOLING WATER SYSTEM; Restore Restore 11 CCW CCW Train to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
D Enter LCO 3.0.3; Place the plant in MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.
Dy The correct answer is D.
A: Incorrect - LCO 3.7.6 is correct entry for a single train of CCW INOPERABLE. INOPERABLE. LCO 3.7.6 Condition A is actually to restore an OPERABLE train of CCW within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
B: Incorrect - BOTH trains INOPERABLE
- INOPERABLE therefore LCO 3.0.3 must be entered, but time to get to MODE 4 is actually 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />, 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br /> is correct time to get to MODE 5.
C: Incorrect - LCO 3.7.6 is correct entry and action for a single train of CCW INOPERABLE.
D: Correct - - CCW Pump A "A" is powered from the DS Bus, which is NOT a credited Safeguards power source. Both B "B" and C "C" Pumps are INOPERABINOPERABLE LE and LCO 3.7.6 does NOT NOT contain a condition for BOTH trains INOPERAB INOPERABLE, LE, therefore LCO 3.0.3 must be entered and the plant must be in MODE 55 in 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.
Exam Exam Question Question Number: 79
Reference:
Reference:
ITS 3.7.6; ITS ITS 3.7.6; 3.0.3, ITS ITS 3.0.3, 3.7.6 BD.
ITS 3.7.6 BD.
KA KA Statement:
Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of of conditions and limitations conditions and limitations inin the the facility license.
license.
History:
History: New New - Written Written for for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC exam.
exam.
SRO SRO - Analysis Analysis of of current current plantplant conditions and application conditions and application ofof generic generic LCOLCO requirements requirements..
KA KA Name:
Name: LOSS LOSS OF OF CCW CCW Tier/Group:
Tier/Group: 1/1 1/1 Importance Rating:
Importance Rating: 3.6/4.5 3.6/4.5 RO/SRO RO/SRO Level:
Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level:
Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43link: 43.1 43.1 Source:
Source: NEW NEW - 2008 2008 Learning Learning Objective:
Objective: CCW-012 CCW-012
CCW CCW System System 3.7.6 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Component 3.7.6 Component Cooling Cooling Water Water (CCW)
(CCW) System System LCO 3.7.6 LCO 3.7.6 Two Two CCW CCW trains trains powered powered from from emergency emergency power power supplies supplies shall shall be be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
APPLICABILITY: MODES MODES 1.
1, 2.
2, 3.
3, and and 4.
4.
ACTIONS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME A. One required CCW train A.1 ........ NOTE*
NOTE ........
inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS RCS Loops LoopsMO- MODE 4, for DE 4."
residual heat removal loops made inoperable
. - by CCW CCW..
Restore required CCW hours 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> train to OPERABLE status.
B.
B. Required Action Action and B.1 B.1 Be in Be in MODE 3. 3. 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> hours associated associated Completion Time Time of of Condition Condition AA AND AND not met.
not met.
8.2 B.2 Be in Be in MODE MODE 5.5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 36 hours HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22 3.7*16 3.7-16 Amendment No.
Amendment No. 176 176
LCO LCO Applicability Applicability 3.0 3.0 3.0 LIMITING 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION CONDITION FORFOR OPERATION OPERATION (LCO) (LCO) APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 LCOs LCOs shall shall bebe met met during during thethe MODES MODES oror other other specified specified conditions conditions in in the the App 1i cabi 1i ty,, except Applicability except as as provi ded in provided in LCO 3.0.2 and LCO 3.0.2 and 3.0.7.
3.0.7.
LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 Upon Upon di scovery of discovery of aa fai 1ure to failure to meet meet anan LCO, LCO, the the Requi red Acti Required ons Actions of of the the associated associated Conditions Conditions shall be met, except as shall be met, except as provided provided in LCO in 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.5 and LCOLCO 3.0.6.
3.0.6.
If the If the LCO LCO is is met met oror isis no no longer longer applicable applicable priorprior to to expiration expiration of of the the specified specified Completion Completion Time(s),
Time(s), completion completion of of the Required the Required Action(s) is not required required unless otherwise otherwise stated.
stated.
LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are are not not met, met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE MODE oror other other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action Action sha shall11 be i ni ti ated wi thin beinitiatedwi thi n 1ihourtoplacet hour to place the unit, as app heunit, 1i cab1e, applicable, in:
- a. MODE 3 3 within 7 7 nours; hours;
- b. MODE 44 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and
- c. MODE 55 within 37 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.
Specification are stated Exceptions to this Specification stated in in the the individual individual Specification Specifications. s.
Where corrective Where corrective measures measures are are completed completed thatthat permit permit operation operation accordance with in accordance in wi th the the LCO LCO or or ACTIONS, ACTIONS, completion comp1et i on of of the the actions act ions required by required by LCO LCO 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is not not required.
required.
LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 isis only only applicable applicable in in MODES MODES 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, and 4.
3, and 4.
LCO LCO 3.0.4 3.0.4 When an When an LCO LCO isis notnot met, met, entry entry intointo aa MODE MODE oror other other specified specified condition in condition in the the Applicability Applicability shall shall only only bebe made:
made:
(continued)
(continued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22 3.0-1 3.0-1 Amendment No.
Amendment No. 203 203
CCW CCW System System 8B 3.7.6 3.7.6 BB 3.7 3.7 PLANT PLANT SYSTEMS SYSTEMS 8B 3.7.6 3.7.6 Component Component Cooling Cooling Water Water (CCW)
(CCW) System System BASES BASES BACKGROUND BACKGROUND The The CCW CCW System System provides provides aa heatheat sink sink for for the the removal removal of of process process and and operating operating heatheat from from safety safety related related components components during during aa Design Design Basis Basis Accident Accident (DBA)
transient. DuringDuring normal normal operation.
operation. the the CCW CCW System System also also provides provides this this function function for for various nonessential components.
various nonessential components, as as well well as as the the spent spent fuel fuel storage storage pool.
pool. TheThe CCW CCW System System serves serves asas aa barrier barrier to to the the release release of of radioactive byproducts byproducts between between potentially potentially radioactive systems radioactive systems and and the the Service Service Water Water System.
System, and and thus thus to the environment.
environment.
The CCW System consists of three pumps. pumps, two heat exchangers.
exchangers.
supply and return header.
a supply header, a surge tank.
tank, and associated associated piping. valves, and instrumentation.
piping, valves. instrumentation. The TjjB and "c" "B" and C CCVI CCW pumps are each powered by a separate safety separate..safe y related relatRcl blJs Liits..
_> The "A" A CCW Dump u is powered owered by the nonsafety nons related e ica e shutdown b~s.
aedlcafed b s. lfiee surge tank accommodates accommodates changes changes in water wa er volume vo ume in the system and ensures that sufficient sufficient net positive suction head is available for the the CCW CCW pumps.
pumps.
All CCW pumps automatically start on low pump discharge discharge header pressure. All CCW pumps in operation upon upon initiati initiation on of aa Safety Injection (SI) signal will continue to to operate operate as long as normal power is available. Upon loss loss ofof normal normal power. the B power, "8" and C "c" CCW pumps are automatically loaded loaded onto the emergency diesel generator (EDG) (EDG) buses buses asas long long as as present. If aa Containment Spray an SI signal is not present. Spray signal signal occurs after the EDG loading sequence sequence has beenbeen completed, completed.
the CCW the CCW pumps pumps are are stripped stripped from the buses. The The B "B" and and C "C" CCW pumps CCW pumps are not loaded onto onto the EDG buses as as part part ofof the the 51 loading SI loading sequence, sequence. however, however. they they are capable capable of of manual manual start when start when EDG EDG loads loads allow.
allow.
Additional information Additional information on on the the design design and and operation operation of of the the system. along system, along with with aa list list of of the the components components served, served. is is presented in presented in the the UFSAR, UFSAR. Section Section 9.2.2 9.2.2 (Ref.
(Ref. 1).
1). TheThe principal safety principal safety related re'lated function function of of the the CCW CCW System System is is the the removal of removal of decay decay heatheat from from the the reactor reactor via via the the Residual Residual Heat Heat Removal (RHR)
Removal (RHR) System.
System. This This may may bebe during during aa normal normal or or post post cooldown and accident cooldown accident and shutdown.
shutdown.
(continued)
(conti nued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22 BB3.7-36 3.7*36 Revision No.
Revision No. 00
HLC-08 NRC Written Exam
- 80. Given the following:
- The plant is in MODE 5 with RHR Pump "A"
- A in service.
- A loss of the Startup Transformer has occurred.
- ALL equipment functioned as designed.
- NO local actions have been performed.
- The Instrument Air Header is depressurized.
- The crew has implemented AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
What is the plant response and what actions are required to restore core cooling?
FCV-605, RHR BYPASS FLOW and HCV-758, RHR DISCH FLOW fail... fail ...
A. OPEN; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions.
B. OPEN; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
C. CLOSED; AOP-01 AOP-017 7 performs ALL required actions.
D. CLOSED; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
80
000055 EA2.01 000055 EA2.0 1 ~Ol/STATION 001/STATION BLACKOUT/l/l/3.4/3.7/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW BLACKOUT/l/ 1/3.4/3 .7/SROIHIGH]43 .5/NEW - 2008/AOP-024-007
- 20081A0P-024-007 Given the Given the following:
following:
The plant
- The
- plant isis in in MODE MODE 55 with with RHR RHR Pump Pump "A" in service.
A in service.
A loss
- A
- loss of of the the Startup Startup Transformer Transformer has has occurred.
occurred.
ALL equipment
- ALL
- equipment functioned functioned as as designed.
designed.
NO local
- NO
- local actions actions have have been performed.
been performed.
The Instrument
- The
- Instrument Air Air Header is depressurized.
Header is depressurized.
The crew has implemented AOP-017, LOSS
- The
- LOSS OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR.
AOP-020, LOSS LOSS OF OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEATHEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
What is the plant response and what actions are required to restore core cooling?
FCV-605, RHR BYPASS FLOW and HCV-758, RHR DISCH FLOW fail ...
fail...
A. OPEN; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions.
B. OPEN; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
C. CLOSED; AOP-017 performs ALL required actions.
D CLOSED; Perform AOP-020 and AOP-017 concurrently.
D~
The correct answer is D.
A: Incorrect - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air. AOP-017 will restore Instrument Air, but does NOT restart the non-running RHR pump.
B: Incorrect - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air. AOP-020 and AOP-017 must be used concurrently to restore core cooling. Correct procedure, but incorrect failure of RHR valves.
C: Incorrect - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air, but AOP-017 will NOT restart the non-running RHR pump.
D: Correct - - FCV-605 and HCV-758 both fail CLOSED on a loss of instrument air, AOP-017 and AOP-020 must be used concurrently to restore IA and restart the RHR pump because the SI sequencer is defeated when in MODE 5.
Exam Question Exam Question Number:
Number: 80 80
Reference:
Reference:
AOP-017, Pages Pages 33 and and 36; AOP-020, Pages 36; AOP-020, Pages 3, 3, 4,60-62 4, 60-62.. ..
KA Statement: Ability KA Statement: Ability to to determine determine or or interpret interpret the the following following as they apply as they apply to to aa Station Station Blackout:
Blackout:
Existing valve positioning Existing positioning onon aa loss loss of of instrument instrument air air system.
system.
History: New History: - Wriffen for New - Written for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRCNRC Exam.
Exam.
SRO - Requires analysis SRO - Requires analysis of of plant conditions, prediction plant conditions, prediction of of subsequent subsequent failures failures during during abnormal abnormal and emergency plant plant conditions, conditions, selection selection of mitigating mitigating procedures.
procedures.
KA Name:
KAName: STATION BLACKOUT STATION Tier/Group:
Tier/Group: 111 ill Importance Rating: 3.4/3.7 Level:
RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level:
Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source:
Source: NEW - 2008 Learning Objective:
Learning Objective: AOP-024-007 AOP-024-007
Rev.
Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP 017 LOSS OF LOSS OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page Page 33 of of 61 61 Purpose and Purpose and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides instructions instructions in in the the event event aa loss loss of of Instrument Air Instrument Air occurs.
occurs.
2.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS
- a. Instrument
- a. Instrument Air Air Header Header pressure pressure less less than than 85 85 psig.
psig.
- b. Instrument
- b. Instrument Air Air System System pipe pipe break.
break.
- END
- END - -
Rev.
Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP-017 LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page 36 of Page 36 of 61 61 ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 11 MAJOR COMPONENTS MAJOR COMPONENTS AFFECTED AFFECTED BY BY LOSS LOSS OF OF IA IA (Page (Page 33 of of 5) 5)
6.
- 6. Isolation Valve Isolation Valve Seal Seal Water Water System System Components Components FAILFAIL POSITION POSITION
- a. PCV-1922 A
- a. PCV-1922 A &
& B, B, IVSW IVSW AUTO AUTO HEADER HEADER ISOLs ISOLs - OPEN
- OPEN 7.
- 7. Main Steam Main Steam System System Components Components FAIL FAIL POSITION POSITION
- a. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES - CLOSED -
LINE PORVs
- b. STEAM LINE PORVs - CLOSED
- 8. Primary Sample System Components FAIL POSITION Primary PS-956 A
- a. PS-956 A through H, PRIMARY SAMPLE ISOLATIONS ISOLATIONS - CLOSED 9.
- 9. Radiation Monitoring System Components FAIL POSITION
- a. RMS-1,2,3 & & 4, R-11/R-12 ISOL VALVES - CLOSED -
10.
- 10. Reactor Coolant System Components FAIL POSITION a.
- a. PCV-455 AA && B.
B, PZR SPRAYS - CLOSED
- b. RC-516 && 553, 553, PRT TO GAS ANALYZER ANALYZER - CLOSED
- c. RC-519
d.
- d. RC-544, RV FLANGE FLANGE LEAKOFF - OPEN -
e.
- CLOSED 11.
II. Residual Residual Heat Heat Removal Removal System System Components Components FAIL FAIL POSITION POSITION
- a. HCV-142,
- a. HCV-142, PURIFICAT PURIFICATION FLOW - CLOSED ION FLOW - CLOSED
- b. HCV-758,
- CLOSED c.
- CLOSED
Rev, Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page Page 33 ofof 107 107
[ STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I H RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 1.
- 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides the the instructions instructions necessary necessary toto mitigate mitigate the the loss of RHR loss of RHR in allin all conditions conditions for for which which RHR RHR can can be be aligned aligned to to provide shutdown provide shutdown cooling.
cooling. This This includes includes loss loss of of RHR RHR cooling cooling for for reasons such reasons such as as RCS leakage, loss RCS leakage, loss of of power, power. loss loss of of Service Water Service Water or Component or Component Cooling Cooling Water, Water, RHR RHR pump pump cavitation, cavitation, and and inadequate inadequate RI-JR flow RHR flow or abnormal reductions or abnormal reductions in in RHR RHR cooling.
cooling.
This procedure This procedure isis applicable applicable in in Modes Modes 4,4. 5, 5, and and 66 when when fuel fuel is is in in the vessel.
the vessel.
2.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS Direct entry from any condition resulting in a loss of RHR pump(s), RHR pump cavitation, abnormal RHR flow or temperature control, or excessive loss of RCS inventory while RHR is aligned for shutdown cooling.
As directed by the following other procedures:
- AOPOO5, Radiation Monitoring System, when a low level in the AOP-005, 5FF exists due to an RCS leak with the SFP SFP 5FF GATE VALVE open.
- AOPO14, AOP-014, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction, resulting in stopping of the RHR Pumps while in CSD.
AOP-016. Excessive Primary Primary Plant Leakage, Leakage. if less than 200°F 200°F and leakage exceeds Charging Capacity.
- END
- END --
Rev.
Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS LOSS OF OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page 44 of Page of 107 107
STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 1.
- 1. Check Check RCS RCS Level Level - LESS LESS THAN THAN II IF RCS RCS Level Level becomes becomes less less than than 72 INCHES
-72 INCHES (69%
(69% FULL FULL RANGE RANGE RVLIS)
RVLIS) -72
-72 inches inches (69%
(69% FULL FULL RANGE RANGE RVLIS).
RVLIS), THEN THEN verify verify BOTH BOTH RHR RHR Pumps Pumps stopped.
stopped.
Go Go To To Step Step 3.
3.
- 2. Verify BOTH RHR Pumps - STOPPED
- STOPPED
- 3. Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry NOTE FRP-S.1 is NOT NQI applicable for this event unless directed by the CSFSTs.
- 4. From The RTGB.RTGB, Verify Reactor IF the reactor does NOT trip.
IE trip, Tripped As Follows: THEN dispatch an Operator to the Rod Drive MG Set Room to Open
- REACTOR TRIP MAIN AND BYP - - REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS A A AND B.
OPEN
- Rod Position indication - -
ZERO
- Rod Bottom lights - -
ILLUMINATED
- 5. Check RCS Level - DECREASING:
IF either PZR PORV is failed open due to loss of input from
- RCS loop standpipe level IF the event does NOT involve aa j.
Inventory. THEN Go loss of Inventory, Go To OR Secti~. Loss Of RHR Flow SectionE, Flow Or Temperature Control.
Temperature
6.
- Refueling Cavity Cavity Watch report
Rev.
Rev. 29 29 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS LOSS OFOF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page 60 Page 60 of of 107 107 j STEP 1[ INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS Section Section E E
RESPONSE
RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED Loss Of Loss RHR Flow Of RHR Flow Or Or Temperature Temperature Control Control (Page (Page 11 of of 20) 20) 1.
- 2. Check CV Check Closure Status CV Closure Status -- Go Go To To Step Step 8.
8.
PENETRATIONS PENETRATIONS OPEN OPEN 3.
- 3. Check Refueling Check Refueling Cavity Cavity Level Level - - Go Go To To Step Step 8.
8.
29 INCHES OR GREATER BELOW THE OPERATING DECK 4.
- 4. Initiate CV Closure Initiate Closure Using OMM-033, CV Closure
- Dispatch an operator to the AVAILABLE TO START FROM RTGB E-l/E-2 Room to prepare to E-1/E-2 verify the breaker Racked In AND Fuses Installed for ONE SI Pump when notified by the Control Room.
- 6.
Check Core Exit TiCs T/Cs - LESS THAN Verify ONE SI Pump breaker is 200 FF 200°0 Racked In AND Fuses Installed.
Go To Step 44.
- 7. Check Core Exit T/Cs TiCs - LESS THAN
- Verify ONE SI Pump breaker is 175° 175 0 FF Racked In AND Fuses Installed while continuing with step in effect.
8.
- 8. Check Reason For Check For Entry: Step 19.
Go To Step 19.
~.
. RHR RHR PUMP PUMP TRIP TRIP
Rev.
Rev. 2929 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page Page 6161 of of 107 107 H__STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS Section I I Section EE
RESPONSE
RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED Loss Of Loss Of RHR RHR Flow Flow Or Or Temperature Temperature Control Control (Page (Page 22 of of 20) 20)
CAUTION CAUTION Changes in Changes in RCS RCS ptessure pressure may may result result in in inaccuracies inaccuracies in in RCS RCS Loop Loop Standpipe Standpipe indications.
indications.
9.
- 9. Check RHR Pumps - ALL STOPPED Observe the NOTE prior to to Step 1212 and Go To Step 12.
NOTE The intent of this procedure is to maintain the CV Purge in service if if Equipment Hatch is not installed.
the Equipment
- 10. Check power supply to at least Initiate CV Closure Using one RHR Pump - AVAILABL AVAILABLE: E: OMM-033. CV Closure.
OMM-O33,
- RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP A A Go To Step 32
- E-1 E-l (CMPT-22A (CMPT-22A))
- RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL PUMP PUMP BB
- E-2 (CMPT-26B))
E-2 (CMPT-26B
Rev.
Rev. 29 2,9 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOwN COOLING)
COOLING)
Page 62 of Page 62 of 107 107 j__STEP_H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS Section Section EE I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
Loss Of Loss Of RHR RHR Flow Flow Or Or Temperature Temperature Control Control (Page (Page 33 of of 20) 20) 11.
Follows:
- a. Check
- a. Check CCW CCW - AVAILABLE
- AVAILABLE a.
- a. GoGo To To Step Step 23.
23.
- b. Adjust
- b. Adjust FC-60S, FC-605, RHR RHR HX HX BYPASS BYPASS FLOW Controller FLOW Controller 0% 0% (Closed)
(Closed)
- c. Adjust
> d. Attempt to start the standby d.
RHR pump Check RHR Pumps - ONE RUNNING
- e. Check -
- e. Observe the NOTE prior to to Step 10 and Go To Step 10.
- f. Adjust
- f. Adjust FC-605, FC-60S, RHR HX BYPASS FLOW Controller. To Restore Flow Between 3000 gpm And 3750 gpm 37S0 gpm
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Exam Exam
- 81. EPP-26,
- 81. EPP-26, LOSSLOSS OF OF DC DC BUS BUS "A" A contains contains this CAUTION CAUTION prior prior to to Step Step 1:
1:
CAUTION CAUTION Restoration of "Restoration of DC DC Control Control Power Power to to aa de-energized de-energized AC Bus Bus before before Steps Steps 16 16 through through 23 23 have have been completed may result in uncontrolled equipment starts."
starts.
41 60V Busses 11 and 2, 480V Busses 11 and 2A).
(Steps 16-23 strips all load breakers on 4160V Which ONE (1) of the following describes the basis for this CAUTION?
A. DC start contactors on some AC equipment may have latched to the START condition, allowing restart on restoration of AC power.
B. Breaker anti-pump features will NOT be available to protect the breakers and equipment upon restart.
41 60V Busses 11 and 2 and the busses downstream are de-energized with load breakers C. 4160V still closed. On power restoration, auto transfer could occur before the load breakers trip on Undervoltage, allowing connected equipment to start.
D. Breakers on equipment connected to busses downstream of 4160V 41 60V Busses 11 and 2 automatically re-close on restoration of AC power if their Undervoltage relays have been re-energized.
81 81
000058 G2.1.32 000058 G2.1.32 001ILOSS 001/LOSS OF OF DCDC POWERllI1I3.8/4.0/SROILOW/43.5INEW POWERI1/1/3.8/4.0/SROILOW/43.5/NEW - 2008/EPP-26-003
- 2008IEPP-26-003 EPP-26, LOSS EPP-26, LOSS OF OF DCDC BUS BUS "A" A contains contains this this CAUTION CAUTION prior prior to to Step Step 1: 1:
CAUTION CAUTION Restoration of "Restoration of DC DC Control Control PowerPower toto aa de-energized de-energized AC AC BusBus before before Steps Steps 1616 through through 23 23 have have been completed may result in uncontrolled been completed may result in uncontrolled equipment starts." equipment starts.
(Steps 16-23 (Steps 16-23 strips strips all load breakers all load breakers on on 4160V Busses 11 and 41 60V Busses and 2,2, 480V 480V Busses Busses 11 and and 2A).
2A).
Which ONE Which ONE (1)(1) of of the following describes the following describes thethe basis basis for for this this CAUTION?
CAUTION?
A. DC A. DC start contactors on start contactors on some some AC AC equipment equipment maymay have have latched latched to to the the START START condition, condition, allowing restart allowing restart on restoration of on restoration of AC power.
power.
B. Breaker anti-pump B. Breaker anti-pump features features will NOTNOT be be available to to protect protect the breakers breakers and and equipment upon restart.
C'r' 41 60V Busses C 4160V Busses 11 and 2 and and the busses busses downstream are are de-energized de-energized with load load breakers breakers still closed. On power restoration, auto transfer could occur before the load breakers trip on Undervoltage, allowing connected equipment to start.
Undervoltage, D. Breakers on equipment connected to busses downstream of 4160V Busses 11 and 2 automatically re-close on restoration of AC power if their Undervoltage relays have been re-energized.
The correct answer is C.
A: Incorrect - DC start contactors do NOT have latch conditions.
B: Incorrect - Breaker anti-pump circuits are restored as soon as DC power is restored.
C: Correct - - Potential for uncontrolled start of equipment upon power restoration.
D: Incorrect - Upon power restoration, loads should strip, NOT re-energize if DC UV coils are energized.
Exam Question Question Number: 81
Reference:
Reference:
EPP-26, EPP-26, Page 4; 4; EPP-26-BD, Page 4.
KA Statement:
KA Statement: AbilityAbility to explain and to explain apply system and apply system limits and precautions.
limits and History:
History: New New - Written Written for for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC Exam.
Exam.
Knowledge of of cautions cautions and and basis basis for for cautions cautions in in procedures procedures past past Immediate Immediate Action Action steps.
steps.
KA Name:
KAName: LOSS LOSS OF OF DC DC POWER POWER Tier/Group:
Tier/Group: III 1/1 Importance Rating:
Importance Rating: 3.8/4.0 3.8/4.0 RO/SRO RO/SRO Level:
Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level:
Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43link:
link: 43.5 43.5 Source:
Source: NEW - 2008 NEW -
2008 Learning Objective:
Learning Objective: EPP-26-003 EPP-26-003
Rev.
Rev. 77 EPP-26 EPP-26 LOSS OF LOSS OF DC BUS "A" DC BUS A Page Page 44 ofof 47 47 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED CAUTION CAUTION Restoration of Restoration of DC DC Control Control Power Power to to aa deenergized deenergized AC AC Bus Bus before before Steps Steps 16 16 through 23 through 23 have have been been completed completed may may result result in in uncontrolled uncontrolled equipment equipment starts.
starts.
- 1. Check The The Cause
- 1. Check Cause Of Of The The DCDC Bus Bus WHEN WHEN the the cause cause is is determined.
determined, Failure - KNOWN Failure KNOWN THEN THEN notify notify Maintenance Maintenance to to correct correct the the problem.
problem.
NOTE AFW PUMP AFW PUMP AA will will not not be available available due due to to loss loss ofof control control power to to the the breaker.
breaker.
2.
- 2. Maintain S/G Maintain S/C Levels Between 8%
And 50%
And 50% Using Available AFW Pumps:
Pumps:
- STEAM DRIVEN STEAM DRIVEN AFW PUMP 3.
- 3. Check Check SISI Signal - INITIATED Go To Step 5.
STEP SPECIFIC STEP SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION AND AND RNP RNP DIFFERENCES DIFFERENCES The following The following pagespages willwill provide provide the the RNPRNP step step number.
number. There There isis no no ERG ERG for for this this procedure.
procedure.
RNP RNP BASIS BASIS STEP STEP PEC PEC This procedure This procedure will will bebe entered entered from from EPP-4 EPP-4 or or EPP-7 EPP-7 based based on on thethe initial initial conditions conditions at at the the time time of of the the loss loss of DC.of DC. IfIf thethe pant pant isis at at power power (> (> 100 100 MW)
MW) itit isis expected ex ected thatt the the ent.!'L~ill entry will be via EPP-7.
be via EPP-7.
~:-, -'-'-----~
Cl C1 The Caution The Caution isis provided provided to warn the to warn Operator of the Operator the possibility of the possibility of of equipment equipment performing performing uncontrolled uncontrTh equipment starts.
equipment starts. IfIf the the loss loss ofof DCDC BusBus AA occurred occurred from from an an at at power power condition condition the the busses busses fed fed downstream of downstream of 4160V 41 60V BussesBusses 11 and and 22 are deenergized with are deenergized with load load breakers breakers still still closed.
closed. IfIf DC DC Control Control Power isis restored Power restored to to the the 4160V 41 60V busses busses and and anan automatic automatic transfer transfer occurs occurs before before the the load load breakers trip on undervoltageundervoltage all all equipment equipment will will start start simultaneously.
simultaneously. The The stepstep below below the the Caution Caution will wi,J initiate efforts to restore the faulted DC Bus.
1 This step This step isis provided provided to initiate initiate efforts efforts to repair repair thethe faulted faulted DC DC Bus.Bus. ItIt is is placed placed early early inin the the procedure procedure so that efforts so that efforts can can bebe made made to contactcontact Maintenance Maintenance personnel.
personnel. The The high high level level step provides direction step provides direction toto diagnose diagnose the the cause cause and and provides provides transitional transitional guidance.
guidance. There There are are three three possible possible failure failure mechanisms that are the most likely causes:
- FaultonABat Fault on A Battery tery
- Fault on A Battery Bus Fault
- Fault on MCC-5 Fault MCC-5 The failure, or tripping, of the in-service Battery Charger, is not a likely cause of the loss of DC since warning would be provided via an annunciator with ample time for Operator action to transfer the chargers.
N2 N2 The note reminds the Operator that since DC BUS A has been lost, no control power is available for for AFW PUMP A. The subsequent step will control SIG S/G level.
22 S/G level is maintained in order to provide a heat sink. BB AFW pump and the SDAFW pump are specified specified because because A A AFW AFW pump pump is is not not available available due due to to the the loss loss of of DC.
DC.
33 Subsequent Subsequent steps steps will reset an an SI SI Signal. This diagnostic diagnostic step step provides Transitional direction provides Transitional direction should should the the event event have have occurred occurred with with the Unit Auxiliaries the Unit Auxiliaries being being powered powered from from the the SUT.
SUT. In In this this case case the the RNORNO bypasses bypasses the the steps steps to to reset SI and restore SI and restore Instrument Instrument Air Air to to the the CV.
CV.
44 ItIf an an SISI has has occurred occurred itit willwill be be necessary necessary to to restore restore Instrument Instrument Air Air to to the the CV CV in in order order toto perform perform subsequent subsequent steps steps such such as as placing placing Excess Excess Letdown Letdown in in service.
service. TheThe step step provided provided resets resets SI SI and and Phase Phase AA then then restores restores IA IA toto the the CV.CV. PCV-1716 PCV-1716 should should be be available available during during aa lossloss ofof DCDC BusBus A A since since itsits solenoid solenoid isis powered powered from from Auxiliary Auxiliary PanelPanel GC GC (DC (DC BusBus B). B). Resetting Resetting SI SI isis possible possible since since Train Train AA has has not initiated not initiated and and Train Train BB has has control control Power.
Power. IfIf resetting resetting the the Isolation Isolation Signal Signal is is unsuccessful unsuccessful in in restoring restoring IAIA toto the the CV, CV, the the valve valve is is placed placed in in the the Override Override position position whichwhich places places control control power power fromfrom AuxAux Panel Panel GCGC directly directly onon thethe solenoid solen'oid for for opening opening the the valve.
valve. Instrument Instrument Air Air pressure pressure isis verified prior to verified prior to attempting attempting toto place place airair inin the the CV CV in in order order to to assure assure airair pressure pressure isis higherhigher than than potential potential CV CV pressure.
pressure. IfIf IA IA isis not not established established the the steps steps for for placing placing Excess Excess letdown letdown inin service service are are also also bypassed bypassed since since this this also also requires requires air air inin the the CV.
CV.
55 This This stepstep provides provides the the means means to to control control PZR PZR level level during during thethe loss loss ofof DC.
DC. Excess Excess Letdown Letdown isis usedused because because power power isis lostlost to to the the Normal Normal Letdown Letdown Valves.
Valves. Letdown Letdown isis necessary necessaryto to control control PZRPZR level level since since Seal Seal Injection Injection must must be be maintained.
maintained.
IEPP-26-BD EPP-26-BD Rev.
Rev. 77 Page 44 of Page of 1111
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 82. Given
- 82. Given the the following:
following:
-A
- A Reactor Reactor Trip Trip has has occurred occurred from 100% RTP.
from 100% RTP.
The BA
- The
- Transfer Pump BA Transfer Pump aligned aligned toto BLEND BLEND hashas tripped.
tripped.
- The crew
- crew isis implementing implementing EPP-4, EPP-4, REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP RESPONSE.
RESPONSE.
- At Step 13,
- 13, "Check Check ALLALL rods rods fully inserted" inserted the following following is is noted:
noted:
Rod M-6
- Rod
- M-6 isis at at 99 inches.
inches.
Rod H-4 is
- Rod
- is at 14 14 inches.
inches.
F-i 2 is at 20 inches.
- Rod F-12 Which ONE (1) (1) of the following is the action required?
A. Begin Boration by OPENING LCV-115B, LCV-i 15B, EMER MU TO CHG SUCT AND CLOSING LCV-1 1 LCV-115C, 5C, VCT OUTLET.
B. Begin Boration using Normal Boration path via FCV-113A, FCV-1 13A, BA FLOW and FCV-113B, FCV-i 13B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT.
C. Borate using EMER BORATION, MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT.
D. Continue to Step 14 (No boration is required).
82 82
000024 A2.02 000024 A2.02 OOllEMERG 001/EMERG BORATION/1I2/3.9/4.4/SROIHIGHJ43.5INEW BORATION/1/2/3.9/4.4/SRO/HIGHJ43 .5/NEW - 200SIEPP-4-003
- 2008!EPP-4-003 Given the following:
Given Reactor Trip
- A Reactor
- Trip has has occurred occurred from from 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
- The BA
- BA Transfer Transfer Pump Pump aligned aligned to BLEND BLEND hashas tripped.
tripped.
- The crew is implementing EPP-4, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.
13, "Check
- At Step 13,
- Check ALL rods fully inserted" inserted the following is noted:
- Rod M-6 is at 9 inches.
- Rod H-4 is at 14 14 inches.
- Rod F-12 is at
- at2O 20 inches.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the action required?
A Begin Boration by OPENING LCV-115B, A'I LCV-1 1 5B, EMER MU TO CHG SUCT AND CLOSING LCV-1 1 5C, VCT OUTLET.
LCV-115C, B. Begin Boration using Normal Boration path via FCV-113A, BA FLOW and FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT.
C. Borate using EMER BORATION, MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT.
D. Continue to Step 14 (No boration is required).
The correct answer is A.
A: Correct -- lAW EPP-4, boration must be initiated if 2 rods are NOT fully inserted. NOT fully inserted is any rod above 12.0 inches as defined in OMM-022. The ONLY correct flowpath available is the Emergency Makeup flowpath using LCV -115B, LCV-1 1 5B, LCV-1 150 must be closed to cause water to enter Charging Pump suction, since LCV-115C there is NO BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND.
B: Incorrect - Flowpath is a viable flowpath as listed in EPP-4 if there is a BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND. The stem indicates there is NO pump available, therefore opening these valves would NOT initiate a boration.
C: Incorrect - Flowpath is a viable flowpath as listed in EPP-4 if there is a BA transfer pump aligned to BLEND. The stem indicates there is NO pump available, therefore opening this valve would NOT initiate a boration.
D: Incorrect - lAW EPP-4,
- EPP-4, boration must be initiated if 2 rods are NOT fully inserted. NOT fully inserted is any rod above 12.012.0 inches as defined in OMM-022. This action would be correct ifif ONLY 11 rod were NOT NOT fully inserted.
Exam Question Exam Number: 82 Question Number: 82
Reference:
EPP-4,
Reference:
EPP-4, Pages Pages 10-11; 1 0-1 1; SO-021, SD-021, CVCS, CVCS, Figure Figure 2; 2; OMM-022, OMM-022, Page Page 53.
53.
KA Statement:
KA Statement: Ability to determine determine and and interpret interpret the the following as they apply as they apply to the Emergency Emergency Boration: When use of manual boration valve is needed.
History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam.
SRO - Requires analysis of plant conditions and selection of mitigating procedure.
KA Name:
KAName: EMERG BORATION Tier/Group: 1/2 112 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.4 ROISRO Level:
RO/SRO SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43 43.5 Source: NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: EPP-4-003
rt, c s
2 xoZcf 4ZoZ Rev.
Rev. 2222 EPP-4 EPP-4 REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP RESPONSE
RESPONSE
Page Page 1010 of of 28 28 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED CAUTION CAUTION The boration The boration pathway pathway through through FCV-114B FCV-114B does does NOT NQI have have heat heat trace.
trace. Use Use of of this pathway this pathway without without flush water flush water could could result result inin blockage blockage of of the the pathway.
pathway.
.~ 13.
- 13. Check All Check Control Rods All Control Rods - FULLY FULLY ~ IF j only only one one Control Control Rod Rod is is stuck stuck INSERTED INSERTED out, out, THEN Th Go Go To To Step Step 14.
14.
~
-IFIF two two or or more more Control Control Rods Rods are are stuck stuck out, out, THEN ThEN perform perform the the following:
following:
- a. Verify at least one one Charging Charging Pump is RUNNING.
RUIINING.
- b. Borate to cold shutdown shutdown boron boron concentration using using one one ofof the following:
- Blender to Charging Pump Charging Pump suction:
- 1) Open FCV-ll3A,
- 1) FCV-113A, BA TO BA TO BLENDER.
BLENDER.
2)" Openl13B,B enFCV FCV-l13B, LENDBLENDED ED MU TO CHG CHG SUCT.
SUCT.
3)
- 3) Start Boric Start Boric Acid Acid Pump Pump aligned for aligned for blend.
blend.
suction:
- 1) Open
- 1) Open LCV-ll5B, LCV-11SB, EMERG EMERG MU TO MU TO CHG CHG SUCT, SUCT, OR OR locally open locally open CVC-358, CVC-3S8, RWST TO RWST TO CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP SUCTION.
SUCTION.
- 2) Close
- 2) Close LCV-llSC, LCV-11SC, VCT VCT OUTLET.
OUTLET.
OR (CONTINUED (CONTINUE NEXT PAGE)
D NEXT PAGE)
Rev.
Rev. 22 22 EPP-4 EPP-4 REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP RESPONSE
RESPONSE
Page 11 of Page 11 of 28 28
-j STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 13.
- 13. (CONTINUED)
(CONTINUED)
- Blender Blender toto VCT:
VCT:
1)
- 1) Open Open FCV-113A, FCV113A, BABA TO TO BLENDER.
BLENDER.
2)
- 2) Open Open FCV-114B, FCV-114B, BLENDED BLENDED MU MU TO TO VCT.
VCT.
- 3) Start
- 3) Start Boric Boric Acid Acid Pump Pump aligned for blend.
blend.
- Emergency boration:
- 1) Open MOV-350, MOV350, BABA TO TO CHARGING PMPPMP SUCT.
SUCT.
- 2) Start Boric Boric Acid Pump Acid Pump aligned forfor blend.
blend.
3)
- 3) boric acid Verify boric acid flow flow FI-110.
on Fl-lb.
- c. Open
- c. Open CVC-310B, LOOP LOOP 22 COLD COLD LEG CHG.
LEG CHG.
IF CVC-3bOB iE CVC-310B will will NQI NOT open, open, THEN open Tii open CVC-310A, CVC-310A, LOOP LOOP 11 HOT LEG HOT LEG CHG.
CHG.
- d. Verify
- d. Verify charging charging flow flow on on FI-122A.
FI-122A.
14.
- 14. Check Check PZR PZR Level Level - LESS LESS THAN THAN 14%
14% Go To Go To Step Step 16.
16.
evesFLOW CVCS FLOWDIAGRAM, DIAGRAM, SIMPLIFIED SIMPLIFIED CVCS-FIGURE-2 CVCS-FIGURE-2 TO PRT ......--,---,
Mixed LOOP 1 Bed COLDLEG~ Demins.
Analyzer LOOP 1 Deborating HOTLEG4t~ Demins AUX SPRA,(4t...rf .'. I Cation LOOP 2 Bed COLD LEG Demin.
EXCESS FCV*
FromLoop From Loop 2 LTDN HX
~~~
114A ColdLeg Cold Leg ./T iii _ From Primary 137 Y Water Pumps To RCDT- . I '
FromRCP From RCPSeals Seals I~
Pulse Dampener To Rep Seals 1~ From RWST
- PI FromBA From BA Transfer TransferPumps Pumps INFORMA INFORMATION HON USEUSE ONLY ONLY
ATTACHMENT 10.4 ATTACHMENT 10.4 Page 22 of Page of 33 GLOSSARY (Continued)
GLOSSARY (Continued) 1.1.9 1.1.9 Recirculation Mode Recirculation Mode - When
- When referenced referenced for for thethe current current status status ofof the the RHR System, RHR System, the the system system isis aligned aligned to to take take aa suction suction onon the the CVCV Sump Sump and discharge and discharge to to the the loops.
loops.
1.1.10 Redundant 1.1.10 Redundant - (In - reference to (In reference to an an indication) indication) Having Having multiple multiple indications indications of the same type for of the same type for the same the same parameter.
parameter. An An example example of of redundant redundant indication isis verification indication verification of of S/G S/G level level using using all all three three narrow narrow range range level level channels.
channels.
~
--- 1.1.11 1.1 Rod On
.11 Rod On Bottom Bottom - AA Control
- Control Rod Rod is is defined defined as as "on on the the bottom" bottom when when NARPI indication shows NARPI indication shows aa position position of of less less than than or or equal equal to to 12".
- 12. This This originates from originates from Westinghouse Westinghouse Documentation Documentation ESBU/wOG ESBU/WOG 96-0080, 96-0080, which defines which defines rod rod bottom bottom occurring occurring at at entry entry to to the the dash dash pot.
pot. Dash Dash PotPot entry occurs entry occurs at at 20 20 steps steps fromfrom thethe bottom bottom which which is is equal equal to to 12.5".
12.5. The The value isis rounded rounded down down to the nearest nearest legible legible increment increment on the NARPI.
1.1.12 S/G 1.1.12 S/GSta tus:
Status:
- 1. Ruptured S/G SIG - Any generator with failed tubes resulting in aa loss of the RCS pressure boundary greater than RCS makeup capability.
- 2. Faulted S/G SIG - A faulted S/G is any generator with a steam line or
- or feedwater line break associated with it.
- 3. Leaking SIG S/G - Any generator with failed tubes resulting in a loss of the RCS pressure boundary within RCS makeup capability.
1.1.13 1.1.13 SIG S/G Level - Unless otherwise stated, a step which refers to S/G level means means narrow narrow range S/G S/G level.
level. A step which requires the use use of of wide range S/GS/G level level will state state specifically specifically to to use use widewide range S/G S/G level.
level.
1.1.14 1.1.14 Stable Stable - (In (In reference reference to to aa parameter) parameter) To To be be within within the the normal normal control control band band oror controllable controllable within within somesome desired desired range.
range.
1.1.15 1.1.15 Uncontrolled Uncontrolled - Refers
- Refers to to aa condition condition that that isis not not under under the the control control of of the the operator operator andand isis incapable incapable of of being being controlled controlled by by the the operator operator using using available available equipment.
equipment.
OMM-022 IOMM-022 Rev.
Rev. 29 29 I Page 53 Page 53 of 54\
of 54 I
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Exam Exam
- 83. Given
- 83. Given the following:
Plant startup
- Plant
- startup is is in in progress progress lAW lAW GP-005, GP-005, POWER POWER OPERATION.
OPERATION.
- Reactor
- is at Reactor is at 8%
8% RTP.
RTP.
- Reactor Engineering has notified the SSO that BOTH Intermediate Range High Flux Trip setpoints were determined to be set non-conservative.
SSQ has declared BOTH IR Channels INOPERABLE.
- The SSO Which ONE (1) of the following describes the action(s) that must be taken in order to comply with Technical Specification requirements?
A. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions AND reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
B. Reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> OR increase thermal power to> P-10 P-1O within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
C. Place channels in TRIP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
D. Open the Reactor Trip Breakers immediately.
83 83
000033 A2.10 000033 A2.10 OOIILOSS 001/LOSS ON ON IR IR NI/1/2/3.1/3.8/SROILOW/43.5IFARLEY-N1111213.113.8ISRO/LOW/43.5/FARLEY- 20011NIS-01l 2001/NIS-Ol 1 Given the Given the following:
following:
Plant startup
- Plant
- startup isis in in progress progress lAWlAW GP-005, POWER OPERATION.
GP-005, POWER OPERATION.
Reactor isis at
- Reactor
- at 8% RTP.
8% RTP.
Reactor Engineering
- Reactor
- Engineering has has notified notified the SSO that the SSO that BOTH BOTH Intermediate Intermediate Range Range HighHigh Flux Flux Trip Trip setpoints were setpoints were determined determined to to be be set non-conservative.
set non-conservative.
The SSO
- The
- SSO has has declared declared BOTHBOTH IR IR Channels Channels INOPERABLE.
Which ONEONE (1) (1) of of the following describes the action(s) that must must bebe taken inin order to comply requirements?
with Technical Specification requirements?
A'I Immediately suspend A Immediately suspend operations operations involving involving positive positive reactivity reactivity additions additions AND reduce reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
B. Reduce thermal power to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> OR increase thermal power to> P-10 P-i 0 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
C. Place channels in TRIP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
D. Open the Reactor Trip Breakers immediately. immediately.
The correct answer is A.
A: Correct - -
LCO 3.3.1, Condition G actions required if TWO IR channels INOPERABLE INOPERABLE with power> P-6, but < P-10. P-ic.
B: Incorrect - LCO 3.3.1, Condition F actions required if ONE IR channel INOPERABLE INOPERABLE with power> P-6, but < P-10. P-i 0.
C: Incorrect - Actions required for most INOPERABLE
- INOPERABLE instrument channels to remove the channel from service, NIs Nls would be BYPASSED instead of removed from service in this manner.
D: Incorrect - LCO 3.3.1, Condition J action for TWO Source Range Channels INOPERABLE.
This action is NOT applicable because both SR instruments are deenergized.
Exam Question Exam Number: 83 Question Number: 83
Reference:
Reference:
ITS 3.3.1, 3.3.1, Page Page 3.3-1, 3.3-1, 3.3-3 3.3-3 KA Statement:
KA Statement: Ability Ability to to determine determine and and interpret interpret the the following following as they apply as they apply to to the the Loss Loss ofof Intermediate Range Intermediate Nuclear Instrumentation:
Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Tech-Spec Tech-Spec limits limits ifif both both intermediate range intermediate range channels channels have have failed.
failed.
History: Modified History: Modified by by changing changing distractors distractors Band B and 0,D, Removed Removed Subsequent Subsequent actions actions and and reference reference to procedures.
to procedures.
SRO - application of required actions AND application of ITS
- ITS Conditions for Table 3.3.1-13.3.1-1 for Conditions in excess of of LCO.
KA Name:
KAName: ON JR NI LOSS ONIRNI Tier/Group: 1/2 112 Importance Rating: 3.1/3.8 3.113.8 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW IOCFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43 43.5 Source: FARLEY- 2001 Learning Objective: NIS-011 NIS-Ol 1
RPS Instru menta Instrume tion ntati on 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRU MENTA INSTRUMEN TIONN TATIO 3.3.1 Reactor Prote ctionn System (RPS) Instru Protectio Instrum menta tionn entatio LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instru menta instrum entatiotionn for each FunctFunctiion on in Table 3.3.1-shall be OPERA 3.3.1-11 BLE..
OPERABLE APPLIC ABILIT APPLICABIL Y:
ITY: Accor Accord ding ing to Table 3.3.1-1.
ACTION ACTIONSS
- -..... ... -... -.. -... --.. -... -..... .. NOTE*
NOTE ...... ...... .... -. -..... ..... -... -..
Separ Separa ate te Condi Condittion ion entry is allowed for each Funct Functiion.
on.
CONDI TION CONDITION REQUIR REQUIRED ED ACTION ACTION COMPL ETIONN TIME COMPLETIO A. One or more Funct Functiions ons A.1 Enter the Condi Condittion ion Imme Immed diately iately with one or more
- ---- requir require inope edd chann inoperrable.
channe able, els ls refere referen nced ced in Table 3.3.1-3.3.1-11 for the chann channeell (s).
Cs).
B. One Manual Reactor B.1 Resto Restorree chann channeell to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Trip chann channeell OPERA BLE status.
OPERABLE inope rable.
I nopera bi e.
OR B.2.1 8.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> V
AND B.2.2 Open reacto reactorr trip 55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> break breake ers rs (RTBs).
(conti nued)
(contin ued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit No. 2 2 3.3*1 3.3-1 Amendment No. 176
RPS Instrumentation I nstrunientati on 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued) fcont niiHi CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One channel E.1 Place channel in 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> inoperable.
inoperable, trip.
OR E.2 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> F, THERMAL POWER>
F. POWER > P-6 F.l F.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> and << P-b, polO. one to < P-6.
Intermediate I ntermedi ate Range Neutron Flux channel OR inoperable.
F.2 Increase THERMAL 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> POWER to > > polO.
P-1O.
~ -~ ..
G. THERMAL POWER>
POWER > P-6 G.l G.1 . -------NOTE NOTE -.. ------
and < P-1O, polO. two Limited boron Intermediate Range concentration changes Neutron Flux channels 1I associated with ReS RCS inoperable.~
inoperable. inventory control or limited plant temperature changes are allowed allowed..
Suspend operations Immediately Iniinedi atel y involving positive reactivity additions.
Mill.
ANU G.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> to < P-6.
(continued)
HBRSEP Unit No. 22 3.3-3 Amendment No. tTfr.190
+/-7,19O
- Correct, If BB - Correct, If one one SRSR isis lost lost all all fuel fuel movement movement must must bebe suspended suspended per per TS TS 3.9.2.
3.9.2. Must Must have two SR and one audible have two SR and one audible count rate count rate operable.
Source: Farley Source: Farley Exam Exam Bank Bank Question Question #052302M04007
- 052302M04007 Answer: CC Answer:
,3EG2.1.12
- 53. 033EG2.1.1211 AA Unit reactor startup Unit 11 reactor startup isis in in progress.
progress. One One hour hour ago ago Intermediate Intermediate Range, Range, IR,IR, channel channel N-36 N-36 was was taken out taken of service out of service due due toto aa power power supply supply problem.
problem. The The decision decision waswas made made to to continue continue with with the reactor the startup, power reactor startup, power is currently at is currently at 8%.
8%.
It is It estimated that is estimated that N-36 N-36 willwill be be returned returned to service in to service in the the next 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />.
hours. TheThe technician working working on the N-36 power supply on supply performed an an action action that that resulted resulted in in Intermediate Range, Range, IR,IR, N-35 failing low.
failing low.
Which ONE of the following describes describes the action(s) that must be taken in in order to comply with Technical Specification Specification requirements?
requirements?
A. Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions AND reduce thermal power to < <P-6 P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
B. Place IR JR N-36 channel level trip switch in the 'BYPASS' T position within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be in BYPASS Mode 3, Hot Standby, within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
C. Do NOT change power level until at least one IR JR channel is restored to operable status. status D. Place the IR N-35 channel level trip switch in the 'BYPASS' BYPASS position and increase thermal power to>
to > P-lO P-1O within TWO hours.
A - Correct, Actions required by TS 3.3.1.G.
3.3.l.G. with 2 JR IR channels lost.
B - Incorrect, Action required if two SR channels were lost.
C - Incorrect, Action if power level was below P-6.
C -
D - Incorrect, Action that was in progress with just the one JR IR channel was out of service, TS 3.3.1.F.
Source: New 54.
- 54. 033K3.O1 033K3.01 11 Annunciator Annunciator FH5, "SFP AREA FR5, SFP AREA RE25 RE25 A OR OR B HI RAD B HI RAD" is in alarm is in alarm onon Unit Unit 1.1.
It has It has been been determined determined that Spent Fuel that Spent Pool Exhaust Fuel Pool Exhaust Flow Flow GasGas monitors R-25AR-25A and and R-25B R-25B indicate high activity.
indicate high activity.
Which ONE Which ONE of of the the following following describes describes thethe automatic automatic action(s) action(s) that that occur occur asas aa result result of of this this alarm?
alarm?
The SFP A. The A. SFP supply and exhaust supply and exhaust fansfans shift to the shift to the recirculation recirculation mode.
mode.
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 84. Given
- 84. Given the the following:
following:
The plant
- The
- plant isis operating operating atat 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
The Inside
- The
- Inside AO AO has reported aa 100 has reported 100 GPM GPM leakleak from from the the RWST.
RWST.
The leak
- The
- leak isis into into the the storm storm drains drains and and appears appears to to be be unisolable.
unisolable.
Which ONE Which ONE (1)(1) of of the the following following actions actions isis required required for this event?
for this event?
A. Implement AOP-008, A. Implement AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF OF LIQUID WASTE. Initiate LIQUID WASTE. Initiate LOCAL LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATI evacuation using EVACUATION ON ALARM and and PA announceme PA announcement. nt.
B. Implement AOP-008, B. Implement AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF OF LIQUID LIQUID WASTE.
WASTE. Send Send personnel personnel to to isolate the Settling isolate Settling Ponds Ponds and and establish access access control.
control.
C. Implement PLP-021, C. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL CHEMICAL STORAGE, STORAGE, INVENTORY, INVENTORY, SPILL SPILL AND HAZARD HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION COMMUNICATION EVACUATION ALARM announcement.
and PA announcement.
D. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish COMMUNICATION access control.
84 84
000059 G2.4.4 000059 G2.4.4 OOl/ACC 00 1/ACC RADWASTE RADWASTE RELEASE/l/2/4.5/4.7/SROILOW/43.5/NEW RELEASEI1/2/4.5/4.7/SRO/LOW/43 .5/NEW - 2008/AOP-008-004
- 2008/AOP-008-004 Given the following:
Given
- The plant
- plant is is operating at at 100%
100% RTP.
RTP.
The Inside
- The
- Inside AO AC has has reported reported a 100 100 GPM GPM leak leak from the RWST.
RWST.
- The leak is into the storm drains and appears to be unisolable.
Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required for this event?
A A ':I Implement AOP-OOB, AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE. Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION ALARM and PA announcement.
B. Implement AOP-OOB,AOP-008, ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF LIQUID WASTE. Send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish access control.
C. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, Initiate LOCAL evacuation using EVACUATION ALARM and PA announcement.
D. Implement PLP-021, CHEMICAL STORAGE, INVENTORY, SPILL AND HAZARD COMMUNICATION PROGRAM, send personnel to isolate the Settling Ponds and establish access control.
The correct answer is A.
A: Correct - - Leakage from RWST, Monitor Tanks or Waste Condensate Tanks requires entry into AOP-008.
AOP-OOB. Steps 3,4,5 3, 4, 5 & 6 of AOP-008 AOP-OOB are paraphrased in "A".A.
B: Incorrect - Leakage from RWST, Monitor Tanks or Waste Condensate Tanks requires entry into AOP-008.
AOP-OOB. AOP-008 AOP-OOB does NOT isolate the Settling Ponds or establish access control.
C: Incorrect - PLP-021 is used for Chemical spills, but borated water is NOT considered a hazardous liquid.
D: Incorrect - PLP-021 is used for Chemical spills
- spills, but borated water is NOT considered a hazardous liquid.
Exam Question Number: 84 B4
Reference:
AOP-008, AOP-OOB, Pages 3 and 4, PLP-021, Pages 4 and 38. 3B.
KA Statement:
Statement: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters parameters that are entry-level conditions conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
History: New New - Written for HLC-08
- HLC-OB NRC Exam.
SRO SRO - Requires
- Requires analysis of of plant conditions conditions and selection of mitigating mitigating procedure.
procedure.
KA Name:
KAName: RADWASTE ACC RADW ASTE RELEASE Tier/Group: 1/2 112 Importance Rating: 4.5/4.7 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW 10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43 43.5 Source: NEW -2008
- 2008 Learning Objective: AOP-008-004
Rev.
Rev. 99 AOP-008 AOP-008 ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF OF LIQUID LIQUID WASTE WASTE Page Page 33 ofof 25 25 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
1.
- 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE To To provide provide the instruction instruction necessary to to respond respond to aa leak leak from from the the RWST, RWST, Monitor Monitor Tank Tank AA or or B, B, or or Waste Waste Condensate Condensate Tank Tank C, C, D, D, or or E.
E.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS Any Any unexplained indication indication ofof aa decrease decrease inin any any of of the following following tanks oror upon receiving aa report that leakage leakage has developed developed from from any any of of the following following tanks:
,..... .* RWST
- Monitor Tank A or B
- Waste Condensate Tank C, D, or E
- END -
Rev.
Rev. 99 AOP-008 AOP-008 ACCIDENTAL ACCIDENTAL RELEASE RELEASE OF OF LIQUID LIQUID WASTE WASTE Page 44 of Page of 25 25 H STEP 1
H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 1.
- 1. Check Check Leak Leak Status Status -- CONFIRMED CONFIRMED BYBY Perform Perform the the following:
following:
LOCAL LOCAL VISUAL VISUAL INSPECTION INSPECTION a.
- a. Perform Perform aa local local visual visual inspection inspection for for leakage leakage prior prior to continuing.
continuing.
- b. IF external leakage is found, THEN Go Go To To Step Step 2.
2.
- c. IF leakage is NOT jjQ found, THEN perform the following:
- 1) Contact I&C to determine the problem with level indication.
- 2) Return to procedure and and step in effect.
~2.
r-2. Locally Identify The Source Of Leakage To Determine If It Is Isolable Is o labl e
~3.
? 3. Evacuate Unnecessary Personnel From The Affected Area As Follows:
- a. Place the VLC switch in EMERG
- b. Place and hold the EVACUATION ALARM switch in the LOCAL position for 15 position 15 seconds
- c. Make a PA System
- c. System announcement unnecessary personnel for all unnecessary personnel stand clear of to stand of the the area due affected area due to to a leak leak in progress in progress
- d. Place and Place and hold hold the EVACUATION switch in ALARM switch in the the LOCAL position for 15 position 15 seconds seconds
- e. Repeat
- e. Repeat the the announcement announcement f.
- f. Place the Place the VLC VLC switch switch in in NORM NORM
1.0 1.0 PURPOSE{
PURPOSE{ TC PURPOSE \f TC "PURPOSE" c \1
\f C 1 }
\1 "1" }
1.1 1.1 This procedure implements the Chemical Safety and Health Health Management Management Program, the U. U. S. Hazard Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) 1910.1200) as adopted by the South Carolina Department of Labor, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act and the Emergency Planning and Community Right To Know Act. The procedure also provides chemical storage, handling, hazard, and spill information.
1.2 This procedure provides guidance for:
1.2.1 Emergency plans for accidental chemical release.
chemical_releas 1.2.2 calpllsat Chemical spills at RNP and Robinson Unit II and Darlington County
,Electric Plant.
1.2.3 The preparation of Tier II EPCRA reports and 90 day inventory change EPCRA reporting requirements.
11.2.4
.2.4 Employee Right to Know Requirements NOTE: The Robinson/Darlington Co. Fossil Plants SHOULD comply with applicable portions of this procedure.
2.0 REFERENCES
{ REFERENCES TC "REFERENCES" \f C \1 "1" }
1 }
2.1 SAF-SUBS-0001 6, Hazard Communication SAF-SUBS-00016, 2.2 EVC-SUBS-00018, Oil Spill and Chemical Release Notification and EmergencxEmergency Res~n~
Response .
2.3 U. S. Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) 1910.1200) 2.4 Emergency Response Community Right to Know Act Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Title Ill III 2.5 Emergency Preparedness Procedures 2.6 PLP-022, Environmental Regulatory Compliance Responsibilities, Guidelines and Disposal of Hazardous Waste/Surplus Chemicals 2.7 MCP-NGGC-0402, Material Material Management Management (Storage, Issue, Issue, and Maintenance)
Maintenance) 2.8 MCP-NGGC-0401, Material Material Acquisition (Procurement, Receiving, and Shipping)
Shipping) 2.9 CHE-NGGC-0045, NGG Chemical Control Program Procedure 1PLP-021 PLP-021 Rev. 26 Page Page 44 of of 38 381
\
ATTACHMENT 10.9 ATTACHMENT 10.9 Page 11 of Page of 11 CHEMICAL SPILL CHEMICAL SPILL REPORTABLE REPORTABLE QUANTITY QUANTITY LlST{ LIST{ TC TC "CHEMICAL CHEMICAL SPILL SPILL REPORTABLE REPORTABLE QUANTITY LIST" QUANTITY LIST \f
\f C C \l
\1 "2" }
2 }
APPROXIMATE REPORTABLE REPORTABLE QUANTITY QUANTITY QUANTITY QUANTITY CHEMICAL NAME POUNDS GALLONS AMMONIUM HYDROXIDE (28%) 1,000.
1,000. 478 ETHYLENE GLYCOL (88-90%) 5000. 540 HYDRAZINE (35%) 1. 0.33 SODIUM HYDROXIDE (50%) 1,000. 157 (1 2-1 5%)
SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE (12-15%) 100. 74 SULFURIC ACID (93%) 1,000. 70 POTASSIUM DI-CHROMATE 10. **
POTASSIUM CHROMATE 10. **
SODIUM DI-CHROMATE 10. **
SODIUM CHROMATE 10. **
- Dependent on concentration (PPM) in solution.
1PLP-021 PLP-021 Rev.
Rev. 26 26 Page Page 38 38 of of 38 381
HLC-08 NRC Written Exam Given the following:
- 85. Given 85.
FRP-C.1, RESPONSE
- The crew has entered FRP-C.1,
- RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.
- RCS temperature by CETC is 750
- 750 of.
°F.
- Step 21 of the procedure directs the crew to depressurize all intact S/Gs to 140 140 PSIG.
Which ONE (1) of the following conditions would be entered/violated while performing the procedure actions of Step 21?
2.1 .1, Reactor Core Safety Limits. (Combination of Thermal Power, RCS Cold Leg A. ITS 2.1.1, 2.1 .1 .1).
Temperature, and Pressurizer Pressure within limits of Figure 2.1.1.1).
B. ITS 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT)(P/T) Limits. (RCS pressure, Temperature, and Heatup and Cooldown rates within limits of Figures 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2).
C. TRM 3.3, Steam Generator Secondary Side PressurelTemperature Pressure/Temperature (P/T)(PIT) Limits.
SIGs maintained within PIT limits of Figure 3.3.1).
(Secondary side of S/Gs D. ITS 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)
Limits.
85
000074 G2.2.42 000074 G2.2.42 OOllINAD 001/INAD CORECORE COOLING/1I2/3.9/4.6/SRO/HIGH/43.2/43.3/NEW COOLING/1/2/3.9/4.6/SRO/HIGHJ43.2/43.3/NEW- 2008IRCS-013- 2008/RCS-013 Given the Given the following:
following:
The crew
- The
- crew has has entered entered FRP-C.1, FRP-C.1, RESPONSE RESPONSE TO TO INADEQUATE INADEQUATE CORE CORE COOLING.
COOLING.
RCS temperature
- RCS
- temperature by CETC isis 750 by CETC F.
0 750 of.
Step 21
- Step
- 21 of of the the procedure procedure directs the crew directs the crew toto depressurize depressurize allall intact intact S/Gs S/Gs to to 140 140 PSIG.
PSIG.
Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) ofof the the following following conditions conditions would would be be entered/violated entered/violated while while performing performing the the procedure actions procedure actions of of Step Step 21?
21?
A. ITS A. ITS 2.1.1, 2.1 .1, Reactor Reactor Core Safety Limits. Limits. (Combination (Combination of Thermal Power, Power, RCSRCS Cold Cold Leg Leg Temperature, and Temperature, and Pressurizer Pressurizer Pressure Pressure within within limits limits of of Figure Figure 2.1.1.1).
2.1.1.1).
B ITS 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT)
B!'" (P/T) Limits. (RCS pressure, Temperature, and Heatup and Cooldown rates rates within limits of Figures 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.3.2).
C. TRM 3.3, Steam Generator Secondary Side PressurelTemperature Pressure/Temperature (P/T) (PIT) Limits.
(Secondary side of S/Gs maintained within PIT limits of Figure 3.3.1).
D. ITS 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)
Limits.
The correct answer is B.
A: Incorrect - LCO 2.1.1 is applicable in MODES 11 and 2, since the plant has been shutdown due to an accident and is in MODE 3, 4 or 5, this LCO does NOT apply.
B: Correct - - Cooldown limit for the RCS is 100 °F/hr. of/hr. Step 21 of FRP-C.1 will depressurize S/Gs and cooldown the RCS to 365 °F. of. This action will exceed the cooldown limit of Figure 3.4.3-2.
C: Incorrect Incorrect - TRM 3.3 is applicable at ALL times, but << 1350 1350 PSID will be established with depressurization depressurization of S/Gs to 140 PSIG. This ensures 140 PSIG. ensures that the SteamSteam Generator Generator Vessel temperature remains in in the acceptable region.
D:
D: Incorrect Incorrect - LCO 3.4.1 3.4.1 is applicable in is applicable in MODE MODE 1, 1, since the plant plant has has been been shutdown shutdown due due to an an accident accident andand is is in in MODE MODE 3, 3,44 or 5, this or 5, this LCO LCO does does NOTNOT apply.
apply.
Exam Question Number:
Exam Question Number: 85 85
Reference:
Reference:
FRP-C.1, FRP-C.1 , Page Page 10;10; ITS ITS 3.4.1, 3.4.1, 3.4.3, 3.4.3, 2.1 .1; TRM 2.1.1; TRM 3.3.
3.3.
KA Statement:
KA Statement: AbilityAbility to to recognize recognize system system parameters parameters that are entry-level that are entry-level conditions conditions for for Technical Technical Specifications.
Specifications.
History:
History: New New - Written Written forfor HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC exam.
exam.
SRO SRO - requires requires analysis analysis ofof plant plant conditions conditions andand selection selection ofof applicable applicable ITSITS condition.
condition.
KA Name:
KAName: INAD CORE COOLING Tier/Group: 1/2 112 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.6 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH 10CFR55.43 linle 10CFR55.43 link: 43.2/43.3 Source: NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: RCS-013
Rev.
Rev. 17 17 FRP-C.l FRP-C.1 RESPONSE RESPONSE TOTO INADEQUATE INADEQUATE CORE CORE COOLING COOLING Page Page 10 10 of of 2828 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I
NOTE
- Partial uncovery of SIG S/G tubes is acceptable in the following steps due to steaming faster faster than feeding.
feeding.
- After the Low Steamline Pressure SI Signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam flow rate setpoint is exceeded.
- ~*21.
-.*2l. Depressurize All Intact SIGs S/Gs To 140 PSIG As Follows:
- a. Check Steam Dump to Condenser a. Dump steam at maximum rate
- AVAILABLE
- using STEAM LINE PORVs.
PORV5.
Go To Step 21.c.
2l.c.
- b. Dump steam to Condenser at maximum rate
- c. Check RCS Hot Leg c. NWHEN RCS hot leg temperatures Temperatures - LESS THAN 543°F less than 543°F, THEN perform Step 21.d.
- 21. d.
Go To Step 21.e.
- d. Defeat Low Tavg Safety Injection Signal as follows:
1)
- 1) place SAFETY Momentarily place T-AVG Selector INJECTION TAVG position Switch to BLOCK position
- 2) Verify LO TEMP SAFETY INJECTION BLOCKED status light - ILLUMINATED light - ILLUMINATED e.
- e. SIG pressures - LESS Check S/G - e. IF S/G SIG pressure isis THAN 140 THAN 140 PSIG PSIG decreasing, THEN decreasing, THEN observe observe NOTE NOTE prior to prior to Step Step 19 19 and and Go Go To To Step 19.
Step 19.
IF S/G IE pressure is SIG pressure is increasing, THEN increasing, THEN Go Go To To Step 28.
Step 28.
(CONTINUED NEXT (CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)
PAGE)
RCS RCS Pressure.
Pressure, Temperature.
Temperature, and and Flow Flow DNB DNB Limits Limits 3.4.1 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEMSYSTEM (RCS) (RCS) 3.4.1 RCS 3.4.1 RCS Pressure.
Pressure. Temperature.
Temperature, and and FlowFlow Departure Departure from from Nucleate Nucleate Boiling Boiling (ONB)
(DNB) Limits Limits LCO 3.4.1 LCO 3.4.1 RCS RCS DNB DNB parameters parameters for for pressurizer pressurizer pressure.
pressure, RCS RCS average average temperature.
temperature, and and RCS RCS total total flow flow rate rate shall shall be be within within the the limits limits specified specified below: below:
a.a. Pressurizer Pressurizer pressure pressure ~> 2205 2205 pSig; psig; b.
- b. RCS RCS average average temperature temperature s 579.4°F; 579.4°F; andand c.
- c. RCS RCS total total flow flow rate rate ~ 97.3 97.3 xx 101066 lbm/hr.
lbm/hr.
APPLICABILITY:
APPLICABILITY: MODE 11..
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NOTE*
NOTE ........................ ---
Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during:
Pressurizer during:
- a. THERMAL POWER ramp> ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or or
- b. THERMAL POWER step> step > 10% RTP.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETI TIME ON TIME A.
A. One One oror more RCS DNB DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB Restore 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> hours parameters parameters not within parameter(s) to limits.
limits. within limit.
within B.
B. Required Required Action Action and and B.1 8.1 Be in Be in MODE MODE 2. 2. 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> hours associated associated Completion Completion Time Time not not met.
met.
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.
No. 22 3.4-1 3.4-1 Amendment No.
Amendment No. 176 176
RCS PIT RCS PIT Limits Limits 3.4.3 3.4.3 3.4 REACTOR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM SYSTEM (RCS) (RCS) 3.4.3 RCS 3.4.3 RCS Pressure Pressure and Temperature (PIT) and Temperature (P/T) Limits Limits LCO 3.4.3 LCO 3.4.3 RCS RCS pressure.
pressure, RCS RCS temperature.
temperature, andand RCS RCS heatup heatup and and cool down cooldown rates rates shall shall be be maintained maintained within within the the limits limits specified specified in in Figures Figures 3.4.3-1 3.4.3-1 and and 3.4.3-2.
3.4.3-2.
APPLICABILITY:
APPLICABILITY: At all At all times.
times.
ACTIONS ACTIONS CONDITION CONDITION REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME A.
A. - -- --- ---NOTENOTE ---- --- -- A.l A.1 Restore parameter(s) 30 30 minutes minutes Required Action A.2 Required to within limits.
shall be completed shall whenever whenever this AND Condition is entered.
Condition
--_ ...... - .... - ....... __ ..... - .... A.2 Determine RCS is 72 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> hours acceptable for Requirements of LCO Requirements continued operation.
not met in MODE 1. 2.
not 2, 3,
- 3. or or 4.4.
B.
B. Required Required Action and B.1 B.1 Be in MODE 3.
Be 3. hours 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> associ ated Completion associated Completion Time Time ofof Condition Condition AA AND not not met.
met.
B.2 B.2 Be in Be in MODE MODE 55 with with RCS RCS 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 36 hours pressure << 400 pressure 400 psig.
psig.
(continued)
(continued)
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No.No. 22 3.4-5 3.4-5 Amendment No.
Amendment No. 176 176
Res RCS P/T Limits PIT Limits 3.4.3 3.4.3 MATERIALS PROPERTIES MATERIALS PROPERTIES BASE BASE CONTROLL ING MATERIAL: Upper CONTROLLING MATERIAL: Upper Shell Shell Plate Plate Curves Curves applicable applicable forfor heatup heatup rates rates upup to to Limiting ART Values at Limiting ART Values at 35 EFPY: 1/4T.
35 EFPY: 1!4T, 167°F 167°F 60°F/Hr 6OF/Hr forfor service service period period up up to to 35 35 EFPY EFPY 314T, 14rF 3/4T. 147°F Heatup Heatup Curves Curves include include +10°F
+1OF and and -60
-60 psig psig Allowance Allowance for for Instrumentation Instrumentation error.
error.
2750 2750 I F i I H HI 2500 2500 2250 2000 200!} LeaK Test Imit Unacceptable Operation 0)
(J) 5V)
VI 1500 150!}
I
-Hj
} H+ LH Heatup Rate to Acceptable Operation 4))
VI 0)
(J)
J4] 60F/Hr 5:. 1250 u 125!}
0)
(J)
+>
<0 0
U
'r-
"E i000 moo Criticality [lint based on Inservice Hydrostatic test 7Cfl temeature (226F) for the 750 vice neriod un to 35 EFP (
nn 500 250 250 0
0o 50 50 100 100 150 150 200 200 250 250 300 300 350 350 400 400 450 450 500 500 550 550 Indicated Indicated Temperature Temperature (°F) (oF)
Figure Figure 3.4.3-1 3.4.3'1 Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant System System 1-leatup Heatup Limits Limits Applicable Applicable Up Up to to 3535 EFFY EFPY HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.4-7 3.4*7 Amendment No.
Amendment No. 202 202
Res RCS P/T Limits PIT 3.4.3 MATERIALS MATERtALS PROPERTIES BASE Controlling Material: Upper Shell Plate Curves applicable for cool down rates cooldown and nd Girth HeldWeld up to 100100°0 F/Hr for the service Limiting ART Values at 35 EFPY:
Liolting period up to 35 EFPY, EFPY.
1/4T. 167°F and 242°F Curves include +10°F and -60 PSIG 2750 Allowance for Instrurnentati Instruientatioon n error_
error.
2500 (0
(.!)
I14 U)
-i LI)
CL.
0 2250 2000 1750
- i. Unacceptable Operation I
i L
II 1 20°F/Hr Li)
(l) s- *1500
- s '1500 V)
Vl
/r 40°F/Hr U)
Vl Li)
(l) s-CL.
0 u
ci)
(l)
+>
1250
'1250 IF! t t'O 0
U
'r-U 1000
.....s::: (°F!Hr)
I I I 100°F/Kr.
750 LIII 1TF
-O ani1 500 - Acceptable Operation rmL- I. .i W 250-250 o0 o0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 Indicated Temperature (oF) (°F)
Figure 3.4.3-2 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limits Applicable Up to 35 EFPY HBRSEP Unit No. 22 3.4-8 Amendment No. 202
SLs SLs 2.0 2.0 2.0 SAFETY 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS LIMITS (SLs)
(SLs) 2.1 SLs 2.1 SLs 2.1.1 Reactor 2.1.1 Reactor Core Core SLs SLs MODES 11 and In MODES In and 2, 2, the the combination combination of of THERMAL THERMAL POWER, POWER, Reactor Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Coolant System (RCS) highest highest cold cold leg leg temperature, temperature, and and pressurizer pressurizer pressure shall pressure shall not not exceed exceed the the SLs SLs specified specified in in Figure Figure 2.1.1-1.
2.1.1-1.
2.1.2 RCS 2.1.2 RCS Pressure Pressure SLSL In In MODES MODES 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4.
- 4. and and 5.5, the RCS RCS pressure shall shall be be maintained maintained 2735
~ 2735 psig.
psig.
2.2 SL Violations 2.2 2.2.1 If SL 2.1.1 is violated.
2.2.1 violated, restore compliance and be in MODE 3 3 within 1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
2.2.2 If SL 2.1.2 is violated:
2.2.2.1 In MODE 1 1 or 2.2, restore compliance and be in MODE 33 in MODE within 1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
2.2.2.2 In MODE 3,3. 4,
- 4. or 5,5. restore compliance within 55 minutes.
minutes.
HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit No. 22 Unit No. 2.0-1 2.0-1 Amendment No.
Amendment No. 176 176
SG SG Secondary Side PIT Secondary Side P/T Limits Limits 3.3 3.3 3.3 STEAM 3.3 STEAM GENERATOR GENERATOR (SG)
(SG) SECONDARY SECONDARY SIDE PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE (PIT)
SIDE PRESSUREITEMPERATURE (PIT) LIMITS LIMITS TRMS TRMS 3.33.3 The The secondary secondary side side of of the the SGs SGs shall shall bebe maintained maintained within within the the (CTS 3.1.2.2) PIT (CTS 3.1.2.2) P/T limits limits ofof Figure Figure 3.3-1.
3.3-1.
APPLICABILITY: At APPLICABILITY: At all all times.
times.
COMPENSATORY MEASURES CONDITION REQUIRED COMPENSATORY COMPENSATORY ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements Requirements of TRMS A.1 A.l Initiate action to Immediately not met.
met, restore SG secondary side PIT P/T to within imits.
1limits.
AND A.2 Initiate aa Condition Immediately Report in accordance with the Corrective Action Program.
REQUIREMENTS TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST FREQUENCY None. NA HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP Unit No.
No. 22 3.3-1 3.3-1 PLP-I00 Rev.
PLP-100 Rev. 22 22
=
(/)
900 ;::
= ~.s 800 Pressure Differential (PSI) 700 :;=; fl:.
.r- ~
.1. o ~ 600 OJ c (Secondary to Priniary) c ct 5 8 500
~ ~ 400 1500 OJ'-' fa f- F- I fl:. 300 C,) U, 1400
~ 1000 i-C 0i - CX) O CD I- r\) U, 0 CD 200 C)
CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD 1300 CD CD r-;o .r-CD o CD 100 CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD 1200 C) CD 40 HBRSEP Unit No. 2 C-, 60 (F,
CD C-I-,
c- --
CD CO 80 CD CD CD CD C)
CD C--)
CC) -5.
0 CD 100 0) I-Figure 3.3-1 (Page 1 of 1)
) -5 o
3.3-2 _5 _t cD> 0)
CD 111111 III:CIIII -cR0 Cr) I Region of (I, rz ILItLI IICD CO IH CD CD CD 120 -H
- 0) 0 C-
_1 Acceptable 0)
--0 CD -h I
Operation CD
_J.
C-,--
Steam Generator PIT Limits
-z C/,
CD CD 140
-5 Cf CD C-,
-5 CD 0
160 C-)
0 0
0) 5 9
Steam Generator Vessel Temperature (OF)
-t, C,,
SG Secondary Side PIT Limits 180 -C 0
CD
-:5 r.) -H CD CD 200 CD C-)
PLP-100 Rev. 22 F. C-.) C,,
C1.
c-f 3.3
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 86. Given the
- 86. Given the following:
following:
The plant
- The
- plant is is in in MODE MODE 44 at at 210 210 of and 350
°F and PSIG.
350 PSIG.
RCS isis solid.
- RCS
- solid.
RHR Pump
- RHR
- Pump "A" A and and RCP RCP "C" are running.
C are running.
swapping Charging
- While swapping
- Charging Pumps, Pumps, the operator operator inadvertently inadvertently starts the Standby Standby Charging Pump with Pump with the the speed speed controller controller set set at at maximum.
maximum.
Which ONE (1) of the following will occur to limit RCS pressure?
RHR-706, RHR A. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF,RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
PRT.
Enter AOP-019, Enter AOP-01 9, MALFUNCTION MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE CONTROL.
B. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
C. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
D. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Use APP-003-A2/A3, PCV-455C and PCV-456 LP PROT ACT/TROUB to direct operator actions.
86 86
00 1/PRT/QIJENCH TANKl2/1/3.6/3.9/SROIHIGH/43.5/NEW 007 A2.03 OOIIPRT/QUENCH TANK/2/1/3 .6/3 .9/SROIHIGHJ43 .5/NEW - 2008IPZR-01O
- 2008/PZR-0 10 Given the following:
- The plant is in MODE
- MODE 4 at 210 210°F PSIG.
of and 350 PSIG.
- RCS is solid.
- RHR Pump "A"
- A and RCP "C" C are running.
- While swapping Charging Pumps, the operator inadvertently starts the Standby Charging Pump with the speed controller set at maximum.
Which ONE (1) of the following will occur to limit RCS pressure?
A. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
AOP-01 9, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL.
Enter AOP-019, B. RHR-706, RHR SYSTEM RELIEF, will OPEN at 600 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
C. PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Enter AOP-020, LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN COOLING).
D~
D PCV-455C and PCV-456, PZR PORVs will OPEN at 400 PSIG to relieve pressure to the PRT.
Use APP-003-A2/A3, PCV-455C and PCV-456 LP PROT ACTITROUB ACT/TROUB to direct operator actions.
The correct answer is D.
A: Incorrect - RHR-706 is set to OPEN at 600 PSIG. AOP-019
- AOP-01 9 is applicable ONLY in MODES 1, 2and 1,2 and 3.
B: Incorrect - RHR-706 is set to OPEN at 600 PSIG, but entry conditions will NOT be met for AOP-020 unless RHR inventory loss occurs. AOP-033 will be used for shutdown LOCA with the RCS greater than 200 °F. of.
C: Incorrect - PZR PORVs are set at 400 PSIG during LTOP
- LTOP conditions. AAOP-033 will be used for shutdown LOCA with the RCS greater than 200 °F. of.
D: Correct -- LTOP will actuate the PZR PORVs at 400 PSIG. APP-003-A2/A3 is the correct procedure to use.
Exam Question Exam Number: 86 Question Number: 86
Reference:
APP-003-A2
Reference:
APP-003-A2 and and A3; A3; AOP-019, AOP-019, PagePage 3; AOP-020, Page 3; AOP-020, Page 3; 3; SO-003, SD-003, RHR, RHR, Figure Figure 3.3.
KA Statement:
KA Statement: Ability Ability to to (a)
(a) predict predict the the impacts impacts of the following of the following malfunctions malfunctions oror operations operations on on the PP S; the and (b)
S; and based on (b) based those predictions, on those predictions, use use procedures procedures toto correct, correct, control, control, or mitigate or mitigate the the consequences consequences of of those those malfunctions malfunctions oror operations:
operations:
Overpressurization Overpressurization of of the the PZR.
PZR.
History: New History: - Written for New - Written for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRCNRC exam.
exam.
SRO - Requires evaluation of plant SRO - plant conditions and selection of the applicable procedure procedure to mitigate the event.
event.
KA Name:
KA PRT/QUENCH TANK PRT/QUENCH TANK Tier/Group:
Tier/Group: 2/1 2/1 Importance Rating:
Importance 3.6/3.9 3.6/3.9 RO/SRO Level:
RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH 10CFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43 43.5 Source: NEW - 2008
- Learning Objective: PZR-OlO PZR-01O
APP-003-A2 APP-003-A2 Page Page11 ofof22 ALARM ALARM PCV-455CLP PCV-455C LPPROT PROTACTfTROUB ACT,TROUB WILLREFLASH
- WILL REFLASH***
AUTOMATICACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.1. PCV-455C, PZR PCV-455C, PZRPORV, PORV, opens opensatat400 400psig psigwhen when inin Low LowPressure PressureModeMode CAUSE CAUSE 1.1. RCS overpressure RCS overpressure condition.
condition.
2.2. Auctioneered low Auctioneered lowTc Tc less less than than 360°F 360°F AND AND LTOPP LTOPP isis NOT NOT enabled.
enabled.
3.3. RC-536, PORV RC-536, PORV BLOCK, BLOCK, Closed Closed 4.
- 4. RC-536, PRESSURIZER RC-536, PRESSURIZER PORV PORV PCV-455C PCV-455C BLOCK, BLOCK, Breaker Breaker Tripped/Open Tripped/Open OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.1. RCS Pressure RCS Pressure (PR-444, (PR-444, PI-500, P1-500, PI-501, P1-501, PI-403)
P1-403) 2.
(TR-410) 3.
(P1-472), Temperature Temperature (TI-471),
(Tl-471), & & Level Level (L1-470)
(LI-470) 4.
- 4. RC-536 Position RC-536 Position indication indication 5.
- 5. Position of Position of RHR-759A, RHR-759A, RHR HX "A" A DISCHARGE DISCHARGE and RHR-759B, RHR-759B, RHR HX HX "B" B DISCHARGE DISCHARGE ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.
- 1. Stop pressure Stop pressure increasing increasing activities.
2.
- 2. IF require IF required,d, THEN THEN turn the LTOP LTOPP P System OVER OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION Switches PRESSURE PROT ECTION Switch es to to LOW LOW PRESS PRESSURE. URE.
3.
- 3. IF IF require required,d, THEN THEN OPEN OPEN RC-53 RC-536.6.
4.
- 4. IF IF RCS RCS isis solid, solid, THEN THEN verify verify BOTH BOTH RHRRHR HX HX A"A" AND AND B"B" DISCHARG DISCHARGE OPEN::
E OPEN 1)
- 1) RHR-759A RHR-759A 2)
- 2) RHR-759B RHR-759B 5.
- 5. IF IF require d, THEN required, THEN dispatc dispatchh operato operatorr to to check check Breake Breaker Position r Positio of RC-53 n of RC-536, PRESSURIZER PORV 6, PRESS URIZER PORV PCV-4 55C PCV-455C BLOCK.BLOCK.
6.6. IF IF tripped tripped,, THEN THEN investi gate the investigate the cause cause of of trip.
trip.
IAPP-0 APP-00303 Rev.
Rev.37 37 Page55ofof53 Page 531
APP-003-A2 APP-003-A2 Page Page 22 of of 22 ALARM ALARM PCV-455C LP PCV-455C LP PROT PROT ACTfTROUB ACT/TROUB (Continued)
(Continued)
DEVICEISETPOINTS DEVICE/SETPOINTS 1.
- 1. TE-41 0, TE-420, TE-410, TE-420, or or TE-430 TE-430 II 360°F 360°F 2.
- 2. RC-536 limit RC-536 limit switch switch 3.
- 3. QM-503 1400 QM-503 I 400 psig psig II variable variable (If auctioneered low (If auctioneered low Tc Tc isis greater greater than than 360°F) 360°F)
POSSIBLE PLANT POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS EFFECTS 1.
- 2. Failure of Failure of LLTOPP TOPP toto actuate actuate when when required required REFERENCES REFERENCES
- 1. ITS LCO 3.4.12, LCO 3.4.3, LCO 3.4.11
- 2. CWD B-190628, Sheet 120, Cables J and M CWO
- 3. Hagan Wiring Diagram HBR2-8608 082 D82 IAPP-003 APP-003 Rev. 37 Rev. 37 Page 66 of Page 53\
of 53
APP-003-A3 APP-00 3-A3 Page 1 1 of 2 ALARM ALARM PCV-456 LP PROT ACTfTACT/TROUB *** WILL REFLASH ***
AUTOMATI AUTOM ATICC ACTIO ACTIONSNS
- 1. RCS overpre overpressure ssure conditio condition.
n.
- 2. Auctioneered Auction eered low Tc less than 360°F AND L LTOP TOPP P is NOT enabled.
- 3. RC-535 RC-535,, PORV BLOCK BLOCK,, Closed
- 4. RC-535 RC-535,, PRESS PRESSURIZE URIZER PORV PCV-45 PCV-456 6 BLOCK BLOCK Breaker Tripped Tripped/Open
/Open OBSERVAT OBSER VATIOIONS NS
- 1. RCS Pressure (PR-444, PI-500, P1-500, PI-501 P1-501,, PI-403)
P1-403)
- 2. RCS Temperature (TR-41 (TR-41 0)
. 3. PRT Pressure (PI-472 (P1-472),
), Temperature (TI-471 (TI-471),
), & Level (LI-470 (LI-470))
- 4. RC-535 RC-535 Position indicati indication on
- 1. Stop pressure increasing activitie activities.
s.
- 2. IF required, THEN turn the L LTOP TOPP P System OVERP OVERPRESS RESSU URE RE PROTE PROTECTIO CTION Switches N Switch es to LOW PRESS PRESSURE.
- 3. IF required, THEN OPEN RC-535RC-535..
- 1) RHR-759A
- 2) RHR-759B
- 5. IF required, THEN dispatch operator to check Breaker Position of RC-535 RC-535,, PRESS PRESSURIZE URIZER PORV PCV PCV-4 -456 56 BLOCK BLOCK..
- 6. IF tripped, THEN investig investigate ate the cause of trip.
IAPP-003 Rev. 37 Page 7 of 53531
APP-00 3-A3 APP-003-A3 Page Page 22 of of 22 ALARM ALARM PCV-456 PCV-4 56 LP LP PROT PROT ACTffR ACTITROIJBOUB (Contin (Continued) ued)
DEVICE/SETP DEVIC E/SETPOI OINTSNTS 1.
- 1. TE-41 0,, TE-420 TE-410 TE-420,, or or TE-430 TE-430 II 360°F 360°F 2.
- 2. RC-535 limit RC-535 limit switch switch 3.
- 3. QM-5033 I/ 400 OM-50 400 psig psig II variabl variablee (If (If auction auctioneered eered low low Tc is is greater greater than than 360°F) 360°F)
POSSIBLE PLANT POSSI PLANT EFFEC EFFECTS 1.
- 2. Failure of LLTOP Failure TOPP P to actuate when required ENCES REFERENCES
- 1. ITS LCO 3.4.12, 3.4.12, LCO 3.4.3, LCO 3.4.11
- 2. CWD B-1906 CWO B-i 90628 28,, Sheet 119, Cables J and M
- 3. Hagan Wiring Diagram Diagram HBR2-HBR2-8608 8608 082 D82 IAPP APP-0-003 03 Rev. 37 Rev. 37 I Page 88 of Page 531I of 53
Rev.
Rev. 13 13 AOP-019 AOP-019 MALFUNCTION OF MALFUNCTION OF RCS RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE CONTROL CONTROL Page Page 33 of of 17 17 Purpose and Purpose and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1)
1.
- 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides instructions instructions in in the the event event RCS RCS pressure pressure is is higher higher OR lower than required Q lower than required forfor current current plant plant conditions.
conditions.
~
- This procedure This procedure isis applicable applicable in in Modes Modes 1,1,2,2, and and 3.
3.
2.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS This procedure This procedure may may be be entered entered when when RCS RCS pressure pressure deviates deviates from from the the desired control band due desired control due to to aa fault fault inin pressure pressure control control components. (AOP-025 components. (AOP-025 covers covers Instrument Instrument Failure)
Failure)
- END --
AOP-020 20 Rev. 29 LOSS LOSS OF OF RESIDU RESIDUALAL HEAT HEAT REMOV AL (SHUTD REMOVAL OWN COOLIN (SHUTDOWN COOLING)G)
Page 3 of 107 107 j STEP H INSTRU INSTRUCTIO CTIONSNS I I RESPON RESPONSESE NOT OBTAIN OBTAINEDED H-1.
- 1. PURPOS PURPOSEE This procedure provid provideses the instru instructio ction s neces ns sary to mitig ate the necessary loss of RHR in all condi loss condition tionss for which RHR can be aligne aligned d to provid e shutdown coolincooling.g. This includ includeses loss of RHR coolincooling g for reason s such as RCS leakag leakage, e, loss of power power,, loss of Servic Service e Water or Component Cooling Water Water,, RHR pump cavita cavitation tion,, and inade quate inadequa te RHR flow or abnorm al reduc reduction tionss in RHR coolin g.
cooling.
This proced ure is applic applicabl able e in Modes 4, 5, and 6 when fuel is in the vesse vessel.
l.
- 2. ENTRY ENTRY CONDI CONDITION TIONSS Directt entry from any condi Direc condition tion result resulting ing in a loss of RHR pump( s), RHR pump cavita cavitation tion,, abnorm al RHR flow or tempe rature temperatu re contr control,ol, or exces excessive sive loss of RCS inven tory while RHR is aligne inventory for shutdown coolin aligned d cooling.
g.
As direct directed ed by the follow following ing other other proce procedurdures:
es:
~.* AOP-016, ExcesExcesssive ive Prima Primarryy Plant Plant Leaka Leakag ge, e, if less than 200°F and leakage exceeds Charg Chargiing ng Capac ity.
Capacity.
- END --
COLD LEG RECIRC - RHR FLOW - W> >120 1200 0 GPM, RCS< RCS<125 125 PSIG RHR RHR-F
-FIGU IGURE RE-3
-3
..-- --. --- --- --- --- --- --- -11 /1 . i 51-887 TO 51 PUMP B& C SUCTIONS TO 51 AND RHR-764 RHR-757B RHR-754B RHR-752B CONTAINMENT M SPRAY PUMP RHR-759B SUCTIONS
~liII ~liII
- FROM RWST SI-862A 1-3::
---'0 MINI FLOW RECIRC FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP RHR HEAT-UP LINE RHR-743 TO RC LOOP 1 ~
COLD LEG ':"
til TO RC LOOP 3 COLD LEG ~
U1 o
TO RC LOOP 2 RHR-7448 COLD LEG RHR-744B SI-876B SI-8768 SI-875B FROM RC LOOP 2 HOT HOT LEG LEG INFO INF ORM RMA ATITION ON USE ONLY
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 87. Given the
- 87. Given the following:
following:
The plant
- The
- in MODE plant isis in MODE 3. 3.
RCS heatup
- RCS
- heatup and and pressurization pressurization isis in in progress.
progress.
- RCS
- temperature isis 511 RCS temperature 511 of.
°F.
RCS pressure
- RCS
- pressure is is 2100 2100 PSIG.
PSIG.
ONE (1)
- ONE
- safety valve (1) safety valve on on S/G SIG "A" A fails fails partially partially OPEN.
OPEN. When reseats, the When itit reseats, the following following conditions exist:
conditions exist:
RCS temperature
- RCS
- temperature stabilized at 492 of. °F.
RCS pressure
- RCS
- pressure stabilized stabilized at at 1700 1700 PSIG.
PSIG.
S/Gs "S"
- S/Gs
- B and "C" pressures stabilized at 640 PSIG.
C pressures PSIG.
SIG "A"
- S/G
- A pressure is is 520 PSIG PSIG and slowly increasing.
increasing.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions required?
A. Stabilize plant parameters. Allow S/G pressures to equalize prior to raising RCS pressure above 2000 PSIG.
B. Stabilize plant parameters. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
C. Initiate Main Steam Line Isolation. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
D. Initiate Safety Injection. Go to PATH-1. PATH-i.
87 87
013 G2. 1.7 001IESFAS/2/1/4.4/4.7/SROIHIOHJ43.5/SALEM 01302.1.7 00 1/ESFAS/2/ 1/4.4/4.7/SRO/HIGHI43 .5/SALEM - 20011ESF-006
- 200 1/ESF-006 Given the Given the following:
following:
The plant
- The
- plant is is in in MODE MODE 3. 3.
RCS heatup
- RCS
- heatup and and pressurization pressurization isis inin progress.
progress.
RCS temperature
- RCS
- temperature is is 511 511 of.
°F.
RCS pressure
- RCS
- pressure is is 2100 2100 PSIG.
PSIG.
- ONE (1) safety valve on S/G
- SIG "A" A fails partially partially OPEN.
OPEN. When itit reseats, reseats, the following conditions exist:
conditions exist:
RCS temperature stabilized at 492 of.
- RCS
- °F.
- RCS pressure stabilized at 1700
- 1700 PSIG.
B and "c"
- S/Gs "8"
- C pressures stabilized at 640 PSIG.
SIG "A"
- S/G
- A pressure is 520 PSIG and slowly increasing.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions required?
A. Stabilize plant parameters. Allow S/G pressures to equalize prior to raising RCS pressure above 2000 PSIG.
B. Stabilize plant parameters. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
C. Initiate Main Steam Line Isolation. Commence RCS cooldown and depressurization to place the plant in an operational MODE where the safety valve is NOT required.
D Initiate Safety Injection. Go to PATH-1.
D!" PATH-i.
The correct answer is D.
A: Incorrect - Allowing S/G pressures to equalize is appropriate but SI needs to be initiated due to plant conditions.
B:
8: Incorrect - LCO action statement allows Safety Valve to be inoperable for a limited time prior to changing MODES.
C:
C: Incorrect Incorrect - Main
- Main Steam Steam Line Isolation Isolation does NOT NOT isolate isolate the Main Main Steam Steam Line Safety Valves.
D: Correct - - > 100 PSID
>100 PSI D will result in Steamline Delta P P SI and PZR Pressure SI should have occurred at 1715 PSIG. Since NO 1715 PSIG. NO SI actuation hashas occurred, the SRO should direct direct SISI initiation, initiation, and direct entry and direct entry to to the appropriate procedure procedure (PATH-i).
(PATH-1).
Exam Question Exam Number: 87 Question Number: 87
Reference:
SD-006,
Reference:
SD-006, ESF,ESF, Pages Pages 12 12 and and 26, 26, Figure Figure 3;3; GP-007, GP-007, Page Page 25, 25, OMM-022, OMM-022, Page Page 31.
31.
KA Statement:
KA Statement: Ability Ability to to evaluate evaluate plant plant performance performance and and make make operational operational judgments judgments based based on on operating characteristics, operating characteristics, reactor reactor behavior behavior andand instrumentation instrumentation interpretation.
interpretation.
History:
History:
SRO - The SRO - The SRO must determine SRO must plant status, determine plant status, the fact that the fact that no no actuations actuations have have occurred occurred but but should have, and that PATH-1PATH-i still applies applies in MODE MODE 3.
KA Name:
KAName: ESFAS ESFAS Tier/Group:
Tier/Group: 2/1 2/1 Importance Rating:
Importance Rating: 4.4/4.7 4.4/4.7 ROISRO Level:
RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH IOCFR55.43 link:
10CFR55.43 43.5 Source:
Source: SALEM - 2001
- Learning Objective: ESF-006
SD-0066 SD-00 ENGINEERE ENGIN EERED D SAFE SAFET TYY FEAT FEATURES URES SYSTE SYSTEM 4.1.2 Reacto 4.1.2 Reactorr Coolan Coolant Tempe Temperature rature (ESF-F (ESF-Figure-1 igure- 1))
The RCS The RCS LowLow Tavg Tavg signal signal (2(2 of of 33 channe channels below below 543°F) 543°F) isis used used to to initiate initiate the the Safety Safety Injection signal, signal, when when coincid coincident with highhigh steam steam flow; flow; and and close close the the Main Main Steam Steam Isolation Valves,, when Isolati when coincid coincident with with high high steam steam flow flow (i.e.,
(i.e., generate the Steam Steam Line Isolation Signal Isolati Signal).
4.1.3 Steam 4.1.3 Steam Flow Flow (ESF-Figure-1)
Hi Steam Steam Flow (37.25(37.25% % flow at at no load load to 20 20%% load, load, increases linearly to 109 109%% at full load) detecte load) detected by at least one sensor on two of three steam lines, coincid ent with low Tavg (543°F) or low steam line pressu re (614 psig), generates a Safety Injection signal and closes all MSIVs MSIVs.. Two flow controllers on each steam line are used to sense high steam line flow. This circuit is designed to detect steam line breaks downstream of the MSIVs..
MSIVs 4.1.4 Steam Line Pressure (ESF-F igure-1 & & 3)
Steam Line Pressure measuremen rementt is utilized for steam line break protec protecttion.
ion. Low steam line pressure (614 psig) in two of three main steam lines or Low Tavg (543°F) in two of three loops, coincident with high steam line flow in two-of-three main steam lines, will initiate the Steam Line Isolation and Safety Injection signals
. This is to protectt against: a steam line break downstream of the main steam protec check valves, a feed line break, and/or an inadvertent opening of a SG safety.
In addition, each steam line pressure measurement rement is compared with a main steam header pressure measurement rement to determine if a high steam line differential pressure
> exists. A A çorncid
~Qincidenceence of two-of-three steam line differential pressures (100 psid) in any one steam steam line, li!!e, that is, steam line pressure lower than main steam header pressu re, will Safety)njecti initiate a ~fe..ty Injecti~J.l on sigllC:lt signaL The steam header pressure is electronically limited to a minim um value of 585 psig.
Therefore, this SI signal must be blocked before a plant cooldo wn is started to prevent SI actuation when S/G pressures drop below 485 psig(approximately ately 467°F) 467°F).. The steam steam line differential pressure circuit detects faults upstrea upstreamm of the MSIVs MSIVs.. Since the steam line check valves prevent reverse flow to the faulted S/G, excessive steam line differential pressure re does not close close the MSIVs.
4.1.5 Containmentnment Pressure (ESF-Figure-4 & 5) 5)
Containment nment Pressure re measurement rement is utilized utilized to initiate Emergency Core Core Coolin Coolingg in response to aa Loss of of Coolant Accident (LOCA),), and to providee contain containment ment pressu pressure re ESF ESP Page Page 12 12 of of 40 40 Revision Revisi 10 on 10 INF INFOR ORM MA ATITIO ON N US USE E ON ONL LY Y
SD-006 SD-006 ENGINEEREDSAFETY ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURES FEATURESSYSTEM SYSTEM
~ Low Lowpressurizer pressurizerpressure pressureand and biglste i h steam lineI differential differential prssre res sure canh~~edcan be_bicked (provided pressurizer (provided pressurizer pressure pressureisis <<2000 psigon 2000 psig on2/32/3 channels) channels) and andunblocked unblockedusing usingaa threeposition three position(BLOCK, (BLOCK, unmarked unmarked(mid (midposition),
position), UNBLOCK)
UNBLOCK) switch switch located onthe located on the RTGB. These SI initiation RTGB. These SI initiation signals are signals are normally normally blocked blockedduringduring aa plant plant cooldown cooldown whenwhen pressurizerpressure pressurizer pressure isis less less than than 1950 1950 psig.
psig. ~~~lltomatikClllJ'.-
These signals will be aumaticaUy_
~ unblocked when pressurizer pressure isis increased
~
unblocked when pressurizer pressure incr edto2OJOpsi to .---..
2000... psig. g. These
-.-.~~".----
These signals signals can can also also be unblocked with be unblocked with aa switch switch onon the the RTGB.
RTGB. BeforeBefore these these signals signals are are manually manually or or automatically unblocked, automatically unblocked, the the operator operator should should check check to to see see ififthe the bistables bistables forfor these these signals are signals are cleared.
cleared.
6.5.2 High 6.5.2 High Steam Steam Line Line Flow Flow Coincident Coincident with with Low Low Steam Steam LineLine Pressure Pressure or or Low Low Tavg Tavg High steam High steam line line flow flow coincident coincident withwith low low steam steam line line pressure pressure or or low low TTavg avg and and the the Hi-Hi Hi-Hi CV pressure CV pressure SI SI signal signal can can be be blocked blocked (provided (provided thatthat Tavg is < 543 OF Tavg is <543°F on 2/3 channels)on 2/3 channels) and unblocked and unblocked using using aa three three position position (BLOCK, (BLOCK, unmarked unmarked (mid (mid position),
position), UNBLOCK)
UNBLOCK) switch on switch on the the RTGB.
RTGB. ThisThis signal signal isis automatically automatically unblocked unblocked when when Tavg reaches 543 Tavg reaches 543°FOF or can be manually unblocked with or can be manually unblocked with the the switch switch onon the the RTGB.
RTGB. Before Before these these signals signals are are manually or manually or automatically automatically unblocked, the the operator operator should should check check to see if the bistables to see if the for these for these signals are cleared.
7.0 7.0 TECIIMCAL SPECIFICATIONS TECHNICAL SPECifICATIONS ITS 3.3.2 ITS Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Instrumentation ITS ITS 3.3.5 Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentat Instrumentation ion ITS ITS 3.3.6 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentat Instrumentation ion ITS ITS 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Filtration System Actuation Instrumentat Instrumentation ion 8.0 8.0 OPERATION OPERATIONAL AL EVENTS EVENTS 8.1 8.1 Commitmen Commitments ts NONE NONE 8.2 8.2 Plant Plant Specific Specific Events Events (Non-commi tments)
(Non-commitments) 8.2.1 8.2.1 LER LER 88-026,88-026, Inadvertent Inadvertent Safeguard Safeguard Actuation Actuation Brief BriefDescription Description of ofthe the Event:
Event:
Miscommun Miscommunicationication resulted resulted in SI actuation in SI actuation during during preparation preparation for for aa plant plant modification modification. .
ESF ESF Page Page2626ofof40 40 , Revision Revision 1010 INFOR INFORMATION MATION USE USE ONLY ONLY
HIGH HIG H STEA STEAMM LINE DIFFERENTIAL PRE PRESSSU SURREE ESF-F ESF-FIGURE IGURE.-3
-3 High Steam Line Differenti rential Pressure LINE LINEAA LINES LINE B LINE C C
iN tN /EN tN YN tN (N
- 74) 75) 7) 84>) 85) 4)
- 86) 6)
S S 55 S 0-Block Block SI 51 Actuat Actuatio ionn 2/3 2/3 A
Safegu Safeguaards rds Logic INFO INFORM RMA ATITION ON USE ONLY Y
8.2.15 (Cont 8.2.15 (Continue inued d))
INIT NOTE: Adjus NOTE Adjusting PC-444J ting PC-44 4J setpoint poten potentiom tiomeeter ter to 0.0 will reduc reduce e RCS pressure to psig. PC-44 1700 psig. PC-444J controlle 4J contro llerr setpoint shall be adjust adjusted ed SLOW SLOWLY to minim minimizeize the potential poten causing tial for causin PZR insurg g a PZR insurge.e. An insurg insurge e could could occur occur if PC-44 PC-444J 4J setpoint is adjusted adjust ed too quickly.
The PZR cooldo cooldow wnn rate shall be be less than or .equal equal to 200°F 200°F/hr/hr.. The PZR heatup rate shall be less than or equalequal to 100°F100°F/hr/hr.. (TRM (TRMS S 3.4) following The follow ing is a contin continuouousus action action step and shall be perfor performed med when condi condition tionss require.
require.
- 3. IF PZR Surge Surge line tempe temperatu raturere decre decreaseasess AND is not due to the norma normall tempe temperaturature re decre decreasease assoc associate iatedd with depressu depre ssurizrizat ion, THEN stop adjust ation, adjusting ing PC-44 PC-444J 4J setpointint until PZR Surge Surge Line tempetemperatu raturere is increa increasing sing..
- 4. Slowly adjusadjustt PC-44 PC-444J, 4J, PZR PRESPRESS S 444J, 444J, contro controlle llerr setpoint setpo potentiom int poten tiomeeter ter to 0.0 withou withoutt excee exceedinding g 200°F 200°F/hr/hr cooldow cooldo wn n rate on the PZR AND contin continueue with this procedur proce dure. e.
CAUTION prevent To preve nt an SI Actua Actuation tion,, steam line pressure shall not be allowe allowed d to drop below below 485 psig prior to blocki blocking ng the HI STM LINE DP SI Signa Signal.l.
The PZR PRES PRESS/HS/HII STM LINE DP SI Signa Signall will autom automati aticall callyy unblo unblockck if RCS pressure increases increa above 2000 psig.
ses above psig. If this occur occurs, s, the signal signal should should be blocke blockedd when RCS pressure decre decrease ases s below below 2000 psig. psig.
8.2.16 WHEN RCS pressure is less than 2000 psig, 8.2.16 psig, THEN perforperform m the follow ing:
- 1. Displayy the following ERFIS Displa ERFIS points points:: (ACR 93-0 93-00 023))
0023
- RCP RCP0 O49 496D, 6D, LO PRE PRES SSS SI BLOC BLOCK K TRAIN A "A"
- RCPO49 RCP0 497D, 7D, LO PRE PRES SSS SI BLOCK K TRAIN B "B" IGP-007 GP-007 I I Rev. 75 Page 25 of 77771 I
8.3.3 8.3.3 AutomaticActions/Actuations{
Automatic Actions/Actuations{TC TC"Automatic AutomaticActions/Actuations" \f C\l\1"3" Actions/Actuations\fC 3 (RAIL94R0928) (RAIL 94R0928) 1.1. Duringthe During thecourse courseofofan an event, event, should should the thesetpoint setpointfor foran an automaticprotective automatic protective system system actuation actuation be be approached, the approached, the Operat or should , Operator should, if possible, if possible, manually manuallyinitiate initiate the the actuation actuation prior prior to the to the automatic automatic actuation. actuation. IfIf immediate immediate actions actions are in progress are in progress they should they should be be completed completed prior priorto to initiating initiating the the signal, signal, however however this isis not this not considered considered performance performance of of steps steps early early oror out of out of order. order. Example: During Example: During an an RCS RCS leakage leakage transient, transient, after after entry entry to to the the EOP Network, EOP Network, pressure pressure isis slowly slowly decreasing decreasing and and after observing after observing the trend the trend inin RCS RCS pressure pressure itit isis apparent apparent that that RCS RCS makeup makeup can can not keep not keep up up withwith leakage. leakage. As As pressure pressure approaches approaches the the lowlow pressure SI pressure SI setpoint setpoint of of 1715 1715 psig, psig, the the Operator Operator should should manually manually initiate Safety initiate Safety Injection Injection prior prior to to reaching reaching the the setpoint. setpoint.
~2.
- 2. jpç nt for If the setRoint for an an automatic automatic actuation actuation signal lijeis che reached d andand thethe actuati on fails actuation fails to occur, the to occur, the Operator Qperator shouldshould manually manually initiate initiate thethe Signal. (SOER 93-1, Rec 2) .
Example: During the scenario Example: scenario described described above, the Operator Operator pressure has reached notes that pressure reached 1700 psig and a Safety Injection Injection actuation has not occurred, actuation occurred, the Operator Operator should immediately immediately initiate the Safety Injection.Injection. Examp Example: le: If an MSIV does not autom automatically atically close from aa valid valid signal and the RTGB contro controll switch does not operate operate,, thenthen depres depressing sing the Steam Line Isolati Isolation pushbutton on pushbu tton for that MSIV MSIV should be be perform performed. ed. Examp Example: le: IfIf aa CV CV Ventil ation Isolati Ventilation Isolation should have on should have occurr occurred, then ed, then depres depressing sing the the HIGH HIGH VOLT VOLTS OFF on S OFF R-11 or on fl-il or R-12 R-12 maymay be be succes successful.sful. OMM-022 IOMM-022 Rev. Rev.29 29 Page31 Page 31 ofof54541
SALEM FOXT SALEM FOXTRO ROTT 2001 NRC 2001 NRC WRITT WRITTE EN N EXAM EXAMIN INATIATIO ON N WORKSH WORK SHEET EET Question Questi on SRO 86 SR08 6 Number: Numbe r: Question: Questio n: Unit 22 isis in Unit in MODE MODE 33 duringduring aa plant plant startup startup.. RCS RCS heatup heatup and and pressur pressuriza ization tion isis in in progres progress. s.
- Tave isis5ll
- Tave 511 degF deg F
*. RCS pressur RCS pressure e isis 1850 1850 psig psig One safety One safety valvevalve onon 2222 SGSG fails fails partiall partially open. When y open. When itit isis reseate reseated, d, the the follow followinging conditi conditiononss exist:
exist:
** Tave isis 492 Tave 492 degdeg FF
** RCS pressur RCS pressure is 1700 e is 1700 psig psig
** 21, 23, 24 21,23, 24 SGs SOs are are 640 640 psig psig
** 22SG 22 SG is52 is 520 Opsi psig g
** All parame All paramete rs are STABL ters STABLE E Which one of the follow Which following describes ing describ es all of the actions actions require required? d?
A. Stabilize Stabili plant parame ze plant paramete rs. Restor ters. Restoree OPERA OPERAB BILITY ILITY of the affecte affected d safety valve and allow SG pressurpressures equalizee prior to raising es to equaliz raising RCS pressur pressuree above above the P-ll P-li setpoin setpointt B. Stabilize Stabili plant parame ze plant paramete rs. Comm ters. Commen encece RCS cooldo cooldow wn n and depres depressusurizat rization to place plant in an operati the plant operation onalal MODE MODE wher wheree the safety safety valve valve is not require requiredd C. Initiate Main Steam Initiate Steam Line IsolatioIsolation.
- n. Comm Commen ence ce RCS cool cooldodowwnn and depress depressu urizatio rizationn to place the plan plantt in an operati operationonal al MODE MODE where where the safety safety valv valvee is not requ requireiredd D. Initiate Safety Injectio Initiate Injectionn and Main Steam Line Isola Isolatio n. Go to EOP tion. EOP-T-TRI RIP-l, P- 1, REA REAC CTOTORR TRIP OR SAF SAFET ETY Y INJE INJEC CTIO TION N Answer: D Justi ficat Justific ion:
ation: 120 psid will resul 120 resultt in strea streammlinlinee Delt Deltaa P SI and MSL MSLI. I. Sinc Since e no actua actuati ons have occu tions occurre d, the rred, SRO shou should ld direc directt initia initiatitions ons,, and direc directt entry entry to the appr appropopriariate proced te proc edurure. (TRIP-
- e. (TRI I).
P-i). Tier/ Tier/GGrou roupp ill 111 10CFR 10CFR55.4155.41 43.5 43.5 beca becaus usee the the SRO SRO mus mustt deter determ mine ine plan plantt statu status, s, the the fact thatthat no no actua actuattions ions have have 10CFR 55.43 occu occurr rred ed but shou ld have should have,, and that that TRIP TRIP--i! still still appl 10CFR55.43 applie s in MOD ies in MODE E 33 Bank BanklN /Newew/ ! New New Mod Modifiified ed K/A KlA#: #: 040A 040AA A2.02.04 4 Abil ity to Ability to deter determ mineine oror inter interpr pret et cond conditi ition ons requiri s requ ng ESF iring ESFAS initiati AS initia tionon K/A KIA Valu Valueses:: 4.7 4.7 Cog nitiv Cognit ivee Anal Analysysisis Level: Level: Refe renc Refere es: nces: NOSO NOS05 5FLUN FLUNCY-00 CY-00,, Obje Object ctive ive 2.c2.c and and 2.k 2.k LP PROC LP PROCEDO2 ED02,, Obj Obj 44
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 88. The cavitating
- 88. The venturi is cavitating venturi designed to is designed to limit limit maximum maximum flow flow from from the the SDAFW SDAFW Pump Pump to to aa faulted faulted S/G to less S/G to less than than 630 630 GPM GPM.....
A. to prevent A. to prevent water water hammer hammer on on the the S/G feed ring. S/G feed ring. B. ensure adequate B. to ensure adequate NPSHNPSH is is available to MDAFW MDAFW Pumps. Pumps. ensure that ReS C. to ensure RCS cooldown rates rates are NOT NOT exceeded. D. to D. to prevent SDAFW SDAFW Pump Pump runout during low runout during low S/G SIG pressure conditions. 88 88
061 G2. 1.27 001/AFW/2/1/3.9/4.0/SROILOW/43.1INEW 061 G2.1.27 00 1/AFW/21113 .9/4.OISRO/L0W143. 1/NEW - 2008/AFW-002
- 2008/AFW-002 The cavitating The cavitating venturi venturi isis designed designed toto limit limit maximum maximum flow flow from from the the SDAFW SDAFW PumpPump to faulted to aa faulted S/G to less than 630 GPM S/G to less than 630 GPM .....
A. to prevent A. to prevent water water hammer hammer on the S/G on the feed ring. S/G feed ring. B. to ensure B. to ensure adequate adequate NPSH NPSH isis available available to to MDAFW MDAFW Pumps. Pumps. C. to ensure C. to ensure thatthat RCS RCS cooldown cooldown rates rates are NOT exceeded. are NOT exceeded. D to DY to prevent prevent SDAFW SDAFW Pump Pump runout runout during during lowlow S/G pressure conditions. S/G pressure conditions. The correct The correct answer answer is is D. D. A: Incorrect - S/G is already hot and SDAFW Pump flow is less than original flow from feedwater system. Inverted J tubes on the feed ring ring aid in preventing preventing water hammer. B: Incorrect - The SD and MDAFW Pumps do have a combined suction line, however SDAFW Pump flow will NOT impact MDAFW Pump NPSH due to the size of the combined suction line. C: Incorrect - The faulted S/G has caused excessive RCS Cooldown, limiting SDAFW Pump flow will maintain the SDAFW Pump available for service. D: Correct - - The SDAFW Pump may experience pump runout if a faulted S/G SIG is at a low pressure and flow is NOT limited by the venturi. Exam Question Number: 88
Reference:
USFAR, Section 10.4.8-1. KA Statement: Knowledge of system purpose and/or function. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO - understandin understanding g conditions of the facility license. KA Name: AFW Tier/Group: 2/1 Importance Rating: 3.9/4.0 3.9/4.0 RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: LOW 10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link: 43.1 Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - Learning Objective: AFW-002
HBR HBR 22 UPDATED UPDATED FSAR FSAR 10.4.8 Auxiliary 10.4.8 Auxiliary Feedwater Feedwater System System 10.4.8.1 Design 10.4.8.1 Design Basis Basis The design The design parameters parameters for for the the auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater system system components components are are shown shown on Table on Table 10.4.8-1. 10.4.8-1. The The auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater systemsystem is is designed designed and and constructed constructed in accordance in accordance withwith the the Seismic Seismic Class Class II requirements requirements presented presented in in Section Section 3.2.3.2. 10.4.8.2 System 10.4.8.2 System Description Description The flow The flow diagram diagram forfor the the auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater system system is is included included with with thethe condensate condensate and and feedwater feedwater flow flow diagram diagram Figures Figures 10.1.0-4, 10.1.0-4, 10.1.0-5, 10.1.0-5, and and 10.1.0-6. 10.1.0-6. The auxiliary The auxiliary feedwater feedwater system system can can provide provide feedwater feedwater to to the the steam steam generators generators from anyone from any one oror combination combination of of three three auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater (AFW)(AFW) pumps, pumps, two two are are motor driven motor driven pumps pumps andand the the third third is is steam steam driven. driven. Two motor Two motor driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pumps pumps areare supplied supplied power from from thethe emergency busses E-1 and emergency and E-2. The emergency emergency busses also also supply supply power to the the motor driven motor driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pump's pumps discharge discharge isolation isolation valvesvalves and and the the steam driven steam driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pump's pumps steam supply and feedwater discharge discharge isolation valves. The emergency
. isolation emergency busses are supplied supplied power either either from from offsite or plant diesel generators. The steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump can can bebe operated independent of electrical ~ower operated power where steam produced from decay heat heat drives the drives the turbine. The auxiliary feedwater pum~s pumps supply feedwater to the steam generators for decay heat removal if main feedwater is not available or or steam generator steam generator level is not adequate, as described below. The auxiliary feedwater pumps can be used to fill the steam generators under any plant feedwater condition, except that the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump requires the the plant to be heated up above 350°F, and the motor driven AFW pumps require power.
power. Upon Upon receipt receipt of an auto start signal signal to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, pump, the steam supply valves will open supplying steam to drive the the turbine-turbine-pump. pump. At the same time, the feedwater discharge valves open to to the the steam steam generators. generators. The turbine-pump builds up speed and supplies 'feedwater feedwater to the the steam generators. generators .. A cavitating cavitating venturi is located in the discharge piping of the steam driven I auxiliary feedwater pump. Its function is to prevent excess flow from the pump
~ump into into aa low low pressure steam steam generator generator in in the case case of of aa failed discharge I flow control flow control valve. This This prevents prevents excessexcess mass/flow mass/flow into containment during during aa I main main steamline steamline break break and prevents prevents steam steam driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater pump pump (junout.
runout. Upon Upon receipt receipt of an auto of an auto start start signal signal to to the the motor motor driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater pumps, pumps, the the feedwater feedwater discharge discharge valves valves openopen while while thethe motor motor isis accelerating accelerating up up to speed to speed and and supplies supplies feedwater feedwater to to the the steam steam generators. generators. . The motor The motor driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pumps 'pumps are are supplied supplied with with bearing bearing cooling cooling water water from from the the service service water water system. system. The The SDAFW SDAFW pump pump is is self-cooled self-cooled using using water water from from the the CST. CST. The The capacity capacity of of the the steam steam driven driven auxiliary auxiliary feedwater feedwater pump pump isis based based on on preventing preventing thethe water water level level in in the the steam steam generators generators from from receding receding below below thethe lowest lowest level level within within thethe indicated indicated level level range range in in the the event event of of aa loss loss of of offsite offsite power. power. ThisThis will will prevent prevent the the tube tube sheet sheet from from being being uncovered. uncovered. AA signal signal indicating indicating aa low low lowlow steam steam generatorwat generator water level in er level in any any twotwo steam steam generators generators or or aa direct direct signal signal of of undervoltage undervoltage on on 4160 4160 buses buses 11 and and 44 will will automatically automatically startstart the the steam steam driven driven AFW AFW pump pump byby opening opening steamsteam admission admission valves and auxiliary valves and auxiliary feedwater feedwater discharge discharge valvesvalves to to individual individual steam steam generators. generators. The The initiating initiating signalssignals for for starting starting the the motor motor driven driven AFN AFW pumps pumps 10.4.8-1 10.4.8-1 Revision No. Revision No. 15 15
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam Given the
- 89. Given
- 89. following:
the following: Instrument Air
- Instrument
- Air Compressor Compressor "0" D is tagged out is tagged out for for maintenance.
maintenance. The Primary
- The
- Primary AirAir Compressor Compressor (PAC) (PAC) isis running.
running. Oil intrusion
- Oil
- intrusion has has plugged plugged the PAC PAC Air Dryer.
Dryer. IA header
- IA
- header pressure pressure is is at at 75 75 PSIG PSIG and and decreasing.
Which ONE Which ONE (1)(1) of of the following is the following is the the required required procedural procedural action action lAW lAW AOP-017, AOP-O1 7, LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT AIR? IA-47, TURBINE BUILDING A. SHUT IA-47, BUILDING ISOLATION ISOLATION to reduce reduce air loss. loss. IA-662, IA B. OPEN IA-662, IA BACK-UP CV QCV-10374 QCV-1 0374 ISOLATION ISOLATION Valve to cross-connect Condensate Polishing Air with IA. C. OPEN IA-3859, PAC DRYER BYPASS. D. Verify the Station Air Compressor is running and OPEN SA-220 and 221, STATION AIR TO INSTRUMENT AIR CROSS-CONNECT. 89 89
078 A2.0l A2.0 1 OOI/INSTRUMENT 00 1/INSTRUMENT AIRI2/l/2.412.9/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW AIRI2/1/2.4/2.9/SRO/HIGHI43 .5/NEW - 2008/AOP-017-006
- 2008/AOP-0 17-006 Given the following:
Instrument Air Compressor "0"
- Instrument - D is tagged out for maintenance. - The Primary Air Compressor (PAC) is running. - Oil intrusion has plugged the PAC Air Dryer. - IA header pressure is at 75 PSIG and decreasing.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the required procedural action lAW AOP-017, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR? A. SHUT IA-47, TURBINE BUILDING ISOLATION to reduce air loss. B. OPEN IA-662, IA BACK-UP CV QCV-10374 ISOLATION Valve to cross-connect Condensate Polishing Air with IA. C. OPEN IA-3859, PAC DRYER BYPASS. D Verify the Station Air Compressor is running and OPEN SA-220 and 221, STATION AIR DY' TO INSTRUMENT AIR CROSS-CONNECT. The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect - Shutting IA-47 will isolate ALL IA to the Turbine Building, and is NOT an action lAW AOP-017. B: Incorrect - The Condensate Polishing Air system is normally cross-connected to lA,
- IA, this valve is normally OPEN and is closed to separate the systems during AOP-017AOP-O1 7 actions.
C: Incorrect - NO AOP-017
- AOP-O1 7 guidance exists for opening the PAC dryer bypass.
D: 0: Correct - - As the first attempt to maintain IA header pressure, AOP-O1 AOP-017 7 actions cross-connect SA to IA. Exam Question Number: 89
Reference:
AOP-O1 AOP-017, 7, Pages 4 and 5; SD-O1 7, Instrument Air, Figures 1 SD-017, 1 and 4. KA Statement: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the lAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Air dryer and filter malfunctions. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO - Requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of appropriate actions lAW station procedures.
KA Name: KAName: INSTRUMENT AIR INSTRUMENT AIR Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 2/1 2/1 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 2.4/2.9 2.4/2.9 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: AOP-017-006 AOP-017-006
Rev. Rev. 35 35 AOP-017 AOP- 017 LOSS LOSS OFOF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page Page 44 of of 61 61 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I H RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I 1.
- 1. Check Plant Check Plant Status Status - MODE MODE 11 OR Go Go To Step 4:
To Step 4. MODE 22 MODE
- 2.
- 2. Check IA Check IA Header Header Pressure Pressure - LESS
- LESS IF IE IA IA pressure pressure decreases decreases to to less less THAN 60 THAN 60 PSIG PSIG than than 60 60 psig, psig, THEN THEN Go Go To To Step Step 3.
3. Go Go To To Step Step 4. 4. 3.
- 3. Perform The Perform The Following:
Following:
- a. Trip
- a. Trip the the Reactor Reactor PATH-l, while
- b. Go To PATH-I, continuing with this procedure continuing
- 4. Verify Instrument Air Compressor DD - RUNNING
- 5. Verify The Primary Air Compressor - RUNNING
~
- 6.
- 6. Check IA Header Pressure - LESS-IF IA pressure decreases to less THAN THAN 80 PSIG than 80 psig, psig. THEN observe NOTE prior to Steps 77 and 88 and perform Steps 77 and 8.
Observe the NOTE Prior ToTo Step 99 and Go To Step 9.
Rev. Rev. 35 35 AOP-O17 AOP-017 LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR Page 55 of Page of 61 61
STEP H____ INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED IA-3821 is located on IA Dryer D~
.7* ~ 7. Dispatch Operator Dispatch Operator(s) (s) ToTo Perform Perform The Following:
The Following:
~ a. a. Verify Verify Station Station Air Air Compressor Compressor a.
- a. Go Go To To Step Step 7.c.
7.c.
- IN SERVICE
- SERVICE WITH DISCHARGE DISCHARGE VALVE OPEN VALVE OPEN
~
- b. b. Verify the following SA TO IA b. Open SA-5, STATION AIR TO TO CROSS CONNECT BYPASS FILTER INST AIR CROSS CONNECT.
ISOLATION Valves - OPEN:-
->.It _* SA-220 SA-22O
. SA-221
- c. Verify IA-18,IA-iS, .AIRAIR DRYER "A" A & &
B BYPASS - OPEN "B" - d.
- d. Verify the following Compressors - RUNNING
*- STATION STATION AIR COMP
*- INST INST AIR AIR COMP COMP AA
*- INST INST AIR AIR COMP COMP BB e.
- e. Check Check FCV-174O.
FCV-1740, AIR AIR DRYER DRYER e. Open
- e. Open IA-3665, IA-3665, AIR AIR DRYER "A" &&
DRYER A HIGH DP HIGH DP FLOW CONTROL Valve FLOW CONTROL Valve - - BYPASS.
"B" BYPASS.
B OPEN OPEN f.
- f. OpenOpen IA-3821, IA-3821, INSTRUME INSTRUMENT AIR NT AIR DRYER DRYER D BYPASS "D" BYPASS
IA IA A& A& BB COMPRESSOR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE PACKAGE AIR-FIGURE-l AIR-FIGURE-i FILTER 23 SW 200 SCFM IA AIR RECEIVER SUPPLY HEADER F I LTER SW -6
-c fr~ER I I DR1ERI---"
200SCFM SCFM 200 INFORMATION INFORMATIONUSE USEONLY ONLY
STATION AIR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE AIR-FIGURE-4 AIR-FIGURE-4 CONSTRUCTION AIR CROSS-CONNECT SA-37 SA-270 400 SCFM 400SCfM AIR RECEIVER AFTERCOOLER It---t SA FILTER ~---a:::c::
...- " "I SEPARATOR i I .. DISTRIBUTION HEADER 0 1 150 FT3 SERVICE WATER -
.. ..-.-------~--
)
SERVICE WATER TO IAA & B AIR DRYERS SA-5 REF. DWG: G- 90200 SHEET 3 G-1190200 INFORMATION USE ONLY
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 90. Given the
- 90. Given the following:
following: The plant
- The
- plant is is operating operating at at 50% RTP.
50% RTP. Power ascension
- Power
- ascension in progress lAW in progress GP-005, POWER lAW GP-005, OPERATION, following POWER OPERATION, following aa refueling refueling outage.
During paperwork
- During
- paperwork reviews, reviews, Maintenance Maintenance Supervision Supervision has has discovered that the the blind blind flange flange on the on the Refueling Refueling Transfer Transfer Tube Tube was installed installed but but has has NOT NOT been been properly properly torqued.
torqued.
- The Containment has been declared INOPERABLE and the plant must be placed in in MODE 3 within 6 hours.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the required Notification Notification to be made to agencies or organizations outside of the RNP organization? A. Load dispatcher must be notified of LCO condition that affects the unit output. B. State and County Emergency Operation Centers must be notified of a potential breach of Containment that may impact off-site doses in the event of an RCS leak. C. NRC Operations Center must be notified PRIOR to initiation of any Tech Spec required shutdown. D. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) must be notified of a breach of the Primary Reactor Containment. 90 90
103 G2.4.20 OOllCONTAINMENT/2/112.7/4.lISROILOW/43.5INEW 103 00 1/CONTAINMENT/2/1/2.7/4. 1/SRO/LOW/43 .5/NEW - 2008/0MM-007-002
- 2008/OMM-007-002 Given the following:
RTP.
- The plant is operating at 50% RTP.
- Power ascension in progress lAW GP-005, POWER
- POWER OPERATION, following a refueling outage.
- During paperwork reviews, Maintenance Supervision has discovered that the blind flange on the Refueling Transfer Tube was installed but has NOT been properly torqued.
- The Containment has been declared INOPERABLE and the plant must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the required Notification to be made to agencies or organizations outside of the RNP organization? A':I A Load dispatcher must be notified of LCO condition that affects the unit output. B. State and County Emergency Operation Centers must be notified of a potential breach of Containment that may impact off-site doses in the event of an RCS leak. c. C. NRC Operations Center must be notified PRIOR to initiation of any Tech Spec required shutdown. D. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) must be notified of a breach of the Primary Reactor Containment. The correct answer is A. A: Correct - - OMM-007 requires that load dispatcher be notified of any LCO that can affect load. B: Incorrect - State and County EOCs are notified when the plant enters EAL condition reportable events. C: Incorrect - NRC Operations Center is notified per AP-030 of reportable events, but does NOT have to be notified PRIOR to initiation of plant shutdown. D: Incorrect - ANI is notified of any declared emergency at an Alert level or higher. Exam Question Number: 90
Reference:
AP-030, Pages 11 and 12; 12; OMM-007, Pages 13, 13, 23, 28, 31. KA Statement: Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO - Requires evaluation of station reporting requirements.
KA Name: KAName: CONTAINMENT CONT AINMENT Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 2/1 2/1 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 2.7/4.1 2.7/4.1 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: OMM-007-002 OMM-007-002
9.0 9.0 PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NOTES: The NOTES: The NRC NRC shall shall be notified of be notified of those those non-emergency non-emergency events events discovered discovered andand reportable in accordance with 10 CFR reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 50.73 within within three three years years from from the time the time that that the the event event occurred. occurred. IfIf more more than than three three years years have have lapsed lapsed before before the the event event isis discovered, discovered, the the event event need need not not be be reported. reported. IfIf the the event event was was aa condition condition reportable reportable by Technical Specifications by Technical Specifications andand the the Technical Technical Specifications Specifications havehave since since been been amended amended to remove the requirement, the event need to remove the requirement, the event need not be reported. not be reported. NUREG-1022 provides NUREG-1022 provides clarifications clarifications forfor 10 10 CFR CFR 50.72 50.72 and and 1010 CFR CFR 50.73. 50.73. The NRC The Operations Center NRC Operations Center may may bebe contacted contacted via via the the NRC NRC Emergency Emergency Telecommun ications System (ETS) Telecommunications System (ETS) telephones. The telephones. The commercial commercial telephone telephone system system may also may also be be used. used. TheThe NRC NRC Operations Operations Center Center telephone telephone numbers numbers are are found found inin the the ERO ERO Telephone Book and in Attachment 11.13 of Book and in Attachment 11.13 of this procedure. procedure. Attachment 11.13, Attachment 11.13, Event Event Notification Notification Worksheet, should be completed for each one-hour hour or four-hour Report of a significant event made to the NRC in accordance with this procedure. procedure. When making an immediate notification, the caller shall identify: (i) The Emergency Class declared; or (i) (ii) The paragraph of 10 CFR 50.72 requiring notification of the Non-Emergency Non-Emergency Event. 9.1 Immediate and One-Hour Notifications 9.1 .1 Notifications listed in Attachment 11.1 9.1.1 11.1 shall be performed immediately and no later than one hour following the event to the NRC NRC locations locations specified in in the attachment. This attachment attachment is organized organized by subject (left handhand column) column) asas follows:
- Notification Notification requirements requirements of of 10 10 CFR CFR 50.72 50.72
** 10 CFR 10 CFR 50.36 50.36 Notification Notification Requirement Requirements s
** Security/Safe guards Notification Security/Safeguards Notification Requirement Requirements from 10 s from 10 CFR CFR 73 73
** Source, Source, byprodut byproduct material, material, and and SNMSNM notification notification requirements requirements of of 10 CFR 10 CFR 30,30, 40, 40, and and 7070
** ISFSI ISFSI Notifications Notifications
** SNM SNM Shipments Shipments Notification Notification Requirement Requirements s
** Follow-up Follow-up Notifications Notifications IAP-030 AP-030 Rev Rev 40 40 Page 111 Page of 57 1 of 57
** Notifications to Notifications to NRC NRC Region Region IIII from from 1010 CFR CFR 20,20, 30 30 and and 4040 requirements requirements
** FED Notification FFD Notification Requirements Requirements
** IAEA Notification IAEA Notification Requirements Requirements 9.2 9.2 Four Hour Four Hour Notifications Notifications Notifications listed Notifications listed inin Attachment Attachment 11.2 11.2 shall shall be be performed performed no no later later than than four four hours after the hours after the event event or or discovery discovery of the condition of the condition to to the the NRC NRC locations locations specified specified inin the the attachment.
attachment. 9.3 9.3 Eight Hour Eight Hour Notifications Notifications Notifications listed Notifications listed inin Attachment 11 11.3
.3 shall be performed no later than eight hours hours after event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified the event in the attachment.
9.4 Twenty-Four Hour Notifications Notifications listed in Attachment 11.4 shall be performed no later than twenty-four hours after the event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified in the attachment. 9.5 Two-Working Day Notifications Two-Working Notifications listed in Attachment 11 11.5.5 shall be performed no later later. than two working days after the event or discovery of the condition to the NRC locations specified in the attachment. 9.6 Thirty-Day Notifications/Reports Notifications/Reports The notifications/reports notifications/reports listed in Attachment 11 .6 shall be performed no later 11.6 than thirty days after the event or discovery of the condition by either phone notification or written report as specified. 9.7 Licensee Event Reports HBRSEP HBRSEP shall shall submit submit an an LER LER for anyany event event ofof the type described described in in Attachment 11.7 11.7 within 60 days days after the discovery of of the event. event. In In the case of an invalid actuation actuation reported under under 10 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i 50.73(a)(2)(iv),v), other than actuation other actuation of of the the reactor protection protection system system (RPS) (RPS) when when thethe reactor reactor isis critical, critical, HBRSEP HBRSEP may, at may, at its its option, option, provide aa telephone notification to the the NRC NRC Operations Center Center within 60 days after 60 days after discovery discovery of of the the event event instead instead ofof submitting submitting aa written written LER. LER. Unless Unless otherwise otherwise specified specified in in this this section, section, the the HBRSEP HBRSEP shall shall report report anan event event ifif itit occurred occurred within within three three years years of of the the date date of of discovery, discovery, regardless regardless of of the the plant plant mode mode or or power power level, level, and and regardless regardless of of the the significance Significance of of the the structure, structure, system, system, oror component component that that initiated initiated the the event. event. This This attachment attachment is is organized organized by by subject subject as as follows: follows: IAP-030 AP-030 Rev Rev 4040 12 of Page 12 Page of 57 57
8.2.6 (Continued) 8.2.6 (Continued)
- Item 44 - Enter Item - Enterthe the maximum maximum time time the the equipment equipment isis allowed allowed to to be be inoperable inin the inoperable applicable blank.
the applicable blank. Circle Circle hrs/days hrs/days as as they apply to they apply to the Special Report. the Special Report.
- Item 55 - Enter Item - Enter thethe Time Time AND AND Date Date that that item item 44 isis required required inin the the applicable blank.
applicable blank. NOTE: NOTE: ODCM required ODCM required compensatory compensatory actions actions and and initial initial sampling sampling lack lack aa "grace grace period. period".
- Item 66 - Enter Item - Enter anyany applicable applicable surveillances surveillances or or activities activities andand required required frequencies which frequencies which are are required required asas aa result result of of the the component component inoperability.
inoperability. Examples: Examples: ITS LCO "ITS LCO 3.2.4 3.2.4 REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION ACTION A.3 requiresrequires SR SR 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.2.1 3.2.1.1 3.2.2.1 once once per per 7 days." days. ITS LCO 3.6.3 REQUIRED ACTION A.2 requires the "ITS the affected penetration flow path verified isolated once per 31 days for isolation devices outside CV." CV. TRM TRMS 3.11 REQUIRED COMPENSATORY "TRM COMPENSATORY MEASURE requires obtaining and analyzing grab samples once per 24 hours thereafter, when degassing is not in progress." progress. 8.2.7 IF the component is an ITS Support System component, THEN perform Attachment 10.11,10.11, which is provided to ensure Safety Function Determinatio Determinations ns are performed consistently. The TRM contains in-depth guidance for performing Safety Function Determinatio Determinations. ns. [CAPR 193057] 193057] 8.2.8 8.2.8 IF IF the the component component is is an an ITS ITS Supported Supported System System Component, Component, THEN THEN review review openopen Loss Loss of of Safety Safety Function Function Worksheets Worksheets (Attachment (Attachment 10.11)10.11) forfor impact. {CAPR impact. [CAPR 193057] 193057]
> 8.2.9 "7 8.2.9 Initial Initial the the blank blank in in Section Section H "H" when when the the Load Load Dispatcher Dispatcher has has been been notified when the component notified when the component inoperability inoperability could could force force plant plant shutdown shutdown or or load load reduction.
reduction. [SOER [SOER 99-1, 99-1, Rec. Rec. 10] 1C] 8.2.10 8.2.10 Initial Initial the the blank blank in in Section Section I "I" when when Planning Planning andand Scheduling Scheduling has has been been notified notified when when ITS/TRM/OD ITSITRM/ODCM/RG CM/RG 1.97 1.97 actions actions have have beenbeen entered entered andand plant plant shutdown shutdown isis anticipated. anticipated. OMM-007 IOMM-007 I Rev. Rev. 7676 Page 13 Page 13 of of 85 851 I
8.6.3.2 (Continued) 8.6.3.2 (Continued)
- Review plant Review plant logs, logs, EIRs, EIRs, and and scheduled scheduled work work activities activities since since the Engineering the Engineering memo memo was was initiated initiated to to assure assure any any maintenance that maintenance that was was performed performed on on the the listed listed heat heat exchangers DID NOT exchangers DID NOT involve involve tube tube plugging plugging and and that that the the components are components are OPERABLE OPERABLE AND AND thethe SSO SSO OR OR the the CRSS CRSS will will sign when the initial check sign when the initial check isis completed.
completed.
- Record completion Record completion of of reviews reviews andand equipment equipment checkschecks inin Auto Auto Log Log 8.6.4 8.6.4 Place the Place the unit in the unit in appropriate Mode the appropriate Mode as as required required byby ITS ITS LCO LCO 3.7.8 3.7.8 REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTIONS ifif the above requirements the above requirements are are not not met.
met. 8.6.5
.-78.6.5 Initial the blank in Section Initial Section "C" C when the Load Load Dispatcher Dispatcher has been been notified of the REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION entry which could force plant shutdown or load reduction.
8.6.6 Initial the blank in Section "0" D when Planning and Scheduling has been notified plant shutdown is anticipated. 8.6.7 Once every 12 hours, Section "E" E is completed as follows: Verify the affected document revisions are current with the memo AND the SSO OR the CRSS will sign when the check is completed. Review plant logs, EIRs, and scheduled work activities for the previous 12 hours to assure no maintenance was performed on the listed heat exchangers that would affect OPERABILI OPERABILITY TY AND that the components are OPERABLE AND the SSO OR the CRSS will sign when the check is completed. Record completion of checks in Auto Log. OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev. 7676 Page 23 Page 23 of of 85 851
8.9.10 IF 8.9.10 the inoperable IF the inoperable component component isis aa Radiation Radiation Monitor, Monitor, Flowrate Flowrate Monitor Monitoror or Tank Level Monitor, THEN Tank Level Monitor, THEN notify notify E&C E&C.. 8.9.11 IF
.---;> 8.9.11 the component IF the component inoperability inoperability could could force force aa plant plant shutdown shutdown or or load load reduction, THEN reduction, THEN notify notify the the Load Load Dispatcher.
Dispatcher. [SOER [SOER 99-1, 99-1, Rec. C] Rec. 1101 8.9.12 IF 8.9.12 ITSITRM!ODCM/RG 1.97 IF ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 actions actions have have been been entered AND aa plant entered AND plant shutdown isis anticipated, shutdown anticipated, THEN THEN notify notify Planning Planning and and Scheduling. Scheduling. 8.9.13 WHEN 8.9.13 WHEN the the equipment equipment isis returned returned to to service service OROR the the equipment equipment isis nono longer required longer required due due to to aa change change in in plant plant conditions, THEN perform conditions, THEN perform thethe following: following: IF the equipment IF the equipment isis declared declared operable, THEN perform operable, THEN perform the the following: following: oo Enter in Enter in AUTO AUTO log.log. oo IF the equipment IF the equipment is is aa Radiation Radiation Monitor, Monitor, Flowrate Flowrate Monitor Monitor oror Tank Tank Level Monitor, Level Monitor, THEN THEN notify notify E&C. E&C.
- IF the equipment is no no longer required, required, THEN enter the reason reason inin AUTO log (such as, MODE 5 entered).
[ OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev. 7676 Page 28 Page 28 of of 85 851
ATTACHMENT 10.1 ATTACHMENT 10.1 Page 2 Page 2 of of 22 EIR - ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 EIR - ITSfTRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 F. IF F. this isis an IF this an ITS ITS Support Support System System Component, Component, THEN perform Attachment THEN perform Attachment 10.11. 10.11. [CAPR 193057] [CAPR 1 93057j G. IF G. IF this this isis an an ITS ITS Supported Supported System System Component, Component, THEN THEN review review open open Loss Loss ofof Safety Safety Function Function Worksheets (Attachment Worksheets (Attachment 10.11)10.11) forfor impact. impact. ~ H. Load Dispatcher H. Load Dispatcher notified notified of of REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION ACTION which which could could force force plant plant shutdown/load shutdown/load reduction. reduction. Initials) [SOER (SSO/CRSS Initials) [SOER 99-1, 99-1, Rec. Rec. 11 C] C] I.I. Planning and Planning and Scheduling Scheduling notified notified toto develop develop Forced Forced Outage Outage Schedule Schedule ifif ITS/TRM/OD ITSITRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 CM/RG 1.97 actionsactions are entered AND are entered plant shutdown AND plant shutdown anticipated. anticipated. _ _ _ _ _ _(SSO/CRSS (SSO/CRSS Initials)Initials) J. IF J. this EIR IF this EIR isis for for aa Radiation Radiation Monitor, Monitor, Flowrate Flowrate Monitor Monitor or or Tank Tank Level Level Monitor, Monitor, THEN THEN notify notify E&C of equipment E&C of equipment inoperability:inoperability : Time _ _ _ _ Date Date _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ E&C Shift E&C Shift Technician Technician (Print (Print name) name) K. IF a Maintenance Rule System Function is affected, THEN record Allowed Unavailability Unavailability Unavailability Hours, and Unavailability Hours, Actual Unavailability Unavailability Hours Remaining. _ _Hours Allowed - - Hours Actual =
= Hours Remaining IF unplanned and less than 72 Hours remaining, THEN notify the RES Duty Manager.
Name Date Time L. Completed By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SSO/CRSS Date M. Comments: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ N. Restoration N. 1.
- 1. Equipment operable: Time _ _ _ _ Date _ _ __
- 2. IF this EIR is for a Radiation Monitor, Flowrate Monitor IF Monitor or Tank Level Monitor, THEN notify E&C E&C of equipment return to service:
Time ____ Date Date _ _ __ E&C E&C Shift Shift Technician Technician (Print (Print Name) Name) 3.
- 3. Equipment Equipment no no longer longer required due due toto plant plant conditions:
Time Time Date _ _ __ Date Reason: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Reason: 4.
- 4. Completed By:
Completed By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ SSO/CRSS SSO/CRSS Date Date OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev. 7676 31 of Page 31 Page 851 of 85
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written ExamExam
- 91. Given
- 91. Given the the following:
following: The Plant
- The
- Plant isis inin MODE MODE 33 at 547 of at 547 following aa reactor
°F following reactor trip trip from from 100%
100% RTP. RTP.
- RCS
- chemistry sample RCS chemistry sample indicates indicates DOSE DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131 1-131 isis 73 73 Micro-Curies/gram.
Micro-Curies/gram. Which ONE Which ONE (1) of the (1) of the following following applies to the applies to the current current condition, condition, andand thethe basis basis for for that that requirement? requirement? A. Be A. Be inin MODE MODE 44 within within 48 48 hours, hours, to to place place the the plant plant inin aa MODE MODE wherewhere the the 1-131 1-131 limit limit isis NOT NOT APPLICABL APPLICABLE. E. B. Reduce B. Reduce TTAVO AVG to 500 of to << 500 within 66 hours,
°F within hours, toto ensure ensure RCS RCS saturation saturation pressure pressure isis below below the the S/G Safety Valve lift S/G Safety Valve lift setpoint. setpoint.
C. Be C. Be inin MODE MODE 44 within within 66 hours, hours, toto place place the the plant plant in in aa MODE MODE wherewhere thethe 1-131 1-131 limit limit isis NOT NOT APPLICABLE. APPLICABLE. D. Reduce D. Reduce TTAVG AVG to < < 500 of °F within 6 hours, to ensure RCS saturation pressure is is below the S/G PORV lift setpoint. 91 91
002 G2.2.40 002 G2.2.40 OOlfREACTOR COOLANTI2I2I3.414.7ISRO/HIGHJ432143.5INEW - 20081RCS-015 OO1IREACTOR COOLANT/212/3.4/4.7/SROIHIGHl43.2/43.5INEW - 2008IRCS-015 Given the Given the following: following: The Plant
- The - Plant isis in in MODE MODE 33 atat 547 °F following 547 of following aa reactor reactor trip trip from from 100%
100% RTP. RTP.
- RCS - chemistry sample RCS chemistry indicates DOSE sample indicates DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131 1-131 isis 73 73 Micro-Curies/gram.
Micro-Curies/gram. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following applies applies to to the the current current condition, condition, and and the the basis basis for for that that requirement? requirement? A. BeBe in in MODE MODE 4 within 48 48 hours, hours, to place the plant inin a MODE MODE where the 1-131 1-131 limit is is NOT NOT APPLICABLE. B B~ Reduce TTAVG Reduce AVG to < < 500 F within 66 hours, 0 500 of hours, to ensure ensure RCS RCS saturation pressure pressure isis below below the S/G Safety Valve lift setpoint. C. Be in MODE 4 within 6 hours, to place the plant in a MODE where the 1-131 limit is NOT APPLICABLE. D. Reduce T AVG to < 500 of TAVG °F within 6 hours, to ensure RCS saturation pressure is below the S/G PORV lift setpoint. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect - This is the partial LCO applicable to 1-131 greater than 0.25, and less than 60 Micro-Curies/gm, except LCO requires MODE 3. B: Correct - - ITS for 1-131 is applicable in MODE 3 with T AVG > TAVG > 500 of. °F. Saturation pressure for 500 °F of is 665 PSIG which is below the S/G PORV and S/G Safety Valve setpoint. C: Incorrect - No MODE 4 requirements. Basis is for conditions below S/G safety valve setpoint. D: Incorrect - Action is correct. Basis is to be below the S/G Safety Valve setpoint, NOT the S/G PORV setpoint.
Exam Question Exam Number: 91 Question Number: 91
Reference:
ITS
Reference:
3.4.16; ITS ITS 3.4.16; ITS 3.4.16 BD. 3.4.16 BO. KA Statement: KA Statement: Ability Ability to to apply Technical Specifications apply Technical Specifications for for aa system. system. History: New History: New - Written
- Written for for HLC-08 NRC exam.
HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO - Knowledge SRO - Knowledge of of ITS ITS beyond beyond 11 hour hour action action statements. statements. KA Name: KAName: REACTOR COOLANT Tier/Group: 2/2 212 Importance Rating: 3.4/4.7 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 43.2/43.5 Source: NEW -2008
- 2008 Learning Objective: RCS-015 RCS-OI5
RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity 3.4.16 3.4.16 3.4 3.4 REACTOR REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM SYSTEM (RCS) (RCS) 3.4.16 3.4.16 RCS Specific Specific Activity LCO LCO 3.4.16 3.4.16 The The specific specific activity of the reactor coolant coolant shall shall be within limits. APPLICABILITY: MODES 11 and 2, MODE 33 with RCS average temperature (Tavg) (TavQ) ~ 500°F. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 - -----------Note Note ------- -----
> 0.25 MCi/gm.
j.lCi/gm. LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable. A.1 Verify DOSE Once per 4 hours EQUIVALENT 1-131
$ 60 uCi/gm.j.lCi Igm.
-AND AND A.2 Restore DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 to 48 hours within limit.
B. Gross specific activity B.1 Be in MODE 33 with 66 hours of the reactor coolant Tavg << 500°F. not within limit. (continued) (continued) HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP Unit No. No. 22 3.4-45 3.4-45 Amendment No. Amendment No. 203 203
RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity 3.4.16 3.4.16 ACTIONS (continued) ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION CONDITION REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION ACTION COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME TIME "'~ C. Requi C. Required red Acti on and Action and C.1 C.1 Be Be in in MODE MODE 33 with with 66 hours hours associated associ ated Completion Cornpl eti on Tav9 Tavg << 500°F. 500°F. Time of Time of Condition Condition A A not met. not met. OR OR DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131 1-131 CiIgm.
> 60 f,lCi/gm.
60 SURVEI LLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SURVEI LLANCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1 Verify reactor coolant gross specific 77 days days activity ~ 100/E f,lCi/gm. 100/ jtCi/gm. SR 3.4.16.2 ----------- --------NOTENOTE ------ ----- ---- ----- Only required to be performed in MODE 1. Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALE EQUIVALENTNT 14 days 14 days 1-131 specific activity ~ 0.25 MCi/gm. f,lCi/gm. AND Between 22 and Between and 66 hours hours after after aa THERMAL POWER change of of 15% RTP
~ 15% RTP within aa 11 hour within hour period period (continued)
(continued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.4-46 3.4-46 Amendment No. Amendment No. 201 201
RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity B B 3.4.16 3.4.16 B B 3.4 3.4 REACTOR REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM SYSTEM (RCS) (RCS) B B 3.4.16 3.4.16 RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity BASES BASES BACKGROUND The LCO contains contains specific specific activity activity limits for for both DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 1-131 and gross specific activity in the reactor coolant. coolant. The allowable levels are intended to limit the offsite dose to less than the limits of 10 CFR 50.67 for analyzed accidents. APPLICABLE The LCO limits on the specific activity of the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES coolant ensure that the resulting offsite doses will not exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose limits following an analyzed accident. The limiting accident analysis used in establishing the specified activity limits is the SGTR. Other accidents, such as the Main Steam Line Break accident also use the limits from this LCO in the dose analysis. The SGTR dose analysis (Ref. 2) assumes the specific activity of the reactor coolant at the LCO limit and an existing reactor coolant steam generator (SG) tube leakage rate of 0.3 gpm. The analysis assumes the specific activity of the secondary coolant at its limit of 0.1 ~Ci/gm jiCi!gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 1-131 from LCO 3.7.15, "Secondary Secondary Specific Activity." Activity. (continued) HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP Unit No. No. 22 BB 3.4-98 3.4-98 Revision No. 31 Revision 31
RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity BB 3.4.16 3.4.16 BASES BASES APPLICABLE APPLICABLE The The SGTR SGTR event event is is assumed assumed to to be be caused caused byby the the instantaneous instantaneous SAFETY ANALYSES SAFETY ANALYSES rupture rupture of of aa steam steam generator generator tube tube which which relieves relieves to to the the (continued) (continued) faulted steam faulted steam generator. generator. TheThe primary primary consequence consequence of of this this event is event is the the release release of of radioactivity radioactivity from from the the reactor reactor coolant. coolant. TheThe analysis analysis also also assumes assumes aa concurrent concurrent lossloss ofof power, power, from from which which the the loss loss of of circulating circulating water water through through the the condenser condenser eventually eventually results results in in the the loss loss of of condenser condenser vacuum. Valves in in the condenser condenser bypass bypass lines lines would automatically automatically close close to to protect protect the the condenser, condenser, thereby thereby causing steam causing steam relief directly to the atmosphere from from the the steam steam generator PORVs or or safety safety valves. This direct relief relief of activity from the ruptured tube would continue until until thethe faulted steam generator is isolated. Additional releases releases due to primary to secondary LEAKAGE would continue from from thethe SG PORVs or safety valves on the intact SGs until they they were were isolated. Since no fuel failures are assumed to occur from the the event, event, the specific activity at the LCO limit, and the amount amount of of coolant released would determine the radioactivity that was was released to the atmosphere. The safety analysis shows the radiological consequences consequences of of an SGTR accident are within the dose limits of 10 CFR50.67. CFR5O.67. Operation with iodine specific activity levels greater than than the LCO limit is permissible for 48 hours, if the the activity activity level does not exceed 60 jiCi/gm.
~Ci/gm.
The permissible iodine level of 60 iCi/gm ~Ci/gm or less is is acceptable because of the low probability of of aa SGTR SGTR accident accident occurring during the established occurring established 4848 hour time time limit. limit. The The occurrence of an SGTR occurrence SGTR accident at 60 60 tCi!gm increase
~Ci/gm would increase boundary dose levels, but the calculated site boundary but still still bebe within 10 within 10 CFR CFR 50.67 50.67 dose dose limits.
limits. Limits on Limits on RCS RCS specific specific activity activity also ensure the radiation radiation shielding design shielding design ofof the the plant remains acceptable plant remains acceptable for plantplant personnel radiation personnel radiation protection. protection. RCS specific RCS specific activity activity satisfies satisfies Criterion Criterion 22 ofof the the NRC NRC Policy Statement. Policy Statement. (continued) (continued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 BB 3.4-99 3.4-99 Revision No. Revision No. 26 26
RCS RCS Specific Specific Activity Activity BB 3.4.16 3.4.16 BASES (Continued) BASES (Continued) LCO LCO The specific The specific iodine iodine activity activity isis limited limited toto 0.25 iCi/gm DOSE 0.25 ~Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131, 1-131, and and the the gross gross specific specific activity activity in in the the reactor coolant is reactor coolant is limited limited toto the the number number of iCi/gm equal of ~Ci/gm equal toto 100 100 divided divided byby E (average (average disintegration disintegration energy energy ofof the the sum sum of of the the average average beta beta andand gamma gamma energies energies ofof the the coolant coolant nuclides). nuclides). The The limits limits onon DOSE DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131 1-131 and and gross gross specific specific activity activity ensure ensure the the 22 hour hour dose dose to an individual at to an individual at the site the site boundary boundary during during the the DBA DBA will will be be less less than than the the allowed dose. allowed dose. The The SGTR SGTR accident accident analysis analysis (Ref. (Ref. 2)
- 2) shows shows that that the the 22 hour hour site site boundary boundary dose dose levels are are within within acceptable acceptable limits.
limits. Violation of the LCO LCO may result in reactor coolant radioactivity levels that could, could, inin the event event ofof an an SGTR, SGTR, lead to site boundary doses that exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 50.67 dose limits. APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY In MODES 11 and 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS average temperature temperature
~ 500°F, operation within the LCO limits for DOSE EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT 1-131 and gross specific activity are necessary to contain contain the potential consequences consequences of an SGTR to within the acceptable site boundary dose values.
For operation in MODE 33 with RCS average temperature
< 500°F, and in MODES 44 and 5, the release of of radioactivity radioactivity in the event of aa SGTR is unlikely since the saturation saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure settings of of the main steam safety valves.
ACTIONS ACTIONS Note permits AA Note permits the useuse of of the the provisions provisions ofof LCO LCO 3.O.4.c. 3.0.4.c. This This allowance allowance permits permits entry entry into into the the applicable applicable MODE(S) MODE(S) while relying while relying onon the the ACTIONS. ACTIONS. ThisThis allowance allowance is is acceptable acceptable due to the significant conservatism due to the significant conservatism incorporated incorporated into into the the activity limit, specific activity specific limit, the the low low probability probability of of anan event event which is which is limiting limiting duedue to to exceeding exceeding this this limit, limit, and and the the ability to ability to restore restore transient transient specific specific activity activity excursions excursions while the while the plant plant remains remains at,at, oror proceeds proceeds toto power power operation. operation. (continued) (continued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.4-100 BB3.4-100 Revision No. Revision No. 28 28
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written ExamExam
- 92. Given
- 92. Given the the following:
following: The plant
- The
- plant isis operating operating at at 100% RTP.
100% RTP. APP-003-E8, PZR
- APP-003-ES,
- PZR CONTROL CONTROL HIILO LVL isis illuminated.
HI/LO LVL illuminated. APP-003-F4, CHG
- APP-003-F4,
- CHG PMP PMP HIHI SPEED SPEED isis illuminated.
illuminated. ALL Pressurizer
- ALL
- Pressurizer Level Level channels channels indicate indicate 47%
47% Level. Level. RCS Pressure
- RCS
- Pressure isis 2215 PSIG and 2215 PSIG and decreasing decreasing slowly.
slowly.
- TTAVG
- AVG isis equal equal to to TTREF.
REF. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following is is the the appropriate appropriate action? action? Implement AOP-015, SECONDARY LOAD A. Implement LOAD REJECTION. B. Implement AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY LEAKAGE. C. Implement AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE. D. Implement AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. 92 92
011 G2.4.50 011 G2.4.50 OOllPZR 001/PZR LLVL CONTROL/2/2/4.2/40/SRO/HIGHI43.5/NEW - 20081PZR-008 VL CONTROLl2/2/4.2/4.0ISROIHIGHl43.5INEW - 20081PZR-008 Given the Given the following: following: The plant
- The
- plant is is operating operating at at 100% RTP.
100% RTP. APP-003-E8, PZR
- APP-003-ES,
- PZR CONTROL CONTROL HIILO LVL isis illuminated.
HI/LO LVL illuminated.
- APP-003-F4, CHG
- CHG PMPPMP HI HI SPEED SPEED is is illuminated.
illuminated. Pressurizer Level
- ALL Pressurizer
- Level channels channels indicate indicate 47% Level.Level.
RCS Pressure
- RCS
- Pressure is is 2215 2215 PSIG PSIG and decreasing slowly.
and decreasing slowly.
-T
- TAvG AVG isis equal to TTREF.REF' Which ONEONE (1) (1) of the following is is the appropriate action?
A. Implement AOP-015, SECONDARY LOAD REJECTION. B B~ Implement AOP-016,AOP-01 6, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY LEAKAGE. C. Implement AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE. D. Implement AOP-019, AOP-01 9, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect - A Secondary load rejection would cause PZR level to increase and a Charging pump Low speed alarm would be illuminated. B: Correct - - ALL indications indicate an RCS leak is in progress. C: Incorrect - ALL PZR level channels indicate the same value, therefore NO instrument failure is in progress. D: Incorrect - - Pressure is decreasing due to a loss of inventory, NOT due to a pressure malfunction or accident. Exam Question Number: 92
Reference:
APP-003-E8 APP-003-ES and F4. KA Statement: Statement: Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in in the alarm response manual. History: History: New New - Written for HLC-08
- HLC-OS NRC NRC exam.
exam. SRO SRO - Diagnosis
- Diagnosis of of plant event, selection plant event, selection ofof correct procedure procedure to to mitigate.
mitigate.
KA Name: KAName: PZR LVL PZR LVL CONTROL CONTROL Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 2/2 2/2 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 4.2/4.0 4.2/4.0 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: PZR-008 PZR-008
APP-003-E8 APP-003-E8 PZRPZRCONTROL CONTROLHI/LO Hl/LOLVLLVL *** WILLREFLASH
*** WILL REFLASH***
AUTOMATICACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.1. High Level High Level energizes energizes Back-up Back-up Group Group"A"A and and "B" B Heaters Heaters CAUSE CAUSE 1.1. Letdown, Charging Letdown, Charging mismatch mismatch 2.2. Malfunction of Malfunction Level Control of Level Control System System 3.3. Plant transient Plant transient -5. "'5. Excessive RCS Excessive RCS leakage leakage 6.6. Channel failure Channel failure OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS 1.1. Pressurizer Level Pressurizer Level (LI-460, (LI-460, LI-461 Ll-461 and and LI-459A) Ll-459A) 2.
- 2. Charging and Charging Letdown Flow and Letdown Flow (FI-122A (FI-122A and and FI-150)
Fl-150) 3.
- 3. Generator Load Generator Load 4.
- 4. Tavg Tavg ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.1. IF a load rejection has occurred, THEN Refer To AOP-015.
IF AOP-O1 5. 2.
- 2. IF excessive IF excessive RCSRCS leakage exists, THEN Refer Refer To AOP-016.
AOP-O1 6. 3.
- 3. IF aa level IF level controller controller has failed, THEN manually adjust Charging and/or Letdown to maintain PZR level.
PZR 4.
- 4. IF, a level channel failure has occurred, THEN refer to AOP-025.
DEVICE/SETPOINTS OEVICE/SETPOINTS 1.
- 1. LC-459D, LC-4590, LC-459E /I 5% above or below program level POSSIBLE POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS 1.
- 1. PZR PZR high high or or low low level level alarm alarm (protection)
(protection) REFERENC REFERENCES ES 1.
- 1. ITS ITS LCO LCO 3.4.9 3.4.9 2.
- 2. AOP-O1 AOP-015, 5, Secondary Secondary Load Load Rejection Rejection 3.
- 3. AOP-016, AOP-016, Excessive Excessive Primary Primary Plant Plant Leakage Leakage 4.
- 4. AOP-025, AOP-025, RTGB RTGB Instrument Instrument Failure Failure 4.
- 4. OWP-030, OWP-030, Pressurizer Pressurizer Level Level Transmitters Transmitters (PLT)
(PLT) 5.5. CWD CWO B-190628, B-190628, Sheet Sheet 459, 459, CablesJ, Cables J, N, N, LL IAPP-003 APP-003 Rev. Rev. 37 37 Page 46 Page 46 of 531 of 53
APP-003-F4 APP-003-F4 Page Page 11 ofof 22 ALARM ALARM CHG PMP HI CHG PMP HI SPEED SPEED AUTOMATIC ACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 1.
- 1. Not Applicable Not Applicable CAUSE CAUSE 1.
- 1. Charging Pump Charging Pump Speed Speed Control Control Failure Failure
- Controller failure Controller failure (RTGB (RTGB OROR local) local)
- Air Pressure Air Pressure Regulator Regulator Failure Failure 2.
- 2. Low Pressurizer Low Pressurizer Level Level
~3. RCS leakage RCS leakage 4.
- 4. Charging PumpPump recirculation valve openopen OR leaking OBSERVATIONS OBSERVATIONS
- 1. Pressurizer Level (LI-460, LI-461 and LI-459A) 2.
- 2. Charging and Letdown Flow (FI-122 (Fl-i 22 and FI-150)
Fl-i 50)
- 3. Charging Pump Recirculation Valves (local)
ACTIONS ACTIONS 1.
- 1. IF RCS leakage is indicated, THEN Refer To AOP-01 IF AOP-016. 6.
2.
- 2. IF required to maintain level, THEN start standby Charging pump(s).
IF
- 3. Check RTGB Charging Pump Speed Controls for possible failure.
- 4. IF IF required, THEN dispatch operator to check Charging Pump Speed controller:
1)
- 1) Speed control swing arm 2)
- 2) Air Air Pressure Pressure Regulator Regulator for for the the affected affected Charging Pump Pump
- IA-3892, IA-3892, CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP A A REGULATO REGULATOR R
- IA-3897, IA-3897, CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP BB REGULATO REGULATOR R
- IA-3902, IA-3902, CHARGING CHARGING PUMP PUMP C C REGULATO REGULATOR R 3.
- 3. IF IF Charging Charging PumpPump Recirculation Recirculation Valve Valve is open OR is open leaking, THEN OR leaking, close the THEN close the effected effected valve valve OR OR isolate the effected pump.
isolate the effected pump. 4.
- 4. IF IF Charging Charging PumpPump Speed Speed Controller Controller has hasfailed, failed, THEN perform either THEN perform either of of the the following:
following:
** Operate Operate pumps pumps inin manual manual to to control control Charging Charging FlowFlow (RTGB (RTGB failure).
failure). OR OR
** Stop the Stop the affected affected Charging Charging Pump Pump AND AND start start aa standby standby Charging Charging Pump.
Pump. IAPP-003 APP-003 Rev. Rev. 37 37 Page 48 Page 48 of of 53 531
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 93. Which ONE
- 93. Which ONE (1)
(1) of of the the following following describes describes the the basis for the basis for the limit limit of of Oxygen Oxygen permitted permitted in in each each Waste Gas Waste Gas Decay Tank? Decay Tank? Oxygen is maintained Oxygen is maintained lessless than than or or equal equal to to ... A. 6% to A. 6% to ensure ensure carbon carbon steel corrosion does steel corrosion does NOTNOT degrade degrade thethe WGDT and and allow allow radioactive radioactive gas release. gas release. B. 6% to ensure B. 6% potentially explosive ensure potentially explosive gas mixture is gas mixture maintained below is maintained below the the flammability flammability limit. limit. C. 4% to ensure potentially C. potentially explosive gas mixture mixture isis maintained maintained below below the flammability flammability limit. limit. D. 4% to ensure D. ensure carbon steel corrosion corrosion does NOT degrade the WGDT and allow radioactive gas release. gas release. 93 93
071 G2.2.25 071 G22.25 OOl/WASTE 001/WASTE GAS GAS DISPOSAL/2/2/3.2/4.2/SROfLOW/43.2INEW DISPOSAL/2/2/3.2/4.2/SRO/LOW/43.2INEW - 2008/wD-008
- 2008/WD-008 Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following describes describes the the basis basis for for the the limit limit of of Oxygen Oxygen permitted permitted in in each each Waste Gas Decay Waste Gas Decay Tank? Tank?
Oxygen isis maintained Oxygen maintained less less than than or or equal equal to to ... A. 6% A. 6% toto ensure ensure carbon carbon steel corrosion does steel corrosion does NOT NOT degrade degrade the the WGDT WGDT and and allow allow radioactive radioactive release. gas release. gas B. 6% to ensure B. 6% potentially explosive ensure potentially explosive gas gas mixture mixture is is maintained maintained belowbelow thethe flammability flammability limit. limit. c~ C 4% to ensure potentially explosive gas mixture is is maintained below the flammability limit. D. 4% to ensure carbon D. carbon steel corrosion corrosion does NOT NOT degrade degrade the WGDT and allow allow radioactive radioactive gas release. gas release. The correct answer is C. incorrect - TRM 3.20, Condition B, Upper Oxygen limit, if exceeded, must immediately A: Incorrect - suspend ALL additions of Waste Gas AND restore compliance with the Oxygen limit. WGDT are carbon steel, but corrosion is NOT a concern. B: Incorrect - TRM 3.20, Condition B, Upper Oxygen limit, if exceeded, must immediately suspend ALL additions of Waste Gas AND restore compliance with the Oxygen limit. Explosive mixture is the correct basis for limiting Oxygen concentration. C: Correct - - TRM 3.20, Condition A limits Oxygen :5. <4%4% to eliminate the hazard of Hydrogen and Oxygen combining to form an explosive mixture. incorrect - TRM 3.20, Condition A limits Oxygen :5. D: Incorrect - <4%, 4%, but carbon steel corrosion is NOT a concern. Exam Question Number: 93
Reference:
TRM 3.20; TRM 3.20 BD. KA Statement: Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO - Knowledge of application of required actions of ITS.
- ITS.
KA Name: KAName: WASTE GAS GAS DISPOSAL Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 2/2 2/2 Importance Importance Rating: Rating: 3.2/4.2 3.2/4.2 RO/SRO Level: Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level: Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link: link: 43.2 43.2 Source: Source: NEW NEW - 2008
- 2008 Learning Learning Objective:
Objective: WD-008 WD-008
Waste Waste Gas Gas Decay Decay Tanks Tanks - Oxygen
- Oxygen Concentration Concentration 3.20 3.20 3.20 WASTE 3.20 WASTE GAS GAS DECAY DECAY TANKS TANKS - OXYGEN
- OXYGEN CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATION TRMS 3.20 TRMS 3.20 The The oxygen oxygen concentration concentration in in the the four four Waste Waste Gas Gas Decay Decay Tanks Tanks (CTS (CTS 3. 16.4. 1) 3.16.4.1) shall shall be be ~4%4%
.-.-.. by by volume.
volume. APPLICABILITY: APPLICABILITY: At At all all times. times. COMPENSATORY MEASURES COMPENSATORY
--- ----------------NOTE NOTE - ------- ----- -- -------- --- ------ ---------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each tank. CONDITION REQUIRED COMPENSATORY COMPENSATORY MEASURE COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME A. Oxygen concentration A.1 Restore compliance 48 hours in aa Waste Gas Decay with the requirements Tank > ~ by vol
>4% ume volume of TRMS.
and ~ 6% by volume. B. Oxygen concentration B.1 Suspend all additions Immediately in aa Waste Gas Decay of waste gas to the Tank volume. Tank>> 6% by volume, affected tank. AND B.2 B.2 Initiate action to Immediately restore compliance with TRMS. AND B.3 8.3 Reduce oxygen Reduce oxygen 24 hours 24 concentration to concentration to ~ 6% 6% by volume. by volume. (continued) (continued) HBRSEP Unit HBRSEP Unit No. No. 22 3.20-1 3.20-1 PLP-100 Rev. PLP-100 Rev. 25 25
Waste Waste Gas Gas Decay Decay Tanks Tanks - Oxygen
- Oxygen Concentration Concentration B
B 3.20 3.20 B B 3.20 3.20 WASTE WASTE GAS GAS DECAY DECAY TANKS TANKS - OXYGEN
- OXYGEN CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATION BASES BASES This This specification specification isis provided to ensure ensure that the concentration concentration ofof potentially explosive gas explosive gas mixtures mixtures contained contained in in the Waste Gas Holdup System System is maintained below the below the flammability flammability limits limits of of hydrogen hydrogen and and oxygen.
oxygen. This This is is accomplished accomplished byby maintaining the maintaining the oxygen oxygen concentration concentration less less than 4% 4% through through procedural controls. Maintaining the concentration of oxygen oxygen below the flammability limit provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in assurance conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A A to 10 CFR Part 50. TR 3.20.1 specifies that monitoring be performed on the in-service tank, as that is the tank with the potential for changing gas concentrations. concentrations. Technical Specification Section 5.5.12, "Explosive Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program," Program, states that this program shall include concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the Waste Gas Decay Tanks limits for concentrations that are appropriate to the system's systems design criteria. By always requiring the the oxygen concentration to be less than 4%, this TRM limit fully meets the requirement to establish appropriate limits for the concentration of the mixture of hydrogen and oxygen to preclude an explosive mixture. HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 BB 3.20-1 3.20-1 PLP-100 Rev. PLP-100 Rev. 25 25
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 94. Given the
- 94. Given the following:
following:
- The
- plant is The plant is in in Mode Mode 66 forfor Refueling.
Refueling. Core offload
- Core
- offload is is in progress with in progress Fuel Assembly with aa Fuel Assembly on on the the Manipulator.
Manipulator. The Transfer Cart
- The
- Cart is loaded with aa fuel is loaded fuel assembly, assembly, enroute enroute to SEP.
to the SFP.
- You are
- Refueling SRO.
are the Refueling ItIt is is reported reported toto you you that that Refueling Refueling Cavity level has Cavity level has dropped dropped ONE ONE (1) (1) foot in in the the last last 55 minutes. minutes. Which ONE (1) of the following is the required required action? Place the Fuel Fuel Assembly from the Manipulator Manipulator in the ... A. RCC change fixture. B. core in it's its original location. C. Upender. D. core in any location that is bordered by 2 other assemblies. 94 94
G2. 1.41 OOl/CONDUCT G2.1.41 001/CONDUCT OF OPERATION/3/2.S/3.7/SROILOW/43.6INEW OPERATION/3/2.8/3 .7/SRO/LOW/43 .6/NEW - 200S/AOP-020-004
- 2008/AOP-020-004 Given the following:
- The plant is in Mode 6 for Refueling.
- Core offload is in progress with a Fuel Assembly on the Manipulator.
- The Transfer Cart is loaded with a fuel assembly, enroute to the SFP.
- You are the Refueling SRO.
ft is reported to you that Refueling Cavity level has dropped ONE (1) foot in the last 5 minutes. It Which ONE (1) of the following is the required action? Place the Fuel Assembly from the Manipulator in the ... A. RCC change fixture. B core in it's BY' its original location. C. Upender. D. core in any location that is bordered by 2 other assemblies. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect - RCC Change fixture has a basket that is available to receive the fuel assembly. Placing the assembly in the RCC Change fixture while losing Refueling Cavity level could result in the fuel assembly being uncovered and cause excessive radiation exposure. B: Correct - - Place the fuel assembly back in a location where subcritical configuration was known. C: Incorrect - The Transfer Cart is enroute to the SFP. There is NO basket available to place the fuel assembly in. D: Incorrect - Placing a fuel assembly in an unanalyzed core position could result in a loss of the required shutdown margin. Exam Question Number: 94
Reference:
AOP-020, Section B. KA Statement: Knowledge of the refueling process. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC Exam. SRO - Knowledge of Refueling Procedures
KA Name: KAName: CONDUCT OF CONDUCT OF OPERATION OPERATION Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 33 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 2.8/3.7 2.S/3.7 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.6 43.6 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 200S Learning Objective: Learning Objective: AOP-020-004 AOP-020-004
Rev. Rev. 29 29 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEATHEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING) COOLING) Page Page 25 25 of of 107 107 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I Section Section BB Loss Of Loss Of RHR RHR Inventory Inventory - Vessel
- Vessel Head Head Off Off (Page (Page 11 of of 9) 9)
1.1. Evacuate Non-essential Evacuate Non-essential Personnel Personnel From Containment From Containment As As Follows: Follows:
- a. Place
- a. Place the the VLCVLC Switch Switch inin the the EMERG positio EMERG position n
- b. Depress
- b. Depress and and hold hold CVCV EVACUATION HORN EVACUATION HORN Pushbutton Pushbutton for 15 for 15 seconds seconds
- c. Announce
- c. Announce The The Following Following Over Over Plant PA Plant PA System:
System: ALL NON-ESSENTIAL "ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL EVACUATE CV UNTIL EVACUATE CV UNTIL FURTHER FURTHER NOTICE NOTICE"
- d. Depress
- d. Depress and and hold CV EVACUATION HORN EVACUATION HORN Pushbutton Pushbutton for 15 for 15 seconds seconds e.
- e. Repeat Repeat PA PA announ cement announcement 2.
- 2. Check Check Status Status Of Of Fuel Fuel Handli Handlingng Go To Step 5.5.
Activi ties - IN Activities - IN PROGRESS PROGRESS
Rev. Rev. 29 29 AOP-020 AOP-020 LOSS OF LOSS OF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL (SHUTDOWN (SHUTDOWN COOLING) COOLING) Page 26 of Page 26 of 107 107 STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED I Section Section BB Loss Of Loss Of RHR RHR Inventory Inventory - Vessel
- Vessel Head Head Off Off (Page (Page 22 ofof 9) 9)
3.
- 3. Notify Refueling Notify Refueling Personnel Personnel To To Perform The Perform The Following:
Following: ~a. a. Place Place anyany fuel fuel assembly assembly in in transit in transit in one one ofof the the follow ing locatio following locations: ns:
** Original Core Original Core location location
** Upender Upender
** Storage location Storage location approved approved by FMP-019.
by FMP-019. Fuel Fuel and and Insert Shuffle Insert Shuffle
- b. Place
- b. Place any any Reactor Reactor Vessel Upper or Upper or Lower Internals Internals in transit in transit in one of the following locations:
following locations:
** Reacto Reactorr Vessel (preferred Vessel (preferred locatio location) n)
** Design Designatedated storage storage locatio location n in in transfe transfer canal r canal c.
- c. Verify Verify FuelFuel Transf Transferer Conve Conveyer yer Car Car Locati Location on - IN IN CONTAINM CONTAINMENTENT d.
- d. Verify Verify CV CV Upend Upender er Positio Position n --
HORIZONT HORIZONTAL AL 4.
- 4. Verify Verify CLOSED CLOSED The The SFPSFP GATE GATE VALVE VALVE 5.
- 5. Check Check Cavity Cavity SealSeal OR SandSand Plug Plug Observe Observ the NOTE e the NOTE prior prior to to Failure Failure - IN -
IN PROGRESS PROGRESS Step 14 Step 14 and and Go Go To To*Step Step 14. 14. 6.
- 6. Contac Contact t Outage Outage Management Management For For Assista nce Assistance In In Restor ation Of Restoration Of The The Cavity Cavity Seal Seal OR Sand Sand Plugs Plugs
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 Written Exam NRC Written Exam
- 95. Given the
- 95. Given the following:
following: RC personnel
- RC
- personnel needneed toto use Demin Water use Demin Water for for decon decon activities activities for for aa spent spent fuel fuel cask.
cask. They will
- They
- will need need to operate one to operate one valve valve for for about about an hour and an hour will finish and will finish before before shift shift turnover.
turnover. The valve
- The
- valve manipulation manipulation is is NOT NOT covered covered byby an an approved approved procedure.
procedure. Which ONE Which ONE (1)(1) of of the the following following describes describes how how thethe status status of of this this manipulation manipulation is is controlled? controlled? procedure must A. A temporary procedure must be be approved approved by SSO prior by the SSO prior to operation operation ofof the valve. valve. B. Enter the valve valve alignment in in Start/Stop Log Log of Autolog. Issue Caution C. Issue Caution TagsTags for any any component thatthat will be be realigned. realigned. D. The portion of the system to be realigned must be taken out of service and controlled with Danger Tags. 95 95
G2.2. 18 001IEQUIPMENT G2.2.18 001/EQUIPMENT CONTROLl3/2.6/3.9/SROIHIGHJ43.5IRNP CONTROL/3/2 .613.9ISROJHIGHI43 5/RNP AUDIT AUDIT - 2001l0MM-001-11-002
- 200 1/OMM-001 002 Given the Given the following:
following: RC personnel
- RC
- personnel need need to to use Demin Water use Demin Water for for decon decon activities activities for for aa spent spent fuel fuel cask.
cask. They will
- They
- will need need toto operate operate oneone valve valve for for about about anan hour hour and and will finish before will finish before shift shift turnover.
turnover. The valve
- The
- valve manipulation manipulation is is NOT NOT covered covered by an approved by an approved procedure.
procedure. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following describes describes how how the status of the status of this this manipulation manipulation is is controlled? controlled? A. A temporary procedure must be approved by the SSO prior by the prior to operation operation of the valve. B B~ Enter the valve alignment in Enter in Start/Stop Log of Autolog. Caution Tags for any component issue Caution C. Issue component that will be be realigned. realigned. D. The portion of the system to be realigned must must be taken out of service and controlled with Danger Tags. The correct answer is B. A: Incorrect - A temporary procedure is NOT appropriate for single valve operation unless water is to be introduced into a system or within a clearance boundary. B: Correct Correct-- Autolog entry will provide the necessary tracking to ensure proper alignment of the valve. incorrect - Would use caution tags if the alignment would be in effect past the end of the C: Incorrect - shift. D: Incorrect - Portion of system component requires caution tags if out of position past the end of the shift. Exam Question Number: 95
Reference:
OMM-QOl OMM-001-11, -11, Pages 23-25. KA Statement: Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc. History: SRO - Knowledge of administrative processes for controlling equipment status. KA Name: KAName: EQUIPMENT CONTROLCONTROL Tier/Group: 33 Importance Importance Rating: Rating: 2.6/3.9 2.6/3.9 RO/SRO Level: Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Cognitive Level: Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link: link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: RNP AUDIT RNP AUDIT -2001
- 2001 Learning Learning Objective:
Objective: OMM-00I-II-002 OMM-001-11-002
8.3.4.1 (Continued) 8.3.4.1 (Continued)
** The The performance performance of of AOPs AOPs and and EOPs.
EOPs.
** The Critical Data The Critical Data Entry Entry shall shall be placed in be placed in the the CO's COs Log Log AND AND completed when completed when E&CE&C isis taking taking thethe daily daily RCS RCS Boron Boron Concentration samples.
Concentration samples. This This will will ensure ensure the the most most accurate accurate data is data is recorded. recorded. 8.3.5 8.3.5 Other Logs Other Logs 1.
~1. The WCC The WCC SRO SRO verifies verifies that that AutoLog AutoLog entries entries are are made made for:
for: (NCR 81962) (NCR 81962) -
- lifting of clearances The placing and lifting
- Clearance boundary changes
- implementation and closeout of MMM-042 to control The implementation equipment that is NOT within clearance boundaries while in Modes 11 and 2
- The Caution Tag number for MMM-042 controlled components that are not restored by the end of shift
- 2. The AOs, MWT AO, and FPAO maintain a narrative log to summarize the major evolutions performed, equipment status, and turnover items. This log is to be maintained in chronologica chronologicall sequence. Log entries may include, but are not limited to, the following: (ACR 94-01 94-01584) 584)
** Date Date
- Starts/stops/t rips of Starts/stops/trips of equipment equipment controlled controlled byby the watch station, station, with with a brief brief description description of of the the reason.
reason. Manual Manual starts/stops starts/stops which are documented which are documented by by initialing initialing an an approved approved procedure procedure need need not not bebe logged. logged. Example: Example: 0957: 0957: Started Started Waste Waste Gas Gas Compressor Compressor A "A" for for observation observation by by Engineering. Engineering. OMM-001 -11 IOMM-001-11 Rev. Rev. 3939 Page 23 Page 23 of of 63 631
(Continued) 8.3.5.2 (Continued) 8.3.5.2
** Completion of Completion of procedures procedures
** Change of Change of auxiliary auxiliary system system and configuration.
and configuration.
** Surveillance tests Surveillance tests started started and and completed.
completed. Example: 0016: Example: 0016: Completed Completed partial partial OST-679 OST-679 to to return return Detector Detector number 16-10 number 16-10 to service.
- Instrument or equipment malfunctions or failures. The entry entry should include the time the component is is removed from service, a brief description of the problem, any compensatory compensatory actions taken, and the number of any Work Request written.
Example: 0330: Monitor Tank Pump "B" B has excessive packing leakage. WR 99-ABCD1 was written and the pump was removed from service per Clearance 99-00395.Unusual trends or conditions observed. 99-00395.Unusual
- Starting and stopping of Gaseous or Liquid Waste Releases (list Waste Release Permit Number).
- Annunciators received that are not the result of operator action or are not expected as a result of evolutions in progress (such as surveillance tests, clearing of equipment or equipment manipulation). It is acceptable to use a rough log for the manipUlation).
accumulation of recurring annunciators and to document these annunciators as a single log entry near the end of shift.
- When annunciators are received and none of the actions specified in the APP are taken in response to the alarm because it is determined that none of the prescribed actions would be effective in eliminating the diagnosed cause, then the basis for not taking the prescribed actions should be logged. This basis should include the plant conditions, diagnosis of the event, conclusions of the diagnosis, and any alternate actions that are taken or justification for taking no actions at all.
- The performance of Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP5), (AOPs),
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and any Fire Brigade response. OMM-001-1 1 IOMM-001-11 Rev. Rev. 39 39 Page Page 24 24 of of 63 631
8.3.5 (Continued) 8.3.5 (Continued) 3.3. Componentmanipulations Component manipulationswhich whichare areNOTNOTpartpartofofan anapproved approved proced ure are to be procedure are to be entered as entered asaacomponent componentout outofofposition position entry entry inin AutoLog. AutoLog. IF IFaacomponent componentwill will remain remain out outofof its its normal position normal position pastshift past shiftturnover, turnover, THEN THEN aaCaution Caution Tag Tag shall shall bebe installed, instaNed, unless unless the evolution the evolution being being performed performed isis turned turned over overon station. on station. ForFor turnover-on-station, the turnover-on-station, the on on coming coming watchstander watchstandermust must receive receive any any applicable pre-job applicable pre-job briefs briefs prior prior to to acceptance acceptance of an evolution of an evolution in in progress. (CR progress. (CR 96-00309) 96-00309) (NCR (NCR 16863) 16863) (NCR (NCR 26491) 26491) a.a. AA PRRPRR should should be be initiated initiated to to provide provide procedural procedural guidance guidance for components for components out out ofof their their normal normal position position thatthat meet any meet any of the follow ing of the following critera:: critera
** involve involve safety safety related related equipment equipment
** involve complex involve complextask taskss
** are frequently are frequently performed performed
~b. Components that are out of their normal Components normal position position are are entered into into the Component Component Out of Position Position Log (Start/Stop (Start/Stop Log) in AutoLog.
AutoLog. This Log was originally originally used to document document starting and stopping starting stopping plant equipment equipment in AutoLog. AutoLog. Although Although it is no longer used for this function, function, it is still labeled as as the the Start/Stop Log in the AutoLog Start/Stop AutoLog programprogram due to softwaresoftware limitations. Use of this log allows positive limitations. tracking positive trackin of g of components that are out of their normal components position normal positio n during aa during shift s~ift and over shift turnov turnover. component er. The compo nent Out of of
---7 Positio Position n Log @art/Stop to Log) is solely for the purpos Lo) purpose of e of trackin tracking g compo component nent manip manipulations ulations that are performed are performed withou
~hout t the the directi on of direction of anan approv approved procedurgJNCR edproc edu[NCR 1686 3(CAPR)]
16863 (CAPR)] c.
- c. Compo Components nents out out of of their their norma normall positio position n SHALSHALL be L be approv approved ed byby the the CRSS CRSS or or SSO.
SSO. d.
- d. The The CRSS/
CRSS/SSO SSO isis respon responsiblesible forfor ensurin ensuring that g that compo nents components out of out of their their norma normall positio positionn areare entered entered into into the the Compo Component nent OutOut of of Positio Position n LogLog (Start/S (Start/Stop Log), top Log), and and are are subseq uently remov subsequently removed from the log when ed from the log when they are they are restore restored d to to their their norma normal positions. l positio ns. IOMM- 001 -1 1 OMM-001-11 I Rev. Rev.3939 I Page25 Page 25ofof63 I 631
QUESTIONSREPORT QUESTIONS REPORT f0rAU for AUDITDIT 1.1 . G2.1.180011/////// G2.1.18 OO1////IIII HPHPneeds needstotouse useDemin Deminwater waterforfordecon deconactivities activitiesforforaaspent spentfuel fuelcask. cask. They Theywill willneed need totooperate operateone onevalve valvefor foraboutaboutan an hour hourandandwill willfinish finishbefore before shift turnover. Thevalve shift turnover. The valve manipulation isisnot manipulation notcovered coveredby byanan approved approvedprocedure. procedure. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following describes describes howhow thethe status status of of this this manipulation manipulation isis contro controlled?lled? A. AA Temporary A. Temporary procedureprocedure must must be be approved approved by by the the SSO SSO prior prior toto operation operation of of the the valves valves. . BY Place By Place aa Position Position Tracking Tracking rubberrubber stamp stamp for for the the alignment alignment inin Autolog Autolog C. Issue C. Issue Caution Caution Tags Tags for for any any component component that that will will be be realigned realigned D. The D. The portion portion of of the the system system to to be be realigned realigned must must be be taken taken out out of of service service and and contro lled controlled with with Danger Danger Tags Tags BB is correct. Would is correct. Would use caution tags if the alignment alignment would be in effect past past the the end end of of the shift the shift Common Question Common Question 067 Tier 33 Tier K/A Importance KIA Importance Rating - RO 2.9/ - 2.9 / SRO 2.9 Ability to Ability make accurate, to make accurate, clear and concis concisee logs, records, records, status boardsboards,, and reports reports.. Refere nce(s) - OMM-Reference(s) - 001 -11, pg 22 OMM-001-11, Propos Proposed ed Refere Referencesnces to be be provid ed to applica provided applicants during examin nts during examination ation - None None Learni ng Object Learning Objective - ive - Questi Question on Source Source - New-New Questi on Histor Question History - y - Questi Question on Cognit Cognitive ive Level Level - Compr
- ehension Comprehension 10 CFR Part 55 Conten 10 CFR Part 55 Content - 41 t - 41 Comm Comments ents - -
Category Category 1:1: Category Category 2:2: Category Category 3:3: Category Category4:4: Category Category5:5: Category Category6:6: Category Category7:7: Category Category8:8:
- Saturday, Saturday,JuneJune14,14,2008 20088:41:28 8:41 :25AM AM 1
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 96. Given the
- 96. Given the following:
following: An operator
- An
- operator is is restoring restoring the the CV CV Spray Spray System alignment following System alignment following major major maintenance.
maintenance. During system
- During
- system restoration, restoration, an operator found an operator found aa valve valve which which was was inside inside the the Clearance Clearance boundary out of alignment.
boundary
- ItIt is
- is believed believed that the valve was inadvertently inadvertently moved moved during maintenance maintenance activities.
activities. There are
- There
- other valves are other valves within within the Clearance boundary the Clearance boundary within within close close proximity proximity toto the the mispositioned valve.
minimum procedural What minimum procedural actions are REQUIRED REQUIRED by by OMM-001-8, 0MM-CO 1 -8, CONTROL CONTROL OF OF EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM STATUS? EQUIPMENT A. Establish a multidiscipline team to establish the cause and determine required actions. B. Verify ONLY the mispositioned valve is returned to the correct position lAW the system Operating Procedure. C. Initiate a full system lineup lAW the system Operating Procedure. D. Initiate a valve lineup for ALL valves within the Clearance boundary lAW the system Operating Procedure. 96 96
G2.2. 15 001IEQUIPMENT 02.2.15 00 1/EQUIPMENT CONTROL/3/3.9/4.3/SRO/LOW/43.3/NEW CONTROL/3/3 .9/4.3ISROILOWI43 .3/NEW - 2008/0MM-001-8-002
- 2008/OMM-00 1-8-002 Given the Given following:
the following:
- An
- An operator operator isis restoring restoring the CV Spray the CV System alignment Spray System alignment following following major major maintenance.
maintenance. During system
- During
- system restoration, restoration, anan operator operator found found aa valve valve which which was was inside inside the the Clearance Clearance boundary out boundary out of alignment.
of alignment.
- ItIt is
- is believed believed that that the the valve valve was was inadvertently inadvertently moved moved during during maintenance maintenance activities.
activities. There are
- There
- are other other valves valves within within the the Clearance Clearance boundary boundary within within close close proximity proximity to the to the mispositioned valve.
mispositioned valve. What minimum minimum procedural procedural actions actions are are REQUIRED REQUIRED by by OMM-001-8, OMM-OO1-8, CONTROL CONTROL OF OF EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM SYSTEM STATUS? STATUS? A. Establish a multidiscipline multidiscipline team to establish establish the cause and determine determine required required actions. B. Verify ONLY B. ONLY the the mispositioned mispositioned valve is is returned returned to the the correct correct position position lAW lAW the the system system Operating Procedure. Initiate a full system lineup lAW the system Operating Procedure. C. Initiate D Initiate a valve lineup for ALL valves within the Clearance boundary lAW the system 01' Operating Procedure. The correct answer is D. OMM-OO1-8 specifies that a multidiscipline A: Incorrect - OMM-001-8
- multidiscipline team be established to determine the cause if the cause is unknown and CANNOT be quickly determined.
B: Incorrect - If the cause of the mispositionin mispositioning g can be clearly identified, a single valve lineup is allowed. The stem does NOT clearly identify the cause. C: Incorrect - A full valve lineup is to be performed if the cause of the mispositionin
- mispositioning g is unknown and CANNOT be quickly determined. A full valve lineup is NOT required because the valve is within the Clearance boundary.
D: Correct - D: - OMM-OO1 OMM-001-8 -8 specifies that a valve lineup lineup of valves within the Clearance boundary is is to be be performed ifif maintenance maintenance activities were performed performed on valves within within the the Clearance boundary, and and itit is is believed believed that that those those maintenance maintenance activities activities caused caused thethe mispositionin mispositioning.g.
Exam Question Exam Question Number: Number: 96 96
Reference:
OMM-001-8,
Reference:
OMM-OO1-8, Page Page 17. 17. KA Statement: Ability KA Statement: Ability to to determine determine the the expected expected plant plant configuration configuration using using design design and and configuration control configuration control documentation, documentation, such such as drawings, line-ups, as drawings, line-ups, tag-outs, tag-outs, etc. etc. History: New History: New - Written
- Written forfor HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC Exam.
Exam. SRO - Requires SRO - Requires analysis analysis of of plant plant events events and and administrative administrative processes processes and and determination determination ofof required actions. required actions. KA Name: KA Name: EQUIPMENT CONTROL EQUIPMENT CONTROL Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 33 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 3.9/4.3 3.9/4.3 RO/SRO RO/SRO Level: Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.3 43.3 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: OMM-001-8-002 OMM-O0l-8-002
8.5.6 8.5.6 Mispositioned Valves Mispositioned Valves
~1. 1. When aa valve When valve in in any any plant plant system system isis found found mispositioned, mispositioned, aa full full system lineup (including independent system lineup (including independent verification verification where where applicable) shall applicable) shall be be performed performed lAW JAW thethe appropriate appropriate OP OP with with the the following exemptions:
following exemptions: 7 .* IF the IF the component component waswas i~side inside aacearance clearance boundary boundary in in which which maintenance was being maintenance was being performed performed and and it~elieved it is believed that. that itit became misaligned gecame misaligned during during that that time, THEN only timeTHE the portion iytF portion of of the OP dealing with the OP dealing with the the valves valves inside inside that that clearance clearance boundary boundary need be need be performed. performed.
- Portions of the system that are known to be properly aligned due to normal system operation or or performance of OSTs do need to have their positions verified lAW the OP.
not need
- Components whose positions can be determined from the RTGB (via switch positions or permissive/
permissive! status lights) do not need to have their positions verified lAW an OP.
- mispositioning can be clearly identified, IF the cause of the mispositioning THEN the scope of the lineup can be restricted to to those valves subject to the same cause.
- IF the cause of the mispositioning mispositioning can NOT be immediately identified, THEN it is recommended recommended that a multi-disciplined multi-disciplined team (Event Review Team) be established to assist in determining the cause.
- 2. IF it is believed that the valve was deliberately mispositione mispositioned d or tampered with, THEN Operational Response to Deliberate Acts Against Plant Equipment in this procedure should be reviewed for applicability (NRC IN 96-71).
f OMM-OO1 -8 IOMM-001-8 I Rev Rev 38 38 Page 17 Page 17 ofof 49 491 I
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam
- 97. Given the
- 97. Given the following:
following:
- The
- plant isis operating The plant operating atat 100%
100% RTP. RTP.
- SI
- SI Pump Pump "A"A isis INOPERABLE INOPERABLE due to an due to an emergent emergent problem problem with with repairs repairs estimated estimated to to take take 48 hours.
48 hours.
- An
- An audit audit of of completed completed surveillance surveillance procedures procedures has has determined determined the the last last quarterly quarterly surveillance on surveillance on SISI Pump Pump "C" was missed.
C was missed. Which ONE Which ONE (1)(1) ofof the the following following describes describes the the appropriate appropriate action? action? Initiate an A. Initiate Operability Determination an Operability Determination onon SI SI Pump Pump "C". C. Perform a Safety Function Determination. B. Perform C. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c" C within 24 hours OR OR be in MODE 4 within 13 hours. D. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c" C within 72 hours OR be in MODE 3 within 6 hours. 97 97
G2.2.36 OOllEQUIPMENT 02.2.36 00 1/EQUIPMENT CONTROL/3/3.114.2/SRO/LOW/43.2/SALEM CONTROL/3/3. 1/4.2/SROILOW/43 .2/SALEM - 2001lITS
- 2001/ITS INTRO-005 INTRO-005 Given the Given the following:
following: The plant
- The
- plant isis operating operating at at 100%
100% RTP. RTP.
- SI
- SI Pump Pump "A" INOPERABLE due A isis INOPERABLE due to an emergent to an emergent problem problem with with repairs repairs estimated estimated to to take take 48 hours.
48 hours.
- An
- An audit audit of of completed completed surveillance surveillance procedures procedures has determined the has determined the last last quarterly quarterly surveillance on surveillance on SI Pump "c" SI Pump was missed.
C was missed. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following describes describes the the appropriate appropriate action? action? Initiate an A. Initiate an Operability Operability Determination Determination on SI Pump on SI Pump "C". C. Perform aa Safety B. Perform B. Safety Function Function Determination. Determination. C'r Demonstrate the C Demonstrate the operability operability of of SI Pump "c" SI Pump C within 2424 hours hours OROR be be in in MODE MODE 44 within 13 13 hours. D. Demonstrate the operability of SI Pump "c" C within 72 hours OR be in MODE 3 within 6 hours. The correct answer is C. A: Incorrect - Inappropriate application of operability determination
- determination procedure OPS-NG GO-i 305.
OPS-NGGC-130S. B: Incorrect - Inappropriate application of TS S.S.1S.
- 5.5.15.
C: Correct - - Conditions in excess of LCO (TWO ECCS trains inoperable), refer to LCO 3.0.3. Enter TS 3.0.3, but operability of SI Pump C can be demonstrated within 24 hours per SR 3.0.3, since the action statement is less than 24 hours. D: Incorrect - Represents inappropriate application of TS 3.5.2, 3.S.2, Condition A.
Exam Question Exam Question Number: Number: 97 97
Reference:
ITS
Reference:
ITS 3.0.3; 3.0.3; SRSR 3.0.3; ITS 5.5.15; 3.0.3; ITS 5.5.15; ITSITS 3.5.2; 3.5.2; OMM-007, OMM-007, OPS-NGGC-1305, OPS-NGGC-1305, Page Page 77 and 8. and 8. KA Statement: Ability KA Statement: to analyze Ability to analyze the the effect effect ofof maintenance maintenance activities, activities, such such as as degraded degraded power power sources, on sources, on the the status status ofof limiting limiting conditions conditions for for operations. operations. History: History: SRO - Requires a 'from SRO - Requires memory application from memory' application of Tech Tech Specs Specs in situation where TS in a situation TS 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is but the 24 hour applied but hour exception exception perper SR SR 3.0.3 will also apply. The SRO SRO has has to determine the appropriate appropriate course of action. KA Name: KAName: EQUIPMENT CONTROL Tier/Group: 3 Importance Rating: 3.1/4.2 3.114.2 RO/SRO Level: SRO Cognitive Level: LOW 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 43.2 Source: SALEM - 2001 Learning Objective: ITS INTRO-005
LCO LCO Applicability Applicability 3.0 3.0 3.0 LIMITING 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION CONDITION FOR FOR OPERATION OPERATION (LCO) (LCO) APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 LCOs shall LCOs shall be be met met during during thethe MODES MODES oror other other specified specified conditions conditions intheA in the App 1i cabi 1ility, pplicab ity, except except as as provi providded ed in in LCO LCO 3.0.2 3.O.2a andnd3.0.7 3.0.7.. LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 Upon di Upon discov scoveryery ofof aa fai 1ure to failure to meet meet an an LCO, LCO, the the Requi Requirred ed Acti Actiononss of the of the associated associated Conditions Conditions shallshall be be met, met, except as provided except as provided in LCO in LCO 3.0.5 3.0.5 and and LCO LCO 3.0.6. 3.0.6. If the If the LCO LCO isis met met or or is is no no longer longer applicable applicable priorprior toto expiration expiration of the of the specified specified Completion Completion Time(s), Time(s), completion completion of of the the Required Required Action(s) Action(s) is is not not required required unless otherwise unless otherwise stated.stated. LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not not met and the associated associated ACTIONS ACTIONS are are notnot met, met, associated ACTION is not provided, an associated provided, or or if if directed by directed by the the associaated associ ted ACTIONS, the uni unitt shall be placed ina in a MODE MODE or or other other specified condition specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. applicable. Action Action shall be i nitiatedwi beiniti ated withi n 1 hour to pl thinl ace the place the unit, unit, asas appl i cabl applica e, ble, in: in:
- a. MODE 33 within 77 hours;
- b. MODE 44 within 13 13 hours; and c.
- c. MODE MODE 55 within 37 hours.
37 hours. Except Exceptions ions to to this this Specif Specification ication are are stated stated in in the the individ individualual Specif Specifications. ications. Where Where correct corrective measures ive measu are comple res are completed that permit ted that permit operati operationon in in accord accordance with the ance with the LCO LCO oror ACTIONS, ACTIONS, comple completion tion ofof the the actions actions require required d byby LCO LCO 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is not not require required.d. LCO LCO 3.0.3 3.0.3 is is only only applica applicable ble in in MODES MODES 1,I, 2,2, 3,3, and and 4.4. LCO LCO 3.0.4 3.0.4 When When an an LCO LCO isis not not met, met, entry entry intointo aa MODE MODE oror other other specifi specifieded conditi condition in the Applic on in the Applicability shall only ability shall only bebe made: made: (continued) (contin ued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.0-1 3.0-1 Amendment No. Amendment No. 203 203
SR SR Applicability AppHcability 3.0 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT (SR) (SR) APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 SR 3.0.1 SRs SRs shall shall be be met met during during the the MODES MODES or or other other specified specified conditions conditions inin the the Applicability Applicability for for individual individual LCOs, LCOs, unless unless otherwise otherwise stated stated in the SR. in the SR. Failure Failure to to meet meet aa Surveillance, Surveillance, whether whether such such failure failure is is experienced experienced during during thethe performance performance of of the the Survei 11 ance or Surveillance or between between performances performances of of the the Survei 11 ance , shall Surveillance, shall be be failure failure to to meet meet the the LCD. LCO. Failure Failure toto perform perform aa Surveillance Surveillance within within the the specified specified Frequency Frequency shall shall bebe failure failure to to meet meet the the LCD LCO except except as as provided provided inin SR 3.0.3. Surveillances SR 3.0.3. Surveillances do do not not have have to to bebe performed performed on on inoperable inoperable equipment equipment or or variables variables outside outside specified specified limits. limits. SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 The The specified specified Frequency Frequency forfor each each SR SR is is met met ifif the the Surveillance Surveillance is performed within 1.25 1.25 times times the interval interval specified specified in in the the Frequency, Frequency, as measured from the previous performance performance or or as as measured from the time a specified specified condition of of the the Frequency Frequency is met. For Frequencies specifiedspecified as "once," once, the aboveabove interval interval extension does not apply. If a a Completion Time requires periodic performance performance on on aa "once once per . . . " basis, the above Frequency extension applies
. . . applies to to each each performance after the initial performance performance..
Exceptions to this Specif Specification stated in ication are stated in the the individual individual Specif Specifications. ications. SR SR 3.0.3 3.0.3 If it If it is is discovered discovered thatthat aa Surveillance Surveillance was was not not performed performed within within its specifi its specified Frequency, then ed Frequency, then compliance compliance with with the the requirement requirement to declare to declare the LCD not the LCO not met met maymay be be delayed, delayed, from from the the time time ofof discovery, up discovery, up to to 24 hours or 24 hours or up up to to the the limit limit of of the the specifi specified ed Frequency, whichever Frequency, whichever is is less. less. ThisThis delay delay period period is is permitted permitted allow performance to allow to performance of of the the Surveillance. Surveillance. (continued) (continued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.0-4 3.04 Amendment No. Amendment No. 203 203
Programs Programs and and Manuals Manuals 5.5 5.5 5.5 Programs 5.5 Programs andand Manuals Manuals 5.5.13 5.5.13 Diesel Fuel Diesel Fuel OilOil Testing Testing Program Program (continued) (continued) b.b. Acceptability of Acceptability of fuel fuel oil oil forfor use use by by testing testing thethe following following parameters at parameters at aa 31 31 day day frequency: frequency: API or API or specific specific gravity, gravity, viscosity, viscosity, water water andand sediment, sediment, and and cloud point. cloud point. The provisions The provisions of of SR SR 3.0.2 3.0.2 and and SRSR 3.0.3 3.0.3 are are applicable applicable to to the the Diesel Fuel Diesel Fuel Oil Oil Testing Testing Program Program surveillance surveillance frequencies. frequencies. 5.5.14 5.5.14 Technical Specifications Technical Specifications (TS) (IS) Bases Bases Control Control Program Program This program This program provides provides controls controls for for processing processing changes changes to to the the Bases Bases of of these Technical Specifications. Specifications. a.
- a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under under appropriate administrative appropriate administrative controls controls and reviews.
- b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without without prior prior NRCNRC approval provided the changes do not involve involve either either of of the the follow foll owing:
ing:
- 1. aa change in the TS incorp incorporated the license; orated in the license; or or
- 2. aa change to the updated FSAR or Bases that that require requiress NRC NRC pursuant approval pursua nt to 10 CFR 50.59.
c.
- c. The Bases Control ProgramProgram shall contain contain provis provisions ions to to ensure ensure that the Bases are mainta maintained consistent ined consis with the tent with the UFSAR.
UFSAR. d.
- d. Proposed Proposed changes changes that that meet meet thethe criteria criteria ofof Specif Specification ication 5.5.14 5.5.14b above shallbe b above shall,bereviewed reviewed and and approved approved by by the the NRCNRC prior prior to to implementat implementation. Changes to ion. Changes to the the Bases Bases implemented implemented withou withoutt prior prior NRC NRC approval approval shall shall be be provided provided to to the the NRCNRC on on aa frequency frequency consist consistent with 10 ent with 10 CFR CFR 50.71(
50.l1(e). e). ' 7 5.5.15 5.5.15 Safety Safety Function Function Determinatio Determination Program (SFDP) n Program (SFDP) This This program program provid provides controls es contro ls toto ensure ensure loss loss ofof safety safety functio functionn is detecte is detected d andand approp appropriate actions taken. riate actions taken. Upon Upon entry entry intointo [CO LCO 3.0.6, 3.0.6, an an evalua evaluation shall be tion shall be made made to to determine determine if if loss loss ofof safety safety functio function exists. Additi n exists. Additionally, other approp onally, other appropriate actions riate actions (continued) (contin ued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 5.0-20 5.0-20 Amendment No. Amendment No. 212 212
Programs Programs and and Manuals Manuals 5.5 5.5 5.5 Programs 5.5 Programs andand Manuals Manuals 5.5.15 5.5.15 Safety Function Safety Function Determination Determination Program Program (SFDP) (SFDP) (continued) (continued) may be may be taken taken as as aa result result ofof the the support support system system inoperability inoperability and and corresponding exception corresponding exception to to entering entering supported supported system Condition system Condition and and Required Actions. Required Actions. This This program program implements implements thethe requirements requirements of of LCO 3.0.6. LCO 3.0.6. a.a. The SFDP The SFDP shall shall contain contain thethe following: following: 1.1. Provisions Provisions for for cross cross train train checks checks toto ensure ensure aa loss loss of of the capability the capability to to perform perform the the safety safety function function assumed assumed in the in the accident accident analysis analysis does does not not go go undetected; undetected; 2.
- 2. Provisions Provisions for for ensuring ensuring the plant is maintained in in aa safe condition safe condition if if aa loss of of function function condition exists; condition exists;
- 3. Provisions Provisions to ensure that an inoperableinoperable supported supported system's systems Completion Time is not inappropriately inappropriately extended as a result of multiplemultiple support support system system inoperabilities; inoperabilities; and
- 4. Other appropriate appropriate limitations limitations and remedial or or compensatory compensatory actions.
actions.
- b. AA loss of safety functio functionn exists when, assuming assuming no no concur concurrent rent single failure, failure, a a safety functio functionn assumed assumed in the in the accide accident analysis nt analys is cannot be performed. For For the the purpose purpose of of this program, aa loss of safety functio function may exist n may exist when when aa suppor supportt system is inoper inoperable, able, and:
1.
- 1. AA require required system redundant to the d system the system system(s) supported (s) suppor ted by the by the inoper inoperable supportt system able suppor system isis also also inoper inoperable; able; oror 2.
- 2. AA require required system redundant d system redundant toto the the system system(s)
(s) inin turn turn supported suppor ted byby the the inoper inoperable supported able suppor system is ted system is also also inoperable; inoper able; or or 3.
- 3. AA require required system redundant d system redundant toto the the suppor supportt system(s) system (s) for the for the suppor supported systems describ ted systems described ed inin b.1 b.l and b.2 and b.2 above is above is also also inoper inoperable.
able. c.
- c. The The SFDP SFDP identif identifies where aa loss ies where loss of of safety safety functio function exists.
n exists. If If aa loss loss ofof safety safety functio function is determined n is determined to to exist exist by by this this program, program, the the approp appropriate Conditions and riate Conditions and Required Required Actions Actions of of the LCO in the LCO in which which thethe loss loss ofof safety safety functio function exists are n exists are require required d to be entered to be entered.. (continued) (contin ued) HBRSEP HBRSEP Unit Unit No. No. 22 5.0-21 5.0-21 Amendment No. Amendment No. 212 212
ECCS ECCS - Opera ti ng Operating 3.5.2 3.5.2 3.5 3.5 EMERG ENCYY CORE EMERGENC CORE COOLIN COOLINGG SYSTEM SYSTEMS S (ECCS) (ECCS) 3.5.2 3.5.2 ECCS -Operrating ECCSOpe ating LCO LCO 3.5.2 3.5.2 Two ECCS ECCS train trains shall shall be OPERA OPERABLEBLE.. APPLI CABILITY: MODES MODES 1. 1, 2. 2, and 3
...... ...... ...... ...... ... NOTES NOTES * ... - -. -. -..... .... -..... . .
1.
- 1. In MODE 3. 3, one cold leg safety safety injec tion (SI) pump flow path may be isolat ed by closin isolated g the isolat closing ion isolation valves valves for up to 24 hours hours to perfor m pressure perform isolat ion valve isolation valve testin testing g per SR 3.4.14.1.
- 2. Opera tion in MODE 3 with one requir Operation ed SI pump required declar declareded inope rable inoperab le pursu ant to LCO 3.4.12.
pursuant "Low Low Temp Tempera erature ture Overp ressur Overpress e Prote ure ctionn (LTOP) Protectio System System. ." is allowe allowed d for up to 4 hours hours or until the tempe rature temperatu re of all RCS cold legs excee ds exceeds 375°F 375°F,. which everr comes first. whicheve first. ACTIO NS ACTI ONS
- - CONDI TION CONDITION REQUIR REQUIRED ED ACTION ACTION COMPL ETIONN TIME COMPLETIO A. One or more trains trains A.1 Resto Restore re train (s) to 72 hours inope rable.
inoperab le. hours OPERA OPERABLEBLE status. AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equiv alentt equivalen to aa single OPERAABLE single OPER BLE ECCS train availa ble. available. B. valvee iden One valv identtified ified Verify B.1 Veri contro fy cont roll power is in SR 3.5.2.1 or SR Imme Imm diately ediat ely removeedd to all valv remov valveess 3.5.2.7 .7 with cont contro roll identtified iden ified in SR power or air 3.5.1.5. .5. restorred. resto ed. AND (conti (con nued) tinue d) HBRSE HBRS EPP Unit Unit No. No. 22 3.5*4 3.5-4 Amendment No. 176 Amend 176
,~8.88.8 Loss of Safety Loss of Safety Function Function Worksheet Worksheet [CAPR [CAPR 193057] 193057] {TC { TC "Loss Loss Of Of Safety Safety Function Function
\l 2 }}
Worksheet \f\f CC \1"2" Worksheet" NOTE: NOTE: These instructions These instructions do do not not supersede supersede any any instructions instructions contained contained in in the the TRM regarding how to perform TRM regarding how to perform aa Safety Safety Function Function Determination Determination (SFD). (S ED). These These instructions supplement instructions supplement the the TRM TRM instructions instructions and and provide provide an aid in an aid in completing completing the the Loss Loss of Safety Function (LOSE) of Safety Function (LOSF) Worksheet. Worksheet. This determination This determination shouldshould be be performed performed by by aa licensed licensed Senior Senior Reactor Reactor Operator Operator and and reviewed any reviewed time additional any time additional inoperabilities inoperabilities occur occur OR OR an an ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature Feature isis declared inoperable. declared inoperable. 8.8.1 8.8.1 Complete plant Complete plant conditions conditions table. table. 8.8.2 8.8.2 Record the ITS Record Support Feature ITS Support Feature which is is inoperable inoperable by by ITS ITS LCO LCO number number and describe the inoperability. inoperability. 8.8.3 Determine if the ITS Support Feature inoperability causes an ITS Supported Feature to not meet its LCO AND record as applicable. 8.8.4 IF no ITS Supported Feature is inoperable due to the ITS Support Feature being inoperable, THEN perform the following:
- 1. N/A the remaining steps and sign Completed By.
- 2. Forward the attachment to the SSO for review.
- 3. IF the Support Feature will NOT be returned to service prior to end of shift, THEN attach the LOSE LOSF Worksheet to the EIR for the ITS Support Feature.
4.
- 4. IF IF the Support Support Feature Feature will be be returned to to service prior prior to to end end ofof shift, shift, THEN file LOSE LOSF Worksheet in in EIR EIR notebook.
notebook. 8.8.5 8.8.5 Determine Determine ifif ITS ITS Support Support Features Feature's LCO LCO requires CASCADIN "CASCADING" G to to ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature(s)Feature(s) REQUIRED ACTION and ACTION and record record as as applicable. applicable. 1.
- 1. IF IF ITS ITS Support Support Features Feature's LCO LCO requires requires CASCADIN "CASCADING" G toto ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature(s)
Feature(s) REQUIRED REQUIRED ACTION, ACTION, THEN THEN the the SFD SFD is is complete. complete. 2.
- 2. N/A the N/A the remaining remaining steps steps and and sign sign Completed Completed By. By.
3.
- 3. Forward Forward the the attachment attachment to to the the SSO SSO for for review.
review. Attach Attach thethe LOSE LOSF Worksheet Worksheet to to the the EIR EIR for for the the ITS ITS Support Support Feature. Feature. OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. 76 Rev. 76 Page 25 Page 25 of 85\ of 85
8.8.6 8.8.6 Determine ififany Determine anyother otherITSITS Support Support LCOs LCOs are are not not met, met, and and record record the the impact impact of ofthe the inoperabilities inoperabilities on on all all applicable applicable ITS ITS Supported Supported Features. Features. 8.8.7 8.8.7 Determine ifif any Determine any redundant redundant ITS ITS Supported Supported FeaturesFeatures are are inoperable. inoperable. 1.1. IFIF no no redundant redundant ITS ITS Supported Supported Features Features are are inoperable, inoperable, THEN THEN the SFD the SFD isis complete. complete. 2.
- 2. N/A the N/A the remaining remaining stepssteps and and sign sign Completed Completed By. By.
3.
- 3. Forward the Forward the attachment attachment to to the the SSO SSO for for review.
review. Attach Attach the the LOSF LOSE Works Worksheet heet to the ITS to the ITS Supported Supported Feature's Features EIR. EIR. 8.8.8 8.8.8 IF aa redundant IF redundant ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature Feature isis inoperable, inoperable, THEN THEN determine determine ifif a Loss a Loss of of Safety Safety Function Function (LOSF) (LOSF) exists exists for for the the ITS ITS Supported Supported Feature. Feature. 8.8.9 8.8.9 IF there IF there isis no LOSE, THEN no LOSF, THEN perform perform the following: following: 11.. Calculate and record Calculate record the maximum maximum completion completion time to restore restore the the ITS Suppo rt ITS Support Feature Featur e AND associated associated ITS Supported Supported Feature(s) Feature(s) toto operable status. operable
- 2. remaining steps and sign Completed N/A the remaining Completed By.
- 3. Forward the attachment Forward attachment to the SSO for review. review. Attach the LOSF LOSF Worksheet to the ITS Supported Worksheet Supported Feature's Features EIR.
8.8.10 8.8.10 IF there is aa LOSE LOSF,, THEN perform the following: 1.
- 1. Calcul Calculateate andand record the maximmaximum completion um compl etion time to restore the the ITS ITS Suppo Support rt Featur Feature e and and associa associated ted ITSITS Suppo Supported Feature(s) rted Featur to e(s) to operab operable le status.
status. 2.
- 2. Enter Enter thethe applica applicableble ITS ITS LCO LCO for for the the ITS ITS Suppo Supported Feature rted Featur OR e OR ITS ITS LCO LCO 3.0.33.0.3 as as applica applicable.
ble. 3.
- 3. Attach Attach the the LOSE LOSF Works Worksheet heet to to the the ITS ITS Suppo Supported Feature's rted Featur EIR.
es EIR. 8.8.11 8.8.11 The The individ ual who individual who comple completedted the the worksh worksheet shall sign eet shall sign and and date date the the worksh worksheet.eet. 8.8.12 8.8.12 The The SSO SSO shall shall sign sign and and date date the the worksh worksheet.eet. [ OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev. 76 76 Page26 Page 851 26ofof85
8.9 8.9 InoperableITSITRM/ODCM/RG Inoperable ITSITRM/ODCM/RG1.97 1.97Components ComponentsThat ThatWill WillBe BeReturned Returnedtoto ServicePrior Service PriortotoEndEndofofShift Shift[CAPR [CAPR193057]193057] { {TC TC"Inoperable Inoperable ITS!TRM/ODCM/RG1.97 ITSfTRM/ODCM/RG 1.97 ComponentsThat Components ThatWill WillBeBeReturned ReturnedtotoService ServicePrior PriortotoEnd Shift \f\fCC\1\l"2" EndofofShift" } 2) 8.9.1 8.9.1 Enterthe Enter the name name of ofthe the equipment equipmentAND ANDthethe reason reason for forthe the equipment equipment inoper ability inoperability inin AUTO AUTO log. log. 8.9.2 8.9.2 Verify aa Work Verify Work Request Request has has been been initiated initiated (if(if applicable) applicable) AND AND enter enterthethe WR numbe WR numberr inin AUTO AUTO log. log. 8.9.3 8.9.3 IF IF the the unavailability unavailability isis unplanned, unplanned, AND AND thethe component component isis part part of of aa system listed system listed on on Attachment Attachment 10.10, 10.10, THEN THEN reviewreview OMM-048OMM-048 AND the AND the Mainte nance Rule Maintenance Rule Scopingg andScopin and Performance Performance Criteria Criteria Basis Basis section section of of the Maintenance the Maintenance Rule Rule Database Database to to determine determine ifif the the listed listed function(s) of function(s) of the system is/are the system is/are affected.affecte d. 8.9.4 8.9.4 IFIF aa system system function function isis affected, affected, THEN THEN initiate initiate an an NCRNCR statingstating aa Safety Safety Significant Functional Significant Functional Failure Failure hashas occurred occurred lAW OMM-048, and lAW OMM-048, and enter enter the the NCR# NCR # in AUTO log. in AUTO log. 8.9.5 8.9.5 applicable LCO, TRMS or Specification Enter applicable Specification number number in AUTO log. log. BeBe specifi specific. c. For example, provide example, provide table number number and item number number where where applicable. applicable. Examples: Examples: LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1 Item 7.a TRMS 3.10, Table 3.10-1 Item 3 Specif ication 2.6.3, Table 2.6-1 Item Specification Item 4.c 8.9.6 8.9.6 Determ Determine ine the maxim maximum um time time the equipm equipment ent is is allowe allowed d to bebe inoper inoperable. able. 8.9.7 8.9.7 Determ Determine ine applica ble surveil applicable lances or surveillances or activit activities and require ies and required frequencies d freque ncies which are require d as which are required as aa result result ofof the the compo component inoperability. nent inoper ability. 8.9.8 8.9.8 IF IF the the compo component nent isis an an ITS ITS Suppo Support System compo rt System component, nent, THEN perform THEN perform Attach ment 10.11, Attachment 10.11, Loss Loss of of Safety Safety Functi Function Worksheet on Works heet AND file AND file Works worksheet heet inin EIR EIR notebo notebook. ok. 8.9.9 8.9.9 IF IF the the compo component nent isis an an ITS ITS Suppo Supported System Compo rted System Component, THEN nent, THEN review review openopen LossLoss ofof Safety Safety Functi Function Worksheets for on Worksheets for impact AND impact enter AND enter inin AUTO AUTO log log to to docum document ent review review.. OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev.76 76 Page27 Page 27ofof85851
ATTACHMENT 10.11 ATTACHMENT 10.11 Page 11 of Page of 44 LOSS OF LOSS OF SAFETY SAFETY FUNCTION FUNCTION WORKSHEET WORKSHEET [CAPR 193057] [CAPR { TC "LOSS 193057] {TC LOSS OF OF SAFETY SAFETY FUNCTION FUNCTION WORKSHEET" WORKSHEET \f\f C C \1\I "2" 2)} CONTINUOUS USE CONTINUOUS USE NOTE: NOTE: The numbers The numbers in in the the flow flow chartchart correspond correspond to to the the description description of of SFD SFD stepssteps inin Appendix CC of Appendix the TRM. of the TRM. 3. DOES TIlE 2.
- 2. NO NO TS SUPPORT TSSUPPORT DETERMINE TIlE DETERMINE IMPACT THE IMPACT FEATURE IS TIlE INOPERABILITY HAS THE INOPERABlLITY HAS FEATURE RESULT N
çBLE IN A SUPPORTED ON APPLICABLE ON APPLICABLE FEATURE LCO NOT SUPPORTED FEATURES SUPPORTED FEATURES YES 5.
5.
- 8. DOES TIlE DOES THE 8.
DETERMINE TIlETHE IMPACT IMPACT YES SUPPORT FEATURE SUPPORT FEATURE DETERMINE THE INOPERABlLITIES INOPERABILITIES TS ACTIONS TS ACTIONS REQUIRE REQUIRE THE HAVE ON ALL APPLICABLE ON ALL APPLICABLE CASCADING TO "CASCADING" TO TIlE THE HAVE SUPPORTED FEATURES FEATURES SUPPORTED FEATURE(S) SUPPORTED TS ACTIONS? [ NO YES
- 9. 10.
ARE ANY NO NO SFD IS COMPLETE. REDUNDANT SUPPORTED 6. REVIEW THE TIlE SFD ANY FEATURES INOPERABLE? TIME AN ADDITIONAL ENTER THE TIlE APPLICABLE TS INOPERABILITY OCCURS OR INOPERABlLITY ACTIONS OF TIlE THE A SUPPORTED FEATURE IS SUPPORTED DECL4RED DECLARED INOPERABLE FEATURETS FEATURE TS YES YES 11. DOES A NO LOSF EXIST FOR THE SUPPORTED FEATURE TS? YES CALCULATE 12. 12. AND TRACK CALCULATE AND TRACK THETIlE ENTER ENTER THE I13. 13. TIlE APPLICABLE APPLICABLE TS TS CALCULATE 14. 14. AND TRACK CALCULATE AND TRACK THE THE REVIEW REVIEW THE 15. 15. THE SFD SFD ANY ANY TIME TIME MAXIMUM COMPLETION MAXIMUM COMPLETION ACTIONS OFTHE ACTIONS OF TIlE SUPPORTED SUPPORTED MAXIMUM MAXIMUM COMPLETION COMPLETION AN ADDITIONAL AN ADDITIONAL TIME TO TIME RESTORE THE TO RESTORE TIlE FEATURE TS. FEATURETS. TIME TO TIME RESTORE THE TO RESTORE TIlE INOPERABlLITY OCCURS INOPERABILITY OCCURS OR OR SUPPORT FEATURE AND SUPPORT FEATURE AND SUPPORT FEATURE AND SUPPORT FEATURE AND AA SUPPORTED SUPPORTED FEATURE FEATURE ISIS ASSOCIATED ASSOCIATED SUPPORTED SUPPORTED ASSOCIATED ASSOCIATED SUPPORTED SUPPORTED DECLARED INOPERABLE. DECLARED INOPERABLE. FEATURE(S) FEATURE(S) TO TO OPERABLE OPERABLE FEATURE(S) FEATURE(S) TO TO OPERABLE OPERABLE STATUS STATUS STATUS. STATUS. OMM-007 IOMM-007 Rev. Rev. 76 76 Page 56 Page 56 ofof 8585
3.7. 3.7. OperabilityConcern Operability ConcernReview Review(OCR) (OCR) Thisisisan This anaction actiontotoresolve resolvean anoperability operabilityconcern concernthat thathashasbeen beenidentified identifiedthrough through initiationof initiation ofan an NCRNCRper perCAP-NGGC-0200. CAP-NGGC-0200. This Thisisisalso also referred toas referred to asan anOperability Operability Concern Response. Concern Response. An An OCR OCRisisaaPassPort PassPortassignment assignmentused usedtotodocument documentthe the results results of ofanan Operability OperabilityReview Reviewfor forNCRs NCRswherewhereeither eitherthe theattribute attributefor foran an OCROCRor or OPER ISSUE OPER ISSUE isis checked checked Y. Y. This Thisisisthe theassignment assignmenttype type used used totodocument documentthe the basisfor basis foran an Operability Operability Determination Determination.. 3.8.
.~ 3.B.
Operability Determination Operability Determination The actual The actual determination determination of of Operability Operability must must bebe made made by by aa licensed licensed individual. individual. Routin e confirm ation Routine confirmation of Operability of Operab ility isis usually usually made made with with out out an an OCR OCR whilewhile screening screening Work Requests Work Requests and and NCRs. NCRs. IfIf required required an an OCR OCR isis prepared prepared to to assist assist Operations. An Operations. An Operability Determination Operability Determination typically typically starts starts when when Operations Operations determinesdetermines that that anan OCR OCR is required and is required and itit typically typically ends ends when when the the applicable applicable on-shifton-shift licensed licensed operator operator accept s accepts the OCRthe OCR basis.basis. 3.9.
-7 3.9. - Quality-Related Quality-Related The term The term "quality-related" quality-related encompasses encompasses the NRC quality assurance assurance controls controls and and requirements imposed requirements imposed on a nuclear nuclear power plant. This specifically specifically includes those includes those activities, services, activities, services, and equipmentequipment associated associated with safety-related safety-related structures, structures, system s and systems and componentscomponents such as environmentalenvironmental and effluent effluent monitoring; monitoring; Technical Technical Specification surveillance; Specification surveillance; operations; operations; radiological radiological emergency emergency planning;planning; firefire protect ion; radiati protection; radiation on protection; protection; packag packaging ing radioac radioactive tive material transport; material for transpo rt; radioac radioactive tive waste manag managementement system systems; s; securit security systems; y system anticipated s; anticip transient ated transie nt withou withoutt scram scram (ATW (ATWS) S) equipm equipment;ent; and enviro environmentally nmentally qualifi qualified components.
ed compo nents. 3.10. 3.10. Safety -Related Safety-Related Those Those SSCs SSCs reliedrelied upon upon to to remain remain functio functionalnal during during and and follow following design basis ing design basis events events to to ensure ensure the the integri ty of integrity of the the reactor reactor coolan coolantt pressupressure boundary, re boundary, the the capabi lity to capability to shut shut down down the the reactor reactor andand mainta maintainin itit inin aa safe safe shutdo shutdown condition, wn condit and ion, and the the ability ability to to preven prevent t or or mitiga te the mitigate the conseq uences of consequences of accide accidents that could nts that could result result in in potenti potential al offsite offsite exposu exposuresres compa comparablerable to to the the guideli guideline exposures of 10 ne exposures of 10 CFR 50.67. CFR 50.67. II OPS-N GGC-1 305 OPS-NGGC-1305 I Rev. Rev.I 1 I Page77ofof50 Page 50 II
4.0 RESPO RESP NSIBIILITIE ONSIB LITIES S 4.1. Manag Mana er-Ope ger-O rations perati ons 4.1.1. Ensur Ensure ess that an Opera Operabbility ility Determination completion time is establ establiished shed and communicat unicate edd to the SSO for entry into the shift logs. 4.1.2. Ensur Ensureess that a compl completedeted Opera Operabbility ility Determination is reviewrevieweded by the Plant Nucle Nucleaarr Safety Comm ittee (PNSC) per site specif specifiicc procedures. 4.1.3. Shoul Should d ensure the following action actionss are taken:
- 1. Obtain a copy of the NCR.
- 2. Determine the allowe d time limit for completion of the Opera Operabbility ility Concern Review Revie w (OCR).
- 3. Inform affected personnel of any time limits for completing the OCR.
4.2. Superi Supe ntende rinten dentnt - Shift Opera
- Operattions ions (SSO)
Superiintend The Super ntende nt - Shift Opera ent Operattions ions (SSO) is responsible for determining ining the operabbility opera ility of SSC. In order to carry out this respon responsibility sibility, the SSO should take or verify that the following action actionss are promptly tly taken as neede neededd:: 4.2.1. Routin Routinee screening of deficie deficiencies ncies (including WRs, WO tasks, NCRs NCRs,, observations and notific notifications ations)) should ensure that items have been appro approppriate riately ly dispositioned with respect to OperaOperabbilityility and degra degrad ed or non-c ded non-coonform nformiingng conditions. Items will typicallly typica ly be dispositioned as follow follows:s:
~1. 1. Operabbility If Opera ility can be readily confirmconfirmed ed and the item is not a degradegrad ed or non-ded non conforming condition, this proce proced ure can be used for guidance but no specif dure specifiicc actionss to comply with this procedure are required. Documentation action of the determination should be included in the WR, NCR or in a log entry.
~
r, 2. Operabbility If Opera ility can not be readily confirm confirmed, ed, or the item is a degra degrad ed or non-ded non conforming condition, an NCR is requir require edd and the provisions of this procedure applica are applic ble. able.
- 3. If there is not a reasonable expec expecttation ation that the SSC is Opera Operab le, then the ble, applica applic ble SSC shall be declar able declare edd inoperable. An NCR is requir require edd and the provisiions provis ons of this proce proced ure are applic dure applica ble.
able. 4.2.2. Logging in the shift logs the initiati initiation on of an Opera Operabbility ility Determination, the time and date of initiati initiation, on, and the allowed compl comple tion time determined by the etion Manager-Op er-Ope rationss.. eration [dSNGGC IOPS- NGGC-1 305
-1305 Rev. 1 1 Page 8 of 50 I
SALEMFOXTROT SALEM FOXTROT 2001 NRC 2001 NRCWRITTEN WRITTENEXAMINATION EXAMINATION WORKSHEET WORKSHEET Question Question SRO 71 SR071 Number: Number: Question: Question: Unit 11 isis operating Unit operating atat 100% 100% power. power.
** 11 SI 11 SI pump pump isis INOPERABLE INOPERABLEdue due to to repairs repairs estimated estimated toto take take 48 48 hours hours
** An audit An audit of ofcompleted completed surveillance surveillance procedures procedures hashas determined determined the the quarterly quarterly surveillance performed surveillance perfonned on on 1212 SI SI pump pump 37 37 days ago was improperly completed.
days ago was improperly completed. Which one Which one ofof the the following following describes describes the the appropriate appropriate action action per per Technical Technical Specifications? Specifications? A. A. Commence aa plant Commence plant shutdown shutdown within within 11 hour hour B. B. Demonstrate the Demonstrate the operability operability of of 1212 SI SI pump pump within within 11 hour hour or or commence commence aa plant plant shutdown shutdown c. C. Demonstrate the operability of 12 12 SI SI pump pump within within 24 hours hours oror commence commence aa plant plant shutdown shutdown D. D. Demonstrate the operability of 12 12 SI pump within 72 hours or commence a plant shutdown Answer: Answer: C Justification: Justification: Enter TS 3.0.3, but operability can be demonstrated within 24 hours per TS 4.0.3, since the Enter action action statement is less than 24 hours. A and B B represent inappropriate application of ofTS TS 3.0.3 3.0.3 and D represents inappropriate application of and ofTSTS 3.5.2 Tier/Group Tier/Group 33 10CFR55.41 10CFR55.41 43.2 43.2 Because it requires a from 'from memory memory' application of of Tech Tech Specs in a situation where where 10CFRSS TS 3.0.3 3.0.3 is applied but the 24 hour exception per 4.0.3 will also apply. The SRO has to 10CFR55.43 determine determine the the appropriate course of action course of action Bank/New! BanklNew/ Modified Modified Modified Modified K/A KlA#:#: 2.2.24, 2.2.24, Knowledge Knowledge of of effects effects ofof maintenance maintenance activities activities on on LCOs LCOs K/A KIA Values: Values: RO 2.6 RO 2.6 SROSRO 3.83.8 Cognitive Cognitive Application Application Level: Level:
References:
References:
TS TS 3.0.3, 3.0.3, 4.0.3 4.0.3 LP 0300-000-OO LP S-TECHSP-01, Objectives 0300-000-00S-TECHSP-Ol, Objectives 13 13 and and 1414
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 Written Exam NRC Written Exam
- 98. Given the
- 98. Given the following:
following: The Reactor
- The
- Reactor hashas tripped tripped from from 100%
100% RTP. RTP. RCS temperature
- RCS
- temperature isis 430430 of.
°F.
RCS pressure
- RCS
- pressure isis 635 PSIG.
635 PSIG.
- S/G
- A pressure S/G "A" pressure isis 100 100 PSIG.
PSIG. S/G "B"
- S/G
- pressure isis 50 B pressure PSIG.
50 PSIG. SIG "C"
- S/G
- pressure is C pressure is 50 PSG.
50 PSIG. CV pressure
- CV
- pressure is is approximately approximately 38 38 PSIG.
PSIG. Which ONE (1) of the following describes the correct mitigation strategy? strategy? Throttle Feedwater A. Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 S/Gs to 80 to to 90 90 GPM lAW Foldout GPM lAW Foldout A. B. Isolate Feedwater to S/Gs "B" B and "C" C lAW Foldout A. C. Isolate Feedwater to ALL S/Gs lAW EPP-16, EPP-1 6, UNCONTROLLED UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. GENERATORS. D. Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM lAW EPP-16, UNCONTROLLEDUNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. DEPRESSURIZATION GENERATORS. 98 98
G2.4.6 OOlJEMERO 02.4.6 00 1JEMERG PROCIPLAN/3/3.7/4.7/SRO/HIGH/43.S/NEW PROC/PLAN/3/3.7/4.7/SROIHIGHJ43 .5/NEW - 200SJEPP-16-003
- 2008/EPP- 16-003 Given the Given the following:
following:
- The
- Reactor has The Reactor tripped from has tripped from 100%
100% RTP. RTP.
- RCS
- temperature isis 430 RCS temperature 430 of.
°F.
- RCS
- pressure isis 635 RCS pressure PSIG.
635 PSIG.
- S/G - A pressure S/G "A" pressure isis 100 100 PSIG.
PSIG. S/G "8"
- S/G
- B pressure pressure isis 50 50 PSIG.
PSIG. SIG "c"
- S/G - pressure is C pressure is 50 PSIG.
50 PSIG.
- CV - pressure isis approximately CV pressure approximately 38 PSIG.
38 PSIG. Which ONE (1) (1) of of the following describes the correct mitigation strategy? strategy? Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM A. Throttle Feedwater GPM lAWlAW Foldout Foldout A. B. Isolate Feedwater to S/Gs "8" B and "c" C lAW Foldout A. C. Isolate Feedwater to ALL S/Gs lAW EPP-16, EPP-1 6, UNCONTROLLED UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION DEPRESSURIZATION OF GENERATORS. ALL STEAM GENERATORS. D Throttle Feedwater to ALL S/Gs to 80 to 90 GPM lAW EPP-16, UNCONTROLLED D~ UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS. DEPRESSURIZATION GENERATORS. The correct answer is D. A: Incorrect - Correct mitigative strategy, but Foldout A requires 1 1 intact S/G. Stem conditions indicate that ALL S/Gs are faulted and EPP-16 will be used. B: 8: Incorrect - Correct mitigative strategy and correct procedure for 22 faulted S/Gs. Stem conditions indicate that ALL S/Gs are faulted and EPP-1 EPP-16 6 will be used. C: Incorrect - EPP-16 is the correct procedure to enter, however, C: - however, the mitigative mitigative strategy strategy is is incorrect, incorrect, Feedwater would NOT be isolated to ALL S/Gs. S/Gs. D: D: Correct - - Stem Stem conditions conditions indicate indicate that ALL S/Gs S/Gs are faulted and and EPP-16 will be be used. used. EPP-16 EPP-16 throttles throttles flow to ALL S/Gs flow to S/Gs to 80 to to 80 to 9090 GPM. This ensures GPM. This ensures S/G S/G internals internals are are kept kept wet. wet.
Exam Question Exam Question Number: Number: 98 98
Reference:
EPP-16,
Reference:
EPP-1 6, Pages Pages 33 and and 8; EPP-1 6 SO, 8; EPP-16 BD, Page Page 18; 18; Foldout Foldout A,A, Pages Pages 3-8. 3-8. KA Statement: KA Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of EOP mitigation of EOP mitigation strategies. strategies. History: New History: New - Written
- Written for for HLC-08 HLC-08 NRC NRC exam.
exam. SRO - Detailed SRO - Detailed knowledge knowledge and and implementation implementation of of the the EOP EOP network network mitigation mitigation strategy strategy past past the the Immediate Actions. Immediate Actions. KA Name: KA Name: EMERG PROCIPLAN EMERG PROC/PLAN Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 33 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 3.7/4.7 3.7/4.7 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: NEW - 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: EPP-16-003 EPP-16-003
UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. Rev. 16 16 E P -16 UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF OF ALL ALL STEAM STEAM EPP-16 GENERATORS GENERATORS Page Page 33 of of 33 33 Purpose Purpose and and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1) 1.
- 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides actions actions for for aa loss loss of of secondary secondary coolant coolant which affects which affects all all Steam Steam Generators.
Generators. 2.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS EPP-11, Faulted EPP-11, Faulted Steam Steam Generator Generator Isolation, Isolation, when when an an uncontrolled uncontrolled depressurizat ion of depressurization all Steam of all Steam Generators Generators occurs.
occurs.
- END
- END --
UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. Rev. 1616 EPP-lo UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF OF ALL ALL STEAM STEAM EPP-16 GENERATORS GENERATORS Page Page 8 8 of of 33 33 H STEP H INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS I L RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 9.9. Control Feed Control Feed Flow Flow ToTo Minimize Minimize RCS Cooldown As Follow RCS Cooldown As Follows:s:
- a. Throttle
- a. Throttle feed feed flow flow to to between a.
- a. Establish Establish between between between 80 80 gpm gpm and and 80 gpm and 90 gpm to each 80 gpm and 90 gpm to each SIG 90 90 gpm gpm feed S/G feed flow flow toto each each SIG S/G using MDAFW using MDAFW FLOW FLOW CONTROLLER:
CONTROLLER: as as follows: follows:
** FIC-l424, AFW FIC-1424, AFW PUMP PUMP AA 1)
- 1) Open Open the the breakers breakers for for DISCH FLOW DISCH FLOW MDAFW MDAFW HEADER HEADER DISCHARGE DISCHARGE Valves:
Valves: OR
** V2-16A V2-16A (MCC-9, (MCC9,
** FIC-1425, AFW FIC-142S, AFW PUMP PUMP BB COMPT-2ML)
COMPT-2ML) DISCH FLOW DISCH FLOW
** V2-16C V2lGC (MCC-9, (MCC-9, COMPT-3J)
COMPT-3J)
** V2-16A V2-l6A (MCC-I0, (MCC-l0, COMPT-4C)
COMPT -4 C)
- V2-16B (MCC-I0, (MCC-10, COMPT-4F)
COMPT-4F)
- 2) Locally throttle AFW Locally throttle HDR AFW HDR DISCH Valves DISCH Valves to to establi establish sh 80 gpm 80 gpm toto 90 90 gpm gpm to to each each S/G:
S/G:
** AFW-V2-16A - S/G AFW-V2-l6A -
SIG "A" A
** AFW-V2-16B - S/G AFW-V2-l6B -
SIG "B" TI
** AFW-V2-16C - S/C AFW-V2-l6C -
"c" SIG C
- 3) Go
- 3) Go ToTo Step Step 11.
11. b.
- b. Go Go ToTo Step Step 1111
RNP WOO WOG BASIS/ BASIS/DIFFE DIFFER ENCES RENC STEP ES STEP 7 2 WOG BASIS PURPOSE: PURPO SE: control feed flow to minimiz To control minimize e the effects of the cooldow cooldown n due to the secondary depresdepressurizat surizatiion on and to subseq subsequently uently control control the transien transient. t. BASIS: BASIS: Depending Depend ing upon the size of the effectiv effective e break areas for the steam generators, the cooldow cooldown n rate experienced after reactor trip could exceed 100°F/h 100°F/hr. r. A reductio reduction n of feed flow to the steam generators has three primary primary effects: effects:
- 1. To minimiz minimize e any addition additional cooldown al cooldow resulting n resultin g from the addition addition of feedwater,
- 2. To prevent steam generator tube dryout by maintai maintaining ning a minimu minimum m feed flow to the steam generators and,
- 3. To minimiz minimize e the water invento inventory ry in the steam generators that eventua eventually lly is the source additional of addition al steam flow to containment or the environ environment ment..
The minimu minimum m feed flow of (S.04) gpm represents the value in plant specific specific units corresponding to 25 gpm. The 25 gpm value is representative of a minimum minimu m measurable feed flow to a steam genera generator. Plant specific specific values may depend upon flow instrumentation and the sensitiv sensitivity ity of the controls controls on the feed flow. As steam flow rate drops, the feed flow will eventua eventually lly increase the steam generator inventory. invento ry. Feed flow is control controlled led to maintai maintain n steam generator tor narrow range level less than 50% to prevent overfee overfeeding ding the steam generators. addition,, as SG pressure and steam flow rate drop, RCS hot leg In addition temperatures will stabilize and .start start increasing. The operator controls controls feed flow or dumps steam to stabilize the RCS hot leg temperatures. This allows the safety injectio injectionn flow to establis establish h conditions conditio ns for SI termina terminationtion and minimiz minimizes es thermal stresses that may be generated. RNP DIFFER DIFFERENC ENCES ES/RE/REASASONONS S Step 7 of the RNP procedure represents step 2.a of the ERG. The RNP step has been split into multiple multiple steps in order to eliminaeliminatete the actions contained in the ERG Caution Caution at step 2 and to provide provide for other Human Factors Factors concern concernss associated with the ERG step. SSD DETER DETERMIN MINAT ATION ION This is an SSD per criterion criterion 11. 8-11 C2 WOG BASIS PURPOSE: PURPO SE: To alert the operator to maintai maintain n a minimu minimum m feed flow to minimiz minimize e any subsequent thermal shock to SG compon components ents BASIS: BASIS:
-?[ If feed flow to a SG is isolated Maintai Maintaining a "wet" ning a minimu wet conditio minimum condition, isolated and the SG is allowed feed flow to the SG could create signific m verifia verifiab n, thereby minimiz ble significant allowed to dry out, subsequent reinitiat ant thermal stress conditio conditionsns on SG compon le feed flow to the SG allows the compo nents to remain in minimizing ing any thermal shock effects if feed flow is increased.
reinitiation ion of components. ents. RNP DIFFER DIFFERENC ENCES ES/RE/REASASONONS S The RNP procedure places the caution or note in an action step to prevent actions within cautions and noted as required by the writer's writers guide. The RNP steps for throttlin throttling g have been split since the throttle valves are differen differentt for the SDAFW SDAFW Pumps and the MDAFW MDAFW Pumps. I EPP-16-BD EPP-16-BD I Rev16 Rev 16 Page 18 of 441 44 I
Rev. Rev. 2727 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page Page 33 ofof 16 16 Purpose and Purpose and Entry Entry Conditions Conditions (Page (Page 11 of of 1) 1) 1.
- 1. PURPOSE PURPOSE This procedure This procedure provides provides actions actions to to respond respond to to circumstances circumstances within within the EOP the EOP Network Network which which are are time time independent.
independent. NOTE The Foldouts The Foldouts do do NOT apply apply during during performance performance ofof the the FRPs. FRPs. 2.
- 2. ENTRY CONDITIONS ENTRY CONDITIONS When directed When directed by the EOPEOP Network. Only Only one Foldout is applicable at aa time.
at time.
- END -
Rev. Rev. 27 27 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page 4 off 16 Page4o 16 CONTINUOUS CONTINUOUS USE USE FOLDOUT FOLDOUT A A (Page (Page 11 of of 5) 5) 1.
- 1. RCP TRIP RCP TRIP CRITERIA CRITERIA
\
IFIF BOTH BOTH conditions conditions below below are are met. met, THEN THEN stop stop all all RCPs: RCPs:
** SI Pumps SI Pumps - AT
- AT LEAST LEAST ONE ONE RUNNING RUNNING AND CAPABLE CAPABLE OF OF DELIVERING DELIVERING FLOW FLOW TO THE TO THE CORE CORE
** RCS Subcooling RCS Subcooling - LESS
- LESS THAN THAN 35°F 35°F [55°F]
[55°F] 2.
- 2. SI ACTUATION SI ACTUATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF EITHER IF EITHER condition condition below below occurs.
occurs, THEN Actuate SI SI and Go Go To To PATH-l, Entry PATH-l. Entry Point A: A:
** RCS Subcooling RCS Subcooling - LESS THAN 35°F [55°F]
** PZR Level PZR Level - CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 10% [32%] [32%]
3.
- 3. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF IF CST CST level level decreases to less than 10%. 10%, THEN switch to to backup backup water water supply supply using using OP-402. Auxiliary Feedwater System.
4.
- 4. EMERGENC EMERGENCY Y COOLING COOLING WATER WATER SWITCHOV SWITCHOVER ER CRITERIA IF normal normal cooling cooling isis lost lost to to any any of of the the following components, components. THEN THEN establish establish emergency emergency cooling cooling water water using using the the referenced referenced procedure:
procedure:
** Charging Charging Pump Pump Oil Oil Coolers Coolers - Use
- Use Attachment Attachment 11 ofof AOP-Ol4, AOP-014.
Component Component Cooling Cooling Water Water System System Malfunction. Malfunction.
** SI SI Pump Pump Thrust Thrust Bearing Bearing - Use-Use Attachment Attachment 11 ofof AOP-O22, AOP-022. Loss Loss of of Service Service Water.
Water.
** MDAFW MDAFW Pumps Pumps - Use Use Attachment Attachment 22 of of AOP-022, AOP-022. Loss Loss of of Service Service Water.
Water.
EPP-F oldouts Rev. 27 FOLDOU FOLDOUTS TS Page 55 of 16 CONTI CONTINUOUNUOUS USE FOLDOU FOLDOUT T AA (Page 22 of 5)
- 5. DC BUS OR INSTRU INSTRUMEMENT NT BUS FAILURFAILURE E CRITER CRITERIAIA
- a. .L IF DC Bus failurfailure e has occur occurrred.
ed, THEN perfor performm the follow ing:
- 1) IF DC Bus A A fails.
fails, THEN perfor performm the follow ing: a) In the Charg Chargiing ng Pump Room.Room, Open CVC-35S. 58, RWST TO CHARG ING CHARGING PUMP SUCTIO SUCTION. N. b) WHEN CVC-3 S8 58 is open. open, THEN close LCV-l LCV-1lSC. 15C. VCT OUTLE OUTLETT from RTGB. c) In the E-l/E-E-1/E-2 Room. Room, trans ferr Instru transfe Instrumment ent Bus 2 2 to MCC-S MCC-8.. d) In the 4l60V 416OV Bus Room. Room, trip the Excit err Field Break Excite Breakeer. r. e) In EDG A A Room perforperformm the follow ing:
- Trip EDG A A Fuel Racks Racks..
- Close DA-21A DA-21A AND DA-2SA DA-25A.. DG DC "A" A AIR START OUTLE T OUTLET ISOLAT ISOLATIONION valve valvess..
- 2) IF DC Bus B B fails.
fails, THEN perfor performm the follow ing: a) In the E-l/E-E-1/E-2 Room. Room, trans transfeferr Instru Instrumment ent Bus 3 to MCC-S MCC-8.. b) In EDG B B Room. Room, perforperform m the follow ing:
- Trip EDG BOG B B Fuel Racks Racks..
- Close DA-21B DA21B AND DA-2SB DA-25B,. DG "B"B AIR START OUTLET ISOLAT ISOLATIONION valve valves s..
c) Close CVC-4 CVC-46O 60 A A && B. B, LTDN LINE STOPs.
- b. IF MCC-S MCC-5 is de-en de-ene ergize rgized, d. THEN trans transfeferr power source to DS Bus using the posted instru instruc ction tions s at the Kirk Key Interl ocked Interlo cked Break Breake ers.
rs. (CONTI NUED (CONTINUE D NEXT PAGE)
EPP-Foldout EPP-F oldouts Rev. 2727 FOLDO FOLDOUTS UTS Page 6 of 16 CONTINUOUS USE FOLDOU FOLDOUTT AA (Page 3 of 5) 55.. (CONTI NUED)) (CONTINUED
- c. IF Instru Instrume ment nt Bus failur failure e has occur occurred, red. THEN perfor performm the follow following ing::
- 1) IFIF Instru Instrume mentnt Bus 4 fails.
fails, THEN maint ain Steam Dump in the maintain Tavg Mode of operaoperation tion..
- 2) j IF a failur failuree of only ONE of the below Instru ment Instrume nt Busse Bussess occur occurs,s. THEN trans fer the failed failed bus .toto MCC-8 MCC-8..
- Instrume Instru mentnt Bus 11
- Instrume Instru mentnt Bus 22
- Instrume Instru mentnt Bus 33
- Instrume Instru ment nt Bus 4
- 3) IF more than ONE InstruInstrume ment nt Bus requi res trans fer to MCC-8 requires MCC-8 for Nucle Nucleaarr Safety Safety Conce rns.rns, THEN strip the affect ed Busse affected Bussess using Attach ment 14 of AOP-024. 24, Loss of Instru ment Instrume nt Bus.
Bus, prior to trans ferri ferrin ngg the Buss( Buss(e es) MCC-8. s) to MCC8
Rev. Rev. 2727 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page 77 of Page of 1616 CONTINUOUS USE CONTINUOUS USE FOLDOUT FOLDOUT AA (Page 44 of (Page of 5) 5) 6.6. MSR MSR ISOLATION ISOLATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF ANY Purge Purge OR Shutoff Valve
. Shutoff Valve does does notnot indicate indicate fully fully closed, closed, THEN THEN place the place the associated associated RTGB RTGB Switch Switch to to CLOSE.
CLOSE. 7.
- 7. EXCESS LETDOWN EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION ISOLATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF aa Phase IF Phase A Isolation signals A Isolation signals occurs, occurs, THEN THEN verify:
verify:
** CVC-387, EXCESS CVC-387, EXCESS LTDN LTDN STOP STOP - CLOSED
- CLOSED
** HIC-137, EXCESS HIC-I37, EXCESS LTDN LTDN FLOW FLOW - CONTROLLER
- CONTROLLER AT AT 0%
0% 8.
- 8. INADVERTENT CV INADVERTENT CV SPRAY SPRAY ACTUATION ACTIJATIONCRITERIA CRITERIA IF aa CVCV Spray Spray Actuation Actuation occurs AND Containment Containment Pressure Pressure has has remain ed below remained below 10 10 psig, psig, THEN perform the following:
following:
- a. Stop
- a. Stop ALL ALL RCPs.
RCPs.
- b. Stop CV
- b. Stop Spray Pumps CV Spray Pumps As Follow Follows: s:
- 1) Mome
- 1) ntarily place Momentarily place the CONTAINM CONTAINMENT Key Switch ENT SPRAY Key Switch to to the the OVRD/RESE OVRD/RESET T positio positionn AND return to the the NORMAL NORMAL positio position.
n. 2)
- 2) Stop Stop CVCV Spray Spray Pumps Pumps
- 3) Close
- 3) Close CVCV SPRAY SPRAY PUMP PUMP DISCH DISCH Valves Valves::
** SI-88O SI-880AA
** SI-880 SI-880BB
** SI-88O SI-880CC
** SI-880 SI-880DD
Rev. Rev. 2727 EPP-Foldouts EPP-Foldouts FOLDOUTS FOLDOUTS Page Page 88 ofof 1616 CONTINUOUS CONTINUOUS USE USE FOLDOUT FOLDOUT AA (Page 55 of (Page of 5)5) ~ 9.9. FAULTED FAULTED S/C ISOLATION S/G ISOLATION CRITERIA CRITERIA IF both IF both the conditions below the conditions below areare met,met, THEN THEN perform perform the the following: following:
** Any Any S/GS/G pressure pressure is is decreasing decreasing in in anan uncontrolled uncontrolled manne r Any manner OR Any S/G hasS/C has completely completely depressurized.
depressurized. AND AND
~
- At least ONE
- At least ONE S/G S/C is is intact.
intact.
- a. Reset
- a. Reset SI.
SI.
- b. CLOSE
- b. CLOSE the the appropriate appropriate Auxiliary Auxiliary Feedwater Feedwater isolation isolation valvesvalves toto the faulted the faulted S/Gs S/Cs ANDAND OPEN OPEN thethe associated associated breaker breaker for for thethe valves valves closed.
closed. S/C "A" S/G A
- V2-14 A, SDAFW SDAFW PUMP DISCH
- V2-14A, MCC-IO, MCC-1O, CMPT - 3C - 3C
** V2-16A, AFW V2-16A, AFW HDRHDR DISCH(Norm DISCH(Norm Pwr) MCC-IO, MCC-1O, CMPT - 4C - 4C (Emerg Pwr MCC-9, MCC-9, CMPT - 2ML)
- 2ML)
S/C S/G B "B"
- V2-14 V2-14B,B, SDAFW SDAFW PUMP PUMP DISCH MCC-9, MCC- 9, CMPT - 1C CMPT -
lC
- V2-16 B, AFW AFW HDR
- V2-16B, HDR DISCH DISCH MCC-IO, CMPT MCC-1O, CMPT - 4F 4F S/C S/G C "C"
- V2-l4C V2-14C,. SDAFW SDAFW PUMP
- PUMP DISCH DISCH MCC-IO, CMPT MCC-1O, CMPT - 4M
- V2-16 V2-16C,C, AFW AFW HDRHDR DISCH
- DISCH MCC-9, MCC- 9, CMPT - 3J CMPT -
3J c.
- c. WHEN WHEN the the faulted faulted S/Cs S/Gs dry dry out, out, THEN THEN dump dump steam steam from from intact intact S/C S/G to to contro control l RCS RCS repress urization.
repressurization.
- - END END --
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam Given the
- 99. Given
- 99. the following:
following: The plant
- The
- was operating plant was operating atat 100%
100% RTP, RTP when when aa Seismic Seismic event event occurred occurred and and caused caused aa leak leak in the in the Instrument Instrument Air Air header. header. The crew
- The
- crew has has implemented implemented AOP-017, AOP-017, LOSS LOSS OFOF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR and and AOP-021, AOP-021, SEISMIC DISTURBANCE.
SEISMIC DISTURBANCE. The reactor
- The
- reactor has has been been manually manually tripped tripped and and all all PATH-1 PATH-i Immediate Immediate Actions Actions have have been been completed and completed and verified.
verified. Which ONE Which ONE (1) of the (1) of the following following describes describes the the correct correct procedures procedures the the CRSS CRSS will will direct direct or or perform? perform? A. Perform the actions of PATH-1 PATH-i and AOP-021 concurrently. concurrently. B. Perform PATH-1 B. Perform PATH-i actions ONLY. AOP-017AOP-Oi 7 and and AOP-021 AOP-02i are NO NO longer applicable. C. Perform the actions of PATH-1 PATH-i and AOP-017 concurrently. concurrently. D. Perform the actions of PATH-1, PATH-i, AOP-017 AOP-Oi 7 and AOP-021 AOP-02i concurrently. concurrently. 99 99
02.4.8OOlfEMERG G2.4.S 00 1/EMERGPROCIPLAN/3/3.S/4.5/SROIHIGHl43.5INEW PROC/PLAN/3/3.8/45/SRO/HIGHI43.5/NEW- 200S/OMM-022-009- 2008/OMM-022-009 Given the Given thefollowing: following: The plant
- The
- plantwas was operating operating atat 100%100% RTP RTP when when aa Seismic Seismic event eventoccurred occurred andand caused caused aa leak leak inin the the Instrument Instrument Air Air header.
header. The crew
- The
- crew has has implemented implemented AOP-017,AOP-0i 7, LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR AIR and and AOP-021, AOP-021, SEISMIC DISTURBANCE.
SEISMIC DISTURBANCE. The reactor
- The
- reactor has has been been manually manually tripped tripped and and all all PATH-1 PATH-i Immediate Immediate Actions Actions have have been been completed and completed and verified.
verified. Which ONE Which ONE (1) (i) of the following of the following describes describes thethe correct correct procedures procedures the the CRSS CRSS will will direct direct or or perform? perform? A. Perform the A. Perform the actions actions of of PATH-1 PATH-i and and AOP-021 AOP-02i concurrently. concurrently. B. Perform PATH-1 B. Perform PATH-i actions actions ONLY.ONLY. AOP-017 AOP-0i7 and and AOP-021 AOP-021 are are NO NO longer longer applicable. applicable. Cv Perform C:I Perform the actions actions of of PATH-1 PATH-i andand AOP-017 AOP-0i7 concurrently. concurrently. D. Perform D. Perform the the actions actions of PATH-1, PATH-i, AOP-017 AOP-0i7 and AOP-021 concurrently. concurrently. The correct The correct answer answer is C. A: Incorrect - PATH-1 A: Incorrect - PATH-i is a higher priority procedure that will be implemented to verify the reactor reactor is shutdown and the plant stabilized. AOP-021 AOP-02i is NOT a concurrent use use procedure and is NOT required to be performed. B: B: Incorrect Incorrect - AOP-017 is a concurrent use procedure and will be performed by a licensed licensed operator when directed by the CRSS, concurrent with PATH-i PATH-1 actions. AOP-02i AOP-021 is NOT a concurrent use procedure. C: Correct C: Correct - - AOP-0i7 AOP-017 is is aa concurrent concurrent use use procedure procedure and and will be performed performed by by aa licensed operator when directed directed byby the CRSS, CRSS, concurrent concurrent with PATH-i PATH-1 actions. actions. D: D: Incorrect Incorrect - PATH-i PATH-1 is is aa higher higher priority priority procedure procedure thatthat will will be be implemented implemented to to verify verify the the reactor is shutdown reactor is shutdown and and thethe plant plant stabilized. stabilized. AOP-0i7 AOP-017 is is aa concurrent concurrent useuse procedure procedure and and will be performed will be performed by by aa licensed licensed operator operator when when directed directed byby the the CRSS, CRSS, concurrent concurrent with with PATH-i PATH-1 actions. actions. AOP-021 AOP-021 isis NOT NOT aa concurrent concurrent useuse procedure procedure and and isis NOT NOT required required toto be be performed. performed.
Exam Question Exam Question Number: Number: 99 99
Reference:
OMM-022,
Reference:
OMM-022, Page Page 3S.38. KA Statement: KA Statement: Knowledge Knowledge of of how how abnormal abnormal operating operating procedures procedures areare used used inin conjunction conjunction with with EOPs. EOPs. History: New History: New - Written
- Written for for HLC-OS HLC-08 NRCNRC exam.
exam. SRO - Assessment SRO - Assessment of of plant plant conditions conditions and and determination determination ofof procedures procedures required required forfor mitigating mitigating those events. those events. KA Name: KAName: EMERG PROC/PLAN EMERGPROCIPLAN Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 33 Importance Rating: Importance Rating: 3.8/4.5 3.8/4.5 RO/SRO Level: RO/SRO Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: HIGH HIGH 10CFR55.43 link: 10CFR55.43 link: 43.5 43.5 Source: Source: NEW 2008 NEW - 2008 Learning Objective: Learning Objective: OMM-022-009 OMM-022-009
8.3.14 Interface 8.3.14 Interface Between Between EOP EOP Network Network and and AOPs/Concurrent AOPs/Concurrent AOPs{ AOP5{Tc TC InterfaceBetween "Interface BetweenEOP EOP Network Networkand and AOPs/Concurrent AOPs \f\fCC \l\1 "3" AOPs/ConcurrentAOPs" 3 } } 1.
- 1. Events which Events which result result in in utilization utilization of of AOPs AOPs may may later later deteriorate deteriorate to to the point the point of of implementing implementing the the procedures procedures of of the the EOP Network.
EOP Network. When this When this occurs, occurs, the potential exists the potential exists for for equipment equipment to to be be improperly utilized improperly utilized and and forfor resources resources to to be be unnecessarily unnecessarily diluted diluted by continuing the by continuing the subsequent subsequent actionsactions of AOPs in of AOPs in effect effect or or implementing AOPs implementing AOPs which which may may become become applicable applicable while while trying trying toto concurrently proceed through concurrently proceed through the the EOP EOP Network. Network. 2.
- 2. With the With the exception exception of of concurrent concurrent AOPs, AC Ps, the the immediate immediate and and subsequent actions subsequent actions of of AOPs AOPs need need not be continued while within not be continued while within EOP Network the EOP Network since since the procedures procedures of the EOP EOP Network Network have have been constructed been constructed to to address address critical critical safety safety functions without these these AOPs.
- 3. The following AOPs are considered concurrent AOPs and should be performed while in the EOP Network:
- AOP-005
- AOP-014
~> *
- AOP-017
- AOP-018
- AOP-034
* .AOP-041 AOP-041 4.
- 4. In In the case of of the the above referenced AOPs, itit is is expected expected that the CRSS will continue with the EOP5 EOPs while another another licensedlicensed operator operator implements implements the the AOP AOP after after any any applicable applicable immediate immediate actions of of the the EOPs EOPs havehave been been completed. The The operator operator performing the the AOP AOP will will notify notify the the CRSS CRSS and and RTGB RTGB operator operator of of all all RTGB RTGB controls controls toto be manipulated be manipulated and/orand/or local local actions actions toto be be taken taken which which could could impact impact thethe performance performance of of the the EQ EOPs.
Ps. QMM-022 IOMM-022 Rev. Rev. 29 29 Page 38 Page 38 ofof 54 541
HLC-08 NRC HLC-08 NRC Written Written Exam Exam 100. Which 100. Which ONE (1) of ONE (1) of the the following following isis the the basis basis for for stopping stopping ALL ALL Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pumps Pumps (RCPs) (RCPs) FRP-H.1 inin FRP-H.1, RESPONSE RESPONSE TO TO LOSS LOSS OF OF SECONDARY SECONDARY HEAT HEAT SINK? SINK? A. Subsequent actions A. Subsequent actions will will cause cause RCP RCP operating operating requirements requirements to to be be exceeded. exceeded. B. ItIt eliminates B. eliminates the the heat heat input input from from the the RCPs RCPs to to extend extend the the time time available available to to restore restore feed feed flow flow before bleed before bleed and and feed feed criteria criteria isis met. met. C. ItIt minimizes C. minimizes thethe loss loss of of RCS inventory when RCS inventory when thethe PZR PZR PORVs PORVs are are OPENED OPENED to to initiate initiate bleed bleed and feed. and feed. D. Stopping D. Stopping thethe RCPs RCPs reduces reduces RCS RCS pressure pressure inin the the Cold Cold Legs Legs toto maximize maximize injection injection flow. flow. 100 100
G2.4. 18 001IEMERG G2.4.1S 00 1/EMERG PROCfPLAN/3/3.3/4.0/SROILOW/43.1INEW PROCIPLAN/3/3 .3/4.OISRO/L0W143. 1/NEW - 200S/FRP-H.I-003
- 2008/FRP-H. 1-003 Which ONE Which ONE (1) (1) of of the the following following isis the the basis basis for for stopping stopping ALLALL Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pumps Pumps (RCPs)
(RCPs) in FRP-H.1, RESPONSE in FRP-H.1, RESPONSE TO TO LOSS LOSS OF OF SECONDARY SECONDARY HEAT HEAT SINK? SINK? A. Subsequent actions A. Subsequent actions willwill cause cause RCP RCP operating operating requirements requirements to to be be exceeded. exceeded. B ItIt eliminates By eliminates the the heat heat input input from from the the RCPs RCPs to to extend extend the the time time available available toto restore restore feed feed flow flow before bleed before bleed andand feed criteria isis met. feed criteria met. C. minimizes the C. ItIt minimizes the loss loss of of RCS inventory when RCS inventory when the the PZR PZR PORVs PORVs are are OPENED OPENED to to initiate initiate bleed bleed and feed. and feed. D. Stopping D. Stopping the the RCPs RCPs reduces reduces RCSRCS pressure pressure inin the the Cold Cold Legs Legs to to maximize maximize injection injection flow. The correct answer is The is B. A: Incorrect Incorrect - Depressurization
- Depressurization of S/Gs is is performed performed in in an an attempt attempt to restore restore feed for corecore cooling, but cooling, but these actions would NOT lower RCS NOT lower RCS pressure to belowbelow RCPRCP operating conditions.
B: Correct - B: - Elimination of the RCPs as a heat source extends the time available before bleed and feed criteria is met by as much as 9 minutes. C: Incorrect C: Incorrect - RCS pressure will decrease when the PZR PORVs are opened. Stopping the RCPs to eliminate the heat input to the RCS is the primary reason. D: Incorrect - Stopping the RCP does reduce pressure, but does NOT have an impact on injection flow. Exam Question Number: 100
Reference:
FRP-H.1 BD, Pages 15, 16 and 48. KA Statement: Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. History: New - Written for HLC-08 NRC exam. SRO - Knowledge of of strategy strategy or or action in emergency procedures beyond immediate immediate actions. KA Name: KAName: EMERG PROC/PLAN EMERGPROCfPLAN Tier/Group: Tier/Group: 33 Importance Importance Rating: Rating: 3.3/4.0 3.3/4.0 RO/SRO RO/SRO Level: Level: SRO SRO Cognitive Level: Cognitive Level: LOW LOW 10CFR55.43 10CFR55.43 link: link: 43.1 43.1 Source: Source: NEW NEW - 2008 200S Learning Learning Objective: Objective: FRP-H.I-003 FRP-H. 1-003
2.4 Feeding 2.4 FeedingaaDry DrySteam SteamGenerator Generator IfIfbleed bleedand andfeedfeedhas hasbeen beeninitiated, initiated,during duringrestoration restorationofofsecondary secondaryheat heatsink, sink,feeding feedingaadry drysteam steamgenerator generatormay maybe be necessary. IfIfthe necessary. theevent eventwas wasinitiated initiatedfrom fromhighhightemperature temperatureand andhighhighdecay decayheat heatconditions conditionsititisislikely that feedwater likely that feedwater flowwill willhave havetotobe beestablished establishedtotoaahot, hot,drydrysteam steamgenerator. generator. AAhot, definedas flow hot,dry drysteam steamgenerator generatorisisdefined asaasteam steam generator in which generator in which the primary the primaryside sideofofthe thesteam steamgenerator generatorisisabove above550 550F** F**and andthethesecondary secondaryside sidehas hasno noliquid liquid inventory. Reestablishment inventory. Reestablishmentofoffeedwater feedwaterisisthe themore moredesirable desirablemode modeofofrecovery recoveryfrom fromaalosslossof ofsecondary secondaryheat heatsinksink thanremaining remainingon onbleed bleedand andfeed feedand andestablishing establishingcold coldleglegrecirculation recirculationfor forlong longterm termcooling coolingbecause than becausethis thiswill willbe be morelikely more likelytotoavoid avoid corecoreuncovery. uncovery. However, However, care caremust mustbe betaken takenwhenwhen re-establishing re-establishingfeedwaterfeedwaterflow flowtoto minimize minimize the effectsof the effects ofthermal thermal shock shockconsistent consistentwith withthetheurgency urgencyofofthe theneed needtotorestore restorethe thesecondary secondaryside side heatsink. heat sink. Sincethe Since heatremoval the heat removal capability capabilityof ofone one steam steam generator generatorisis alwaysalways greater greaterthan thandecay decayheat,heat, ititisisadvisable advisabletoto reestablish feedwater feedwatertoto only onlyoneone steam steam generator generatorregardless regardless of ofthe the size sizeof ofthe the plant plantorornumber numberof reestablish ofloops. loops. Thus, Thus, ifif aafailure failureinin an an SGSG occurs occurs due due toto excessive excessivethermalthermal stresses, stresses,the the failure failureisis isolated isolated toto oneone steam generator. steam generator. IfIfbleed bleed and and feed feed has has beenbeen initiated initiated andand RCS RCS temperature temperature isis increasing, increasing, the the re-establishment re-establishment of offeedwater feedwaterflow flow should be be limited limited to to one one steamsteam generator generator and and the the flow flow rate rate used used should high as as can can bebe made made available should should be be as as high available due due to to the urgency the urgency of the situation. ofthe situation. IfIf RCS RCS temperatures temperatures are are stable stable or or decreasing decreasing when when feedwater feedwater flow flow is restored the flow is restored the flow should be should directed to be directed to one one steam steam generator generator and and the the rate rate should should be be limited limited to to the the plant-specific plant-specific equivalent equivalent of of25 25 - 100 100 gpm until wide range level gpm until wide range level isis established. established. With With stable stable or or decreasing decreasing RCS RCS temperatures, temperatures, the the feedwater feedwater flow flow raterate isis limited to limited to minimize minimize the the potential potential impact impact of excessive thermal of excessive thermal stresses stresses since since aa direct direct measure measure of of thethe steam steam generator generator temperature isis not temperature not available. available. Once Once an an indicated indicated wide wide range range level level isis achieved achieved in in the affected steam the affected steam generator, generator, feedwater flow feedwater flow can can be be adjusted adjusted as as necessary necessary to to restore restore level level into into the the narrow narrow range range and and thereby thereby satisfying satisfying the the requirements for a secondary requirements for a secondary heat heat sink. sink. Once feedwater Once feedwater is established, the is established, the feeding feeding process process should should continue continue until until the the RCSRCS temperature temperature indications indications are are decreasing. decreasing. At At that that time time the the active active steam steam generator generator should should be be checked checked for for symptoms symptoms indicating indicating aa faultedfaulted or or ruptured condition. condition. IfIf the the active active steam steam generator generator is is faulted or ruptured, then or ruptured, then feedwater feedwater shouldshould be ruptured be established established to to another intact steam generator. another intact steam generator. IfIf an intact intact steam generator does does notnot exist, then a decision should be be made made to to use the use the best best available available steam steam generator, which may be the active steam generator. Once the heat load load has has beenbeen transferred to transferred to aa backup backup steam steam generator, the original steam generator should be isolated to prevent further prevent further radiation releases. radiation releases. Thus, the Thus, the process process of initiating feedwater to a dry ste~m of initiating steam generator, as described here, is one that accounts accounts for for the the fact that fact that the the steam steam generator generator temperature may be above 550 F. The number of steam generators that that may be may be fed fed inin a hot, a hot, dry dry condition condition are are limited limited and if RCS temperature is decreasing the flow rate is also limited so so as as to to limit the limit the thermal thermal shock shock to to the steam generator being fed. Subsequent the steam Subsequent to securing SI and exiting FR-H.1 the the remaining remaining dry dry steam steam generators generators may may havehave their levels recovered at the direction of the plant engineering engineering staff in in aa manner manner that that will will minimize minimize thermal thermal shock shock to the steam generators. generators. This evaluation should consider consider steam steam generator generator materials materials and and properties, properties, Technical Technical Specification Specification consideration considerations, s, etc. etc. 2.5 2.5 Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pump Pump Operation Operation r Operation Operation of 1 of reactor reactor coolant coolant pumps pumps will will affect affect the the dryout dryout time time of of the the steam steam generators generators due due toto RCP RCP heat heat addition addition and, and, therefore, therefore, willwill affect affect the the time time at at which which operator operator actionaction to to initiate initiate bleed bleed andand feed feed mustmust occur. occur. Studies Studies havehave beenbeen performed performed using using thethe LOFTRAN LOFTRAN code code (Reference (Reference 2) 2) to to assess assess the the impact impact of of RCP RCP operation operation on on thethe time time PORVs PORVs will will open open without without operator operator actionaction andand the the time time to to steam steam generator generator dryout dryout forfor aa loss loss of of main main feedwater feedwater event event without without AFW AFW available. available. AA four-loop four-loop plant plant typical typical of ofcurrent current Westinghous Westinghouse design was e design was used. used. ItIt had had aa core core power of 3411 power of 3411 Mwt Mwt and and an an RCPRCP steady steady statestate power power of of 14 14 Mwt. Mwt. Model Model FF steam steam generators generators were were also also assumed. assumed. Thus, Thus, while while this this plant plant isis notnot identical identical to to the the one one usedused inin References References 1,1, 33 and and 4, 4, the the study studywill will bebe representativ representative of e of Westinghous Westinghouse e plant plant response response and and sufficient sufficient to to determine determinethe the impact impactof ofRCP RCP statusstatus on on the the time time available available before before operator operatoractionaction to to initiate initiate bleed bleed andand feed feed isis required. required. The The cases cases analyzed analyzedwere: were: Case Case 1:1: RCPs RCPs running runningthroughout throughouttransienttransient Case Case2:2: RCPs RCPstrippedtripped atatreactor reactortrip trip Case Case3:3: RCPs RCPstrippedtripped55minutes minutesafter afterreactor reactortrip trip
- 550°F 550°FisisaCltemperature temperatureevaluated evaluatedtotobe below lowenough enoughthat thatthermal thermalstress stresswould wouldnot notlead leadtotoaafailurefailurewhen when feedwater is established feedwater is establishedtotoany anyremaining remainingdry drysteam steamgenerator.
generator. IFRP-H.1-BD FRP-H.1-BD Rev Rev22 22 Page15 Page 15ofof70 70 I
~I The focus The focus of ofthe the analysis analysis was wasto determinethe to determine the additional additional time time available available to to the the operator operator as as aa result result of ofeliminating eliminating
> RCP heat from the RCP heat from the system before system before action action to to initiate initiate bleed and feed bleed and feed became became necessary.
necessary. Thus, Thus, thethe time time ofoftwo two events events was used to was used to determine determine the the impact impact of of RCP RCP trip trip time. time. TheThe two two events events areare 1)1) the the time time when when PORVs PORVs automatically automatically open open asas aa result result ofofthethe degraded degraded heat heat transfer transfer capability capability of the steam ofthe steam generator generator and and 2) 2) the the time time when when steam steam generator generator secondaries dry secondaries dry out. out. Table 11 shows Table shows aa comparison comparison of of the the three three cases. cases. Case Case 11 represents represents aa situation situation wherewhere steam steam generators generators would would experience the experience the earliest earliest dryout dryout due due toto the RCP heat the RCP heat load load and and Case Case 22 isis where where the the steam steam generators generators wouldwould experience the experience the latest latest dryout. dryout. The extension inin dryout The extension dryout time time from from Case Case 11 to to Case Case 22 isis between between 77 and and 99 minutes, minutes, depending upon depending upon the the indication indication of dryout that of dryout that isis chosen. chosen. The The use use ofof the the time time to to PORV PORV opening opening willwill have have some some uncertainty due uncertainty due to to the the uncertainty uncertainty inin predicting predicting non-equilibrium non-equilibrium effects effects inin the the pressurizer. pressurizer. However, However, PORV PORV opening opening time isis probably time probably the the best best indicator indicator obtainable obtainable fromfrom thethe LOFTRAN LOFTRAN analysis analysis of of the the time time available available untiluntil bleed bleed and and feed feed must be must initiated. be initiated. TABLE 1I TABLE IMPACT OF IMPACT RCP TRIP OF RCP TRIP ON LOSS OF ON LOSS OF HEAT HEAT SINK SINK PARAMETER PARAMETER CASE 1* CASE 1* CASE2* CASE 2* CASE CASE 3* 3* PORVs OPEN PORVs OPEN 30.75 mm 30.75 min 37.83 37.83 min mm 35.80 35.80 min mm STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR 33.10 min 33.10 mm 42.50 42.50 min mm 40.93 40.93 min mm DRY DRY OUT
- CASE 1:
CASE 1: All RCPs RCPs Running Running CASE 2: All RCPs Tripped at Reactor Trip CASE CASE 3: All RCPs Tripped 5 Minutes After Reactor Trip Reactor trip occurred at 28 seconds. Loss of main feed occurred at 10 seconds. Case 3, where the RCPs are tripped 5 minutes after reactor trip, is a best estimate expectation of when the operator operator can can be expected to trip RCPs following a reactor trip based on guidance provided in this guideline. Thus, the the extension extension in time to loss of heat sink symptoms is the most realistic that could be expected based on anticipated operator operator response. The extension to loss of secondary heat sink symptoms is about 5 minutes based on on PORV PORV opening time. This compares favorably with the extension already seen between Cases 11 and 2. Thus, operator opening action action to trip RCPs upon entering this guideline for loss of secondary heat sink can appreciably delay the need for for bleed bleed and feed and the loss of secondary heat sink. Thus, time can be gained for the operator to establish aa means means of of supplying supplying feedwater. Delaying Delaying the loss of secondary heat heat sink is not not the only reason for tripping RCPs. RCPs running can also also reduce reduce the the effectiveness effectiveness of of bleed bleed andand feed. RCP RCP heat heat input input toto the the RCS willwill result result inin increased increased steam steam generation generation hindering hindering the the depressurizat depressurization ion ofof the the RCS during during bleed bleed and and feed. The The higher higher pressure pressure produced produced by by RCP RCP operation operation will reduce reduce SI SI flow andand increase increase inventory inventory lostlost through through thethe PORVs. PORVs. Therefore, Therefore, RCPs RCPs should should be be tripped tripped ifif AFW AFW flow cannot cannot bebe established established immediately immediately after after entering entering this this guideline. guideline. 3.
- 3. RECOVERY /RESTORATION TECHNIQU RECOVERY/RESTORATION TECHNIQUE E The The objective objective of of the the recovery/rest oration technique recovery/restoration technique incorporated incorporated intointo guideline guideline FR-H.1 FR-H.1 is is to to restore restore and/or and/or maintain maintain adequate adequate secondary secondary heat heat removal removal capability capability andand to to establish establish RCS RCS bleed bleed and and feed feed heat heat removal removal ifif secondary secondary heatheat removal removal capability capability cannotcannot be be maintained.
maintained. The The following following subsections subsections provideprovide aa summary summary of of the the major major categories categories of of operator operator actions actions and and key key utility utility decision decision points points forfor guideline guideline FR-H.1, FR-H.1, RESPONSE RESPONSE TO TO LOSS LOSS OF OF SECONDAR SECONDARY HEAT SINK. Y HEAT SINK. 3.1 High Level 3.1 High Level Action Action Summary Summary AA high high level level summary summary of of the the actions actions performed performed in in FR-H.1 FR-H.1 isis given given below below in in the the form form of of major major action action categories. categories. These are These are described described below below inin more more detail. detail. MAJOR MAJOR ACTION ACTION CATEGORICATEGORIES ES IN IN FR-H.1 FR-H.1 oo Attempt Attempt Restoration Restoration of of Feed Feed Flow Flow To To Steam Steam Generators Generators oo Initiation Initiation of RCS Bleed of RCS Bleed and and Feed Feed Heat Heat Removal Removal IFRP-H.1-BD FRP-H .1-80 Rev Rev 22 22 Page 16 Page of 70 16 of 70 I
RNP WOG BASIS/DIFFERENCES RNP WOG BASISIDIFFERENCES STEP STEP STEP STEP RNPDIFFERENCES/REASONS RNP DIFFERENCES/REASONS TheRNP The RNPprocedure procedurehas hasbeenbeensplit splitinto intoseveral several steps stepsininorder ordertotoprovide providethe thelevel levelofof detail required detail requiredtoto satisfy satisfyNUREG-1358. NUREG-1358. The Theintent intentofofthethe ERG ERG has has been been maintained maintained inin the steps. Specifically thesteps. Specificallyeach each step step performs performsthe thefollowing: following: Step 7:7: Satisfies Step Satisfiesthe the ERG ERG step step2.a2.a Step 8:8: This Step This step step determines determines and and attempts attempts to to isolate isolate an an AFW AFW pipe pipe break break ififthis this isis the the cause of cause the loss ofthe loss of offunction. function. Step 9:9: Attempts Step Attempts aa restartrestart of ofthe the MDAFW MDAFW Pumps. Pumps. Start Start of ofthethe pumps pumps should should havehave already been already been attempted attempted inin Path-1.Path-I. This This step step will will also also attempt attempt to to reset reset aa tripped tripped breaker breaker ifif that isis the that reason the the reason the pumps pumps have have not not started. started. IfIf the the start start isis successful successful the the operator operator verifies flow verifies flow and and exits exits thethe procedure. procedure. Step 10: Step 10: Attempts Attempts to to start start the the SDAFW SDAFW pump. pump. The The action action verb verb isis listed listed asas "verify" verify therefore ifif local therefore local actions actions are are required required to to open open the the valves, valves, this this should should be be attempted. attempted. IfIf the the SDAFW pump SDAFW pump overspeed overspeed tripped tripped has has actuated, actuated, even even locally locally opening opening the the steam steam supply supply valves will valves will not not start start the the pumppump unless unless the the trip trip can can be be reset. reset. IfIf the the start start is is successful successful the the operator verifies operator verifies flowflow andand exits exits the procedure. the procedure. Step 11: Step Ii: This This step step provides provides local local actions actions for for valve valve alignment alignment and and local start of local start of the the MDAFW pumps. MDAFW pumps. The The local local start start function function over-rides over-rides many many of of the the trip trip features features for for the the pumps and may be successful in in starting the pump. Step 12: Step 12: Satisfies Satisfies the ERG ERG step 2.d. Step 13: Satisfies the ERG step 2.e. Step DETERMINATION SSD DETERMINATION This is an SSD per criterion 4, 10, and 11. 14 14 33 WOG WOG BASIS
.- PURPOSE:
~ PURPOSE: To stop RCPs in order to extend the time to restore feed flow to the SGs SGs BASIS:
BASIS: RCP RCP operation results in in heat heat addition addition to the RCS RCS water. By By tripping the RCPs, the the effectiveness effectiveness of of the the remaining remaining water water inventory inventory in in the SGs SGs is is extended, extended, which which extends extends the the time time atat which which thethe operator operator actionaction to to initiate initiate bleed bleed and and feed must must occur. occur. ThisThis extension extension of of time time isis additional additional time time forfor the the operator operator to to restore restore feedwater feedwater flow flow to to the the SGs. SGs. Additional Additional information information is is provided provided in in subsection subsection 2.5, 2.5, Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant Pump Pump Operation, Operation, of of this this background background document. document. KNOWLED KNOWLEDGE: GE: Stopping Stopping all all RCPs RCPs will will result result inin an an interim interim plantplant transient transient on on RCSRCS pressure pressure and and temperature temperature as as natural natural circulation circulation flow flow conditions conditions are are established established inin the the RCS. RCS. An An example example of ofthis shown inin Figures this isis shown Figures 66 and and 77 where where RCS RCS pressure pressure and and temperature temperature rise rise and and reestablish reestablish new new steady steady state state conditions conditions prior prior to to steam steam generator generator dryoutdryout occurring. occurring. IfIf rising rising RCSRCS pressure pressure and and hothot leg leg temperatures temperatures are are the the criteria criteria forfor initiation initiation ofofbleed bleed and and feed heat feed heat removal, removal, the the operator operator mustmust evaluate evaluate whether whether these these conditions conditions are are caused caused by by an an RCP RCP trip trip or orbyby aa loss loss of ofsecondary secondary heat heatsink sink inin order orderto to determine determine ififbleedbleed andand feedfeed heat heatremoval removal isis to to bebe established. established. RNP RNP DIFFERENC DIFFERENCES/REASONS ES/REASONS There There are are essentially essentiallyno nodifferences. differences. SSD SSD DETERMIN DETERMINATION ATION This Thisisisnot notananSSD. SSD. IFRP-H.1-BD FRP-H .1-80 Rev Rev22 22 Page48 Page 48of of70 70 I}}