ML100130210

Comment (05) of Mary Lampert on Behalf of Pilgrim Watch on Revisions to Environmental Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant Operating License

ML100130210
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	01/12/2010
From:	Lampert M Pilgrim Watch
To:	Rulemaking, Directives, and Editing Branch
References
74FR38239 00005, NRC-2008-0608
Download: ML100130210 (48)

Text

a'j 1/11/16 Page 1 of 1 PUBLIC SUBMISSION As of: January 11, 2010 Received:

January 11, 2010 Status: Pending-Post Tracking No. 80a7b140 Comments Due: January 12, 2010 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2008-0608 Environmental Effect of Renewing the Operating License of a Nuclear Power Plant Comment On: NRC-2008-0608-0003 Revisions to Environmental Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses Document:

NRC-2008-0608-DRAFT-0035 Comment on FR Doc # E9-18284 Submitter Information Name: Mary Lampert Address: c" -148 Washington Street Duxbury, MA, 02332 Submitter's Representative:

Director Organization:

Pilgrim Watch General Comment The following document is attached NUREG-1437, REVISION 1, JULY 2009 [DOCKET ID NRC-2008-0608]

COMMENTS PILGRIM WATCH Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch, Director January 12, 2010 Please upload document in its entirety.Attachments NRC-2008-0608-DRAFT-0035.1:

Comment on FR Doc # E9-18284 7,VL/'f -x -https:H/fdms.erulemaking.net/fdms-web-agency/component/submitterlnfoCoverPage?Call=Print&Printld...

01/11/2010 NUREG-1437, REVISION 1, JULY 2009 [DOCKET ID NRC-2008-0608]

COMMENTS PILGRIM WATCH Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch, Director 148 Washington Street Duxbury, MA 02332 January 12, 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section I Errors Assigning Significance Levels & Categories Introduction 1 Human Health 2 Solid Waste Management 8 Postulated Accidents 13 Termination Operations

& Decommissioning 16 Radionuclides Released to Groundwater 16 Affected Environment 23 Meteorology and Global Warming Emergency Preparedness 26 Safeguards

& Security 31 Section II Procedural Issues Public Involvement

& Input -Restricted 32 Reasonable Assurance Standard 36 Timing License Renewal Application 36 Draft Decisions Based Limited Research 37 Appendix 38 Meteorology.

Review straight-line Gaussian plume model by NRC, DOE, EPA, NAS, State Officials, Nuclear Trade Groups, Air Dispersion Modeling Community Michael Lesar, Chief, Rulemaking and Directives Branch, Mailstop TWB-05-BO IM, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Email: Federal e-Rulemaking Portal at htp/www.regulations.gov;Docket ID NRC-2008-0608 January 12, 2010 RE: NUREG-1437, Revision 1, July 2009 [Docket ID NRC-2008-0608]

-COMMENTS PILGRIM WATCH Pilgrim Watch (hereinafter "PW") provides comments on NUREG-1437, Revision 1 issued July 2009.Section 1 comments on portions of the document indicating where NRC improperly characterized some impacts as "small," contrary to NRC's own impact definitions; incorrectly placed some issues as Category I, contrary to NRC's own criteria for placement into Category 1 or Category 2; and incorrectly determining that emergency planning (1.7.3) and safeguards and security (1.7.4) do not need review in license renewal. Section 2 discusses procedural issues that impede public participation and fairness in the license renewal process.As an overview, the Draft is a second rate job and the research analysis performed to support conclusions is third rate; thereby confidence in the NRC and this process is undermined.

I. SECTION 1 A. Errors in Assigning Significance Levels to Issues & Determining Whether Issues Are Generic (Category

1) or Site Specific (Category 2)Pilgrim Watch contends that the Draft incorrectly determined contrary to NRC's own definition of "small impact" that the environmental impact of some issues was "small" when it clearly should have been"moderate to large 1;" and wrongly categorized several issues as Category 1 instead of Category 2.2 These'July 2009, S-5, NUREG-1437, Rev.l: NRC defines in the Draft small impact as, "Environmental effects are not detectable or are so minor that they will neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource.

For the purposes of assessing radiological impacts, the Commission has concluded that those impacts do not exceed permissible level in the Commission's regulations are considered small. Moderate impact as,"Environmental effects are sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to destabilize, important attributes of the resource." Large impact as, "Environmental effects are clearly noticeable and are sufficient to destabilize important attributes of the resource." 2 Ibid: The draft says that Category 1 issues are those that meet all of the following criteria:

(1) The environmental impacts associated with the issue have been determined to apply either to all plants or, for some issues, to plants I include, for example: human health; solid waste management, onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel and low-level waste storage and disposal; postulated and severe accidents; radionuclides released to groundwater; and decommissioning.

NRC justified their conclusions of a "small impact" and Category 1 designation by: (1) totally ignoring or mischaracterizing new and significant information that provided contrary evidence or "Inconvenient Truths" (example, NRC's mischaracterization of meteorology, climatology and BEIR VII); (2)referencing guidance or industry practices, without demonstrating that they, in fact, provide "reasonable assurance" (example, SAMA and Applicant's use of outdated computer code and uses ATMOS); and (3)referencing "safeguard" information unavailable for independent scrutiny (example on site storage spent fuel, NRC's Updated Waste Confidence Rule).Further, and of considerable importance, NRC incorrectly determined that emergency planning and security were outside the scope of review. They both have a potentially large impact and are site specific.1. HUMAN HEALTH NRC incorrectly assigns "small impact" and Category 1 designation to radiation exposures to the public and occupational workers (at 3-130.) contrary to their own definitions, provided in footnote 1.a. Health Impacts Are.Mischaracterized By NRC To Be Of Small Impact NRC incorrectly found health impacts to be small or "so minor" by:* Misrepresenting the National Academy of Science BEIR VII Report and "cherry picking" current research to avoid acknowledging new and significant research on radiation health effects; and" Incorrectly assuming that reported releases are accurate and reliable.

NRC assumed that monitoring releases into the air and water on site and environmental sampling offsite is "state-of-having a specific type of cooling system or other specified plant or site characteristics; (2) A single significance level (i.e., small, moderate, or large) has been assigned to the impacts (except for collective offsite radiological impacts from the fuel cycle and from high-level waste and spent fuel);(3)

Mitigation of adverse impacts associated with the issue has been considered in the analysis, and it has been determined that additional plant-specific mitigation measures would probably not be sufficiently beneficial to warrant implementation.

For issues that meet the three Category 1 criteria, no additional plant-specific analysis is required in future SEISs unless new and significant information is identified.

Category 2 issues are those that do not meet one or more of the criteria of Category 1, and, therefore, require additional plant-specific review.2 the art" and provides an accurate record of what is released in order to determine that impacts do not exceed permissible level in the Commission's regulations and are therefore small.(1) Misrepresenting BEIR VII: NRC explains on the basis of a selective NRC staff analysis of BEIR VII (NRC 2005b) (ADAMS accession number ML052640532) that, The NRC completed a review of the BEIR VII report and documented its findings in the Commission paper SECY-05-0202, "Staff Review of the National Academies Study of the Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII)," dated October 29, 2005 (NRC 2005b) (ADAMS accession number ML052640532).

In this paper, the NRC concluded that the findings presented in the BEIR VII report agree with the NRC's current understanding of the health risks from exposure to ionizing radiation.

The NRC agreed with the BEIR VII report's major conclusion that current scientific evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a linear, no-threshold dose response relationship between exposure to ionizing radiation and the development of cancer in humans. This conclusion is consistent with the process the NRC uses to develop its standards of radiological protection.

Therefore, the NRC's regulations continue to be adequately protective of public health and safety and the environment.

NRC arrives at the absurd conclusion that "NRC's regulations continue to be adequately protective of public health and safety and the environment" by avoiding discussing BEIR VII's principle and relevant findings (new and significant information);

if they had, there is no way that there could be a determination that "NRC's regulations continue to be adequately protective of public health and safety" -that the significance of radiation exposure is "small." What did BEIR VII actually say?* BEIR VII concludes that if 100,000 people were each exposed to 10,000 millirem (1100) people would get a cancer from the radiation and half of them would die. This is above and beyond the number who would have gotten cancer in the absence of the additional radiation.

NRC may think that is a small effect; the families of the cancer victims might think differently." The BEIR VII report reaffirmed the conclusion of the prior report that every exposure to radiation produces a corresponding increase in cancer risk. The average risks to the population are estimated to be 10 to 15 percent higher than the reference value now used for radiation protection of the general population (565 cancer fatalities per million rem exposure in BEIR VII compared to 500 typically 3 cited in the literature on radiation protection).

While this average risk is in the general range of uncertainties and values reported previously, it indicates an increase of mortality risk overall.* BEIR VII found cancer incidence risk is considerably greater -a point ignored by NRC. BEIR VII found cancer incidence risks to be about a third higher than previously presumed in the previous BEIR reports and by agencies such as NRC. Federal Guidance Report 13, prepared with support from NRC, had previously set the cancer incidence risk at 8.76 cancers/ per 10,000 person-rem.

BEIR VII sets it at 11.4.* Workers.:

NRC permits doses to workers of 5/rem/per year. A worker who received that dose every year he or she worked, never going over the limit, would receive a dose of 250 /rem. NRC's own risk figures say 1 in 8 workers so exposed would die from cancer induced by that dose. BEIR VII says-twice that number --- -1 in 4 --- would get cancer from that exposure.

NRC may say risks of 1 in 4 or 1 in 8 are small; hard to say so with a straight face to the quarter of workers who would get cancer from exposure to the "permissible" dose. Unions should demand hazard pay." The Draft ignores BEIR VII's analysis of the effects on women and young children.

In 1990, the NAS estimated that the risks of dying from cancer due to exposure to radiation were about five percent higher for women than for men. In BEIR VII, the cancer mortality risks for females are 3 7.5 percent higher. The risks for all solid tumors, like lung, breast, and kidney, liver, and other solid tumors added together are almost 50 percent greater for women than men, though there are a few specific cancers, including leukemia, for which the risk estimates for men are higher." (Summary estimates are in Table ES-1 on page 28 of the BEIR VII report prepublication copy, on the Web at http://books.nap.edu/books/030909156X/html/28.html.)" The BEIR VII report estimates that the differential risk for children is even greater. For instance, the same radiation in the first year of life for boys produces three to four times the cancer risk as exposure between the ages of 20 and 50. Female infants have almost double the risk as male infants. (Table 12 D-1 and D-2, on pages 550-551 of the prepublication copy of the report, on the Web starting at http://books.nap.edu/books/030909156X/html/550.html)." While the report states there is no direct evidence of harm to human offspring from exposure of parents to radiation, the committee noted that such harm has been found in animal experiments and that there is "no reason to believe that humans would be immune to this sort of harm." (Page 20, prepublication copy)." BEIR VII also noted that relatively high levels of radiation exposure increase risk of heart disease and stroke, though it did not give specific risk estimates.

The committee also noted children born to 4 parents that have been exposed to radiation could be affected by those exposures and study was warranted.

• In sum, cancer mortality and incidence risk has indeed gone up and there is greater recognition that health effects, other than cancer, must be considered.

Therefore "NRC's regulations (do not) continue to be adequately protective of public health and safety and the environment" and the impact cannot be considered "small."" Further BEIR VII was published prior to more recent studies that demonstrate radiation is far more dangerous than that assumed by the National Academies.

These studies were ignored by NRC in the Draft GEIS.(2) Health Research Cited in Draft -Problems:

Methodologically Flawed & NRC Avoided New &Significant Research (a) County statistical studies cited in the Draft included:

NCI 1990; Florida Department of Health, 2001;Illinois Department of Health 2000 & 2006. Each study compared cancer rates in counties with nuclear reactors to those without nuclear reactors and concluded that there was no impact from the reactors.Obviously the studies were flawed because, for example, they assumed that: counties with reactors and counties without were comparable in all other respects; reactors were located dead center in the county and not closer to the county line so that in fact it impacted an adjacent county more; and that the expected impact affected the whole county and not pockets closer to the reactor. Despite these obvious methodological weaknesses, apparently these studies gave the "right answer" for NRC Staff to decide to include them in the Draft.(b) Significant Studies that concluded an impact from exposure were not mentioned in the Draft where NRC is obligated in its rulemaking to review pertinent new information.

For example: Elizabeth Cardis, "Risk of cancer risk after low doses of ionising radiation:

retrospective cohort study in 15 countries." British Medical Journal (2005) 331:77. Cardis published the largest study of occupational radiation exposures ever conducted.

It found, by examining nuclear workers in 15 nations, cancer induction per unit dose is about 6 times higher than currently assumed by EPA and NRC; and similar findings recently were reported in the Techa River cohort (Krestina et al (2005).3 Krestinina LY, Preston DL, Ostroumova EV,Degteva MO, Ron E, Vyushkova OV, et al. 2005.Protracted radiation exposure and cancer mortality in the Techa River cohort. Radiation Research 5 Both studies give similar values for low dose, protracted exposure, namely (1) cancer death per Sievert (100 rem). In the United States a series of other occupational studies, including several from the Department of Energy's Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Oak Ridge, and Hanford nuclear facilities, suggest current agency risk estimates may be low by as much as an order of magnitude." Kaatsch P, Spix C, Schulze- Rath R, et al., Leukaemia in young children living in the vicinity of German nuclear power plants, Int. J Cancer. 2008; 1220:721-726.

A government-sponsored study of childhood cancer in the proximity of 16 German commercial nuclear power plants (German acronym KiKK) found that children < 5 years living < 5 km from the plants had twice the risk for contracting leukemia as those residing > 5 km. The study was very large: it examined 593 under-fives with leukaemia and 1766 controls.

The study was consistent with other European childhood leukemia 4 studies and radiation exposure.* Southeastern Massachusetts Health Study [published in the Archives of Environmental Health, Vol.51, p.266, July-August 1996] found a four-fold increase in adult leukemia the closer one lived or worked to the Pilgrim NPS.(3) Monitoring Releases Into The Air And Water Onsite And Environmental Sampling Offsite-Unreliable So That Health Impact Cannot Be Determined By Applicant's Emissions Data Neither the NRC, licensee nor the public knows for certain what is released into the air and water from reactors to say, as the Draft incorrectly does say, that releases are within limits and therefore have no negative impacts. The NRC knows what we say is true. For example, in the Liquid Radioactive Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report, September 1, 2006 5 NRC says that,[The Branch Technical Division]...

does not require ground water monitoring within the licensee's site for general detection and 164(5):602-611.

4 Baker PJ, Hoel DG. Meta-analysis of standardized incidence and mortality rates of childhood leukemia in proximity to nuclear facilities.

Eur J Cancer Care. 2007;16:355-363; Fairlie I. J Radiol Protect. 2007;27:157-168; CERRIE. Report of the Committee Examining the Radiation Risks of Internal Emitters.

Chilton: Health Protection Agency, 2004. www.cerrie.org Guizard, Boutou 0, Pottier D, et al. The incidence of childhood leukaemia around the La Hague nuclear waste reprocessing plant (France):

a survey for the years 1978-1998.

J Epidem Comm Health.2001 ;55(7):469-480.

5 Liquid Radioactive Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report, September 1, 2006, NRC http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/grndwtr-contam-tritium.html

]6 monitoring purposes.

Ground water monitoring within the licensee's site is only required if the ground water is tapped for drinking or irrigation purposes.

P. 18 [Emphasis added]The radiation detection capabilities specified in the BTP are the 1970's state-of-the-art for routine environmental measurements in laboratories.

More sensitive radiation detection capability exists today, but there is no regulatory requirement for the plants to have this equipment.

The guidance primarily focuses on gamma isotopic analysis of environmental material and on tritium in water samples. There are minimal requirements for analyzing environmental samples for beta- and alpha -emitting radionuclides.

P. 18 [Emphasis added]The regulatory guidance provides built in flexibility in the scope of the REMP. It ... allows licensees to reduce the scope of and frequency of the sampling program, without the NRC approval, on historical data. ... if a licensee's environmental samples have not detected licensed radioactive material in several years, then the licensee typically reduces the scope and sample frequency of the associated environmental pathway. NRC inspections have observed reductions in the scope and frequency of licensee programs...

p. 19 [Emphasis added]Reactors are not required to have real-time combination radiation/meteorological monitoring stations (measuring high and low let alpha and beta, in addition to gamma) located in appropriate offsite communities, placed according to meteorological studies, and computer linked to the NRC, state Departments of Public Health, and available on line to the public.Only with such a requirement would there be "reasonable assurance" that releases were within allowable limits; and would there be real and reliable data to look backwards to determine a link between any evidence of pockets of radiation-linked disease and the reactor.Only with real-time monitors, as described, would NRC then be qualified to determine the impact of releases.7

b. Health Impacts Should Be Designated Category 2, Site-Specific.

Health impacts are site specific due to: history of operations, such as the use of bad fuel and above-normal releases, as was the case 'at Pilgrim NPS; demographic characteristics of past and projected population, an increase for example in population groups most susceptible to radiation such as children, women, the elderly; meteorology, for example gravity drainage or plumes over water that can carry radiation to more distant yet heavily populated areas; evidence of radiation-linked diseases in the affected community; proximity to other toxic emitters that could act synergistically with radiation enhancing its impact, a cumulative impact.In sum, any Petitioner in a license renewal proceedings deserves the opportunity to show any new and significant information that demonstrates that the off-site radiological consequences of another twenty years of operations may be greater than previously thought -evidence that the particular affected population is more susceptible to more radiation-linked damage than was contemplated when the plant was licensed.2. SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IS-171 NRC incorrectly assigns "small impact" and a Category 1 designation to solid waste management, low level waste storage and disposal and onsite storage of spent fuel.a. Low-Level Waste Storage & Disposal NRC assigns a "small impact" and a Category 1 designation to Low-Level Waste Storage and disposal, Table 2.1-1. We disagree. (a) There is nothing low about so-called "low-level waste." Radioactive waste is characterized according to where it comes from, not according to its toxicity and longevity; therefore it can indeed impact public health and safety. Low dose concentration does not equate with low dose exposure; especially if the material is ingested or inhaled.6 (b) Sites vary on whether or not the state in which the site is located has access to an off-site storage facility; site specific geography and acreage; and potential impact of climate change (increased frequency and severity of storms and eroding coast lines)6 High-Level Dollars Low-Level Sense, A Critique Of Present Policy For The Management Of Long-Lived Radioactive Waste And Discussion Of An Alternative Approach, Arjun Makhijani, Scott Saleska, A Report of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, 1992.8 and terrorism.

All of the foregoing factors are site specific and new and significant information.

Petitioners should be allowed to bring these forward as Category 2 issues.b. onsite storage of spent fuel: NRC assigns a "small impact" and a Category 1 designation to onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel, Table 2.1-1. We disagree and reference the filings on record submitted by Pilgrim Watch, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office and New York State in the License Renewal Applications of Entergy in Pilgrim, Vermont Yankees and Indian Point's adjudications respectively; and the filings on record as comments to NRC's Proposed Waste Confidence Decision by Pilgrim Watch;Texans For A Sound Energy Policy; Attorney Generals of New York, Vermont and Massachusetts7.

(1) Impact Potentially Large Under Severe Accident Situations:

The Draft incorrectly determined that the impact was small. There would be nothing small about the potential impact on the environment from a spent fuel pool fire in a densely packed spent fuel pool. For example: The Massachusetts Attorney General's Request for a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene With Respect to Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc.'s Application for Renewal of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plants License Renewal Application (May 2006) estimated the costs of latent cancers following the release of one isotope, C-137, from Pilgrim's pool. It said that, Estimates of Costs and Latent Cancers Following Releases of Cesium-137 From Pilgrim's Spent-Fuel Pool 8 10% release C-137 100% release C-137 Cost (billions)

$105-$175 billion $342-$488 Billion Latent Cancers 8,000 24,000 7 Texans For A Sound Energy Policy And Commenters On Proposed Waste Confidence Decision Update And Proposed Rule Regarding Consideration Of Environmental Impacts Of Temporary Storage Of Reactor Operations Prepared By Ms. Diane Curran, Esq; New York Attorney General's Office, 02,06,09, comment 26; and Comment of The Offices of the Attorneys General of the States of New York and Vermont and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on Waste Confidence Decision Update and Consideration of Environmental Impacts of Temporary Storage of Spent Fuel After Cessation of Reactor Operation 2009/02/06, Comment (21) (2) Reactors vary -GE mark I BWR's for example are considerably more vulnerable to acts of malice.8 The Massachusetts Attorney General's Request for a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene With respect to Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc.'s Application for Renewal of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plants Operating License and Petition for Backfit Order Requiring New Design features to Protect Against Spent Fuel Pool Accidents, Docket No. 50-293, May 26, 2006 includes a Report to The Massachusetts Attorney General On The Potential Consequences Of A Spent Fuel Pool Fire At The Pilgrim Or Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant, Jan Beyea, PhD., May 25, 2006.9 It is sobering for a comparison to look at the impact of the Chernobyl accident, 1986, to help understand the potential impact from an accident from a spent fuel pool fire. Sheep remain contaminated in Wales;reindeer are still contaminated in Lapland from an accident that occurred more than 20 years ago.Chernobyl was bad, no doubt, but certainly not worst case. The 1986 Chernobyl accident released 2,403,000 curies of C-137; whereas Pilgrim's core, for example, during license extension will have 5,130,000 curies of C-137 [Beyea Declaration, Chernobyl; and LR, Pilgrim CS-137 figures];

and at Pilgrim the inventory of long-lived radionuclides, such as Cesium-137, in the spent fuel pool is eight times that in the reactor core.Therefore, the Draft's Table 4.9.1.2-1 Conclusions, Consideration of Spent Fuel Pool Accidents (Section E.3.7) are foolish. It says that, "... it is concluded that the environmental impacts from accidents at spent fuel pools (SFPs) (as quantified in NUREG-1738) can be comparable to those from reactor accidents at full power (as estimated in NUREG-150).

Subsequent analyses performed, and mitigative measures employed since 2001 have further lowered the risk of this class of accidents.

In addition, even the conservative estimates from NUREG-1738 are much less than the impacts from full power reactor accidents as estimated in the 1996 GEIS." The NRC Draft misleads once again by totally avoiding an important fact brought forward in NUREG-1738, Technical Study of Spent Fuel Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants (2001), of spent fuel pool accident risk, performed for NRC by Sandia. It clearly stated that a catastrophic meltdown in the spent fuel pool of a nuclear plant could cause 25,000 fatal radiation induced cancers as far out as 500 miles from the site. An especially important fact is that in Sandia's Millstone analysis, they assumed that 95% of the population around Millstone 1 evacuated in a timely fashion.Spent Fuel Pool Fire Accompanied by a Reactor Accident Also ignored in the Draft's analysis is a spent fuel pool fire accompanied by a reactor accident -credible"reasonably foreseeable" events that have "catastrophic consequences.

At typical US nuclear power plants the spent-fuel pool may be located outside but immediately adjacent to the reactor's containment and share some essential support systems with the reactor; or the pool may be inside the main reactor building and again share some essential support systems with the reactor. Thus, it is important to consider potential interactions between the pool and the reactor in the context of accidents.

There could be at least three types of interaction.

First, a pool fire and a core-damage accident could occur together, with a common cause. For example, a severe earthquake could cause leakage of water from the pool, while also 10 damaging the reactor and its supporting systems to such an extent that a core-damage accident occurs.Second, the high radiation field produced by a pool fire could initiate or exacerbate an accident at the reactor by precluding the presence and functioning of operating personnel.

Third, the high radiation field produced by a core-damage accident could initiate or exacerbate a pool fire, again by precluding the presence and functioning of operating personnel.

Many core-damage sequences would involve the interruption of cooling to the pool, which would call for the presence of personnel to provide makeup water or spray cooling of exposed fuel. The third type of interaction was considered in a license-amendment proceeding in regard to expansion of spent-fuel-pool capacity at the Harris nuclear power plant.Environmental impacts that must be considered in an EIS include those which are "reasonably foreseeable" and have "catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low." 40 CFR §1502.22(b)(1).

Spent fuel pool fires as explained in Pilgrim Watch's and the Massachusetts and New York Attorney General's Motions to Intervene and subsequent appeals and referenced comments to NRC's Waste Confidence Rule Update are "reasonably foreseeable" and have "catastrophic consequences." NRC's Waste Confidence Rule: The Draft justifies determining "small impact" by reference to NRC's Updated Waste Confidence Rule. However NRC's rule is based upon documents that the public cannot see because of "safeguards." This places the public in an Alice in Wonderland situation.

It contradicts Chairman Jaczko's September 24, 2009 warning that NRC "is strengthened by public involvement and input, and by (NRC) being open and transparent about what we do and why." Last the Draft should look to the 1996 GEIS and appreciate that there is a big difference between onsite storage of spent fuel under normal operations (considered now in the GELS, Section 6) and in severe accidents (GELS, Section 5). GEIS, Section 5, deals specifically with severe accidents.

A straight-forward reading finds nothing in it to exclude spent fuel -pools currently have the largest inventory of radioactive material at reactor sites and hence the potential for the most severe consequences.

Severe accidents are defined in Section 5 because of their severe consequences, and are "severe" regardless of whether they originate from the core or the spent fuel pool. This Draft document should be revised to say likewise.11 (2) On-site storage of spent fuel is a Category 2 issue: " The NRC has never performed an EIS that addresses the potential for, and impacts of, the onset of exothermic oxidation reactions in a spent fuel pool. NUREG 1437 § 6.4.6 simply states "Inadvertent criticality and acute occupational exposure are remote risks of dense-racking (DOE/RW-0220)." Yet, in a report published in October 2000 and issued in January 2001, the NRC Staff has conceded that if the water in any densely packed spent nuclear fuel pool is lost, even a year and longer after discharge, the fuel will heat up to the point where its zircoloy cladding will melt and then catch fire.9 As stated previously, the resulting fire will not be able to be extinguished by water and has the potential of significantly contaminating hundreds of miles downwind.

Spent Fuel Heatup Following Loss of Water During Storage, Allen Benjamin et al. (Sandia National Laboratory, NUREG/CR The risk of fire is increased because the spent fuel is densely packed NUREG/CR-0649, SAND77-1371, 1979), fig. 14.* In 2001, the NRC staff summarized the conclusions of its most recent analysis of the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident in a spent fuel pool as follows: (I)t was not feasible, without numerous constraints, to establish a generic decay heat level (and therefore a decay time) beyond which a zirconium fire is physically impossible.

Heat removal is very sensitive to ... factors such as fuel assembly geometry and SFP (spent fuel pool) rack configuration

...(which) are plant specific and ... subject to unpredictable changes after an earthquake or cask drop that drains the pool. Therefore, since a non-negligible decay heat source lasts many years and since configurations ensuring sufficient air flow for cooling cannot be assured, the possibility of reaching the zirconium ignition temperature cannot be precluded on a generic basis. Id. at 18. (Emphasis added)* Reactors differ in design, layout and physical protection features affecting the safety of onsite storage in spent fuel pools. For example, GE Mark I reactor's spent fuel pool are located outside primary containment in the attic of the reactor. This is more susceptible to acts of malice than reactors designed with the pool separate from the main reactor building.9A technical study of spent fuel accident risk, performed for the NRC by Sandia Lab, clearly stated that a catastrophic meltdown in the spent fuel pool of a nuclear power plant could cause fatal, radiation-induced cancer in 25,000 people as far as 500 miles from the site. NUREG-1738 Technical Study of Spent Fuel Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants (2001).12

" The NRC has demonstrated that it considers terrorist attacks on nuclear plants are foreseeable threats that must be addressed; the Pilgrim spent fuel pool, for example, is particularly vulnerable to attack from the air." The use and probable effectiveness of mitigation varies from site to site -requiring site specific analysis." Reactor sites differ in topography and demography making the risk of onsite storage of spent fuel site specific.3. POSTULATED ACCIDENTS The NRC staff incorrectly has concluded that the environmental impacts of design-basis accidents are of small significance for all plants and are designated Category 1. Severe accidents absurdly are designated"Small impact" also that includes the probability-weighted consequences of atmospheric releases, fallout onto open bodies of water, releases to groundwater, and societal and economic impacts from severe accidents are small for all plants. However, alternatives to mitigate severe accidents must be considered for all plants that have not considered such alternatives.

a. Small Impact: The impact of postulated accidents incorrectly is categorized as "small." The Draft arrives at this absurd conclusion as a result of the following.

(1) NRC allowing Applicant's to use computational codes that minimize impact -MACCS/MACCS2 or WinMACCS.

All three incorporate ATMOS, an inappropriate plume distribution model for complex sites (sites located on coastal areas, river valleys, hilly or mountain terrain).

ATMOS incorrectly assumes the plume will travel in a straight line and thereby narrows the true area of true impact.(2) NRC and Applicants assume a best case scenario; underestimate release; and base dose response on outdated science.(3) NRC and Applicants minimize or ignore a host of costs in their calculations from evacuation time estimates, clean-up costs (discussed for example in SAND96-0957, Appendix E at 11 and from lessons learned from Chernobyl), health costs, to economic costs. David Chanin author of the code said, "If you want to discuss economic costs ... the 'cost model' of MACCS2 is not worth anyone's time. My sincere advice is to not waste anyone's time (and money) in trying to make any sense of it." (and) "I have spent 13 many many hours pondering how MACCS2 could be used to calculate economic costs and concluded it was impossible.1 0" (4) NRC and Applicants ignore spent fuel fires; and ignore the spread of an accident from/between the spent fuel pool and reactor. See Pilgrim Watch's filings regarding SAMA, Contention 3, in Pilgrim's License Renewal Application and New York State's filings regarding SAMA in Indian Point's License Renewal Application.

Examples: (a) Computer Code & Meteorological Model: NRC and Applicants use the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS), MACCS2 or most recent WinMACCS computer code in SAMAs." Meteorological Model in the computer code- ATMOS inappropriate:

The codes incorporate ATMOS, the straight -line Gaussian Plume model -both the computer code and ATMOS underestimate consequence.

Severe Accident Mitigation Analysis is required for license renewal and licensing of new reactors; they must be required to use site appropriate computer codes and plume distribution models. DOE recognized the deficiencies in the MACCS/MACCS2 model and updated with SAND96-0957; NRC refused to do likewise.Variable trajectory plume distribution models are appropriate for complex sites such as in coastal locations and sites along river valleys and in hilly terrain. Current computer technology and capability make using these models practical.

NRC, DOE, EPA, The National Research Council of the National Academies, State Officials, nuclear trade groups, & air dispersion modeling community agree that the straight line Gaussian plume model cannot account for the effects of complex terrain on the dispersion of pollutants from a source; therefore NRC must require that variable models, not straight-line Gaussian models, are used in performing SAMA analyses so that consequences are not distorted and minimized. (See attachment A).* Computer Codes used were designed as research codes not licensing codes: MACCS2 calculations are used by NRC as a basis of recent commercial reactor license-renewal decisions involving SAMA cost/benefit analysis of severe accident risks. However as explained by David Chanin, the author of the code in a paper written for the Energy Facilities Contractor Operating Group Safety Analysis 10 www.chaninconsulting.com 14 1 Working Group Annual Workshop, April 29-May 5, 2005, Santa Fe, NM, The Development of MA CCS2: Lessons Learned,'1 MACCS2 was never intended or advertised as appropriate for use as a licensing code; instead it was developed as a research code. MACCS (and its successor MACCS2) were not developed according to the very strict 18-point QA requirements of NQA-1 13 as is required for SARs...Rather, both MACCS and MACCS2 were developed following the less rigorous research-focused QA guidelines of ANSI/ANS 10.4.On p. 1-7 of the MACCS2 User's Guide, there is a strong warning for analysts who choose to use it for such purposes: When MACCS2 is used for authorization basis studies, it is very important to carefully review the code's phenomenological models and input parameter values to ensure that they conform to applicable guidance and are appropriate for the accident scenario being modeled.The identification of deficiencies in these areas could bring into question the safety basis of the facility.

If errors are later found in authorization basis calculations, an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) could be raised, and continued operation of the facility would then require a demonstration that the facility's safety basis was adequate.Because license renewal is in fact a licensing decision as licensing code should be required -even if it necessitates NRC funding the development of such a code.(b) Assumption "best case" scenario & ignoring onsite storage spent fuel Potential Impact Far From Small: As said in the forgoing, it is sobering for a comparison to look at the impact of the Chernobyl accident, 1986, to help understand the potential impact from postulated accidents.

Sheep remain contaminated in Wales and reindeer are still contaminated in Lapland from an accident 20 years ago. Chemobyl was bad, no doubt, but certainly not worst case. The 1986 Chemobyl accident released 2,403,000 curies of C-137; whereas Pilgrim's core, for example, during license extension will have 5,130,000 curies of C-137 [Beyea Decl, Chernobyl; and LR, Pilgrim CS-137 figures];"Chanin, D.I. (2005), "The Development of MACCS2: Lessons Learned," [written for:] EFCOG Safrev Analysis Annual Workshop Proceedings, Santa Fe, NM, April 29-May 5, 2005. Full text available on http://chaninconsulting.com/iindex.php?resume 15 and at Pilgrim the inventory of long-lived radionuclides, such as Cesium-137, in the spent fuel pool is eight times that in the reactor core.4. TERMINATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATIONS AND DECOMMISSIONING The Draft wrongly argues that, "... termination of plant operations and decommissioning would occur eventually regardless of license renewal. The additional 20-year period of operation under the license renewal term would not affect the impacts of shutdown and decommissioning on any resource or at any plant." This is designated as "small impact" Category 1 issue.a. Decommissioning Mischaracterized By NRC as Small Impact As any plant ages, it is more likely to develop operating failures such as increasing the likelihood, magnitude and frequency of leaks into the ground water. There already have been a noticeable increase in leakage as plants approach 40 years old, and there are no signs that this trend will abate. Thus decommissioning costs are not static, are site specific, and are likely to increase dramatically with the increased probability of significant cleanup of groundwater radioactive plumes.b. Decommissioning

-Category 2 Issue, not Category 1 Decommissioning activities cannot be relegated to Category 1. Recent disclosures of inadequate capital in decommissioning funds at a large number of reactor sites, as well as wide fluctuations in the reported fiscal health of certain decommissioning funds should be fair game for Petitioners as a Category 2 issue.Failure of the licensee to possess adequate capital at the time of decommissioning could impact safety margins and place an undue burden on ratepayers or taxpayers.

As currently argued in Vermont regarding ENVY, the decommissioning fund should be fully funded before the license renewal application is approved.5. RADIONUCLIDES RELEASED TO GROUNDWATER NRC incorrectly assigns "small to moderate impact" from radionuclides released to groundwater.

We are pleased that NRC properly designated it as a Category 2 issue.a. Impacts -Mischaracterized To Be Of Small to Moderate Impact 16 NRC bases this determination on inadequate information; blind faith in the sufficiency of industry's proposed voluntary initiatives; and a wrong assessment of the adequacy of NRC's aging management program.(1) Impact Based Inadequate Information Neither NRC, the licensee, state/local governments nor the public knows exactly what has leaked to groundwater or unmonitored offsite into adjacent water bodies. This is because, for example: NRC does not require monitoring wells onsite unless the ground water is used for drinking.

Radiation detection capabilities used by industry are based on 1970's technology.

NRC does not define the magnitude of spills that must be reported nor do they define "significant contamination" that needs to be recorded after the cleanup process. There is no requirement that this information must be submitted to the NRC.Although 10CFR50.75 (g) discusses the requirement for records of any remaining residual contamination, there are no regulatory requirements which require remediation while the power plant is operating.

This was made clear by NRC in a report The NRC's Groundwater Contamination (Tritium) at Nuclear Plants-Task Force -Final Report, Sept 1, 2006.In the Executive Summary they say, Leakage that enters the ground below the plant may be undetected because there are generally no NRC requirements to monitor the groundwater onsite for radioactive contamination.

Contamination in groundwater onsite may migrate offsite undetected.

And further in the report that,... many of the release events reviewed occurred over an extended period of time and the use of current source term data may not reflect actual conditions at the time of release. p. 13"the NRC should develop guidance to the industry for detecting, evaluating, and monitoring releases from operating facilities via unmonitored pathways." P. 15 17

[The Branch Technical Division]...

does not require ground water monitoring within the licensee's site for general detection and monitoring purposes.

Ground water monitoring within the licensee's site is only required if the ground water is tapped for drinking or irrigation purposes.

P. 18 The radiation detection capabilities specified in the BTP are the 1970's state-of-the-art for routine environmental measurements in laboratories.

More sensitive radiation detection capability exists today, but there is no regulatory requirement for the plants to have this equipment.

The guidance primarily focuses on gamma isotopic analysis of environmental material and on tritium in water samples. There are minimal requirements for analyzing environmental samples for beta- and alpha -emitting radionuclides.

P. 18 The regulatory guidance provides built in flexibility in the scope of the REMP. It ... allows licensees to reduce the scope of and frequency of the sampling program, without the NRC approval, on historical data. ..if a licensee's environmental samples have not detected licensed radioactive material in several years, then the licensee typically reduces the scope and sample frequency of the associated environmental pathway. NRC inspections have observed reductions in the scope and frequency of licensee programs...

p. 19 No specific regulatory requirements for licensees to conduct routine onsite environmental surveys and monitoring for potential abnormal spills and leaks of radioactive liquids. However, 10CFR 50.72(g)requires that licensees keep records of information important to the safe and effective decommissioning of the facility.

These records include information about known spills [key word "known"].The rule does not define the magnitude of the spills and the leaks that need to be documented by the licensee.

Also the rule does not define"significant contamination" that needs to be recorded after the cleanup process. There is no requirement that this information must be submitted 18 to the NRC. However, the records are available for review by NRC inspectors.

Although 1OCFR50.75(g) discusses the requirement for records of any remaining residual contamination, there are no regulatory requirements which require remediation while the power plant is operating.

A licensee's decision to remediate contamination before the plant is decommissioned is typically based on several factors, including ALARA considerations for potential worker and public dose, cost, feasibility, disposal options, and external stakeholder considerations.

P. 19 (2) Draft's Misguided Faith -Adequacy Industry's Voluntary Groundwater Protection Initiatives NRC in response to the recent proliferation of leaks from reactors decided to allow industry to self regulate instead of imposing enforceable requirements

-regulations.

Voluntary programs are not enforceable and do not provide the protection the public deserves; neither do they assure that NRC's rules that prohibit unmonitored radioactive releases offsite will be followed.The weaknesses identified by Pilgrim Watch in Entergy's Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program and Monitoring Program provide an example. 1 2* Section 5.0, subsection

[1] at page 7 acknowledges right at the beginning that "The risk of a failure caused by corrosion, directly or indirectly, is probably the most common hazard associated with buried piping and tanks."* Steps required in building a risk assessment tool are discussed in Section 5.0, subsection

[2] on page 7. However the program fails in that it does not require a complete baseline review. There is no indication that the entire component is supposed to be examined; instead escape hatches are provided to the licensee -such as [at 2a] "the size of each section shall reflect practical considerations of operation, maintenance, and cost of data gathering with respect to the benefit of increased accuracy." Any program worth its salt would require a thorough baseline inspection along the entire length of the pipe.12 Docket 50-293: Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, April 2008 -Adams Accession Number ML081070329; Pilgrim Watch Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, June 2009 -Adams Accession Number ML081650345; Pilgrim Watch Petition for Review of LBP-06-848

-Adams Accession Number ML083240599 19

• Subsection

[4] categorizes the piping into high, medium and low impact. High impact components require prompt attention.

The Board agrees that they should require prompt attention however Entergy's definition of "prompt" allows considerable delay -high impact buried sections shall be examined within 9 months of issuance of the procedure; and no date is given when the procedure shall be initiated.

• Buried piping and tanks having high risk are specified as having an initial inspection period of 5 years with a re-inspection interval of 8 years. The time interval is too long* The Table does not tell how much of the component will be inspected.

• There is no requirement to shorten a subsequent inspection based upon the degree of corrosion discovered at the time of the prior inspection.

• Absent from this procedure is the prudent and practical guidance to conduct the inspection provisions of this procedure when opportunities present themselves, regardless of the inspection intervals in Table 4. For example, if a section of buried piping categorized as having "Low" inspection priority is excavated for other reasons, this excavation procedure should direct/require workers to take advantage of the opportunity and perform inspections-corrosion is neither linear nor constant across the component's length.* In subsection

[5], the determination of inspection locations may also consider the "ease of access to inspection point." However, ease of location and lack of corrosion do not necessarily go together.

A component that is difficult to access may never been inspected

-all the more reason that it should be inspected now.* Section 5.6, Parameters to be Inspected, page 13, lists: external coatings and wrapping condition; pipe wall thickness degradation; tank plate thickness degradation; and cathodic protection system performance, if applicable.

The attributes that must be considered in tabulating risk are too narrow. They include: (a) soil resistivity measurement; (b) drainage risk weight; (c) material risk weight; (d) cathodic protection/coating risk weight.* The list in Section 5.6 should be expanded to include, for example, the age of the component's parts; the number of high risk corrosion areas in component such as welds, dead spots etc;counterfeit or substandard part not replaced.

The list is silent on internal corrosion even though corrosion from the inside can bring about a failure." Section 5.6 also is silent on the size of the sample required, its location, and the rational for the sampling protocol -if, in fact, a sample is taken and not an inspection of the entire component.

Section 5.7, on page 13, provides vague remarks about acceptance criteria for any degradation of external coating, wrapping and pipe wall or tank plate thickness.

It says that they should be based 20 on current plant procedures; and if not covered by plant procedures then new procedures need to be developed before the inspections.

The pass/fail grade should be clearly defined. For example what precisely constitutes an "unacceptable" from an "acceptable" degraded external wrapping?The NRC's Lessons Learned task Force was very specific that "significant" and other such descriptions need definition.

Section 5.8, Corrective Actions, page 14, says that "a condition report (CR) shall be written if acceptance criteria are not met. Any and all inspections should generate a written condition report' regardless of what is or is not found to maintain a permanent paper trail of all inspections.

The Section also says that corrective actions may include engineering valuations, scheduled inspections, and change of coating or replacement of corrosion susceptible components, and those components that do not meet acceptance criteria shall be dispositioned by engineering.

[Emphasis added]. This provides no assurance to public safety for-the following reasons.a. The corrective actions may include engineering valuations, -scheduled inspections, and change of coating or replacement of corrosion susceptible components; but they also "may not." These should be required.b. The licensee's own engineering department will deal with it; but there is no clear definition of how they will deal with it. There should be layers of supervision and that the NRC should have an oversight role in this program?c. Who sees the Condition Reports -or to put it another way, where are the reports kept, who has access to those reports, do they have to be sent to the NRC and if so under what conditions and time schedule?

A more basic issue is that Condition Reports are unlikely to be written or, if they are written, to actually say anything as explained directly below.Section 5.12 Inspection Methods and Technologies/Techniques, subsection

[1] on page 15 specifies steps to be taken for Visual Inspections of buried piping and tanks. Step (g) directs the workers: "A CR [condition report] shall be initiated if the acceptance criteria are not met." A review of steps (a) through (f) reveal a lack of objective, or even subjective, acceptance criteria that could trigger a condition report: a. When opportunities arise, buried sections of piping and tanks "should be examined to quantify deposit accumulation...

and those results documented." As long as exposed piping is examined and damage chronicled, the acceptance criteria are met -no condition report.b. "Look for signs of damaged coatings or wrapping defects"-as long as workers look the acceptance criteria are met. Only not looking would fail to meet the acceptance criterion and trigger a condition report.21

c. "The interior of piping may be examined by divers, remote cameras, robots or moles, when appropriate:" The combination of "may" and "when appropriate" means the acceptance criterion is met when examinations are performed or not.d. "Use holiday tester to check excavated areas of piping for coating defects:" When coating defects are found for exposed area of piping using a holiday tester, the acceptance criteria is met and no condition report is written.e. If visual inspection reveals coatings or wrappings are not intact, further inspection of piping for signs of pitting, MIC, etc. is required; and if the additional inspection is performed and the acceptance criterion is satisfied then no condition report is warranted whether damage is found or not.f. Inspect below grade concrete for indication of cracking and loss of material.

As long as the inspection is performed, the acceptance criterion is satisfied whether damage is found or not." Section 5.12 subsection

[2] on page 16 specifies the steps to be. taken for Non-Destructive Testing of buried piping and tanks. No steps direct workers to initiate condition report(s)regardless of how extensive the piping and/or tank damage is identified.

• Section 5.9 Preventive Measures, at 14, "...the existing cathodic protection system may be updated or a new Cathodic Protection system may be installed.

Pilgrim Watch has explained that cathodic protection should be installed.

The emphasis should be on prevention not waiting to discover failures before acting.In summary, reasonable assurance is not provided by this new program. Ground Water Programs need real commitments.

(3) Draft's Misguided Assessment

-Adequacy Aging Management Program in License Renewal The Draft incorrectly assumes that the aging management program for buried pipes and tanks and the day-today maintenance programs provide reasonable assurance that the impact will be small to moderate.This is misguided and fully explained in Pilgrim Watch's filings on Contention 1 in Entergy's License Renewal Application adjudication.

Please refer to those documents in NRC's Adams collection." 3 The Aging Management Program: The Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection Program include (a)preventive measures to mitigate corrosion and (b) inspections to manage the effects of corrosion on the pressure-retaining capability of buried carbon steel, stainless steel, and titanium components.

Preventive measures are in accordance with standard industry practice for maintaining external coatings and 13 Ibid.22 wrappings.

Buried components are inspected when excavated during maintenance.

If trending within the corrective action program identifies susceptible locations, the areas with a history of corrosion problems are evaluated for the need for additional inspection, alternate coating, or replacement.

A focused inspection will be performed within the first 10 years of the period of extended operation, unless an opportunistic inspection (or an inspection via a method that allows assessment of pipe condition without excavation) occurs within this ten-year period.Neither the Aging Management Program for buried pipes and tanks, nor the inspections and tests performed as part of routine maintenance and operation, provide reasonable assurance that the effects of aging will be managed such that the buried pipes within scope and under consideration will perform their intended functions consistent with the current licensing basis for the period of extended operation.

They are not sufficient.

Therefore in order to protect public safety, the aging management program must be enhanced or supplemented with a more robust inspection system, cathodic protection, a base line inspection prior to license extension, and an effective monitoring well program or any licensee's Application denied Day-to-Day maintenance procedures quite obviously are ineffective; if they were effective the proliferation of leaks known to have occurred would not have happened.

For example, the water chemistry program is a mitigation program and does not provide detection for aging effects. More frequent complete inspections as part of the overall program are the only effective assurance that defects created by aging components will be uncovered.

Tritium leaks at reactors across the country belie the effectiveness of water chemistry alone to prevent leaks.6. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT (S 4)3.3.1 METEOROLOGY AND CLIMATOLOGY (3-30 TO 3-31)NRC's Draft discusses the importance of meteorology.

In the Draft they say that the NRC requires that basic meteorological information be available for use in assessing (1) the environmental effects of radiological and non-radiological emissions and effluents resulting the construction or operation of a nuclear power plant and (2) the benefits of design alternatives.

23 Plume Modeling Misrepresented

-Implications The Draft makes clear that NRC does not have an accurate understanding of plume modeling and as a result the Draft incorrectly assigns significance levels to certain issues (examples:

health effects, emergency planning, SAMA) and incorrectly determined whether some issues are generic, Category 1 or site specific, Category 2 -all contrary to their own definitions of significance levels and criteria for category designation.

The Draft says that, "The most recent update to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.23, which covers meteorological monitoring programs for nuclear power plants, provides new guidance for onsite meteorological measurements at stationary licensed power reactors.

The guidance covers the siting of instruments to provide representative measures at plant sites, the accuracy and range of specified measured parameters, and special considerations for plants located near influences of complex terrain (e.g., coastal areas, hills of significant grade or valleys), among other criteria and specifications." This "positive spin" is misleading.

What they fail to provide is an analysis of improvements that must be required to provide accurate plume modeling.Onsite fixed Meteorological Towers: The Draft says that, "Onsite meteorological conditions at commercial nuclear power plants are monitored at primary fixed meteorological towers with instrumentation at two levels (e.g., 10 and 60 in), and, if necessary, one additional higher level on the tower to better represent dispersion of elevated releases from stacks. A secondary onsite tower is typical at many installations as a backup if primary tower measures fail." What NRC does not tell you is that the onsite tower is insufficient.

It tells where the plume is going onsite but not what may happen to it once it goes offsite. The simple fact is that measurements from a single 220' high anemometer will not provide sufficient information to project how an accidental release of a hazardous material would travel. For example: For cases at sites located adjacent to large bodies of water when the sea breeze is just developing and for cases when the onshore component winds do not reach entirely from the ground to the anemometer height, the occurrence of a sea breeze would not be identified.

The anemometer would likely indicate an offshore wind indication.

Further as PW demonstrated in Pilgrim's License Renewal process that basing wind direction on the single on-site meteorological tower data ignores shifting wind patterns away from the Pilgrim Plant including temporary stagnations, re-circulations, and wind flow reversals that produce a different plume trajectory.

24 Variability of Weather Conditions:

The Draft says that, "Weather conditions at each of the plants can be quite variable depending on the year, season, time of day, and site-specific conditions, such as whether the site is near coastal zones or located in or near terrain with complex features (e.g., steep slopes, ravines, valleys)." However NRC then fails to do anything with it.No mention is made of the importance of requiring the use of advanced variable trajectory plume models (instead of straight-line Gaussian plume models) and requiring real-time data from properly placed met towers offsite in surrounding communities.

Instead the Draft goes off on an irrelevant tangent about"climate zones and historical tornado events," complete with maps. There is no tie to plume modeling, location of meteorological towers, computational modeling -MACCS2 or WINMAC that incorporates ATMOS.The Meteorological references provided, at 3.12, are paltry and show that NRC has not done due diligence in their review. It fails to include for example references to NRC, DOE, EPA, NAS -see references provided in Appendix A.Global Warming The Draft defines global warming in the Glossary; but most important, NRC fails to consider its impact on nuclear reactor operations during an extended license. It properly should be considered on a site specific, Category 2, basis in license renewal.Global phenomena can be anticipated to produce localized effects dependent on site specific conditions.

For example, power plants that cool. directly with seawater would be affected by increased severity of storms and increased salinity in sea water affecting corrosion.

Erosion and/or submergence of shorelines could place some buried components underwater, impacting corrosion in buried components and thereby an increase in potential leaks of radioactivity offsite. Increased severity of flooding or storm surge would also have the potential flood at grade or below grade structures and components including, but not limited to pump houses, reactor building basements, spent fuel pools, buried components associated with the 25 following systems -service water, condensate storage, fuel oil , station blackout diesel generator, and fire protection systems.Increased ocean, lake, river water temperatures would magnify the effect of cooling water discharge on the biotic community.

Warmer average temperatures would, varied by site-specific conditions, result in increased localized humidity and increased incidences of atmospheric temperature inversions.

Changes in degree and incidence of these phenomena may result in increasing the dose from radiological releases radiation to the public and should be analyzed on a site specific basis.Early warnings at the dawn of commercial nuclear development posited just such scenarios: "A gently seeping nuclear reactor can put its radioactive poison under a stable inversion layer and concentrate it onto a few hundred square miles in a truly deadly fashion...

By being careful and also by good luck, we have so far avoided all serious nuclear accidents. " Dr. Edward Teller, Journal of Petroleum Technology:

Issue 2 May 1965.B DRAFT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT EMERGENCY PLANNING &SAFEGUARDS ARE OUTSIDE REVIEW IN LICENSE RENEWAL 1. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

a. NRC's Rationale Lacks Merit- Emergency Planning Deserves to be in Scope The Commission incorrectly determined that there is no need for a special review of emergency planning issues in the context of an environmental review for license renewal (NUREG-1850).

It is outside the scope.The rationale provided in the Draft says the emergency plans for nuclear power plants cover preparations for evacuation, sheltering, and other actions to protect residents near plants in the event. Before a plant is licensed to operate, the NRC must have "reasonable assurance" that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

Therefore, the Commission has determined that there is no need for a special review of emergency planning issues in the context of an environmental review for license renewal (NUREG-1850).

In sum, decisions and recommendations concerning 26 emergency preparedness at nuclear plants are ongoing and outside the regulatory scope of license renewal.PW finds NRC's position and rationale without merit.(1) The Draft says that, "Before a plant is licensed to operate, the NRC must have "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." However, as PW explained in Section I of this comment, "reasonable assurance" is a meaningless term because NRC never defines what level of proof -clear preponderance of the evidence presented

-is required for there to be "reasonable assurance" -51% or > than 90% certainty.

Therefore, "reasonable assurance" is a meaningless term.(2) Local and State officials, at many sites, believe the plans won't work, along with the public. The reasons for their lack of confidence are explained below. The net effect is that the NRC's expressed confidence in planning further undermines the public's confidence in NRC and in this GEIS process.(3) There are site specific differences in preparedness due, for example, to the size of the population in relation to available emergency response infrastructure and resources.

Local and State officials, at many sites, believe the plans won't work, along with the public.It is reasonable to assume that County Leaders take annual certification of evacuation plans for Indian Point seriously, and therefore, refusal to certify the plan is quite significant.

Examples: " Indian Point: Since 2003, the Counties of Westchester, Rockland, and Orange have refused to provide the annual certification for the emergency plans.14" Pilgrim: The Towns of Duxbury and Kingston Massachusetts have refused to certify the radiological plans and procedures for Pilgrim. In order to ascertain local responder's honest views it is necessary to have anonymous questionnaires because responders fear losing their jobs if they give the "wrong answer" and want to avoid missing out on additional pay provided." Vermont Yankee: Through most of this decade, the towns of Brattleboro, Dummerston, Guilford, Halifax and Marlboro declined to certify the RERP.14 New York State Notice of Intention to Participate and Petition to Intervene, Contention 29, NRC Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR, November 30, 2007, at 267.27 Public Believes Plans Won't Work: The State of New York's Attorney General's Office described in NYS's Motion to Intervene a survey to determine the opinion of local responders and officials around Indian Point. The survey was conducted by Ecology and Environment, Inc. for the New York State Emergency Management Office in July 2004 and February 2005 to provide a baseline, and again in July 2006 to determine changes. In 2004, 69 percent of respondents indicated that they would not follow advice from public authorities.

The follow-on survey conducted in 2006 saw that number drastically increase to 91 percent. First responder intentions and attitudes found among the general populace work together15.

NYS summarized their assessment and said that, "The population and transportation constraints unique to Indian Point likely will result in failure of the evacuation plan." Prior to the NYS Attorney General's filing, the Witt Report at Indian Point concluded that local responders and the public lacked confidence in the plan.More recently, public speakers at public meetings held during license renewal at Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Millstone, and Indian Point repeatedly stated that emergency plans would not work. For example: The Town of Plymouth's appointed Nuclear Affairs Committee's Recommendations to the Board of Selectmen, Town of Plymouth, January 2006 said that, "from many perspectives, it is clear that current evacuation plans, well-conceived and well-intended as they are, stand little chance of working in case of a rapidly evolving event." Sandia Survey -Methodologically Unsound: Despite the foregoing, NRC commissioned Sandia to determine how people will respond in a radiological disaster at a nuclear reactor, 2008. The results of the survey were published in NUREG/CR 6953, Vol. 2. The purpose of the study was to determine if people within the EPZs knew what to do in a radiological disaster at a nuclear reactor and whether they would implement protective actions if asked to do so. Generally the study concluded that respondents were well informed about what to do in an emergency and would follow directions.

However, the study was methodologically weak and its results unreliable.

What's wrong with the survey? Examples: Sample Size: The telephone survey randomly administered to 821 households in communities located within 10 miles of nuclear power plants across the country. At that time 4,873,774 persons lived within the 10-mile EPZs of the 104 operating nuclear reactors.

NRC received 800"5 Ibid, at 264, 267 28 replies to the survey that represents 0.016414384417496586%

of the EPZ populations of the 104 operating reactors -a not impressive sample.Demographics of Survey Respondents:

The report does not break down respondents by reactor site, only by Region. It is clear that the demographic characteristics and history surrounding each reactor will affect response.

Surveys to be meaningful must be site specific.

For example: James Lee Witt Associates analysis of preparedness and planning for Indian Point16, at 11.2.1.3, pointed out that each reactor site was unique; therefore each reactor should be surveyed and surveyed every two years in order to gain realistic expectations of public behavior.

At Indian Point,"Having lost many lives in the 9/11 tragedy, they may be especially vulnerable to concerns about terrorism; accordingly, their behavior may be markedly different from what may be expected at other regions and locations." Also it is reasonable to expect that public behavior and attitudes living in EPZs will vary if the EPZs are located in sparsely populated versus more congested areas; areas with higher education levels versus less educated; and EPZs with larger transportation dependent populations.

Further as the Witt Report pointed out, "The survey should not be confined to those within the 10 mile EPZ because there are significant health and safety issues related to public behaviors beyond that zone." Reasons why local/ state officials, at many sites, and the public believe the plans won't work, examples 1 7: Planning is based on false assumptions:

The biological impact and amount of radiation likely to be released is minimized in planning.PAGS are not based on BEIR VII; plans ignore releases from large accidents-e.g., spent fuel pool 16 Review of Emergency Preparedness ofAreas Adjacent to Indian Point and Millstone James Lee Witt Associates, 2003 17 See: Pilgrim Watch's October 19, 2009 Comments Regarding NRC 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 RIN 3150-AIIO (NRC-2008-0122)

Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations and to Pilgrim Watch's Comments Regarding Draft Released for Public Comment, May 18, 2009: Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1 Supplement 4, October 18, 2009 29 fires; accident interaction between the pool and reactor; and TMI releases continue to be misrepresented.

The Affected Area: Airborne emissions are assumed to only affect 2 miles around the site, and a"key hole" from 2-10 miles. This is wrong because it is based on a simplistic straight-line Gaussian plume model not suited for complex sites. It is non-temporal and non-spatial.

Local officials and the public knows that advanced variable models are needed along with met towers placed offsite in surrounding communities to provide real-time data.Dispersion:

The plans assume that airborne radioactive releases rapidly disperse to "safe" levels, limiting the EPZ to 10-miles when the impact is likely to be much larger. This is because we know that local meteorology/geography (e.g., sea breeze, plume concentration as it travels over water, gravity drainage, stagnations and reversals

-are likely to contain, not disperse, a plume.* Notification, sirens primary system: Notification is a key component in emergency preparedness and planning.

Sirens are essentially simply outdoor warning systems, we do not sleep or many do not work outside; worse backup power is not required.

This does not provide reasonable assurance.

The public knows that redundancy is required, such as requiring rapid dialing systems, electronic roadside signboards etc. Emergency responders often lack compatible communications equipment.

• Evacuation Time Estimates:

ETE's are not currently required to be updated. The proposed change to require updates does not include important variables such as an increase in the percent of children (transportation dependent), changes in the infrastructure and shadow evacuation, of ETE's prepared by KLD are based on "best case scenarios, e.g., not peak traffic periods.e Reception Centers: are not equipped to monitor 100% of the population within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by NUREG 0654, J-12; instead they are only required to service 20 percent of the population.

Biennial Exercises:

Exercises are predictable and do not reflect a wide range of challenging events that can occur such as: fast breaking events; infrastructure failures, such as LOOPs, damage to evacuation routes, attack on another reactor impacting the state; exercises held in the evenings, during holidays, and announced; exercises involving the ingestion pathway. Exercises do not all require progression to a General Emergency so that offsite response is tested.b. Emergency Planning -Category 2 Issue Site specific variables affect emergency planning.

For example new information regarding local demographic characteristics and egress routes would affect environmental impacts. These deserve an opportunity for hearing.30

2. SAFEGUARDS

& SECURITY a. Security Belongs in Scope: The Draft says that safeguards and security shall not be looked at in license renewal unless a District Court of Appeals in that state has ruled otherwise.

This is wrong for several reasons: It runs counter to Chairman Jaczko's call for public involvement and input. Because unless the public at a particular site has considerable financial resources to hire an experienced attorney and funds for expert witnesses, the case is unlikely to be brought before the court; or if it is brought forward it is unlikely to be successful.

Courts give deference to agencies and defer to its analysis unless it is without substantial basis in fact. However NRC relies on "studies" that are subject to safeguards so that it is not possible to show by independent analysis that the analysis lacks substantial evidence when the petitioner cannot see that evidence -Alice in Wonderland.

We know that the 911 Commission and NRC are aware that reactors are on the terrorist's hit list and if they were successful the consequences could be catastrophic.

[See the Massachusetts Motion to Intervene in Pilgrim and ENVY's License Renewal Application and the NYS Attorney General's Motion to Intervene in Indian Point's License Renewal Application expert testimony by Dr. Gordon Thompson].

The environmental impacts that must be considered in an EIS include those which are "reasonably foreseeable" and have "catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low ..." 40 CFR § 1502.22(b)

(1).The fact that the likelihood of an impact may not be easily quantifiable is not an excuse for failing to address it in an EIS. NRC regulations require that "to the extent that there are important qualitative considerations or factors that cannot be quantified, these considerations or factors will be discussed in qualitative terms" 10 CFR§5 1.71.b. Security -a Category 2 Issue: Reactors vary in both vulnerability and their attractiveness as targets.For example: Vulnerability:

GE Mark I reactors' spent fuel pools are located outside primary containment, in the attic of the reactors with a thin roof overhead.

Therefore they are especially vulnerable to acts of malice.NUREG 1738 says that containments in BWR Mark 1 reactors provide no substantial barrier to aircraft penetration from a mid-weight commercial aircraft; they did not model larger aircraft or smaller aircraft with explosives.

We know, for example, that penetration of the containment is a step beyond penetration 31 of the spent fuel pool that is outside primary containment.

Also NUREG 1738 looked at Vermont Yankee's susceptibility to a severe earth quake and said that in.a strong quake it would be subject to seismic fragility.

The damage from explosives is due from shock waves, comparable to a seismic event.NUREG 1738 went further and said as a result of a heavy seismic shock, the bottom of the spent fuel pool could fall out. It is a logical extension to predict the same could occur from explosives.

Attractiveness:

Reactors near large population centers, such as Indian Point and Diablo Canyon, are especially attractive targets due to the potential devastation that a successful attack could cause. Likewise symbolic 'targets would have appeal, such as Pilgrim -located in America's Hometown -and TMI.Therefore, this is not a generic issue, all reactors cannot be treated the same.SECTION 2- PROCEDURAL ISSUES A. Public Involvement

& Input Restricted -Recommended The Honorable Gregory Jaczko's said in a speech entitled, "A Regulator's Perspective on New Nuclear Reactor License Applications," September 24, 2009 that, NRC is built upon a solid foundation of a talented workforce dedicated to the safety and security mission of the agency, and guided by sound safety regulations.

This solid foundation is strengthened by public involvement and input, and by our being open and transparent about what we do and why. I am confident that we can successfully meet these challenges in an effective way, with safety at the heart of our decisions.

[Emphasis added]1. Stakeholder Scoping Sessions -Number, Location & Lack Public Outreach Stakeholder Meetings:

Public involvement and input at the stakeholder regional meetings is restricted and limited by the location of the meetings and minimal to non-existent public notification.

In order for there to be meaningful participation, it seems obvious.that meetings should be located convenient to residents near reactor sites due to apply for license renewal and advertised in the local media; not located simply near reactor sites that have already applied for license renewal. For example on September 17, 2009 the regional GEIS Stakeholder meeting was held in Newton Massachusetts, just outside Boston. However, the remaining reactors to apply for license renewal in this region are located in Pennsylvania and New Hampshire.

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2. Participation, Finances:

In order to fulfill the Chairman's goals to assure "public involvement and input," lack of financial resources should not be an impediment for those accepted into the license renewal adjudication process to participate.

Problem: The expense of litigation (filings, including copying and mailing; witness fees; and legal fees)make it impossible for many, if not most, individual members of the public, public interest groups and local governments to participate in the process; or if they are able to take part in the process, to severely limit them in their ability to obtain the number and quality of expert witnesses required to put forward their case. Although rules say that, Where an intervenor would call a witness but for the Intervenor's financial inability to do so, the Licensing Board may call the witness as a Board witness and authorize NRC payment of the usual witness fees and expenses.

The decision to take such action is a matter of Licensing Board discretion which should be exercised with circumspection.

If the Board calls such a witness as its own, it should limit cross-examination to the scope of the direct examination", Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2),-ALAB-382, 5 NRC 603, 607-08 (1977). (Emphasis added).The rule does not solve the problem. Because: (1) there are often sizeable expenses beyond witnesses

-filing /copying fees and legal fees; and (2) "The decision to take such action is a matter of Licensing Board discretion which should be exercised with circumspection." This leaves it entirely up to the Board who at that point in the proceedings are not fully informed about the issue to be able to properly determine what is and what is not important for them to hear.We know that "While NEPA does not require agencies to select particular options, it is intended to "foster both informed decision making and informed public participation, and thus to ensure the agency does not act upon incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is too late to correct" (citing Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77, 88 (1998).Solution:

The NRC should establish a "kitty" for Petitioners to draw upon for incurred expenses and establish guidelines for determining qualifications for assistance and amounts made available.

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3. NRC Staff: The adjudication technically is between two parties, the Applicant and the Petitioner.

Problem: The NRC Legal and Technical Staff in most, if not in all license renewal adjudications, take an active role similar to the two parties -filing motions, replies, etc. In most, if not all, cases to date the NRC has taken the side of the Applicant so that the Petitioner is placed at an unfair disadvantage -two parties against one. To make matters worse, the NRC Staff are not subject to discovery or required to provide complete disclosures and the ASLB relies upon the NRC legal staff to interpret or explain what the regulations mean. Solution:

The NRC Staff, just as any other outside party, should simply be allowed to file amicus briefs, as appropriate.

4. Hearings:

Problem: During the so-called "informal hearings," the ASLB alone asks the party's expert(s) questions

-obviously limiting the Intervenor's participation and input. This can present a problem because, again, the ASLB is not fully versed in the subject and may limit the discussion and risk acting upon incomplete or incorrect information.

Solution:

Allow cross examination, and opening and closing statements at all hearings.5. Commitments:

NRC has "resolved" issues brought forward in license renewal proceedings by issuing commitments.

The Cumulative Usage Factor (CUF) is an example brought forward at Vermont Yankee, Oyster Creek, Indian Point and Pilgrim's proceedings.

Unless commitments are resolved prior to granting a license to Renew, the public has no ability to review the Applicant's actions in regard to the commitments and issue a timely response.

In order'for NRC to comply with Chairman Jaczko's wise counsel that NRC staff "is strengthened by public involvement and input, and by our being open and transparent about what we do and why" --- all commitments must be resolved first before a license renewal is issued.6. Consistency:

NRC changes the rules of the game during the adjudication process so that with the ground constantly shifting the Petitioner is placed in a losing situation.

Consistency is required for public confidence.

Example: Docket 50-293, Pilgrim Watch, Contention 1: The ASLB on October 16, 2006 accepted Pilgrim Watch's Motion to Intervene on Contention 1 and 3.Pilgrim Watch's Contention 1, as amended by the Board, stated, "The Aging Management program proposed in the Pilgrim Application for license renewal is inadequate with regard to aging management of 34 buried pipes and tanks that contain radioactively contaminated water, because it does not provide for monitoring wells that would detect leakage. '8" Mid-stream, on October 17, 2007, December 19, 2007 and January 11, 2008, the ASLB considerably narrowed the original order saying that: the only issue remaining before this Licensing Board regarding Contention 1 is "...whether Pilgrim's existing AMPs have elements that provide appropriate assurance as required under relevant NRC regulations that the buried pipes and tanks will not develop leaks so great as to cause those pipes and tanks to be unable to perform their intended safety functions' 9 Further safety function was narrowly re-defined by the ASLB to the only thing that matters about such pipes and tanks is leaks that are so great as to permit a design base failure. The effect of the interlocutory decisions was to prevent Petitioner from including within scope a number of the key ways in which the Aging Management Program (AMP) did not provide reasonable assurance that radioactive or other leakage from buried pipes and tanks would comply with the current licensing basis ("CLB") during license renewal -the point. As a result, the adjudicatory process failed to consider the standard set by the CLB, the standard against which the AMP must be evaluated, and therefore the public has no assurance, reasonable or otherwise, whether the CLB will be maintained over the license renewal period. The ground constantly shifted. Again consistency is required for public confidence in the process.7. Safeguards

& Security:

The Draft says that safeguards and security shall not be looked at in license renewal unless a District Court of Appeals in that state has ruled otherwise.

Problem: (1) Unless the public or government agency/department at a particular site has the financial resources to hire an experienced attorney and funds for expert witnesses, the case is unlikely to be brought before the court; or if it is appealed, to be successful.

This runs counter to Chairman Jaczko's call for public involvement and input. (2) Safeguards and security are not issues that are necessarily limited to a District Court's jurisdiction.

The National Academy of Sciences and Attorney Generals of Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut and California have demonstrated that the consequences, for example, of an attack on a spent 18 Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Standing and Contentions of Petitioners Massachusetts Attorney General and Pilgrim Watch), LBP-06-23, 64 N.R.C. 257 (2006)19 Memorandum and Order, LBP-07-12, 66 N.R.C. (October 17, 2007) (Summary Disposition Order);Order Revising Schedule for Evidentiary hearing and Responding to Pilgrim Watch's December 14 and 15 Motions, LBP-06-848-02 N.R.C.(December 19, 2007); Order Denying Pilgrim watch's Motion for Reconsideration, LBP-06-848-02 NRC (January 11, 2008)35 fuel pool could be devastating for hundreds of miles and to our nation's economy as a whole. Solution: Fairness dictates that safeguards and security should be looked at in license renewal as a Category 2 issue.B. Reasonable Assurance Standard The Draft uses the term "reasonable assurance" throughout the document yet, like the NRC in other contexts, the Draft never bothers to define exactly what "reasonable assurance" is supposed to mean.2 0 We appreciate that there is a burden to prove "reasonable assurance" with a "clear preponderance" of the evidence [North Anna Envtl., Coalition

v. NRC, 533 F. 2d 655, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1976)]. It is a two step process. It is necessary for NRC to define what level of assurance is "reasonable assurance." For example is it 51%, 99%, or some place in between? Absent a standard, the term "reasonable assurance" has no meaning.2' For an analogy if the public were told that there was "reasonable assurance" that evidence showed that the rebuilt levees in New Orleans had a 51% probability to withhold water in a storm they would feel far less confident than if they were told that there was "reasonable assurance" from the evidence that there was a >90% chance that they would hold.C. Timing License Renewal Application The NRC allows a licensee to apply for a license extension too early -when simply one-half the original license is completed.

20 See Draft pages 69, 134, 453 and 455 where it refers to the NRC having "reasonable assurance" regarding emergency planning; dose commitments from gaseous radioactive waste; low level waste issues; and spent fuel issues.21 See: Pilgrim Watch Petition for Review of LBP-06-848, at 7, Adams Accession Number ML083240599; Pilgrim Watch Reply to Entergy's Answer in Opposition to Pilgrim Watch's Petition for Review, December 2008, at 2, Adams Accession Number ML083440445.

Pilgrim Watch's Reply to Entergy stated that, "Reasonable Assurance:

The fundamental dispute is whether reasonable assurance has been shown when the standard for "reasonable assurance" has not been defined. Entergy referred to cases saying that reasonable assurance is "sound technical judgment applied on a case-by-case basis" and "compliance with Commission regulations." However, what assurance must that "sound technical judgment" prove? "Sound technical judgment" that there is a 51% chance that the Minneapolis Bridge won't collapse during the next rush hour would not provide "reasonable assurance." "Sound technical judgment," that there is less than a 5% likelihood of the bridge collapsing, or of Pilgrim's buried pipes leaking during the license renewal term, might do so, if supported by a clear preponderance of the evidence.

And as Judge Young said, the preponderance of the evidence does not define what level of assurance is "reasonable." (Concurring Opinion, LBP-06-848-02,p.55) "Sound technical judgment" must be related to a defined level of assurance and backed up with verification

-a clear preponderance of facts that the defined level of assurance will be met. PW does not disagree that reasonable assurance "is not susceptible to a formalistic quantification or mechanistic application." But the potential consequences of a nuclear power plant failure are severe, and the Board did not define what level of assurance of on-going compliance with the CLB is required for that "assurance" to be considered "reasonable." 36 D. Draft Decision Based Limited Research NRC's draft says that they based their decision on whether to change the categorization of issues in the 1996 GEIS on "new research, findings, and other information

... considered in evaluating the significance of impacts associated with license renewal." The purpose of their evaluation was, "to determine if the findings presented in the 1996 GEIS remain valid, in doing so, the NRC considered the need to modify, add to, or delete any of the 92 issues in the 1996 GEIS." (Summary, S-2, Scope of the Generic Environmental Impact Statement, lines 25-28)PW Comment: It sounds well and good; but the "Devil is in the details." Reading NRC's statement carefully, it is clear that they committed to nothing. As their statement reads, they simply could have considered only a handful of articles.

Clearly, we believe that NRC is responsible to base updates on all available current scientific information and it is evident that they did not do so. In fact it seems clear that research and documents containing "Inconvenient Truths" either were avoided or totally misrepresented.

Example: (1) Meteorology (Draft 3.3 Meteorology, Air Quality and Noise M3.12 References):

The references for meteorology include simply NRC Reg. Guide 1.23, Rev 1 (March). Absent are all the new significant documents on plume modeling of complex sites from NRC, DOE, EPA, National Oceanic, and Meteorology Scientists published studies referenced, for example, in State Of New York's Motion For Summary Disposition On Use Of Straight Line Gaussian Air Dispersion Model For The Environmental Impact Analysis Of Significant Radiological Accidents At Indian Point And NYS Contention 16/16A,(DPR-26, DPR-64) August 28, 2009 and accompanying Declaration Of Bruce A. Egan, Sc.D., 18 forward and PW's Brief in Response to CLI-09-1 1, (Docket No. 50-292-LR, ASLPB No. 06-848-02-LR), June 25, 2009. (2) Health: absent, for example, is the German Governments KIKK case control study of infant leukemia around nuclear reactors.Pilgrim Watch supports and incorporates herein comments submitted by Riverkeeper Inc., Tarrytown, New York and the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility, California.

Respectfully Submitted, Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch, Director -Duxbury MA 37 APPENDIX A NRC, DOE, EPA, The National Research Council of the National Academies, State Officials, Nuclear Trade Groups, & Air Dispersion Modeling Community Agree That Straight Line Gaussian Plume Models Cannot Account For the Effects of Complex Terrain on the Dispersion of Pollutants from A Source NRC Since the 1970s, the USNRC has historically documented advanced modeling technique concepts and potential need for multiple meteorological towers appropriately located in offsite communities, especially in coastal site regions. But ignored implementing its' own advice.In 2009, the NRC made a presentation to the National Radiological Emergency Planning Conference22 concluded that the straight-line Gaussian plume models cannot accurately predict dispersion in a complex terrain and are therefore scientifically defective for that purpose[ADAMS -ML091050226, ML091050257, and ML091050269 (page references used here refer to the portion attached, Part 2, ML091050257).]

Most reactors, if not all, are located in complex terrains.

In the presentation, NRC said that the"most limiting aspect" of the basic Gaussian Model, is its "inability to evaluate spatial and temporal differences in model inputs" [Slide 28]. Spatial refers to the ability to represent impacts on the plume after releases from the site e.g., plume bending to follow a river valley or sea breeze circulation.

Temporal refers to the ability of the model to reflect data changes over time, e.g., change in release rate and meteorology

[Slide 4].Because the basic Gaussian model is non-spatial, it cannot account for the effect of terrain on the trajectory of the plume -that is, the plume is assumed to travel in a straight line regardless of the surrounding terrain. Therefore, it cannot, for example, "'curve' a plume around mountains or follow a river valley." NRC 2009 Presentation, Slide 33. However, many reactors are located 22 Ibid 38 near mountains or along river valleys. Further it cannot account for transport and diffusion in coastal sites subject to the sea breeze. Sea breeze also applies to any other large bodies of water.The sea breeze causes the plume to change direction caused by differences in temperature of the air above the water versus that above the land after sunrise. If the regional wind flow is light, a circulation will be established between the two air masses. At night, the land cools faster, and a reverse circulation (weak) may occur [Slide 43]. Turbulence causes the plume to be drawn to ground level [Slide 44].The presentation goes on to say that, "Additional meteorological towers may be necessary to adequately model sea breeze sites" [Slide 40].Significantly, the NRC 2009 Presentation then discussed the methods of more advanced models that can address terrain impact on plume transport, including models in which emissions from a source are released as a series of puffs, each of which can be carried separately by the wind, (NRC 2009 Presentation Slides 35, 36). This modeling method is similar to CALPUFF.Licensees are not required, however, to use these models in order to more accurately predict where the plume will travel to base protective action recommendations.

The NRC recognized as early as 1977 that complex terrain presented special problems that a model must address if the air dispersion analysis is to be accurate.23 For example: NRC, Regulatory Guide 1.111, Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light- Water-Cooled Reactors (July 1977) (Draft for Comment) says that, "Geographic features such as hills, valleys, and large bodies of water greatly influence dispersion and airflow patterns.

Surface roughness, including vegetative cover, affects the degree of turbulent mixing." (Emphasis added).This is not new information; knowledge of the inappropriateness of straight-line Gaussian plume in at complex sites goes back a long way within NRC. For example: 23 Ibid 39 1972: NRC Regulatory Guide 123 (Safety Guide 23) On Site Meteorological Programs 1972, states that, "at some sites, due to complex flow patterns in non-uniform terrain, additional wind and temperature instrumentation and more comprehensive programs may be necessary." 1977: NRC began to question the feasibility of using straight line Gaussian plume models for complex terrain. See U.S.NRC, 1977, Draft for Comment Reg. Guide 1.111 at ic (pages 1.111-9 to 1.111-10)1983: In January 1983, NRC Guidance [ NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," January 1983 Regulatory Guide 1.97- Application to Emergency Response Facilities; 6.1 Requirements],suggested that changes in on-site meteorological monitoring systems would be warranted if they have not provided a reliable indication of monitoring conditions that are representative within the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ.1996: The NRC acknowledged the inadequacy of simple straight-line Gaussian plume models to predict air transport and dispersion of a pollutant released from a source in a complex terrain when it issued RTM-96, Response Technical Manual, which contains simple methods for estimating possible consequences of various radiological accidents.

In the glossary of that document, the NRC's definition of "Gaussian plume dispersion model" states that such models have important limitations, including the inability to "deal well with complex terrain." NUREG/BR-0 150, Vol. 1 Rev.4, Section Q; ADAMS Accession Number ML062560259, 2004: A NRC research paper, Comparison of Average Transport and Dispersion Among a Gaussian, A Two- Dimensional and a Three-Dimensional Model, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, October, 2004 at 2. ("Livermore Report") had an important caveat added to the Report's summary about the scientific reliability of theuse of a straight-line Gaussian model in complex terrains:

"... [T]his study was performed in an area with smooth or favorable terrain and persistent winds although with structure in the form of low-level nocturnal jets and severe storms. In regions with complex terrain, particularly if the surface wind direction changes with height, caution should be used. Livermore Report at 72. (emphasis added)40 2005: In December, 2005, as part of a cooperative program between the governments of the United States and Russia to improve the safety of nuclear power plants designed and built by the former Soviet Union, the NRC issued a Procedures Guide for a Probabilistic Risk, related to a Russian Nuclear Power Station. The Guide, prepared by the Brookhaven National Laboratory and NRC staff, explained that atmospheric transport of released material is carried out assuming Gaussian plume dispersion, which is "generally valid for flat terrain." However, the Guide the caveat that in "specific cases of plant location, such as, for example, a mountainous area or a valley, more detailed dispersion models may have to be considered." Kalinin VVER-1O00 Nuclear power Station Unit 1 PRA, Procedures Guide for a Probabilistic Risk Assessment, NUREG/CR-6572, Rev. 1 at 3-114; excerpt attached as Exhibit 8, full report available at http://www.nrc.

gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6572.

2007: NRC revised their Regulatory Guide 1.23, Meteorological Monitoring Programs for Nuclear Power Plants. On page 11, the section entitled Special Considerations for Complex Terrain Sites says that, At some sites, because of complex flow patterns in nonuniform terrain, additional wind and temperature instrumentation and more comprehensive programs may be necessary.

For example, the representation of circulation for a hill-valley complex or a site near a large body of water may need additional measuring points to determine airflow patterns and spatial variations of atmospheric stability.

Occasionally, the unique diffusion characteristics of a particular site may also warrant the use of special meteorological instrumentation and/or studies. The plant's operational meteorological monitoring program should provide an adequate basis for atmospheric transport and diffusion estimates within the plume exposure emergency planning zone [i.e., within approximately 16 kilometers (10 miles)].2 4 These excerpts from Regulatory Guide 1.23 demonstrate that the NRC recognizes there are certain sites, such as those located along river valleys (like Indian Point and Vermont Yankee)24 For example, if the comparison of the primary and supplemental meteorological systems indicates convergence in a lake breeze setting, then a "keyhole" protective action recommendation (e.g., evacuating a 2-mile radius)41 and those located in coastal areas (like Pilgrim and Seabrook) that multiple meteorological data input sources are needed for appropriate air dispersion modeling.

Not simply one or two meteorological towers onsite. Since, for the reasons discussed above, the straight-line Gaussian plume model is incapable of handling complex flow patterns and meteorological data input from multiple locations, Regulatory Guide 1.23 demonstrates NRC's recognition that it should not be used at any site with complex terrain.EPA Likewise, EPA recognized the need for complex models. For example: EPA's 2005 Guideline on Air Quality Models says in Section 7.2.8 Inhomogenous Local Winds that, In very rugged hilly or mountainous terrain, along coastlines, or near large land use variations, the characterization of the winds is a balance of various forces, such that the assumptions of steady-state straight line transport both in time and space are inappropriate.(Fed. Reg., 11/09/05).

EPA goes on to say that, "In special cases described, refined trajectory air quality models can be applied in a case-by-case basis for air quality estimates for such complex non-steady-state meteorological conditions." This EPA Guideline also references an EPA 2000 report, Meteorological Monitoring Guidance for Regulatory Model Applications, EPA-454/R-99-005, February 2000. Section 3.4 of this Guidance for coastal Locations, discusses the need for multiple inland meteorological monitoring sites, with the monitored parameters dictated by the data input needs of particular air quality models. EPA concludes that a report prepared for NRC 25 provides a detailed discussion of considerations for conducting meteorological measurement programs at coastal sites, reactors on large bodies of water. Most important, EPA's November 2005 Modeling Guideline (Appendix A to Appendix W) lists EPA's "preferred models" and the 25 Raynor, G.S.P. Michael, and S. SethuRaman, 1979, Recommendations for Meteorological Measurement Programs and Atmospheric Diffusion Prediction Methods for Use at Coastal Nuclear Reactor Sites. NUREG/CR-0936.

U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC.42 use of straight line Gaussian plume model, called ATMOS, is not listed. Sections 6.1 and 6.2.3 discuss that the Gaussian model is not capable of modeling beyond 50. km (32 miles) and the basis for EPA to recommend CALPUFF, a non -straight line model.2 6 DOE DOE, too, recognizes the limitations of the straight-line Gaussian plume model. They say for example that Gaussian models are inherently flat-earth models, and perform best over regions of transport where there is minimal variation in terrain. Because of this, there is inherent conservatism (and simplicity) if the environs have a significant nearby buildings, tall vegetation, or grade variations not taken into account in the dispersion parameterization.

2 7 National Research Council Tracking and Predicting The Atmospheric Dispersion of Hazardous Material Releases Implications for Homeland Security, Committee on the Atmospheric Dispersion of Hazardous Material Releases Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2003.This report provides the recent history of dispersion model development.

It summarizes the findings of the National Academies workshop by the same title that had the purpose of examining "how meteorological observations and dispersion models can be used by emergency managers in the context of an atmospheric release of hazardous chemical, biological or nuclear (C/B/N) agents". The workshop participants included atmospheric scientists from academia, government laboratories and the private sector as well as emergency management officials and first responders, and experts in related fields.The report discusses how the analytical Gaussian models were used in the 1960s and tested against limited field experiments in flat terrain areas performed in earlier decades.26 http://www.epa.gov/scramO01/guidance/guide/appw 05.pdf 27 the MACCS2 Guidance Report June 2004 Final Report, page 3-8:3.2 Phenomenological Regimes of Applicability 43 In the 1970s the US passed the Clean Air Act which required the use of dispersion models to estimate the air quality impacts of emissions sources for comparison to regulatory limits. This resulted in the development and testing of advanced models for applications in complex terrain settings such as in mountainous or coastal areas. In the 1980s, further advances were made with Lagrangian puff models and with Eulerian grid models. Gaussian models moved beyond the simple use of sets of dispersion coefficients to incorporate Monin-Obukhov and other boundary layer similarity measures which are the basis of contemporary EPA models used for both short range and long range transport applications.

Helped enormously by advances in computer technologies, in the 1990s, significant advances were made in numerical weather prediction models and also further improve dispersion models through the incorporation of field experiment results and improved boundary layer parameterization.

The decade starting with the year 2000 has seen improved resolution of meteorological models such as MM5 and the routine linkage of meteorological models with transport and dispersion models as exemplified by the real time forecasts of detailed fine grid weather conditions available to the public at Olympic events.Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) models which involve very fine grid numerical simulations of turbulence and fluid flow began to see applications in atmospheric dispersion studies. The next decade will see routine application of CFD techniques to complex flows associated with emergency response needs.The nuclear industry does not show evidence of keeping up with these technological advances.For use in modeling air quality concentrations, the NRC uses straight-line Gaussian dispersion algorithms that date back to the 1960s. Complex flow situations such as those associated with flow around high terrain features or that would incorporate sea breeze circulations are not simulated.

For emergency response applications, the NRC does not seem to require any advanced modeling to be installed at nuclear power plants.' 'The agency research groups have access to advanced simulation models but how these might be used for training purposes or for real time emergency response purposes is not apparent in the literature.

According to the report, 44 Emergency responders have a number of observational and modeling needs that are not well satisfied by existing services.Although it may never be possible to provide a "perfect" atmospheric dispersion prediction for any hazardous release, the committee believes that with more effective application of available tools and development of new technologies and capabilities, the atmospheric science community could play a larger role in addressing this critical national security concern.A copy of the Executive Summary and selected sections are attached (Appendix A).Nuclear Utility Groups Nuclear utility Meteorological Data Users Group (NUMUG): At the 1994 American Nuclear Society Topical Meeting Environmental Transport and Dosimetry Aug 31-Sept 3, 1993, Charleston, SC, a paper titled An Atmospheric Dispersion Model for Emergency Response, K.Jerry Allwine (Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington)

NUMUG 1994 said in its introduction that, Predicting the dispersion of accidental releases of material to the atmosphere in regions of nonuniform terrain can be very challenging.

Wind patterns can be highly variable in time and space, because of the synoptic influences, the influences of nonhomogenous surfaces (sea breeze, heat inland), and terrain-induced processes such as slope flows, channeling, blocking, mountain-valley winds, stagnations, layered flows. During the nighttime terrain effects can dominate the atmospheric motion, especially near the surface. Consequently, an important component of any emergency response model is the wind model which must reasonably represent the winds in complex terrain using a limited number of input wind observations that are generally not of sufficient coverage to completely define the winds in the modeling domain.45