ML100410116

Initial Exam 2009-302 Draft Simulator Scenarios

ML100410116
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Site:	Harris
Issue date:	01/05/2010
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IR-09-302
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Appendix D DRAFT Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

IC-26, MOL, 88% power TDAFW Pump has been Out of Service for last 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br />, due to damaged over speed trip device, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, awaiting parts from vendor Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 - 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO

'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement Turnover:

Plant is at 88% power. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect. Normal shutdown is in progress lAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown step 9. The desired load rate change is 4 DEH units per minute. Load is set at 120, and the turbine is in hold. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to downpower.

Critical Task:

Trip RCPs once RCP Trip Foldout Criteria is met and prior to exiting PATH-1 Align one train of Containment Spray System for operation prior to containment pressure exceeding 35 psig Transition to Cold Leg Recirculation prior to RWST level reaching 3%

Event Malt. No.

Event Type*

Event No.

Description 1

N-BOP Plant Shutdown R-RO TRG2 CVC07 I-RO/SRO Letdown pressure control valve fails CLOSED TRG3 HVA04 C - BOP/SRO "A" Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip TS-SRO TRG4 GEN01 C-BOP/SRO Generator Voltage Regulator Failure TRG5 RCS18B C-ALL Small RCS leak (-25 gpm)

TS-SRO TRG6 RCS01B M-ALL Large Break LOCA 7

ZDSQ94:4B C-RO/SRO "B" CSIP Fails to auto-start on Safety Injection (preset) 8 ZRPK643A, B C-RO/SRO BOTH Containment Spray Pumps Fail to auto-start ZRPK644A, B (preset)

ZRPK645A, B 9

ZRPK740A 1-RO/SRO RWST swap-over fails, 1 SI-300 and 1 SI-31 0 fail to open when RWST level reaches 23.4% (preset)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 1 1

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D DRAFT Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

IC-26, MOL, 88% power TDAFW Pump has been Out of Service for last 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br />, due to damaged over speed trip device, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, awaiting parts from vendor Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 - 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO

'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement Turnover:

Plant is at 88% power. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect. Normal shutdown is in progress lAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown step 9. The desired load rate change is 4 DEH units per minute. Load is set at 120, and the turbine is in hold. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to downpower.

Critical Task:

Trip RCPs once RCP Trip Foldout Criteria is met and prior to exiting PATH-1 Align one train of Containment Spray System for operation prior to containment pressure exceeding 35 psig Transition to Cold Leg Recirculation prior to RWST level reaching 3%

Event Malt. No.

Event Type*

Event No.

Description 1

N-BOP Plant Shutdown R-RO TRG2 CVC07 I-RO/SRO Letdown pressure control valve fails CLOSED TRG3 HVA04 C - BOP/SRO "A" Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip TS-SRO TRG4 GEN01 C-BOP/SRO Generator Voltage Regulator Failure TRG5 RCS18B C-ALL Small RCS leak (-25 gpm)

TS-SRO TRG6 RCS01B M-ALL Large Break LOCA 7

ZDSQ94:4B C-RO/SRO "B" CSIP Fails to auto-start on Safety Injection (preset) 8 ZRPK643A, B C-RO/SRO BOTH Containment Spray Pumps Fail to auto-start ZRPK644A, B (preset)

ZRPK645A, B 9

ZRPK740A 1-RO/SRO RWST swap-over fails, 1 SI-300 and 1 SI-31 0 fail to open when RWST level reaches 23.4% (preset)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 1 1

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 88% power in middle of life with the turbine in HOLD. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect. Normal shutdown is in progress lAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown step 9 with a planned rate change of 4 DEH units per minute. Load is set at 120. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to a power reduction of > 10% (YELLOW risk is a qualitative risk assessment per WCM-001).

Event 1: Crew performs a power reduction lAW GP-006. For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to lower power.

Event 2: The Letdown pressure control valve PCV-145 failure (closes in AUTO) can be inserted once the power reduction has been observed to the extent necessary. The crew should respond in accordance with letdown relief line alarm procedure APP-ALB-007, 3-1 and/or 3-5, take MANUAL control of letdown line pressure, adjust letdown pressure and ensure the relief valve re-seats.

Event 3: The trip of the running A-SA ESCWS Chiller can be inserted after letdown pressure has been restored in MANUAL. The crew will respond to various alarms on ALB-023, diagnose the event, and enter AOP-026, Loss of Essential Chill Water System.

This will direct starting the 'B' Train ESCWS Chiller. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.13, Essential Services Chilled Water System and PLP-114, Relocated Technical Specifications and Design Basis Requirements. Note that the 'A' Chiller will be inoperable for the remainder of the scenario and this will impact plant response during the Major Event in that this failure will prevent Load Block 9 on sequencer Train

'A" from energizing.

Event 4: The failure of the Generator Voltage Regulator can be inserted once the 'B' Train ESCWS Chiller has been placed in service (Do not wait for Train swap to be completed). This failure will cause generator MVARS to rise above the normal control band and alarms to annunciate on ALB-022 and ERFIS. The BOP operator should attempt to control voltage with the voltage regulator in MANUAL, but this will fail and the base adjuster must be used to reduce MVARs to a lower value within normal operational limits (75 to 175 MVARs).

Event 5: A small RCS leak (-25 gpm) can be inserted once MVARS have been returned to within normal operational limits. Based on control board indications, the crew should diagnose the leak and enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. The crew will implement a plant shutdown due to exceeding Tech Spec 3.4.6.2, RCS Operational Leakage and as directed by AOP-016. The SRO will evaluate the leakage to determine the required rate of shutdown.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 2

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 88% power in middle of life with the turbine in HOLD. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect. Normal shutdown is in progress lAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown step 9 with a planned rate change of 4 DEH units per minute. Load is set at 120. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to a power reduction of > 10% (YELLOW risk is a qualitative risk assessment per WCM-001).

Event 1: Crew performs a power reduction lAW GP-006. For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to lower power.

Event 2: The Letdown pressure control valve PCV-145 failure (closes in AUTO) can be inserted once the power reduction has been observed to the extent necessary. The crew should respond in accordance with letdown relief line alarm procedure APP-ALB-007, 3-1 and/or 3-5, take MANUAL control of letdown line pressure, adjust letdown pressure and ensure the relief valve re-seats.

Event 3: The trip of the running A-SA ESCWS Chiller can be inserted after letdown pressure has been restored in MANUAL. The crew will respond to various alarms on ALB-023, diagnose the event, and enter AOP-026, Loss of Essential Chill Water System.

This will direct starting the 'B' Train ESCWS Chiller. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.13, Essential Services Chilled Water System and PLP-114, Relocated Technical Specifications and Design Basis Requirements. Note that the 'A' Chiller will be inoperable for the remainder of the scenario and this will impact plant response during the Major Event in that this failure will prevent Load Block 9 on sequencer Train

'A" from energizing.

Event 4: The failure of the Generator Voltage Regulator can be inserted once the 'B' Train ESCWS Chiller has been placed in service (Do not wait for Train swap to be completed). This failure will cause generator MVARS to rise above the normal control band and alarms to annunciate on ALB-022 and ERFIS. The BOP operator should attempt to control voltage with the voltage regulator in MANUAL, but this will fail and the base adjuster must be used to reduce MVARs to a lower value within normal operational limits (75 to 175 MVARs).

Event 5: A small RCS leak (-25 gpm) can be inserted once MVARS have been returned to within normal operational limits. Based on control board indications, the crew should diagnose the leak and enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. The crew will implement a plant shutdown due to exceeding Tech Spec 3.4.6.2, RCS Operational Leakage and as directed by AOP-016. The SRO will evaluate the leakage to determine the required rate of shutdown.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 2

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events Continued:

Event 6 (Major): LBLOCA (100% severity) on the 'B' Loop can be inserted once the 'B' ESCWS Chiller has been started. The crew should carry out immediate actions of PATH-1. The earlier failure of A-SA ESCWS Chiller will prevent the 'A' Sequencer from reaching Load Block 9. The BOP should manually actuate the MAN PERM switch to enable manual loading on the A-SA bus (due to the earlier trip of the A-SA ESCWS Chiller). Plant conditions will require transition to FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock and then return to PATH-1.

Event 7: The 'B' Charging Pump will fail to auto start on the Safety Injection but may be started manually at the MCB.

Event 8: Shortly after entering PATH-1, the crew should recognize that the Foldout Criteria for securing all RCPs has been met and carry out that action. Pressure in containment will continue to rise due to the LOCA and a Containment Spray Actuation will be required. Both Containment Spray Pumps will fail to automatically start and at least one pump will need to be manually started with a flow path established to containment. The 'A' CT pump cannot be manually started unless actions taken during Event 6 for the MAN PERM switch have been completed. Without Containment Spray in service, an ORANGE path will be met for Containment.

Event 9: When RWST level reaches 23.4%, the crew will transition to EPP-010, Transition to Cold Leg Recirculation. 1SI-300 and 1SI-310 will fail to automatically open when RWST level reaches 23.4% and will need to be manually opened.

Once cold leg recirculation has been established, the scenario may be terminated.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 3

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events Continued:

Event 6 (Major): LBLOCA (100% severity) on the 'B' Loop can be inserted once the 'B' ESCWS Chiller has been started. The crew should carry out immediate actions of PATH-1. The earlier failure of A-SA ESCWS Chiller will prevent the 'A' Sequencer from reaching Load Block 9. The BOP should manually actuate the MAN PERM switch to enable manual loading on the A-SA bus (due to the earlier trip of the A-SA ESCWS Chiller). Plant conditions will require transition to FR-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock and then return to PATH-1.

Event 7: The 'B' Charging Pump will fail to auto start on the Safety Injection but may be started manually at the MCB.

Event 8: Shortly after entering PATH-1, the crew should recognize that the Foldout Criteria for securing all RCPs has been met and carry out that action. Pressure in containment will continue to rise due to the LOCA and a Containment Spray Actuation will be required. Both Containment Spray Pumps will fail to automatically start and at least one pump will need to be manually started with a flow path established to containment. The 'A' CT pump cannot be manually started unless actions taken during Event 6 for the MAN PERM switch have been completed. Without Containment Spray in service, an ORANGE path will be met for Containment.

Event 9: When RWST level reaches 23.4%, the crew will transition to EPP-010, Transition to Cold Leg Recirculation. 1SI-300 and 1SI-310 will fail to automatically open when RWST level reaches 23.4% and will need to be manually opened.

Once cold leg recirculation has been established, the scenario may be terminated.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 3

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Provide a copy of the following procedures:

o GP-006, NORMAL PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM POWER OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 1 TO MODE 3) marked up through section 5.2 step 8 with step 8 signed off and step 9 circled INITIAL CONDITIONS:

IC-26, MOL, 88% power Place CIT on the 'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump and take switch to STOP Place 'B' Boric Acid Transfer Pump switch to AUTO and green protected train placard Set potentiometers as follows: FK-114: 7.50 FK-113: 3.17 Protected equipment placards for TDAFP (per OMM-001 Att. 16) o

'A-SA' MDAFP - Orange placard o

'B-SA' MDAFP - Green placard o

'A' Startup Transformer brk 52-2 and 52-3 Orange placards o

'B' Startup Transformer brk 52-13 and 52-14 Green placards Hang CITs on 1 MS-70, 1 MS-72 and Trip and Throttle Valve 1 MS-T Place RED bars on ALB 01-7-5, ALB 017-7-4 Place BLUE bar on ALB 23-2-13 Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates PRE-LOAD:

TDAFW Pump OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device1MS-70 and 72 breakers open and Trip and Throttle valve tripped (irf mss034 OPEN, irf mss035 OPEN, imf cfc01c true)

'A' Boric Acid Pump OOS for motor replacement (idi xa2i174 STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g OFF)

Containment Spray Pump A fails to auto start on Hi-3 Signal can be manually started (imf zrpk643a FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk644a FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk645a FAIL_ASIS)

Containment Spray Pump B fails to auto start on Hi-3 Signal can be manually started (imf zrpk643b FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk644b FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk645b FAIL_ASIS)

CSIP B fails to auto start on SI (imf zdsq94:4b FAIL_ASIS) 1SI-300 and 1SI-310 fail to auto open when RWST level reaches 23.4% (imf zrpk740A FAIL_ASIS)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 4

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Provide a copy of the following procedures:

o GP-006, NORMAL PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM POWER OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 1 TO MODE 3) marked up through section 5.2 step 8 with step 8 signed off and step 9 circled INITIAL CONDITIONS:

IC-26, MOL, 88% power Place CIT on the 'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump and take switch to STOP Place 'B' Boric Acid Transfer Pump switch to AUTO and green protected train placard Set potentiometers as follows: FK-114: 7.50 FK-113: 3.17 Protected equipment placards for TDAFP (per OMM-001 Att. 16) o

'A-SA' MDAFP - Orange placard o

'B-SA' MDAFP - Green placard o

'A' Startup Transformer brk 52-2 and 52-3 Orange placards o

'B' Startup Transformer brk 52-13 and 52-14 Green placards Hang CITs on 1 MS-70, 1 MS-72 and Trip and Throttle Valve 1 MS-T Place RED bars on ALB 01-7-5, ALB 017-7-4 Place BLUE bar on ALB 23-2-13 Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates PRE-LOAD:

TDAFW Pump OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device1MS-70 and 72 breakers open and Trip and Throttle valve tripped (irf mss034 OPEN, irf mss035 OPEN, imf cfc01c true)

'A' Boric Acid Pump OOS for motor replacement (idi xa2i174 STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g OFF)

Containment Spray Pump A fails to auto start on Hi-3 Signal can be manually started (imf zrpk643a FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk644a FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk645a FAIL_ASIS)

Containment Spray Pump B fails to auto start on Hi-3 Signal can be manually started (imf zrpk643b FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk644b FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk645b FAIL_ASIS)

CSIP B fails to auto start on SI (imf zdsq94:4b FAIL_ASIS) 1SI-300 and 1SI-310 fail to auto open when RWST level reaches 23.4% (imf zrpk740A FAIL_ASIS)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 4

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline TRIGGERS:

ET-2: imf cvc07 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.000:01 :00 Letdown PCV 145 fails closed manual control possible ET-3: imf hva04 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) TRAIN_A

~, Chiller Trip respond using AOP-026 ET-4: imf gen01 (200:00:0000:00:00) 115.000:15:00 Form ES-D-1 Generator Voltage Regulator Failure 15 min ramp APP-ALB-022, or OMM-001, or OP-153.01 ET -5: imf rcs18b (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.18 00:05:00 0 Small RCS leak AOP-016 then AOP-038 plant shutdown leakage is -25gpm ET-6: imf rcs01b (600:00:0000:00:00) 10000:10:000 Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident LBLOCA (inserted per Lead Examiners instruction)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 5

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline TRIGGERS:

ET-2: imf cvc07 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.000:01 :00 Letdown PCV 145 fails closed manual control possible ET-3: imf hva04 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) TRAIN_A

~, Chiller Trip respond using AOP-026 ET-4: imf gen01 (200:00:0000:00:00) 115.000:15:00 Form ES-D-1 Generator Voltage Regulator Failure 15 min ramp APP-ALB-022, or OMM-001, or OP-153.01 ET -5: imf rcs18b (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.18 00:05:00 0 Small RCS leak AOP-016 then AOP-038 plant shutdown leakage is -25gpm ET-6: imf rcs01b (600:00:0000:00:00) 10000:10:000 Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident LBLOCA (inserted per Lead Examiners instruction)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 5

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline CAEP

!Description of 2009B NRC Exam Scenario 1

! Establish Initial Conditions

! Reset to IC-26

! -89% power ramped from 100% at 4 DEH Units per min on hold for turnover

! Continue with ramp down due to expiring LCO on TDAFW Pump

! TDAFW Pump is OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device Form ES-D-1

! Pump has been OOS for 62 total hours and is expected back within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

! Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, HSD following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

! Hang CIT on both MS-70 and 72 then place protected train placards per OMM-001 irf mss034 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN irf mss035 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN

! Trip the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfw01 c (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true

! "A" BA Pump is OOS for motor replacement place MCB switch to STOP

! Hang CIT on CB Switch place the B BA Pump MCB switch to AUTO

! Place B BA pump switch to auto and protect B BA pump switch idi xa2i174 (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)OFF

! Go to RUN and set DEH ramp rate to 4 Units/Min

! EVENTS:

! Event 1: Crew continues the plant shutdown lAW GP-006 due to LOC expiring on TDAFWpump Normal-BOP Reactivity - RO

! Event 2: Letdown PCV 145 fails closed manual control possible

! Crew actions addressed per APP ALB-007-3-1 or 3-5 Instrument - RO/SRO imf cvc07 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0 00:01 :00 -

! Event 3: 'A' Chiller Trip

! Crew responds using AOP-026 (no immediate actions)

! Tech Spec 3.7.13 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO or HSB within next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, CSD within following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> Component - BOP/SRO Tech Spec - SRO imf hva04 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) TRAIN_A

! Event 4: Generator Voltage Regulator Failure over 15 min ramp

! Crew actions based on APP-ALB-022, or OMM-001, or OP-153.01 Component - BOP/SRO imf gen01 (200:00:0000:00:00) 115.000:15:00-Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 6

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline CAEP

!Description of 2009B NRC Exam Scenario 1

! Establish Initial Conditions

! Reset to IC-26

! -89% power ramped from 100% at 4 DEH Units per min on hold for turnover

! Continue with ramp down due to expiring LCO on TDAFW Pump

! TDAFW Pump is OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device Form ES-D-1

! Pump has been OOS for 62 total hours and is expected back within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

! Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, HSD following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

! Hang CIT on both MS-70 and 72 then place protected train placards per OMM-001 irf mss034 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN irf mss035 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN

! Trip the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfw01 c (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true

! "A" BA Pump is OOS for motor replacement place MCB switch to STOP

! Hang CIT on CB Switch place the B BA Pump MCB switch to AUTO

! Place B BA pump switch to auto and protect B BA pump switch idi xa2i174 (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)OFF

! Go to RUN and set DEH ramp rate to 4 Units/Min

! EVENTS:

! Event 1: Crew continues the plant shutdown lAW GP-006 due to LOC expiring on TDAFWpump Normal-BOP Reactivity - RO

! Event 2: Letdown PCV 145 fails closed manual control possible

! Crew actions addressed per APP ALB-007-3-1 or 3-5 Instrument - RO/SRO imf cvc07 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0 00:01 :00 -

! Event 3: 'A' Chiller Trip

! Crew responds using AOP-026 (no immediate actions)

! Tech Spec 3.7.13 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO or HSB within next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, CSD within following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> Component - BOP/SRO Tech Spec - SRO imf hva04 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) TRAIN_A

! Event 4: Generator Voltage Regulator Failure over 15 min ramp

! Crew actions based on APP-ALB-022, or OMM-001, or OP-153.01 Component - BOP/SRO imf gen01 (200:00:0000:00:00) 115.000:15:00-Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 6

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline

! Event 5: Small RCS leak Crew enters AOP-016 (no immediate actions)

! AOP-016 to AOP-038 for plant shutdown (leakage is - 25 gpm)

! Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 < 1 gpm unidentified leakage Form ES-D-1

! Action b reduce leakage rate to within limits < 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or HSB within next 6, CSD next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />

! Tech Spec - SRO imf rcs 18b (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.18 00:05:00 0

! Event 6: LBLOCA Major - ALL imf rcs01 b (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) 100 00: 1 0:00 0

! Event 7: CSIP B fails to auto start on SI (preloaded)

I Component - RO/SRO imf zdsq94:4b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS

! Event 8: Containment Spray Pump A fails to auto start on Hi-3 Signal can be manually started (preload)

! NOTE: This is complicated by the earlier loss of the "A" Chiller

! To start the "A" CS pump you must first establish the manual load block on the "A" EDG sequencer

! Without establishing the manual load block the CS pump will not start Component - RO/SRO imf zrpk643a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk644a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk645a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

! Event 8: Containment Spray Pump B fails to auto start on Hi-3 Signal (preloaded)

! The "B" CS pump does not auto start but can be manually started by the RO Component - RO/SRO imf zrpk643b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk644b (n 00:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk645b (n 00:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

! Event 9: 1SI-300 and 1SI-310 fail to auto open when RWST level reaches 23.4%

(pre loaded)

! Both valves will not auto open but can be manually opened Instrument - RO/SRO imf zrpk740A (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 7

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline

! Event 5: Small RCS leak Crew enters AOP-016 (no immediate actions)

! AOP-016 to AOP-038 for plant shutdown (leakage is - 25 gpm)

! Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 < 1 gpm unidentified leakage Form ES-D-1

! Action b reduce leakage rate to within limits < 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or HSB within next 6, CSD next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />

! Tech Spec - SRO imf rcs 18b (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.18 00:05:00 0

! Event 6: LBLOCA Major - ALL imf rcs01 b (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) 100 00: 1 0:00 0

! Event 7: CSIP B fails to auto start on SI (preloaded)

I Component - RO/SRO imf zdsq94:4b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS

! Event 8: Containment Spray Pump A fails to auto start on Hi-3 Signal can be manually started (preload)

! NOTE: This is complicated by the earlier loss of the "A" Chiller

! To start the "A" CS pump you must first establish the manual load block on the "A" EDG sequencer

! Without establishing the manual load block the CS pump will not start Component - RO/SRO imf zrpk643a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk644a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk645a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

! Event 8: Containment Spray Pump B fails to auto start on Hi-3 Signal (preloaded)

! The "B" CS pump does not auto start but can be manually started by the RO Component - RO/SRO imf zrpk643b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk644b (n 00:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk645b (n 00:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

! Event 9: 1SI-300 and 1SI-310 fail to auto open when RWST level reaches 23.4%

(pre loaded)

! Both valves will not auto open but can be manually opened Instrument - RO/SRO imf zrpk740A (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 7

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

Page §.

of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I

Position I

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior The crew has been directed to shutdown the plant lAW GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown due to TDAFW pump being inoperable. GP-006 is signed off through step 8, and the power reduction is on hold for turnover.

WHEN Turbine load is less than 75%, THEN VERIFY the SGBD Regenerative Heat Exchan er Condensate Outlet is ali ned to the CPO effluent er OP-127, Section 7.1.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Dispatcher to meet system load demands.

SRO BOP EVALUATOR NOTE:

DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 Units/Min with target value set at 120. May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.

Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button There is no procedural guidance directing when the boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to place the Turbine in GO. The boration steps are located on page 10 of this guide.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

Page §.

of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I

Position I

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior The crew has been directed to shutdown the plant lAW GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown due to TDAFW pump being inoperable. GP-006 is signed off through step 8, and the power reduction is on hold for turnover.

WHEN Turbine load is less than 75%, THEN VERIFY the SGBD Regenerative Heat Exchan er Condensate Outlet is ali ned to the CPO effluent er OP-127, Section 7.1.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Dispatcher to meet system load demands.

SRO BOP EVALUATOR NOTE:

DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 Units/Min with target value set at 120. May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.

Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button There is no procedural guidance directing when the boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to place the Turbine in GO. The boration steps are located on page 10 of this guide.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

Page

~

Qf 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I

Position I

AplJlicanfs Actions or Behavior

• Verifies the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 Units/minute)

• DEPRESS the ENTER push-button BOP

• DEPRESS the REF push-button

• Verifies the desired load (120 MW per step 5.2.5.e) in the DEMAND display

• DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push-button should illuminate PROCEDURE NOTE:

The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push-button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate.

• DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through 'Crew Update' Turbine in 'GO' BOP VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display decreases

• VERI FY Generator load is decreasing RO MONITORS primary systems response.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may determine to allow ceo to insert in AUTO prior to boration to match reactivity plan rod height.

RO INITIATES boration, as necessary (with SRO concurrence) per OP-107.01.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

Page

~

Qf 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

• Verifies the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 Units/minute)

• DEPRESS the ENTER push-button BOP

• DEPRESS the REF push-button

• Verifies the desired load (120 MW per step 5.2.5.e) in the DEMAND display

• DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push-button should illuminate PROCEDURE NOTE:

The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push-button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate.

• DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through 'Crew Update' Turbine in 'GO' BOP VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display decreases

• VERI FY Generator load is decreasing RO MONITORS primary systems response.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may determine to allow ceo to insert in AUTO prior to boration to match reactivity plan rod height.

RO INITIATES boration, as necessary (with SRO concurrence) per OP-107.01.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

Page 10 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I

Position I

RO EVALUATOR NOTE:

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration increase required DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the reactivity plan associated with the IC FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths position.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

RO PROCEDURE NOTE:

SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS.

SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed RO in the STOP position VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

Page 10 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I

Position I

RO EVALUATOR NOTE:

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration increase required DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the reactivity plan associated with the IC FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths position.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

RO PROCEDURE NOTE:

SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS.

SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed RO in the STOP position VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

Page 11 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

START the makeup system as follows:

• TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily

• VERI FY the RED indicator light is LIT PROCEDURE CAUTION:

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

Page 11 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

START the makeup system as follows:

• TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily

• VERI FY the RED indicator light is LIT PROCEDURE CAUTION:

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

Page 12.

of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

IF rod control is in AUTO, RO THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding properly.

RO VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.

RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but none will be applicable since the system just came out of Automatic. The only steps included here are the ones with verifiable action.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

RO Is in the STOP position

• The GREEN light is LIT RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

START the makeup system as follows:

• TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily

• VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT LEAD EVALUATOR:

Once satisfied with observation of the power reduction, initiate Event 2 - "Letdown Pressure Controller Failing Closed" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

Page 12.

of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

IF rod control is in AUTO, RO THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding properly.

RO VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.

RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but none will be applicable since the system just came out of Automatic. The only steps included here are the ones with verifiable action.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

RO Is in the STOP position

• The GREEN light is LIT RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

START the makeup system as follows:

• TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily

• VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT LEAD EVALUATOR:

Once satisfied with observation of the power reduction, initiate Event 2 - "Letdown Pressure Controller Failing Closed" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

2 Page II of 57 Event

Description:

Letdown Pressure Regulator Failure)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG 2 "ltdn Pressure Controller Failing Closed" Indications Available:

ALB-07-3-5 LOW PRESSURE LETDOWN HIGH PRESS ALB-07-5-5 COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL SYSTEMS ALB-07-3-1 LP LETDOWN RELIEF LINE HIGH TEMP RO RESPONDS to alarms.

SRO Directs RO to carry out actions of APP's.

(May direct isolating letdown due to relief lifting)

CONFIRM alarm using PI-145, LP Ltdn Press. Report 1 CS-38 CLOSED.

VERIFY Automatic Functions: (None)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

0 IF necessary to lower letdown pressure, THEN:

(YES)

RO REFER to OP-107, Chemical and Volume control System.

REMOVE or change in-service letdown orifices.

0 TAKE manual control of PK-145.1, Ltdn Pressure, AND ADJUST 1 CS-38 to lower letdown pressure.

Should provide a control band for manual letdown pressure control between 340 psig and 360 psig based on SRO OP-107 normal parameters (may provide wider band)

Contact Work Control for assistance.

Fills out Equipment Problem Checklist EVALUATOR NOTE: When letdown pressure is being controlled or letdown is isolated, initiate Event 3

("A" Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip).

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

2 Page II of 57 Event

Description:

Letdown Pressure Regulator Failure)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG 2 "ltdn Pressure Controller Failing Closed" Indications Available:

ALB-07-3-5 LOW PRESSURE LETDOWN HIGH PRESS ALB-07-5-5 COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL SYSTEMS ALB-07-3-1 LP LETDOWN RELIEF LINE HIGH TEMP RO RESPONDS to alarms.

SRO Directs RO to carry out actions of APP's.

(May direct isolating letdown due to relief lifting)

CONFIRM alarm using PI-145, LP Ltdn Press. Report 1 CS-38 CLOSED.

VERIFY Automatic Functions: (None)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

0 IF necessary to lower letdown pressure, THEN:

(YES)

RO REFER to OP-107, Chemical and Volume control System.

REMOVE or change in-service letdown orifices.

0 TAKE manual control of PK-145.1, Ltdn Pressure, AND ADJUST 1 CS-38 to lower letdown pressure.

Should provide a control band for manual letdown pressure control between 340 psig and 360 psig based on SRO OP-107 normal parameters (may provide wider band)

Contact Work Control for assistance.

Fills out Equipment Problem Checklist EVALUATOR NOTE: When letdown pressure is being controlled or letdown is isolated, initiate Event 3

("A" Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip).

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

3 Page 14 of 57 Event

Description:

'A' Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip Time L

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG-3 "Trip of the running ESCWS Chiller WC-2 A-SA" Indications Available:

ALB-23-1-18 CHILLER WC2-A TROUBLE ALB-23-1-16 WC2-A CH HIfSW LO FLOW RESPONDS to alarm on ALB-23 (1-18).

BOP REPORTS WC-2A-SA tripped.

i *...* *:/"'~'</;~& ;~~ff<~¥t~ ~~i?;. } EN¥ERSA0R.. ()261WL0SSf*0F.*ESSE~iIA~SER'IlI*GE~~.~;:*

~ ',:;:;,'",

......x X*';* *~(jf:ll~tl#[):,#~f~tfg~~tg~.~*~**~~1:~J:**.:*:S;?*i.**.*~S)**... If*~;;{~:****;*

',~,;' {:,~~~~~

PROCEDURE NOTE:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

BOP CHECK the in-service chiller RUNNING. (NO)

CREW DISPATCH an operator to determine the cause of the chiller trip.

COMMUNICATOR:

When contacted, wait 2 minutes and then report that the breaker for the chiller has tripped on overcurrent and that there are no visible problems locally at the chiller.

PERFORM the following using OP-148, Essential Service BOP Chilled Water System: START the Standby chiller (Start P-4B and 'B' Chiller) section 5.1 or 5.2 of OP-148. (Attached at end of guide)

COMMUNICATOR:

If contacted, report "Pre-start checks on P-4B and 'B' Chiller are complete." No simulator booth operations are required.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Section 5.2 of OP-148 may be used if crew determines that loss will be short term.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

3 Page 14 of 57 Event

Description:

'A' Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG-3 "Trip of the running ESCWS Chiller WC-2 A-SA" Indications Available:

ALB-23-1-18 CHILLER WC2-A TROUBLE ALB-23-1-16 WC2-A CH HIfSW LO FLOW RESPONDS to alarm on ALB-23 (1-18).

BOP REPORTS WC-2A-SA tripped.

I

>'~"~:~5>:l'~F:iF~~~ ;f~~~a~~i7; } EN¥ERSA0R.. ()261WL0SSf'0F;;ESSE~iIA~SER'IlI~GE~~;~;:'

~

~ ',:;:;,'",

~

L.):(~;;".8;; ':7~?~~~*j~ *~(jf:ll~tI#D:,#~f~tfg~~tg~.~:~'.~~1:~J:".:*:S;?*i.. *.*~S)*i,.* lf*~;;{~:***;;* : ',~,;' {:,~~~~~

PROCEDURE NOTE:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

BOP CHECK the in-service chiller RUNNING. (NO)

CREW DISPATCH an operator to determine the cause of the chiller trip.

COMMUNICATOR:

When contacted, wait 2 minutes and then report that the breaker for the chiller has tripped on overcurrent and that there are no visible problems locally at the chiller.

PERFORM the following using OP-148, Essential Service BOP Chilled Water System: START the Standby chiller (Start P-4B and 'B' Chiller) section 5.1 or 5.2 of OP-148. (Attached at end of guide)

COMMUNICATOR:

If contacted, report "Pre-start checks on P-4B and 'B' Chiller are complete." No simulator booth operations are required.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Section 5.2 of OP-148 may be used if crew determines that loss will be short term.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

3 Page.1.§ of 57 Event

Description:

'N Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip Time I

Position J Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

,'.. **.*.C, L,; :':~..<:)R-148~?:$~CtiOh511T~nd,~s~bti6d5,2Ai:::.*.. 'iC !~,~~Sl;;.>>*.

'NOJE:~ D~e~toccr~~,preferer1.~~.tQe9R,.~0~~sectibrl§~~re*IQCat~~cat;t5e;eh,?;~f,;t~i~Y'~UJdef~~

.in.~!!a.ghm~nt'J~TI1~'I3.qI;'will*J1~ft2rmtl1e.*?~tiQfl~;9f~Q~~QPkpr0gedute;~;;;,.:*;~i ;*~C>/*(

COMMUNICATOR:

CREW BOP IF contacted by the BOP to RESET the Low Chilled Water Flow alarm, wait 15 seconds and then report "The Low Chilled Water No Flow Alarm has been reset, and there are no other alarms." There are NO simulator operations required.

CONTACT Maintenance as necessary for troubleshooting and appropriate corrective actions.

CHECK EITHER chiller STARTED. (YES)

VERI FY the following AH units for the operating train chiller are RUNNING:

AH-15, Control Room Normal Supply AH-17, Fuel Vent FP Pump Room Fan Cooler AH-16, Elec Equip Prot Rm Supply VERIFY the following alarm is CLEAR for the running chiller ALB-23-1-20, Expansion TK A LO-LO Level ALB-23-2-20, Expansion TK B LO-LO Level Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

3 Page.1.§ of 57 Event

Description:

'N Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip Time I

Position I

COMMUNICATOR:

CREW BOP Applicanfs Actions or Behavior IF contacted by the BOP to RESET the Low Chilled Water Flow alarm, wait 15 seconds and then report "The Low Chilled Water No Flow Alarm has been reset, and there are no other alarms." There are NO simulator operations required.

CONTACT Maintenance as necessary for troubleshooting and appropriate corrective actions.

CHECK EITHER chiller STARTED. (YES)

VERI FY the following AH units for the operating train chiller are RUNNING:

AH-15, Control Room Normal Supply AH-17, Fuel Vent FP Pump Room Fan Cooler AH-16, Elec Equip Prot Rm Supply VERIFY the following alarm is CLEAR for the running chiller ALB-23-1-20, Expansion TK A LO-LO Level ALB-23-2-20, Expansion TK B LO-LO Level Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

3*

Page.1Q of 57 Event

Description:

'A' Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior REFER TO Tech Spec 3.7.13.

At least two independent Essential Services Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.

• ACTION: With only one ESCW System loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE SRO status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in CSD within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Contacts WCC for Work Request and EIR. Contacts Maintenance to investigate and fills out an Equipment Problem Checklist.

Obtains OWP-ECW Direct BOP to perform Train Swap BOP Start the corresponding air handlers SRO EXIT this procedure.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

After the ESCWS Chiller is running - Initiate Event 4 "Generator Voltage Regulator Failure".

Note: Alarms will not actuate for approximately 2 minutes after TRG 4 is inserted.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

3*

Page.1Q of 57 Event

Description:

'A' Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior REFER TO Tech Spec 3.7.13.

At least two independent Essential Services Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.

• ACTION: With only one ESCW System loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE SRO status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in CSD within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Contacts WCC for Work Request and EIR. Contacts Maintenance to investigate and fills out an Equipment Problem Checklist.

Obtains OWP-ECW Direct BOP to perform Train Swap BOP Start the corresponding air handlers SRO EXIT this procedure.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

After the ESCWS Chiller is running - Initiate Event 4 "Generator Voltage Regulator Failure".

Note: Alarms will not actuate for approximately 2 minutes after TRG 4 is inserted.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

4 Page 17 of 57 Event

Description:

'Failure of the Generator Voltage Regulator Time I

Position I

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG-4 "Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure" MVARS increasing on ERFIS ALB-22-9-4 COMPUTER ALARM GEN/EXCITER SYSTEMS ALB-22-4-3 GENERATOR VOLTAGE/FREQ RATIOIHIGH OR UNDER FREQ ALB-22-6-5 GENERATOR EXCITER MAX EXCITATION & LIMITING ALB-20-5-5 COMPUTER ALARM MSITURBINE SYSTEMS BOP RESPONDS to alarms ALB-022-9-4 and 4-3.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Alarm ALB-022-9-4 is a computer alarm. ALB-022-4-3 will initiate corrective actions.

BOP The crew may refer to AOP-006, Turbine Generator Trouble but no actions will result.

CONFIRM alarm using:

AT MCB:

EI-525, Generator Frequency.

EI-520, Generator Phase Volts. (YES-Reports voltage regulation problem)

EI-540, Gen Exciter Field Volts.

EI-541, Gen Exciter Field Current.

VERI FY Automatic Functions:

VOLTAGE Regulator Limiter decreases Generator excitation.

IF Voltage Limiter is unable to control excitation increase, a Generator Lockout occurs.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

4 Page 17 of 57 Event

Description:

'Failure of the Generator Voltage Regulator Time I

Position I

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG-4 "Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure" MVARS increasing on ERFIS ALB-22-9-4 COMPUTER ALARM GEN/EXCITER SYSTEMS ALB-22-4-3 GENERATOR VOLTAGE/FREQ RATIOIHIGH OR UNDER FREQ ALB-22-6-5 GENERATOR EXCITER MAX EXCITATION & LIMITING ALB-20-5-5 COMPUTER ALARM MSITURBINE SYSTEMS BOP RESPONDS to alarms ALB-022-9-4 and 4-3.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Alarm ALB-022-9-4 is a computer alarm. ALB-022-4-3 will initiate corrective actions.

BOP The crew may refer to AOP-006, Turbine Generator Trouble but no actions will result.

CONFIRM alarm using:

AT MCB:

EI-525, Generator Frequency.

EI-520, Generator Phase Volts. (YES-Reports voltage regulation problem)

EI-540, Gen Exciter Field Volts.

EI-541, Gen Exciter Field Current.

VERI FY Automatic Functions:

VOLTAGE Regulator Limiter decreases Generator excitation.

IF Voltage Limiter is unable to control excitation increase, a Generator Lockout occurs.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

4 Page.1.§ of 57 Event

Description:

'Failure of the Generator Voltage Regulator Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective Actions:

CHECK for the following at MCB:

EI-525, Generator Frequency, stable at 60 Hz. (yES)

BOP EI-520, Generator Phase Volts, stable at 22 KV. (NO)

EI-540, Gen Exciter Field Volts stable. (YES)

EI-541, Gen Exciter Field Current stable. (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

An automatic transfer to manual Generator voltage control is indicated by GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch ON and the GREEN light LIT.

Both the AMBER light and RED light will be OFF.

ALB-022-4-3 OPERATE GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch to restore Generator voltage to 22 KV and reduce MVARS.

IF GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch is ineffective THEN PERFORM the following to transfer and maintain voltage manually:

OPERATE the GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER BOP to attempt to zero the REGULATOR OUTPUT BAL VOLT meter.

PLACE GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch in the TEST position and observe AMBER light LIT and RED light OFF.

OPERATE GENERATOR BASE ADJUSTER switch to restore Generator voltage to 22 KV.

Dispatch AO to inspect voltage regulator COMMUNICATOR:

If dispatched to inspect voltage regulator locally, wait approximately 2 minutes and report that there are no abnormal indications at the voltage regulator.

SRO REFERENCE AOP-028, Grid Instability. (N/A - the problem is not on the grid)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

4 Page.1.§ of 57 Event

Description:

'Failure of the Generator Voltage Regulator Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective Actions:

CHECK for the following at MCB:

EI-525, Generator Frequency, stable at 60 Hz. (yES)

BOP EI-520, Generator Phase Volts, stable at 22 KV. (NO)

EI-540, Gen Exciter Field Volts stable. (YES)

EI-541, Gen Exciter Field Current stable. (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

An automatic transfer to manual Generator voltage control is indicated by GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch ON and the GREEN light LIT.

Both the AMBER light and RED light will be OFF.

ALB-022-4-3 OPERATE GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch to restore Generator voltage to 22 KV and reduce MVARS.

IF GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch is ineffective THEN PERFORM the following to transfer and maintain voltage manually:

OPERATE the GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER BOP to attempt to zero the REGULATOR OUTPUT BAL VOLT meter.

PLACE GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch in the TEST position and observe AMBER light LIT and RED light OFF.

OPERATE GENERATOR BASE ADJUSTER switch to restore Generator voltage to 22 KV.

Dispatch AO to inspect voltage regulator COMMUNICATOR:

If dispatched to inspect voltage regulator locally, wait approximately 2 minutes and report that there are no abnormal indications at the voltage regulator.

SRO REFERENCE AOP-028, Grid Instability. (N/A - the problem is not on the grid)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

4 Page 19 of 57 Event

Description:

'Failure of the Generator Voltage Regulator Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY Main Generator is operating per the Generator Capability Curve.

• Contacts Load Dispatcher and provides information that the Voltage regulator is in manual SRO/BOP 30 minute requirement per ALB-022-4-3 0

0 60 minute requirement per OMM-001, Att. 12

• Contacts WCC for support and fills out Equipment Problem Checklist Provides control band to BOP for MVAR control based on SRO OP-153.01 normal limits 0

75 to 175 MVAR if above 750 MWe 0

65 to 175 MVAR if 550 to 750 MWe EVALUATOR NOTE:

After the Generator Voltage Regulator is stabilized insert Event 5 (Small ReS leak (- 25 gpm.

The leak is ramped in over 4 minutes. Approximately 1 minute after trigger is actuated, charging flow can be observed increasing.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

4 Page 19 of 57 Event

Description:

'Failure of the Generator Voltage Regulator Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY Main Generator is operating per the Generator Capability Curve.

• Contacts Load Dispatcher and provides information that the Voltage regulator is in manual SRO/BOP 30 minute requirement per ALB-022-4-3 0

0 60 minute requirement per OMM-001, Att. 12

• Contacts WCC for support and fills out Equipment Problem Checklist Provides control band to BOP for MVAR control based on SRO OP-153.01 normal limits 0

75 to 175 MVAR if above 750 MWe 0

65 to 175 MVAR if 550 to 750 MWe EVALUATOR NOTE:

After the Generator Voltage Regulator is stabilized insert Event 5 (Small ReS leak (- 25 gpm.

The leak is ramped in over 4 minutes. Approximately 1 minute after trigger is actuated, charging flow can be observed increasing.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 20 of 57 Event

Description:

Time I

Position I

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

RO CREW SRO "Large Break LOCA Applicanfs Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG-5 "RCS leak in Containment of... 25 gpm" Increasing Charging flow, VCT level decrease Pressurizer Level decreasing ALB-10-4-5 RAD MONITOR SYSTEM TROUBLE REM-1 L T-3502A Cont Leak Detection in Alarm Containment temperature and pressure increasing RESPONDS to alarms on ALB-1 0-4-5 and changing plant conditions Identifies entry condition to AOP-016, Leakage Inside CNMT CONFIRM alarm on RM-11, MCB and ERFIS indications PROCEDURE NOTE: No immediate actions.

SRO CHECK RHR in operation. (NO)

GO TO Step 3 (Refer to PEP-11 0)

PROCEDURE NOTE: This step is a qualitative check for leakage obviously in excess of Make Up capability. Isolation of letdown may be necessary. A formal calculation to determine the leakrate is rmed in Ste 16.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 20 of 57 Event

Description:

Time I

Position I

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

RO CREW SRO "Large Break LOCA Applicanfs Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG-5 "RCS leak in Containment of... 25 gpm" Increasing Charging flow, VCT level decrease Pressurizer Level decreasing ALB-10-4-5 RAD MONITOR SYSTEM TROUBLE REM-1 L T-3502A Cont Leak Detection in Alarm Containment temperature and pressure increasing RESPONDS to alarms on ALB-1 0-4-5 and changing plant conditions Identifies entry condition to AOP-016, Leakage Inside CNMT CONFIRM alarm on RM-11, MCB and ERFIS indications PROCEDURE NOTE: No immediate actions.

SRO CHECK RHR in operation. (NO)

GO TO Step 3 (Refer to PEP-11 0)

PROCEDURE NOTE: This step is a qualitative check for leakage obviously in excess of Make Up capability. Isolation of letdown may be necessary. A formal calculation to determine the leakrate is rformed in

16.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 21 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Reviews note SRO (CONTINUOUS ACTION) CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. (YES) DIRECTS RO to determine leakrate RO Determines leakrate to be -25 gpm <+/- 10 gpm) and within VCT makeup capability.

NOTE: If CSIP suction is re-aligned to the RWST, negative reactivity addition should be anticipated.

Reviews note:

SRO DIRECTS RO TO MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5%

GO TO step 10 RO Monitors VCT level and Primary plant parameters during transient CHECK valid CNMT Ventilation Isolation monitors (REM-3561 A, B, C and D) ALARM CLEAR. (YES)

SRO CHECK RM 3502A, RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor, ALARM CLEAR. (NO)

Directs BOP to VERIFY CNMT ventilation isolation has ACTUATED BOP VERIFIES CNMT ventilation isolation has occurred (May recommend going to Max Containment Cooling)

CHECK RM 3502A, RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor, ALARM CLEAR (NO)

SRO 01 RECTS BOP TO VERIFY CNMT normal purge and supply fans isolate on high radiation level signal.

VERI FI ES CNMT normal purge and supply fans and dampers BOP are secured (YES)

(AH-82 SA, 1 CP-9 and 1 CP-5)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 21 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Reviews note SRO (CONTINUOUS ACTION) CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. (YES) DIRECTS RO to determine leakrate RO Determines leakrate to be -25 gpm <+/- 10 gpm) and within VCT makeup capability.

NOTE: If CSIP suction is re-aligned to the RWST, negative reactivity addition should be anticipated.

Reviews note:

SRO DIRECTS RO TO MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5%

GO TO step 10 RO Monitors VCT level and Primary plant parameters during transient CHECK valid CNMT Ventilation Isolation monitors (REM-3561 A, B, C and D) ALARM CLEAR. (YES)

SRO CHECK RM 3502A, RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor, ALARM CLEAR. (NO)

Directs BOP to VERIFY CNMT ventilation isolation has ACTUATED BOP VERIFIES CNMT ventilation isolation has occurred (May recommend going to Max Containment Cooling)

CHECK RM 3502A, RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor, ALARM CLEAR (NO)

SRO 01 RECTS BOP TO VERIFY CNMT normal purge and supply fans isolate on high radiation level signal.

VERI FI ES CNMT normal purge and supply fans and dampers BOP are secured (YES)

(AH-82 SA, 1 CP-9 and 1 CP-5)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 22 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO CHECK ALL valid Area Radiation Monitors ALARM CLEAR.

(YES)

SRO CHECK valid Stack Monitors ALARM CLEAR (YES)

SRO DIRECT RO to perform RCS flow balance calculation RO Performs RCS flow balance and calculates leakrate of -25 gpm (710 Qpm)

Evaluate RCS leakage Tech Spec 3.4.6.2

• > 1 gpm Unidentified leakage Action b reduce leakage to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or HSB within next 6 and SRO CSD within following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (If informed by BOP to review TS 3.4.6.1 and 3.4.8 they do not apply for this situation)

DETERMINE leak location: Using MCB indications, Valid CREW Radiation Monitors and CNMT sump in-leakage the crew should determine leak location as "Inside Containmenf'.

SRO Transitions to Attachment 7 DIRECTS BOP to perform attachment 7 Performs AOP-016 Attachment 7 actions (attached on last BOP pages of scenario guide)

Notify Chemistry and HP of leak in progress (if directed by SRO)

Determines that RCS leakage is exceeding Tech Specs Continue with the Shutdown lAW GP-006 SRO NOTE: Although NOT directed by AOP-016 for RCS leakage the SRO may determine that a rapid shutdown should be performed and use AOP-038 to quickly get the plant off line.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 22 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO CHECK ALL valid Area Radiation Monitors ALARM CLEAR.

(YES)

SRO CHECK valid Stack Monitors ALARM CLEAR (YES)

SRO DIRECT RO to perform RCS flow balance calculation RO Performs RCS flow balance and calculates leakrate of -25 gpm

(+10 gpm)

Evaluate RCS leakage Tech Spec 3.4.6.2

• > 1 gpm Unidentified leakage Action b reduce leakage to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or HSB within next 6 and SRO CSD within following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (If informed by BOP to review TS 3.4.6.1 and 3.4.8 they do not apply for this situation)

DETERMINE leak location: Using MCB indications, Valid CREW Radiation Monitors and CNMT sump in-leakage the crew should determine leak location as "Inside Containmenf'.

SRO Transitions to Attachment 7 DIRECTS BOP to perform attachment 7 Performs AOP-016 Attachment 7 actions (attached on last BOP pages of scenario guide)

Notify Chemistry and HP of leak in progress (if directed by SRO)

Determines that RCS leakage is exceeding Tech Specs Continue with the Shutdown lAW GP-006 SRO NOTE: Although NOT directed by AOP-016 for RCS leakage the SRO may determine that a rapid shutdown should be performed and use AOP-038 to quickly get the plant off line.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 23 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE:

The next step will be a decision to continue the plant shutdown using either GP-OOS or rapidly shutting the plant down IAW-AOP-038. If the SRO asks for guidance, the MSO will direct that the plant shutdown will be conducted using AOP-038 if no guidance is request then a plant shutdown will be continued based on the SRO decision EITHER WAY IS OK.

Continue with the plant shutdown using ONE of the following:

GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot or r

EXAMINER NOTE: If AOP-038 is performed then follow the actions below. If not performed then crew will continue with down power lAW GP-OOS. The actions will be to continue as a normal lant shutdown.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

Steps may be performed simultaneously or out of sequence at the discretion of the Superintendent

- Shift Operations.

EVALUATOR I COMMUNICATOR NOTE:

The crew may make calls to notify plant management before or during the power reduction. Acknowledge and request a report when more information becomes available.

SRO AOP-038, Rapid Downpower Actions REFER TO PEP-11 0, Emergency Classification And Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point X.

NOTIFY Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load. (N/A)

PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration of the RCS commences at Step 10.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 23 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior EXAMINER NOTE:

The next step will be a decision to continue the plant shutdown using either GP-OOS or rapidly shutting the plant down IAW-AOP-038. If the SRO asks for guidance, the MSO will direct that the plant shutdown will be conducted using AOP-038 if no guidance is request then a plant shutdown will be continued based on the SRO decision EITHER WAY IS OK.

Continue with the plant shutdown using ONE of the following:

GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Stand or EXAMINER N

If AOP-038 is performed then follow the actions below. If not performed then crew will continue with down power lAW GP-OOS. The actions will be to continue as a normal ant shutdown.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

Steps may be performed simultaneously or out of sequence at the discretion of the Superintendent

- Shift Operations.

EVALUATOR I COMMUNICATOR NOTE:

The crew may make calls to notify plant management before or during the power reduction. Acknowledge and request a report when more information becomes available.

SRO AOP-038, Rapid Downpower Actions REFER TO PEP-11 0, Emergency Classification And Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point X.

NOTIFY Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load. (N/A)

PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration of the RCS commences at Step 10.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 24 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

The crew may use OP-107, Section 8.21 - RAPID ADDITION OF BORIC ACID TO RCS, to estimate the boration and perform the steps.

DETERMINE required boric acid addition for desired power reduction, as follows:

CHECK BOTH of the following conditions exist:

RO/SRO

• Reactor power is -75%.

Target power level is provided in OPT-1525, Reactivity Plan Generation Weekly Interval MODE 1 at Full Power (50%, 30% or 5%).

OBTAIN values from Attachment 2, Gallons of Boric AcidlTarget Rod Height Required for Power Reduction.

RO Desired Boration gal Target Rod height (D Bank)

PROCEDURE NOTE: If load reduction rates in excess of 45 MW/min are required, the Unit should be tripped.

If OSI-PI is available, the following path in PLANTSTATUS.PIW will assess VIDAR functionality:

Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu), DEH Trends, DEH_MEGAWATTS. If DEH_MEGAWATTS is flat-lining, VIDAR is NOT functioning properly.

If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics Display Computer (located in the Termination Cabinet Room near the ATWS Panel) will show several points, most of which should be updating if the VIDAR Unit is functioning properly.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Failure of the DEH computer VIDAR Unit while in OPER AUTO has resulted in a plant trip.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 24 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

The crew may use OP-107, Section 8.21 - RAPID ADDITION OF BORIC ACID TO RCS, to estimate the boration and perform the steps.

DETERMINE required boric acid addition for desired power reduction, as follows:

CHECK BOTH of the following conditions exist:

RO/SRO

• Reactor power is -75%.

Target power level is provided in OPT-1525, Reactivity Plan Generation Weekly Interval MODE 1 at Full Power (50%, 30% or 5%).

OBTAIN values from Attachment 2, Gallons of Boric AcidlTarget Rod Height Required for Power Reduction.

RO Desired Boration gal Target Rod height (D Bank)

PROCEDURE NOTE: If load reduction rates in excess of 45 MW/min are required, the Unit should be tripped.

If OSI-PI is available, the following path in PLANTSTATUS.PIW will assess VIDAR functionality:

Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu), DEH Trends, DEH_MEGAWATTS. If DEH_MEGAWATTS is flat-lining, VIDAR is NOT functioning properly.

If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics Display Computer (located in the Termination Cabinet Room near the ATWS Panel) will show several points, most of which should be updating if the VIDAR Unit is functioning properly.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Failure of the DEH computer VIDAR Unit while in OPER AUTO has resulted in a plant trip.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 25 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CHECK BOTH of the following:

BOP DEH System in AUTO (YES)

VIDAR functioning properly (YES)

PERFORM the following at the DEH panel:

DEPRESS the Load Rate MW/MIN pushbutton.

ENTER desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MW/MIN) in DEMAND display.

DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.

BOP DEPRESS REF pushbutton.

ENTER desired load (120 MW if shutting down) in DEMAND display.

DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.

CH ECK HOLD pushbutton LIT.

CHECK Rod Control in AUTO. (YES)

RO MANUALLY POSITION Control Rods to maintain Tavg within 5°F of Tref.

ENERGIZE ALL available PRZ Backup heaters.

SRO DISCUSS Attachment 3, Reactivity Brief, with the MCR staff.

PROCEDURE NOTE: With the Megawatt and Impulse Pressure Feedback Loops out of service, the MW indication in the REFERENCE display will not reflect actual MW output. An accurate indication of Main Generator output can be obtained from ERFIS point JEE15688 (Gross MWe).

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 25 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CHECK BOTH of the following:

BOP DEH System in AUTO (YES)

VIDAR functioning properly (YES)

PERFORM the following at the DEH panel:

DEPRESS the Load Rate MW/MIN pushbutton.

ENTER desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MW/MIN) in DEMAND display.

DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.

BOP DEPRESS REF pushbutton.

ENTER desired load (120 MW if shutting down) in DEMAND display.

DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.

CH ECK HOLD pushbutton LIT.

CHECK Rod Control in AUTO. (YES)

RO MANUALLY POSITION Control Rods to maintain Tavg within 5°F of Tref.

ENERGIZE ALL available PRZ Backup heaters.

SRO DISCUSS Attachment 3, Reactivity Brief, with the MCR staff.

PROCEDURE NOTE: With the Megawatt and Impulse Pressure Feedback Loops out of service, the MW indication in the REFERENCE display will not reflect actual MW output. An accurate indication of Main Generator output can be obtained from ERFIS point JEE15688 (Gross MWe).

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 26 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior COMMENCE turbine load reduction at the DEH panel:

CHECK OPER AUTO Mode AVAILABLE. (YES)

BOP DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

VERIFY the value in the REFERENCE display LOWERS.

PROCEDURE NOTE:To prevent over-boration, only the amount of boron required to reduce power to the desired power level should be added.

Adjustments should be made to boric acid flow based on actual core/rod responses.

RO COMMENCE ReS boration as required to maintain Control Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit (Curve F-X-1).

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 26 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior COMMENCE turbine load reduction at the DEH panel:

CHECK OPER AUTO Mode AVAILABLE. (YES)

BOP DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

VERIFY the value in the REFERENCE display LOWERS.

PROCEDURE NOTE:To prevent over-boration, only the amount of boron required to reduce power to the desired power level should be added.

Adjustments should be made to boric acid flow based on actual core/rod responses.

RO COMMENCE ReS boration as required to maintain Control Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit (Curve F-X-1).

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 27 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

The following boration steps are provided for evaluator use. They are not in AOP-038. They will use OP-107.01 section 8.7 or 5.2. Either section will result in the desired outcome.

PROCEDURE NOTE: If performing a rapid shutdown of the plant per AOP-038, the following calculation does not have to be completed before boration begins, but should be completed before half of the estimated (or before 500 gallons whichever is less) boron addition has been dispensed.

• DETERMINE the volume of boric acid necessary to achieve the required RCS boron concentration.

• ENTER the amount determined in previous Step on.

• VERIFY the backup Boric Acid Transfer Pump control switch is in STOP.

• START the Boric Acid Transfer Pump aligned for Auto RO Make-up (switch in AUTO) by placing the control switch to START.

• OPEN 1CS-278 SB, EMERGENCY BORIC ACID ADDITION.

• RECORD the Boric Acid flowrate from FI-11 0 on.

• CALCULATE the amount of time in minutes it will take to deliver the required amount of Boric Acid.

BOP INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY the calculation Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 27 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

The following boration steps are provided for evaluator use. They are not in AOP-038. They will use OP-107.01 section 8.7 or 5.2. Either section will result in the desired outcome.

PROCEDURE NOTE: If performing a rapid shutdown of the plant per AOP-038, the following calculation does not have to be completed before boration begins, but should be completed before half of the estimated (or before 500 gallons whichever is less) boron addition has been dispensed.

• DETERMINE the volume of boric acid necessary to achieve the required RCS boron concentration.

• ENTER the amount determined in previous Step on.

• VERIFY the backup Boric Acid Transfer Pump control switch is in STOP.

• START the Boric Acid Transfer Pump aligned for Auto RO Make-up (switch in AUTO) by placing the control switch to START.

• OPEN 1CS-278 SB, EMERGENCY BORIC ACID ADDITION.

• RECORD the Boric Acid flowrate from FI-11 0 on.

• CALCULATE the amount of time in minutes it will take to deliver the required amount of Boric Acid.

BOP INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY the calculation Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 28 of 57 Event

Description:

Time I

Position I

RO BOP "Large Break LOCA Applicanfs Actions or Behavior CONTROL charging and letdown to maintain normal PRZ and VCT levels.

CALCULATE the final BAT level for the required amount of Boric Acid bei added.

INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY the calculation performed PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration flow may be interrupted as needed by cycling 1 CS-278, while maintaining the total boration time calculated RO WHEN the calculated amount of time has elapsed, THEN SHUT 1 CS-278 SB.

STOP the Boric Acid Transfer Pump started previously.

VERIFY Boric Acid pumps in the following alignment:

• One pump is in AUTO.

• One pump is in STOP.

REQUEST Chemistry to sample the RCS boron concentration.

PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.

RO DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration increase required.

DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added.

PROCEDURE NOTE: FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths position.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically at the et value.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 28 of 57 Event

Description:

Time I

Position I

RO BOP "Large Break LOCA Applicanfs Actions or Behavior CONTROL charging and letdown to maintain normal PRZ and VCT levels.

CALCULATE the final BAT level for the required amount of Boric Acid bei added.

INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY the calculation performed PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration flow may be interrupted as needed by cycling 1 CS-278, while maintaining the total boration time calculated RO WHEN the calculated amount of time has elapsed, THEN SHUT 1 CS-278 SB.

STOP the Boric Acid Transfer Pump started previously.

VERIFY Boric Acid pumps in the following alignment:

• One pump is in AUTO.

• One pump is in STOP.

REQUEST Chemistry to sample the RCS boron concentration.

PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.

RO DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration increase required.

DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added.

PROCEDURE NOTE: FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths position.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically at the et value.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 29 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior RO SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate.

Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS.

SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

RO PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.

START the makeup system as follows:

0 TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A 1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure

• ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure

• Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

PROCEDURE NOTE: At least 10 minutes should be allowed for mixing before a sample is taken.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 29 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior RO SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate.

Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS.

SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

RO PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.

START the makeup system as follows:

0 TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A 1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure

• ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure

• Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

PROCEDURE NOTE: At least 10 minutes should be allowed for mixing before a sample is taken.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 30 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior For large boron changes, PERFORM the following:

a. DIRECT Chemistry to sample the RCS for boron concentration.

RO

b. MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP

• START the makeup system as follows:

RO o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

o VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

PROCDURE CAUTION: The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

• VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

• IF rod control is in AUTO, RO

• THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding properly.

PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 30 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior For large boron changes, PERFORM the following:

a. DIRECT Chemistry to sample the RCS for boron concentration.

RO

b. MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

PROCEDURE NOTE: Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP

• START the makeup system as follows:

RO o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

o VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

PROCDURE CAUTION: The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

• VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

• IF rod control is in AUTO, RO

• THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding properly.

PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 31 of 57 Event

Description:

Time I

Position I

CREW BOP RO CREW "Large Break LOCA Applicanfs Actions or Behavior VERIFY Generator load AND Reactor power LOWERING.

MAINTAIN Generator reactive load (VARs) within guidelines.

CHECK Tavg within 5 of of Tref. (YES)

NOTI FY Chemistry of the following: Reactor power change will exceed 15% in a one hour period.

The following surveillances specified in the applicable sections require performing:

o RST -204, Reactor Coolant System Chemistry and Radiochemistry Surveillance, RST-211, Gaseous Effluent Radiochemistry Surveillance SRO CHECK that a planned load reduction will take the Unit to Turbine shutdown. (YES)

CREW RO SRO RO ALUATOR'S NOTE:

DISPATCH an operator to start the Auxiliary Boiler using OP-130.02, Auxiliary Boiler and Fuel Oil.

NOTIFY Radwaste Control Room to be prepared for the increased water processing requirements due to boration.

CHECK Power level at the target value. (NO)

RATE OR DILUTE as necessary to maintain AFD (Curve F-X-2) as close to the target value as possible while maintaining rods above the Rod Insertion Limit urve F-X-1.

REQUEST Chemistry to sample the RCS for boron.

ALIGN RCS makeup for AUTO operation using OP-1 07.01, CVCS Boration Dilution and Chemist Control.

Once satisfied with power reduction implementation response to the small RCS leak, initiate Event 6 Break LOCA" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 31 of 57 Event

Description:

Time I

Position I

CREW BOP RO CREW "Large Break LOCA Applicanfs Actions or Behavior VERIFY Generator load AND Reactor power LOWERING.

MAINTAIN Generator reactive load (VARs) within guidelines.

CHECK Tavg within 5 of of Tref. (YES)

NOTI FY Chemistry of the following: Reactor power change will exceed 15% in a one hour period.

The following surveillances specified in the applicable sections require performing:

o RST -204, Reactor Coolant System Chemistry and Radiochemistry Surveillance, RST-211, Gaseous Effluent Radiochemistry Surveillance SRO CHECK that a planned load reduction will take the Unit to Turbine shutdown. (YES)

CREW RO SRO RO ALUATOR'S NOTE:

DISPATCH an operator to start the Auxiliary Boiler using OP-130.02, Auxiliary Boiler and Fuel Oil.

NOTIFY Radwaste Control Room to be prepared for the increased water processing requirements due to boration.

CHECK Power level at the target value. (NO)

BORATE OR DILUTE as necessary to maintain AFD (Curve F-X-2) as close to the target value as possible while maintaining rods above the Rod Insertion Limit F-X-1.

REQUEST Chemistry to sample the RCS for boron.

ALIGN RCS makeup for AUTO operation using OP-1 07.01, CVCS Boration Dilution and Che Control.

Once satisfied with power reduction implementation response to the small RCS leak, initiate Event 6 Break LOCA" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 32 ill 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Activate TRG-6 "Large Break LOCA" Indications Available:

RCS Pressure rapid decrease

• Charging flow increasing

• Pressurizer level decreasing

• ALB-09-5-1 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS

• ALB-09-2-2 PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION

• ALB-09-3-3 PRZ CO NT LOW PRESS AND HEATERS ON

• ALB-10-8-5a CMPTR ALARM RX COOLANT Radiation monitors in alarm Evaluator Note:

The crew may transition to EPP-004 before the SI is required but it will occur shortly thereafter.

'B' CSIP will not auto start when SI is initiated.

Due to the earlier problems with the A-SA ESCWS Chiller, the

'A' sequencer will not reach load block 9, requiring the MAN PERM switch to be manipulated to allow manual loading of

'A' train components.

Crew RESPONDS to RCS inventory alarms.

RO INITIATES MANUAL Reactor Trip.

SRO ENTERS and directs actions of PATH-1.

RO PERFORM immediate actions of PATH-1.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 32 ill 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Activate TRG-6 "Large Break LOCA" Indications Available:

RCS Pressure rapid decrease

• Charging flow increasing

• Pressurizer level decreasing

• ALB-09-5-1 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS

• ALB-09-2-2 PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION

• ALB-09-3-3 PRZ CO NT LOW PRESS AND HEATERS ON

• ALB-10-8-5a CMPTR ALARM RX COOLANT Radiation monitors in alarm Evaluator Note:

The crew may transition to EPP-004 before the SI is required but it will occur shortly thereafter.

'B' CSIP will not auto start when SI is initiated.

Due to the earlier problems with the A-SA ESCWS Chiller, the

'A' sequencer will not reach load block 9, requiring the MAN PERM switch to be manipulated to allow manual loading of

'A' train components.

Crew RESPONDS to RCS inventory alarms.

RO INITIATES MANUAL Reactor Trip.

SRO ENTERS and directs actions of PATH-1.

RO PERFORM immediate actions of PATH-1.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 33 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior VERI FY Reactor Trip:

• AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

• CHECK for any of the following:

RO Trip breakers RT A and BY A OPEN (YES)

Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES) 0 ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES) 0 NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

VERI FY Turbine Trip:

• CHECK for any of the following:

BOP ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses BOP 1 A-SA and 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's (YES, off-site power)

CHECK SI Actuation:

• CHECK for any of the following - LIT: (YES or NO) 0 SI Actuated bypass permissive light RO ALB-11-2-2 ALB-11-5-1 ALB-11-5-3 ALB-12-1-4 SI actuation - REQUI RED (YES)

RO

• Actuate SI (AUTO actuated)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

6 Page 33 of 57 Event

Description:

"Large Break LOCA Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior VERI FY Reactor Trip:

• AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

• CHECK for any of the following:

RO Trip breakers RT A and BY A OPEN (YES)

Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES) 0 ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES) 0 NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

VERI FY Turbine Trip:

• CHECK for any of the following:

BOP ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses BOP 1 A-SA and 1B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's (YES, off-site power)

CHECK SI Actuation:

• CHECK for any of the following - LIT: (YES or NO) 0 SI Actuated bypass permissive light RO ALB-11-2-2 ALB-11-5-1 ALB-11-5-3 ALB-12-1-4 SI actuation - REQUI RED (YES)

RO

• Actuate SI (AUTO actuated)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

7 Page 34 of 57 Event

Description:

"'B' CSIP Fails to Auto Start on SI Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

Once Containment Pressure exceeds 3 psig the crew should apply adverse CNMT values for the remainder of the scenario.

Event 7 INFORMS Crew Foldout A applies.

SRO NOTE: The crew may brief on the foldout criteria and stop the RCP's at this time dependent on RCS conditions and leak progression.

RO VERIFY ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING. (NO.

'B' CSIP is not running) o STARTS 'B' CSIP CHECK SI Flow:

o SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES) oRCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG. (NO)

BOP CHECK Main Steam Isolation:

MAIN Steam isolation - ACTUATED. (YES)

BOP VERIFY all MSIVs and Bypass Valves - SHUT (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

7 Page 34 of 57 Event

Description:

"'B' CSIP Fails to Auto Start on SI Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Evaluator's Note:

Once Containment Pressure exceeds 3 psig the crew should apply adverse CNMT values for the remainder of the scenario.

Event 7 INFORMS Crew Foldout A applies.

SRO NOTE: The crew may brief on the foldout criteria and stop the RCP's at this time dependent on RCS conditions and leak progression.

RO VERIFY ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING. (NO.

'B' CSIP is not running) o STARTS 'B' CSIP CHECK SI Flow:

o SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES) oRCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG. (NO)

BOP CHECK Main Steam Isolation:

MAIN Steam isolation - ACTUATED. (YES)

BOP VERIFY all MSIVs and Bypass Valves - SHUT (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 35 of 57 Event

Description:

Time I

Position I

EventS RO Both CNMT Spray Pumps Fail to Auto Start Applicanfs Actions or Behavior CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. (NO)

Perform the following:

o Verify CNMT spray - ACTUATED (NO) o Start at least one CNMT spray pump ('A' pump will not start unless the MAN PERM switch is operated for train A)

Starts 'B' CT Pump Take A Sequencer to MAN PERM then start

'A' CT Pump o

Locally establish educator flow using TABLE:

ER1!'IS POIN'!'

lfiNlMUH (FCT7152)

FLOW DUAL TRAJlf 25.6 GPH SlHGLll 'l'RAIN 13.0 GPH (Eductor flow should be establisbed in band within 15 MINUTES of CNMT spray aetuation. )

HAXllWM FLOW 26.8 GPK 13.2 GPM COMMUNICATOR I BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by MCR to adjust spray educator flow, this can be accomplished by utilizing malfunction FT:7152. FI-7152 can be monitored on drawing CNS01. The malfunction can be accessed on the drawing as we". Call back when adjustments are completed.

ci'iii~Eti,g

,T,a:s~~~lif:

BOP CHECK AFW Status:

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAI LABLE. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 35 of 57 Event

Description:

Time I

Position I

EventS RO Both CNMT Spray Pumps Fail to Auto Start Applicanfs Actions or Behavior CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. (NO)

Perform the following:

o Verify CNMT spray - ACTUATED (NO) o Start at least one CNMT spray pump ('A' pump will not start unless the MAN PERM switch is operated for train A)

Starts 'B' CT Pump Take A Sequencer to MAN PERM then start

'A' CT Pump o

Locally establish educator flow using TABLE:

ER1!'IS POIN'!'

lfiNlMUH (FCT7152)

FLOW DUAL TRAJlf 25.6 GPH SlHGLll 'l'RAIN 13.0 GPH (Eductor flow should be establisbed in band within 15 MINUTES of CNMT spray aetuation. )

HAXllWM FLOW 26.8 GPK 13.2 GPM COMMUNICATOR I BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by MCR to adjust spray educator flow, this can be accomplished by utilizing malfunction FT:7152. FI-7152 can be monitored on drawing CNS01. The malfunction can be accessed on the drawing as we". Call back when adjustments are completed.

ci'iii~Eti,g

,T,a:s~~~lif:

BOP CHECK AFW Status:

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAI LABLE. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1_ Event #

8 Page 36 of 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior ASSIGNS a crew member to perform the following:

VERIFY alignment of components from actuation of SRO ESFAS Signals using Attachment 6, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", while continuing with implementation of EOPs.

CONTROL RCS Temperature:

STABILIZE AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

TABLE 1: RCS TEMPERATURE CONTROL GUIDELINES FOLLOWING RX TRIP Guidance is applicable until another procedure directs otherwise.

iF no RCPs running, THEN use wide range cold leg temperature.

LESS THAN 557°F AND GREATER THAN 557°F STABLE AT OR DECREASING AND INCREASING TRENDING TO 557°F

• Stop dumping steam

• IF condenser available

• Control feed flow and steam dump to establish THEN transfer steam and maintain RCS BOP dump to STEAM temperature between PRESSURE mode 555°F AND 559°F using OP-126, Section 5.3 AND dump steam to condenser

• Control feed flow OR

• Maintain total feed flow

• Dump steam using greater than 210 KPPH intact SG PORVs until level greater than

• Control feed flow to 25% [40%] in at least maintain SG levels one on intact SG BOP ENERGIZES AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1_ Event #

8 Page 36 of 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior ASSIGNS a crew member to perform the following:

VERIFY alignment of components from actuation of SRO ESFAS Signals using Attachment 6, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", while continuing with implementation of EOPs.

CONTROL RCS Temperature:

STABILIZE AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

TABLE 1: RCS TEMPERATURE CONTROL GUIDELINES FOLLOWING RX TRIP Guidance is applicable until another procedure directs otherwise.

iF no RCPs running, THEN use wide range cold leg temperature.

LESS THAN 557°F AND GREATER THAN 557°F STABLE AT OR DECREASING AND INCREASING TRENDING TO 557°F

• Stop dumping steam

• IF condenser available

• Control feed flow and steam dump to establish THEN transfer steam and maintain RCS BOP dump to STEAM temperature between PRESSURE mode 555°F AND 559°F using OP-126, Section 5.3 AND dump steam to condenser

• Control feed flow OR

• Maintain total feed flow

• Dump steam using greater than 210 KPPH intact SG PORVs until level greater than

• Control feed flow to 25% [40%] in at least maintain SG levels one on intact SG BOP ENERGIZES AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 37 ill 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

• CHECK PRZ PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE RO OPEN. (YES)

• PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)

IDENTIFY any faulted SG:

• CHECK for any of the following:

BOP 0

ANY SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO) 0 ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

Identify Any Ruptured SG CHECK for all of the following:

CONDENSER vacuum pump effluent radiation -

SRO NORMAL. (YES)

• SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

MAIN Steam line radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

Check any SG level-INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

RO CHECK for all of the following:

CNMT pressure - NORMAL. (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 44 (Path-1, Entry Point C)

IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Due to ReS conditions, a transition to FR-P.1 may be required. There are no significant actions, and the crew will return to procedure and step in effect. The following steps encompass the FR-P.1 actions with return to PATH-1.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 37 ill 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

• CHECK PRZ PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE RO OPEN. (YES)

• PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)

IDENTIFY any faulted SG:

• CHECK for any of the following:

BOP 0

ANY SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO) 0 ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

Identify Any Ruptured SG CHECK for all of the following:

CONDENSER vacuum pump effluent radiation -

SRO NORMAL. (YES)

• SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

MAIN Steam line radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

Check any SG level-INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

RO CHECK for all of the following:

CNMT pressure - NORMAL. (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 44 (Path-1, Entry Point C)

IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Due to ReS conditions, a transition to FR-P.1 may be required. There are no significant actions, and the crew will return to procedure and step in effect. The following steps encompass the FR-P.1 actions with return to PATH-1.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 38 of 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check RCS Pressure:

o Check for both of the following:

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG SRO (YES)

Any RHR HX header flow - GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (YES)

RETURN to procedure and step in effect. (PATH-1)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 38 of 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check RCS Pressure:

o Check for both of the following:

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG SRO (YES)

Any RHR HX header flow - GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (YES)

RETURN to procedure and step in effect. (PATH-1)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 39 of 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior 1<

'<.~<

..,'" 1"/';>

J

• • ' ** *.*.:s SRey****

,> ',~~' " f>>::'

~ *. ;:....... '

• Lc..P 4TH-f'.. '. '. *..;j~".>L~*.j.(*.***.*.*...***. ; '. :.~ *.*s*;.**;*?i*~*.. <*.*i;*.

.'t{~lI.lFlI"~"I;P',,;,.:

..J.

< ** >.~i*.....

• SRO INFORMS Crew that Foldouts A AND B apply.

NOTE: The crew may brief on the foldout criteria.

RO MAINTAIN RCP Seal Injection flow between 8 GPM AND 13 GPM.

BOP CHECK Intact SG Levels:

• ANY level-GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES)

• CONTROL feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% AND 50% [40% AND 50%].

CHECK PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:

RO

• VERIFY AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED. (YES)

• CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

• CHECK block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES)

CONTINUOUS ACTION: IF a PRZ PORV opens on high SRO pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

RO CHECK SI Termination Criteria:

• RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 10°F [40°F] - C (NO) 20°F [50°F] - M (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 39 of 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

... 1"/';>

J

• • • ** *.*.:s SRey****

,> ',~~' " f>>::'

~.~.,:;~ ">-'cc:OATH-1\\

.... *<~~*.>L~~.*(;.....

• • • • ~*****;*;***;*?/'~*.;****i;,

1*.rl:~L}lI'liL;,

7.

.* *..* *.<.>~i.,:

SRO INFORMS Crew that Foldouts A AND B apply.

NOTE: The crew may brief on the foldout criteria.

RO MAINTAIN RCP Seal Injection flow between 8 GPM AND 13 GPM.

BOP CHECK Intact SG Levels:

• ANY level-GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES)

• CONTROL feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% AND 50% [40% AND 50%].

CHECK PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:

RO

• VERIFY AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED. (YES)

• CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

• CHECK block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES)

CONTINUOUS ACTION: IF a PRZ PORV opens on high SRO pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

RO CHECK SI Termination Criteria:

• RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 10°F [40°F] - C (NO) 20°F [50°F] - M (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 40 of 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR I COMMUNICATOR:

When contacted to place AlB air compressors in Local Control mode, run CAEP

\\air\\ACs_to_local.txt. When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors are running in local control mode.

When contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves, run CAEP :\\cvc\\path-1 att 6 csip suction valves power. txt. When the CAEP is complete, report completion to the MCR.

SRO WHENEVER the SI termination criteria are met, THEN GO TO EPP-008, "SI TERMINATION".

RO CHECK any CMT Spray Pump - RUNNING. (YES)

SRO CONSUL T plant operations staff to determine if CNMT spray should be placed in standby.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

If contacted as plant operations staff, provide the following direction: "Unless directed by procedure, leave CNMT Spray in service until the TSC has completed an evaluation".

SRO CONTINUOUS ACTION: WHEN directed by plant operations staff, place CNMT Spray in standby alignment.

WHEN flux less than 5x10-11 AMPS, THEN do Steps 52b ANDc.

RO VERIFY source range detectors - ENERGIZED.

• TRANSFER nuclear recorder to source range scale.

RO CHECK RHR Pump Status:

• RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 40 of 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR I COMMUNICATOR:

When contacted to place AlB air compressors in Local Control mode, run CAEP

\\air\\ACs_to_local.txt. When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors are running in local control mode.

When contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves, run CAEP :\\cvc\\path-1 att 6 csip suction valves power. txt. When the CAEP is complete, report completion to the MCR.

SRO WHENEVER the SI termination criteria are met, THEN GO TO EPP-008, "SI TERMINATION".

RO CHECK any CMT Spray Pump - RUNNING. (YES)

SRO CONSUL T plant operations staff to determine if CNMT spray should be placed in standby.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

If contacted as plant operations staff, provide the following direction: "Unless directed by procedure, leave CNMT Spray in service until the TSC has completed an evaluation".

SRO CONTINUOUS ACTION: WHEN directed by plant operations staff, place CNMT Spray in standby alignment.

WHEN flux less than 5x10-11 AMPS, THEN do Steps 52b ANDc.

RO VERIFY source range detectors - ENERGIZED.

• TRANSFER nuclear recorder to source range scale.

RO CHECK RHR Pump Status:

• RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 41 of 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Establish CCW flow to the RHR Heat Exchanger:

Verify both CCW pumps - RUNNING (YES)

• Open the following valves:

o TRAIN A: 1CC-147 o TRAIN B: 1CC-167

• Verify CCW flow to the RHR heat exchangers

• Perform one of the following to establish two independent RO CCW systems 0

Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves 1CC-99 1CC-128 0

Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves 1CC-113 1CC-127

• CHECK EDG Status:

BOP 0

CHECK AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND 1 B-SB-ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER. (YES)

• CHECK any EDG - RUNNING UNLOADED. (YES)

RO RESET SI.

SRO Foldouts A and B apply.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 41 of 57 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA (continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Establish CCW flow to the RHR Heat Exchanger:

Verify both CCW pumps - RUNNING (YES)

• Open the following valves:

o TRAIN A: 1CC-147 o TRAIN B: 1CC-167

• Verify CCW flow to the RHR heat exchangers

• Perform one of the following to establish two independent RO CCW systems 0

Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves 1CC-99 1CC-128 0

Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves 1CC-113 1CC-127

• CHECK EDG Status:

BOP 0

CHECK AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND 1 B-SB-ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER. (YES)

• CHECK any EDG - RUNNING UNLOADED. (YES)

RO RESET SI.

SRO Foldouts A and B apply.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 42 of 57 Event

Description:

Time I

Position I

RO/SRO Large Break LOCA (continued)

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status RHR system - CAPABLE OF COLD LEG RECIRCULATION. (YES) o Check auxiliary AND radwaste processing building radiation - NORMAL (yES)

• Check RCS status o

Check for both of the following:

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 psig (YES)

ANY RHR HX header flow - GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The following step may have RWST level less than 23.4%,

requiring transition to EPP-010 dependent on RWST conditions. Otherwise, the crew will remain in PATH-1 until RWST level drops to 23.4% and apply foldout criteria to transition to establish cold leg recirculation.

SRO

• Check Cold Leg Recirculation Criteria:

o Check SI System - ALIGNED FOR COLD LEG RECIRCULATION (NO) o Perform a brief on EPP-010, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION" to prepare for transfer to cold leg recirculation.

o RWST level - LESS THAN 23.4% (214 LOW-LOW ALARM) (NO)

• RETURN to Step 57 (Evaluating RCS conditions).

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

8 Page 42 of 57 Event

Description:

Time I

Position I

RO/SRO Large Break LOCA (continued)

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status RHR system - CAPABLE OF COLD LEG RECIRCULATION. (YES) o Check auxiliary AND radwaste processing building radiation - NORMAL (yES)

• Check RCS status o

Check for both of the following:

RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 psig (YES)

ANY RHR HX header flow - GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The following step may have RWST level less than 23.4%,

requiring transition to EPP-010 dependent on RWST conditions. Otherwise, the crew will remain in PATH-1 until RWST level drops to 23.4% and apply foldout criteria to transition to establish cold leg recirculation.

SRO

• Check Cold Leg Recirculation Criteria:

o Check SI System - ALIGNED FOR COLD LEG RECIRCULATION (NO) o Perform a brief on EPP-010, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION" to prepare for transfer to cold leg recirculation.

o RWST level - LESS THAN 23.4% (214 LOW-LOW ALARM) (NO)

• RETURN to Step 57 (Evaluating RCS conditions).

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

9 Page 43 of 57 Event

Description:

RWST swap-over failure (1 SI-300 and 1 SI-31 0 fail to open)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution Perform Steps 1 through 8 without delay. Do NOT implement Function Restoration Procedures prior to completion of these steps.

SI recirculation flow to RCS must be maintained at all times.

Switchover to recirculation may cause high radiation levels in the reactor auxiliary building. Radiation levels must be assessed prior to performance of local actions in the affected areas.

Procedure Note Foldout applies.

A minimum of 142 INCHES CNMT wide range sump level ensures the recirculation sump strainers are completely submerged AND assures a long term recirculation suction source.

The following sequence of steps to transfer to cold leg recirculation assumes o erabili of at least one train of safe uards e ui ment.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The crew may identify that 151-300 and 151-310 will not open due to failed relay based on the following indications:

Bypass Permissive Light Box 4-8 flashing No white light on 51 5uction Auto 5witchover Reset Train A switch Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

9 Page 43 of 57 Event

Description:

RWST swap-over failure (1 SI-300 and 1 SI-31 0 fail to open)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution Perform Steps 1 through 8 without delay. Do NOT implement Function Restoration Procedures prior to completion of these steps.

SI recirculation flow to RCS must be maintained at all times.

Switchover to recirculation may cause high radiation levels in the reactor auxiliary building. Radiation levels must be assessed prior to performance of local actions in the affected areas.

Procedure Note Foldout applies.

A minimum of 142 INCHES CNMT wide range sump level ensures the recirculation sump strainers are completely submerged AND assures a long term recirculation suction source.

The following sequence of steps to transfer to cold leg recirculation assumes o erabili of at least one train of safe uards e ui ment.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The crew may identify that 151-300 and 151-310 will not open due to failed relay based on the following indications:

Bypass Permissive Light Box 4-8 flashing No white light on 51 5uction Auto 5witchover Reset Train A switch Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

9 Page 44 of 57 Event

Description:

RWST swap-over failure (1 SI-300 and 1 SI-31 0 fail to open)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Establish CSIP Recirculation Alignment:

0 Shut CSIP alternate miniflow isolation valves:

1CS-746 (Train A CSIP) 1CS-752 (Train B CSIP)

Verify normal miniflow isolation valves - SHUT (YES) 0 1CS-182 0

1CS-196 0

1CS-210 0

1CS-214

• Open RHR discharge to CSIP suction valves:

0 1RH-25 0

1RH-63 Reset SI.

• Manually realign safeguards equipment following a loss of offsite power. (Refer to PATH-1 GUIDE, Attachment 2.)

• Shut RWST to CSIP suction valves AND place in pull-to-lock position:

1 CS-291 (LCV-115B)

SRO/RO

.. 1CS-292 (LCV-115D)

• Check Charging System Status:

0 Check charging line -ISOLATED (YES) 1CS-235 1CS-238

• Verify Both Charging Pumps - RUNNING (YES)

Establish Recirculation Injection Flowpath:

0 Open alternate high head SI to cold leg valve:

1SI-52 0

Check any BIT outlet valve - OPEN 1SI-3 1SI-4 0

Check power for CSIP discharge cross-connect valves - AVAI LABLE 1CS-219 (MCC 1A35-SA-14E) 1CS-217 (MCC 1 B35-SB-12C) 1CS-218 (MCC 1A35-SA-14D) 1 CS-220 (MCC 1 B35-SB-9D)

Shut CSIP discharge cross connect-valves based on Table:

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _1 _

Event #

9 Page 44 of 57 Event

Description:

RWST swap-over failure (1 SI-300 and 1 SI-31 0 fail to open)

Time I

Position I

Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Establish CSIP Recirculation Alignment:

0 Shut CSIP alternate miniflow isolation valves:

1CS-746 (Train A CSIP) 1CS-752 (Train B CSIP)

Verify normal miniflow isolation valves - SHUT (YES) 0 1CS-182 0

1CS-196 0

1CS-210 0

1CS-214

• Open RHR discharge to CSIP suction valves:

0 1RH-25 0

1RH-63 Reset SI.

• Manually realign safeguards equipment following a loss of offsite power. (Refer to PATH-1 GUIDE, Attachment 2.)

• Shut RWST to CSIP suction valves AND place in pull-to-lock position:

1 CS-291 (LCV-115B)

SRO/RO

.. 1CS-292 (LCV-115D)

• Check Charging System Status:

0 Check charging line -ISOLATED (YES) 1CS-235 1CS-238

• Verify Both Charging Pumps - RUNNING (YES)

Establish Recirculation Injection Flowpath:

0 Open alternate high head SI to cold leg valve:

1SI-52 0

Check any BIT outlet valve - OPEN 1SI-3 1SI-4 0

Check power for CSIP discharge cross-connect valves - AVAI LABLE 1CS-219 (MCC 1A35-SA-14E) 1CS-217 (MCC 1 B35-SB-12C) 1CS-218 (MCC 1A35-SA-14D) 1 CS-220 (MCC 1 B35-SB-9D)

Shut CSIP discharQe cross connect-valves based on Table:

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 8cenario # _1_ Event #

9 Page 45 of 57 Event

Description:

RW8T swap-over failure (181-300 and 181-310 fail to open)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

,N2m; Two valves are specified to be SHUT for each pump combination for redundanCI! however. a single valve provides satisfactory 180 t10n in the event one or more of the specified valves can NQI be SHUT.

Discharge Cross Connect SRO/RO CSIPs Running Valves To Be Shut Any 2: lCS-217. lCS-218 A AND B lCS-219. lCS-220 A AND C lCS-217. lCS-219 BAND C lCS-21S. lCS-220 Verify High Head SI Flow: (YES) 0 Alternate header flow (Train A):

FI-940 0

Normal header flow (Train B):

FI-943 Verify CCW Alignment To The RHR Heat Exchangers:

0 Verify both CCW pumps - RUNNING (YES) 0 Verify the following valves OPEN (YES) 1CC-147 1 CC-167 0

Verify CCW flow to the RHR heat exchanger(s). (YES) 0 Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:

1CC-99 1CC-128 SRO/RO 0

Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:

1CC-113 1CC-127 Observe NOTE prior to Step 9 AND GO TO Step 9.

Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

Align CNMT Spray For Recirculation:

0 Any CNMT spray pump - RUNNING (YES) 0 Verify CNMT sump to CNMT spray suction valves -

OPEN (YES) 1CT-105 1 CT-1 02 0

Verify RWST to CNMT spray pump suction valves-SHUT 1CT-26 1CT-71 TERMINATE SCENARIO Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 8cenario # _1_ Event #

9 Page 45 of 57 Event

Description:

RW8T swap-over failure (181-300 and 181-310 fail to open)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

,N2m; Two valves are specified to be SHUT for each pump combination for redundanCI! however. a single valve provides satisfactory 180 t10n in the event one or more of the specified valves can NQI be SHUT.

Discharge Cross Connect SRO/RO CSIPs Running Valves To Be Shut Any 2: lCS-217. lCS-218 A AND B lCS-219. lCS-220 A AND C lCS-217. lCS-219 BAND C lCS-21S. lCS-220 Verify High Head SI Flow: (YES) 0 Alternate header flow (Train A):

FI-940 0

Normal header flow (Train B):

FI-943 Verify CCW Alignment To The RHR Heat Exchangers:

0 Verify both CCW pumps - RUNNING (YES) 0 Verify the following valves OPEN (YES) 1CC-147 1 CC-167 0

Verify CCW flow to the RHR heat exchanger(s). (YES) 0 Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:

1CC-99 1CC-128 SRO/RO 0

Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:

1CC-113 1CC-127 Observe NOTE prior to Step 9 AND GO TO Step 9.

Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

Align CNMT Spray For Recirculation:

0 Any CNMT spray pump - RUNNING (YES) 0 Verify CNMT sump to CNMT spray suction valves -

OPEN (YES) 1CT-105 1 CT-1 02 0

Verify RWST to CNMT spray pump suction valves-SHUT 1CT-26 1CT-71 TERMINATE SCENARIO Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 46 of 57 5.0 STARTUP 5.1.

Startup Train A~

(B-SB) from Main Control Room or Local Panel 5.1.1. Initial Conditions NOTE:

Section 5.2, Pracing standby Train in Operation, should be used when swapping Trains of ESCWS.

1.

No Chiller Train is in service.

2.

system filled and vented per Section 8.1.

3.

System lineup Attachments 1 and 2 are complete.

4.

For non-emergency starts the prestart checks of Attacllment 5 have been performed and an operator should be present to observe start of chiller.

5.

Section 8.12 Manual Chiller Reset has been performed, if necessary due to cIliller trip.

6.

The LO. heaters have been in service for twelve hours. (See Precaution and Umitation 4.0.3 for applicabirrty of this Initial Condition)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 46 of 57 5.0 STARTUP 5.1.

Startup Train A~

(B-SB) from Main Control Room or Local Panel 5.1.1. Initial Conditions NOTE:

Section 5.2, Pracing standby Train in Operation, should be used when swapping Trains of ESCWS.

1.

No Chiller Train is in service.

2.

system filled and vented per Section 8.1.

3.

System lineup Attachments 1 and 2 are complete.

4.

For non-emergency starts the prestart checks of Attacllment 5 have been performed and an operator should be present to observe start of chiller.

5.

Section 8.12 Manual Chiller Reset has been performed, if necessary due to cIliller trip.

6.

The LO. heaters have been in service for twelve hours. (See Precaution and Umitation 4.0.3 for applicabirrty of this Initial Condition)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 47 of 57 5.1.2. Procedural Steps NOTE: Whenever an "A" Train component is referred to in the body of this procedure it's "B" Train counterpart wHllmmedfately folloW. enclosed by parentheses.

NOTE:

ESR 99-00142 has evaluated and determined that long-term dosure of the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units will not affect operability of the Essential services Chiller system. The next two steps will align tile NNS AH units however, If it is desired to maintain the NNS isolation valVes shut, tI1en steps 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.1 may be skipped.

1.

ISOLATE the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units from the train that wiD not be placed in service by shutting the following valVes:

1CH-125 SB (1CH-196 S8)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-126 SA (1CH-197 SA)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-115 SA (1CH-148 S8)

CHillED WATER TO NESSRFANS CLR ISOL 1CH-116 S8 (1CH-149 SA)

CHIllED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL

2.

AUGN the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units associated with tile train that WilllJe placed in service by opening the following valVes:

1CH-125 S8 (1CH-196 S8)

CHIllED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-126SA (1CH-197SA)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSRFAN ClRSISOL 1CH-115SA (1CH-148 SB)

CHILLEOWATERTO NESSR FANS CLR ISOL 1CH-116 SB (1CH-149 SA)

CHillED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 47 of 57 5.1.2. Procedural Steps NOTE: Whenever an "A" Train component is referred to in the body of this procedure it's "B" Train counterpart wHllmmedfately folloW. enclosed by parentheses.

NOTE:

ESR 99-00142 has evaluated and determined that long-term dosure of the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units will not affect operability of the Essential services Chiller system. The next two steps will align tile NNS AH units however, If it is desired to maintain the NNS isolation valVes shut, tI1en steps 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.1 may be skipped.

1.

ISOLATE the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units from the train that wiD not be placed in service by shutting the following valVes:

1CH-125 SB (1CH-196 S8)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-126 SA (1CH-197 SA)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-115 SA (1CH-148 S8)

CHillED WATER TO NESSRFANS CLR ISOL 1CH-116 S8 (1CH-149 SA)

CHIllED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL

2.

AUGN the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units associated with tile train that WilllJe placed in service by opening the following valVes:

1CH-125 S8 (1CH-196 S8)

CHIllED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-126SA (1CH-197SA)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSRFAN ClRSISOL 1CH-115SA (1CH-148 SB)

CHILLEOWATERTO NESSR FANS CLR ISOL 1CH-116 SB (1CH-149 SA)

CHillED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-O-2 Page 48 of 57 5.1.2 ProceduraJ Steps (continued)

NOTE: The local alarm indication for low chilled water flow and low chilled water temperature will lock in until manually reset at the WC-2 control paneL

3.

START WC-2 Chiller 1A-SA (1 B-SB) Chilled water pump P-4 to establish chilled water flow.

4.

At the Local Control panel, RESET the Low Chilled water Row alarm using the CHILLED WATER NO FLOW TRIP INDICATION RESET push-button.

5.

IF starting the chiller for the lIrst time following maintenance where the chiller lube oil heater circuit was under dearance, THEN PERFORM the following:

a.

Locally START the oil pump on the 1A-SA (1 B-SB) compressor by taking the control switch on the local panel to the MAN position.

b.

RUN pump for 5 minutes.

c.

STOP the oil pump on the 1A-SA (1 B-SB) chiller compressor by taking the control switch on the local panel to the AUTO posItion.

6.

At the Local Control Panel, CHECK that all alarm lights are NOT lit.

7.

IF any alarm light(s) is lit, THEN PERFORM the following:

a.

IF the Local Select switch is in the LOCAL position, THEN locally DEPRESS the STOP push-button.

b.

IF the Local Sefed switch is In the MCB HVAC position, THEN place the 1A-SA (1B-SB) compressor control switch on AEP-1 to STOP.

c.

IF any alann light is still lit, THEN PERFORM the following:

(1)

DECLARE the chiller inoperable.

(2)

INITIATE corrective actions.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-O-2 Page 48 of 57 5.1.2 ProceduraJ Steps (continued)

NOTE: The local alarm indication for low chilled water flow and low chilled water temperature will lock in until manually reset at the WC-2 control paneL

3.

START WC-2 Chiller 1A-SA (1 B-SB) Chilled water pump P-4 to establish chilled water flow.

4.

At the Local Control panel, RESET the Low Chilled water Row alarm using the CHILLED WATER NO FLOW TRIP INDICATION RESET push-button.

5.

IF starting the chiller for the lIrst time following maintenance where the chiller lube oil heater circuit was under dearance, THEN PERFORM the following:

a.

Locally START the oil pump on the 1A-SA (1 B-SB) compressor by taking the control switch on the local panel to the MAN position.

b.

RUN pump for 5 minutes.

c.

STOP the oil pump on the 1A-SA (1 B-SB) chiller compressor by taking the control switch on the local panel to the AUTO posItion.

6.

At the Local Control Panel, CHECK that all alarm lights are NOT lit.

7.

IF any alarm light(s) is lit, THEN PERFORM the following:

a.

IF the Local Select switch is in the LOCAL position, THEN locally DEPRESS the STOP push-button.

b.

IF the Local Sefed switch is In the MCB HVAC position, THEN place the 1A-SA (1B-SB) compressor control switch on AEP-1 to STOP.

c.

IF any alann light is still lit, THEN PERFORM the following:

(1)

DECLARE the chiller inoperable.

(2)

INITIATE corrective actions.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 49 of 57 5.1.2 Procedural steps (continued)

NOTE:

If the unit cycles oft due to low chilled water flow or low chilled water temperature, the unit will automatically restart If all start permissive conditions exist NOTE: An anti-recyde feature prevents more than one normal start Within a 30 minute period. This anti-recyde feature Is bypassed upon any automatic start signal from the ESF sequencer.

NOTE:

A1ter going to START on the ChiUer Control SWitch, the oil pump will start and bring oil pressure up to normal operating pressure prior to chiller start.

NOTE:

OPT -1512 rotates the Temperature control Point potentiometer to dean the surfaces. While OPT-1512 restores the potentiometer to its original position.

it is possible that due to the surface deaning the dlaracteristics of the potentiometer have changed suflicienUy to require a manual temperature adjustment per section 8.14 of this procedure. This will be determined by monitoring temperature after chiller start in the following step.

8.

START the chiller by performing one otttre following:

a.

At AEP-1, PLACE Water Chiller Compressor WC-2 A-SA rNC-2 B-SB) control switch to the START position and release.

OR

b.

DEPRESS the START push-button at the local control panel with the Local seIed: switch in the U)CAL position.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 49 of 57 5.1.2 Procedural steps (continued)

NOTE:

If the unit cycles oft due to low chilled water flow or low chilled water temperature, the unit will automatically restart If all start permissive conditions exist NOTE: An anti-recyde feature prevents more than one normal start Within a 30 minute period. This anti-recyde feature Is bypassed upon any automatic start signal from the ESF sequencer.

NOTE:

A1ter going to START on the ChiUer Control SWitch, the oil pump will start and bring oil pressure up to normal operating pressure prior to chiller start.

NOTE:

OPT -1512 rotates the Temperature control Point potentiometer to dean the surfaces. While OPT-1512 restores the potentiometer to its original position.

it is possible that due to the surface deaning the dlaracteristics of the potentiometer have changed suflicienUy to require a manual temperature adjustment per section 8.14 of this procedure. This will be determined by monitoring temperature after chiller start in the following step.

8.

START the chiller by performing one otttre following:

a.

At AEP-1, PLACE Water Chiller Compressor WC-2 A-SA rNC-2 B-SB) control switch to the START position and release.

OR

b.

DEPRESS the START push-button at the local control panel with the Local seIed: switch in the U)CAL position.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 50 ill 57 5.2.

Placing Standby Train In Operation NOTE: It Is necessary to shift associated trains of HVAC units when shifting trains of Essential SeJVices Chilled water.

NOTE: ThisSection Is written for swapping from Train B ESCW to Train A ESCW, with components for swapping from Train A ESCW to Train B ESCW in parentheses.

5.2.1. Initial COnditions

i.

Service water is being supplied to the non-operating chUIer WC-2 1A-SA (WC-21B-SB).

2.

One train of ESCW Is already in operation.

3.

For non-emergency starts the prestart checks of Attachment 5 have been performed and an operator should be present to obseIVe start of chiller.

4.

Section R 12. Manual Chiller Reset performed if necessary for non-operating chiller.

5.

The La. heaters have been in service foriwelve hours. (See Precaution and Umitation 4.0.3 for applicabUity of this Initial Condition) 5.2.2. Procedural Steps NOTE: The focal alarm indication for low chilled water flow and low chilled water temperature will lock in until manually reset at the WC-2 control panel NOTE: If starting the chiller compressor is delayed following the start of the P-4 Pump in the next step, the compressor oil coUld cool doWn to the point that the compressor will trip on low oil pressure.

1.

At AEP-1, START the non-operating Chiller WC-2 A-SA (B-SB) Chilled Water Pump P-4 A-SA (B-SB) to establish chilled water flow in the non-operating train.

2.

At the local Control panel, RESET the Low Chilled water Row alarm using the CHILLED WATER NO FLOW TRIP INDICATION RESET push-button.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 50 ill 57 5.2.

Placing Standby Train In Operation NOTE: It Is necessary to shift associated trains of HVAC units when shifting trains of Essential SeJVices Chilled water.

NOTE: ThisSection Is written for swapping from Train B ESCW to Train A ESCW, with components for swapping from Train A ESCW to Train B ESCW in parentheses.

5.2.1. Initial COnditions

i.

Service water is being supplied to the non-operating chUIer WC-2 1A-SA (WC-21B-SB).

2.

One train of ESCW Is already in operation.

3.

For non-emergency starts the prestart checks of Attachment 5 have been performed and an operator should be present to obseIVe start of chiller.

4.

Section R 12. Manual Chiller Reset performed if necessary for non-operating chiller.

5.

The La. heaters have been in service foriwelve hours. (See Precaution and Umitation 4.0.3 for applicabUity of this Initial Condition) 5.2.2. Procedural Steps NOTE: The focal alarm indication for low chilled water flow and low chilled water temperature will lock in until manually reset at the WC-2 control panel NOTE: If starting the chiller compressor is delayed following the start of the P-4 Pump in the next step, the compressor oil coUld cool doWn to the point that the compressor will trip on low oil pressure.

1.

At AEP-1, START the non-operating Chiller WC-2 A-SA (B-SB) Chilled Water Pump P-4 A-SA (B-SB) to establish chilled water flow in the non-operating train.

2.

At the local Control panel, RESET the Low Chilled water Row alarm using the CHILLED WATER NO FLOW TRIP INDICATION RESET push-button.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 51 of 57 5.2.2 Procedural steps (continued)

3.

IF starting the chiller for the first time following maintenance where the chiller lube oil heater orcuit was under dearance, THEN PERFORM the following:

a.

Locally START the oil pump on the standby chiller compressor by taking the control switch on the local panel to the MAN position.

b.

RUN pump for 5 minutes.

c.

STOP the standby chiller compressor oil pump by taking the control switch on the local panel to the AUTO position.

4.

At the Local Control Panel, CHECK that all alarm lights are NOT Ill.

5.

IF any alarm Jight{s) is lit THEN PERFORM the following:

a.

IF the Local Select: switch is in the LOCAL position, THEN locally DEPRESS the STOP push-button.

b.

IF the Local Select switch is in the MCB HVAC position, THEN place the standby chiller compressor control switch on AEP-1 to STOP.

c.

IF any alarm light is still lit, THEN PERFORM the following:

(1)

DECLARE the chiller inoperable.

(2)

INITlA TE corrective actions.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 51 of 57 5.2.2 Procedural steps (continued)

3.

IF starting the chiller for the first time following maintenance where the chiller lube oil heater orcuit was under dearance, THEN PERFORM the following:

a.

Locally START the oil pump on the standby chiller compressor by taking the control switch on the local panel to the MAN position.

b.

RUN pump for 5 minutes.

c.

STOP the standby chiller compressor oil pump by taking the control switch on the local panel to the AUTO position.

4.

At the Local Control Panel, CHECK that all alarm lights are NOT Ill.

5.

IF any alarm Jight{s) is lit THEN PERFORM the following:

OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 52 of 57 5.2.2 Procedural steps (continued)

NOTE:

OPT-1512 rotates the Temperature control Point potentlometerto dean the surfaces. While OPT-1512 restores the potentiometer to its original position, it is possible that due to the surface deaning the characteristics of the potentiometer have changed suffidently to require a manual temperature adjustment per Section 8.14 of this procedure. This will be determined by ITKlnitoring temperature after chiller start in the following step.

6.

START the chiller by performing ONE of the following:

a.

At AEP-1, PLACE water Chiller compressor WC-2 A-SA (WC-2 B-S6) control switch to the START position AND RELEASE.

OR

b.

DEPRESS the START push-button at the local control panel with the local select switch in the LOCAL position.

7.

PLACE additional safety related air handlers in service prior to switchover of the nonessential header.

NOTE:

ESR 99-00142 has evaluated and determined that long-term dosure of the supply and return valVes to the NNS AH units will not affect operability ofthe Essential Services Chiller system. The next two steps will align the NNS AH units hoWever, if it is desired to maintain the NNS isolation valVes shut, then steps 5.2.2.8 and 52.2.9 may be skipped.

8.

ISOLATE the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units from the train that was already operating by shutting the following valves:

1CH-196 S6 (1CH-125 S6)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRSISOL 1CH-197 SA (1CH-126 SA)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-148 S6 (1 CH-115 SA)

CHIllED WATER TO NESSR FANS ClRISOl 1CH-149 SA (1CH-116 S6)

CHILlED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRSISOL Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 52 of 57 5.2.2 Procedural steps (continued)

NOTE:

OPT-1512 rotates the Temperature control Point potentlometerto dean the surfaces. While OPT-1512 restores the potentiometer to its original position, it is possible that due to the surface deaning the characteristics of the potentiometer have changed suffidently to require a manual temperature adjustment per Section 8.14 of this procedure. This will be determined by ITKlnitoring temperature after chiller start in the following step.

6.

START the chiller by performing ONE of the following:

a.

At AEP-1, PLACE water Chiller compressor WC-2 A-SA (WC-2 B-S6) control switch to the START position AND RELEASE.

OR

b.

DEPRESS the START push-button at the local control panel with the local select switch in the LOCAL position.

7.

PLACE additional safety related air handlers in service prior to switchover of the nonessential header.

NOTE:

ESR 99-00142 has evaluated and determined that long-term dosure of the supply and return valVes to the NNS AH units will not affect operability ofthe Essential Services Chiller system. The next two steps will align the NNS AH units hoWever, if it is desired to maintain the NNS isolation valVes shut, then steps 5.2.2.8 and 52.2.9 may be skipped.

8.

ISOLATE the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units from the train that was already operating by shutting the following valves:

1CH-196 S6 (1CH-125 S6)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRSISOL 1CH-197 SA (1CH-126 SA)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-148 S6 (1 CH-115 SA)

CHIllED WATER TO NESSR FANS ClRISOl 1CH-149 SA (1CH-116 S6)

CHILlED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRSISOL Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-O-2 Page 53 of 57 5.2.2 Procedural steps (continued)

9.

AUGN NNS AH units to the train that will remain operating by opening the following valVes:

1CH-125 S6 (1CH-196 SB)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-126 SA (1CH-197 SA)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-115 SA (1CH-148 SB)

CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FANS ClRISOl 1CH-116 S6 (1CH-149 SA)

CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN ClRSISOl

10.

IF shifting chillers to support pladng the standby safety equipment train in

service, THEN PERFORM Attachment 8.

NOTE:

Service water to the chiller condenser Will isolate 90 seconds after the chiller has stopped, SW FROM WC-2 B-S6 (A-SA) CONDENSER 1SW-1208 SB

{1SW-1055 SA) Will close.

11.

STOP the chiller by performing one of the following:

a.

At AEP-1, PLACE Water Chiller Compressor WC-2 B-SB (A-SA) control switch to the STOP position and release.

OR

b.

DEPRESS the STOP push-button at the local control panel with the local select switch in the lOCAl position.

12.

At AEP-1, STOP the Chiller WC-2 B-SB (A-SA) Chilled Water Pump P-4 B-SB (A-SA) in the train just secured.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 and 5.2 Form ES-O-2 Page 53 of 57 5.2.2 Procedural steps (continued)

9.

AUGN NNS AH units to the train that will remain operating by opening the following valVes:

1CH-125 S6 (1CH-196 SB)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-126 SA (1CH-197 SA)

CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN ClRSISOL 1CH-115 SA (1CH-148 SB)

CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FANS ClRISOl 1CH-116 S6 (1CH-149 SA)

CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN ClRSISOl

10.

IF shifting chillers to support pladng the standby safety equipment train in

service, THEN PERFORM Attachment 8.

NOTE:

Service water to the chiller condenser Will isolate 90 seconds after the chiller has stopped, SW FROM WC-2 B-S6 (A-SA) CONDENSER 1SW-1208 SB

{1SW-1055 SA) Will close.

11.

STOP the chiller by performing one of the following:

a.

At AEP-1, PLACE Water Chiller Compressor WC-2 B-SB (A-SA) control switch to the STOP position and release.

OR

b.

DEPRESS the STOP push-button at the local control panel with the local select switch in the lOCAl position.

12.

At AEP-1, STOP the Chiller WC-2 B-SB (A-SA) Chilled Water Pump P-4 B-SB (A-SA) in the train just secured.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 Form ES-D-2 INSTRUCTIONS

1. STOP CNMT purge. as follows:

Sheet 1 of4

a. STOP Normal Purge supply fans:

C AH-82SA C

AH-82SB

b. VERIFY the following Nonnal CNMT Purge InletJDlscharge dampers are SHUT:

C 1CP-9SA C

1CP-5SA C

1CP-6SB C

1CP-3SB c..

VERIFY ONE Airborne Radioactivity Removal fan is RUNNING:

C S-1A C

S-1B

d. VERIFY CNMT Pre-enby Purge Isolation dampers are SHUT:

C 1CP-4SA C

1CP-10SA C

1CP-1 SB C

1CP-7SB C

CP-050 (Continued on Next Page)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 Page 54 of 57 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 Form ES-D-2 INSTRUCTIONS

1. STOP CNMT purge. as follows:

Sheet 1 of4

a. STOP Normal Purge supply fans:

C AH-82SA C

AH-82SB

b. VERIFY the following Nonnal CNMT Purge InletJDlscharge dampers are SHUT:

C 1CP-9SA C

1CP-5SA C

1CP-6SB C

1CP-3SB c..

VERIFY ONE Airborne Radioactivity Removal fan is RUNNING:

C S-1A C

S-1B

d. VERIFY CNMT Pre-enby Purge Isolation dampers are SHUT:

C 1CP-4SA C

1CP-10SA C

1CP-1 SB C

1CP-7SB C

CP-050 (Continued on Next Page)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 Page 54 of 57 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 Form ES-O-2 Page 55 of 57 Sheet2of4 INSTRUCTIONS

1. (continued)

e. VERIFY GNMT Vacuum Relief valves/dampers are SHUT:

C 1GB-2, Vacuum Relief C

CB-051 SA, Vacuum Relief C

1CB-6. Vacuum Refief C

CB-D52-SB, Vacuum Relief

02. NOTIFY Health Physics that CNMT Purge has been STOPPED.

3. PERFORM the following Attacf1ments to monitor the leakage:

C

• 8 C

• 9 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE If a containment Ventilation Isolation signal has occurred, Tern Spec 3.0.3 is appticable, since both trains of Containment Vacuum Relief are inoperable.

04. CHECK containment conditions NORMAL C5. NOTIFY Chemistry to sample the RCS for Dose Equivalent 1-131.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 C 4. IF containment Ventilation Isolation has ACTUATED, THEN VERIFY proper equipment alignment (refer to OMM-004, Post-bipl safeguards Actuation Review).

IA.1]

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 Form ES-O-2 Page 55 of 57 Sheet2of4 INSTRUCTIONS

1. (continued)

e. VERIFY GNMT Vacuum Relief valves/dampers are SHUT:

C 1GB-2, Vacuum Relief C

CB-051 SA, Vacuum Relief C

1CB-6. Vacuum Refief C

CB-D52-SB, Vacuum Relief

02. NOTIFY Health Physics that CNMT Purge has been STOPPED.

3. PERFORM the following Attacf1ments to monitor the leakage:

C

• 8 C

• 9 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE If a containment Ventilation Isolation signal has occurred, Tern Spec 3.0.3 is appticable, since both trains of Containment Vacuum Relief are inoperable.

04. CHECK containment conditions NORMAL C5. NOTIFY Chemistry to sample the RCS for Dose Equivalent 1-131.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 C 4. IF containment Ventilation Isolation has ACTUATED, THEN VERIFY proper equipment alignment (refer to OMM-004, Post-bipl safeguards Actuation Review).

IA.1]

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 Form ES-O-2 INSTRUCTIONS

6. CHECK the following indications NORMAl: [A.1. 3)

C PRZlevel C

CNMT temperature C

CNMT pressure C

CNMT radiation levels C

CNMT sump level C

CNMTsumpp~

frequency Sheet30f4 Page 56 of 57 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE Radiation COntrol personnel must identify radiological conditions or provide coverage and issue a special RWP prior to CNMT entty.

C 6. MAKE a CNMT entry when permissible to locate, identify and isolate the leak.

C RMW System operation frequency

07. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

3.4.6.1 3.4.6.2 3.4.8 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 Form ES-O-2 INSTRUCTIONS

6. CHECK the following indications NORMAl: [A.1. 3)

C PRZlevel C

CNMT temperature C

CNMT pressure C

CNMT radiation levels C

CNMT sump level C

CNMTsumpp~

frequency Sheet30f4 Page 56 of 57 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE Radiation COntrol personnel must identify radiological conditions or provide coverage and issue a special RWP prior to CNMT entty.

C 6. MAKE a CNMT entry when permissible to locate, identify and isolate the leak.

C RMW System operation frequency

07. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

3.4.6.1 3.4.6.2 3.4.8 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 Sheet4of4 Form ES-D-2 Page 57 of 57 r-__________________ =le~a~~~e~lnsmre-c-N-MT--------------------~

--1 INSTRUCTIONS H

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

~

8. EVALUATE plant conditions fOr continued operation:

C a..

INITIATE appropriate action to repair the leak.

C

b. CONSULT the Responsible Engineer for flIrIher leak isolation guidance.

C

c. VERIFY any valves or breakers manipulated for leak isolation are documented per the following:

C

• OMM-001. Operations -

COnduct of Operations C

OPS-NGGC-1303, Independent Verification.

C

d. CONSULT With Operations Management for other recovery actions.

C 9. EXIT this procedure.

- END OF ATTACHMENT 7 -

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 AOP-016 Attachment 7 Sheet4of4 Form ES-D-2 Page 57 of 57 r-__________________ ~le=a=~~e~lnsm~e~c=N=MT~------------------~

--1 INSTRUCTIONS H

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

~

8. EVALUATE plant conditions fOr continued operation:

C a..

INITIATE appropriate action to repair the leak.

C

b. CONSULT the Responsible Engineer for flIrIher leak isolation guidance.

C

c. VERIFY any valves or breakers manipulated for leak isolation are documented per the following:

C

• OMM-001. Operations -

COnduct of Operations C

OPS-NGGC-1303, Independent Verification.

C

d. CONSULT With Operations Management for other recovery actions.

C 9. EXIT this procedure.

- END OF ATTACHMENT 7 -

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 1 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Facility:

SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.: 05000400/2009302 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

IC-19, MOL, 100% power TDAFW Pump Out of Service due to damaged over speed trip device, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, awaiting parts from vendor "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement Turnover:

Plant is at 100% power. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect. The crew is being directed to shut down the plant lAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown section 5.2, step 4. The desired load rate of change is 4 DEH units per minute. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW.

Critical Tasks:

Trip the main turbine by no later than the reading of the PATH-1 immediate actions Establish feedwater flow into at least one SG before RCS feed and bleed is required Event Malt. No.

Event Type*

Event No.

Description 1

N/A N-BOP Power reduction to s; 90%

R-RO TRG2 PRS06B C - RO/SRO PRZ PORV 44SB leakage TS-SRO TRG3 TT:144 1-RO/SRO Letdown Temperature control failure and divert valve 1 CS-SO jtb143b fails to reposition on high temperature TRG4 PPI08 C-BOP/SRO Grid frequency degradation TS-SRO TRGS PPI08 C-BOP/SRO Grid frequency further degrades requiring Rx Trip per M-AII AOP-028, enter PATH-1 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Facility:

SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.: 05000400/2009302 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

IC-19, MOL, 100% power TDAFW Pump Out of Service due to damaged over speed trip device, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, awaiting parts from vendor "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement Turnover:

Plant is at 100% power. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect. The crew is being directed to shut down the plant lAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown section 5.2, step 4. The desired load rate of change is 4 DEH units per minute. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW.

Critical Tasks:

Trip the main turbine by no later than the reading of the PATH-1 immediate actions Establish feedwater flow into at least one SG before RCS feed and bleed is required Event Malt. No.

Event Type*

Event No.

Description 1

N/A N-BOP Power reduction to s; 90%

R-RO TRG2 PRS06B C - RO/SRO PRZ PORV 44SB leakage TS-SRO TRG3 TT:144 1-RO/SRO Letdown Temperature control failure and divert valve 1 CS-SO jtb143b fails to reposition on high temperature TRG4 PPI08 C-BOP/SRO Grid frequency degradation TS-SRO TRGS PPI08 C-BOP/SRO Grid frequency further degrades requiring Rx Trip per M-AII AOP-028, enter PATH-1 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l 6

TUR02 C-BOP/SRO Turbine Auto Trip fails, PATH-1 RNOs implemented to close turbine governor valves 7

CWF16A M -ALL LOSS OF HEAT SINK -

CSF16B Loss of both feed pumps (MFP 'A' 10 sees after Rx CFW01A trip, MFP 'B' 50 sees).

CFW01B Loss of both AFW pumps (AFW Pump 'A' 4 min. after reactor trip, AFW Pump 'B' 5 min. after reactor trip).

Entry into FRP H.1, success path utilizing condensate pumps to establish heat sink.

8 ZRPK622B I-BOP/SRO Partial failure of Automatic Phase A Isolation signal (Train B Phase A Slave Relay for CNMT Phase A valves, 1SI-287, 1CS-11 & 1SW-242)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity,

(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 100% power in the middle of life. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect. A Normal shutdown has been directed by plant management, with a planned rate change of 4 DEH units per minute. The 'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump is out of service for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to a power reduction of > 10%

(YELLOW risk is a qualitative risk assessment per WCM-001).

Event 1: Crew performs a power reduction lAW GP-006. For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate per the reactivity plan and the BOP operator will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to lower power.

Event 2: PRZ PORV 445B leakage can be inserted once the power reduction has been observed to the extent necessary. This failure will cause PRZ PORV 445B to leak, resulting in rising PRT pressure and level. PORV Line Temp indicator TI-463 will increase as observed on the MCB and the crew will respond lAW ALB 009-8-2, PRESSURIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP. The crew may utilize AOP-016 to determine which PORV is leaking. The SRO will evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.4, RCS Relief Valves which will require action statement 'a' to be active.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l 6

TUR02 C-BOP/SRO Turbine Auto Trip fails, PATH-1 RNOs implemented to close turbine governor valves 7

CWF16A M -ALL LOSS OF HEAT SINK -

CSF16B Loss of both feed pumps (MFP 'A' 10 sees after Rx CFW01A trip, MFP 'B' 50 sees).

CFW01B Loss of both AFW pumps (AFW Pump 'A' 4 min. after reactor trip, AFW Pump 'B' 5 min. after reactor trip).

Entry into FRP H.1, success path utilizing condensate pumps to establish heat sink.

8 ZRPK622B I-BOP/SRO Partial failure of Automatic Phase A Isolation signal (Train B Phase A Slave Relay for CNMT Phase A valves, 1SI-287, 1CS-11 & 1SW-242)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity,

(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 100% power in the middle of life. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect. A Normal shutdown has been directed by plant management, with a planned rate change of 4 DEH units per minute. The 'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump is out of service for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to a power reduction of > 10%

(YELLOW risk is a qualitative risk assessment per WCM-001).

Event 1: Crew performs a power reduction lAW GP-006. For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate per the reactivity plan and the BOP operator will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to lower power.

Event 2: PRZ PORV 445B leakage can be inserted once the power reduction has been observed to the extent necessary. This failure will cause PRZ PORV 445B to leak, resulting in rising PRT pressure and level. PORV Line Temp indicator TI-463 will increase as observed on the MCB and the crew will respond lAW ALB 009-8-2, PRESSURIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP. The crew may utilize AOP-016 to determine which PORV is leaking. The SRO will evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.4, RCS Relief Valves which will require action statement 'a' to be active.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Events Continued:

Event 3: Failure of the Letdown Temperature Transmitter, TT-144, can be inserted once actions addressing leaking PORV have been completed. The transmitter fails low which causes the system to attempt to increase temperature by reducing Component Cooling Water flow. As cooling flow reduces, actual temperature will increase. The automatic divert to protect the demineralizers fails to operate. Operators should take action lAW ALB 007-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP to manually restore temperature and divert letdown around the demineralizers.

Event 4: Degradation in grid frequency can be inserted once letdown temperature control has been established. Frequency will degrade to and stabilize at 59.2 Hz, requiring entry into AOP-028, Grid Instability. Conditions will require that the crew implement AOP-028 Attachment 2 to energize the safety busses from the Emergency Diesel Generators.

Event 5: Once one Safety Bus has been transferred to an EDG, the grid will degrade further (58.2 Hz) to the point where the crew should initiate a manual reactor trip and entry into PATH-1.

Event 6: The turbine will fail to automatically trip requiring the crew to implement the RNOs of PATH-1 to close the turbine governor valves.

Event 7: Both Main Feed Pumps will be lost after the reactor is tripped. The 'A' MFW pump will trip 10 seconds after the trip breakers open and the 'B' MFW pump will trip 40 seconds later. The crew will need to verify adequate AFW flow exists to support maintenance of heat sink conditions. Shortly after the crew transitions to EPP-004, both AFW pumps will be lost, requiring transition to FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The AFW pumps and the MFPs will not be available, requiring the crew to secure the RCPs and depressurize one SG in order to establish feedwater flow using the condensate pumps.

Event 8: Phase A isolation will be incomplete, requiring the closure of 1 SI-287, 1 CS-11 and 1SW-242.

Once the crew has established at least 25% NR level in one SG and transitioned back to EPP-004, the scenario may be terminated.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Events Continued:

Event 3: Failure of the Letdown Temperature Transmitter, TT-144, can be inserted once actions addressing leaking PORV have been completed. The transmitter fails low which causes the system to attempt to increase temperature by reducing Component Cooling Water flow. As cooling flow reduces, actual temperature will increase. The automatic divert to protect the demineralizers fails to operate. Operators should take action lAW ALB 007-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP to manually restore temperature and divert letdown around the demineralizers.

Event 4: Degradation in grid frequency can be inserted once letdown temperature control has been established. Frequency will degrade to and stabilize at 59.2 Hz, requiring entry into AOP-028, Grid Instability. Conditions will require that the crew implement AOP-028 Attachment 2 to energize the safety busses from the Emergency Diesel Generators.

Event 5: Once one Safety Bus has been transferred to an EDG, the grid will degrade further (58.2 Hz) to the point where the crew should initiate a manual reactor trip and entry into PATH-1.

Event 6: The turbine will fail to automatically trip requiring the crew to implement the RNOs of PATH-1 to close the turbine governor valves.

Event 7: Both Main Feed Pumps will be lost after the reactor is tripped. The 'A' MFW pump will trip 10 seconds after the trip breakers open and the 'B' MFW pump will trip 40 seconds later. The crew will need to verify adequate AFW flow exists to support maintenance of heat sink conditions. Shortly after the crew transitions to EPP-004, both AFW pumps will be lost, requiring transition to FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The AFW pumps and the MFPs will not be available, requiring the crew to secure the RCPs and depressurize one SG in order to establish feedwater flow using the condensate pumps.

Event 8: Phase A isolation will be incomplete, requiring the closure of 1 SI-287, 1 CS-11 and 1SW-242.

Once the crew has established at least 25% NR level in one SG and transitioned back to EPP-004, the scenario may be terminated.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Provide a copy of the following procedures:

o GP-006, NORMAL PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM POWER OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 1 TO MODE 3) marked off up through section 5.2 step 4 (step 5 circled)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

IC-19, MOL, 100% power Place CIT on the 'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump and take switch to STOP Place 'B' Boric Acid Transfer Pump switch to AUTO and green protected train placard Set potentiometers as follows: FK-114: 7.50 FK-113: 3.17 Protected equipment placards for TDAFP (per OMM-001 Att. 16) o

'A-SA' MDAFP - Orange placard o

'B-SA' MDAFP - Green placard o

'A' Startup Transformer brk 52-2 and 52-3 Orange placards o

'B' Startup Transformer brk 52-13 and 52-14 Green placards Hang CITs on 1 MS-70, 1 MS-72 and Trip and Throttle Valve 1 MS-T Place RED bars on ALB 01-7-5, ALB 017-7-4 Place BLU E bar on ALB 23-2-13 Hang restricted access signs on all 3 swing gates PRE-LOAD:

TDAFW Pump OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device1 MS-70 and 72 breakers open and Trip and Throttle valve tripped (irf mss034 OPEN, irf mss035 OPEN, imf cfc01c true)

'A' Boric Acid Pump OOS for motor replacement (idi xa2i174 STOP,AUTO, ilo xa20174g OFF)

Turbine auto trip failure (imf tur02 (n 00:00:0000:00:00) true)

Partial Phase A failure (imf zrpk622b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Provide a copy of the following procedures:

o GP-006, NORMAL PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM POWER OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 1 TO MODE 3) marked off up through section 5.2 step 4 (step 5 circled)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

IC-19, MOL, 100% power Place CIT on the 'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump and take switch to STOP Place 'B' Boric Acid Transfer Pump switch to AUTO and green protected train placard Set potentiometers as follows: FK-114: 7.50 FK-113: 3.17 Protected equipment placards for TDAFP (per OMM-001 Att. 16) o

'A-SA' MDAFP - Orange placard o

'B-SA' MDAFP - Green placard o

'A' Startup Transformer brk 52-2 and 52-3 Orange placards o

'B' Startup Transformer brk 52-13 and 52-14 Green placards Hang CITs on 1 MS-70, 1 MS-72 and Trip and Throttle Valve 1 MS-T Place RED bars on ALB 01-7-5, ALB 017-7-4 Place BLU E bar on ALB 23-2-13 Hang restricted access signs on all 3 swing gates PRE-LOAD:

TDAFW Pump OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device1 MS-70 and 72 breakers open and Trip and Throttle valve tripped (irf mss034 OPEN, irf mss035 OPEN, imf cfc01c true)

'A' Boric Acid Pump OOS for motor replacement (idi xa2i174 STOP,AUTO, ilo xa20174g OFF)

Turbine auto trip failure (imf tur02 (n 00:00:0000:00:00) true)

Partial Phase A failure (imf zrpk622b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline TRIGGERS:

ET-2: imf prs06b (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 00:00:30 0 Pressurizer PORV Leakage 2% ramped in over 30 seconds ET -3: imf tt: 144 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 50 00:00:00 imf jtb143b (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Letdown temp control failureldiverson valve fails to shift ET-4: irf ppi08 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) 59.2 00:02:00 Grid Frequency drops to 59.2 Hz ET-5: TRG= 5 mrf ppi08 58.7 00:02:00 Grid Frequency lowers to 58.7 Hz and remains low for> 5 minutes ET-7: imf CFW16A (40 00:00:10 00:00:00) imf CFW168 (4000:00:5000:00:00) imf cfw01a (40 00:02:00 OO:OO:OO)true imf cfw01 b (4000:03:00 OO:OO:OO)true Loss of Heat Sink MFW Pumps and AFW Pumps trip after Rx Trip Form ES-D-l Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline TRIGGERS:

ET-2: imf prs06b (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 00:00:30 0 Pressurizer PORV Leakage 2% ramped in over 30 seconds ET -3: imf tt: 144 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 50 00:00:00 imf jtb143b (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Letdown temp control failureldiverson valve fails to shift ET-4: irf ppi08 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) 59.2 00:02:00 Grid Frequency drops to 59.2 Hz ET-5: TRG= 5 mrf ppi08 58.7 00:02:00 Grid Frequency lowers to 58.7 Hz and remains low for> 5 minutes ET-7: imf CFW16A (40 00:00:10 00:00:00) imf CFW168 (4000:00:5000:00:00) imf cfw01a (40 00:02:00 OO:OO:OO)true imf cfw01 b (4000:03:00 OO:OO:OO)true Loss of Heat Sink MFW Pumps and AFW Pumps trip after Rx Trip Form ES-D-l Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline CAEP

!Description of 2009B NRC Exam Scenario 2 CAEP Reset to IC-19

! Establish Initial Conditions

! Reset to IC-19

! 100% power steady state conditions

! TDAFW Pump is OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device Form ES-D-l

! Pump has been OOS for 62 total hours and is expected back within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

! Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, HSD following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

! Hang CIT on both MS-70 and 72 then place protected train placards per OMM-001 irf mss034 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN irf mss035 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN

! Trip the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfw01 c (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true

! "A" BA Pump is OOS for motor replacement place MCB switch to STOP

! Hang CIT on CB Switch place the B BA Pump MCB switch to AUTO, protect B BA pump switch idi xa2i174 (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)OFF

! Preload Trigger 40 (active on Reactor Trip)

TRG 40 "JPPLP4.DSS"

! EVENTS:

! Event 1: Crew starts plant shutdown lAW GP-006 due to LOC expiring on TDAFW pump Normal-BOP Reactivity - RO

! Event 2: Pressurizer PORV Leakage of 2% that is ramped in over 30 seconds

! Tech Spec 3.4.4 within 1 hr restore to operable or close associated block valve or HSB within next 6, HSD next 6

! Component - RO/SRO Tech Spec - SRO imf prs06b (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 00:00:30 0

! Event 3: Letdown temp control failure with divert valve failing to shift on high temperature Instrument - RO/SRO imf tt: 144 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 50 00:00:00 imf jtb143b (300:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline CAEP

!Description of 2009B NRC Exam Scenario 2 CAEP Reset to IC-19

! Establish Initial Conditions

! Reset to IC-19

! 100% power steady state conditions

! TDAFW Pump is OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device Form ES-D-l

! Pump has been OOS for 62 total hours and is expected back within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

! Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, HSD following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

! Hang CIT on both MS-70 and 72 then place protected train placards per OMM-001 irf mss034 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN irf mss035 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN

! Trip the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfw01 c (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true

! "A" BA Pump is OOS for motor replacement place MCB switch to STOP

! Hang CIT on CB Switch place the B BA Pump MCB switch to AUTO, protect B BA pump switch idi xa2i174 (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)OFF

! Preload Trigger 40 (active on Reactor Trip)

TRG 40 "JPPLP4.DSS"

! EVENTS:

! Event 1: Crew starts plant shutdown lAW GP-006 due to LOC expiring on TDAFW pump Normal-BOP Reactivity - RO

! Event 2: Pressurizer PORV Leakage of 2% that is ramped in over 30 seconds

! Tech Spec 3.4.4 within 1 hr restore to operable or close associated block valve or HSB within next 6, HSD next 6

! Component - RO/SRO Tech Spec - SRO imf prs06b (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 00:00:30 0

! Event 3: Letdown temp control failure with divert valve failing to shift on high temperature Instrument - RO/SRO imf tt: 144 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 50 00:00:00 imf jtb143b (300:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l

! Event 4: Grid Frequency lowers to 59.2 Hz w/ramp of 2 minutes AOP-028 entry and power to Emerg. Buses w/EDGs Component - BOP/SRO

! Tech Spec - SRO irf ppi08 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) 59.200:02:00-

! Event 5: Grid Frequency decrease - drops to <58.4 Hz and remains low requiring Rx Trip and Path-1 entry Major - ALL TRG= 5 mrf ppi08 58.2 00:02:00

! Event 6: Turbine trip fails NOTE: NO TRIGGER (preloaded)

Component - BOP/SRO imf tur02 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true

! Event 7: Loss of Heat Sink - Both MFW Pumps trip after Ax Trip (tied to trigger 40 after Rx trip)

! Major - ALL imf CFW16A (40 00:00:10 00:00:00) imf CFW16B (4000:00:50 00:00:00)

! Event 7: Continued - AFW Pump A trips 4 mins after Rx Trip, AFW Pp B trips one min later Loss of Heat Sink FRP-H.1 entry

! Component - BOP/SRO imf cfw01a (40 00:04:00 00:00:00) true imf cfw01 b (40 00:05:00 00:00:00) true

! Event 8: Partial failure of Phase A isolation 1SI-287, 1CS-11 and 1SW-242 fail to position NOTE: NO TRIGGER (preloaded)

Instrument - BOP/SRO imf zrpk622b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l

! Event 4: Grid Frequency lowers to 59.2 Hz w/ramp of 2 minutes AOP-028 entry and power to Emerg. Buses w/EDGs Component - BOP/SRO

! Tech Spec - SRO irf ppi08 (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) 59.200:02:00-

! Event 5: Grid Frequency decrease - drops to <58.4 Hz and remains low requiring Rx Trip and Path-1 entry Major - ALL TRG= 5 mrf ppi08 58.2 00:02:00

! Event 6: Turbine trip fails NOTE: NO TRIGGER (preloaded)

Component - BOP/SRO imf tur02 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true

! Event 7: Loss of Heat Sink - Both MFW Pumps trip after Ax Trip (tied to trigger 40 after Rx trip)

! Major - ALL imf CFW16A (40 00:00:10 00:00:00) imf CFW16B (4000:00:50 00:00:00)

! Event 7: Continued - AFW Pump A trips 4 mins after Rx Trip, AFW Pp B trips one min later Loss of Heat Sink FRP-H.1 entry

! Component - BOP/SRO imf cfw01a (40 00:04:00 00:00:00) true imf cfw01 b (40 00:05:00 00:00:00) true

! Event 8: Partial failure of Phase A isolation 1SI-287, 1CS-11 and 1SW-242 fail to position NOTE: NO TRIGGER (preloaded)

Instrument - BOP/SRO imf zrpk622b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page

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of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior LEAD EVALUATOR:

When the evaluating team has completed their evaluation of the power change Cue Event 2 "PRZ PORV 445B Leakage". It is not necessary to reach 90% power to continue the scenario.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The crew has been directed to shutdown the unit using GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, due to TDAFW LCO action statement.

The crew may elect to manually throttle open a PRZ Spray Valve to establish PRZ Surge line flow and thereby maintain PRZlRCS boron concentrations within limits.

..** s~a:....... '.......>...... ; "".:......:......

~.~;.q.....,. '.

.. ~..,,'....

• ';c" :-:f;{

~g-006;?teR.:p.~.4.. *........... J....*. :J.~ *....*.....

PROCEDURE NOTE:

When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Crew may refer to OE database

.. RO ENERGIZE all available Pressurizer Backup Heaters.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page

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of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior LEAD EVALUATOR:

When the evaluating team has completed their evaluation of the power change Cue Event 2 "PRZ PORV 445B Leakage". It is not necessary to reach 90% power to continue the scenario.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The crew has been directed to shutdown the unit using GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, due to TDAFW LCO action statement.

The crew may elect to manually throttle open a PRZ Spray Valve to establish PRZ Surge line flow and thereby maintain PRZlRCS boron concentrations within limits.

..** s~a:....... '.......>...... ; "".:......:......

~.~;.q.....,. '.

.. ~..,,'....

• ';c" :-:f;{

~g-006;?teR.:p.~.4.. *........... J....*. :J.~ *....*.....

PROCEDURE NOTE:

When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Crew may refer to OE database

.. RO ENERGIZE all available Pressurizer Backup Heaters.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page

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of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I EVALUATOR NOTE:

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ax power may increase> 100% if the Turbine ramp is not started after energizing all Pressurizer Heaters.

The crew may elect to begin boration prior to lowering turbine load. Turbine load reduction begins on page 12 of this guide.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Dispatcher to meet system load demands.

RO DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.

DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration increase required.

DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the reactivity plan associated with the IC.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths position.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

RO SRO SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

Directs boration Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page

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of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I EVALUATOR NOTE:

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ax power may increase> 100% if the Turbine ramp is not started after energizing all Pressurizer Heaters.

The crew may elect to begin boration prior to lowering turbine load. Turbine load reduction begins on page 12 of this guide.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Dispatcher to meet system load demands.

RO DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.

DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration increase required.

DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the reactivity plan associated with the IC.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths position.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

RO SRO SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

Directs boration Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page 10 of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS.

• SET controller 1 CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACI D FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

• VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in RO the STOP position.

• VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

• OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron RO concentration to less than 10 ppm.

0 MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page 10 of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS.

• SET controller 1 CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACI D FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

• VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in RO the STOP position.

• VERI FY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

• OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron RO concentration to less than 10 ppm.

0 MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page 11 of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

START the makeup system as follows:

0 TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RD momentarily.

0 VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

Verifies proper valve and pump alignment PROCEDURE CAUTION:

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

• VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

• IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding correctly.

RO VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.

PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

.'.!/.~.'.. ".'

• • • • • • • • • RQ~(

PtAeE2Flij~btorM~Keu'pinAutgp~r:S~ptiOl'lz§i~~:"'"

)~

I:***.*...

}~.......

,,:c.. '>,.;

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but none will be applicable since the system just came out of Automatic. The only steps included here are the ones with verifiable action.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page 11 of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

START the makeup system as follows:

0 TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RD momentarily.

0 VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

Verifies proper valve and pump alignment PROCEDURE CAUTION:

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

• VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

• IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding correctly.

RO VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.

PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

......!:/:"

';'~Q~(..

PtAeE2Flij~btorM~Keu*pinAutgp~r:S~ptiOl'lz§i~~~"*:

>/

":C'.'>

• . ; /', *.. ;.........;

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but none will be applicable since the system just came out of Automatic. The only steps included here are the ones with verifiable action.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page 12 of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

0 Is in the STOP pOSition.

0 The GREEN light is LIT.

PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

RO

• START the makeup system as follows:

0 TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

0 VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

Reports to CRS that boration is complete and Makeup is back in AUTO EVALUATOR NOTE: The following steps will initiate turbine load reduction lAW GP-006.

SRO INFORMS Load Dispatcher that a load reduction to 90% will begin. (N/A, per Initial Conditions)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page 12 of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

0 Is in the STOP pOSition.

0 The GREEN light is LIT.

PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

RO

• START the makeup system as follows:

0 TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

0 VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

Reports to CRS that boration is complete and Makeup is back in AUTO EVALUATOR NOTE: The following steps will initiate turbine load reduction lAW GP-006.

SRO INFORMS Load Dispatcher that a load reduction to 90% will begin. (N/A, per Initial Conditions)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page 13 of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

A failure of the Vidar in the DEH computer has resulted in a plant trip in the past. This failure would affect operation in Operator Auto, and can be detected in either of the following ways:

• If OSI-PI is available, the process book PLANTSTATUS.PIW, DEH Trends function of the Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu) contains a pOint for DEH MEGAWATTS. With a failure of the Vidar, this pOint will not be updating.

• If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics display computer (in the Termination Cabinet room near the ATWS panel) will show several points, most of which should be updating if the Vidar is functioning properly.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

There is no procedural guidance directing when the boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to place the Turbine in GO. The boration steps are located on page 11 of this guide.

DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 DEH Units/Min.

SRO May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.

BOP Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page 13 of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

A failure of the Vidar in the DEH computer has resulted in a plant trip in the past. This failure would affect operation in Operator Auto, and can be detected in either of the following ways:

• If OSI-PI is available, the process book PLANTSTATUS.PIW, DEH Trends function of the Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu) contains a pOint for DEH MEGAWATTS. With a failure of the Vidar, this pOint will not be updating.

• If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics display computer (in the Termination Cabinet room near the ATWS panel) will show several points, most of which should be updating if the Vidar is functioning properly.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

There is no procedural guidance directing when the boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to place the Turbine in GO. The boration steps are located on page 11 of this guide.

DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 DEH Units/Min.

SRO May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.

BOP Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page 14 of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button.

ENTER the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)

DEPRESS the ENTER push-button.

BOP

• DEPRESS the REF push-button.

ENTER the desired load (120 MW per CRS) in the DEMAND display.

DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push-button should illuminate.

PROCEDURE NOTE: The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push-button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate.

DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through 'Shift Update' Turbine in 'GO'.

• VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display BOP decreases.

• VERIFY Generator load is decreasing.

• WHEN Turbine load is less than 95%, THEN VERIFY the 3A and 3B Feedwater Vents have been opened per op-136, Section 7.2 COMMUNICATOR:

Acknowledge direction. No simulator response actions are required.

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Once satisfied with observation of the power reduction, initiate Event 2 - "PRZ PORV 4458 Leakage" Good point is following return of Makeup to AUTO.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

1 Page 14 of 43 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button.

ENTER the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)

DEPRESS the ENTER push-button.

BOP

• DEPRESS the REF push-button.

ENTER the desired load (120 MW per CRS) in the DEMAND display.

DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push-button should illuminate.

PROCEDURE NOTE: The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push-button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate.

DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through 'Shift Update' Turbine in 'GO'.

• VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display BOP decreases.

• VERIFY Generator load is decreasing.

• WHEN Turbine load is less than 95%, THEN VERIFY the 3A and 3B Feedwater Vents have been opened per op-136, Section 7.2 COMMUNICATOR:

Acknowledge direction. No simulator response actions are required.

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Once satisfied with observation of the power reduction, initiate Event 2 - "PRZ PORV 4458 Leakage" Good point is following return of Makeup to AUTO.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_2_

Page 15 of 43 Event

Description:

PRZ PORV 445B Leakage Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG 2 "PRZ PORV 445B leakage" Indications Available: ALB-009-8-2 PRESSURIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP TI-463 rising RESPONDS to alarms ALB-009-8-2.

RO ENTERS and performs APP-ALB-009-8-2.

SRO Refer to TS 3.4.4 and 3.4.6.2 as referenced by ALB-009-8-2 EVALUATOR NOTE: The SRO may elect to enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Leakage. If so, then those actions begin on page 18 of this guide.

BOP Crew may place turbine in HOLD (based on TAVG)

CONFIRM alarm using:

PRZ PORV discharge line temperature TI-463.

PRESSURIZER relief tank level, pressure, and temperature U-470.1, PI-472.1, and TI-471.1.

RO PRESSURIZER PORV position indication.

VERIFY Automatic Functions: (None)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

IF a PORV is open (NO), THEN CHECK PRZ pressure using PI-444, PI-445.1, PI-456, and PI-457.

PROCEDURE NOTE: For minor leakage, it may be necessary to have Engineering assistance to develop proper strategies.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_2_

Page 15 of 43 Event

Description:

PRZ PORV 445B Leakage Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG 2 "PRZ PORV 445B leakage" Indications Available: ALB-009-8-2 PRESSURIZER RELIEF DISCHARGE HIGH TEMP TI-463 rising RESPONDS to alarms ALB-009-8-2.

RO ENTERS and performs APP-ALB-009-8-2.

SRO Refer to TS 3.4.4 and 3.4.6.2 as referenced by ALB-009-8-2 EVALUATOR NOTE: The SRO may elect to enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Leakage. If so, then those actions begin on page 18 of this guide.

BOP Crew may place turbine in HOLD (based on TAVG)

CONFIRM alarm using:

PRZ PORV discharge line temperature TI-463.

PRESSURIZER relief tank level, pressure, and temperature U-470.1, PI-472.1, and TI-471.1.

RO PRESSURIZER PORV position indication.

VERIFY Automatic Functions: (None)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

IF a PORV is open (NO), THEN CHECK PRZ pressure using PI-444, PI-445.1, PI-456, and PI-457.

PROCEDURE NOTE: For minor leakage, it may be necessary to have Engineering assistance to develop proper strategies.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2 _

Event #

_2_

Page 16 of 43 Event

Description:

PRZ PORV 445B Leakage Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Any PORV isolations that are shut due to decreasing RCS Pressure should NOT be reopened without further evaluation.

• IF all PORV's are closed and RCS pressure is normal, THEN SRO DETERMINE which PORV is leaking and isolate it:

• IF leakage is significant, THEN SHUT all PORV isolations.

REOPEN one at a time to identify affected PORV.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

ERIS Point TRC-0463 can be used to evaluate if PORV is leaking.

Shuts PORV isolations as directed by SRO RO 0

After shutting RC-115, PRT Relief Line Temperature starts to decrease Determines/reports PORV-445B leaking.

SRO ENTER TS 3.4.4.a - within one hour either restore the PORV to operable or close the block valve with power maintained.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Cue Event 3 (Letdown Temperature Control Failure, Diversion Valve Fails to Shift) after the leaking PORV is isolated and the TS declaration.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

If AOP-016 is entered (Optional reference), the crew will be directed to Attachment 5 for specific actions for a leaking PRZ PORV. Attachment 5 actions follow.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2 _

Event #

_2_

Page 16 of 43 Event

Description:

PRZ PORV 445B Leakage Time t

Position t

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Any PORV isolations that are shut due to decreasing RCS Pressure should NOT be reopened without further evaluation.

• IF all PORV's are closed and RCS pressure is normal, THEN SRO DETERMINE which PORV is leaking and isolate it:

• IF leakage is significant, THEN SHUT all PORV isolations.

REOPEN one at a time to identify affected PORV.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

ERIS Point TRC-0463 can be used to evaluate if PORV is leaking.

Shuts PORV isolations as directed by SRO RO 0

After shutting RC-115, PRT Relief Line Temperature starts to decrease Determines/reports PORV-445B leaking.

SRO ENTER TS 3.4.4.a - within one hour either restore the PORV to operable or close the block valve with power maintained.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Cue Event 3 (Letdown Temperature Control Failure, Diversion Valve Fails to Shift) after the leaking PORV is isolated and the TS declaration.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

If AOP-016 is entered (Optional reference), the crew will be directed to Attachment 5 for specific actions for a leaking PRZ PORV. Attachment 5 actions follow.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_2_

Page 17 of 43 Event

Description:

PRZ PORV 445B Leakage TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

~

". "*SFtt>:******

~

• • ~i.i:;*.*!xJ****i*~62~~)

Ent~rAOR*016;(Optional.reference)~

i':...*

t.! '.!'/' ','.

'".........:.: :.. ';/;;'.. ".

~,.:....' : "'..."i" SRO WHEN leakage location has been determined, THEN PERFORM the applicable Attachment (Attachment 5)

• CHECK the PRZ PORVs SHUT. (YES)

• CHECK that the leaking PORV has been identified. (NO)

RO

• SHUT the associated PORV Block Valve.

PERFORM ONE of the following based on severity of leak.

• SHUT AND REOPEN ONE PORV Block Valve at a time to identify the affected PORV.

Enter Tech Spec 3.4.4.a.

VERI FY valve manipulated for leak isolation is documented per the following:

0 OMM-001, Operations - Conduct of Operations SRO OPS-NGGC-1303, Independent Verification.

0 0

Initiates Equipment Problem Checklist 0

Contacts WCC for assistance EXIT this procedure.

EVALUATOR NOTE: Initiate Event 3 (letdown temperature Control Failure, Diversion Valve Fails to Shift) when the leaking PORV has been identified and Tech Specs have been addressed.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_2_

Page 17 of 43 Event

Description:

PRZ PORV 445B Leakage TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

~

". "*SFtt>:******

~

• • ~i.i:;*.*!xJ****i*~62~~)

Ent~rAOR*016;(Optional.reference)~

i':...*

t.! '.!'/' ','.

'".........:.: :.. ';/;;'.. ".

~,.:....' : "'..."i" SRO WHEN leakage location has been determined, THEN PERFORM the applicable Attachment (Attachment 5)

• CHECK the PRZ PORVs SHUT. (YES)

• CHECK that the leaking PORV has been identified. (NO)

RO

• SHUT the associated PORV Block Valve.

PERFORM ONE of the following based on severity of leak.

• SHUT AND REOPEN ONE PORV Block Valve at a time to identify the affected PORV.

Enter Tech Spec 3.4.4.a.

VERI FY valve manipulated for leak isolation is documented per the following:

0 OMM-001, Operations - Conduct of Operations SRO OPS-NGGC-1303, Independent Verification.

0 0

Initiates Equipment Problem Checklist 0

Contacts WCC for assistance EXIT this procedure.

EVALUATOR NOTE: Initiate Event 3 (letdown temperature Control Failure, Diversion Valve Fails to Shift) when the leaking PORV has been identified and Tech Specs have been addressed.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_3_

Page 18 of 43 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Failure, Diversion Valve Fails to Shift TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Indications Available:

Actuate TRG-3 "Letdown Temperature Control Failure, Diversion Valve Fails to Shift" TK-144 Failed Low (0)

ALB-07-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP.

ALB-07-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL SYSTEMS (When 1 CS-50 is placed to VCT)

RESPONDS to alarm and ENTERS APP-ALB-07-3-2.

CONFIRM alarm using TI-143, LP Letdown Temperature.

VERIFY Automatic Functions:

o 1 CS-50, Letdown to VCT/Demin, diverts flow to the VCT.

RO PERFORM Corrective actions:

o VERIFY that 1CS-50 diverts flow to the VCT, bypassing the BTRS and Purification Demineralizers. (NO)

Manually positions 1 CS-50 to VCT PERFORM the following as needed to lower letdown temperature:

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_3_

Page 18 of 43 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Failure, Diversion Valve Fails to Shift TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Indications Available:

Actuate TRG-3 "Letdown Temperature Control Failure, Diversion Valve Fails to Shift" TK-144 Failed Low (0)

ALB-07-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP.

ALB-07-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL SYSTEMS (When 1 CS-50 is placed to VCT)

RESPONDS to alarm and ENTERS APP-ALB-07-3-2.

CONFIRM alarm using TI-143, LP Letdown Temperature.

VERIFY Automatic Functions:

o 1 CS-50, Letdown to VCT/Demin, diverts flow to the VCT.

RO PERFORM Corrective actions:

o VERIFY that 1CS-50 diverts flow to the VCT, bypassing the BTRS and Purification Demineralizers. (NO)

Manually positions 1 CS-50 to VCT PERFORM the following as needed to lower letdown temperature:

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_3_

Page 19 of 43 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Failure. Diversion Valve Fails to Shift Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• VERIFY proper charging flow is established. (YES)

LOWER letdown flow. (N/A - CCW Problem)

IF CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger appears low, THEN:

RO 0

TAKE manual control of TK-144. (YES) 0 OPEN 1CC-337, to raise CCW flow. (YES)

Temperature should be established within a normal control band of 110 to 120°F Reports to CRS when temperature is in the desired band

• Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for SRO assistance. May also contact Chemistry.

Initiates Equipment Problem Checklist.

COMMUNICATOR:

If contacted as wee or System Engineer, provide direction to: "maintain flow bypassing the demineralizers until a resin damage assessment is completed".

EVALUATOR NOTE: After letdown temperature has been stabilized initiate Event 4 "Grid Frequency Degradation" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_3_

Page 19 of 43 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Failure. Diversion Valve Fails to Shift Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• VERIFY proper charging flow is established. (YES)

LOWER letdown flow. (N/A - CCW Problem)

IF CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger appears low, THEN:

RO 0

TAKE manual control of TK-144. (YES) 0 OPEN 1CC-337, to raise CCW flow. (YES)

Temperature should be established within a normal control band of 110 to 120°F Reports to CRS when temperature is in the desired band

• Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for SRO assistance. May also contact Chemistry.

Initiates Equipment Problem Checklist.

COMMUNICATOR:

If contacted as wee or System Engineer, provide direction to: "maintain flow bypassing the demineralizers until a resin damage assessment is completed".

EVALUATOR NOTE: After letdown temperature has been stabilized initiate Event 4 "Grid Frequency Degradation" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2 _

Event #

_4_

Page 20 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequencv Degradation Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR'S NOTE This event will have grid frequency degrade to the point where vital busses will be transferred to the EDGs. Once vital bus 1 B-SB and associated 480V busses are energized from EDG 'B', initiate event 5. This scenario is not designed to swap charging pumps in preparation to power 1 A-SA from EDG 'A'.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG-4 "Lowering Grid Frequency" Indications Available:

Turbine speed decreasing EI-525 lowering (indicated frequency)

SG levels decrease slightly EVALUATOR NOTE: If grid frequency is not observed by the crew, have the Communicator call in as the Load Dispatcher to inform the crew that the grid is experiencing frequency problems.

There are no low frequency alarms.

.... \\>

1;); ** *.~.~9:~*}*c.. Eriter§!AOei02SrGRID.INS"I"ABII..ITY:.'....*..

...........>>.:gj:~.....*..*

. ".. ': i..*

......~

. **, "1,

.. :'".. *****1".*:;* :*i::::.:'**:.*,:*

PROCEDURE NOTE:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

The loss of Oft-Site power may require the initiation of the Emergency Plan REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification and Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND enter EAL Network at entry point X.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2 _

Event #

_4_

Page 20 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequencv Degradation Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR'S NOTE This event will have grid frequency degrade to the point where vital busses will be transferred to the EDGs. Once vital bus 1 B-SB and associated 480V busses are energized from EDG 'B', initiate event 5. This scenario is not designed to swap charging pumps in preparation to power 1 A-SA from EDG 'A'.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG-4 "Lowering Grid Frequency" Indications Available:

Turbine speed decreasing EI-525 lowering (indicated frequency)

SG levels decrease slightly EVALUATOR NOTE: If grid frequency is not observed by the crew, have the Communicator call in as the Load Dispatcher to inform the crew that the grid is experiencing frequency problems.

There are no low frequency alarms.

.... \\>

1;); ** *.~.~9:~*}*c.. Eriter§!AOei02SrGRID.INS"I"ABII..ITY:.'....*..

...........>>.:gj:~.....*..*

. ".. ': i..*

......~

. **, "1,

.. :'".. *****1".*:;* :*i::::.:'**:.*,:*

PROCEDURE NOTE:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

The loss of Oft-Site power may require the initiation of the Emergency Plan REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification and Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND enter EAL Network at entry point X.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_4_

Page 21 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequencv Degradation Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

If frequency drops suddenly and power is greater than P-7, the reactor will trip automatically when RCP frequency decreases to 57.5 Hz, resulting in a turbine trip.

Operation of electrical motors with voltage below the normal band will increase stator current and change torque loading. Component trips, insulation and/or bearing damage, shorts, grounds, or blown fuses may result. The probability of damage is increased with lowering voltage and increased operating time.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Operation of the unit between 59.0 and 58.4 Hz should be limited to 5 minutes, after which time the generator must be taken off-line.

Operation below 58.4 Hz is not allowed and the generator must be taken off line immediately.

CHECK Main Generator indications for ANY of the following conditions:

Generator frequency less than 59 Hz for greater than or BOP equal to 5 minutes (NO)

Generator frequency less than 58.4 Hz (NO)

Turbine speed less than or equal to 1752 RPM (NO)

SRO GOTO Step 3.

BOP CHECK BOTH Emergency Buses ENERGIZED. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_4_

Page 21 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequencv Degradation Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

If frequency drops suddenly and power is greater than P-7, the reactor will trip automatically when RCP frequency decreases to 57.5 Hz, resulting in a turbine trip.

Operation of electrical motors with voltage below the normal band will increase stator current and change torque loading. Component trips, insulation and/or bearing damage, shorts, grounds, or blown fuses may result. The probability of damage is increased with lowering voltage and increased operating time.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Operation of the unit between 59.0 and 58.4 Hz should be limited to 5 minutes, after which time the generator must be taken off-line.

Operation below 58.4 Hz is not allowed and the generator must be taken off line immediately.

CHECK Main Generator indications for ANY of the following conditions:

Generator frequency less than 59 Hz for greater than or BOP equal to 5 minutes (NO)

Generator frequency less than 58.4 Hz (NO)

Turbine speed less than or equal to 1752 RPM (NO)

SRO GOTO Step 3.

BOP CHECK BOTH Emergency Buses ENERGIZED. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_4_

Page 22 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequency Degradation Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO SECURE unnecessary equipment to minimize component damage.

SRO CHECK with the Senior Dispatcher that BOTH of the following conditions exist:

The system grid is able to provide adequate voltage support in the event of a LOCA. (YES)

Adequate system frequency can be maintained during performance of this procedure. (YES)

COMMUNICATOR:

If Load Dispatcher is contacted, provide information to crew that "the grid can support adequate voltage and frequency control in the event of a LOCA. Grid frequency appears to be stabilizing and we are continuing actions to raise grid frequency. "

CHECK the Main Generator ONLINE by observing the following for adverse trends: (YES)

Turbine Speed EI-526, SWYD North Bus Voltage (normally 232.5kV)

BOP EI-527, SWYD South Bus Voltage (normally 232.5kV)

EI-520, Generator Phase Volts (normally 22kV)

EI-525, Generator Frequency (normally 60 Hz)

EI-567, MegaVars (normally 75 to 175 MVARs out)

SRO NOTI FY the Load Dispatcher of any observed adverse trends.

(contacted earlier for load reduction)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_4_

Page 22 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequency Degradation Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO SECURE unnecessary equipment to minimize component damage.

SRO CHECK with the Senior Dispatcher that BOTH of the following conditions exist:

The system grid is able to provide adequate voltage support in the event of a LOCA. (YES)

Adequate system frequency can be maintained during performance of this procedure. (YES)

COMMUNICATOR:

If Load Dispatcher is contacted, provide information to crew that "the grid can support adequate voltage and frequency control in the event of a LOCA. Grid frequency appears to be stabilizing and we are continuing actions to raise grid frequency. "

CHECK the Main Generator ONLINE by observing the following for adverse trends: (YES)

Turbine Speed EI-526, SWYD North Bus Voltage (normally 232.5kV)

BOP EI-527, SWYD South Bus Voltage (normally 232.5kV)

EI-520, Generator Phase Volts (normally 22kV)

EI-525, Generator Frequency (normally 60 Hz)

EI-567, MegaVars (normally 75 to 175 MVARs out)

SRO NOTI FY the Load Dispatcher of any observed adverse trends.

(contacted earlier for load reduction)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_4_

Page 23 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequency Degradation Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• TREND plant electrical parameters per Attachment 1 until CREW the grid is determined to be STABLE.

• CHECK for indications of a load rejection during performance of this procedure.

SRO OBSERVE Caution before Step 10 AND GO TO Step 10.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

• With off-site voltage or system frequency unstable, EDGs must NOT be paralleled with off-site power since severe load swings may occur and overload the EDGs.

Loss of Service Water flow to an EDG requires the affected EDG be stopped.

CHECK ANY EDG operating paralleled to the Grid. (NO)

CHECK ALL of the following parameters WITHIN the limits of the indicated range:

6.9 kV Emergency Buses - 6550 to 7250 volts:

BOP 0

EI-6956A 1 SA, EMER BUS A VOLTS (YES) 0 EI-6956B1 SB, EMER BUS B VOLTS (YES)

Frequency - 59.5 to 60.5 Hz (NO)

ENERGIZE the Emergency Buses with the associated EDG per SRO.

Provide direction to BOP to utilize Attachment 2 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_4_

Page 23 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequency Degradation Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• TREND plant electrical parameters per Attachment 1 until CREW the grid is determined to be STABLE.

• CHECK for indications of a load rejection during performance of this procedure.

SRO OBSERVE Caution before Step 10 AND GO TO Step 10.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

• With off-site voltage or system frequency unstable, EDGs must NOT be paralleled with off-site power since severe load swings may occur and overload the EDGs.

Loss of Service Water flow to an EDG requires the affected EDG be stopped.

CHECK ANY EDG operating paralleled to the Grid. (NO)

CHECK ALL of the following parameters WITHIN the limits of the indicated range:

6.9 kV Emergency Buses - 6550 to 7250 volts:

BOP 0

EI-6956A 1 SA, EMER BUS A VOLTS (YES) 0 EI-6956B1 SB, EMER BUS B VOLTS (YES)

Frequency - 59.5 to 60.5 Hz (NO)

ENERGIZE the Emergency Buses with the associated EDG per SRO.

Provide direction to BOP to utilize Attachment 2 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_4_

Page 24 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequency Degradation TIme I Position I RO PROCEDURE NOTE:

BOP CREW BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior DETERMINE which Emergency Bus is supplying power to the operating CSIP. (1A-SA)

MDAFW FCVs will get an auto open signal (unless an AFW isolation signal is present) when either breaker 105 or 125 opens.

On a loss of power to an emergency bus the associated steam supply valve to the Turbine Driven AFW Pump will open.

This step will cause CVIS isolation and render both Containment Vacuum Reliefs inoperable (Tech Spec 3.0.3).

OPEN the supply breaker to the Emergency Bus NOT supplying power to the operating CSI P:

o Emergency Bus B-SB to Aux Bus E Tie Breaker 125 SB VERIFY the associated EDG STARTS AND ENERGIZES the associated Emergency Bus.

VERI FY proper load sequencing for the Emergency Bus being ENERGIZED per OMM-004, Post-Trip/Safeguards Review, Attachment 12.

CHECK the following for the Emergency Bus being ENERGIZED:

o B Sequencer Load Block 9 AUTO ACT COMPLETE MAN LOAD PERMITTED light is LIT.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_4_

Page 24 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequency Degradation TIme I Position I RO PROCEDURE NOTE:

BOP CREW BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior DETERMINE which Emergency Bus is supplying power to the operating CSIP. (1A-SA)

MDAFW FCVs will get an auto open signal (unless an AFW isolation signal is present) when either breaker 105 or 125 opens.

On a loss of power to an emergency bus the associated steam supply valve to the Turbine Driven AFW Pump will open.

This step will cause CVIS isolation and render both Containment Vacuum Reliefs inoperable (Tech Spec 3.0.3).

OPEN the supply breaker to the Emergency Bus NOT supplying power to the operating CSI P:

o Emergency Bus B-SB to Aux Bus E Tie Breaker 125 SB VERIFY the associated EDG STARTS AND ENERGIZES the associated Emergency Bus.

VERI FY proper load sequencing for the Emergency Bus being ENERGIZED per OMM-004, Post-Trip/Safeguards Review, Attachment 12.

CHECK the following for the Emergency Bus being ENERGIZED:

o B Sequencer Load Block 9 AUTO ACT COMPLETE MAN LOAD PERMITTED light is LIT.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2 _

Event #

_4_

Page 25 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequency Degradation Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Any TDAFW Pump steam supply valve shut in the following step will not automatically re-open if an AFW actuation is received. TDAFW FCVs do not receive auto-open signals.

Stopping a MDAFW Pump powered by the EDG or shutting a MDAFW FCV will block further automatic actuations until the original condition for pump start is cleared.

CONTROL AFW as necessary to maintain reactor power AND S/G levels for plant conditions.

80P Stops TDAFW Pump (already under clearance)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 Stops MDAFW pump '8" or closes all AFW flow control valves Energizing 480V Emergency Buses will restore power to the following:

PZR Heater Banks PZR PORV Block Valves Air Compressors (Compressors will not auto start) 125 VDC Battery Chargers Direct Booth Operator to insert Event 5, resulting in degradation of frequency requiring a reactor trip. This scenario is not intended to have the crew swap charging pumps.

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger-5 "Grid Frequency degrades requiring RxTrip" October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2 _

Event #

_4_

Page 25 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequency Degradation Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Any TDAFW Pump steam supply valve shut in the following step will not automatically re-open if an AFW actuation is received. TDAFW FCVs do not receive auto-open signals.

Stopping a MDAFW Pump powered by the EDG or shutting a MDAFW FCV will block further automatic actuations until the original condition for pump start is cleared.

CONTROL AFW as necessary to maintain reactor power AND S/G levels for plant conditions.

80P Stops TDAFW Pump (already under clearance)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 Stops MDAFW pump '8" or closes all AFW flow control valves Energizing 480V Emergency Buses will restore power to the following:

PZR Heater Banks PZR PORV Block Valves Air Compressors (Compressors will not auto start) 125 VDC Battery Chargers Direct Booth Operator to insert Event 5, resulting in degradation of frequency requiring a reactor trip. This scenario is not intended to have the crew swap charging pumps.

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger-5 "Grid Frequency degrades requiring RxTrip" October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_5_

Page 26 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequency Further Degrades. requires Reactor Trip Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE:

Event 5 will initiate the following sequence of events:

• Grid frequency further degrades requiring Rx Trip per AOP-028, enter PATH-1

• Turbine Auto Trip fails, PATH-1 RNOs implemented to close turbine governor valves

• LOSS OF HEAT SINK - Loss of both feed pumps (MFP

'A' 10 sees after Rx trip, MFP '8' 50 secs). Loss of both AFW pumps (AFW Pump 'A' 4 min. after reactor trip, AFW Pump '8' 5 min. after reactor trip). Entry into FRP H.1, success path utilizing condensate pumps to establish heat sink.

Indications Available:

AL8-022-4-3, GENERATORVOLTAGElFREQ RATIOIHIGH OR UNDER FREQ CREW Responds to alarm and identifies frequency conditions requiring a trip of the reactor.

SRO Directs MANUAL reactor trip.

}C..... *

...~... **..,;\\;Ss~~q'*?'L EfifefsF?AfH~1:h\\i}***..*;****)*/.s**)i2(; **.,'e>; ** '

• .... ~ *.

,,

i. '".* "."/</.'i>':'/;:.:.* :....

J:;:" /,:.....<.....*. ).\\.. '..

RD Initiates a MANUAL reactor trip.

CREW Performs PATH-1 immediate actions.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_5_

Page 26 of 43 Event

Description:

Grid Frequency Further Degrades. requires Reactor Trip Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE:

Event 5 will initiate the following sequence of events:

• Grid frequency further degrades requiring Rx Trip per AOP-028, enter PATH-1

• Turbine Auto Trip fails, PATH-1 RNOs implemented to close turbine governor valves

• LOSS OF HEAT SINK - Loss of both feed pumps (MFP

'A' 10 sees after Rx trip, MFP '8' 50 secs). Loss of both AFW pumps (AFW Pump 'A' 4 min. after reactor trip, AFW Pump '8' 5 min. after reactor trip). Entry into FRP H.1, success path utilizing condensate pumps to establish heat sink.

Indications Available:

AL8-022-4-3, GENERATORVOLTAGElFREQ RATIOIHIGH OR UNDER FREQ CREW Responds to alarm and identifies frequency conditions requiring a trip of the reactor.

SRO Directs MANUAL reactor trip.

}C..... *

...~... **..,;\\;Ss~~q'*?'L EfifefsF?AfH~1:h\\i}***..*;****)*/.s**)i2(; **.,'e>; ** '

• .... ~ *.

,,

i. '".* "."/</.'i>':'/;:.:.* :....

J:;:" /,:.....<.....*. ).\\.. '..

RD Initiates a MANUAL reactor trip.

CREW Performs PATH-1 immediate actions.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2 _

Event #

_6_

Page 27 of 43 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Turbine Auto Trip Failure TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior VERI FY Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

CHECK for any of the following:

RO TRI P breakers RTA and BY A OPEN (YES)

TRI P breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

BOP VERI FY power to AC Emergency Buses:

1 A-SA and 1 B-SB Buses energized by Off-site power or EDG's (YES, 1 A-SA by Off-site, 1 B-SB by EDG 'B')

RO CHECK SI Actuation (NO)

RO SI Required (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2 _

Event #

_6_

Page 27 of 43 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip with Turbine Auto Trip Failure TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior VERI FY Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

CHECK for any of the following:

RO TRI P breakers RTA and BY A OPEN (YES)

TRI P breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

BOP VERI FY power to AC Emergency Buses:

1 A-SA and 1 B-SB Buses energized by Off-site power or EDG's (YES, 1 A-SA by Off-site, 1 B-SB by EDG 'B')

RO CHECK SI Actuation (NO)

RO SI Required (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 28 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1*..*** *.**. * *.. * *. n*;?{.j*I**s~::~i~R'p(.".. FGb.TO~Eif?~OO~1iRS\\e'-OR(:rf{le:R~$RONS5;""Ste~;1.*;(~***j*v.1

• **. **.t;... /**.* ;,",""'. ';' *... //....................... ".

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Foldout applies.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

No EPP-004 Foldout criteria apply in this scenario.

The A and B MDAFW will trip 4 and 5 minutes (respectively) after the reactor trip.

At this point the crew may recognize that both MFW pumps CREW have tripped and identify when the MDAFW pumps trip to challenge heat sink.

BOP Starts the 'B' MDAFW pump (may have left running, controls flow to SGs with flow control valves)

SRO Informs Shift Manager to evaluate EAL Network Using Entry Point X.

Check RCS Temperature:

Check SG blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555°F AND 559°F RO Check RCP Status:

Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 28 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

n';:'{,j,I'/:~i~R9(;<"., ;~~.P,TO§R~~OO~1i.8~~TOFi~~~IR:t=t~$~Qfisr;;">§tep;1*r~**/{,1 PROCEDURE NOTE:

Foldout applies.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

No EPP-004 Foldout criteria apply in this scenario.

The A and B MDAFW will trip 4 and 5 minutes (respectively) after the reactor trip.

At this point the crew may recognize that both MFW pumps CREW have tripped and identify when the MDAFW pumps trip to challenge heat sink.

BOP Starts the 'B' MDAFW pump (may have left running, controls flow to SGs with flow control valves)

SRO Informs Shift Manager to evaluate EAL Network Using Entry Point X.

Check RCS Temperature:

Check SG blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555°F AND 559°F RO Check RCP Status:

Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _2_ Event #

_7_

Page 29 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check Feed System Status:

RCS Temperature - LESS THAN 564°F (YES)

BOP Verify feed reg valves - SHUT (YES)

CREW Check feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (currently YES, but should report later when MDAFW Pump 'A' is tripped and 'B' MDAFW Pump is tripped)

Contacts AO to investigate loss of MDAFW Pumps as they are recognized.

COMMUNICATOR:

If dispatched to investigate cause of loss of MFW and MDAFW pumps, wait approximately 2 minutes then report that "overcurrent flags are tripped for all breakers, and that there are no adverse indications locally at the pumps."

Check Control Rod Status:

RO Check DRPI-AVAILABLE (YES)

Verify all control rods - FULLY INSERTED (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The crew's success path for this scenario is to depressurize a SG and establish feed using the Condensate System.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # _2_ Event #

_7_

Page 29 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Check Feed System Status:

RCS Temperature - LESS THAN 564°F (YES)

BOP Verify feed reg valves - SHUT (YES)

CREW Check feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (currently YES, but should report later when MDAFW Pump 'A' is tripped and 'B' MDAFW Pump is tripped)

Contacts AO to investigate loss of MDAFW Pumps as they are recognized.

COMMUNICATOR:

If dispatched to investigate cause of loss of MFW and MDAFW pumps, wait approximately 2 minutes then report that "overcurrent flags are tripped for all breakers, and that there are no adverse indications locally at the pumps."

Check Control Rod Status:

RO Check DRPI-AVAILABLE (YES)

Verify all control rods - FULLY INSERTED (YES)

<..*..**...... itio.n~f~~.~~~~~~~i.f()II()Y'in$rtri~iqf~'I3{~F:~.~~j~.~mpt[H~;*,.

• pumR;tripPif1g:S~ill~irnrnedifiteMp~usg*~~Rf;Q~OI1~J--I~J\\"cfE§INK.ii";; ~

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The crew's success path for this scenario is to depressurize a SG and establish feed using the Condensate System.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 30 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I EVALUATOR NOTE:

COMMUNICATOR:

SRO RO SOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior AS soon as FRP-H.1 is entered, direct the Booth Operator to activate Trigger 6 "Restore bus frequency to 60 Hz" (ramped in over 3 minutes).

Monitor bus frequency and immediately notify the MCR as the Load Dispatcher when frequency returns to 60 Hz. Inform crew that frequency has been restored and has been stabilized.

PERFORM the following:

IMPLEMENT function restoration procedures as required.

Informs Shift Manager to EVALUATE EAL Network using entry Point X. (Refer to PEP-11 0)

CHECK Secondary Heat Sink Requirements:

RCS pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE. (YES)

RCS temperature - GREATER THAN 350°F [330°F].

(YES)

STOP any running RHR pumps. (N/A)

CHECK SG Slowdown and SG Sample Valves shut (YES)

(COMPLETED IN EPP-004)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 30 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I EVALUATOR NOTE:

COMMUNICATOR:

SRO RO SOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior AS soon as FRP-H.1 is entered, direct the Booth Operator to activate Trigger 6 "Restore bus frequency to 60 Hz" (ramped in over 3 minutes).

Monitor bus frequency and immediately notify the MCR as the Load Dispatcher when frequency returns to 60 Hz. Inform crew that frequency has been restored and has been stabilized.

PERFORM the following:

IMPLEMENT function restoration procedures as required.

Informs Shift Manager to EVALUATE EAL Network using entry Point X. (Refer to PEP-11 0)

CHECK Secondary Heat Sink Requirements:

RCS pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE. (YES)

RCS temperature - GREATER THAN 350°F [330°F].

(YES)

STOP any running RHR pumps. (N/A)

CHECK SG Slowdown and SG Sample Valves shut (YES)

(COMPLETED IN EPP-004)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 31 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ESTABLISH AFW Flow to at least ONE SG:

OBSERVE MCB indications to determine cause of AFW failure:

0 CST level (NO) 0 MDAFW pump power supplies (NO) 0 TDAFW pump steam supply valves (YES) 0 TDAFW pump speed controller (NO)

BOP/SRO 0

TDAFW pump control power (NO) 0 AFW valve alignment (NO)

TRY to restore AFW flow at the MCB. (Refer to Attachment 1 for guidance of rate of feed flOW.)

(Refer to OP-137, Auxiliary Feedwater System, for guidance regarding AFW pump operations, precautions and limitations and valve operation.)

TOTAL feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH.

(NO)

BOP/SRO PERFORM the following:

CONTINUE attempts to restore AFW flow at the MCB.

SRO OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 5 AND continue with Step 5.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

After stopping all RCPs and placing steam dump in the steam pressure mode, RCS pressure and temperature will increase as natural circulation is established. A large loop.6. T prior to PRZ PORV opening confirms natural circulation. This must be considered while evaluating bleed and feed criteria.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 31 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ESTABLISH AFW Flow to at least ONE SG:

OBSERVE MCB indications to determine cause of AFW failure:

0 CST level (NO) 0 MDAFW pump power supplies (NO) 0 TDAFW pump steam supply valves (YES) 0 TDAFW pump speed controller (NO)

BOP/SRO 0

TDAFW pump control power (NO) 0 AFW valve alignment (NO)

TRY to restore AFW flow at the MCB. (Refer to Attachment 1 for guidance of rate of feed flOW.)

(Refer to OP-137, Auxiliary Feedwater System, for guidance regarding AFW pump operations, precautions and limitations and valve operation.)

TOTAL feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH.

(NO)

BOP/SRO PERFORM the following:

CONTINUE attempts to restore AFW flow at the MCB.

SRO OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 5 AND continue with Step 5.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

After stopping all RCPs and placing steam dump in the steam pressure mode, RCS pressure and temperature will increase as natural circulation is established. A large loop.6. T prior to PRZ PORV opening confirms natural circulation. This must be considered while evaluating bleed and feed criteria.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 32 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Stop Heat Input From RCP Operations:

STOPs ALL RCP.

CHECK all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser:

CHECK any intact SG MSIV - OPEN. (YES)

BOP CHECK condenser available (C-9) light (BPLB 3-3) - LIT.

(YES)

STEAM dump control system - AVAILABLE. (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The following three substeps may VERIFY actions completed in EPP-004.

PLACE steam dump pressure controller in manual AND decrease output to 0%.

BOP PLACE steam dump mode select switch in STEAM PRESS.

ADJUST steam dump controller setpoint to 84% (1092 PSIG) AND place in auto.

BOP ESTABLISH Main FW Flow to at least ONE SG:

CHECK condensate system - IN SERVICE. (YES)

SUPPORT condition for FW startup - AVAILABLE. (NO, both pumps are tripped on overcurrent and unavailable)

POWER to at least ONE Main FW pump -

AVAILABLE. (YES)

• PP-1 D212 - ENERGIZED. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 32 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Stop Heat Input From RCP Operations:

STOPs ALL RCP.

CHECK all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser:

CHECK any intact SG MSIV - OPEN. (YES)

BOP CHECK condenser available (C-9) light (BPLB 3-3) - LIT.

(YES)

STEAM dump control system - AVAILABLE. (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The following three substeps may VERIFY actions completed in EPP-004.

PLACE steam dump pressure controller in manual AND decrease output to 0%.

BOP PLACE steam dump mode select switch in STEAM PRESS.

ADJUST steam dump controller setpoint to 84% (1092 PSIG) AND place in auto.

BOP ESTABLISH Main FW Flow to at least ONE SG:

CHECK condensate system - IN SERVICE. (YES)

SUPPORT condition for FW startup - AVAILABLE. (NO, both pumps are tripped on overcurrent and unavailable)

POWER to at least ONE Main FW pump -

AVAILABLE. (YES)

• PP-1 D212 - ENERGIZED. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 33 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO WHEN support conditions met, THEN do Steps 6c AND d.

Observe CAUTION prior to Step 8 AND GO TO Step 8.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Following block of automatic SI actuation, manual SI actuation may be required if conditions degrade.

(Examples of degraded conditions are the inability to maintain or restore PRZ level, RVLIS indication or RCS subcooling.)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

RO Evaluator Note:

DEPRESSURIZE RCS AND BLOCK Low Steam Pressure SI:

CHECK SI - IN SERVICE (NO)

GO TO Step 8e.

DEPRESSURIZE RCS to between 1900 PSIG AND 1950 PSIG CHECK letdown -IN SERVICE (YES)

DEPRESSURIZE using auxiliary spray.

BLOCK SI Signals:

Low PRZ pressure Low steam pressure MAINTAIN pressure less than 1950 PSIG..

RCS pressure will need to be monitored or it will continue to decrease with AUX spray until noticed. This may also result in letdown isolation. If VCT level drops <5%, CSIP suction will swap the RWST.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 33 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO WHEN support conditions met, THEN do Steps 6c AND d.

Observe CAUTION prior to Step 8 AND GO TO Step 8.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Following block of automatic SI actuation, manual SI actuation may be required if conditions degrade.

(Examples of degraded conditions are the inability to maintain or restore PRZ level, RVLIS indication or RCS subcooling.)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

RO Evaluator Note:

DEPRESSURIZE RCS AND BLOCK Low Steam Pressure SI:

CHECK SI - IN SERVICE (NO)

GO TO Step 8e.

DEPRESSURIZE RCS to between 1900 PSIG AND 1950 PSIG CHECK letdown -IN SERVICE (YES)

DEPRESSURIZE using auxiliary spray.

BLOCK SI Signals:

Low PRZ pressure Low steam pressure MAINTAIN pressure less than 1950 PSIG..

RCS pressure will need to be monitored or it will continue to decrease with AUX spray until noticed. This may also result in letdown isolation. If VCT level drops <5%, CSIP suction will swap the RWST.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 34 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

Depressurizing only one 5G minimizes the likelihood of reaching the "bleed and feed" criteria (due to lowering 5G level) AND the likelihood of the appearance of degraded plant conditions that might require manual 51 actuation.

The preferred 5G to depressurize is the intact 5G with the highest indicated wide range level.

A second 5G may be depressurized if condensate flow cannot be established to the first 5G depressurized.

DEPRESSURIZE One SG To Less Than 500 PSIG AND ESTABLISH Condensate Flow:

IDENTIFY the SG to be depressurized.

SHUT the following valves for the SGs that are NOT to be depressurized.

MSIVs BOP

• MSIV bypass valves SG main Steam drain isolation before MSIV DUMP steam at maximum rate to depressurize identified to SG to 500 PSIG using any of the following (listed in order of preference):

Condenser steam dump ESTABLISH condensate flow using Attachment 3.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 34 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

Depressurizing only one 5G minimizes the likelihood of reaching the "bleed and feed" criteria (due to lowering 5G level) AND the likelihood of the appearance of degraded plant conditions that might require manual 51 actuation.

The preferred 5G to depressurize is the intact 5G with the highest indicated wide range level.

A second 5G may be depressurized if condensate flow cannot be established to the first 5G depressurized.

DEPRESSURIZE One SG To Less Than 500 PSIG AND ESTABLISH Condensate Flow:

IDENTIFY the SG to be depressurized.

SHUT the following valves for the SGs that are NOT to be depressurized.

MSIVs BOP

• MSIV bypass valves SG main Steam drain isolation before MSIV DUMP steam at maximum rate to depressurize identified to SG to 500 PSIG using any of the following (listed in order of preference):

Condenser steam dump ESTABLISH condensate flow using Attachment 3.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 35 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I PROCEDURE NOTE:

EVALUATOR NOTE:

BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior This attachment provides instructions for establishing condensate flow to one SG to restore secondary heat sink. It may also be used as a reference for establishing condensate flow to SGs while implementing other EOPs.

The low steam pressure SI blocked, main steam line isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

If an action or its contingency in this attachment can NOT be accomplished, the operator should return to the step in effect, while continuing efforts to establish condensate flow.

FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 is attached on the end of this scenario guide for use if desired.

CHECK Primary and Secondary Conditions To Allow Establishing Condensate Flow:

CHECK low steam SG pressure SI - BLOCKED (YES)

CHECK SG pressure for SG to which condensate flow is to be established - LESS THAN 500 (NO)

GO To Step 2.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

The preferred SG to depressurize is the intact SG with the highest indicated wide range level.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

While depressurizing SGs with steam dumps, the MSIVs may close automatically requiring use of SG PORVs.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 35 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I PROCEDURE NOTE:

EVALUATOR NOTE:

BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior This attachment provides instructions for establishing condensate flow to one SG to restore secondary heat sink. It may also be used as a reference for establishing condensate flow to SGs while implementing other EOPs.

The low steam pressure SI blocked, main steam line isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

If an action or its contingency in this attachment can NOT be accomplished, the operator should return to the step in effect, while continuing efforts to establish condensate flow.

FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 is attached on the end of this scenario guide for use if desired.

CHECK Primary and Secondary Conditions To Allow Establishing Condensate Flow:

CHECK low steam SG pressure SI - BLOCKED (YES)

CHECK SG pressure for SG to which condensate flow is to be established - LESS THAN 500 (NO)

GO To Step 2.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

The preferred SG to depressurize is the intact SG with the highest indicated wide range level.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

While depressurizing SGs with steam dumps, the MSIVs may close automatically requiring use of SG PORVs.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 36 of 43 Event

Description:

loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Depressurize One SG To Less Than 500 PSIG:

Identify the SG to be depressurized.

Shut the following valves for the SGs that are NOT to be depressurized.

o MSIVs o

MSIV bypass valves o

SG main steam drain isolations before MSIV:

SG A: 1 MS-231 SG B: 1 MS-266 SG C: 1 MS-301 Dump steam at maximum rate to depressurize identified SG to 500 PSIG using any of the following (listed in order of preference ):

o Condenser steam dump o

SG PORVs o

Locally operate SG PORVs using OP-126, "MAIN STEAM, EXTRACTION STEAM, AND STEAM DUMP SYSTEMS", Section 8.2.

o TDAFWpump CHECK Condensate System Status:

At least one condensate - RUNNING (YES)

At least one condensate booster pump - RUNNING (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

The main FW pump discharge valve control switches must be held in the OPEN position to open the valves with the main FW pumps stopped.

OPEN The Following Valves:

Low pressure FW heater bypass valves: (1 CE-330/1 CE-BOP 359)

High pressure FW heater bypass valves: (1 FW-110)

Main FW pump discharge valves: (1 FW-29/1 FW-60)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 36 of 43 Event

Description:

loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Depressurize One SG To Less Than 500 PSIG:

Identify the SG to be depressurized.

Shut the following valves for the SGs that are NOT to be depressurized.

o MSIVs o

MSIV bypass valves o

SG main steam drain isolations before MSIV:

SG A: 1 MS-231 SG B: 1 MS-266 SG C: 1 MS-301 Dump steam at maximum rate to depressurize identified SG to 500 PSIG using any of the following (listed in order of preference ):

o Condenser steam dump o

SG PORVs o

Locally operate SG PORVs using OP-126, "MAIN STEAM, EXTRACTION STEAM, AND STEAM DUMP SYSTEMS", Section 8.2.

o TDAFWpump CHECK Condensate System Status:

At least one condensate - RUNNING (YES)

At least one condensate booster pump - RUNNING (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

The main FW pump discharge valve control switches must be held in the OPEN position to open the valves with the main FW pumps stopped.

OPEN The Following Valves:

Low pressure FW heater bypass valves: (1 CE-330/1 CE-BOP 359)

High pressure FW heater bypass valves: (1 FW-110)

Main FW pump discharge valves: (1 FW-29/1 FW-60)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 37 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO RESET SI. (Not active)

CREW Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-1 GUIDE, Attachment 2.) (NA)

RESET FW Isolation.

PLACE Feed Reg Bypass Controllers In Manual AND Set Output To Zero.

RESET AND open main FW isolation valve(s): (All open already)

BOP

• 1 FW-159 (A SG) 1 FW-277 (B SG) 1 FW-217 (C SG)

SHUT Main FW Pump Recirc Valves: (1 FW-8/1 FW-39)

PLACE Condensate Booster Pump Controllers In Manual AND Control Discharge Pressure At 600 PSIG.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 37 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW TIme I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO RESET SI. (Not active)

CREW Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-1 GUIDE, Attachment 2.) (NA)

RESET FW Isolation.

PLACE Feed Reg Bypass Controllers In Manual AND Set Output To Zero.

RESET AND open main FW isolation valve(s): (All open already)

BOP

• 1 FW-159 (A SG) 1 FW-277 (B SG) 1 FW-217 (C SG)

SHUT Main FW Pump Recirc Valves: (1 FW-8/1 FW-39)

PLACE Condensate Booster Pump Controllers In Manual AND Control Discharge Pressure At 600 PSIG.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 38 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I PROCEDURE NOTE:

COMMUNICATOR:

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Local checks for flow noise may be used to confirm the presence of flow.

When directed to go to desired FRV Bypass valve, wait 2 minutes, then report that you are standing by as requested. Monitor for flow on simulator.

In order to monitor for flow, open the monitored parameter file - Plant Status Monitor CFW. The following parameters can be utilized to identify when flow starts Line 21: wcfw479(1} FRV Bypass Valve A flow Line 22: wCfw479(2} FRV Bypass Valve B flow Line 23: wcfw479(3} FRV Bypass Valve C flow ESTABLISH Feed Flow To SG(s):

BOP (Refer to Attachment 1 while performing actions that restore feed flow.)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

When restoring heatsink using Condensate flow before RCS Bleed And Feed: IF wide range RCS Tcold is stable at OR trending to the saturation temperature corresponding to the depressurized SG pressure, THEN feed the depressurized SG without restriction on rate.

EVALUATOR NOTE: Terminate the scenario once feed flow has been established and at least one SG NR level is at or trending to 25%.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

_7_

Page 38 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss Of Heat Sink Both Main FW Pumps Trip and No AFW Time I Position I PROCEDURE NOTE:

COMMUNICATOR:

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Local checks for flow noise may be used to confirm the presence of flow.

When directed to go to desired FRV Bypass valve, wait 2 minutes, then report that you are standing by as requested. Monitor for flow on simulator.

In order to monitor for flow, open the monitored parameter file - Plant Status Monitor CFW. The following parameters can be utilized to identify when flow starts Line 21: wcfw479(1} FRV Bypass Valve A flow Line 22: wCfw479(2} FRV Bypass Valve B flow Line 23: wcfw479(3} FRV Bypass Valve C flow ESTABLISH Feed Flow To SG(s):

BOP (Refer to Attachment 1 while performing actions that restore feed flow.)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

When restoring heatsink using Condensate flow before RCS Bleed And Feed: IF wide range RCS Tcold is stable at OR trending to the saturation temperature corresponding to the depressurized SG pressure, THEN feed the depressurized SG without restriction on rate.

EVALUATOR NOTE: Terminate the scenario once feed flow has been established and at least one SG NR level is at or trending to 25%.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

5/6/7/8 Event

Description:

FRP-H.l Attachment 3 Time L

I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Att..:m..mt 3 Sheet 1 of S M.A&LIs:mn;. CiXfOBmW'E n.ow TO SGJ Tb1. att.em..mt pcOYid.. in.tructtonc tor.. tlbli.hina eondltftAte tlow to OM SG to caltor<< ceeOD.a1:Y but riM..

It MY.1.0 k 1,\\.. d. u

• m,uel)c* toe: *.-t.bUcbilla C<:IndltftAte flow to SG, vhtt.illlP'leJWlt1na othu £OP,.

o The low &'tUII pr....un S1 blocked.. wn.-t... Un. 1col,atloa

,.111 oc¢ur 11 th. hip It... pr.-,uce rate ntpoint is

~

.. 4e4.

o It.n.ct:loa >or it. eontiftl~Y ;m tb1 ** tta:elutt#t cau Ell b.t.eeotplicl!ed. the opeutor ~ld e:uue:n to the,tt, ift 4ft<<crt. vh11a COni1:uutn,,Hocta to ltltatl11lb eondGMte flov.

Clack Pr1oll1l::1 and. Secondary Condition. To Allow !ctabli.hln, CondltftAte Ilowl Cheek lov.te.. SG prelluu gm Res pre **,u:. iI 1 *.."

SI

• l\\tOCX!l) than 21)00 PSIG..rm: block 81 lian-l,1; I) tow PRZ pr ** cue:*

I) tow.t... prepuce

b.

Cheek Se-pte. lUre toc SG to

b.

00 10 Step 2.

vhteh cond.en.ate flov s.iJ to be "tabU,h.d.

• LESS TIWf 500 '!'SIe-

c.

GO TO Step 3.

I I

Form ES-D-2 Page 39 of 43 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

5/6/7/8 Event

Description:

FRP-H.l Attachment 3 Time L

I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Att..:m..mt 3 Sheet 1 of S M.A&LIs:mn;. CiXfOBmW'E n.ow TO SGJ Tb1. att.em..mt pcOYid.. in.tructtonc tor.. tlbli.hina eondltftAte tlow to OM SG to caltor<< ceeOD.a1:Y but riM..

It MY.1.0 k 1,\\.. d. u

• m,uel)c* toe: *.-t.bUcbilla C<:IndltftAte flow to SG, vhtt.illlP'leJWlt1na othu £OP,.

o The low &'tUII pr....un S1 blocked.. wn.-t... Un. 1col,atloa

,.111 oc¢ur 11 th. hip It... pr.-,uce rate ntpoint is

~

.. 4e4.

o It.n.ct:loa >or it. eontiftl~Y ;m tb1 ** tta:elutt#t cau Ell b.t.eeotplicl!ed. the opeutor ~ld e:uue:n to the,tt, ift 4ft<<crt. vh11a COni1:uutn,,Hocta to ltltatl11lb eondGMte flov.

Clack Pr1oll1l::1 and. Secondary Condition. To Allow !ctabli.hln, CondltftAte Ilowl Cheek lov.te.. SG prelluu gm Res pre **,u:. iI 1 *.."

SI

• l\\tOCX!l) than 21)00 PSIG..rm: block 81 lian-l,1; I) tow PRZ pr ** cue:*

I) tow.t... prepuce

b.

Cheek Se-pte. lUre toc SG to

b.

00 10 Step 2.

vhteh cond.en.ate flov s.iJ to be "tabU,h.d.

• LESS TIWf 500 '!'SIe-

c.

GO TO Step 3.

I I

Form ES-D-2 Page 39 of 43 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

5/617/8 Page 40 of 43 Event

Description:

FRP-H.l Attachment 3 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Atn(lhaa.~ 3 Shut 2 of S

!STA&Ll~ cmwl!lU'1'! fLOW 1'0 SSt Iml tM pUht:fM SG to dep~.uufile U t1le intact SG w1th the hiaMR 1n4teated wide ranp levu.

Z.

~pr...

ud:..~. sa TI) lA., Thu.

S(lO PSMl Identify tbe SG to k depreuuriled.

b.

Shut tbe f(lll~, valve.

f()r the Sa. tltat are 1m. to be depr... u:r:1ced.

(I HSlYl!

(I MSIV bypul! valva (I

SG uta 1ft..,. drain i.o1ation. before HSlYI AI lMS'2n SiS It lMS-266 SiS CO; INS-30t

c.

Duap,tUIII at IIUiaua rate to deprec,u:r:tz. Identified SG to 500 PSIG l.IIina my of the toll_nl (U.ted in (I<<er Oct prefueMel I U

Coltdennr,te.tm dWllp

U SiS POlV.

3)

Lccally ~r.te SG POlY, u.ina OP-116.

• ~IIt ftIWI.

ElTiACl'IOli S'l'lW!. AID mAlI!). SYSTBltS".

Seetion 8.1.

I Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2

b.

Shut the fo1low1n, valvu fot: tbe $

tl;l k deprHwdced.

o

)l'$IV o

)l'$IV by,... val".

o St; ua.t... 4t'caa It'*lauOll before HSDt St; AI l)1'$~Z31 SG ih l)1'$~l(,(i St; O!

INS*lOI I

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

5/617/8 Page 40 of 43 Event

Description:

FRP-H.l Attachment 3 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Atn(lhaa.~ 3 Shut 2 of S

!STA&Ll~ cmwl!lU'1'! fLOW 1'0 SSt Iml tM pUht:fM SG to dep~.uufile U t1le intact SG w1th the hiaMR 1n4teated wide ranp levu.

Z.

~pr...

ud:..~. sa TI) lA., Thu.

S(lO PSMl Identify tbe SG to k depreuuriled.

b.

Shut tbe f(lll~, valve.

f()r the Sa. tltat are 1m. to be depr... u:r:1ced.

(I HSlYl!

(I MSIV bypul! valva (I

SG uta 1ft..,. drain i.o1ation. before HSlYI AI lMS'2n SiS It lMS-266 SiS CO; INS-30t

c.

Duap,tUIII at IIUiaua rate to deprec,u:r:tz. Identified SG to 500 PSIG l.IIina my of the toll_nl (U.ted in (I<<er Oct prefueMel I U

Coltdennr,te.tm dWllp

U SiS POlV.

3)

Lccally ~r.te SG POlY, u.ina OP-116.

• ~IIt ftIWI.

ElTiACl'IOli S'l'lW!. AID mAlI!). SYSTBltS".

Seetion 8.1.

I Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2

b.

Shut the fo1low1n, valvu fot: tbe $

tl;l k deprHwdced.

o

)l'$IV o

)l'$IV by,... val".

o St; ua.t... 4t'caa It'*lauOll before HSDt St; AI l)1'$~Z31 SG ih l)1'$~l(,(i St; O!

INS*lOI I

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

5/6/7/8 Event

Description:

FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior AttaellMnt 3 Sh~ft,3 ~:t 5

!STAliLlmNG ~

Jt.(IW TO ss.

3.

Check CoMenAte Sy.to Statu,;

a.

At l~ut on. coCI4enAte PUlip

• ItIJltNlllG

b.

At lean one col1!de.ue boo"u pUllp

• ItUllNlNG

a.

Plac. on. ;::~MenA" PWlP in, ** rv1;:: **

(a.t.r to 0'"134.

"<:OlfODSA'D S'IS't!K".

Secti()n 5.3.)

b.

PIae. OM COMenAte boon", ~

1n uffl¢e.

{a.t.r to GP*13 **

• ~A'D STS'!!I!-,

Section S.S.)

llm.=

TIle :uin PW PUlip dtaemae v_1ft c~ro1 4Y1tcl;u __ t K held in,

'the om ponti@. to ope "the valve. nth 'the uU !"IiI puap.

It~PP"+

4.

Ope the l!'ollow1nJ Valv.. :

o tow pr *** ure FW beater bypa.. valve.;

o liip prucure '" Mater by!)a.. val"...

n'l-110 o

!fatn FW PutlP 4iceharp valve. I I

I Form ES-D-2 Page 41 of 43 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

5/6/7/8 Event

Description:

FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior AttaellMnt 3 Sh~ft,3 ~:t 5

!STAliLlmNG ~

Jt.(IW TO ss.

3.

Check CoMenAte Sy.to Statu,;

a.

At l~ut on. coCI4enAte PUlip

• ItIJltNlllG

b.

At lean one col1!de.ue boo"u pUllp

• ItUllNlNG

a.

Plac. on. ;::~MenA" PWlP in, ** rv1;:: **

(a.t.r to 0'"134.

"<:OlfODSA'D S'IS't!K".

Secti()n 5.3.)

b.

PIae. OM COMenAte boon", ~

1n uffl¢e.

{a.t.r to GP*13 **

• ~A'D STS'!!I!-,

Section S.S.)

llm.=

TIle :uin PW PUlip dtaemae v_1ft c~ro1 4Y1tcl;u __ t K held in,

'the om ponti@. to ope "the valve. nth 'the uU !"IiI puap.

It~PP"+

4.

Ope the l!'ollow1nJ Valv.. :

o tow pr *** ure FW beater bypa.. valve.;

o liip prucure '" Mater by!)a.. val"...

n'l-110 o

!fatn FW PutlP 4iceharp valve. I I

I Form ES-D-2 Page 41 of 43 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

5/6/7/8 Page 42 of 43 Event

Description:

FRP-H.l Attachment 3 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

6.

a.

9.

10.

11.

Attac1lMllt 3 Shut " of ;5 UTULtSB'.1W cotfll!NS.U! !LOW TO SGI KanuaUy h.tltan S.. ~e,uud.

!qU1~t !~llov1nl A to.. Of Offt1te ~l",

(h'fer to PAn-I GUID.!.

At~nt 2.)

ReMt P'If 1~U"10t1.

Plaee 'eea le, aypa **

Controller. 13 Kanual AND Set

~tp!Xt To z.t"~>+

ReMt M1D ope..un P'If 1coutiOti v.tveh:) ;

lrw'U9 (4 S~)

lrw'l17 () SG) lrw~117 (C SG)

Shut tra1n P'If Pup aeeire Val""1 In-8 lEW*)')

Place CoMetlAte aooauc hap Controller. III Kamu.l ANI)

Cont~l Dt.eh:.u"I* Pre.aure At 64:)0 PSIG.

I

'Rev. 13 Il lAY trun ot st will !mr re.t:'!: at HC8. nm!. un" lot SSl'S ll.tna PA'l'JH GOlD!.

Attaellftut U.

Verify flea reI. bypu. v.tvu

• SHOT

!M:&ll,..hut 11111ll PW pump re<:irc

.aQual i.olation v.l ** (.)~

I Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

5/6/7/8 Page 42 of 43 Event

Description:

FRP-H.l Attachment 3 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

6.

a.

9.

10.

11.

Attac1lMllt 3 Shut " of ;5 UTULtSB'.1W cotfll!NS.U! !LOW TO SGI KanuaUy h.tltan S.. ~e,uud.

!qU1~t !~llov1nl A to.. Of Offt1te ~l",

(h'fer to PAn-I GUID.!.

At~nt 2.)

ReMt P'If 1~U"10t1.

Plaee 'eea le, aypa **

Controller. 13 Kanual AND Set

~tp!Xt To z.t"~>+

ReMt M1D ope..un P'If 1coutiOti v.tveh:) ;

lrw'U9 (4 S~)

lrw'l17 () SG) lrw~117 (C SG)

Shut tra1n P'If Pup aeeire Val""1 In-8 lEW*)')

Place CoMetlAte aooauc hap Controller. III Kamu.l ANI)

Cont~l Dt.eh:.u"I* Pre.aure At 64:)0 PSIG.

I

'Rev. 13 Il lAY trun ot st will !mr re.t:'!: at HC8. nm!. un" lot SSl'S ll.tna PA'l'JH GOlD!.

Attaellftut U.

Verify flea reI. bypu. v.tvu

• SHOT

!M:&ll,..hut 11111ll PW pump re<:irc

.aQual i.olation v.l ** (.)~

I Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

5/6/7 /8 Page 43 of 43 Event

Description:

FRP-H.l Attachment 3 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior AttacllMnt 3 Shtn $ <>t,

!STA!LIml'l"G oottl)!IlS!1'! PLOW TO SG.

l:!:QIl1

!.oed cbectc. f<>r flow no1" II&J be un4 to e<>llfira the precen<<

<>f flow.

11, !.uJ)U.h reed n<>w T<> SG(.h (ltet",r to eAttaJ:lwult 1 wile p.rtonl1nll. aeti<>nc that "utore feR fl<>w.}

a,

!.tab11~ teed flow u.1n,

'the feed "e, bnao valve.

t"0111 the HClI.

b.

reed flow to 00(.) *

!STULlmo I

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2

• !!In

• Locally ",.ubl:t..l1 fee( fl<>w u.ina the Iud re, bypu:.

valves.

(btu to 01-134.01. "'FII' SYft1!Xw, Section $.4.)

b.

P.dona the f<>llOYil)a:

1}

Verity main rw block valv.{.} - OrEN; now-:t30 (eA 00) 1!V<:46 (tl OO)

IF11" 188 (C SG) l}

~al11 *.t.bl1~ teed tl<>w lUlU/a the t.R reI val ub).

(a.fer to OP-134.01.

IOn SYST!H".

SectionS.l.)

I October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_2_ Event #

5/6/7 /8 Page 43 of 43 Event

Description:

FRP-H.l Attachment 3 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior AttacllMnt 3 Shtn $ <>t,

!STA!LIml'l"G oottl)!IlS!1'! PLOW TO SG.

l:!:QIl1

!.oed cbectc. f<>r flow no1" II&J be un4 to e<>llfira the precen<<

<>f flow.

11, !.uJ)U.h reed n<>w T<> SG(.h (ltet",r to eAttaJ:lwult 1 wile p.rtonl1nll. aeti<>nc that "utore feR fl<>w.}

a,

!.tab11~ teed flow u.1n,

'the feed "e, bnao valve.

t"0111 the HClI.

b.

reed flow to 00(.) *

!STULlmo I

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 2

• !!In

• Locally ",.ubl:t..l1 fee( fl<>w u.ina the Iud re, bypu:.

valves.

(btu to 01-134.01. "'FII' SYft1!Xw, Section $.4.)

b.

P.dona the f<>llOYil)a:

1}

Verity main rw block valv.{.} - OrEN; now-:t30 (eA 00) 1!V<:46 (tl OO)

IF11" 188 (C SG) l}

~al11 *.t.bl1~ teed tl<>w lUlU/a the t.R reI val ub).

(a.fer to OP-134.01.

IOn SYST!H".

SectionS.l.)

I October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D DRAFT Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.: 05000400/2009302 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

IC-11, MOL, 90% power, started up 9 hrs ago from Rx Trip21 hours ago The TDAFW Pump has been Out of Service for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect

'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump is out of service for motor replacement, expected return to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Turnover:

Plant is at 90% power, MOL with the turbine in HOLD. A plant startup is in progress following a reactor trip 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> ago. The reactor went critical 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> ago. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.7.1.2 action

'a' is in effect. Normal startup in progress lAW with GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) section 5.0 step 138.c. with a planned rate change of 4 DEH units per minute. Load is set at 960, and the turbine is in hold. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is out of service for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

Critical Task:

• Start the 'A' RHR pump prior to the completion of PATH-1 Attachment 6.

• Isolate AFW flow to the 'B' SG from the MDAFW pumps prior to exiting EPP-014

• Close MSIVs for SG 'A' and 'C' prior to exiting EPP-015.

Event Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event N

Description

o.

1 N/A N-BOP Power escalation to 100%

R-RO TRG2 TE:575A C-BOP/SRO Main Transformer High Temperature TE:575B TE:575C TRG3 CVC29A C-RO/SRO CSIP "A" Shaft Shear TS-SRO TRG4 XD11121 C-BOP/SRO Containment Fan Cooler Fan (AH-2 A-SA) Trips TS-SRO TRG5 NIS07E I-RO/SRO Power Range N-43 fails HI TS-SRO TRG6 MSS11 M-AII Main Steam Line Break outside of Containment Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D DRAFT Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.: 05000400/2009302 Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

IC-11, MOL, 90% power, started up 9 hrs ago from Rx Trip21 hours ago The TDAFW Pump has been Out of Service for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect

'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump is out of service for motor replacement, expected return to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Turnover:

Plant is at 90% power, MOL with the turbine in HOLD. A plant startup is in progress following a reactor trip 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> ago. The reactor went critical 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> ago. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.7.1.2 action

'a' is in effect. Normal startup in progress lAW with GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) section 5.0 step 138.c. with a planned rate change of 4 DEH units per minute. Load is set at 960, and the turbine is in hold. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is out of service for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

Critical Task:

• Start the 'A' RHR pump prior to the completion of PATH-1 Attachment 6.

• Isolate AFW flow to the 'B' SG from the MDAFW pumps prior to exiting EPP-014

• Close MSIVs for SG 'A' and 'C' prior to exiting EPP-015.

Event Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event N

Description

o.

1 N/A N-BOP Power escalation to 100%

R-RO TRG2 TE:575A C-BOP/SRO Main Transformer High Temperature TE:575B TE:575C TRG3 CVC29A C-RO/SRO CSIP "A" Shaft Shear TS-SRO TRG4 XD11121 C-BOP/SRO Containment Fan Cooler Fan (AH-2 A-SA) Trips TS-SRO TRG5 NIS07E I-RO/SRO Power Range N-43 fails HI TS-SRO TRG6 MSS11 M-AII Main Steam Line Break outside of Containment Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 TRG7 MSS05A C-BOP/SRO MSIVs fail to close and can't be closed from control room - Enter MSS05B EPP-015 then exit after valves are closed locally MSS05C 8

ZRPK616A I-BOP/SRO SG 'B' AFW isolation valve fails to close on Feedwater Isolation ZRPK616B signal 9

ZDSQ2:52A I-RO/SRO

'A' RHR Pump fails to start from sequencer 10 ZRPK630A I-BOP/SRO Phase A failure - Same slave relay in each train fails to actuate ZRPK630B respective Phase A Isolation Valves

• 1 SP-948/1 SP-949

• 1 ED-94/1 ED-95

• 1 SP-16/1 SP-939

• 1 SP-916/1 SP-918 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Summary:

Plant is at 90% power, MOL with the turbine in HOLD. A plant startup is in progress following a reactor trip 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> ago. The reactor went critical 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> ago. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect. Normal startup in progress lAW with GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) section 5.0 step 138.c, with a planned rate change of 4 DEH units per minute. Load is set at 960, and the turbine is in hold. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is out of service for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

Event 1: Crew performs a power escalation lAW GP-005. For this reactivity manipulation, it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will dilute per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to raise power.

Event 2: High Main Transformer temperatures can be initiated once the power escalation has been observed to the extent necessary to evaluate reactivity control. High temperature alarms will annunciate on ERFIS and ALB-022 requiring entry into AOP-035. The crew will need to stop the power escalation and evaluate conditions and determine that the transformer will need to be removed from service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If contacted, plant management will provide direction to hold power at the present level while the problem is being investigated.

Event 3: CSIP 'A' shaft shear can be inserted once the Main Transformer corrective actions have been determined. This will result in multiple alarms on ALB-006 and ALB-007 associated with the loss of charging flow, requiring entry into AOP-018, RCP Abnormal Conditions in order to address the loss of seal injection. The crew will start CSIP 'B' and re-establish seal injection lAW AOP-018 and then restore letdown per OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control System.

The SRO will evaluate Tech Specs for the loss of CSIP 'A'.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 TRG7 MSS05A C-BOP/SRO MSIVs fail to close and can't be closed from control room - Enter MSS05B EPP-015 then exit after valves are closed locally MSS05C 8

ZRPK616A I-BOP/SRO SG 'B' AFW isolation valve fails to close on Feedwater Isolation ZRPK616B signal 9

ZDSQ2:52A I-RO/SRO

'A' RHR Pump fails to start from sequencer 10 ZRPK630A I-BOP/SRO Phase A failure - Same slave relay in each train fails to actuate ZRPK630B respective Phase A Isolation Valves

• 1 SP-948/1 SP-949

• 1 ED-94/1 ED-95

• 1 SP-16/1 SP-939

• 1 SP-916/1 SP-918 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Summary:

Plant is at 90% power, MOL with the turbine in HOLD. A plant startup is in progress following a reactor trip 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> ago. The reactor went critical 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> ago. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

LCO 3.7.1.2 action 'a' is in effect. Normal startup in progress lAW with GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) section 5.0 step 138.c, with a planned rate change of 4 DEH units per minute. Load is set at 960, and the turbine is in hold. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is out of service for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

Event 1: Crew performs a power escalation lAW GP-005. For this reactivity manipulation, it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will dilute per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to raise power.

Event 2: High Main Transformer temperatures can be initiated once the power escalation has been observed to the extent necessary to evaluate reactivity control. High temperature alarms will annunciate on ERFIS and ALB-022 requiring entry into AOP-035. The crew will need to stop the power escalation and evaluate conditions and determine that the transformer will need to be removed from service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If contacted, plant management will provide direction to hold power at the present level while the problem is being investigated.

Event 3: CSIP 'A' shaft shear can be inserted once the Main Transformer corrective actions have been determined. This will result in multiple alarms on ALB-006 and ALB-007 associated with the loss of charging flow, requiring entry into AOP-018, RCP Abnormal Conditions in order to address the loss of seal injection. The crew will start CSIP 'B' and re-establish seal injection lAW AOP-018 and then restore letdown per OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control System.

The SRO will evaluate Tech Specs for the loss of CSIP 'A'.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events Continued:

Event 4: Loss of AH-2A can be inserted once letdown has been restored. This will result in annunciator ALB 027-8-2, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-2 LOW FLOW - OIL actuating.

The crew will have to establish the 'B' train of Containment Fan Coolers lAW OP-169, Containment Cooling and Ventilation. The SRO will evaluate Tech Spec 3.6.2.3, Containment Systems - Containment Cooling System.

Event 5: Power Range Channel N-43 fails high once the 'B' train of Containment Fan Coolers has been placed in service. This will cause rods to start stepping in and the crew should enter AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System. The crew should perform the immediate actions of AOP-001, placing Rod Control in MANUAL to stop rod motion. Follow up actions of AOP-001 will be performed in order to restore rod withdrawal capability. The SRO will evaluate Tech. Spec 3.3.1 for any impact due to the failed instrument.

Event 6: Main Steam Line Break outside of Containment is initiated once rod withdrawal capability has been restored. The crew will trip the reactor, initiate SI and enter PATH-1.

Event 7: Automatic Main Steam Isolation does not occur, and the crew will attempt to close the MSIVs at the MCB. The MSIVs will fail to close manually requiring direction to plant operators to isolate air to the MSIVs. The crew will transition from PATH-1 to EPP-014 and then to EPP-015 due to uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs. Once in EPP-015, the 'A' and 'C' MSIVs will be closed locally and the crew will transition back to EPP-014.

Event 8: The AFW Auto Isolation for the 'B' SG will not occur and the crew will have to manually isolate AFW flow to the 'B' Steam Generator.

Event 9: The 'B' RHR pump will trip immediately after it starts and cannot be restarted. The 'A' RHR pump will fail to start automatically from the 'A' Sequencer. The 'A' RHR pump can be started by the operator. This will be accomplished during the completion of PATH-1 Guide.

Event 10: Phase A isolation will not complete due to relay failure for the following containment isolation valves: 1 SP-948/1 SP-949, 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, 1 SP-16/1 SP-939, 1 SP-916/1 SP-918. In order to assure at least single valve containment Phase A isolation, the operator will have to close either 1 SP-948 or 1 SP-949 AND either 1 ED-94 or 1 ED-95. This will be accomplished during the completion of OMM-004 Attachment 4 which is directed by PATH-1 Guide.

The scenario may be terminated at the lead Evaluator's discretion following transition back to EPP-014.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events Continued:

Event 4: Loss of AH-2A can be inserted once letdown has been restored. This will result in annunciator ALB 027-8-2, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-2 LOW FLOW - OIL actuating.

The crew will have to establish the 'B' train of Containment Fan Coolers lAW OP-169, Containment Cooling and Ventilation. The SRO will evaluate Tech Spec 3.6.2.3, Containment Systems - Containment Cooling System.

Event 5: Power Range Channel N-43 fails high once the 'B' train of Containment Fan Coolers has been placed in service. This will cause rods to start stepping in and the crew should enter AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System. The crew should perform the immediate actions of AOP-001, placing Rod Control in MANUAL to stop rod motion. Follow up actions of AOP-001 will be performed in order to restore rod withdrawal capability. The SRO will evaluate Tech. Spec 3.3.1 for any impact due to the failed instrument.

Event 6: Main Steam Line Break outside of Containment is initiated once rod withdrawal capability has been restored. The crew will trip the reactor, initiate SI and enter PATH-1.

Event 7: Automatic Main Steam Isolation does not occur, and the crew will attempt to close the MSIVs at the MCB. The MSIVs will fail to close manually requiring direction to plant operators to isolate air to the MSIVs. The crew will transition from PATH-1 to EPP-014 and then to EPP-015 due to uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs. Once in EPP-015, the 'A' and 'C' MSIVs will be closed locally and the crew will transition back to EPP-014.

Event 8: The AFW Auto Isolation for the 'B' SG will not occur and the crew will have to manually isolate AFW flow to the 'B' Steam Generator.

Event 9: The 'B' RHR pump will trip immediately after it starts and cannot be restarted. The 'A' RHR pump will fail to start automatically from the 'A' Sequencer. The 'A' RHR pump can be started by the operator. This will be accomplished during the completion of PATH-1 Guide.

Event 10: Phase A isolation will not complete due to relay failure for the following containment isolation valves: 1 SP-948/1 SP-949, 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, 1 SP-16/1 SP-939, 1 SP-916/1 SP-918. In order to assure at least single valve containment Phase A isolation, the operator will have to close either 1 SP-948 or 1 SP-949 AND either 1 ED-94 or 1 ED-95. This will be accomplished during the completion of OMM-004 Attachment 4 which is directed by PATH-1 Guide.

The scenario may be terminated at the lead Evaluator's discretion following transition back to EPP-014.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for raising power to >90%

Provide a copy of GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) signed off up to and including step 138.c of section 5.0.

Provide a copy of OP-130.01 section 8.5 and 8.6.

Provide a copy of OP-136 section 5.1.

Provide a copy of OP-153.02 section 8.6 and 8.7.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

IC-11, MOL, 90 % power, started up 9 hrs ago from Rx Trip 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> ago Place CIT on the 'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump and take switch to STOP Place 'B' Boric Acid Transfer Pump switch to AUTO and green protected train placard Set potentiometers as follows: FK-114: 7.50 FK-113: 3.54 Protected equipment placards for TDAFP (per OMM-001 Att. 16) o

'A-SA' MDAFP - Orange placard o

'B-SA' MDAFP - Green placard o

'A' Startup Transformer brk 52-2 and 52-3 Orange placards o

'B' Startup Transformer brk 52-13 and 52-14 Green placards Hang CITs on 1 MS-70, 1 MS-72 and Trip and Throttle Valve 1 MS-T Place RED bars on ALB 01-7-5, ALB 017-7-4 Place BLUE bar on ALB 23-2-13 Hang restricted access signs on all 3 swing gates PRE-LOAD:

TDAFW Pump OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device1 MS-70 and 72 breakers open and Trip and Throttle valve tripped (irf mss034 OPEN, irf mss035 OPEN, imf cfc01c true)

'A' Boric Acid Pump OOS for motor replacement (idi xa2i174 STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g OFF)

Failure of Auto AFW Block on SG "B" (imf zrpk616a (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk616b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS)

Phase A failure of 1 SP-949/1 SP-949, 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, 1 SP-16/1 SP-939, 1 SP-916/1 SP-918 (imf zrpk630a (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk630b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS)

'A' RHR pump fails to start from the sequencer (imf zdsq:52a)

"B" RHR pump trips when it starts (imf rhr01 b)

MSIVs fail to close (imf mss05a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00)2, imf mss05b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00)2, imf mss05c (n 00:00:00 00:00:00)2)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for raising power to >90%

Provide a copy of GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) signed off up to and including step 138.c of section 5.0.

Provide a copy of OP-130.01 section 8.5 and 8.6.

Provide a copy of OP-136 section 5.1.

Provide a copy of OP-153.02 section 8.6 and 8.7.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

IC-11, MOL, 90 % power, started up 9 hrs ago from Rx Trip 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> ago Place CIT on the 'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump and take switch to STOP Place 'B' Boric Acid Transfer Pump switch to AUTO and green protected train placard Set potentiometers as follows: FK-114: 7.50 FK-113: 3.54 Protected equipment placards for TDAFP (per OMM-001 Att. 16) o

'A-SA' MDAFP - Orange placard o

'B-SA' MDAFP - Green placard o

'A' Startup Transformer brk 52-2 and 52-3 Orange placards o

'B' Startup Transformer brk 52-13 and 52-14 Green placards Hang CITs on 1 MS-70, 1 MS-72 and Trip and Throttle Valve 1 MS-T Place RED bars on ALB 01-7-5, ALB 017-7-4 Place BLUE bar on ALB 23-2-13 Hang restricted access signs on all 3 swing gates PRE-LOAD:

TDAFW Pump OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device1 MS-70 and 72 breakers open and Trip and Throttle valve tripped (irf mss034 OPEN, irf mss035 OPEN, imf cfc01c true)

'A' Boric Acid Pump OOS for motor replacement (idi xa2i174 STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g OFF)

Failure of Auto AFW Block on SG "B" (imf zrpk616a (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk616b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS)

Phase A failure of 1 SP-949/1 SP-949, 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, 1 SP-16/1 SP-939, 1 SP-916/1 SP-918 (imf zrpk630a (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS, imf zrpk630b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS)

'A' RHR pump fails to start from the sequencer (imf zdsq:52a)

"B" RHR pump trips when it starts (imf rhr01 b)

MSIVs fail to close (imf mss05a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00)2, imf mss05b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00)2, imf mss05c (n 00:00:00 00:00:00)2)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline TRIGGERS:

ET-2: TRG= 2 imf TE:575A 111.98:20 TRG= 2 imf TE:575B 111.2 8:30 TRG= 2 imf TE:575C 112.3 8: 1 0 Form ES-O-1 Main Transformer High Temperature AOP-035 entry - MTF winding temp heatup from start of 7rC ET-3: cvc29a (300:00:0000:00:00) true CSIP Pump ~' Shaft Shear ET-4: imf hva01b (400:00:0000:00:00) true Containment Fan Cooler AH-2 A-SA trip ET-5: imf nis07e (5 00:00:00 00:00:00)200.0 00:00:00 Power Range Channel N-43 fails HI ET -6: imf mss11 (6 00:00:00 00:00:00)4e+006 00:01 :00 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment size to prevent RED or ORANGE on Integrity ET -7: TRG= 7 dmf mss05a, TRG= 7 dmf mss05c 30 Allows closure of MSIV~' and 'c' ONL Y AFTER CREW IS IN EPP-015 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Scenario Outline TRIGGERS:

ET-2: TRG= 2 imf TE:575A 111.98:20 TRG= 2 imf TE:575B 111.2 8:30 TRG= 2 imf TE:575C 112.3 8: 1 0 Form ES-O-1 Main Transformer High Temperature AOP-035 entry - MTF winding temp heatup from start of 7rC ET-3: cvc29a (300:00:0000:00:00) true CSIP Pump ~' Shaft Shear ET-4: imf hva01b (400:00:0000:00:00) true Containment Fan Cooler AH-2 A-SA trip ET-5: imf nis07e (5 00:00:00 00:00:00)200.0 00:00:00 Power Range Channel N-43 fails HI ET -6: imf mss11 (6 00:00:00 00:00:00)4e+006 00:01 :00 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment size to prevent RED or ORANGE on Integrity ET -7: TRG= 7 dmf mss05a, TRG= 7 dmf mss05c 30 Allows closure of MSIV~' and 'c' ONL Y AFTER CREW IS IN EPP-015 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CAEP

'Description of 2009B NRC Exam Scenario 3 CAEP Reset to IC-11

, TDAFW Pump is OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device

, Pump has been OOS for 62 total hours and is expected back within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

, Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, HSD following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

! Hang CIT on both MS-70 and 72 then place protected train placards per OMM-001 irf mss034 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN irf mss035 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN

! Trip the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfw01c (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true

! A BA Pump OOS for motor replacement place MCB switch to STOP

, Hang CIT on CB Switch and place the B BA Pump MCB switch to AUTO, protect B BA pump switch idi xa2i174 (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)OFF

, Event 1: Crew performs power escalation to 100% power lAW GP-005 Normal-ALL Reactivity - ALL

, Event 2: Main Transformer High Temperature AOP-035 entry - MTF winding temp heatup from start of 77°C

, Annunciator ALB-22 9-5 Comp Alarm Elect Dist Systems will come in during temp increase

! Sim Operator can view heatup using ERFIS plot GO AOP-035 Component - BOP TRG= 2 imf TE:575A 111.9 8:20 TRG= 2 imf TE:575B 111.2 8:30 TRG= 2 imf TE:575C 112.3 8: 1 0

, Event 3: CSI P "A" Shaft Shear requires entry to AOP-018 Component - RO Tech Spec - SRO imf cvc29a (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) true

! Event 4: Containment Fan Cooler AH-2 A-SA trip Component - BOP Tech Spec - SRO imf hva01b (400:00:0000:00:00) true Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CAEP

'Description of 2009B NRC Exam Scenario 3 CAEP Reset to IC-11

, TDAFW Pump is OOS due to damaged overspeed trip device

, Pump has been OOS for 62 total hours and is expected back within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

, Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, HSD following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

! Hang CIT on both MS-70 and 72 then place protected train placards per OMM-001 irf mss034 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN irf mss035 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN

! Trip the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfw01c (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true

! A BA Pump OOS for motor replacement place MCB switch to STOP

, Hang CIT on CB Switch and place the B BA Pump MCB switch to AUTO, protect B BA pump switch idi xa2i174 (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)OFF

, Event 1: Crew performs power escalation to 100% power lAW GP-005 Normal-ALL Reactivity - ALL

, Event 2: Main Transformer High Temperature AOP-035 entry - MTF winding temp heatup from start of 77°C

, Annunciator ALB-22 9-5 Comp Alarm Elect Dist Systems will come in during temp increase

! Sim Operator can view heatup using ERFIS plot GO AOP-035 Component - BOP TRG= 2 imf TE:575A 111.9 8:20 TRG= 2 imf TE:575B 111.2 8:30 TRG= 2 imf TE:575C 112.3 8: 1 0

, Event 3: CSI P "A" Shaft Shear requires entry to AOP-018 Component - RO Tech Spec - SRO imf cvc29a (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) true

! Event 4: Containment Fan Cooler AH-2 A-SA trip Component - BOP Tech Spec - SRO imf hva01b (400:00:0000:00:00) true Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline

! Event 5: Power Range Channel N-43 fails HI Instrument - RO Tech Spec - SRO imf nis07e (5 00:00:00 00:00:00)200.0 00:00:00 Form ES-D-1

! Event 6: Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment size to prevent receiving a RED or ORANGE condition on Integrity Major - ALL imf mss11 (6 00:00:00 00:00:00)4e+006 00:01 :00 400000

! MSIV's fail to close (preloaded) imf mss05a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00)2 imf mss05b (n 00:00:0000:00:00)2 imf mss05c (n 00:00:00 00:00:00)2

! Event 7: MSIV "A" and "C" close - NOTE: ONLY AFTER CREW HAS ENTERED EPP-015

! NOTE: "C" MSIV will close 30 seconds after "A" MSIV TRG= 7 dmf mss05a TRG= 7 dmf mss05c 0:30

! Event 8: Failure of Auto AFW Block on SG "B" (preloaded)

Instrument - RO imf zrpk616a (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk616b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS

! Event 9: "A" RHR Pump fails to start from sequencer (preloaded)

Component - RO imf zdsq2:52a (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS

! Event 9 continued: "B" RHR Pump Trips when it autostarts imf RHR01B

! Event 10: Phase A failure of 1 SP-948/1 SP-949, 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, 1 SP-16/1 SP-939, 1 SP-916/1 SP-918 (preloaded)

Instrument - BOP imf zrpk630a (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk630b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline

! Event 5: Power Range Channel N-43 fails HI Instrument - RO Tech Spec - SRO imf nis07e (5 00:00:00 00:00:00)200.0 00:00:00 Form ES-D-1

! Event 6: Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment size to prevent receiving a RED or ORANGE condition on Integrity Major - ALL imf mss11 (6 00:00:00 00:00:00)4e+006 00:01 :00 400000

! MSIV's fail to close (preloaded) imf mss05a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00)2 imf mss05b (n 00:00:0000:00:00)2 imf mss05c (n 00:00:00 00:00:00)2

! Event 7: MSIV "A" and "C" close - NOTE: ONLY AFTER CREW HAS ENTERED EPP-015

! NOTE: "C" MSIV will close 30 seconds after "A" MSIV TRG= 7 dmf mss05a TRG= 7 dmf mss05c 0:30

! Event 8: Failure of Auto AFW Block on SG "B" (preloaded)

Instrument - RO imf zrpk616a (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk616b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS

! Event 9: "A" RHR Pump fails to start from sequencer (preloaded)

Component - RO imf zdsq2:52a (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS

! Event 9 continued: "B" RHR Pump Trips when it autostarts imf RHR01B

! Event 10: Phase A failure of 1 SP-948/1 SP-949, 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, 1 SP-16/1 SP-939, 1 SP-916/1 SP-918 (preloaded)

Instrument - BOP imf zrpk630a (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk630b (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)FAIL_ASIS Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

--L Event #

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Page

§.

of 46 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior LEAD EVALUATOR:

When the evaluating team has completed their evaluation of the power change initiate Event 2 "Main Transformer High temperature". Event 2 can be triggered -5 minutes early because it will take -7 minutes before the alarms come in.

SRO Provides direction per GP-005, Step 138.d CONTINUE the load increase by depressing the GO BOP pushbutton.

Monitors turbine and feedwater system response.

SRO Direct Radwaste Control Room to supply Auxiliary Steam from Extraction Steam per OP-130.01 Section 8.5 or Section 8.6.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Respond as Radwaste Operator but no simulator actions are required.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may elect to start a dilution before the power change is initiated.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

OP-107.01 section 5.3 is a "Continuous Use" procedure.

PROCEDURE NOTES:

If Blender Dilution (Alternate Dilution) Operation is for RCS temperature adjustments during steady state power operations, Steps 5.3.2.1 through 5.3.2.3 are not applicable. Operator experience will dictate the required amount of makeup water needed.

FIS-114 may be set for one gallon less than desired. A pressure transient caused by 1CS-151 shutting results in FIS-114 normally indicating one gallon more than actual flow but two gallons more would not be unexpected.

RO SETS FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

--L Event #

_1_

Page

§.

of 46 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior LEAD EVALUATOR:

When the evaluating team has completed their evaluation of the power change initiate Event 2 "Main Transformer High temperature". Event 2 can be triggered -5 minutes early because it will take -7 minutes before the alarms come in.

SRO Provides direction per GP-005, Step 138.d CONTINUE the load increase by depressing the GO BOP pushbutton.

Monitors turbine and feedwater system response.

SRO Direct Radwaste Control Room to supply Auxiliary Steam from Extraction Steam per OP-130.01 Section 8.5 or Section 8.6.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Respond as Radwaste Operator but no simulator actions are required.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The crew may elect to start a dilution before the power change is initiated.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

OP-107.01 section 5.3 is a "Continuous Use" procedure.

PROCEDURE NOTES:

If Blender Dilution (Alternate Dilution) Operation is for RCS temperature adjustments during steady state power operations, Steps 5.3.2.1 through 5.3.2.3 are not applicable. Operator experience will dictate the required amount of makeup water needed.

FIS-114 may be set for one gallon less than desired. A pressure transient caused by 1CS-151 shutting results in FIS-114 normally indicating one gallon more than actual flow but two gallons more would not be unexpected.

RO SETS FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

--L Event #

_1_

Page

~

of 46 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

Dilution of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase dilution rate of the RCS.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Setting RMUW flow controller for a desired flow rate greater than 90 gpm when performing a dilution in the normal dilute mode will result in a flow deviation alarm. The reduced flow in this configuration is due to the additional back pressure from the spray nozzles and letdown flow to the VCT.

SET total makeup flow as follows:

o IF performing DIL in Step 5.3.2.8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 gpm. (YES)

RO 0

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL OR the AL T DIL position.

PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

--L Event #

_1_

Page

~

of 46 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

Dilution of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase dilution rate of the RCS.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

Setting RMUW flow controller for a desired flow rate greater than 90 gpm when performing a dilution in the normal dilute mode will result in a flow deviation alarm. The reduced flow in this configuration is due to the additional back pressure from the spray nozzles and letdown flow to the VCT.

SET total makeup flow as follows:

o IF performing DIL in Step 5.3.2.8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 gpm. (YES)

RO 0

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL OR the AL T DIL position.

PROCEDURE NOTE: When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.

ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

~ Event #

_1_

Page 10 of 46 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and the RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm. (Already on due to power escalation)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

At least 10 minutes should be allowed for mixing before sample is taken.

Dilution (Alternate Dilution) may be manually stopped at any time by turning the control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily.

VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

Verify valve alignment and proper flow.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

~ Event #

_1_

Page 10 of 46 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and the RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm. (Already on due to power escalation)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

At least 10 minutes should be allowed for mixing before sample is taken.

Dilution (Alternate Dilution) may be manually stopped at any time by turning the control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily.

VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

Verify valve alignment and proper flow.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_1_

Page 11 of 46 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are stepping in to the desired height.

• PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.2

• VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

0 Is in the STOP position.

0 The green light is lit.

RO PLACE one BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP A-SA(B-SB) in AUTO. (A-SA is tagged out)

PLACE one BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP B-SB(A-SA) in STOP. (A-SA is tagged out)

PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

• START the makeup system as follows:

0 TU RN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

0 VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Event 2 can inserted -5 minutes early because it will take -7 minutes before any of the alarms annunciate.

Insert Event 2 when the evaluating team has completed their evaluation of Event 1 Event 2 "Main Transformer High temperature" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_1_

Page 11 of 46 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are stepping in to the desired height.

• PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.2

• VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

0 Is in the STOP position.

0 The green light is lit.

RO PLACE one BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP A-SA(B-SB) in AUTO. (A-SA is tagged out)

PLACE one BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP B-SB(A-SA) in STOP. (A-SA is tagged out)

PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

• START the makeup system as follows:

0 TU RN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

0 VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Event 2 can inserted -5 minutes early because it will take -7 minutes before any of the alarms annunciate.

Insert Event 2 when the evaluating team has completed their evaluation of Event 1 Event 2 "Main Transformer High temperature" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

....£..-

Page

---12. of 46 Event

Description:

Main Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG-2 "Main Transformer High Temperatures" (Note it will take.... 7 minutes before alarms actuate).

Indications Available:

ALB-022-9-5, Computer Alarm Elect Dist System ERFIS Points TE:575A1TE:575BITE:575C (Main Transformer Winding Temperatures)

Identifies annunciators and references APP-ALB-22-5-1 and APP-ALB-22-9-5

• CONFIRM alarm using:

0 On Gen Protective Relay Panel1A (1B), Gen Lockout G1A (G1 B) relay status 0

At Main Transformer Phase A, B, and C, alarm status light indications

• VERIFY Automatic Functions: (NONE actuated) 0 If a Fault Pressure Trip of the Main Transformers BOP occurs, a Generator lockout will occur, 0

resulting in the following 0

(1 )Breakers 52-7 and 52-9 will trip 0

(2)Exciter Field Breaker will trip 0

(3)Main Turbine will trip 0

(4)Plant loads will automatically transfer from the UAT to the SUT PERFORM Corrective Actions:

GO TO AOP-035, Main Transformer Trouble.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

....£..-

Page

---12. of 46 Event

Description:

Main Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG-2 "Main Transformer High Temperatures" (Note it will take.... 7 minutes before alarms actuate).

Indications Available:

ALB-022-9-5, Computer Alarm Elect Dist System ERFIS Points TE:575A1TE:575BITE:575C (Main Transformer Winding Temperatures)

Identifies annunciators and references APP-ALB-22-5-1 and APP-ALB-22-9-5

• CONFIRM alarm using:

0 On Gen Protective Relay Panel1A (1B), Gen Lockout G1A (G1 B) relay status 0

At Main Transformer Phase A, B, and C, alarm status light indications

• VERIFY Automatic Functions: (NONE actuated) 0 If a Fault Pressure Trip of the Main Transformers BOP occurs, a Generator lockout will occur, 0

resulting in the following 0

(1 )Breakers 52-7 and 52-9 will trip 0

(2)Exciter Field Breaker will trip 0

(3)Main Turbine will trip 0

(4)Plant loads will automatically transfer from the UAT to the SUT PERFORM Corrective Actions:

GO TO AOP-035, Main Transformer Trouble.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # ~ Event #

_2_

Page

~

of 46 Event

Description:

Main Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Place turbine in HOLD (pre-emptive action)

DISPATCH an operator to the Main Transformers with CREW, Main Transformer Trouble Local Actions COMMUNICATOR:

When dispatched to address Attachment 1, wait 2 minutes and then report the following information:

BOP All three windings have local Hot Spot Temperature alarms Local readings are approximately 111°C and stable All three transformer cooling banks are operating Unable to determine the cause of the higher temperatures MONITOR transformer parameters (ERFIS Display AOP-035):

Control Board Indication EI-521 Gen Phase A current EI-522 Gen Phase B current EI-523 Gen Phase C Current ERFIS Points TEE0575A Main Transformer Phase A Temp (Winding)

TEE0575B Main Transformer Phase B Temp (Winding)

TEE0575C Main Transformer Phase C Temp (Winding) lEE 1567A Gen Phase A Current IEE1567B Gen Phase B Current IEE1567C Gen Phase C Current TGA0902A Iso Phase A Bus Duct Temp Mn Xfmr TGA0902B Iso Phase B Bus Duct Temp Mn Xfmr TGA0902C Iso Phase C Bus Duct Temp Mn Xfmr Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # ~ Event #

_2_

Page

~

of 46 Event

Description:

Main Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Place turbine in HOLD (pre-emptive action)

DISPATCH an operator to the Main Transformers with CREW, Main Transformer Trouble Local Actions COMMUNICATOR:

When dispatched to address Attachment 1, wait 2 minutes and then report the following information:

BOP All three windings have local Hot Spot Temperature alarms Local readings are approximately 111°C and stable All three transformer cooling banks are operating Unable to determine the cause of the higher temperatures MONITOR transformer parameters (ERFIS Display AOP-035):

Control Board Indication EI-521 Gen Phase A current EI-522 Gen Phase B current EI-523 Gen Phase C Current ERFIS Points TEE0575A Main Transformer Phase A Temp (Winding)

TEE0575B Main Transformer Phase B Temp (Winding)

TEE0575C Main Transformer Phase C Temp (Winding) lEE 1567A Gen Phase A Current IEE1567B Gen Phase B Current IEE1567C Gen Phase C Current TGA0902A Iso Phase A Bus Duct Temp Mn Xfmr TGA0902B Iso Phase B Bus Duct Temp Mn Xfmr TGA0902C Iso Phase C Bus Duct Temp Mn Xfmr Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

~ Event #

_2_

Page....H. of 46 Event

Description:

Main Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior NOTI FY the following personnel of any problems with main transformers.

Responsible Engineer SRO Load Dispatcher (System Operator)

Plantrrransmission Activities Coordinator (PTAC)

Initiate Equipment Problem Checklist GO TO the applicable step: (7, Page 8)

PERFORM the following for transformer high temperatures:

(Note-Winding temperatures are >110°C and <120°C)

SRO GO TO the applicable substep for the highest temperatures reached: (Determines 24 hrs for time to unload transformer based on temperatures)

COMMUNICATOR:

Initiates Equipment Problem Checklist Contacts WCC for assistance If contacted as plant management, direct the crew to maintain current power level. Engineering has been contacted and will be evaluate the current conditions in order to provide a recommendation for plant response.

REMOVE transformers from service within 24-hours, as follows:

CHECK EITHER of the following temperature conditions exists: (YES) o Windings greater than or equal to 110°C (YES)

SRO 0

Top Oil greater than or equal to 90°C (NO)

EVALUATE using water spray on transformer coolers.

REDUCE load using GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operations to Hot Standby.

GO TO Step 9 to remove transformers from service within 24-hours from exceeding temperature limits.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

~ Event #

_2_

Page....H. of 46 Event

Description:

Main Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior NOTI FY the following personnel of any problems with main transformers.

Responsible Engineer SRO Load Dispatcher (System Operator)

Plantrrransmission Activities Coordinator (PTAC)

Initiate Equipment Problem Checklist GO TO the applicable step: (7, Page 8)

PERFORM the following for transformer high temperatures:

(Note-Winding temperatures are >110°C and <120°C)

SRO GO TO the applicable substep for the highest temperatures reached: (Determines 24 hrs for time to unload transformer based on temperatures)

COMMUNICATOR:

Initiates Equipment Problem Checklist Contacts WCC for assistance If contacted as plant management, direct the crew to maintain current power level. Engineering has been contacted and will be evaluate the current conditions in order to provide a recommendation for plant response.

REMOVE transformers from service within 24-hours, as follows:

CHECK EITHER of the following temperature conditions exists: (YES) o Windings greater than or equal to 110°C (YES)

SRO 0

Top Oil greater than or equal to 90°C (NO)

EVALUATE using water spray on transformer coolers.

REDUCE load using GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power Operations to Hot Standby.

GO TO Step 9 to remove transformers from service within 24-hours from exceeding temperature limits.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

...£...

Page

....1§. of 46 Event

Description:

Main Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior COMMUNICATOR:

If the crew directs water spray cooling for the" A" Main Transformer, inform them that you will contact System Engineering and get approval prior to use.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

After the crew has stabilized plant power from activities of Event 2, initiate Event 3 "CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

...£...

Page

....1§. of 46 Event

Description:

Main Transformer High Temperature Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior COMMUNICATOR:

If the crew directs water spray cooling for the" A" Main Transformer, inform them that you will contact System Engineering and get approval prior to use.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

After the crew has stabilized plant power from activities of Event 2, initiate Event 3 "CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

...;L.

Page 16 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG-3 "CSIP 'A' shaft shear" Indications Available:

ALB-06-1-1 CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER HIGH-LOW FLOW Immediate Action ALB-08-2-1 RCP SEAL WATER INJECTION LOW FLOW RESPONDS to alarms on ALB-06-1-1 and ALB-08-2-1.

REPORTS CSI P 'A' shaft shear (From MCB indications of RO no flow and pump still running with abnormal amps)

RO Takes MCB switch for 'A' CSIP to STOP and reports to CRS that 'A' CSIP is secured PERFORMS immediate actions.

CHECK ANY CSIP RUNNING. (YES but shaft sheared.

CSIP 'A' may have been preemptively secured if the shaft shear has been identified)

ISOLATE letdown by verifying the following valves SHUT:

o 1CS-7, 45 GPM Letdown Orifice A o

1 CS-8, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice B o

1CS-9, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice C REFER to PEP-11 0, Emergency Classification and Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry pOint X.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

...;L.

Page 16 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG-3 "CSIP 'A' shaft shear" Indications Available:

ALB-06-1-1 CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER HIGH-LOW FLOW Immediate Action ALB-08-2-1 RCP SEAL WATER INJECTION LOW FLOW RESPONDS to alarms on ALB-06-1-1 and ALB-08-2-1.

REPORTS CSI P 'A' shaft shear (From MCB indications of RO no flow and pump still running with abnormal amps)

RO Takes MCB switch for 'A' CSIP to STOP and reports to CRS that 'A' CSIP is secured PERFORMS immediate actions.

CHECK ANY CSIP RUNNING. (YES but shaft sheared.

CSIP 'A' may have been preemptively secured if the shaft shear has been identified)

ISOLATE letdown by verifying the following valves SHUT:

o 1CS-7, 45 GPM Letdown Orifice A o

1 CS-8, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice B o

1CS-9, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice C REFER to PEP-11 0, Emergency Classification and Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry pOint X.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_3_

Page 17 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior COMMUNICATOR:

The crew should dispatch AOs to investigate.

IF dispatched, wait 1-2 minutes then report that "the shaft is broken on the 'A' CSIP." Report as TB operator (if dispatched) that "there are no apparent problems at the breaker for 'A' CSIP."

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Minimum allowable flow for a CSIP is 60 gpm which is provided by normal miniflow during normal operation and alternate miniflow during safety injection. Maintaining CSIP flow greater than or equal to 60 gpm also satisfies this requirement.

EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate section:

SRO MALFUNCTION SECTION PAGE Loss of CCW and/or Seal Injection to 3.1 5

RCPs RO CHECK ALB-5-1-2A, RCP Thermal Bar HDR High Flow, alarm CLEAR. (YES)

SRO CHECK ALL RCPs operating within the limits of Attachment 1.

(YES)

• CHECK ALL RCPs RUNNING. (YES)

• CHECK the following NORMAL for ALL RCPs:

RO 0

CCW flow (YES) 0 Seal Injection flow (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_3_

Page 17 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior COMMUNICATOR:

The crew should dispatch AOs to investigate.

IF dispatched, wait 1-2 minutes then report that "the shaft is broken on the 'A' CSIP." Report as TB operator (if dispatched) that "there are no apparent problems at the breaker for 'A' CSIP."

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Minimum allowable flow for a CSIP is 60 gpm which is provided by normal miniflow during normal operation and alternate miniflow during safety injection. Maintaining CSIP flow greater than or equal to 60 gpm also satisfies this requirement.

EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate section:

SRO MALFUNCTION SECTION PAGE Loss of CCW and/or Seal Injection to 3.1 5

RCPs RO CHECK ALB-5-1-2A, RCP Thermal Bar HDR High Flow, alarm CLEAR. (YES)

SRO CHECK ALL RCPs operating within the limits of Attachment 1.

(YES)

• CHECK ALL RCPs RUNNING. (YES)

• CHECK the following NORMAL for ALL RCPs:

RO 0

CCW flow (YES) 0 Seal Injection flow (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page 18 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO RESTORE using the applicable attachment:

MALFUNCTION ATTACHMENT Loss of Seal Injection flow only (Page 32)

• CHECK at least one CSIP RUNNING. (NO)

PLACE controller FK-122.1, Charging Flow in MANUAL AND SHUT.

• SHUT HC-186.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow.

• VERIFY a suction path for the standby CSIP by performing the following:

0 VERIFY CSIP suction flowpath from VCT as follows:

VERIFY greater than 5% level is established RO in VCT. (YES)

VERIFY the following valves are OPEN:

• LCV-115C, VCT Outlet (1 CS-165)

(YES)

• LCV-115E, VCT Outlet (1CS-166)

(YES)

• START the standby CSIP. (CSIP 'B')

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The answer to 'CHECK seal injection flow LOST for less than 5 minutes' could be NO. If so, the crew will be directed to restore seal injection flow in accordance with Attachment 4 which will limit the cooldown rate of the seal inlet and pump radial bearings to 1°F/minute.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page 18 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO RESTORE using the applicable attachment:

MALFUNCTION ATTACHMENT Loss of Seal Injection flow only (Page 32)

• CHECK at least one CSIP RUNNING. (NO)

PLACE controller FK-122.1, Charging Flow in MANUAL AND SHUT.

• SHUT HC-186.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow.

• VERIFY a suction path for the standby CSIP by performing the following:

0 VERIFY CSIP suction flowpath from VCT as follows:

VERIFY greater than 5% level is established RO in VCT. (YES)

VERIFY the following valves are OPEN:

• LCV-115C, VCT Outlet (1 CS-165)

(YES)

• LCV-115E, VCT Outlet (1CS-166)

(YES)

• START the standby CSIP. (CSIP 'B')

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The answer to 'CHECK seal injection flow LOST for less than 5 minutes' could be NO. If so, the crew will be directed to restore seal injection flow in accordance with Attachment 4 which will limit the cooldown rate of the seal inlet and pump radial bearings to 1°F/minute.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_3_

Page 19 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

• CHECK seal injection flow LOST for less than 5 minutes.

(YES)

RO

• ADJUST HC-186.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow, to establish seal injection flow as necessary to maintain the following:

0 LESS than 31 gpm total flow to all RCPs 0

BETWEEN 8 and 13 gpm to all RCPs START CSI P room ventilation per OP-172, Reactor Auxiliary BOP Building HVAC System. (AH-9B)

Starts AH-9B RO RESTORE Charging and Letdown flow per OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control System.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The steps for evaluating restoration of letdown begin on page 19.

INITIATE action to determine and correct the cause of the loss of the CSIP.

SRO

• Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance.

• Directs AO to remove control power from 'A' CSIP BOOTH OPERATOR IF directed - Remove control power from the 'A' CSIP. Use remote function CVC047 to open knife switch for control power to the A CSIP.

COMMUNICATOR Report back after control power has been removed.

RO CHECK seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm has been established to all RCPs.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_3_

Page 19 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior

• CHECK seal injection flow LOST for less than 5 minutes.

(YES)

RO

• ADJUST HC-186.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow, to establish seal injection flow as necessary to maintain the following:

0 LESS than 31 gpm total flow to all RCPs 0

BETWEEN 8 and 13 gpm to all RCPs START CSI P room ventilation per OP-172, Reactor Auxiliary BOP Building HVAC System. (AH-9B)

Starts AH-9B RO RESTORE Charging and Letdown flow per OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control System.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The steps for evaluating restoration of letdown begin on page 19.

INITIATE action to determine and correct the cause of the loss of the CSIP.

SRO

• Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance.

• Directs AO to remove control power from 'A' CSIP BOOTH OPERATOR IF directed - Remove control power from the 'A' CSIP. Use remote function CVC047 to open knife switch for control power to the A CSIP.

COMMUNICATOR Report back after control power has been removed.

RO CHECK seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm has been established to all RCPs.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

---.l...

Event #

_3_

Page 20 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior WHEN seal injection flow has been established between 8 and 13 gpm, THEN PERFORM OST-1126, Reactor Coolant SRO Pump Seals Controlled Leakage Evaluation Monthly I nterval Modes 1-4. (Will not be completed before next event is initiated)

ENTERS TS:

3.1.2.2, Boron Injection Flowpaths, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore at least 2 boron injection flowpaths, or be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> SRO 3.1.2.4, CSIP's, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore at least 2 CSIPs, or be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore the inoperable subsystem to operable status, or be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

~,:-: ~;',

~~

~;.. ~~

~.

~~~~

~.~"~ I

~~~~.".~~ *

~ ** ~.i ':':.',.. ::;L7.~..

'.~ ~~.... ~~~ *. ~., 7'/~*') :).~/.~.. ;<./

I* ~..;~;" I~\\i ~Rq..;.~O!?'"1 07,S.~;~lhitj~tingNorrmaltetdQwn 5"

~~.,~ ~ ~

~ :':.

~~~~~~. '.';'..

c_c ". _.

_, ___,c. -

~.' -

• Verifies Initial Conditions:

0 Charging flow established RO 0

PRZ Level> 17%

0 CS-7, CS-8, CS-9 (Letdown Orifice Isolation valves)

SHUT PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If Charging flow was stopped or greatly reduced prior to letdown being secured, there is a possibility that the Letdown line contains voids due to insufficient cooling. This is a precursor to water hammer, and should be evaluated prior to initiating letdown flow.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

---.l...

Event #

_3_

Page 20 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior WHEN seal injection flow has been established between 8 and 13 gpm, THEN PERFORM OST-1126, Reactor Coolant SRO Pump Seals Controlled Leakage Evaluation Monthly I nterval Modes 1-4. (Will not be completed before next event is initiated)

ENTERS TS:

3.1.2.2, Boron Injection Flowpaths, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore at least 2 boron injection flowpaths, or be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> SRO 3.1.2.4, CSIP's, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore at least 2 CSIPs, or be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore the inoperable subsystem to operable status, or be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

~,:-: ~;',

~~

I.X

~~:

~. ~~~~ ** ~"~

~~'. ~.".~~~.. ~.. ~.i,~~~. ~ ~~~.".... ::;L7.~..

'.~ ~~.... ~~~ *. ~ *. 7'/~*') :/~{' ",

.. <'. ;.'~

~ "

i" 12, *RO*~.;.~O!?'"1 07,S.~;~lhitj~tingNorrmaltetdQwn :i>

~~.,~ ~ ~/:

F... ~

~.

c_c ". _.

_, ___,c. -

~.' -

• Verifies Initial Conditions:

0 Charging flow established RO 0

PRZ Level> 17%

0 CS-7, CS-8, CS-9 (Letdown Orifice Isolation valves)

SHUT PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If Charging flow was stopped or greatly reduced prior to letdown being secured, there is a possibility that the Letdown line contains voids due to insufficient cooling. This is a precursor to water hammer, and should be evaluated prior to initiating letdown flow.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page 21 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior VERIFY 1CC-337, TK-144 LTDN TEMPERATURE, controller is:

• in AUTO RO AND

• set for 110 to 120 of (4.0 to 4.7 on potentiometer) normal operation PROCEDURE NOTE:

PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE, 1CS-38, may have to be adjusted to control at lower pressures.

VERIFY 1CS-38 Controller, PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE, in MAN with output set at 50%.

VERI FY open the following Letdown Isolation Valves:

RO 1 CS-2, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-459 1CS-1, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-460 VERIFY open 1CS-11, LETDOWN ISOLATION.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page 21 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior VERIFY 1CC-337, TK-144 LTDN TEMPERATURE, controller is:

• in AUTO RO AND

• set for 110 to 120 of (4.0 to 4.7 on potentiometer) normal operation PROCEDURE NOTE:

PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE, 1CS-38, may have to be adjusted to control at lower pressures.

VERIFY 1CS-38 Controller, PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE, in MAN with output set at 50%.

VERI FY open the following Letdown Isolation Valves:

RO 1 CS-2, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-459 1CS-1, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-460 VERIFY open 1CS-11, LETDOWN ISOLATION.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page 22 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

The following table gives the minimum charging flow required to keep the regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when letdown is established:

Letdown Flow (to be established)

Minimum Charging Flow necessary when letdown is established 45gpm 20gpm 60gpm 26gpm 105 gpm 46gpm 120 gpm 53gpm I

I PROCEDURE NOTE:

If Pressurizer level is above the programmed level setpoint, charging flow should be adjusted to a point above the minimum required to prevent regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm but low enough to reduce pressurizer level.

I I

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page 22 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

The following table gives the minimum charging flow required to keep the regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when letdown is established:

Letdown Flow (to be established)

Minimum Charging Flow necessary when letdown is established 45gpm 20gpm 60gpm 26gpm 105 gpm 46gpm 120 gpm 53gpm I

I PROCEDURE NOTE:

If Pressurizer level is above the programmed level setpoint, charging flow should be adjusted to a point above the minimum required to prevent regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm but low enough to reduce pressurizer level.

I I

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_3_

Page 23 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• ADJUST controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, as required to:

0 Maintain normal pressurizer level program 0

Keep regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when the desired letdown orifice is placed in service.

• OPEN an Orifice Isolation Valve (1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1CS-9) for the orifice to be placed in service.

RO

• ADJUST 1 CS-38 position by adjusting PK-145.1 output as necessary to control LP L TDN Pressure (PI-145.1) at 340 to 360 psig, to prevent lifting the LP Letdown Relief.

• WHEN Letdown pressure has stabilized at 340 to 360 psig on PI-145.1, LP LTDN PRESS, THEN PERFORM the following:

0

a. ADJUST PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE setpoint to 58%

0

b. PLACE the controller in AUTO.

Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_3_

Page 23 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• ADJUST controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, as required to:

0 Maintain normal pressurizer level program 0

Keep regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when the desired letdown orifice is placed in service.

• OPEN an Orifice Isolation Valve (1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1CS-9) for the orifice to be placed in service.

RO

• ADJUST 1 CS-38 position by adjusting PK-145.1 output as necessary to control LP L TDN Pressure (PI-145.1) at 340 to 360 psig, to prevent lifting the LP Letdown Relief.

• WHEN Letdown pressure has stabilized at 340 to 360 psig on PI-145.1, LP LTDN PRESS, THEN PERFORM the following:

0

a. ADJUST PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE setpoint to 58%

0

b. PLACE the controller in AUTO.

Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page 24 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• VERI FY PK-145.1 L TDN PRESSU RE Controller maintains Letdown pressure stable at 340 to 360 psig.

• OPEN additional orifice isolation valves (1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1 CS-9) as required.

• ADJUST charging flow as necessary to:

0 prevent high temperature alarm (per table above) 0 maintain pressurizer programmed level.

• PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in MAN to cancel any integrated signal.

RO

• PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in AUTO.

• WHEN the following occurs:

0 Program pressurizer level is matching the current pressurizer level AND 0

Letdown and seal return are balanced with seal injection flow and charging flow.

• THEN place controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, in AUTO.

• COMPLETE Section 5.4.3. (Position Verification)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The SRO may address OWP-CS, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM. This OWP verifies status light box verification when CSIP

• A' is tagged out for maintenance and will not be implemented for this scenario.

Contacts WCC for EIR and support. Requests that either SRO control power or breaker is racked out on 'A' CSIP EVALUATOR NOTE:

IF the crew did not have the control power removed or the breaker racked out on 'A' CSIP, when the SI signal occurs later in the scenario the

• A' CSIP will restart.

After Letdown is restored initiate Event 4 "Containment Fan Cooler Trip" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page 24 of 46 Event

Description:

CSIP 'A' Shaft Shear Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• VERI FY PK-145.1 L TDN PRESSU RE Controller maintains Letdown pressure stable at 340 to 360 psig.

• OPEN additional orifice isolation valves (1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1 CS-9) as required.

• ADJUST charging flow as necessary to:

0 prevent high temperature alarm (per table above) 0 maintain pressurizer programmed level.

• PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in MAN to cancel any integrated signal.

RO

• PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in AUTO.

• WHEN the following occurs:

0 Program pressurizer level is matching the current pressurizer level AND 0

Letdown and seal return are balanced with seal injection flow and charging flow.

• THEN place controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, in AUTO.

• COMPLETE Section 5.4.3. (Position Verification)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The SRO may address OWP-CS, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM. This OWP verifies status light box verification when CSIP

• A' is tagged out for maintenance and will not be implemented for this scenario.

Contacts WCC for EIR and support. Requests that either SRO control power or breaker is racked out on 'A' CSIP EVALUATOR NOTE:

IF the crew did not have the control power removed or the breaker racked out on 'A' CSIP, when the SI signal occurs later in the scenario the

• A' CSIP will restart.

After Letdown is restored initiate Event 4 "Containment Fan Cooler Trip" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event # -.i.

Page 25 of 46 Event

Description:

Containment Fan Cooler (AH-2 A-SAl Trips Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by lead evaluator, Actuate TRG-4 "Containment Fan Cooler Trip AH-2A trips" Indications Available:

ALB-027-7-2 CONTAIMENT FAN COOLERS AH-2 LOW FLOW-OIL ALB-01-6-5 ESF SYS TRN A BYPASSED OR INOPERABLE RESPONDS to alarm on ALB-027-7-2 and ALB-01-6-5 BOP

• Refers to annunciator response CONFIRM alarm using:

• AH-2 fans running indication BOP

• AH-2 fan trouble indication

• Damper position indication VERIFY Automatic Functions:

Fans trip on overload. (YES)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

• CHECK the fan status indication.

• IF the running fan has tripped, THEN START standby containment fan per OP-169, Containment Cooling and Ventilation.

BOP

• CHECK proper damper alignment per OP-169, Containment Cooling and Ventilation.

DISPATCH an operator to check the status of the following breakers:

0 1A22-SA-2A, AH-2 (1A-SA) CNMT Fan Cooler Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event # -.i.

Page 25 of 46 Event

Description:

Containment Fan Cooler (AH-2 A-SAl Trips Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by lead evaluator, Actuate TRG-4 "Containment Fan Cooler Trip AH-2A trips" Indications Available:

ALB-027-7-2 CONTAIMENT FAN COOLERS AH-2 LOW FLOW-OIL ALB-01-6-5 ESF SYS TRN A BYPASSED OR INOPERABLE RESPONDS to alarm on ALB-027-7-2 and ALB-01-6-5 BOP

• Refers to annunciator response CONFIRM alarm using:

• AH-2 fans running indication BOP

• AH-2 fan trouble indication

• Damper position indication VERIFY Automatic Functions:

Fans trip on overload. (YES)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

• CHECK the fan status indication.

• IF the running fan has tripped, THEN START standby containment fan per OP-169, Containment Cooling and Ventilation.

BOP

• CHECK proper damper alignment per OP-169, Containment Cooling and Ventilation.

DISPATCH an operator to check the status of the following breakers:

0 1A22-SA-2A, AH-2 (1A-SA) CNMT Fan Cooler Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event # --+/-.

Page 26 of 46 Event

Description:

Containment Fan Cooler (AH-2 A-SAl Trips Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior COMMUNICATOR:

When dispatched as an AO to investigate fan breakers, approximately 2 to 3 minutes later report there is an overcurrent trip condition on breaker 1 A22-SA-1 A, AH-2 (1 A-SA) CNMT Fan Cooler.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The RO may need to borate while holding power.

Direct BOP to start the B train of containment fan cooler using SRO OP-169, Containment Cooling and Ventilation AND select AH-2 1 B-SA as the lead fan.

Verifies Initial Conditions met BOP

• Place the control switches for both fans in each Containment cooler unit AH-2 A-SA (AH-1 B-SB) and AH-2 A-SA to LO-SPD.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Steps 5.1.2.2 and 5.1.2.3 must be done without delay.

The fan should not be allowed to coast down before being started in fast speed.

Place the control switch for the fans started in Step 5.1.2.1 BOP to STOP.

Place the control switches for the fans stopped in Step 5.1.2.2 to HI-SPD.

• Place the control switch for each fan to be removed from BOP service to STOP.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event # --+/-.

Page 26 of 46 Event

Description:

Containment Fan Cooler (AH-2 A-SAl Trips Time I Position

.1 Applicanfs Actions or Behavior COMMUNICATOR:

When dispatched as an AO to investigate fan breakers, approximately 2 to 3 minutes later report there is an overcurrent trip condition on breaker 1 A22-SA-1 A, AH-2 (1 A-SA) CNMT Fan Cooler.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The RO may need to borate while holding power.

Direct BOP to start the B train of containment fan cooler using SRO OP-169, Containment Cooling and Ventilation AND select AH-2 1 B-SA as the lead fan.

Verifies Initial Conditions met BOP

• Place the control switches for both fans in each Containment cooler unit AH-2 A-SA (AH-1 B-SB) and AH-2 A-SA to LO-SPD.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Steps 5.1.2.2 and 5.1.2.3 must be done without delay.

The fan should not be allowed to coast down before being started in fast speed.

Place the control switch for the fans started in Step 5.1.2.1 BOP to STOP.

Place the control switches for the fans stopped in Step 5.1.2.2 to HI-SPD.

• Place the control switch for each fan to be removed from BOP service to STOP.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # -.L Event # -+/-..

Page 27 of 46 Event

Description:

Containment Fan Cooler (AH-2 A-SA) Trips Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Evaluate Tech Spec 3.6.2.3.a Restore to operability in 7 days, or then be in Hot Standby in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> SRO o This LCO is eliminated once the 'B' train fans are selected for LEAD.

Initiates Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance EVALUATOR NOTE:

After '8' Train Containment Fan Coolers have been placed in service, initiate Event 5 "PR NIS Channel 43 Fails High" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario # -.L Event # -+/-..

Page 27 of 46 Event

Description:

Containment Fan Cooler (AH-2 A-SA) Trips Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Evaluate Tech Spec 3.6.2.3.a Restore to operability in 7 days, or then be in Hot Standby in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> SRO o This LCO is eliminated once the 'B' train fans are selected for LEAD.

Initiates Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance EVALUATOR NOTE:

After '8' Train Containment Fan Coolers have been placed in service, initiate Event 5 "PR NIS Channel 43 Fails High" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page Event

Description:

PR N43 Fails High Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG-5 "PR NIS Channel 43 fails High" Indications Available:

Uncontrolled rod motion/bistable trips N-43 fails to 120%

ALB-13-4-1, POWER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SP ALERT ALB-13-4-2, POWER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RATE ALERT ALB-13-4-5, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION ALB-13-5-1, OVERPOWER ROD STOP ALB-10-6-5A, OITEMPLlT BLK ROD C-3 ALERT ALB-10-6-5A 6-5B OITEMP LlT ALERT RO RESPONDS to alarms/uncontrolled rod motion.

• >~*}~t***,~"

\\;f§~(~(i.

,<,:,' *:f*.:-:.

.*~N~*~B~*~~~:~ir~6i$*a£tip~~.C>t>~c?I?-9~1:**.*{.*.**... X<..**... 5.

...: **.. \\~

RO PERFORMS immediate actions.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Rods cannot be moved out until AOP actions clear the overpower rod stop. A TS declaration is not required for this event.

Immediate CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped.

Action RO (YES)

Immediate RO POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN.

Action Immediate RO CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES)

Action SRO PROCEEDS to Section 3.2.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page Event

Description:

PR N43 Fails High Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG-5 "PR NIS Channel 43 fails High" Indications Available:

Uncontrolled rod motion/bistable trips N-43 fails to 120%

ALB-13-4-1, POWER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SP ALERT ALB-13-4-2, POWER RANGE HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RATE ALERT ALB-13-4-5, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION ALB-13-5-1, OVERPOWER ROD STOP ALB-10-6-5A, OITEMPLlT BLK ROD C-3 ALERT ALB-10-6-5A 6-5B OITEMP LlT ALERT RO RESPONDS to alarms/uncontrolled rod motion.

>?{~......,

• .*~* *. **~~t.*).*** \\'.§~(~(

<,'.{.)

....*~N~*~B~*~~~:~ir~6i$*a£tip~~.C>t~~c?I?-9~1:.{.*.** ;.

.(.

,..:.w."....

RO PERFORMS immediate actions.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

Rods cannot be moved out until AOP actions clear the overpower rod stop. A TS declaration is not required for this event.

Immediate CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped.

Action RO (YES)

Immediate RO POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN.

Action Immediate RO CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES)

Action SRO PROCEEDS to Section 3.2.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_5_

Page 29 of 46 Event

Description:

PR N43 Fails High Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior CHECK that instrument channel failure has NOT OCCURRED by observing the following:

RCS Tavg (YES)

RO RCS Tref (yES)

POWER Range NI channels (NO)

TURBINE first stage pressure PERFORM the following:

IF a power supply is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. (NO)

IF an individual instrument failed, THEN MAINTAIN SRO manual rod control until corrective action is complete.

(YES)

IF a Power Range NI Channel failed, THEN PLACE the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer. (YES)

Manually OPERATE affected control bank to restore the following:

Equilibrium power and temperature conditions Rods above the insertion limits of Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 and RO PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.

VERIFY proper operation of the following: (YES)

CVCS demineralizers BTRS Reactor Makeup Control System Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_5_

Page 29 of 46 Event

Description:

PR N43 Fails High Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior CHECK that instrument channel failure has NOT OCCURRED by observing the following:

RCS Tavg (YES)

RO RCS Tref (yES)

POWER Range NI channels (NO)

TURBINE first stage pressure PERFORM the following:

IF a power supply is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. (NO)

IF an individual instrument failed, THEN MAINTAIN SRO manual rod control until corrective action is complete.

(YES)

IF a Power Range NI Channel failed, THEN PLACE the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer. (YES)

Manually OPERATE affected control bank to restore the following:

Equilibrium power and temperature conditions Rods above the insertion limits of Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 and RO PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.

VERIFY proper operation of the following: (YES)

CVCS demineralizers BTRS Reactor Makeup Control System Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

.....L.

Event #

_5_

Page Event

Description:

PR N43 Fails High Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior SRO CHECK that this section was entered due to control banks MOVING OUT. (NO)

GO TO Step 6.

CHECK that NEITHER of the following OCCURRED:

RO Unexplained RCS boration (NO)

Unplanned RCS dilution (NO)

CHECK that an automatic Rod Control malfunction OCCURRED. (NO)

GO TO Step 9.

EXIT this procedure.

Initiate Equipment Problem Checklist and contact WCC for assistance.

Tech Spec Evaluation:

0 3.3.1 for N-43, Action 2, inoperable channel SRO placed in tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 0

3.3.1 for OT flT, Action 6, inoperable channel placed in tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 0

3.2.1 for AFD limits, restore AFD within 15 minutes or reduce thermal power to < 50%

within 30 minutes (Not applicable AFD is operable, AFD monitor is inoperable) 0 3.2.4 for QPTR, calculate QPTR at least once per hour per specification 4.2.4.2 EVALUATOR NOTE:

OWP-RP-25 for N-43 failure is not required for completion prior to initiating the next event.

Once actions for failed N-43 have been completed, initiate Event 6 "Main Steam Line Break Outside of Containment" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

.....L.

Event #

_5_

Page Event

Description:

PR N43 Fails High Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior SRO CHECK that this section was entered due to control banks MOVING OUT. (NO)

GO TO Step 6.

CHECK that NEITHER of the following OCCURRED:

RO Unexplained RCS boration (NO)

Unplanned RCS dilution (NO)

CHECK that an automatic Rod Control malfunction OCCURRED. (NO)

GO TO Step 9.

EXIT this procedure.

Initiate Equipment Problem Checklist and contact WCC for assistance.

Tech Spec Evaluation:

0 3.3.1 for N-43, Action 2, inoperable channel SRO placed in tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 0

3.3.1 for OT flT, Action 6, inoperable channel placed in tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 0

3.2.1 for AFD limits, restore AFD within 15 minutes or reduce thermal power to < 50%

within 30 minutes (Not applicable AFD is operable, AFD monitor is inoperable) 0 3.2.4 for QPTR, calculate QPTR at least once per hour per specification 4.2.4.2 EVALUATOR NOTE:

OWP-RP-25 for N-43 failure is not required for completion prior to initiating the next event.

Once actions for failed N-43 have been completed, initiate Event 6 "Main Steam Line Break Outside of Containment" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

..L Event #

_6_

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

RO RO When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG-6 "MS Line Break Outside of CNMT" ALB-09-3-3, PRZ CONT LOW PRESS AND HEATERS ON ALB-09-5-1 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS Increasing Reactor power RCS pressure decreasing Charging flow increasing SG nr~'~~1 Recommends Reactor Trip, Manually Trips Reactor and manually SI (with no objection from CRS)

Manually trips the reactor PERFORM immediate actions of PATH-1.

VERIFY Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

CHECK for any of the following:

RO Trip breakers RT A and BY A OPEN (YES)

Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

..L Event #

_6_

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

RO RO When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Actuate TRG-6 "MS Line Break Outside of CNMT" ALB-09-3-3, PRZ CONT LOW PRESS AND HEATERS ON ALB-09-5-1 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS Increasing Reactor power RCS pressure decreasing Charging flow increasing SG ures InUIAriinn Recommends Reactor Trip, Manually Trips Reactor and manually SI (with no objection from CRS)

Manually trips the reactor PERFORM immediate actions of PATH-1.

VERIFY Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

CHECK for any of the following:

RO Trip breakers RT A and BY A OPEN (YES)

Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

~ Event #

_6_

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Une Break Outside Containment Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior VERI FY Turbine Trip:

CHECK for any of the following:

• ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP

• ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses 1 A-SA and 1 B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's (YES, off-site power)

CHECK SI Actuation:

CHECK for any of the following - LIT: (YES or NO, SRO may direct initiation of SI following recognition of steam break)

SI Actuated bypass permissive light RO ALB-11-2-2 ALB-11-5-1 ALB-11-5-3 ALB-12-1-4 SI actuation - REQUIRED (YES)

Actuate SI (if not preemptively actuated earlier)

Initiate monitoring of monitoring the Critical Safety Function Trees SRO

• Informs Shift Superintendent to evaluate EAL Network Using Entry Point X.

Foldout A Applies EVALUATOR NOTE:

The crew should brief on the general foldout criteria.

The 'B' RHR pump trips when started. The 'A' RHR pump does not AUTO start from the sequencer and must be manually started.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

~ Event #

_6_

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Une Break Outside Containment Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior VERI FY Turbine Trip:

CHECK for any of the following:

• ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP

• ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses 1 A-SA and 1 B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's (YES, off-site power)

CHECK SI Actuation:

CHECK for any of the following - LIT: (YES or NO, SRO may direct initiation of SI following recognition of steam break)

SI Actuated bypass permissive light RO ALB-11-2-2 ALB-11-5-1 ALB-11-5-3 ALB-12-1-4 SI actuation - REQUIRED (YES)

Actuate SI (if not preemptively actuated earlier)

Initiate monitoring of monitoring the Critical Safety Function Trees SRO

• Informs Shift Superintendent to evaluate EAL Network Using Entry Point X.

Foldout A Applies EVALUATOR NOTE:

The crew should brief on the general foldout criteria.

The 'B' RHR pump trips when started. The 'A' RHR pump does not AUTO start from the sequencer and must be manually started.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page 33 of 46 Event

Description:

MSIV's Fail To Shut Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior VERIFY ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING. (NO).

RO Event #9 Identifies that there are no RHR pumps running CHECK SI Flow:

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RO RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG. (NO)

Directs TB AO -Place the A and B If A compressors to local control mode.

BOP Directs RAB AO - Locally unlock and turn on the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross connect valves: Refer to 1.

BOOTH OPERATOR: When contacted to place AlB air compressors in Local Control mode, run CAEP :\\air\\ACs_to_local.txt.

COMMUNICATOR:

When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors are running in local control mode.

BOOTH OPERATOR When contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for the COMMUNICATOR:

CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves, run CAEP :\\cvc\\path-1 att 6 csip suction valves power. txt.

When the CAEP is complete, report task to the MCR.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

~ Page 33 of 46 Event

Description:

MSIV's Fail To Shut Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior VERIFY ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING. (NO).

RO Event #9 Identifies that there are no RHR pumps running CHECK SI Flow:

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RO RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG. (NO)

Directs TB AO -Place the A and B If A compressors to local control mode.

BOP Directs RAB AO - Locally unlock and turn on the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross connect valves: Refer to 1.

BOOTH OPERATOR: When contacted to place AlB air compressors in Local Control mode, run CAEP :\\air\\ACs_to_local.txt.

COMMUNICATOR:

When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors are running in local control mode.

BOOTH OPERATOR When contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for the COMMUNICATOR:

CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves, run CAEP :\\cvc\\path-1 att 6 csip suction valves power. txt.

When the CAEP is complete, report task to the MCR.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

...1....

Event #

_7_

Page 34 of 46 Event

Description:

MSIV's Fail To Shut Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior CHECK Main Steam Isolation:

MAIN Steam isolation - ACTUATED. (YES)

BOP II Event #7 II VERIFY Main Steam Isolation Valves SHUT. (NO)

Attempts to close ALL MSIV's (MSIV's will not shut)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

...1....

Event #

_7_

Page 34 of 46 Event

Description:

MSIV's Fail To Shut Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior CHECK Main Steam Isolation:

MAIN Steam isolation - ACTUATED. (YES)

BOP II 1="l:IIn+ #7 II II VERIFY Main Steam Isolation Valves SHUT. (NO)

Attempts to close ALL MSIV's (MSIV's will not shut)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

10 Page Event

Description:

Phase A failure Time I Position I RD BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. (YES)

CHECK AFW Status:

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (yES)

SRO ASSIGNS BOP to periorm the following:

Control RCS Temperature:

Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

TABLE 1: RCS TEMPERATURE CONTROL GUIDELINES RO FOLLOWING AX TRIP Guidance is applicable until another procedure directs otherwise.

IF no RCPs running, THEN use wide range cold leg temperature.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

10 Page Event

Description:

Phase A failure Time I Position I RD BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. (YES)

CHECK AFW Status:

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (yES)

SRO ASSIGNS BOP to periorm the following:

Control RCS Temperature:

Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

TABLE 1: RCS TEMPERATURE CONTROL GUIDELINES RO FOLLOWING AX TRIP Guidance is applicable until another procedure directs otherwise.

IF no RCPs running, THEN use wide range cold leg temperature.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

...1....

Event #

-2..

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: The only action available to control ReS temperature is to limit AFW flow but a flow reduction to < 210 kpph should not be initiated until SG levels have recovered to at least 25% in one SG.

Check PRZ PORVs AND Spray Valves:

Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED (YES)

RO CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

CHECK PRZ PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES)

PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)

IDENTIFY any faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

BOP

• ANY SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

SRO Transitions to EPP-014 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

...1....

Event #

-2..

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE: The only action available to control ReS temperature is to limit AFW flow but a flow reduction to < 210 kpph should not be initiated until SG levels have recovered to at least 25% in one SG.

Check PRZ PORVs AND Spray Valves:

Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED (YES)

RO CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

CHECK PRZ PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES)

PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)

IDENTIFY any faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

BOP

• ANY SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

SRO Transitions to EPP-014 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_6_

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution: At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO Implements FRPs Check MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

BOP

a. Verify all MSIVs - SHUT (NO)

SRO direct the following actions to be taken outside the MCR:

Perform the following:

SRO Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 11A-814 (north of AH-191A-SA)

Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: 11A-1876 (located in corridor outside Verify all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (NO)

BOP Check Any SG NOT Faulted:

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 o

Any SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (NO)

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_6_

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Caution: At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO Implements FRPs Check MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

BOP

a. Verify all MSIVs - SHUT (NO)

SRO direct the following actions to be taken outside the MCR:

Perform the following:

SRO Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 11A-814 (north of AH-191A-SA)

Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: 11A-1876 (located in corridor outside Verify all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (NO)

BOP Check Any SG NOT Faulted:

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 o

Any SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (NO)

October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

.....L.

Event #

_6_

Page 38 of 46 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior SRO Foldout applies.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The EPP-015 Foldout criteria that may apply is:

EVALUATOR NOTE:

MINIMUM FEED FLOW IF level in any SG is less than 25% [40%], THEN maintain a minimum of 12.5 KPPH feed flow to that SG.

, B' SG MSIV will not close in this scenario. After the MSIVs for 'A' and 'C' SGs are closed, pressures will rise and meet EPP-014 transition criteria.

When appropriate, have simulator booth operator run Trigger 7 to close SG 'A' and 'C' MSIVs.

CHECK MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT (NO)

Perform the following: (Previously directed)

BOP Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 11A-814 (north of AH-19 1A-SA)

Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: 11A-1876 (located in corridor outside VERIFY all MSIV Bypass Valves - SHUT (YES)

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

IF the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, THEN maintain steam supply to the TDAFW pump from one SG. (N/A - under clearance)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

.....L.

Event #

_6_

Page 38 of 46 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior SRO Foldout applies.

EVALUATOR NOTE:

The EPP-015 Foldout criteria that may apply is:

EVALUATOR NOTE:

MINIMUM FEED FLOW IF level in any SG is less than 25% [40%], THEN maintain a minimum of 12.5 KPPH feed flow to that SG.

, B' SG MSIV will not close in this scenario. After the MSIVs for 'A' and 'C' SGs are closed, pressures will rise and meet EPP-014 transition criteria.

When appropriate, have simulator booth operator run Trigger 7 to close SG 'A' and 'C' MSIVs.

CHECK MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT (NO)

Perform the following: (Previously directed)

BOP Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 11A-814 (north of AH-19 1A-SA)

Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: 11A-1876 (located in corridor outside VERIFY all MSIV Bypass Valves - SHUT (YES)

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

IF the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, THEN maintain steam supply to the TDAFW pump from one SG. (N/A - under clearance)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_6_

Page 39 of 46 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE: IF local actions are required, attempts to isolate all boundaries of one SG should be completed prior to starting those for another SG.

CHECK Secondary Pressure Boundary for ALL SGs:

VERIFY SG PORVs - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

SHUT steam supply valves to TDAFW pump: (NO, tagged closed) o SG B: 1 MS-70 (Tagged) o SG C: 1 MS-72 (Tagged)

BOP VERI FY main steam drain isolations before MSIVs -

SHUT: (YES) o SG A: 1 MS-231 o

SG B: 1 MS-266 o

SG C: 1 MS-301 VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY Main Steam Analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE: AS SG pressure and steam flow decrease, RCS hot leg temperatures will eventually stabilize and may increase.

Adjusting feed flow and steam dump will control RCS hot leg temperatures.

CONTROL RCS Temperature:

RO CHECK RCS cooldown rate - LESS THAN 100°F/HR (NO)

Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_6_

Page 39 of 46 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE: IF local actions are required, attempts to isolate all boundaries of one SG should be completed prior to starting those for another SG.

CHECK Secondary Pressure Boundary for ALL SGs:

VERIFY SG PORVs - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

SHUT steam supply valves to TDAFW pump: (NO, tagged closed) o SG B: 1 MS-70 (Tagged) o SG C: 1 MS-72 (Tagged)

BOP VERI FY main steam drain isolations before MSIVs -

SHUT: (YES) o SG A: 1 MS-231 o

SG B: 1 MS-266 o

SG C: 1 MS-301 VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY Main Steam Analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE: AS SG pressure and steam flow decrease, RCS hot leg temperatures will eventually stabilize and may increase.

Adjusting feed flow and steam dump will control RCS hot leg temperatures.

CONTROL RCS Temperature:

RO CHECK RCS cooldown rate - LESS THAN 100°F/HR (NO)

Harris 20098 NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_6_

Page Event

Description:

Time I Position BOP CREW SRO RO Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Reduce feed flow to 12.5 KPPH to each SG.

Identifies RED Path on Heat Sink and transitions to FRP-H.1 Reads Caution prior to step 1 and determines that FRP-H.1 should not be performed Caution:

This procedure should NOT be performed if total feed flow capability of 210 KPPH is available AND total feed flow has been reduced due to operator action as directed by the EOPs.

EXITS FRP-H.1 and returns to EOP-EPP-015 Check RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING (YES/NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

_6_

Page Event

Description:

Time I Position BOP CREW SRO RO Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior Reduce feed flow to 12.5 KPPH to each SG.

Identifies RED Path on Heat Sink and transitions to FRP-H.1 Reads Caution prior to step 1 and determines that FRP-H.1 should not be performed Caution:

This procedure should NOT be performed if total feed flow capability of 210 KPPH is available AND total feed flow has been reduced due to operator action as directed by the EOPs.

EXITS FRP-H.1 and returns to EOP-EPP-015 Check RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING (YES/NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

.....2....

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE:

On your direction have the BOOTH OPERATOR actuate closure of 'A' and 'C' MSIV Several more EPP-015 steps are included in the scenario guide but EPP-014 transition criteria should be met shortly after MSIV 'A' and MSIV 'C' are closed.

BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed by Evaluator actuate TRG-7 "A & C MSIV closure" Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 GPM.

Check RCP Trip Criteria:

• Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES - 2 RCPs RO are running A and B)

Check all of the following:

• SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

• Check RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1400 PSIG (NO)

Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:

• Verify power to PORV block valves - AVAILABLE (YES)

• PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

RO

• GO TO Step 6f.

• Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

• IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

.....2....

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE:

On your direction have the BOOTH OPERATOR actuate closure of 'A' and 'C' MSIV Several more EPP-015 steps are included in the scenario guide but EPP-014 transition criteria should be met shortly after MSIV 'A' and MSIV 'C' are closed.

BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed by Evaluator actuate TRG-7 "A & C MSIV closure" Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 GPM.

Check RCP Trip Criteria:

• Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES - 2 RCPs RO are running A and B)

Check all of the following:

• SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

• Check RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1400 PSIG (NO)

Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:

• Verify power to PORV block valves - AVAILABLE (YES)

• PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

RO

• GO TO Step 6f.

• Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

• IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

.....;L.

Event #

_6_

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Une Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

~, <: ~"",

. Critic~K Tasl<~~~;***

BOP/SRO RO RO A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

Check Secondary Radiation:

Check for all of the following:

• Condenser vacuum pump effluent rad - NORMAL (YES)

• SG blowdown radiation - NORMAL (YES)

• Main steam line radiation - NORMAL (YES)

• SG activity sample - NORMAL (IF AVAILABLE) (N/A)

Check RHR Pump Status:

Ch~CKary~~t-n:rpurnPs;~<...*...* ~IN(3"l'f3~.pomp.if\\lO; puoiptripPf3d.onstarttA'pllfJlP~NO).;~

RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Check RHR pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

Reset SI.

Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-1 GUIDE,.)

Stop RHR pumps. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

.....;L.

Event #

_6_

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Une Break Outside Containment (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

~, <: ~"",

. Critic~K Tasl<~~~;***

BOP/SRO RO RO A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

Check Secondary Radiation:

Check for all of the following:

• Condenser vacuum pump effluent rad - NORMAL (YES)

• SG blowdown radiation - NORMAL (YES)

• Main steam line radiation - NORMAL (YES)

• SG activity sample - NORMAL (IF AVAILABLE) (N/A)

Check RHR Pump Status:

Ch~CKary~~t-n:rpurnPs;~<...*...* ~IN(3"l'f3~.pomp.if\\lO; puoiptripPf3d.onstarttA'pllfJlP~NO).;~

RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Check RHR pump suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

Reset SI.

Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-1 GUIDE,.)

Stop RHR pumps. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

~ Event #

_8_

Page Event

Description:

SG 'B' AFW Auto FW Isolation Failure Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

BOP CHECK MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT. (NO)

VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT. (YES)

CHECK Any SG NOT Faulted:

ANY SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING. (yES)

IDENTIFY Any Faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

ANY SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (YES-UB")

ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED.

(YES - UB")

ISOLATE Faulted SG(s):

VERIFY faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT. (YES)

VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

~ Event #

_8_

Page Event

Description:

SG 'B' AFW Auto FW Isolation Failure Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

BOP CHECK MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT. (NO)

VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT. (YES)

CHECK Any SG NOT Faulted:

ANY SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING. (yES)

IDENTIFY Any Faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

ANY SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (YES-UB")

ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED.

(YES - UB")

ISOLATE Faulted SG(s):

VERIFY faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT. (YES)

VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

§.

Page 44 of 46 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break (Continued)

Time I Position I BOP PROCEDURE NOTE:

SRO RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Shut faulted SG(s) to steam supply valve to TDAFW pump-SHUT.

SG B: 1 MS-70 (Tagged Shut)

VERIFY main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs-SHUT (yES)

VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT.

(YES)

VERIFY main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT.

(YES)

CHECK CST Level-GREATER THAN 10%. (YES)

A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

CHECK Secondary Radiation:

CHECK for all of the following:

SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

MAIN steamline radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

CHECK SG Levels:

ANY level - INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (NO)

CHECK if SI has been terminated:

SI flow-GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

§.

Page 44 of 46 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break (Continued)

Time I Position I BOP PROCEDURE NOTE:

SRO RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Shut faulted SG(s) to steam supply valve to TDAFW pump-SHUT.

SG B: 1 MS-70 (Tagged Shut)

VERIFY main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs-SHUT (yES)

VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT.

(YES)

VERIFY main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT.

(YES)

CHECK CST Level-GREATER THAN 10%. (YES)

A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

CHECK Secondary Radiation:

CHECK for all of the following:

SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

MAIN steamline radiation - NORMAL. (YES)

CHECK SG Levels:

ANY level - INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. (NO)

CHECK if SI has been terminated:

SI flow-GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

..2.....

Event #

2.

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior CHECK SI Termination Criteria:

CHECK Subcooling - GREATER THAN 10°F [40°F] - C (YES) 20°F [50°F] - M CHECK secondary heat sink by observing any of the following:

RO LEVEL in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES/NO)

TOTAL feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH. (YES)

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

PRZ level-GREATER THAN 10% [30%]. (YES)

RESET SI.

SRO CONTINUOUS ACTION: MANUALLY realign Safeguards Equipment following a loss of offsite power.

RO Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation Signals.

Restore Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment:

Open the following valves:

11A-819 RO 1SI-287 STOP all but ONE CSIP.

CHECK RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

..2.....

Event #

2.

Page Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior CHECK SI Termination Criteria:

CHECK Subcooling - GREATER THAN 10°F [40°F] - C (YES) 20°F [50°F] - M CHECK secondary heat sink by observing any of the following:

RO LEVEL in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES/NO)

TOTAL feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH. (YES)

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

PRZ level-GREATER THAN 10% [30%]. (YES)

RESET SI.

SRO CONTINUOUS ACTION: MANUALLY realign Safeguards Equipment following a loss of offsite power.

RO Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation Signals.

Restore Instrument Air and Nitrogen to Containment:

Open the following valves:

11A-819 RO 1SI-287 STOP all but ONE CSIP.

CHECK RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

§ Page 46 of 46 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior ISOLATE High Head SI Flow:

CHECK CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST. (YES)

OPEN normal miniflow isolation valves:

0 1CS-182 0

1CS-196 0

1CS-210 0

1CS-214 SHUT BIT outlet valves:

RO 0

1SI-3 0

1SI-4 VERIFY cold leg AND hot leg injection valves - SHUT 0

1SI-52 0

1SI-86 0

1SI-107 OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 19 AND GO TO Step 19.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

High head 51 flow should be isolated before continuing.

ESTABLISH Charging Lineup:

SHUT charging flow control valve:

0 FK-122.1 RO OPEN charging line isolation valves:

0 1CS-235 0

1CS-238 Lead Evaluator:

Terminate the scenario when normal charging has been established.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_3_

Event #

§ Page 46 of 46 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break (Continued)

Time I Position I Applicanfs Actions or Behavior ISOLATE High Head SI Flow:

CHECK CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST. (YES)

OPEN normal miniflow isolation valves:

0 1CS-182 0

1CS-196 0

1CS-210 0

1CS-214 SHUT BIT outlet valves:

RO 0

1SI-3 0

1SI-4 VERIFY cold leg AND hot leg injection valves - SHUT 0

1SI-52 0

1SI-86 0

1SI-107 OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 19 AND GO TO Step 19.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

High head 51 flow should be isolated before continuing.

ESTABLISH Charging Lineup:

SHUT charging flow control valve:

0 FK-122.1 RO OPEN charging line isolation valves:

0 1CS-235 0

1CS-238 Lead Evaluator:

Terminate the scenario when normal charging has been established.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 3 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Facility:

SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario 4

Op Test 05000400/2009302 No.:

No.:

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-27, MOL, 4% power, Xenon free startup in progress

'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump is Out of Service for motor replacement, expected return to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> FRV Bypass Valves controlling SG level Turnover:

The plant is at 4% power, MOL, plant startup in progress. Criticality was achieved 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after a trip from 100% power. GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) is completed through step 95. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

Critical Task:

Manually close 'A' SG PORV prior to exiting PATH-2 Depressurize the RCS to minimize primary to secondary leakage prior to SG "A" exceeding 95% level Manually actuate SI prior to exiting PATH-1.

Event Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event No.

Description 1

N/A N-BOP Start power escalation to 7 - 9% in preparation to roll the R-RO turbine. Place FRVs in service.

TRG2 HVA009 C-BOP/SRO Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start TS-SRO TRG3 LT:460 I-RO/SRO Pressurizer Level Transmitter for LT-460 fails low which TS-SRO isolates letdown. Must restore letdown per APP.

TRG4 SWS07A C-RO/SRO NSW Pump "A" Shaft Shear requiring AOP-022 entry TRG5 CFW16A R-ALL

'A' MFP trips with MFP 'B' failure to start. Maintain Rx CFW16B C-BOP/SRO power <10% and initiate AFW in accordance with AOP-ZR211113 010.

ZR211158 TRG6 SGN05A M-ALL

'A' SGTR occurs, 420 GPM ramped in over 3 minutes.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Facility:

SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario 4

Op Test 05000400/2009302 No.:

No.:

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-27, MOL, 4% power, Xenon free startup in progress

'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump is Out of Service for motor replacement, expected return to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> FRV Bypass Valves controlling SG level Turnover:

The plant is at 4% power, MOL, plant startup in progress. Criticality was achieved 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after a trip from 100% power. GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) is completed through step 95. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

Critical Task:

Manually close 'A' SG PORV prior to exiting PATH-2 Depressurize the RCS to minimize primary to secondary leakage prior to SG "A" exceeding 95% level Manually actuate SI prior to exiting PATH-1.

Event Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event No.

Description 1

N/A N-BOP Start power escalation to 7 - 9% in preparation to roll the R-RO turbine. Place FRVs in service.

TRG2 HVA009 C-BOP/SRO Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start TS-SRO TRG3 LT:460 I-RO/SRO Pressurizer Level Transmitter for LT-460 fails low which TS-SRO isolates letdown. Must restore letdown per APP.

TRG4 SWS07A C-RO/SRO NSW Pump "A" Shaft Shear requiring AOP-022 entry TRG5 CFW16A R-ALL

'A' MFP trips with MFP 'B' failure to start. Maintain Rx CFW16B C-BOP/SRO power <10% and initiate AFW in accordance with AOP-ZR211113 010.

ZR211158 TRG6 SGN05A M-ALL

'A' SGTR occurs, 420 GPM ramped in over 3 minutes.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l 7

JPB455D C-RO/SRO Auto SI failure. Failure caused by 2 SI (Train A and B)

JPB456D Low Pressurizer Pressure relay failures. Failure of one XC11036 MCB SI manual actuate switch TRG8 PT:308 C-BOP/SRO "A" SG PORV fails open in auto due to PT -308 failing high, Operator can close manually (N)ormal, (R)eactivity,

(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 4% power, MOL, plant startup in progress. GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) is completed through step 95. Criticality was achieved 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after a trip from 100% power. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

Event 1: The crew performs a power escalation lAW GP-005 to raise power to between 7 and 9% in preparation to perform step 96 of GP-005, placing the FRVs in automatic. Following completion of step 96, the crew will start to raise power lAW GP-005.

Event 2: Trip of the running AH-85A fan can be inserted once the power escalation has been observed to the extent necessary. This trip will provide alarms at the MCB and the crew will enter the appropriate APP. This trip should auto start the standby AH-85 fan, however the auto start has failed. The standby fan can be started manually from the MCB. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating, and 3.3.3.5b, Remote Shutdown System.

Event 3: Controlling Pressurizer level channel L T -460 fails low can be inserted once AH-85B has been started. The crew should respond in accordance with alarm response procedure APP-ALB-009. The crew should take Charging FCV-122 to Manual and maintain Pressurizer level within the directed control band and shift level control to an alternate channel. Letdown will restored lAW OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control System. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs and identify Tech Spec 3.3.1, action 6 as applicable.

Event 4: Normal Service Water Pump 'A' sheared shaft can be inserted once Pressurizer level has been stabilized and letdown restored. This will result in multiple NSW alarms and the crew should enter AOP-022. Once immediate actions are complete the crew should use the AOP to start up the standby NSW pump and verify proper system operation.

Event 5: 'A' MFP trip, with the 'B' MFW pump failing to auto start may be inserted once NSW has been restored. Both MDAFW pumps fail to auto start but can be started in the MCR. The crew may need to reduce power to be within AFW flow capacity in order to maintain SG water levels between 52% and 62% in accordance with AOP-010.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l 7

JPB455D C-RO/SRO Auto SI failure. Failure caused by 2 SI (Train A and B)

JPB456D Low Pressurizer Pressure relay failures. Failure of one XC11036 MCB SI manual actuate switch TRG8 PT:308 C-BOP/SRO "A" SG PORV fails open in auto due to PT -308 failing high, Operator can close manually (N)ormal, (R)eactivity,

(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Summary:

The plant is at 4% power, MOL, plant startup in progress. GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) is completed through step 95. Criticality was achieved 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after a trip from 100% power. The "A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump is OOS for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to startup.

Event 1: The crew performs a power escalation lAW GP-005 to raise power to between 7 and 9% in preparation to perform step 96 of GP-005, placing the FRVs in automatic. Following completion of step 96, the crew will start to raise power lAW GP-005.

Event 2: Trip of the running AH-85A fan can be inserted once the power escalation has been observed to the extent necessary. This trip will provide alarms at the MCB and the crew will enter the appropriate APP. This trip should auto start the standby AH-85 fan, however the auto start has failed. The standby fan can be started manually from the MCB. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating, and 3.3.3.5b, Remote Shutdown System.

Event 3: Controlling Pressurizer level channel L T -460 fails low can be inserted once AH-85B has been started. The crew should respond in accordance with alarm response procedure APP-ALB-009. The crew should take Charging FCV-122 to Manual and maintain Pressurizer level within the directed control band and shift level control to an alternate channel. Letdown will restored lAW OP-107, Chemical and Volume Control System. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs and identify Tech Spec 3.3.1, action 6 as applicable.

Event 4: Normal Service Water Pump 'A' sheared shaft can be inserted once Pressurizer level has been stabilized and letdown restored. This will result in multiple NSW alarms and the crew should enter AOP-022. Once immediate actions are complete the crew should use the AOP to start up the standby NSW pump and verify proper system operation.

Event 5: 'A' MFP trip, with the 'B' MFW pump failing to auto start may be inserted once NSW has been restored. Both MDAFW pumps fail to auto start but can be started in the MCR. The crew may need to reduce power to be within AFW flow capacity in order to maintain SG water levels between 52% and 62% in accordance with AOP-010.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Events Continued:

Event 6: A SGTR on the 'A' SG can be inserted following stabilization of secondary parameters lAW AOP-010. A 320 gpm tube leak will develop over 3 minutes. The crew will implement AOP-016 due to the leakage. As the leak progresses, conditions will be met to require a reactor trip.

The crew will initiate a reactor trip and implement PATH-1 actions.

Event 7: When conditions requiring a safety injection are met, automatic SI will not occur. One manual SI switch is blocked. Manual initiation of SI is possible with the other switch.

Event 8: When the BOP is directed to energize busses 1 A 1 and 1 B1, the SG 'A' PORV will fail open in automatic. The SG PORV may be closed manually at the MCB. The crew may recognize the PORV being open based on alarms and MCB indications and take pre-emptive action to close the PORV. This will result in a transition to PATH-2. If the PORV is not closed, MCB indications may require transition to EPP-014 and then to PATH-2 to mitigate the ruptured SG. PATH-2 will implement actions to isolate the ruptured SG and depressurize the RCS to eliminate break flow.

Terminate scenario once the RCS has been depressurized and all but one CSIP is stopped lAW Path 2.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Events Continued:

Event 6: A SGTR on the 'A' SG can be inserted following stabilization of secondary parameters lAW AOP-010. A 320 gpm tube leak will develop over 3 minutes. The crew will implement AOP-016 due to the leakage. As the leak progresses, conditions will be met to require a reactor trip.

The crew will initiate a reactor trip and implement PATH-1 actions.

Event 7: When conditions requiring a safety injection are met, automatic SI will not occur. One manual SI switch is blocked. Manual initiation of SI is possible with the other switch.

Event 8: When the BOP is directed to energize busses 1 A 1 and 1 B1, the SG 'A' PORV will fail open in automatic. The SG PORV may be closed manually at the MCB. The crew may recognize the PORV being open based on alarms and MCB indications and take pre-emptive action to close the PORV. This will result in a transition to PATH-2. If the PORV is not closed, MCB indications may require transition to EPP-014 and then to PATH-2 to mitigate the ruptured SG. PATH-2 will implement actions to isolate the ruptured SG and depressurize the RCS to eliminate break flow.

Terminate scenario once the RCS has been depressurized and all but one CSIP is stopped lAW Path 2.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Ensure rods are ON in SFC Reset to saved IC-169 (Note: do NOT run CAEP for scenario 4. All triggers are saved in IC-169)

Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for power escalation Provide a copy of GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) signed off up to and including step 95 of section 5.0.

Provide a copy of OP-131.04 Moisture Separator Reheaters signed off up to step 6 Go to RUN and Silence/acknowledge alarms, then set potentiometers as follows:

o FK-114: 5.03 o

FK-113: 7.50 Check RODUP to ensure rod position correct and update if needed, go to FREEZE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Use IC-27, MOL, 4.5% power reactivity data FRV Bypass valves are controlling SG levels Place CIT on the 'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump and take switch to STOP Place 'B' Boric Acid Transfer Pump switch to AUTO and green protected train placard Hang restricted access signs on swing gates PRE-LOAD:

'A' Boric Acid Pump OOS for motor replacement (idi xa2i174 STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g OFF)

Auto SI failure, Failure caused by 2 SI (Train A and B) Low Pressurizer Pressure relay failures o

imf jpb455d FAIL_ASIS o

imf jbp456d FAIL_ASIS A and B Motor Drive AFW pumps fail to start after BOTH Main FW pumps trip o

imf zr211113 (n 0 0) FAIL_DEENERGIZED,FAIL_ASIS o

imf zr211158 (n 0 0) FAIL_DEENERGIZED,FAIL_ASIS Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l SIMULATOR SETUP SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Ensure rods are ON in SFC Reset to saved IC-169 (Note: do NOT run CAEP for scenario 4. All triggers are saved in IC-169)

Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for power escalation Provide a copy of GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1) signed off up to and including step 95 of section 5.0.

Provide a copy of OP-131.04 Moisture Separator Reheaters signed off up to step 6 Go to RUN and Silence/acknowledge alarms, then set potentiometers as follows:

o FK-114: 5.03 o

FK-113: 7.50 Check RODUP to ensure rod position correct and update if needed, go to FREEZE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Use IC-27, MOL, 4.5% power reactivity data FRV Bypass valves are controlling SG levels Place CIT on the 'A' Boric Acid Transfer Pump and take switch to STOP Place 'B' Boric Acid Transfer Pump switch to AUTO and green protected train placard Hang restricted access signs on swing gates PRE-LOAD:

'A' Boric Acid Pump OOS for motor replacement (idi xa2i174 STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g OFF)

Auto SI failure, Failure caused by 2 SI (Train A and B) Low Pressurizer Pressure relay failures o

imf jpb455d FAIL_ASIS o

imf jbp456d FAIL_ASIS A and B Motor Drive AFW pumps fail to start after BOTH Main FW pumps trip o

imf zr211113 (n 0 0) FAIL_DEENERGIZED,FAIL_ASIS o

imf zr211158 (n 0 0) FAIL_DEENERGIZED,FAIL_ASIS Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l TRIGGERS:

ET-2 Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start (irf hva009 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) BKR_OFF)

ET-3: Pressurizer Level Transmitter for LT-460 fails low which isolates letdown must restore letdown per APP imf 1t:460 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0 00:00:00 ET-4: NSW Pump "A" Shaft Shear requires AOP-022 entry imf sws07a (400:00:00 OO:OO:OO)true ET-5: A MFW Pump trips and B MFW Pump trips after starting requires AOP-010 entry and AFW to supply SG's imf cfw16a (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) true imf cfw16b (600:00:1000:00:00) true)

ET-6: A SG Tube Rupture at design break flow of 420 gpm requires AOP-016 and PATH-1 Entry imf sgn05a (700:00:0000:00:00) 420 00:03:00 0 ET -8: "A" SG PORV fails open in auto due to PT -308 failing high, Operator can close manually imf pt:308a (9 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1300.0 00:00:00 ET-10: NSW A CONTROL POWER STATUS to off irf sws100 (10 00:00:00 00:00:00)

CP_OFF Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l TRIGGERS:

ET-2 Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start (irf hva009 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) BKR_OFF)

ET-3: Pressurizer Level Transmitter for LT-460 fails low which isolates letdown must restore letdown per APP imf 1t:460 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0 00:00:00 ET-4: NSW Pump "A" Shaft Shear requires AOP-022 entry imf sws07a (400:00:00 OO:OO:OO)true ET-5: A MFW Pump trips and B MFW Pump trips after starting requires AOP-010 entry and AFW to supply SG's imf cfw16a (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) true imf cfw16b (600:00:1000:00:00) true)

ET-6: A SG Tube Rupture at design break flow of 420 gpm requires AOP-016 and PATH-1 Entry imf sgn05a (700:00:0000:00:00) 420 00:03:00 0 ET -8: "A" SG PORV fails open in auto due to PT -308 failing high, Operator can close manually imf pt:308a (9 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1300.0 00:00:00 ET-10: NSW A CONTROL POWER STATUS to off irf sws100 (10 00:00:00 00:00:00)

CP_OFF Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l CAEP

!Description of 2009B NRC Exam Scenario 4 Reset to IC-27

! To establish initial conditions: Place the simulator in run.

! The boron concentration will increase and Rx power will decrease to -4% then the simulator will go to freeze in 8 minutes.

! NOTE: All initial conditions and Triggers will be created and you must line up the BA pumps.

imf rcs05 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1525.0 00:00:60 -

80 dmf rcs05

! "A" BA Pump OOS for motor replacement place MCB switch to STOP

! Hang CIT on CB Switch place the B BA Pump MCB switch to AUTO, protect B BA pump switch idi xa2i174 (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)OFF

! Event 5 problems

! A and B Motor Drive AFW pumps fail to start after BOTH Main FW pumps trip

! Both pumps can be manually started and will be directed to in AOP-010 imf zr211113 (n 0 0) FAIL_DEENERGIZED,FAIL_ASIS imf zr211158 (n 0 0) FAIL_DEENERGIZED,FAIL_ASIS

! Events

! Event 1: Raise Rx power to 7 - 9% and place FRV's in AUTO lAW GP-005 Normal - BOP Reactivity - RO

! Event 2: Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start Component - BOP/SRO Tech Spec - SRO irf hva009 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) BKR_OFF AH-85B fails to start in Standby imf z3263tib (n 00:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

! Event 3: Pressurizer Level Transmitter for L T -460 fails low which isolates letdown must restore letdown per APP Instrument - RO/SRO Tech Spec - SRO imf 1t:460 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0 00:00:00

! Event 4: NSW Pump "A" Shaft Shear requires AOP-022 entry Component - RO/SRO Tech Spec - SRO imf sws07a (4 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)true Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l CAEP

!Description of 2009B NRC Exam Scenario 4 Reset to IC-27

! To establish initial conditions: Place the simulator in run.

! The boron concentration will increase and Rx power will decrease to -4% then the simulator will go to freeze in 8 minutes.

! NOTE: All initial conditions and Triggers will be created and you must line up the BA pumps.

imf rcs05 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1525.0 00:00:60 -

80 dmf rcs05

! "A" BA Pump OOS for motor replacement place MCB switch to STOP

! Hang CIT on CB Switch place the B BA Pump MCB switch to AUTO, protect B BA pump switch idi xa2i174 (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)STOP,AUTO ilo xa20174g (n 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)OFF

! Event 5 problems

! A and B Motor Drive AFW pumps fail to start after BOTH Main FW pumps trip

! Both pumps can be manually started and will be directed to in AOP-010 imf zr211113 (n 0 0) FAIL_DEENERGIZED,FAIL_ASIS imf zr211158 (n 0 0) FAIL_DEENERGIZED,FAIL_ASIS

! Events

! Event 1: Raise Rx power to 7 - 9% and place FRV's in AUTO lAW GP-005 Normal - BOP Reactivity - RO

! Event 2: Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start Component - BOP/SRO Tech Spec - SRO irf hva009 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) BKR_OFF AH-85B fails to start in Standby imf z3263tib (n 00:00:0000:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

! Event 3: Pressurizer Level Transmitter for L T -460 fails low which isolates letdown must restore letdown per APP Instrument - RO/SRO Tech Spec - SRO imf 1t:460 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0 00:00:00

! Event 4: NSW Pump "A" Shaft Shear requires AOP-022 entry Component - RO/SRO Tech Spec - SRO imf sws07a (4 00:00:00 OO:OO:OO)true Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

! Event 5: A MFW Pump trips and B MFW Pump trips after starting requires AOP-010 entry and AFW to supply SG's Reactivity - ALL Component - BOP/SRO imf cfw16a (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) true imf cfw16b (5 00:00: 1 0 00:00:00) true

! Event 6: A SG Tube Rupture at design break flow of 420 gpm requires AOP-016 and PATH-1 Entry Major - ALL imf sgn05a (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) 420 00:03:00 0

! Event 7: Auto SI failure (preloaded)

! Failure caused by 2 SI (Train A and B) Low Pressurizer Pressure relay failures Component - RO/SRO imf jpb455d (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf jpp456d (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

! Failure of one MCB SI manual actuate switch (preloaded - the one by the Rx Trip breaker indication) idi xc1 i036 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS

! Event 8: "A" SG PORV fails open in auto due to PT-308 failing high, Operator can close manually Instrument - BOP/SRO imf pt:308a (8 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1300.0 00:00:00

! Trigger 10: NSW A CONTROL POWER STATUS to off, emulates opening control power knife switch irf sws100 (1000:00:0000:00:00) CP _OFF

! Simulator goes to freeze 8 minutes after going to run to allow initial conditions to be established 480 frz These conditions have been saved to IC-169 for the NRC exam Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

! Event 5: A MFW Pump trips and B MFW Pump trips after starting requires AOP-010 entry and AFW to supply SG's Reactivity - ALL Component - BOP/SRO imf cfw16a (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) true imf cfw16b (5 00:00: 1 0 00:00:00) true

! Event 6: A SG Tube Rupture at design break flow of 420 gpm requires AOP-016 and PATH-1 Entry Major - ALL imf sgn05a (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) 420 00:03:00 0

! Event 7: Auto SI failure (preloaded)

! Failure caused by 2 SI (Train A and B) Low Pressurizer Pressure relay failures Component - RO/SRO imf jpb455d (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf jpp456d (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS

! Failure of one MCB SI manual actuate switch (preloaded - the one by the Rx Trip breaker indication) idi xc1 i036 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS

! Event 8: "A" SG PORV fails open in auto due to PT-308 failing high, Operator can close manually Instrument - BOP/SRO imf pt:308a (8 00:00:00 00:00:00) 1300.0 00:00:00

! Trigger 10: NSW A CONTROL POWER STATUS to off, emulates opening control power knife switch irf sws100 (1000:00:0000:00:00) CP _OFF

! Simulator goes to freeze 8 minutes after going to run to allow initial conditions to be established 480 frz These conditions have been saved to IC-169 for the NRC exam Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

1 Page

~

of 41 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time I

Position I

Event 1 CREW BOP RO RO RO RO RO RO RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Raise power lAW GP-005 Adjusts steam dump demand signal as necessary.

Initiates dilution as necessary DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added. This may be done by experience or via the reactivity plan associated with the Simulator IC.

SETS FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

SET total makeup flow as follows:

IF performing DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1 CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 gpm.

IF performing AL T DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1 CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL OR the ALT DIL position.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

1 Page

~

of 41 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time I

Position I

Event 1 CREW BOP RO RO RO RO RO RO RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Raise power lAW GP-005 Adjusts steam dump demand signal as necessary.

Initiates dilution as necessary DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added. This may be done by experience or via the reactivity plan associated with the Simulator IC.

SETS FIS-114, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

SET total makeup flow as follows:

IF performing DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1 CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 gpm.

IF performing AL T DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1 CS-151, FK-114 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL OR the ALT DIL position.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

1 Page

.2 of 41 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure NOTE:

SRO concurrence should be obtained prior to energizing the Back Up Heaters in MANUAL.

OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

1 Page

.2 of 41 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a PI controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure NOTE:

SRO concurrence should be obtained prior to energizing the Back Up Heaters in MANUAL.

OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm.

RO START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

1 Page 10 of 41 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are stepping out to the desired height. (N/A - rod control is in MANUAL)

VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired quantity has been added.

PLACE Reactor Makeup in AUTO per Section 5.1.

RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

CREW Is in the STOP position.

The GREEN light is LIT.

PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

Identifies entry into Mode 1 Completes steps 55 and 56 in GP-005 SRO Directs BOP to perform Step 97, TRANSFER SG level control to the Main Feedwater Regulating BOP valves WHEN Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valve FCV Controller demand is between 70% and 80%, OR when Reactor Power is between 7 and 9%, THEN TRANSFER SG level control to the Main Feedwater Regulating valves as follows:

1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1 1 FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

1 Page 10 of 41 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are stepping out to the desired height. (N/A - rod control is in MANUAL)

VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired quantity has been added.

PLACE Reactor Makeup in AUTO per Section 5.1.

RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

CREW Is in the STOP position.

The GREEN light is LIT.

PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

Identifies entry into Mode 1 Completes steps 55 and 56 in GP-005 SRO Directs BOP to perform Step 97, TRANSFER SG level control to the Main Feedwater Regulating BOP valves WHEN Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valve FCV Controller demand is between 70% and 80%, OR when Reactor Power is between 7 and 9%, THEN TRANSFER SG level control to the Main Feedwater Regulating valves as follows:

1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1 1 FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

1 Page 11 of 41 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PLACE the Main FW Regulating Valve Controllers in AUTO:

1FW-133, MAIN FW A REGULATOR FK-478 BOP 1FW-249, MAIN FW B REGULATOR FK-488 1FW-191, MAIN FW C REGULATOR FK-498 PROCEDURE NOTE: The following Steps verify the Feed Regulating valves will respond prior to fully closing the Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCVs.

LOWER the output of the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCV Controllers to a position 10% lower than the current output:

BOP 1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1 1FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 PROCEDURE NOTE: If the demand signal reaches a value of 10% with no response from the Feedwater Regulating Valves, it may be necessary to return the FRV controller to MAN to cancel any integrated signal and assess the situation before continuing.

WHEN Feedwater Regulating Valves indicate BOTH of the following responses:

• Controller output increasing

• SG level returning to normal BOP THEN LOWER output of the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCV Controllers to 0% Minimum output):

• 1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1 1 FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

1 Page 11 of 41 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PLACE the Main FW Regulating Valve Controllers in AUTO:

1FW-133, MAIN FW A REGULATOR FK-478 BOP 1FW-249, MAIN FW B REGULATOR FK-488 1FW-191, MAIN FW C REGULATOR FK-498 PROCEDURE NOTE: The following Steps verify the Feed Regulating valves will respond prior to fully closing the Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCVs.

LOWER the output of the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCV Controllers to a position 10% lower than the current output:

BOP 1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1 1FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 PROCEDURE NOTE: If the demand signal reaches a value of 10% with no response from the Feedwater Regulating Valves, it may be necessary to return the FRV controller to MAN to cancel any integrated signal and assess the situation before continuing.

WHEN Feedwater Regulating Valves indicate BOTH of the following responses:

• Controller output increasing

• SG level returning to normal BOP THEN LOWER output of the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCV Controllers to 0% Minimum output):

• 1FW-140, MN FW A REG BYP FK-479.1 1 FW-256, MN FW B REG BYP FK-489.1 1FW-198, MN FW C REG BYP FK-499.1 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

1 Page 12 of 41 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior At STATUS LIGHT BOX 1, VERIFY SHUT the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCVs:

BOP

• A BYP FW-140 (Window 4-1)

• B BYP FW-256 (Window 4-2)

• C BYP FW-198 (Window 4-3)

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Prior to initiating Event 2 ensure that the' A' and '8' SG Feed Reg Valves are placed in service. Then, once satisfied with observation of the power escalation, initiate Event 2 (Trip of running AH-85 Fan).

Note: During validation the crew was allowed to place all 3 Feed Reg valves in service prior to Event 2.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

1 Page 12 of 41 Event

Description:

Start Power Escalation Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior At STATUS LIGHT BOX 1, VERIFY SHUT the following Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass FCVs:

BOP

• A BYP FW-140 (Window 4-1)

• B BYP FW-256 (Window 4-2)

• C BYP FW-198 (Window 4-3)

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Prior to initiating Event 2 ensure that the' A' and '8' SG Feed Reg Valves are placed in service. Then, once satisfied with observation of the power escalation, initiate Event 2 (Trip of running AH-85 Fan).

Note: During validation the crew was allowed to place all 3 Feed Reg valves in service prior to Event 2.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

2 Page 13 ill 41 Event

Description:

Trip of AH-85A Time I

Position I

EVALUATOR NOTE:

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

BOP SRO Applicant's Actions or Behavior This trip should auto start the AH-85B fan, however the auto start has failed.

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

AcutateTRG-2 "Trip of the Running AH-85A Fan" ALB-027-1-4, DIESEL GEN ELEC EQUIP RM SUP FANS AH-85 LOW FLOW-OIL IDENTIFIES the tripped fan, AH-85A REPORTS failure of AH-85B standby fan to start STARTS standby AH-85B Contacts AO to investigate Prepares Equipment Problem checklist Contacts WCC for support REFER to Tech Specs (and possibly OWP-HVAC)

T.S 3.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating (Perform OST-1023, Offsite Power Verification within one hour)

Contacts AO to perform OST -1023 T.S. 3.3.3.5b, Remote Shutdown System action c 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO COMMUNICATOR:

When contacted as AO after - 2 min. report that the breaker for AH-85A was found in the tripped condition Report that OST-1023 is completed 10-15 minutes after assignments are given.

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Once the plant has stabilized and Tech Specs have been evaluated, initiate Event 3, "Pressurizer level transmitter LT-460 Fails Low" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

2 Page 13 ill 41 Event

Description:

Trip of AH-85A Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE:

This trip should auto start the AH-85B fan, however the auto start has failed.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

AcutateTRG-2 "Trip of the Running AH-85A Fan" Indications Available:

ALB-027-1-4, DIESEL GEN ELEC EQUIP RM SUP FANS AH-85 LOW FLOW-OIL

~,~)~1;~~\\~"

I'~:

I;;~~~~~ ~~,;'.'

,!T\\.JJr~~"

~. AbriAIR2(*~*.'. *>~!~!~i1;~,~{~&~j~... ~j!.)*:,.i~.{~z;;;K~~!{,.;~;

Ii ~Nr

'5.1i~*~*~:~ZR< *;.... ** *... :.;.~.2J;..:Jf!*

• .**,!;i}~:};

.! "'i:§~i'

. y;x IDENTIFIES the tripped fan, AH-85A REPORTS failure of AH-85B standby fan to start BOP STARTS standby AH-85B Contacts AO to investigate Prepares Equipment Problem checklist Contacts WCC for support REFER to Tech Specs (and possibly OWP-HVAC)

SRO

• T.S 3.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating (Perform OST-1023, Offsite Power Verification within one hour)

Contacts AO to perform OST -1023

• T.S. 3.3.3.5b, Remote Shutdown System action c 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO COMMUNICATOR:

When contacted as AO after - 2 min. report that the breaker for AH-85A was found in the tripped condition Report that OST-1023 is completed 10-15 minutes after assignments are given.

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Once the plant has stabilized and Tech Specs have been evaluated, initiate Event 3, "Pressurizer level transmitter LT-460 Fails Low" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

3 Page 14 of 41 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter U-460 Fails Low Time I

Position I

EVALUTATOR NOTE:

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Event #3 is the controlling Pressurizer Level Instrument, L T-460, failing low resulting in letdown isolation. The crew should respond in accordance with alarm response procedure APP-ALB-009-4-3. The crew will be required to take Charging FCV-122 to manual and select an alternate controlling channel and restore letdown.

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG-3 "Pressurizer Level Instrument, LT-460, fails low" ALB-009-4-3, PRESSURIZER LOW LEVEL L TDN SECURED AND HTRS OFF Pressurizer Level Indication on LI-460 Letdown Flow Indication FI-1S0.1 RD IDENTIFY a failed Pressurizer Level Channel RD CONFIRM alarm using:

Pressurizer level LI-459A 1, LI-460, LI-461.1 (LI-460 low)

Letdown flow FI-150.1 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

3 Page 14 of 41 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter U-460 Fails Low Time I

Position I

EVALUTATOR NOTE:

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Event #3 is the controlling Pressurizer Level Instrument, L T-460, failing low resulting in letdown isolation. The crew should respond in accordance with alarm response procedure APP-ALB-009-4-3. The crew will be required to take Charging FCV-122 to manual and select an alternate controlling channel and restore letdown.

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG-3 "Pressurizer Level Instrument, LT-460, fails low" ALB-009-4-3, PRESSURIZER LOW LEVEL L TDN SECURED AND HTRS OFF Pressurizer Level Indication on LI-460 Letdown Flow Indication FI-1S0.1 RD IDENTIFY a failed Pressurizer Level Channel RD CONFIRM alarm using:

Pressurizer level LI-459A 1, LI-460, LI-461.1 (LI-460 low)

Letdown flow FI-150.1 Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

3 Page 15 of 41 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter U-460 Fails Low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective Actions:

IF PRZ level is low, THEN VERIFY letdown is isolated AND heaters are off. (YES)

• IF RCS leakage is indicated, THEN GO TO AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. (NO)

IF alarm is due to malfunction of level control system, THEN MANUALLY RESTORE normal level. (NO, L T-459 is controlling channel for PZR level)

• IF the alarm is due to a failed level instrument, (YES)

RO 0

USING the Pressurizer Level Controller Selector switch, THEN SELECT a position which places the two operable channels into service. (Select channels 459/461)

• VERIFY the failed channel is not selected, at the MCB recorder panel. (NO)

RESET the control heaters by placing the control switch to OFF and then back to ON.

IF maintenance is to be performed, THEN REFER TO OWP-RP, Reactor Protection.

RO SELECT 459/461 on Pressurizer Level Controller Selector Evaluate T.S. 3.3.1 (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to place in tripped condition)

T.S. 3.3.6 (Tracking EIR)

SRO Prepares an Equipment Problem Checklist Contacts WCC for assistance.

• (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)

• • • ** 0;:1 *. *****,*.*... )'~()~~~i' "i*......... ""'0:""'/'

• • *.c..,""";"

i.* *.;..,:.

c'

. *.... !.** p>/.***. ~......

I* *... *...............

.<.1........***. ~. 1;QP~107~.5.4-'t: Initiating. f\\JQ£rnatLetdQwn;;

,'~<-~T<~'",'\\._,j" '' ; (--/:-;--v--:~>_- ____ ':;f->>:<<:_;' -

_":>-,-.~~;" _:vV~:_:_:.:'v -

_-_-,_'~_,~_-_

• Verifies Initial Conditions:

0 Charging flow established RO 0

PRZ Level> 17%

0 CS-7, CS-8, CS-9 (Letdown Orifice Isolation valves)

SHUT Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

3 Page 15 of 41 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter U-460 Fails Low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective Actions:

IF PRZ level is low, THEN VERIFY letdown is isolated AND heaters are off. (YES)

• IF RCS leakage is indicated, THEN GO TO AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. (NO)

IF alarm is due to malfunction of level control system, THEN MANUALLY RESTORE normal level. (NO, L T-459 is controlling channel for PZR level)

• IF the alarm is due to a failed level instrument, (YES)

RO 0

USING the Pressurizer Level Controller Selector switch, THEN SELECT a position which places the two operable channels into service. (Select channels 459/461)

• VERIFY the failed channel is not selected, at the MCB recorder panel. (NO)

RESET the control heaters by placing the control switch to OFF and then back to ON.

IF maintenance is to be performed, THEN REFER TO OWP-RP, Reactor Protection.

RO SELECT 459/461 on Pressurizer Level Controller Selector Evaluate T.S. 3.3.1 (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to place in tripped condition)

T.S. 3.3.6 (Tracking EIR)

SRO Prepares an Equipment Problem Checklist Contacts WCC for assistance.

• (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)

• • • ** 0;:1 *. *****,*.*... )'~()~~~i' "i*......... ""'0:""'/'

• • *.c..,""";"

i.* *.;..,:.

c'

. *.... !.** p>/.***. ~......

I* *... *...............

.<.1........***. ~. 1;QP~107~.5.4-'t: Initiating. f\\JQ£rnatLetdQwn;;

,'~<-~T<~'",'\\._,j" '' ; (--/:-;--v--:~>_- ____ ':;f->>:<<:_;' -

_":>-,-.~~;" _:vV~:_:_:.:'v -

_-_-,_'~_,~_-_

• Verifies Initial Conditions:

0 Charging flow established RO 0

PRZ Level> 17%

0 CS-7, CS-8, CS-9 (Letdown Orifice Isolation valves)

SHUT Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

3 Page 16 of 41 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter U-460 Fails Low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If Charging flow was stopped or greatly reduced prior to letdown being secured, there is a possibility that the Letdown line contains voids due to insufficient cooling.

This is a precursor to water hammer, and should be evaluated prior to initiating letdown flow.

VERIFY 1CC-337, TK-144 LTDN TEMPERATURE, controller is:

RO

• in AUTO AND

• set for 110 to 120 of (4.0 to 4.7 on potentiometer) normal operation PROCEDURE NOTE:

PK-145.1 L TON PRESSURE, 1 CS-38, may have to be adjusted to control at lower pressures.

VERI FY 1 CS-38 Controller, PK-145.1 L TON PRESSURE, in MAN with output set at 50%.

VERIFY open the following Letdown Isolation Valves:

RO 1 CS-2, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-459 1CS-1, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-460 VERIFY open 1CS-11, LETDOWN ISOLATION.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

3 Page 16 of 41 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter U-460 Fails Low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If Charging flow was stopped or greatly reduced prior to letdown being secured, there is a possibility that the Letdown line contains voids due to insufficient cooling.

This is a precursor to water hammer, and should be evaluated prior to initiating letdown flow.

VERIFY 1CC-337, TK-144 LTDN TEMPERATURE, controller is:

RO

• in AUTO AND

• set for 110 to 120 of (4.0 to 4.7 on potentiometer) normal operation PROCEDURE NOTE:

PK-145.1 L TON PRESSURE, 1 CS-38, may have to be adjusted to control at lower pressures.

VERI FY 1 CS-38 Controller, PK-145.1 L TON PRESSURE, in MAN with output set at 50%.

VERIFY open the following Letdown Isolation Valves:

RO 1 CS-2, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-459 1CS-1, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-460 VERIFY open 1CS-11, LETDOWN ISOLATION.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

3 Page 17 of 41 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter LI-460 Fails Low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

The following table gives the minimum charging flow required to keep the regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when letdown is established:

Letdown Flow (to be established)

Minimum Charging Flow necessary when letdown is established 45gpm 20gpm 60gpm 26gpm 105 gpm 46gpm 120 gpm 53gpm PROCEDURE NOTE:

If Pressurizer level is above the programmed level setpoint, charging flow should be adjusted to a point above the minimum required to prevent regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm but low enough to reduce pressurizer level.

• ADJUST controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, as required to:

0 Maintain normal pressurizer level program 0

Keep regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when the desired letdown orifice is placed in service.

• OPEN an Orifice Isolation Valve (1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1CS-9) for RO the orifice to be placed in service.

• ADJUST 1 CS-38 position by adjusting PK-145.1 output as necessary to control LP L TDN Pressure (PI-145.1) at 340 to 360 psig, to prevent lifting the LP Letdown Relief.

• WHEN Letdown pressure has stabilized at 340 to 360 psig on PI-145.1, LP LTDN PRESS, THEN PERFORM the following:

0

a. ADJUST PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE setpoint to 58%

0

b. PLACE the controller in AUTO.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

3 Page 17 of 41 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter LI-460 Fails Low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

The following table gives the minimum charging flow required to keep the regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when letdown is established:

Letdown Flow (to be established)

Minimum Charging Flow necessary when letdown is established 45gpm 20gpm 60gpm 26gpm 105 gpm 46gpm 120 gpm 53gpm PROCEDURE NOTE:

If Pressurizer level is above the programmed level setpoint, charging flow should be adjusted to a point above the minimum required to prevent regenerative heat exchanger high temperature alarm but low enough to reduce pressurizer level.

• ADJUST controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, as required to:

0 Maintain normal pressurizer level program 0

Keep regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when the desired letdown orifice is placed in service.

• OPEN an Orifice Isolation Valve (1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1CS-9) for RO the orifice to be placed in service.

• ADJUST 1 CS-38 position by adjusting PK-145.1 output as necessary to control LP L TDN Pressure (PI-145.1) at 340 to 360 psig, to prevent lifting the LP Letdown Relief.

• WHEN Letdown pressure has stabilized at 340 to 360 psig on PI-145.1, LP LTDN PRESS, THEN PERFORM the following:

0

a. ADJUST PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE setpoint to 58%

0

b. PLACE the controller in AUTO.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

3 Page 18 of 41 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter LI-460 Fails Low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE:

Placing LK-459F in AUTO may take several minutes due to matching PRZ level to reference level.

• VERIFY PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE Controller maintains Letdown pressure stable at 340 to 360 psig.

• OPEN additional orifice isolation valves (1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1 CS-9) as required.

• ADJUST charging flow as necessary to:

0 prevent high temperature alarm (per table above) 0 maintain pressurizer programmed level.

PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in MAN to cancel any integrated signal.

RO PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in AUTO.

• WHEN the following occurs:

0 Program pressurizer level is matching the current pressurizer level AND 0

Letdown and seal return are balanced with seal injection flow and charging flow.

• THEN place controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, in AUTO.

• COMPLETE Section 5.4.3. (Position Verification)

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Once the plant has stabilized and Tech Specs have been evaluated, initate Event 4 "NSW Pump' A' Shaft Shear" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

3 Page 18 of 41 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Level Transmitter LI-460 Fails Low Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR NOTE:

Placing LK-459F in AUTO may take several minutes due to matching PRZ level to reference level.

• VERIFY PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE Controller maintains Letdown pressure stable at 340 to 360 psig.

• OPEN additional orifice isolation valves (1CS-7, 1CS-8, 1 CS-9) as required.

• ADJUST charging flow as necessary to:

0 prevent high temperature alarm (per table above) 0 maintain pressurizer programmed level.

PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in MAN to cancel any integrated signal.

RO PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459F, in AUTO.

• WHEN the following occurs:

0 Program pressurizer level is matching the current pressurizer level AND 0

Letdown and seal return are balanced with seal injection flow and charging flow.

• THEN place controller 1CS-231, FK-122.1 CHARGING FLOW, in AUTO.

• COMPLETE Section 5.4.3. (Position Verification)

LEAD EVALUATOR:

Once the plant has stabilized and Tech Specs have been evaluated, initate Event 4 "NSW Pump' A' Shaft Shear" Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

4 Page 19 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' NSW Pump Shaft Shear Time I

Position I

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

Applicant's Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator Actuate Trg-4 "NSW Pump

• A' sheared shaft" ALB-02-6-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR A LOW PRESS ALB-02-7-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR B LOW PRESS ALB-02-7-2, SERV WTR PUMPS DISCHARGE LOW PRESS ALB 02-5-5, SERV WTR HEADER A HIGH-LOW FLOW ALB 02-6-6, SERV WTR HEADER B HIGH-LOW FLOW RO EVALUATOR NOTE:

Immediate Action RO Responds to ALB-02 alarms - reports low NSW header pressure with pump running indication.

The ESW Pumps will auto start on low header pressure.

CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING CSIP - MORE THAN 1-minute: (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 2.

Immediate Action SRO CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING EDG - MORE THAN 1-minute: (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

4 Page 19 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' NSW Pump Shaft Shear Time I

Position I

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Indications Available:

Applicant's Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator Actuate Trg-4 "NSW Pump

• A' sheared shaft" ALB-02-6-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR A LOW PRESS ALB-02-7-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR B LOW PRESS ALB-02-7-2, SERV WTR PUMPS DISCHARGE LOW PRESS ALB 02-5-5, SERV WTR HEADER A HIGH-LOW FLOW ALB 02-6-6, SERV WTR HEADER B HIGH-LOW FLOW RO EVALUATOR NOTE:

Immediate Action RO Responds to ALB-02 alarms - reports low NSW header pressure with pump running indication.

The ESW Pumps will auto start on low header pressure.

CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING CSIP - MORE THAN 1-minute: (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 2.

Immediate Action SRO CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING EDG - MORE THAN 1-minute: (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

4 Page 20 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' NSW Pump Shaft Shear Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior COMMUNICATOR:

There are several points in the AOP where an AO may be dispatched to check for leaks and proper operation of equipment. Report no leaks, no breaker problems but when dispatched to the pump, after 1 to 2 minutes report that the coupling appears to have failed and request maintenance assistance.

BOOTH OPERATOR IF REQUESTED TO OPEN KNIFE SWITCH ON THE 'A' NSW PUMP BREAKER: Run Trigger 10 "open the knife switch" then have Communicator report back when completed SRO GO TO Step 3.

GO TO the appropriate step as indicated by the parameter LOST:

SRO

• NSW Pump failure (YES)

• NSW Pump loss of flow Proceeds to Step 6 CHECK loss of NSW Header due to NSW Pump FAILED or LOSS OF FLOW.

START standby NSW Pump as follows:

• VERIFY discharge valve for affected pump is CLOSING by placing affected pump control switch to STOP.

RO

• START standby NSW Pump in priming mode by momentarily placing standby NSW Pump control switch to START.

• WHEN discharge valve for affected pump is fully SHUT, THEN PLACE and HOLD control switch for running pump to START to fully OPEN pump discharge valve.

CHECK ANY NSW Pump - RUNNING. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

4 Page 20 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' NSW Pump Shaft Shear Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior COMMUNICATOR:

There are several points in the AOP where an AO may be dispatched to check for leaks and proper operation of equipment. Report no leaks, no breaker problems but when dispatched to the pump, after 1 to 2 minutes report that the coupling appears to have failed and request maintenance assistance.

BOOTH OPERATOR IF REQUESTED TO OPEN KNIFE SWITCH ON THE 'A' NSW PUMP BREAKER: Run Trigger 10 "open the knife switch" then have Communicator report back when completed SRO GO TO Step 3.

GO TO the appropriate step as indicated by the parameter LOST:

SRO

• NSW Pump failure (YES)

• NSW Pump loss of flow Proceeds to Step 6 CHECK loss of NSW Header due to NSW Pump FAILED or LOSS OF FLOW.

START standby NSW Pump as follows:

• VERIFY discharge valve for affected pump is CLOSING by placing affected pump control switch to STOP.

RO

• START standby NSW Pump in priming mode by momentarily placing standby NSW Pump control switch to START.

• WHEN discharge valve for affected pump is fully SHUT, THEN PLACE and HOLD control switch for running pump to START to fully OPEN pump discharge valve.

CHECK ANY NSW Pump - RUNNING. (YES)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

4 Page 21 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' NSW Pump Shaft Shear Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO GO TO Section 3.2 (page 30).

EVALUATOR NOTE: The following alarms will annunciate due to loss of cooling in containment and subsequent start of ESW:

• ALB-028-5-1, CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM

• ALB-028-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION SYSTEM The BOP should identify these alarms and identify Tech Specs 3.6.1.4, 3.6.1.1, 3.6.3, 3.6.5 and 3.9.4 to be referenced CHECK Turbine trip required by ANY of the following conditions - EXIST: (NO)

• No NSW Pump can be operated

• Non-isolable leak exists in the NSW system SRO

• Major isolable leak exists on the Turbine Building NSW Header AND time does not permit a controlled plant shutdown OBSERVE Note prior to Step 13 AND GO TO Step 13.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Steps 13 through 19 address leaks on NSW turbine building header. Leaks on individual components supplied by the Turbine Building header are addressed by Steps 20 and 21.

CREW CHECK for minor isolable leak on Turbine Building header -

ANY EXISTING. (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 20.

CREW CHECK for leak in an individual component - ANY EXISTING.

(NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

4 Page 21 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' NSW Pump Shaft Shear Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO GO TO Section 3.2 (page 30).

EVALUATOR NOTE: The following alarms will annunciate due to loss of cooling in containment and subsequent start of ESW:

• ALB-028-5-1, CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM

• ALB-028-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION SYSTEM The BOP should identify these alarms and identify Tech Specs 3.6.1.4, 3.6.1.1, 3.6.3, 3.6.5 and 3.9.4 to be referenced CHECK Turbine trip required by ANY of the following conditions - EXIST: (NO)

• No NSW Pump can be operated

• Non-isolable leak exists in the NSW system SRO

• Major isolable leak exists on the Turbine Building NSW Header AND time does not permit a controlled plant shutdown OBSERVE Note prior to Step 13 AND GO TO Step 13.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Steps 13 through 19 address leaks on NSW turbine building header. Leaks on individual components supplied by the Turbine Building header are addressed by Steps 20 and 21.

CREW CHECK for minor isolable leak on Turbine Building header -

ANY EXISTING. (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 20.

CREW CHECK for leak in an individual component - ANY EXISTING.

(NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

4 Page 22 Qf 41 Event

Description:

'A' NSW Pump Shaft Shear TIme I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO GO TO Step 22.

CREW CHECK for leak on WPB header - ANY EXISTING. (NO)

GO TO Step 24.

RO CHECK that NSW Pump(s) - MALFUNCTIONED. (YES)

CREW PERFORM the following for affected NSW Pump(s):

CHECK NSW Pump breaker(s) - MALFUNCTIONED. (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 25.b.

CHECK adequate pump suction inventory EXISTS: (YES)

LI-9300.1, Service Water PMP A CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9300)

RO/BOP LI-9302, Service Water PMP B CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9302)

LI-1931, Cooling Tower Basin Level, GREATER THAN 31 inches Locally VERIFY the following for the affected NSW Pump per OP-139, Service Water System:

Proper cooling and seal water supply to NSW Pumps.

CREW (YES)

Proper operation of NSW strainer backwash. (YES)

Locally CHECK NSW Pump(s) for signs of damage (shaft shear or other obvious problems). (YES)

INITIATE appropriate corrective action for the loss of NSW.

SRO Initiate Equipment Problem Checklist and contact WCC.

Exit AOP-022 EVALUATOR NOTE:

Once the plant has stabilized, initiate Event 5

'A' MFW Pump Trip with 'B' MFW Pump Fail to Start Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

4 Page 22 Qf 41 Event

Description:

'A' NSW Pump Shaft Shear TIme I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO GO TO Step 22.

CREW CHECK for leak on WPB header - ANY EXISTING. (NO)

GO TO Step 24.

RO CHECK that NSW Pump(s) - MALFUNCTIONED. (YES)

CREW PERFORM the following for affected NSW Pump(s):

CHECK NSW Pump breaker(s) - MALFUNCTIONED. (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 25.b.

CHECK adequate pump suction inventory EXISTS: (YES)

LI-9300.1, Service Water PMP A CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9300)

RO/BOP LI-9302, Service Water PMP B CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9302)

LI-1931, Cooling Tower Basin Level, GREATER THAN 31 inches Locally VERIFY the following for the affected NSW Pump per OP-139, Service Water System:

Proper cooling and seal water supply to NSW Pumps.

CREW (YES)

Proper operation of NSW strainer backwash. (YES)

Locally CHECK NSW Pump(s) for signs of damage (shaft shear or other obvious problems). (YES)

INITIATE appropriate corrective action for the loss of NSW.

SRO Initiate Equipment Problem Checklist and contact WCC.

Exit AOP-022 EVALUATOR NOTE:

Once the plant has stabilized, initiate Event 5

'A' MFW Pump Trip with 'B' MFW Pump Fail to Start Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

5 Page 23 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' MFW Pump Trip with 'B' MFW Pump Fail to Start Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG-5

'A' MFW Pump Trip with 'B' MFW Pump Fail to Start.

Indications Available:

• Lowering Level on all three Steam Generators

• ALB-016-1-2, FW PUMP AlB LUBE OIL LOW PRESS OR

. TRIP

• ALB-016-2-2, LOSS OF BOTH MAIN FW PUMPS BOP Identify loss of 'A' MFW pump Identify annunciators

• ~s;¥:*;;f'Tii *{>~Fiq?* ** ****

Ebi~fs;A01?-QiQ;FeeciWatefMalfUhcti()h'S\\);

c ','<,",~J "

......... **;:r'

'v'v'

",' ~<:.::.,;"~,-<>~-;>"/,,,",;::--/, ',:, <;':"<~:';'!"N'>>;J';",/.>~{:\\. '}j'~.*.J,:"l ::';.. 'V,<, >',;",:

',';,'} *i:,:;~.:*;~;~;*:*......... :....

. *s Immediate

• CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (YES)

Actions SRO/BOP

• CHECK initial Reactor power less than 90%. (YES)

• CHECK initial Reactor power less than 80%. (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Turbine runback will automatically terminate at approximately 50% power with DEH in AUTO.

Turbine runbacks are quickly identified by ALB-020-2-2, TURBINE RUNBACK OPERATIVE, in alarm and RUNBACK OPER light LIT as long as the initiating signal is present on DEH Panel A.

• CHECK initial Reactor power less than 60%. (YES)

SRO/BOP

• CHECK DEH controlling Turbine Valves PROPERLY.

(YES)

Harris 200gB NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

5 Page 23 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' MFW Pump Trip with 'B' MFW Pump Fail to Start Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate TRG-5

'A' MFW Pump Trip with 'B' MFW Pump Fail to Start.

Indications Available:

• Lowering Level on all three Steam Generators

• ALB-016-1-2, FW PUMP AlB LUBE OIL LOW PRESS OR

, TRIP

• ALB-016-2-2, LOSS OF BOTH MAIN FW PUMPS BOP Identify loss of 'A' MFW pump Identify annunciators

. ',' *~s;¥i*;;f'Tc2' i{r~Fiq?>'***'* Ebi~fs;A01?-QiQ;FeeciWatefMalfUhcti()h'S\\);

c ','<,",~J '<.,':.. '

'v'v'

5',

c.;...

';'-;,

",' ~<:.::.,;..~'-<>~-;>,,/,,'"';::--/, ',:, <;':"<~:';'!"N'>>;J';",/.>~{:\\. '}j'~.*.J,:"l ::';..,V,<, >',;",:

',';,'} *i:,:;~.:*;~;~;*:*..... :.

Immediate

• CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (YES)

Actions SRO/BOP

• CHECK initial Reactor power less than 90%. (YES)

• CHECK initial Reactor power less than 80%. (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Turbine runback will automatically terminate at approximately 50% power with DEH in AUTO.

Turbine runbacks are quickly identified by ALB-020-2-2, TURBINE RUNBACK OPERATIVE, in alarm and RUNBACK OPER light LIT as long as the initiating signal is present on DEH Panel A.

• CHECK initial Reactor power less than 60%. (YES)

SRO/BOP

• CHECK DEH controlling Turbine Valves PROPERLY.

(YES)

Harris 200gB NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

5 Page 24 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' MFW Pump Trip with 'B' MFW Pump Fail to Start Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior MAINTAIN ALL of the following:

• At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (NO)

PERFORM the following:

• IF ANY SG level drops to 30% THEN TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP Path-1 PROCEDURE NOTE: Mode change occurs at 5% Reactor BOP power.

IF Above POAH AND Reactor power is LESS THAN 10%,

THEN: (YES)

• INITIATE AFW flow to maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62%. (AFW is running due to loss of both MFW pumps)

REDUCE power as necessary IF below POAH, THEN: (NO)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

At this point, the SRO would direct a power reduction to be within the capacity of the AFW pumps. This reactivity manipulation is not required to satisfy this evaluation.

When desired initiate Event 6, 'A' SGTR Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

5 Page 24 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' MFW Pump Trip with 'B' MFW Pump Fail to Start Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior MAINTAIN ALL of the following:

• At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (NO)

PERFORM the following:

• IF ANY SG level drops to 30% THEN TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP Path-1 PROCEDURE NOTE: Mode change occurs at 5% Reactor BOP power.

IF Above POAH AND Reactor power is LESS THAN 10%,

THEN: (YES)

• INITIATE AFW flow to maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62%. (AFW is running due to loss of both MFW pumps)

REDUCE power as necessary IF below POAH, THEN: (NO)

EVALUATOR NOTE:

At this point, the SRO would direct a power reduction to be within the capacity of the AFW pumps. This reactivity manipulation is not required to satisfy this evaluation.

When desired initiate Event 6, 'A' SGTR Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_7_

Page 25 of 41 Event

Description:

Auto 51 fails to actuate Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

Once AFW is established, or the SRO directs a reactor trip, initiate Event 6, SGTR. The leak will ramp up to 420 gpm over 3 minutes. The first few steps of AOP-016 may be implemented prior to initiate the Rx trip and are included as part of this scenario guide. The crew may conservatively elect to trip the Rx, if so this will eliminate immediate AOP-016 entry.

Additionally, automatic SI will fail to actuate, requiring a manual SI actuation. Once the reactor is tripped, Event 8, SG 'A' PORV fails open will be initiated.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator: actuate TRG-6 "A" SGTR - 420 gpm I

Indications Available:

ALB-009-2-2, PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION ALB-10-4-5, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM TROUBLE RO Responds to alarms and/or indications of ReS leakage.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

Alarms associated with RCS leakage will direct implementation of AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE. Letdown will have to be reduced or isolated to stabilize charging flow on scale.

The RO may take MANUAL control of FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, at any point after the failure is recognized.

If the crew elected to trip the Reactor on loss of MFW, the crew will be in PATH-1, not AOP-016.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_7_

Page 25 of 41 Event

Description:

Auto 51 fails to actuate Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

Once AFW is established, or the SRO directs a reactor trip, initiate Event 6, SGTR. The leak will ramp up to 420 gpm over 3 minutes. The first few steps of AOP-016 may be implemented prior to initiate the Rx trip and are included as part of this scenario guide. The crew may conservatively elect to trip the Rx, if so this will eliminate immediate AOP-016 entry.

Additionally, automatic SI will fail to actuate, requiring a manual SI actuation. Once the reactor is tripped, Event 8, SG 'A' PORV fails open will be initiated.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

When directed by Lead Evaluator: actuate TRG-6 "A" SGTR - 420 gpm I

Indications Available:

ALB-009-2-2, PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL DEVIATION ALB-10-4-5, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM TROUBLE RO Responds to alarms and/or indications of ReS leakage.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

Alarms associated with RCS leakage will direct implementation of AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE. Letdown will have to be reduced or isolated to stabilize charging flow on scale.

The RO may take MANUAL control of FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, at any point after the failure is recognized.

If the crew elected to trip the Reactor on loss of MFW, the crew will be in PATH-1, not AOP-016.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_7_

Page 26 of 41 Event

Description:

Auto 51 fails to actuate Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

Throughout this procedure, as well as all AOPs, actions are based on valid alarms and instrumentation. Actions based on invalid indication are not applicable.

When possible (except in the cases of rapidly propagating leaks and leaks approaching Action Level 3), leakage should be qualitatively confirmed prior to declaration of an action level. Leakage is qualitatively confirmed when two different indications (such as grab samples or radiation monitors) trend in the same direction with the same approximate order of magnitude.

RO/SRO SRO CHECK RHR in operation. (NO)

GO TO Step 3.

REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification And Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point X.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

This step is a qualitative check for leakage obviously in excess of Make Up capability. Isolation of letdown may be necessary. A formal calculation to determine the leakrate is performed in Step 16.

CREW RO SRO RO May identify 'A' SG as the ruptured generator due to rising SG level.

CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. (NO)

Directs MANUAL reactor trip and manual SI.

INITIATES MANUAL Reactor Trip and attempts SI.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_7_

Page 26 of 41 Event

Description:

Auto 51 fails to actuate Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE NOTE:

This procedure contains no immediate actions.

Throughout this procedure, as well as all AOPs, actions are based on valid alarms and instrumentation. Actions based on invalid indication are not applicable.

When possible (except in the cases of rapidly propagating leaks and leaks approaching Action Level 3), leakage should be qualitatively confirmed prior to declaration of an action level. Leakage is qualitatively confirmed when two different indications (such as grab samples or radiation monitors) trend in the same direction with the same approximate order of magnitude.

RO/SRO SRO CHECK RHR in operation. (NO)

GO TO Step 3.

REFER TO PEP-110, Emergency Classification And Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Network at entry point X.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

This step is a qualitative check for leakage obviously in excess of Make Up capability. Isolation of letdown may be necessary. A formal calculation to determine the leakrate is performed in Step 16.

CREW RO SRO RO May identify 'A' SG as the ruptured generator due to rising SG level.

CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. (NO)

Directs MANUAL reactor trip and manual SI.

INITIATES MANUAL Reactor Trip and attempts SI.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_7_

Page 27 of 41 Event

Description:

Auto 51 fails to actuate Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO PERFORM immediate actions of PATH-1.

VERIFY Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

CHECK for any of the following:

Trip breakers RT A and BY A OPEN (YES)

Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES) o ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES) o NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

VERI FY Turbine Trip:

CHECK for any of the following:

ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses 1 A-SA and 1 B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's (YES, off-site power)

SRO Monitor Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_7_

Page 27 of 41 Event

Description:

Auto 51 fails to actuate Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO PERFORM immediate actions of PATH-1.

VERIFY Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

CHECK for any of the following:

Trip breakers RT A and BY A OPEN (YES)

Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES) o ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES) o NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

VERI FY Turbine Trip:

CHECK for any of the following:

ALL turbine throttle valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP ALL turbine governor valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses 1 A-SA and 1 B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDG's (YES, off-site power)

SRO Monitor Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_6_

Page 28 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X.

SRO

• Foldout A Applies.

0 Assigns RO and BOP foldout items Verify All CSIPs AND RHR pumps

- RUNNING (YES)

RO CHECK SI Flow:

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (YES)

CHECK Main Steam Isolation:

MAIN Steam isolation - ACTUATED. (NO)

BOP MAIN Steam isolation - REQUIRED. (NO)

Steam line pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG.

CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG.

Manual closure of all MSIVs AND bypass valves is desired RO CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. (YES)

CHECK AFW Status:

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (YES)

BOP CHECK any SG level-GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES)

VERIFY Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS Signals Using Attachment 6, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", While Continuing with this Procedure.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_6_

Page 28 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• Evaluate EAL Network using entry point X.

SRO

• Foldout A Applies.

0 Assigns RO and BOP foldout items Verify All CSIPs AND RHR pumps

- RUNNING (YES)

RO CHECK SI Flow:

SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG. (YES)

CHECK Main Steam Isolation:

MAIN Steam isolation - ACTUATED. (NO)

BOP MAIN Steam isolation - REQUIRED. (NO)

Steam line pressure - LESS THAN 601 PSIG.

CNMT pressure - GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG.

Manual closure of all MSIVs AND bypass valves is desired RO CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG. (YES)

CHECK AFW Status:

AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (YES)

BOP CHECK any SG level-GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES)

VERIFY Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS Signals Using Attachment 6, "Safeguards Actuation Verification", While Continuing with this Procedure.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_6_

Page 29 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs TB AO -Place the A and B If A compressors to local control mode.

BOP Directs RAB AO - Locally unlock and turn on the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross connect valves: Refer to 1.

BOOTH OPERATOR: When contacted to place AlB air compressors in Local Control mode, run CAEP :\\air\\ACs_to_local.txt.

COMMUNICATOR:

When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors are running in local control mode.

BOOTH OPERATOR When contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves, run CAEP :\\cvclpath-1 att 6 csip suction valves power. txt.

COMMUNICATOR:

When the CAEP is complete, report task to the MCR.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable.

Control RCS Temperature:

Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

BOP Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555 OF AND 559 OF VERIFY AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED. (NO)

Energize AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 EVALUATOR NOTE:

Direct Booth Operator to initiate Event 8, 'A' SG PORV fails open when BOP energizes the first of the two buses.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_6_

Page 29 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs TB AO -Place the A and B If A compressors to local control mode.

BOP Directs RAB AO - Locally unlock and turn on the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross connect valves: Refer to 1.

BOOTH OPERATOR: When contacted to place AlB air compressors in Local Control mode, run CAEP :\\air\\ACs_to_local.txt.

COMMUNICATOR:

When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors are running in local control mode.

BOOTH OPERATOR When contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves, run CAEP :\\cvclpath-1 att 6 csip suction valves power. txt.

COMMUNICATOR:

When the CAEP is complete, report task to the MCR.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable.

Control RCS Temperature:

Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

BOP Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555 OF AND 559 OF VERIFY AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 - ENERGIZED. (NO)

Energize AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 EVALUATOR NOTE:

Direct Booth Operator to initiate Event 8, 'A' SG PORV fails open when BOP energizes the first of the two buses.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_8_

Page 30 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG PORV fails open Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 are energized, Initiate Event 8 'A' SG PORV to fail open.

CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

RO CHECK block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES-All OPEN)

PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE: If the crew has not identified SG "A" PORV as OPEN then a transition to EPP-014 should occur. If SG "A" PORV has been closed in MANUAL then the crew will continue in PATH-1 to the PATH-2 transition. (Page 34 of this guide)

IDENTIFY any faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

BOP ANY SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES/NO - "A")

ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_8_

Page 30 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG PORV fails open Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:

When AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 are energized, Initiate Event 8 'A' SG PORV to fail open.

CHECK PRZ PORVs - SHUT. (YES)

RO CHECK block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES-All OPEN)

PRZ spray valves - SHUT. (YES)

EVALUATOR NOTE: If the crew has not identified SG "A" PORV as OPEN then a transition to EPP-014 should occur. If SG "A" PORV has been closed in MANUAL then the crew will continue in PATH-1 to the PATH-2 transition. (Page 34 of this guide)

IDENTIFY any faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

BOP ANY SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES/NO - "A")

ANY SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_8_

Page 31 of 41 Event

Description:

I A' SG PORV fails open Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior COMMUNICATOR:

PROCEDURE NOTE:

If directed to walk down the system to check for leaks:

Wait 3 minutes and then report SG "A" PORV tailpipe is blowing steam.

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

BOP CHECK MSIVs and BYPASS Valves:

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT. (YES/NO If not in PATH-1, then NO)

BOP VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT. (YES)

BOP CHECK any SG NOT Faulted:

ANY SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

BOP IDENTIFY any Faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

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Page 31 of 41 Event

Description:

I A' SG PORV fails open Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior COMMUNICATOR:

PROCEDURE NOTE:

If directed to walk down the system to check for leaks:

Wait 3 minutes and then report SG "A" PORV tailpipe is blowing steam.

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

BOP CHECK MSIVs and BYPASS Valves:

VERIFY all MSIVs - SHUT. (YES/NO If not in PATH-1, then NO)

BOP VERIFY all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT. (YES)

BOP CHECK any SG NOT Faulted:

ANY SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

BOP IDENTIFY any Faulted SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_8_

Page 32 2f 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG PORV fails open Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior ANY SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES, 'A')

ANY SG pressure - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

BOP ISOLATE Faulted SG(s):

VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

VERI FY MDAFW and TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) - SHUT SHUT faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump

- SHUT (NA)

VERIFY main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs-SHUT:

BOP SG A: 1 MS-231 (YES)

SG B: 1 MS-266 (YES)

SG C: 1 MS-301 (YES)

VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

CHECK CST Level-GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE: A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The "Check secondary radiation" could be answered YES or NO, depending on the condition of the alarm before SI was initiated.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

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Page 32 2f 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG PORV fails open Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior ANY SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES, 'A')

ANY SG pressure - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

BOP ISOLATE Faulted SG(s):

VERIFY Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

VERI FY MDAFW and TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) - SHUT SHUT faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump

- SHUT (NA)

VERIFY main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs-SHUT:

BOP SG A: 1 MS-231 (YES)

SG B: 1 MS-266 (YES)

SG C: 1 MS-301 (YES)

VERIFY SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

VERIFY main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

CHECK CST Level-GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

PROCEDURE NOTE: A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

EVALUATOR NOTE: The "Check secondary radiation" could be answered YES or NO, depending on the condition of the alarm before SI was initiated.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_8_

Page 33 of 41 Event

Description:

I A' SG PORV fails open Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CHECK Secondary Radiation:

SRO SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL (YES/NO)

MAIN steamline radiation - NORMAL (YES/NO)

BOP CHECK SG Levels:

ANY level-INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES, "A")

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

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Page 33 of 41 Event

Description:

I A' SG PORV fails open Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior CHECK Secondary Radiation:

SRO SG Blowdown radiation - NORMAL (YES/NO)

MAIN steamline radiation - NORMAL (YES/NO)

BOP CHECK SG Levels:

ANY level-INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES, "A")

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_6_

Page 34 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' sG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO FOLDOUT C applies.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

No actions should result from FOLDOUT "C" during the remainder of the scenario.

SRO PROCEDURE NOTE:

RO The board utilized for PATH-2 is an abbreviated version of EOP-Guide 2. The actions identified within this scenario guide are consistent with those actions utilized by the SRO.

EVALUATE EAL Network using Entry Point U.

IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is initiated.

CHECK RCP Trip Criteria:

ANY RCP - RUNNING (YES)

Check all of the following:

o SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES) o Check RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1400 PSIG (NO)

Ruptured SG identified BOP SG level - INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES - "A")

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

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Page 34 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' sG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO FOLDOUT C applies.

EVALUATOR'S NOTE:

No actions should result from FOLDOUT "C" during the remainder of the scenario.

SRO PROCEDURE NOTE:

RO The board utilized for PATH-2 is an abbreviated version of EOP-Guide 2. The actions identified within this scenario guide are consistent with those actions utilized by the SRO.

EVALUATE EAL Network using Entry Point U.

IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is initiated.

CHECK RCP Trip Criteria:

ANY RCP - RUNNING (YES)

Check all of the following:

o SI flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES) o Check RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1400 PSIG (NO)

Ruptured SG identified BOP SG level - INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES - "A")

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_6_

Page 35 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' sG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

If the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, one steam supply valve from an intact SG must be maintained open.

ADJUST ruptured SG PORV controller setpoint to 88% (1145 PSIG) AND place in auto.

Places SG "A" PORV in MANUAL and closes (if not already performed earlier). It should NOT be placed in AUTO. If it is placed in AUTO then the operator should determine that it has opened, place it in MANUAL, close it, and leave it in MANUAL.

CHECK ruptured SG PORV - SHUT. (YES/NO)

SHUT ruptured SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump:

BOP May already be closed VERI FY blowdown isolation valves from ruptured SG -

SHUT (YES)

SHUT ruptured SG main steam drain isolation before MSIV:

SG A: 1 MS-231 SHUT ruptured SG MSIV and BYPASS valve. (SG "It')

o Ruptured SG MSIV and bypassed valves SHUT (YES)

SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 8 AND GO TO Step 8.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, THEN feed flow to that SG should remain isolated.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

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Page 35 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' sG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

If the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, one steam supply valve from an intact SG must be maintained open.

ADJUST ruptured SG PORV controller setpoint to 88% (1145 PSIG) AND place in auto.

Places SG "A" PORV in MANUAL and closes (if not already performed earlier). It should NOT be placed in AUTO. If it is placed in AUTO then the operator should determine that it has opened, place it in MANUAL, close it, and leave it in MANUAL.

CHECK ruptured SG PORV - SHUT. (YES/NO)

SHUT ruptured SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump:

BOP May already be closed VERI FY blowdown isolation valves from ruptured SG -

SHUT (YES)

SHUT ruptured SG main steam drain isolation before MSIV:

SG A: 1 MS-231 SHUT ruptured SG MSIV and BYPASS valve. (SG "It')

o Ruptured SG MSIV and bypassed valves SHUT (YES)

SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 8 AND GO TO Step 8.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

If ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, THEN feed flow to that SG should remain isolated.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15,2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_6_

Page 36 of 41 Event

Description:

lA' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ruptured SG Level Greater than 25% [40%] - GREATER BOP THAN 25% (YES) 0 Stop feed flow by shutting the MDAFW and TDAFW isolation valves to the ruptured SG.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

The steam supply valve from the ruptured 5G to the TDAFW pump should be shut OR isolated before continuing.

BOP CHECK Ruptured SG(s) Pressure - GREATER THAN 260 PSIG [350 PSIG] (YES)

Block Low Steam Pressure SI:

RO Pressure - LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (yES)

Block low steam pressure SI.

PROCEDURE NOTE: After the low steam pressure 51 signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_6_

Page 36 of 41 Event

Description:

lA' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ruptured SG Level Greater than 25% [40%] - GREATER BOP THAN 25% (YES) 0 Stop feed flow by shutting the MDAFW and TDAFW isolation valves to the ruptured SG.

PROCEDURE CAUTION:

The steam supply valve from the ruptured 5G to the TDAFW pump should be shut OR isolated before continuing.

BOP CHECK Ruptured SG(s) Pressure - GREATER THAN 260 PSIG [350 PSIG] (YES)

Block Low Steam Pressure SI:

RO Pressure - LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (yES)

Block low steam pressure SI.

PROCEDURE NOTE: After the low steam pressure 51 signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_6_

Page 37 of 41 Event

Description:

'N SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• At least one intact SG - AVAILABLE FOR RCS SRO COOLDOWN (YES)

ERFIS NOT AVAILABLE:

LOWEST EREIS AVAILABLE:

HIGHEST CORE EXIT RUPTURED CORE EXIT TC (PREFERRED)

SG PRESSURE TEMPERATURE OR ACTIVE LOOP WIDE (PSIG)

(OF)

RANGE T-HOT (OF)

ABOVE 1100 530 [495]

520 [490]

1000 TO 1100 515 [485]

505 [475]

900 TO 1000 505 [470]

495 [465]

800 TO 900 490 [460]

480 [450]

700 TO 800 475 [445]

465 [435]

600 TO 700 460 [425]

450 [420]

500 TO 600 440 [410]

430 [400]

400 TO 500 420 [385]

410 [380]

300 TO 400 390 [360]

380 [350]

200 TO 300 360 rNA]

350 [NA]

EVALUATOR NOTE: The MSIVs may have been previous shut. IF the crew did not identifiy SG "A" PORV was OPEN and transitioned to EPP-014 they may have closed all MSIVs. IF so this would require using the SG 'B' and 'e' PORVs to perform the cool down.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_6_

Page 37 of 41 Event

Description:

'N SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• At least one intact SG - AVAILABLE FOR RCS SRO COOLDOWN (YES)

ERFIS NOT AVAILABLE:

LOWEST EREIS AVAILABLE:

HIGHEST CORE EXIT RUPTURED CORE EXIT TC (PREFERRED)

SG PRESSURE TEMPERATURE OR ACTIVE LOOP WIDE (PSIG)

(OF)

RANGE T-HOT (OF)

ABOVE 1100 530 [495]

520 [490]

1000 TO 1100 515 [485]

505 [475]

900 TO 1000 505 [470]

495 [465]

800 TO 900 490 [460]

480 [450]

700 TO 800 475 [445]

465 [435]

600 TO 700 460 [425]

450 [420]

500 TO 600 440 [410]

430 [400]

400 TO 500 420 [385]

410 [380]

300 TO 400 390 [360]

380 [350]

200 TO 300 360 rNA]

350 [NA]

EVALUATOR NOTE: The MSIVs may have been previous shut. IF the crew did not identifiy SG "A" PORV was OPEN and transitioned to EPP-014 they may have closed all MSIVs. IF so this would require using the SG 'B' and 'e' PORVs to perform the cool down.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_6_

Page 38 of 41 Event

Description:

Time I

Position BOP IA' sG Tube Rupture (Continued)

I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Condenser available for steam dump (YES)

Intact SG MSIV - OPEN (YES)

Place steam dump pressure controller in manual AND decrease output to 0%.

Place steam dump mode select switch in STEAM PRESS.

When RCS temperature - LESS THAN OR EQUAL 553°F (P-12 SETPOINT) (yES) o Momentarily place both steam dump interlock bypass switches to INTLK BYP. (YES) o Verify LOW-LOW STEAM DUMP (P-12)

BYPASSED status light -ILLUMINATED (YES)

Dump steam from intact SGs to condenser at maximum rate.

EVALUATOR NOTE: During cooldown at MAX Rate, Main Steam Line Isolation may occur, requiring use of SG '8' and 'C' PORVs to continue cooling down.

The crew will continue with the procedure while the cooldownis in progress. When the CET temperature is less than the target then the crew should terminate the cooldown and continue with the procedure.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: Cooldown may cause an invalid Red or Orange on the integrity CSFST. FRP*P.1 should not be implemented until step 39 is completed.

RO Core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (NO)

WHEN core exit TCs less REQUIRED TEMPERATURE THEN STOP RCS cooldown and maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature.

Continue recovery actions during cooldown Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 GPM.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

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Page 38 of 41 Event

Description:

Time I

Position BOP IA' sG Tube Rupture (Continued)

I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Condenser available for steam dump (YES)

Intact SG MSIV - OPEN (YES)

Place steam dump pressure controller in manual AND decrease output to 0%.

Place steam dump mode select switch in STEAM PRESS.

When RCS temperature - LESS THAN OR EQUAL 553°F (P-12 SETPOINT) (yES) o Momentarily place both steam dump interlock bypass switches to INTLK BYP. (YES) o Verify LOW-LOW STEAM DUMP (P-12)

BYPASSED status light -ILLUMINATED (YES)

Dump steam from intact SGs to condenser at maximum rate.

EVALUATOR NOTE: During cooldown at MAX Rate, Main Steam Line Isolation may occur, requiring use of SG '8' and 'C' PORVs to continue cooling down.

The crew will continue with the procedure while the cooldownis in progress. When the CET temperature is less than the target then the crew should terminate the cooldown and continue with the procedure.

PROCEDURE CAUTION: Cooldown may cause an invalid Red or Orange on the integrity CSFST. FRP*P.1 should not be implemented until step 39 is completed.

RO Core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (NO)

WHEN core exit TCs less REQUIRED TEMPERATURE THEN STOP RCS cooldown and maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature.

Continue recovery actions during cooldown Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 GPM.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_6_

Page 39 Qf 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

• If an AFW isolation to an intact SG occurs, the signal may be reset to allow restoration of AFW. (An AFW isolation will occur if a main steam line isolation signal is present AND one SG pressure decreases 100 PSIG below the other two SGs.)

• If the steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to TDAFW pump reopens due to decreasing SG level, it must be restored to the shut position. (Two out of three SG levels decreasing below 25% will open both steam supply vales to the TDAFW pump.)

• Control feed flow to maintain intact SG levels between 25%

BOP and 50% [40% and 50%]

• AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)

SRO GO TO Step 16.

• Verify power available to PORV block valves (YES)

• Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

• Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

RO IF a PRZ PORVopens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

Reset SI.

SRO Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power. (Direct BOP)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-O-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

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Page 39 Qf 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior PROCEDURE CAUTION:

• If an AFW isolation to an intact SG occurs, the signal may be reset to allow restoration of AFW. (An AFW isolation will occur if a main steam line isolation signal is present AND one SG pressure decreases 100 PSIG below the other two SGs.)

• If the steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to TDAFW pump reopens due to decreasing SG level, it must be restored to the shut position. (Two out of three SG levels decreasing below 25% will open both steam supply vales to the TDAFW pump.)

• Control feed flow to maintain intact SG levels between 25%

BOP and 50% [40% and 50%]

• AFW flow - AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)

SRO GO TO Step 16.

• Verify power available to PORV block valves (YES)

• Check PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

• Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

RO IF a PRZ PORVopens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

Reset SI.

SRO Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power. (Direct BOP)

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_6_

Page 40 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

RO RO BOP BOP RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. (Phase A only is actuated)

Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:

o Opens the following valves:

11A-819 1SI-287 RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

Stop RHR pumps.

Core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (YES/NO)

Stop RCS cooldown and Maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature.

Check ruptured SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Check RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 30 of - C (YES)

Normal PRZ spray - AVAILABLE (YES)

PRZ level less than 75% [60%] (YES)

RCS subcooling greater than 10°F (YES)

RCS pressure less than ruptured SG pressure (NO)

Open normal spray valves to depressurize RCS as maximum rate EVALUATOR NOTE: Crew will maintain the spray valves open until RCS pressure is less than SG pressure. They may close the spray valves if they do not meet PRZ level or subcooling conditions.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event #

_6_

Page 40 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

RO RO BOP BOP RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. (Phase A only is actuated)

Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:

o Opens the following valves:

11A-819 1SI-287 RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

Stop RHR pumps.

Core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (YES/NO)

Stop RCS cooldown and Maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature.

Check ruptured SG pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Check RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 30 of - C (YES)

Normal PRZ spray - AVAILABLE (YES)

PRZ level less than 75% [60%] (YES)

RCS subcooling greater than 10°F (YES)

RCS pressure less than ruptured SG pressure (NO)

Open normal spray valves to depressurize RCS as maximum rate EVALUATOR NOTE: Crew will maintain the spray valves open until RCS pressure is less than SG pressure. They may close the spray valves if they do not meet PRZ level or subcooling conditions.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_6_

Page 41 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• Shut Spray valves used for depressurization. (YES)

• If valves cannot be shut, stop RCPs 'A' and 'B' (NO)

RO

• Do not restart RCPs until spray valves shut (NA)

• RCS subcooling greater than 10°F (YES)

• Level in at least one intact SG greater than 25% (yES)

• RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

• PRZ level-GREATER THAN 10% [30%] (YES)

• Stop All But One CSIP.

• Check CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (yES)

RO

• Open normal miniflow isolation valves:

1CS-182 1CS-196 1CS-210

• 1CS-214

• CSIP Normal Miniflow valves open (YES)

RO

• Shut BIT outlet valves:

• 1SI-3 1SI-4 LEAD EVALUATOR - Terminate the scenario after BIT outlet valves 1SI-3 and 1SI-4 are SHUT.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

05000400/2009302 Scenario #

_4_ Event#

_6_

Page 41 of 41 Event

Description:

'A' SG Tube Rupture (Continued)

Time I

Position I

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

• Shut Spray valves used for depressurization. (YES)

• If valves cannot be shut, stop RCPs 'A' and 'B' (NO)

RO

• Do not restart RCPs until spray valves shut (NA)

• RCS subcooling greater than 10°F (YES)

• Level in at least one intact SG greater than 25% (yES)

• RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

• PRZ level-GREATER THAN 10% [30%] (YES)

• Stop All But One CSIP.

• Check CSIP suction - ALIGNED TO RWST (yES)

RO

• Open normal miniflow isolation valves:

1CS-182 1CS-196 1CS-210

• 1CS-214

• CSIP Normal Miniflow valves open (YES)

RO

• Shut BIT outlet valves:

• 1SI-3 1SI-4 LEAD EVALUATOR - Terminate the scenario after BIT outlet valves 1SI-3 and 1SI-4 are SHUT.

Harris 2009B NRC Scenario 4 October 15, 2009 Rev. 2