ML070430263

Comment (3) of Mary Lampert on Draft Supplemental Environmental Review - Draft NUREG-1437, Supplement 29 -Summary

ML070430263
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Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	02/05/2007
From:	Lampert M - No Known Affiliation
To:	NRC/ADM/DAS/RDB
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71FR75280 00003, NUREG-1437, Suppl 29
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.rage i oi i Doris Mendiola - NUREG-1437, Supplement 29 ---Draft SEIS, PNPS Comment - Pilgrim Watch From: "Mary Lampert" <mary.lampert@comcast.net>

To: <PilgrimEIS @nrc.gov>

Date: 02/03/2007 12:57 PM

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NUREG-1437, Supplement 29 ---Draft SEIS, PNPS Comment - Pilgrim Watch Please indicate receipt by return email.

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NUREG-1437, Supplement 29 ---Draft SEIS, PNPS Comment - Pilgrim Watch Creation Date 02/03/2007 12:56:54 PM From:. "Mary Lampert" <mary.lampert@comcast.net>

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148 Washington St., Duxbury MA 02332 Tel 781-934-0389 Fax 781-934-5579 E-Mail Marv.Lamvert@comcast.net February 5, 2007 DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW (SEIS) -

Draft NUREG-1437, Supplement 29 -Summary Comments OVERVIEW The NRC staff concludes that cumulative impacts of PNPS license renewal would be SMALL for most potentially affected resources, with the exception of the local winter flounder population and Jones River population of rainbow smelt, for which impacts would be MODERATE (p.9-5).

NRC's conclusion results from ignoring new and significant information pertaining to Pilgrim that has occurred since NUREG - 1437 [The Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants] was written in 1996; and incorrectly assuming current NRC regulations are being met by the licensee and that the regulations, themselves, reflect current realities and are protective of public health and safety.

CONTENTS I. RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS ON HUMAN HEALTH [4.3; 4.7; 4.8]

II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE URANIUM FUEL CYCLE AND SOLID WASTE

[6.0] - spent fuel, so-called low level waste and transportation of radioactive waste, III. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS [5.0]

IV. ENVIROMENTAL IMPACTS OF DECOMMISSIONING [7.0]

V. MARINE AQUATIC RESOURCES [2.2.5; 4.0]

I. RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS ON HUMAN HEALTH "Small" impact, no new and significant information Draft SEIS: Health 2.27 (radiological impacts - monitoring & dose assessment); 4.3 (normal operations); 4.7 (during renewal term); 4.8.3 (cumulative on health); 5.0 (impacts accidents); 6.0 (decommissioning); comments A-28 Summary NRC staff incorrectly concurs with Entergy that there is no new and significant information pertaining to Pilgrim and that the health impact is, and will continue to be, small by:

(1) Mischaracterizinq the National Academy of Science (NAS) Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII) report.

NRC staff and Entergy deny that BEIR VII provides new and significant information by misstating what BEIR VII actually said. Examples:

" NRC focused only on cancer mortality, and ignored BEIR VII's findings on cancer incidence which the report found 1/3 higher than previously thought.

• NRC ignored: BEIR VII's findings of the differential effect of radiation exposure on women and young children. For example: In 1990, the NAS estimated that the risks of dying from cancer due to exposure to radiation were about five percent higher for women than for men. In BEIR VII, the cancer mortality risks for females are 37.5 percent higher. The risks for all solid tumors, like lung, breast, and kidney, liver, and other solid tumors added together are almost 50 percent greater for women than men.

• BEIR VII increased the impact from allowable radiation standards on workers (5 rem/yr) from their previous study. NRC's own risk figures say 1 in 8 workers so exposed would die from cancer induced by that dose. BEIR VII says -twice that number -- -1 in 4 -- would get a cancer, fatal or one they survive, from that exposure.

• BEIR VII discusses negative health effects in addition to cancer- increase risk of heart disease and stroke, though it did not give specific risk estimates.

2

(2) NRC staff cite cherry-picked health studies done by the nuclear industry's equivalent of "tobacco scientists" that supposedly, though mistakenly, demonstrate that there is no correlation between radiation dose from nuclear facilities and cancer to the general public and ignoring those studies that do show a correlation.

One Example:

• NRC highlights the University of Pittsburg study that "found" no link between the radiation released during TMI's 1979 accident and cancer deaths among nearby residents.

The Draft SEIS failed to mention a later study by Dr. Steven Wing, associate professor of epidemiology at the UNC-CH School of Public Health, who led a study of cancer cases within 10 miles of the facility from 1975 to 1985. He and colleagues conclude that following the March 28, 1979 accident, lung cancer and leukemia rates were two to 10 times higher downwind of the Three Mile Island (TMI) reactor than upwind.

For a comprehensive review of new and significant studies that indeed show a correlation between radiation dose from nuclear facilities and negative health effects in the general public, see: BEIR VII and Clark University's Marsh Institute, Health Risks of Ionizing Radiation -an overview of epidemiology studies, March 2006.

http ://www.clarku.edu/dep~artments/marsh/projects/community/EpiOverviewFinal. pdf (3) Mischaracterizinnq Massachusetts Department of Public Health's Southeastern Massachusetts Health Study (SMHS): SMHS is a case control study that found a four-fold increase in adult leukemia. Boston Edison (BECO), the owner of Pilgrim at the time, cut a political deal which allowed BECO, the implicated industry, to appoint a second peer review panel to re-review the study-and write a report. The NRC Staff in the Draft SEIS misinterpret the second re-review peer group and state in the Draft

SEIS,

...with regard to the SMHS, NRC has considered the relevant information in these citations and concludes that the peer reviews and even the authors now agree that the SMHS does not demonstrate a causal relationship between the PNPS effluents and the potential effect of excess cancers in the areas around the site.

3

a) The authors of the study [Dr. Robert S. Knorr, Director, Environmental Epidemiology Program Center for Environmental Health, MDPH] never spoke to the NRC staff on this issue 1 ; additionally Suzanne Condon, Associate Commissioner MDPH stated that, "the only conversations she ever had about our study and/or cancer rates with the NRC always emphasized that we continue to stand by our original conclusions."

The author of the SMHS study continued by pointing out that the re-review panel concluded:

The [original SMHS] study team adhered to generally accepted epidemiological principles.." and "the findings of the SMHS cannot be readily dismissed on the basis of methodological errors or proven biases...;" and The association found between leukemia and proximity to the Pilgrim nuclear facility was unexpectedly strong and, this raised concern regarding the biologic plausibility of the study.

...because the study results could not be dismissed, further study may be warranted, including expanding case finding and including children.

The NRC's statement that the MDPH indicated that the findings demonstrated cause and effect is incorrect. The MDPH report specifically states that it is not possible to reach definitive conclusions regarding cause and effect but that the results should be followed up to clarify their public health implications. This conclusion is consistent with that stated by the peer reviewers. While the findings of the study may not support a causal relationship, the NRC arguments in their Supplemental Impact Statement ignore the principal MDPH and peer review conclusions that the findings cannot be dismissed.

(4) The NRC staff ignored other new and significant information - site specific studies of radiation health effects in communities likely-to-be affected by Pilgrim; and the changed demographics of the population immediately surrounding the plant, including its age and geographical distribution - making this population more 1 Source: Personal communication with Dr. Robert Knorr, January 17, 2007 via email 4

susceptible to more radiation-linked damage than was contemplated when the plant was licensed.

Thyroid Cancer in Plymouth Area Leukemia (minus CLL) in Plymouth Area 1982-1989 1982-1989 H4fl 19 1 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 0l W625192 0160 6l/25W93 The Massachusetts Cancer Registry also shows, for the years 1998-2002, a continuing increase of leukemia and thyroid cancer in the towns around PNPS.

Specifically, there were 83 cases of leukemia reported to the Massachusetts Cancer Registry (MCR), where 72.9 would have been expected based on statewide rates.

This results in a Standardized Incidence Ratio (SIR) of 114 (95% conf. int. = 91-143). In addition, there was excess thyroid cancer in these same towns for the same time period. The thyroid cancer SIR was 122 (95% conf. int-. = 96-155). In other words, leukemia was 14% elevated over the statewide rate and thyroid cancer was 22% elevated. Neither of these calculations were statistically significantly elevated by the usual convention (P<.05), but there were more cases than expected nevertheless. This means there is a continuing excess of these two radiation-related cancers in the population, as there was in the 1980s.

Prostate cancer and multiple myeloma, both radiation-linked diseases, are also elevated and statistically significant for the years 1998-2002 in the seven towns most likely to be impacted near Pilgrim (Carver, Duxbury, Kingston, Marshfield, Pembroke, Plymouth, and Plympton). The seven towns listed are those that a meteorological analysis done by Dr. Spengler and Dr. Keeler for Massachusetts Department of Public Health indicated are most impacted by the sea breeze effect. 2 These new and significant site-specific studies show that the area is a damaged, sensitive population, and consequently less able to tolerate additional assaults.

2 Feasibility of Exposure Assessment for The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Dr. J.D. Spengler and Dr. G.J. Keeler, May 12, 1988 5

Demographics: Communities south of Boston will grow 13% and Plymouth is expected to add the most, about 10,000 residents - a population jump of over 20%.

By 2030, 1 in 3 people will be over the age of 55, compared to 1 in 5 now. This is relevant to any analysis of health impacts, as new and significant studies have shown an increased sensitivity to low levels of ionizing radiation in older populations.

(5) Standards, allowable releases: NRC's misrepresents the impact of radiation released from Pilgrim by inappropriately using the "standard man' or "reference man" as its basis for calculating risk and health effects. The so-called standard man is fully matured and healthy. BEIR VII states that risks for females and children are much larger than for a 'standard man.' That would cause the calculations for risks using the NRC's 'standard man' to be much lower than actually experienced by a population at risk unless the population at risk is composed totally of 'standard men.'

The population of Plymouth County has 51.3% women and many children [7% under 5; 26% under 18] who are not correctly considered in the risk calculations (US Census data, 2000). Additionally, we know from new research that radiation affects the most vulnerable - the sick (discussed above), the young 4 and the old.s This makes intuitive sense - for example, the older we get, the more vulnerable we become and this is borne out by research. 6 By 2030, (1) in (3) people will be over the'age of 55, compared to 1 in 5 now.

3 GreaterSensitivity to Ionizing Radiation at Older Age: follow-up of workers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory through 1990. Richardson, D.B. and Wing, S. Int. J.

Epidemiol., 1999, 28:428-436; the Hanford Data: Issues of Age at Exposure and Dose. Stewart, A.M., Kneale, G.W., PSR Quarterly Vol. 3, No.3 (Sept. 1993) 3:101-111; and Leukaemia near nuclear power plant in Massachusetts, Richard Clapp, Sidney Cobb, C K Chan, Bailus Walker, 924 , Lancet, 1987.

4 National Academies of Science, Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII Phase 2, 2005, National Academies Press 5 George Kneale and Alice Stewart, "Factors Affecting Recognition of Cancer Risk of Nuclear Workers" Occupational and Environmental Medicine 52 (1995):515-23; Steve Wing et al.,"

Mortality among Workers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory," Journal of American Medical Association 265 np, 11 (20 March 1991): 1437-38.

6 We note that the A-bomb studies concluded that radiation affects the young and healthy more than the old, since they found more cancer in the young. But this would make radiation unlike almost any other cause of death. The A-Bomb Survivor Study was begun in 1950, five years after the bombing; many of the sick, weak, young children and elderly died off from the devastating lifestyle consequences of 6

(6) NRC staff overstates background radiation and incorrectly assume that Pilgrim's monitoring reports and dose calculation models are reliable and accurate.

Background radiation: The NRC staff attempts to minimize the impact of the reported amount of radiation released from Pilgrim by stating it is but a small per-cent of background radiation. They incorrectly claim that, "The average dose of approximately 360 mrem/yr from natural background and medical sources of radiation (NRC 2005)." That number is a national average - not applicable here.

The soil in Plymouth and surrounding towns is largely sand containing very little uranium, thorium and radium. We are not Denver, Colorado, for example.

" Pilgrim's monitoring reports and dose calculation models are neither reliable nor accurate. Example: dose calculation models assume that a radioactive plume will move in a straight line when, in fact, wind in our coastal communities is highly variable affected by the sea breeze effdct, topography, and buildings. Wind direction is measured by the meteorological tower on the reactor building. It only tells where the wind in blowing on site not what happens to it offsite. There are no real-time weather and radiation monitors appropriately placed in surrounding communities to measure alpha, beta and gamma radiation. Environmental sampling for radiation in the environment is limited; and the samples are analyzed and reports prepared by Entergy's own laboratory.

" Testing Silver Lake - it provides drinking water to Brockton. There is no indication that the lake has been tested for radionuclides; and Brockton adds an environmental justice dimension, due to its economic profile. 7 (7) Bio-Accumulation of Radionuclides in the Environment from 1972-2032 -ignored The effects of radiation exposure are cumulative; this is ignored by NRC staff in the Draft. Some types of nuclear power plant emissions stay radioactive for a long time and, because they can enter biological food chains, those materials can accumulate in the environment and adversely affect public health. "If radioactive emissions persist for years, decades or even centuries within the environment, then even the bomb. The survivors were actually a selected healthy survivor population; the survivors are not a representative population.

7 Point brought forward at Hearing by Ms Pine DuBois, Kingston 7

modest reductions in annual discharges may not be sufficient to prevent an environmental build up of those materials overtime." Estimates of Environmental Accumulations of radioactivityResulting from Routine Operation of New England Nuclear Power Plants (1973-84), Dr. Richard W. England,, Mr. Eric Mitchell, p.4, A Report of the Nuclear Emission Research Project, Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H., August 1987.

It is known for example that the following radionuclides have been released from Pilgrim into neighboring communities: plutonium 239 (half life 24,400 years);

neptunium 236 or 237 (half life ranging from 120,000years -2.1 million years);

cesium 137 (half life 30.2 years); strontium 90 (half life 28.5 years); tritium (half life 12.3 years), and xenon (half life 9.17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />). Xenon transforms after its emission into cesium 135, which persists almost indefinitely in the environment. Examples of previous releases have been reported in the Annual Radiological Environmental 8

Monitoring Program Reports [REMP].

These releases include substances that will remain active in the local environment for the foreseeable future and should have been taken into account when actual on-going doses to the public are evaluated.

(8) NRC staff fail to include new and significant information on health effects in Section 5.0 Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents. Examples:

NRC staff do not mention, the new and significant site specific report by the Massachusetts AGO, Report to The Massachusetts Attorney General On The Potential Consequences Of A Spent Fuel Pool Fire At The Pilgrim Or Vermont 8 For example, in June 1982, Pilgrim blew its filters and released contaminated resin material off site into surrounding communities. The licensee's own Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Report for 1982 showed for example: Cesium -

137, (1,000,000) times higher than expected in milk tested at the indicator sampling farm 12 miles west of the reactor and no elevation at the control station, 22 miles away; Cesium-137 again (1,000,000) higher in vegetation samples from indicator farms .7 miles and 1.5 miles from the reactor. Plutonium 239/240: Radiological Environmental Reports(REMP) 1998, Plutonium found in indictor samples and Duxbury Beach; REMP 1999, Plutonium found Duxbury Beach; REMP 2000, Plutonium in indicator samples and Duxbury Beach, later excused by stating contamination must have resulted from a dirty beaker; REMP 2001 Plutonium Duxbury Beach; REMP 2003 forward stopped testing for Plutonium on Duxbury Beach.

8

Yankee Nuclear Plant, Jan Beyea, PhD., May 25, in MassachusettsAttorney General's Request for a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene With respect to Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. 's Application for Renewal of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plants Operating License and Petition for Backfit Order Requiring New Design features to ProtectAgainst Spent Fuel Pool Accidents, Docket No. 50-293, May 26, 2006 2006.

The report estimated the costs and latent cancers of Cesium-137 releases from Pilgrim's spent fuel as follows:

10% release C-137 100% release C-137 Cost (billions) $105-$175 billion $342-$488 Billion Latent Cancers 8,000 24,000 NRC staff failed to mention the new and significant information on potential health consequences from a spent fuel pool accident. Conclusions the National Academy of Sciences - Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Fuel Storage,"

National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, Public Version, April, 2005 Finding 3B - "... a terrorist attack that partially or completely drained a spent fuel pool could lead to a propagating zirconium cladding fire and the release of large quantities of radioactive materials to the environment. Details are provided in the committee's classified report" NAS, p. 6; "Such (zirconium cladding) fires would create thermal plumes that could potentially transport radioactive aerosols hundreds of miles downwind under appropriate atmospheric conditions". NAS, p.50; and "The excess cancer estimates ...to between 2,000 and 6,000 cancer deaths" NAS, p. 45. The NAS report pertains directly to Pilgrim because it was among the reactors pointed out to be more susceptible to damage due to its design placing the pool in the "attic" - vulnerable from three sides.

II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE URANIUM FUEL CYCLE AND SOLID WASTE [6.0] - spent fuel, so-called low level waste and transportation of radioactive waste "Small" impact, no new and significant information Draft SEIS states that Entergy and the NRC staff are not aware of any new and significant issues - they therefore conclude that there will be no impacts related to 9

these issues beyond those discussed in the GEIS - impacts judged to be "small."

However new and significant information abounds.

A. Spent Fuel - high level radioactive waste "Small" impact, no new and significant information The Draft SEIS's findings ignore new and significant information regarding the dangers of spent fuel storage. For example, staff ignored:

• The National Academy of Sciences Report Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Public Report, April 2005;

" Dr. Jan Beyea's report for the Massachusetts Attorney General's Motion to Intervene in Pilgrim's Re-Licensing Application, May 2006;

• Pilgrim Watch's Motion to Intervene in Pilgrim's Re-Licensing Application, Contention 4, May 2006;

" The Massachusetts Attorney General's Petition for Rulemaking, August 2006 that calls, for example, for NRC to consider new and significant information showing that the NRC's characterization of the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage as insignificant in the 1996 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Renewal of Nuclear Plant Licenses ("License Renewal GEIS") is incorrect; and

• The fact that NRC's Waste Confidence Rule is fantasy or wishful thinking- there is no likelihood that the spent fuel at Pilgrim will leave Plymouth anytime soon or ever.

More basically - there is no storage plan for spent fuel presented in the Application or any subsequent study by the NRC review staff so that the onsite storage plan can be analyzed; therefore there is no basis for the NRC staff to claim that the environmental impact of storing half-again as much until 2032 presents no environmental risk.

B. Low-Level Radioactive Waste "Small" impact, no new and significant information The NRC staff incorrectly concluded that there was no new and significant information and therefore there would be no impacts of low level waste storage and disposal associated with the renewal term. Further the staff mistakenly agrees with the GEIS that, "...The maximum additional on-site land that may be required for low-level waste storage during the term of a renewed license and associated impacts will 10

be small." And, "...the Commission concludes that there is reasonable assurance that sufficient low-level waste disposal capacity will be made available when needed for facilities to be decommissioned consistent with NRC decommissioning requirement."

The NRC staff did not bother to look at new and significant information pertinent to this site and must be required to do so before finalizing the SEIS.

" Pilgrim is a very large generator of LLRW. In 2003, for example, Pilgrim shipped 59,089 cubic feet, containing 1,210.000 curies; and stored 4,178.3 cubic feet containing 4,620.000 curies. 9

• Barnwell S.C. announced that it will close to Massachusetts generators June 20, 2008.

" Massachusetts is not a member of any compact; in order to join Massachusetts would have to agree to be a host community; Massachusetts indicated clearly in the mid 1990's that it would not be a host community.

• Texas may open, no guarantees, and if it does open there is no assurance that non-Texas Compact members will be able to send their waste there and if allowed whether fees would be prohibitive.

" No sites have been developed anywhere in the country despite millions of dollars spent on failed attempts.

• Terrorism or acts of malice were not considered a threat in 1972. Not so, post 9/11 - nuclear facilities/materials are known to be attractive targets.

• Pilgrim is located on Cape Cod Bay and the property slopes towards the Bay so that any leaking contaminants from waste storage facilities will flow towards and eventually into the Bay. There are no monitoring wells lining the shoreline. Further the coast is a salt corrosive environment and its effect on concrete and waste packaging must be analyzed.

• The undisputed recognition of global warming is new and brings with it increased severity of coastal storms, erosion, and increased sea levels. Hence this must be factored into on-site waste storage options.

2003 MASSACHUSETTS LOW - LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE SURVEY REPORT, Massachusetts Department of Health Radiation Control Program, October 2005 11

Storage of LLRW is important for our community's health and safety because there is nothing low level about the waste. Waste is characterized "high" or "low" depending on where it comes from, how it is generated, not according to its' toxicity and longevity. Waste containers and forms will not last as long as some waste remains hazardous. Therefore, we want to know what Entergy's plans are for storing LLRW; monitoring the releases; and what are the "acceptable" public radiation exposures and health risks.

We deserve to know what the LLRW storage plans are before the application is decided; so that the re-licensing decision does not prejudge any LLRW storage decision.

C. Transportation The Draft SEIS incorrectly concludes that there was no new and significant information identified so therefore there will be no impacts of transportation associated with license renewal beyond those discussed in the GEIS.

Comment Let's assume, as the Draft does, that Yucca will open -some day off in the future.

The Draft ignores new and significant information about transportation hazards and shipping cask integrity. In fact, they never present the transportation plan for getting the tons of spent fuel out of here.

As part of the current plan, DOE proposes up to 24 barges carrying giant high-level radioactive waste containers onto Cape Cod Bay, Massachusetts Bay and Boston Harbor bringing hundreds of tons of dangerous poisons to densely populated Boston to be transferred from there by rail.

Will the public go along? Accidents happen and each barge sized container would hold up to 200 times the long-lasting radioactivity given by the Hiroshima atomic bomb. Leakage of even a fraction could mean catastrophe. How do you ever recover it?

NRC design criteria for waste transport containers are woefully inadequate. Rather than full scale physical testing, scale model tests and computer simulations are all 12

that is required. The underwater immersion design criteria test examines the integrity of a slightly damaged container submerged under 3 feet of water for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. An undamaged cask is paper-tested for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> submersion under 656 feet of water. If a cask were accidentally immersed under water or sunk by terrorists, is it reasonable to assume that the cask was only slightly damaged, or not damaged at all? Barge casks weigh well over 100 tons (up to 140 tons), how can NRC assume that they will be recovered underwater somewhere en route to Boston within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, or even up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />? Special cranes capable of lifting such a heavy load would have to be located, brought in and set up after finding where it went, perhaps in inclement weather.

III. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS

[5.0]

5.1.2 Severe Accidents "Small" impact, no new and significant information There is so much that is so blatantly wrong with NRC's analysis that it is nearly impossible to know where to begin. We will focus on some illustrative highlights.

1. Risk of Sabotage Deemed "Small" Draft SEIS concluded that, "Additionally the NRC regulatory requirements under 10 CFR Part 73 provides reasonable assurance that the risk of sabotage is small."

NRC did not consider new and significant information specific to this site; no reasonable person would agree that NRC regulatory requirements "provide reasonable assurance that the risk of sabotage is small."

Massachusetts listed among top 5 terrorist tarQets In, Arab-American to become first Massachusetts homeland security chief, David Weber, Associated Press, January 21, 2007 states, The federal government lists Massachusetts -- where two of the planes involved in the 9-11 attacks were launched from Logan International Airport -

- among the five states most likely to be involved in attacks.

Ninth Circuit Court - San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 21, 2006 contradicts NRC Staff. The court dealt with the question 13

of whether the NRC must address impacts of terrorist attacks in licensing decisions under National Environmental Policy Act - the court concluded that it did. Although technically the court's decision does not have to be applied here, practically it does.

The NRC deals with most issues generically. Therefore how can NRC turn around and say it applies in California but not in Massachusetts?

The Court found that: the risk of a terrorist attack is not too speculative for consideration under NEPA; the numeric probability of a terrorist attack need not be precisely quantifiable in order for its potential environmental impacts to be considered; the NRC erred by characterizing Petitioners' request as a demand for a "worst-case" analysis when Petitioners did not ask the NRC to engage in conjecture on the worst-case outcome, but instead sought an analysis of the likely range of, environmental impacts if an attack occurred;"[t]here is no support for the use of security concerns as an excuse from NEPA's requirements.

The US Supreme Court, January 16, 2007, refused to review the Ninth Circuit's ruling that, in order to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the NRC must consider the environmental impacts of terrorist attacks before it licenses the new waste storage facility.

The NRC and industry claim that they have invested huge sums to increase security and put in place extra measures. It is not logical for the NRC to consider the threat of terrorist attacks extremely serious outside the NEPA context but only speculative and theoretical within it.

Bottom line -the ruling stated that agencies must conduct at least an environmental assessment for any government-approved project. If that review reveals the likelihood of a significant impact, the agency then must prepare a more thorough environmental impact statement. Re-licensing Pilgrim is a government -approved project; hence the SEIS logically should consider its impact - the draft did not.

Risk of sabotage far from "small" - CRAC II Report; NAS Report; MA AGO Motion The President of the United States, Congress, special commissions all agree that the risk of sabotage to our country is considerable and increasing. Nuclear reactors are prime targets because of the catastrophic consequences a successful attack would 14

bring. Pilgrim is an especially attractive target because of its location in "America's Hometown" - a symbolic target - Plymouth is known around the world. Pilgrim is vulnerable to an attack by the air [even a small explosive laden helicopter could cause a disaster by targeting the switch-yard, control room, intake, not to mention the densely packed spent fuel pool]; sea [a few buoys marking the no-enter zone, floating "No Trespassing" signs, provide no real deterrence; and land [onsite guards depend on off site forces, it is highly unlikely for them to arrive in sufficient time considering that OSRE mock attacks are usually lost in three minutes]; and there are simply not enough guards, trained and equipped, to meet the number of attackers and type of equipment involved in 9/11.

Examples - new and significant information showing risk far from small:

A. Core Melt - Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (CRAC-2), Sandia National Laboratory, 1982 A core melt at Pilgrim NPS, calculated by the federal government, would result in a 20 miles peak 1 st year fatal radius; a 65 miles peak 1 st year injury radius; and 23,000 peak cancer deaths. 10 And new information available since the GEIS is a later analysis of the CRAC study by Dr. Edward Lyman showing that these estimates are conservative ["Chernobyl on the Hudson? 7 The Health and Economic Impacts of a TerroristAttack at Indian Point Power Plant," Dr. Edwin Lyman, September 2004]. In the report he concluded, The federal study, CRAC II:

10 Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (CRAC-2),

Sandia National Laboratory, 1982. "Peak" refers to the highest calculated values - it does not mean worst case scenario. This is due to uncertainties in the meteorological modeling acknowledged by Sandia. The model only considered one year's worth of data and does not model for precipitation beyond a 30-mile radius. This is significant because the highest consequence is predicted to occur when a radioactive plume encounters rain over densely populated area. Peak Early Fatalities are deaths that result within the first year. Peak Early Injuries are radiation-induced injuries occurring in the first year that require hospitalization of other medical attention -

such as sterility, thyroid nodules, vomiting and cataracts. Peak Cancer Deaths are predicted to occur over a lifetime. However, this is not the case with leukemia which is assumed to have occurred within the first 30 years following the accident.

15

• used census data from 1970;

• assumed entire 10-mile EPZ would be evacuated within at most six hours after issuance order;

• assumed aggressive medical treatment for all victims of acute radiation exposure in developing numbers for early fatalities;

• used a now obsolete correlation between radiation dose and cancer risk that underestimated the risk by a factor of 4 relative to current models; and current models need to be recalculated again based on the National Academy's BEIR VII Report (June 2005) that reconfirmed that there is no safe level of radiation, risks are greater than previously thought and health risks other than cancer must be considered -such as heart disease and birth defects;

• sampled only 100 weather sequences out of over eight thousand (an entire year's worth), a method that underestimates the peak value over the course of a year by 30%

B. Spent Fuel Pool Accident

1) National Academy of Sciences" "Finding 2A: Spent fuel storage facilities cannot be dismissed as targets for such attacks because it is not possible to predict the behavior and motivations of terrorists, and because of the attractiveness of spent fuel as a terrorist target given the well known public dread of radiation...The committee judges that attacks by knowledgeable terrorists with access to appropriate technical means are possible." NAS, p.4 "Terrorists view nuclear power plant facilities as desirable targets because of the large inventories of radionuclides they contain. The committee believes

• that knowledgeable terrorists might choose to attack spent fuel pools because: (1) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants, these pools are less well protected structurally than reactor cores; (2) they typically contain Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Public Report, National Academy of Sciences, April 2005 16

inventories of medium - and long-lived radionuclides that are several times greater than those in individual reactor cores." NAS, p.36 "A loss-of-pool-coolant event resulting from damage or collapse of the pool could have severe consequences. Severe damage of the pool wall could potentially result from several types of terrorist attacks, for instance: (1)

Attacks with large civilian aircraft; (2) Attacks with high-energy weapon; Attacks with explosive charges." NAS, p.49 "Finding 3B -... a terrorist attack that partially or completely drained a spent fuel pool could lead to a propagating zirconium cladding fire and the release of large quantities of radioactive materials to the environment. Details are provided in the committee's classified report." NAS, p.6 "Such (zirconium cladding) fires would create thermal plumes that could potentially transport radioactive aerosols hundreds of miles downwind under appropriate atmospheric conditions." NAS, p.50 "The excess cancer estimates ...to between 2,000 and 6,000 cancer deaths"'

p.45

2) An analysis of spent fuel pool accident at Pilgrim was performed by Dr. Jan Beyea for the Massachusetts Attorney General's Motion to Intervene in Pilgrim's re-licensing application. [The Massachusetts Attorney General's Request for a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene With respect to Enterqy Nuclear Operations Inc.'s Application for Renewal of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plants Operating License and Petition for Backfit Order Requiring New Design features to Protect Against Spent Fuel Pool Accidents, Docket No. 50-293, May 26, 2006 includes a Report to The Massachusetts Attorney General On The Potential Consequences Of A Spent Fuel Pool Fire At The Pilgrim Or Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant, Jan Beyea, PhD., May 25, 2006.]

Dr. Jan Beyea's estimated the consequences following the release of Cesium-137 from Pilgrim's spent-fuel pool. We recognize that these are conservative estimates because: (1) he only considers Cesium-137, other radionuclides would be released; 17

and (2) he only looks at latent cancers and not other radiation-linked diseases, reproductive disorders and birth defects.

1 0% release C-137 100% release C-137 Cost (billions) $105-$175 billion $342-$488 Billion Latent Cancers 8,000 24,000

3) Operating with faulty fuel cladding was not taken into account, either - both the probability and consequences of postulated accidents may be increased when nuclear plants operate with pre-existing fuel cladding failures. Degraded fuel is an on going issue for the industry. NRC Commissioner Merrifield has admitted nearly 1/3 reactors now have failed fuel, and the trend is increasing, not decreasing. Briefing on Nuclear Fuel Performance, Transcript, p.4, (February 24, 2005), http://www.nrc.gov.

3. 5.2.6 Conclusion - NRC Staff mistakenly claim Applicant's SAMA Analysis

,"sound"

1) It was far from "sound" in that it ignored a spent fuel pool accident at Pilgrim. The NRC staff excused this by misinterpreting prior cases and going to the wrong section of the GEIS.

The NRC in Turkey Point concluded that the GEIS exempts spent fuel pools. They did so by referring to section 6 of the GEIS' 2 , which deals with "The Uranium Fuel Cycle and Solid Waste Management" under normal operations, rather than going to section 5 of the GEIS, which deals with "Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents."

Section 5 includes definitions of "severe" and "accident" and does not limit these to reactor accidents in any way.13 Section 5.2.1 of NUREG 1437 "General Characteristics of Accidents" begins its discussion of design basis and severe accidents with a definition of these terms.

"The term 'accident' refers to any unintentional event outside the normal plant operational envelope that results in a release or the potential for release of radioactive materials into the environment . . . 'severe' . . .[includes] those involving multiple failures of equipment or function and, therefore, whose likelihood 12 Section 6 in NUREG - 1437, whose conclusions are carried over into Appendix B to Subpart A of Part 51.

13 See discussion under III.A.

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is generally lower than design basis accidents but where consequences may be higher..

It is their potential for "releases substantially in excess of permissible limits" that makes it necessary to consider them in SAMAs. This entire SAMA section focuses on potential consequences to determine whether a potential accident is severe or not -

not whether the source is the reactor core or elsewhere at the plant.

2) "The staff reviewed Entergy's analysis and concluded that the methods used and implementation of those methods was sound." And "the costs of SAMAs evaluated would be higher than the associated benefits. 5.2.5. The NRC staff is wrong to accept Entergy's SAMA analysis in the application - see Pilgrim Watch's Motion to Intervene, Contention 3.

Criticism:

The Applicant's Environmental Report inadequately accounts for off-site health exposure and economic costs in its SAMA analysis of severe accidents. By using probabilistic modeling and incorrectly inputting certain parameters into the modeling software [such as meteorology, demographic data, economic data, emergency response data], Entergy has downplayed the consequences of a severe accident at Pilgrim and this has caused it to draw incorrect conclusions about the costs versus benefits of possible mitigation alternatives.

Examples:

Economic data - Nowhere in the assessment of the economic costs of a severe accident does the model account for the loss of economic activity in Plymouth County. The valuations include only the assessed value of the property, ignoring business value. The fact that the building is an on-going business with inventory, equipment, and income generation capability is not taken into account. Tourism is ignored which is mystifying because the staff looked into and mentions historic and archaeological resources as a variable in their alternative analysis, section 8, and description of the site (section 2.2.9).

Evacuation Delay time 19

Entergy assumes that the longest likely delay before residents begin to evacuate is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. This assumption is incorrect for the simple reason that notice of the evacuation could take longer than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to reach people. The sirens only can be heard outside, if an accident occurs when residents are inside, during the night for instance, they are unlikely to be notified within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The peak population in the EPZ approximates 100,000. How is it conceivably possible to spread the word if the sirens are down over approximately 150 square miles when the public is engaged in a variety of activities? What about those who can not hear the sirens inside?

Evacuation Speed Entergy assumes the evacuation speed will be from 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 35 minutes to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes However, to arrive at this number, the applicant falsely assumes that:

the public is out of danger once they cross the 10 mile boundary but in a severe accident harmful levels of radiation (and thus evacuation) will extend beyond 10 miles; they assume no one beyond 10 miles will evacuate, leaving roads clear when we know the "shadow evacuation" will occur and a "cork will effectively be placed in the bottle" trapping those near the core; and they assume transportation providers from well outside the zone will come and whisk folks away within this small frame-period. How did the NRC staff buy into this?

5. 2 Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives The applicant is required to analyze severe accident mitigation alternatives. The NRC staff concluded in their review of Entergy's analysis that the methods were sound

and, Although the treatment of SAMAs for external events was somewhat limited by the unavailability of an external event PSA, the likelihood of there being cost-beneficial enhancements in this area was minimized by improvements that have been realized as a result of the IPEEE process, and increasing the estimated SAMA benefits by a factor of five to account for potential benefits in external events.

Question: Where did "5" come from; what is the rational, none is given; what should it have been? Five is obviously pulled out of the air. It assumes that there is no difference between events caused externally than internally - there is no rational basis for that assumption.

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Consequences of NRC rubber-stamping the faulty SAMA Analysis The faulty SAMA analysis used by Entergy in the Environmental Report, and accepted by NRC in the Draft SEIS, caused it to wrongly dismiss mitigation alternatives such as adding a filter to the Direct Torus Vent.

5.1.1 Design-Basis Accidents "Small" impact, no new and significant information "The Commission has determined that impacts of DBAs are small significance for all plants because the plants were designed to successfully withstand these accidents."

NRC staff obviously forgot about the near-miss at Davis Besse NPS - the reactor with a hole in its head. NRC staff incorrectly assumes that: NRC regulations are sufficiently stringent; that regulations are followed by licensees and manufacturers; and that there is sufficient NRC oversight and enforcement action when regulations are not met.

What was not taken into account?

• Spent fuel pool accident can cause/lead to a reactor core accident and vice versa

-the interplay was ignored and not analyzed;

• Human error;

" The effects of an aging work force;

" The bathtub curve of aging - trouble occurs in all mechanical components in their.

early and later stages - Pilgrim will be in the "late stage" from 2012-2032;

• The use of counterfeit and substandard parts;

• The potential leakage of contaminated water offsite;

" The Aging Management Plan failure to adequately monitor for corrosion in the drywell liner; ,

" Wiring Coating- missing from the list of passive equipment is testing /re-qualifying the EQ rating, although the miles of wiring at Pilgrim is tested with the active components they interconnect -these wires are required to perform under harsh conditions (fire, high temperature, and high moisture). As the wiring ages its ability to still meet the original qualification tests is an interesting, though overlooked, challenge. A good comparison, consider what is happen in the City 21

of Boston. The aging Nstar electric system is failing. How many of those failures are just old wires with rubber coating turned brittle and cracked? The power flows until the manhole explodes. Turing on a pump is like turning on your lights; it does not test the wiring coating, the EQ, only the metal of the wire.

Engineering Review of Operating Transients: Pilgrim in 1994 had already exceeded the 40-year design standards for 6 kinds of events that put stress on the reactor before license expiration, according to a February 24, 1994 NRC Inspection Report -we are considering adding an additional 20 years.

Transient Design Cycles Cycles to-date Projected Cycles Description I[ 40 years 21 years 40 years Startup 120 187 368 Power Increase 1 120 133 264 T/G Trips 40 26 49 Other Scrams 147 134 346 Loss of FW Pumps ]l 10 26 64 SR Valve Blowdown:fII/i 2 13 23 Replacement parts - difficult, if not impossible, to find from 2012-2032:

Example - The Patriot Ledger Reported, February 25, 2003, Broken pump shuts Pilgrim power plant - Engineers traced the pump problem to a defective part in the generator that powers the pump motor, Tarantino said. A 12-inch-wide "slip ring" in the motor and generator had failed... The motor and generator together are about the size of an automobile... Workers are replacing the rotor in the generator... It took until Sunday to get the part because Pilgrim "was built in the 1960s and went on line in 1972," Tarantino said. "In some cases it's becoming difficult to find replacement parts because the technology has changed."

Replacement parts in a global economy can come from anywhere in the world.

This presents serious QA issues, not analyzed.

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IV. ENVIROMENTAL IMPACTS OF DECOMMISSIONING [7.0]

"Small" impact, no new and significant information The NRC staff concluded that there are no impacts related to these issues beyond those discussed in the GEIS - the impacts are small and additional mitigation measures are not likely to be sufficiently beneficial to be warranted.

Subsections

1. Waste Management (p.7-3): "Decommissioning at the end of a 20-year license renewal period would generate no more solid wastes than at the end of the current license term. No increase in the quantities of Class C or greater than Class C wastes would be expected." The staff did not identify and new and significant information.

Comment - what's wrong?

What about the generation of half-again as much spent fuel and so-called low-level waste? There is new and significant information indicating that there will NOT be an offsite storage solution anytime soon - not within NRC's stated estimates. The staff simply ignored reality and rests its case on the now outdated Waste Confidence Rule.

2. Air quality (p.7-3): "Air quality impacts of decommissioning are expected to be negligible either at the end of the current operating term or at the end of the license renewal term." The staff did not identify and new and significant information Comment:

The staff did not provide information about buried wastes on site - where they were located; how deep they were buried; packaging; chemical and radioactive composition of waste.

We know for example that when Pilgrim blew its filters in 1982, there was considerable contamination. During the clean up, waste was buried on the property.

Neighbors and passer-bys on Rocky Hill Road observed the operation - NRC and Entergy's staff are aware, too. The public, NRC officials and Entergy staff also are well aware of burials off the Access Road. If the application is approved, decommissioning will not begin until 2032 or later. We assume that the licensee and NRC determined that burying waste on site would not harm the environment based 23

on a definite time frame - a 40 year license. What would happen after 60 years was not considered nor analyzed. It needs to be analyzed to provide reasonable assurance that public health and safety will not be negatively impacted. For example erosion of the top soil will be affected by the passage of time, increasing frequency and severity of coastal storms; and the topography of the site that slants down into Cape Cod Bay. Migration of contaminants underground is currently not monitored.

Migration of contaminants from so-called low level waste has happened at other sites

- for example, at Barnwell SC, TVA, Hanford and Starmet. Hence there is no reason to believe that the same could not happen here.

3. Water Quality (p. 7-3): "The potential for significant water quality impacts from erosion or spills is no greater when decommissioning occurs after a 20-year license renewal period or after the original 40-year operation period, and measures are readily available to avoid such impacts."

The staff did not identify any new and significant information. If they had looked they would have concluded that there are no effective measures currently or in the aging management program to avoid impacts.

The staff ignored the points brought forward by Pilgrim Watch in their Motion to Intervene, May 2006. Contention 1 asserts that the Aging Management program proposed in the Pilgrim application for license renewal is inadequate because (1) it does not provide for adequate inspection of all systems and components that may contain radioactively contaminated water and (2) there is no adequate monitoring to determine if and when leakage from these areas occurs. Some of these systems include underground pipes and tanks which the current aging management and inspection programs do not effectively inspect and monitor. NRC staff need consider that:

We know that over the last decade a series of events, occurring at a quickening pace and with increasing magnitude, have raised serious questions about whether nuclear facilities are in compliance with federal regulations governing the release of radioactive materials into the environment - leaks have been reported at the majority of reactors. The industry is "addressing" the issue by a voluntary reporting program. Public safety requires requirements.

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Exposure to radiation, including tritium, can cause cancer, disease, genetic mutations and birth defects.

Recent discoveries of leaked radioactive water in other nuclear facilities have made it clear that current methods for monitoring systems and components such as buried pipes and underground tanks are inadequate. In addition, the older the structure in question, the more likely it is for leakages to occur.

Pilgrim is specifically vulnerable to undetected leaks in its underground pipes and tanks because it has nonconforming pipe fittings and flanges. The United States Government Accounting Office 14 reported that PNPS is suspected of having received counterfeit or substandard pipe fittings and flanges. This could make leaks of contaminated water more likely. There is no evidence in the applicant's filing that a thorough investigation at PNPS has occurred to determine precisely which pipe fittings and flanges are substandard and whether they have been upgraded to meet standards.

The Aging Management Program at Pilgrim does not provide adequate inspection of systems and components such as underground pipes and tanks. Appendix B describes the Aging Management Program for buried pipes and tanks. This section says that buried components will be inspected when excavated during maintenance, and that a focused inspection will be performed within ten years unless an opportunistic inspection occurs within this period - the focused inspection described is an untested Ultrasonic Test.

Pilgrim does not have monitoring test wells around, for example, buried pipes and tanks to detect leaks.

The topography of the Pilgrim site is such that, were a leak to develop in an underground pipe or tank, the contaminated water would most likely migrate seaward and drain into Cape Cod bay.

14 United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, Nuclear safety and Health Counterfeit and Substandard Products Are a Government Wide Concern, GAO/RCED-91-6, October 1990.

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The only effective way to monitor for such an occurrence would be to have on-site monitoring wells located between Pilgrim and the ocean.1 5 A suitable array of wells, sampled regularly, could be used to test that the inspection program is working properly.

4. Socioeconomic Impacts (p.7-4):

Again the staff identified no new and significant information and concluded that there would be no socioeconomic impacts associated with decommissioning.

Example: Leaks into Cape Cod Bay could significantly impact our air and water quality - not to mention socioeconomic impacts on our fishing and tourist industry and valuation of properties.

V. MARINE AQUATIC RESOURCES [2.2.5; 4.0]

The staff concludes that cumulative impacts of PNPS license renewal would be SMALL for most potentially affected resources, with the exception of the local winter flounder population and Jones River population of rainbow smelt, for which impacts would be MODERATE (p.9-5).

Methods used to Assess Impact: How did NRC come to their conclusion when marine impact can not be assessed at present because definite numbers have not been set on what constitutes "significant impact." A yardstick has to be firmly established for each species (plant and animal) with appropriate federal, state and independent partners and rationales provided to the public; and Thermal backwash as not considered. During a thermal backwash, about 155,000 gpm of heated water 15 Topography source: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Boston Edison Company Docket No. 50-293, May 1972 -U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Division of Radiological and Environmental Protection, Final EIS "The station site is along the rocky western shoreline of Cape Cod Bay. The geology of the site is recognized as primarily glacial deposits. The natural surface stratum in the station area consists of approximately 20 feet of silty and clayey fine sands with scattered boulders. Bedrock is about 30 to 90 feet below mean sea level." P. 9 "Surface topography is such that surface drainage from the station is seaward and surface water will not leave the Station property otherwise." P. 10.

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(>105 0 F) is sent into the intake embayment for a period of about 1.5-2 hrs. Studies to evaluate potential impacts of the thermal backwash have not been performed.

Determining Impact:

There appear to be many methods used to determine impact, each with drawbacks.

It must be determined before going forward with the re-licensing process what methods provide the most reliable estimates of impact, with a detailed rationale; a requirement that these methods are followed by the licensee unless better methods are established and independently approved.

We understand that there has been no policy statement regarding losses on a square mile basis by any state or federal agency. NRC should in its review process determine what percent loss is a significant detriment to any population [figure depending on population], with a detailed rationale.

Entrainment: Winter Flounder- methods used by Entergy to determine impact

1. Equivalent adult method: "researchers conducting this work have assumed an otter trawl efficiency of 50%, but the actual efficiency may be much lower (or higher), which would alter the number of fish in the study area per square mile and the apparent impact. Second, entrainment sampling results are quite variable. Third, it is difficult to determine the accuracy, and therefore, the applicability, of the survival matrix used in estimating equivalent adults."

Whether or not these levels of impact are a "significant" detriment to the population, and will result in slowing the return to much higher population densities, is currently unknown and a policy statement regarding losses on a square mile basis has not been issued by any of the state or federal agencies. EPA Region 1 has stated in the past that population impacts of 5% or greater are typically of concern. However, to DEP's and Pilgrim Watch's knowledge, the geographic bounds of this particular population have not been agreed upon by state or federal agencies.

2. 2 nd method - estimate the percentage of the total larval population passing in front of the facility that is entrained 27

3. The third method used by the facility to evaluate impact was the RAMAS (Risk Analysis Management Alternative System; Ferson, 1993) winter flounder model. It was used from 1999-2001 to further evaluate the effects of the facility on the Cape Cod Bay winter flounder population. Results suggested that stock reductions from 2.3 to 5.2% might occur as the direct result of entrainment at the facility.

It should be determined and agreed upon by NRC, appropriate state agencies and independent analysts what method or methods actually provide accurate information needed to assess more accurately impact before the license is approved.

4. An analysis of Backwash effects has not been performed to the best of our knowledge.

4.1.4 Potential Mitigation Measures: 12 measures are listed; however "The NRC staff has not conducted an analysis of each of these measures relative to their applicability to PNPS... It is expected that a more thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of these technologies would be conducted as part of the 316(b) CDS currently being conducted by PNPS in support of the NPDES permit renewal."

Missing from the list is thermal discharge - allowable maximum temperature of the water discharged and its measurement. Discharge temperature is now averaged over an hour; instantaneous measurement should be required. We are told that instantaneous releases have been over the allowable limit. Those reading do not appear on the record because they can be countered by a lower release - a way to cook the books and the fish that happen to be swimming by at the wrong time.

5. Cape Cod Bay is an Ocean Sanctuary. Therefore greater consideration of a wider range of species needs to be analyzed further.

Submitted by, Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch, Director 148 Washington Street, Duxbury MA 02332 28