Text

Draft - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 2)
	ML083540454
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	11/10/2008
From:	; Exelon Generation Co
To:	Todd Fish; Operations Branch I
	Hansell S
Shared Package
ML081060602	List: IR 05000277/2009301; ML082200014; ML083390459; ML083530477; ML083540094; ML083540178; ML083540401; ML083540411; ML083540454; ML090220315; ML090290221; ML090290223; ML090290224; ML090290228; ML090330087;
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Scenario Outline EI-D-I Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No. #I (altered bank)

Op Test No.

2008 NfK Event No.

I Examiners Operators CRS (SRO)

URC: (ATC)

Malfunction Event Event N

URO SwapCRUpumps No.

Type*

Description CRS PRC (BOP)

//

2 3

4 Scenario Summary The scenario begins with a plant startup in progress at approximately 5% power following a rb?fueling outage. During shift turnover, the crew IS directed to swap CRD pumps due to a noisy bearin 3 on the A pump. Following the CRD pump swap, the 6 drywell chiller trips, requiring the crew to place the standby drywell chiller in service in accordance with ON-I20 High Drywell Temperature.

Next, a loss of MCC E224-R-6 results in a loss of the 6 RPS MG set, a half scram and PCIS outboard Group II isolation. The crew will investigate, transfer RPS toithe alternate supply and reset the half scram and PClS isolation Following the Tech Spec evaluation, startup level controllclr LCV-8091 will fail open, requiring the crew to manually restore and control RPV water level in accordance with OT-I 10 Reactor High Level. This event is further complicated by an inadvertent RClC initiation, requiring entry into OT-104 Positive Reactivity Insertion and manual shutdown of FCIC.

C PRO Drywell chiller trip CRS URO PRO CRS C

TS Loss of MCC E224-R-B resulting in half scram and Group II outboard isolation /transfer RPS power supplies, reset half scram and isolations I

URO Startup level controller (LCV-8091) failure CRS I

PRO TS CRS Inadvertent RClC initiation II I

6 7

C URO CRS ALL EHC failure causes rising reactor pressure / reactor scram with.node switch failure (manual scram works)

Torus leak into secondary containment (torus room) leading to emergency blowdown / turbine bypass valve fails open, causing MSlVs to close (due to failed mode switch)

M

SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:

Unit 2 startup IAW GP-2 Normal Plant Startup in progress. Procedure complete up to step 6.2.61. Variance steps include:

6.2.44 (Drywell purge still in progress to support drywell inspections) 6.2.60 (awaiting AO-809 1 troubleshooting)

Rod Sequence Sheet is complete up to and including Group 16, rod 42-1 1.

Startup ON HOLD due to erratic operation of AO-8091. Troubleshooting equipment being installed. Stay on AO-8091 for RPV level control until equipment is installed, THEN transition to Auto Level Control on the Master Controller.

Currently in Step 1 of ReMA PB2C18-1.O.

INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:

The previous shift noticed erratic operation of the Startup Level Control Valve (AO-8091).

Troubleshooting is in progress.

SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

Predictive Maintenance reports a noisy bearing on the A CRD pump motor and has requested a swap to the B CRD pump in order to install instrumentation on the A pump.

Place 2B CRD pump (Standby pump) in service using SO 3.6.A-2 Placing the Standby Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Pump in Service. 2B CRD pump has NOT been drained.

SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

None GENERAL INFORMATION:

Reactor level control through AO-8091 using SO 6C.1.A-2 (at step 4.4) 0 Startup ON HOLD due to erratic operation OF AO-8091. Troubleshooting equipment being installed. Stay on AO-8091 for RPV level control until equipment is installed, THEN transition to Auto Level Control on the Master Controller.

Containment purge in progress using SO 7B.4.A-2 (at step 4.19).

Shell warming in progress using SO l B. l.A-2 (at step 4.9.10).

0 0

CRITICAL TASK LIST

1.

Manually scram the reactor on recognition of failure to automatically scram at 1085 paiig reactor pressure, or in any case before reactor pressure exceeds 11 00 psig. Recognize failure of the reactor mode switch and shutdown the reactor using the manual scram push buttons.

2.

Perform an emergency blowdown in accordance with T-I 12 Emergency Blowdown before Torus level lowers to 10.5 feet.

Operator Actions ES-El-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

1 Page:

1 of13 Event

Description:

Swap CRD pumps Cause:

Noisy pump motor bearing on the A CRD pump.

Effects:

N/A Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct the URO to swap CRD pumps in accordance with SO 3.6.A-2 Placing the Standby Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Pump in Service.

URO Swap CRD pumps IAW SO 3.6.A-2 Placing the Standby Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Pump in Service:

Contact the Equipment Operator to verify 2B CRD pump ready for start IAW SO 3.6.A,-2 Steps 4.2.1 through 4.2.8.

Start the 2B CRD pump and monitor pump amps.

Direct the Equipment Operator to slowly open HV-2-3-36B.

0 Shutdown the 2A CRD pump.

Direct the Equipment Operator to close HV-2-3-36A.

0 Check CRD system parameters IAW SO 3.8.A-2 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Routine Inspection.

0 Inform the CRS the pump swap is complete.

PRO Monitor plant parameters and assist as directed.

ES-El-2 Page:

2of13 Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Cause:

Effects:

1. Alarms B drywell chiller trip Spurious chiller motor high temperature 21 7 D-I Drywell Chiller Trouble 21 7 J-I Drywell Chilled Water Hi-Lo Temp (approx. 15 minutes after chiller tr p, depending on restoration time) 0 217 J-2 A Drywell Chiller Discharge Hi Temp (approx. 5 minutes after trip)

2. B chiller outlet temperature increases; chilled water supply and return, drywell coder fan outlet and return, drywell equipment drain sump outlet, and recirc pump motor temperatures all increase.

3. Drywell temperature and pressure rise accordingly.

Time Position UROIPRO CRS PRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report alarm 217 D-I Drywell Chiller Trouble and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Card.

Recognize and report alarm 217 J-I Drywell Chilled Water Hi-Lo Temp and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Card, if it alarms.

Recognize and report alarm 21 7 J-2 A Drywell Chiller Discharge Hi Temp and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Card.

Enter and execute ARC 217 D-I Drywell Chiller Trouble:

0 Direct placing additional drywell chillers in service IAW SO 44A.6.A-2 Placing an Additional Drywell Chiller in Service. NOTE: Drywell chillers are NOT in outage operation.

Direct performing SO 44A.7.F-2 Response to a Drywell Chiller Trouble Alarm.

0 Place the control switch for the B drywell chiller in STOP.

Start the standby drywell chiller IAW SO 44A.6.A-2 Placing an Additional Drywell Chiller in Service.

0 Direct an Equipment Operator to verify 2C Drywell Chiller is ready for start by performing steps 4.7 through 4.9 of SO 44A.6.A-2.

Place the C chilled water pump in service by placing the pump control switch in RUN.

0 Place the C drywell chiller in service by placing the chiller control switch in START.

Dispatch an Equipment Operator to perform SO 44.A.7.F-2 Response to a Drywell Chiller Trouble Alarm.

Operator Actions ES-0-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

3 Page:

3of23 Event

Description:

Cause:

Effects:

Loss of electrical power to E224-R-B Overcurrent trip of 480 VAC MCC circuit breaker

1. Initial Alarm: 002 F-I E224 MCC: FDR BKR TRIP

2. Loss of power to multiple pieces of ECCS equipment, which will ultimately result in a Tech Spec required shutdown.

Time Position PRO CRS PRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report alarm 002 F-I E224 MCC FDR BKR Trip and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Card.

Direct an Equipment Operator to investigate the E224 MCC feeder breaker trip.

Direct the Equipment Operator to green flag the tripped breaker by placing its local control switch to the TRIP position.

Identify loads without power by monitoring panels, reviewing associated electrical prints and reviewing Attachment 1 of A 0 56E.3-2 for E224-R-B.

Enter and execute the alarm response card for 002 F-I E224 MCC BKR Trip.

Review Technical Specifications and determine a 3.0.3 shutdown is required due to B Core Spray and B RHR inoperable.

Direct transfer of B RPS bus to the alternate supply IAW SO 60F.6.A-2.

Direct reset of the half scram IAW GP-11.E Reactor Protection System -

Scram and ARI Reset Direct reset of PClS Group I, II and Ill isolations IAW GP-8.D Group I, II and Ill Outboard Half Isolation.

Transfer B RPS bus to the alternate supply IAW SO 6OF.6.A-2.

0 0

Verify ALT SOURCE AVAILABLE light is lit at Panel 20C017.

Verify scram solenloid group 1-4 lights are lit at Panel 20C015.

Place the RPS M E SET ALT FEED TRANS S W to ALTERNATE:.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

3 ES-El-2 Page:

4of13 Event Description :

Loss of electrical power to E224-R-B...continued Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Reset the half scram IAW GP-11.E Reactor Protection System - Scram and ARI Reset.

Reset half scram IAW GP-11.E.

0 0

0 Place the Scram Reset switch to the Group 1 & 4 position.

Place the Scram Reset switch to the Group 2 & 3 position.

Verify scram solenloid group 1-4 lights are lit at Panel 20C015 and Panel 20C017.

Verify scram annunciators are resetklear.

Place the SDV Inboard Vent and Drain Valves control switch to OPEN and verify the valves indicate open.

Place the SDV Outboard Vent and Drain Valves control switch to OPEN and verify the valves indicate open.

PRO Reset the PClS Group I, II and Ill isolations IAW GP-8.D Group I, II and Ill Outboard Half Isolation.

Verify affected equipment in Required Position by performing COI-Direct Equipment Operator to verify Reactor Building and Refuel Floor ventilation fans are tripped and all fan control switches are placed in OFF.

Place control switches for affected equipment in the Place Switch To position per GP-8.D.

Place the Outboard Isolation Logic Reset Switch (16A-S33) to the GRP II / 111 position.

Verify GROUP II / Ill OUTBOARD ISOL. RELAYS NOT RESET annunciator is clear.

GP-8.D.

0 0

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

3 ES-0-2 Page:

5of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of electrical power ta E224-R-B...continued Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRO Shutdown the SBGT System IAW SO 9A.2.A Standby Gas Treatment System Shutdown Following an Automatic Start.

0 Place the operating SBGT Fan control switch to STOP and let it spring return to AUTO.

Close the in-service B SBGT Filter Train inlet and outlet valves:

o AO-00476-1 o AO-00476-2 Close the following ventilation dampers:

o AO-20469-02 o AO-20470-02 o

PO-20466 PRO Restore Reactor Building Ventilation IAW SO 406.1.A-2 Reactor Building Ventilation System Startup and Normal Operation.

Verify open the following dampers:

o AO-20453 o AO-20461 o AO-20462 o AO-20452 o AO-20458 o AO-20463 o AO-20464 o AO-20457 o AO-20467 o AO-20468 0

Direct an Equipment Operator to startup Reactor Building Ventilaticn.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

4 ES-D-2 Page:

6of13 Event

Description:

Startup level controller (LCN-8091) failure Cause:

Control signal failure Effects:

1. Alarm:

0

2. LCV-8091 fails open, causing RPV water level to rise.

210 H-2 Reactor Hi-Lo Water Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Recognize and report alarm 210 H-2 Reactor Hi-Lo Water Level and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Cards.

Control RPV water level below +35 inches.

0 Recognize and report LCV-8091 has failed open.

0 Attempt to take manual control of LCV-8091; determine valve does not respond to manual control.

0 Perform any of the following actions to control the transient:

o Take manual control of C reactor feed pump MIA station; reduce feed pump speed to reduce pump discharge pressure below RPV pressure, OR o Close MO-8090 IC RFP Bypass and batch feed the RPV using the C RFP discharge valve, OR o Transfer to Master Level Control using SO 6C.1.A-2 C Reactor Feedwater Pump Startup With Vessel Level Control Established Through AO-8091.

CRS Enter and execute OT-I 00 Reactor Low Level when RPV level initially lowers.

Enter and execute OT-I 10 Reactor High Level when RPV level rises Direct maintaining RP\\/ water level below +35 inches.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Inadvertent RCIC initiation ES-I)-2 Page:

7of13 Cause:

Effects:

1. Alarms:

initiation relay contacts short closed 0

2. RCIC injection into the RPV; reactor water level and reactor power increase 227 E-3 RCIC Relays Not Reset Time Position PRO URO CRS Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report RClC initiation.

Using at least two independent indications, verify mis-operation of RCIC and/or adequate core cooling is assured.

Control feed pump speed / discharge pressure as necessary to maintain RPV water level below +35 inches (N/A if transferred to Auto Master Level Control in previous event).

(May) enter and execute OT-I 04 Positive Reactivity Insertion.

Enter and execute OT-I 10 Reactor High Level.

0 Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.5.2 (RCIC Instrumentation), 3.5.1 and 3.5.3:

0 Verify HPCI operability immediately.

0 Declare RCIC inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

0 Determine RCIC must be restored to operable within 14 days.

Request troubleshooting/technical assistance through the Shift Manager Using at least two independent indications, verify mis-operation of RCIC and/or adequate core cooling is assured.

Direct RCIC shutdown in accordance with SO 13.2.A-2 RCIC Systsm Shutdown.

Direct maintaining RPV water level below +35 inches.

Operator Actions ES-I)-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

5 Page:

8of13 Event

Description:

Inadvertent RClC initiation... continued Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRO Perform SO 13.2.A-2 RCIC System Shutdown:

Trip the RClC turbine by depressing the Trip pushbutton.

Attempt closure of MO-2-13-021 To Feed Line.

Close MO-2-13-131 Supply.

Verify the following:

o AO-2-13-034 Drain lsol to Mn Cndr opens.

o AO-2-13-035 Drain lsol to Mn Cndr opens.

o MO-2-13-132 Cooling Water closes.

Close MO-2-13-030 Full Flow Test.

Close MO-2-23-024 Cond Tank Return.

Place MO-4487 Trip Throttle Vlv to Close.

Shutdown Vac Pump after it has run for 10-15 minutes.

0

Operator Actions ES-11-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

6 Page:

9of13 Event

Description:

Rising reactor pressure due to EHC regulator failure / reactor scram / mode switch failure Cause:

Pressure setpoint failure results in rising reactor pressure.

Effects:

1. Alarms 0

2. Reactor pressure rises, requiring a reactor scram.

21 0 G-2 Reactor Hi Press Time Position URO CRS CT URO CT Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report alarm 21 0 G-2 Reactor Hi Press and enter corresponding Alarm Response Card.

Recognize failure of the EHC pressure regulator, causing rising reactor pressure.

Enter and execute OT-102 Reactor High Pressure.

Direct insertion of a manual scram before reactor pressure reaches the automatic scram setpoint (- 1085 psig).

Ensure compliance with Tech Spec 3.4. IO.

Insert a manual scram before reactor pressure reaches the automatic scram setpoint (- 1085 psig).

Perform applicable scram actions:

0 0

0 Place the mode switch to SHUTDOWN.

Recognize mode switch failure / failure to automatically scram; depress both manual scram pushbuttons.

Verify / report control rods are inserting.

Verify / report APRMs are downscale.

Restore and maintain RPV level by controlling C feed pump speec /

discharge pressure.

Verify all control rods are inserted.

Operator Actions ES-E)-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

6 Page:

10of13 Event

Description:

EHC regulator failure / reactor scram / mode switch failure...continued Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRO Perform applicable scram actions:

0 0

Verify scram discharge volume vents and drains are closed.

Verify recirc pumps; are at 30% speed.

Monitor instrument air header pressure and drywell pressure.

Report to the CRS instrument air header pressure is greater than drywell pressure.

CRS NOTE: the CRS should initially enter T-I 01 RPV Control due to the mode switch failure (AIWS). T-I 01 can then be immediately exited following the scram.

Enter and execute T-I 00 Scram:

0 Direct RPV level restored and maintained between +5 and +35 inches using feedwater.

Direct instrument nitrogen restored by performing instrument nitrogen bypass (GP-8E).

Direct RPV pressure stabilized below 1050 psig.

0 0

URO/PRO Bypass and restore drywell instrument nitrogen IAW GP-8E.

0 0

0 Place AO-2969A control switch to CLOSE.

Place AO-29698 control switch to CLOSE.

Place Drywell Instrument Nitrogen Bypass Switch 16A-SI00 in the BYPASS position.

Place Drywell Instrument Nitrogen Bypass Switch 16A-S99 in the BYPASS position.

ES-El-2 Page:

11 of 13 Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

1. Torus leak

2. #I turbine bypass valve fails open Cause:

1. Rupture in Torus shell

2. A ground on the servo motor

1. Torus level will lower and will eventually equalize with the torus room at approximately 7 feet.

2. Alarms:

Effects:

0 0

3. Following the scram reactor pressure will continue to lower. Due to the mode switch failure, MSlVs will close when reactor pressure decreases below 850 psig.

224 C-5 Torus Room Flood 226 A-4 Torus Level Out Of Normal Range Time Position PRO CRS PRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report alarm 226 A-4 Torus Level Out Of Normal RanGe and enter corresponding Alarm Response Card.

Direct an Equipment Operator to determine the source of the leak.

Enter and execute T-I 02 Primary Containment Control.

0 0

Enter and execute ON-I 10 Loss of Primary Containment.

Direct torus level restored using T-233 CST Makeup to the Torus Via HPCl Minimum Flow Line.

Direct torus level restored using T-231 HPSW Injection Into the Torus.

Perform T-233 CST Makeup to the Torus Via HPCl Minimum Flow Line.

0 0

Verify HPCl suction MO-2-23-017 OPEN.

OPEN HPCl minimum flow MO-2-23-025.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

1. Torus leak...continued

2. # I turbine bypass valve fails open... continued Time Position PRO PRO CRS CRS URO/PRO URO/PRO ES-I)-2 Page:

12of13 Applicants Actions or Behavior Perform T-231 HPSW Injection Into the Torus as directed.

e e

e Verify 2B and 2D RHR pumps are shutdown.

Verify closed MO-;!-I 0-1 548 Outboard Discharge.

Verify 28 and 2D HPSW pumps are shutdown.

Verify MO-2-10-0896 and MO-2-10-089D RHR Hx HPSW outlet valves CLOSED.

Verify MO-2-32-2344 (1 0-1 86) HPSW loop cross-tie CLOSED.

OPEN MO-2-10-174 and MO-2-10-176 HPSW/RHR cross-tie valves.

OPEN MO-2-10-0398 Torus Header.

Start a HPSW pump.

Throttle MO-2-10-0348 to maintain 5,300 gpm flow.

Start a second HPSW pump if needed.

Throttle MO-2-10-0348 to maintain 10,600 gpm flow for 2 pump operation.

Recognize and report alarm 224 C-5 Torus Room Flood and enter corresponding Alarm Response Card.

Enter and execute T-I 03 Secondary Containment Control.

Direct an evacuation of the torus room in accordance with GP-15 Local Evacuation (make request to Shift Manager).

Direct RPV depressurization using SRVs IAW T-I 02 T/L-6.

Depressurize the RPW using SRVs, as directed.

Recognize and report: that torus level is approaching 12.5 feet.

Recognize and reporl: that torus level is approaching 10.5 feet.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

1 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

1. Torus leak...continued

2. # I turbine bypass valve fails open...continued Time Position CT CRS CT PRO CRS URO/PRO U RO/PRO CRS URO ES-D-2 Page:

13of113 Applicants Actions or Behavior When torus level cannot be maintained above 10.5 feet, direct an emergency blowdown.

Enter and execute T-I,12 Emergency Blowdown.

0 Verify torus level is above 7 feet.

0 Verify reactor pressure is 50 psig above torus pressure.

0 Direct 5 ADS SRVs opened.

Perform an emergency blowdown by opening 5 ADS SRVs.

Report 5 ADS SRVs are open.

When torus level drops below 10.5 feet, if any RHR pumps are running, direct all operating RHR pumps secured.

Secure all operating RHR pumps, as directed.

Recognize and report that torus level is approaching 9.5 feet.

Direct RPV level maintained between +5 and +35 inches using HPCl (and/or condensate, depending on reactor pressure).

Maintain RPV level between +5 and +35 inches using HPCI and/or condensate, as directed.

TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario may be terminated when the RPV is depressurized and HPSW is injecting into the torus.

Scenario Outline ES D-I h

Event No.

11 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No. #2 (altered bank)

Op Test No.

2008 NR 2 Malfunction Event Event No.

Type*

Description 11 Examiners Operators CRS SRO)

URO (ATC)

PRO iBOP)

N PRO TS CRS Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at approximately 76% power with power ascension on hc dd.

The crew will perform ST-0-001-200-2 Turbine Stop Valve Closure and EOC-RPT Functiona! Test when an RPS failure will require the crew to make a Tech Spec declaration. This will be followed by a trip of the in-service TBCCW pump with a failure of the standby pump to auto-start. The creN will be required to respond IAW ON-I 18 Loss of TBCCW and place the standby TBCCW pump i service. Following this, the A SRV will inadvertently open, requiring the crew to take actions AW OT-I 14 Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve. Power will be reduced in accordance with G:-9-2 Fast Power Reduction. The crew will be successful in closing the A SRV by directing plant operators to pull fuses for the valve.

Perform the main turbine stop valve functional test / RPS failure during functional test performance A small steam leak inside the primary containment will occur next. The crew will be required ti, take actions in accordance with OT-101 High Drywell Pressure. When the reactor is scrammed, A hydraulic ATWS will occur, requiring the crew to enter T-101 RPV Control and T-I 17 Level/~ower Control. A failure of the Standby Liquid Control pump will require the crew to start the other pJmp in order to successfully lower reactor power.

The crew will also be required to enter T-102 Primary Containment Control due to high drywell pressure. After diagnosing the inability to spray the containment due to an instrument failure, Ihe crew will perform T-I 12 Emergency Blowdown. One ADS SRV will fail to open, requiring the opening of another SRV. The crew will need to implement T-216 Control Rod Insertion By Manual Scram Or Individual Scram Test Switches and T-220 Driving Control Rods During Failure To Scram to terminate the ATWS.

C URO 1

CRS TBCCW pump trip w/ failure of standby pump to auto-start ll I 3

C TS CRS SRV closes when control power fuses are removed PRO SRV inadvertently opens, requiring torus cooling to be maximized /

I

I 5

R URO Fast power reduction due to SRV opening CRS ALL M

Steam leak in the primary containment / hydraulic ATWS / pressure instrument failure prevents using containment sprays II I

control pump trips requiring manual start of the to open during emergency blowdown requiring an

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Tech Spec

SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:

Approximately 76% power.

0 0

A load drop had been performed for control rod sequence exchange.

GP-5 Power Operation is at step 5.1.2.

Power ascension is on hold. Power ascension ReMA and rod sequence sheets are being evaluated by Reactor Engineer.

INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:

0 The A loop of RHR is out of service due to work on RHR valve MO-2-10-154A Outboard Discharge. Three hours into LCO 3.5.1, with expected return to service in 1 day.

SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

0 0

Perform ST-0-001-200-2 Turbine Stop Valve Closure and EOC-RPT Functional. It is alresdy completed through step 6.2.1.34.

A routine Diesel Fuel Oil delivery is expected this shift.

SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

0 Perform ST-0-001-200-2 Turbine Stop Valve Closure and EOC-RPT Functional. It is already completed through step 6.2.1.34.

ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

0 RHRLoopA GENERAL INFORMATION:

0 0

Complete the Turbine Stop Valve functional test, beginning at step 6.3.1.

An extra RO is available to perform ST-0-001-200-2, steps 6.3.7.2 though 4 and 6.3.8.1 through 3 ONLY.

CRITICAL TASK LIST

1.

Before torus temperature exceeds the limits of the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) curve, lower reactor power by performing T-240 Terminating and Preventing Injection to lower RPV level until:

a.

Reactor power is below 4%,

b.

RPV level reaches -172 inches, &I

c.

All SRVs remain closed and drywell pressure is below 2 psig.

2.

Perform an emergency blowdown in accordance with T-I 12 Emergency Blowdown when drywell bulk average temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 281 degrees F.

3.

Initiate a reactor shutdown by inserting control rods in accordance with T-216 Control Rod Insertion by Manual Scram or Individual Scram Test Switches and/or T-220 Driving Control Rods During Failure to Scram andlor shutdown the reactor by initiating Standby Liquid Control before torus temperature exceeds the limits of the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) curve.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

Cause:

N/A Effects:

N/A Perform the turbine stop valve functional test ES-13-2 Page:

1 of14 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct the PRO to perform ST-0-001-200-2 Turbine Stop Valve Closure and EOC-RPT Functional.

PRO Perform ST-0-001-200-2 Turbine Stop Valve Closure and EOC-RPT Functional:

0 ReviewST Inform the Unit Reactor Operator that the test is going to be conducted and what indications can be expected (this may be covered during turnover and/or a CRS briefing).

At Panel 20C015 and 20C017:

1. Verify all RPS A and B scram solenoid group 1-4 lights are lit

2. Verify A I and HI TURB STOP VALVE NORMAL lights are lit.

0 At Panel 20C008B, place the CV/SV test selector switch to SV TEST.

0 Verify the lights on all four TSV test buttons are ON.

0 At Panel 20C015, place the EOC-RPT test switch in TEST (m

18).

0 Verify alarm 214 D-3 SYSTEM I EOC-RPT LOGIC PWR FAIWEST.

0 At Panel 20C008B, depress and hold TSV-1 test pushbutton.

1. Verify TSV-1 position indicator moves smoothly at low speed to less than 10% open and then fast closes.

2. After 2 to 3 seconds at full close, release the test pushbutton.

3. Verify TSV-1 valve position indicator moves smoothly from closed to full open.

When the RPS relay failure is reported, STOP the functional test.

1. Place the CV/SV test selector switch to OFF.

2. Verify the lights; on all four TSV test buttons are off.

3. Place backup E!HC pump to STOP, then back to AUTO.

0 URO Monitor plant parameterdassist as directed.

Operator Actions ES-83-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

1 Page:

2of 14 Event

Description:

RPS failure during turbine stop valve functional test Cause:

Turbine stop valve position switch input to RPS logic fails Effects:

RPS instrumentation failure; application of Tech Specs Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: the Extra RO at Panels 20C015 and 20C017, role played by the Simulator Operator in the booth, will provide the crew with the following information from ST-0-001-200-2, allowing the CRS to apply Tech Specs:

Step 6.3.7.2 - auxiliary scram relay 5A-KIOA mde-energize.

0 Step 6.3.7.3 - auxiliary scram relay 5A-KIOB did not de-energize.

0 Step 6.3.7.4 - indicating light 5A-DS26B islit.

PRO Stop the functional test when the RPS failure is reported.

Perform system restoration IAW ST-0-001-200-2, step 6.7 (see previoilis page).

CRS Direct stopping the functional test and system restoration when the RPS failure is reported.

Review Tech Spec 3.3.1.1.A (RPS Function 8 on Table 3.3.1.1-1):

Review Tech Spec 3.3.4.2.A:

0 Determine need to place associated trip system in TRIP within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Determine EOC-RPT instrumentation must be restored, or channel placed in trip, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Operator Actions ES-III-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

2 Page:

3of14 Event

Description:

Cause:

TBCCW pump failure /trip with failure of the standby pump to auto-start Overload of 2A TBCCW pump due to excessive motor bearing friction Failure of PS-2131 to actuate on low TBCCW System pressure

1. Alarm: 217 C-5 TURB BLDG COOLING WATER SUPPLY LO PRESS

2. Loss of cooling to TBCCW loads Effects:

Time Position URO CRS URO PRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize annunciator 217 C-5 TURB BLDG COOLING WATER SUPPLY LO PRESS and report trip of 2A TBCCW pump. Respond IAW Alarm Response Card.

Place 2A TBCCW purrip control switch to OFF.

Recognize failure of 28 TBCCW pump to auto start after 20 seconds.

Enter ON-I 18 Loss of TBCCW.

Direct starting the 28 TBCCW pump.

Direct follow-up use of SO 34.6.A-2 Placing Standby TBCCW System Pump In Service.

Direct troubleshooting.

Place 28 TBCCW pump control switch to RUN.

Verify placing standby TBCCW pump in service IAW SO 34.6.A-2 Placing Standby TBCCW System Pump In Service.

Monitor plant parameters/assist as necessary

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

SRV A inadvertently opens Cause:

Mechanical failure of relief valve pilot Effects:

1. Alarms:

21 0 D-2 Safety Relief Valve Open 227 B-4 Blowdown Relief Valves Hi Temp ES-13-2 Page:

4of I 4

2. Loss of Generator Load, steam flow/feed flow mismatch, I eat input to the primary containment.

Time Position URO/PRO CRS URO/PRO PRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize, report, and take actions IAW ARC 210 D-2 Safety Relief Valve Open and ARC 227 B-4 Blowdown Relief Valves Hi Temp.

Enterldirect actions IAW OT-I 14 Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve?:

e e

Lead crew in confirming an SRV is open.

Direct the B loop of RHR placed in torus cooling.

Direct attempts to close the A SRV.

Confirm the A SRV is open IAW OT-I 14.

Cycle the A SRV control switch when directed.

Monitor torus temperature.

Place the B loop of RHR in torus cooling IAW RRC I O. 1-2 RHR System Torus Cooling During a Plant Event when directed.

e e

e OPEN MO-2-10-039B OPEN MO-2-32-89B(D)

START B(D) HPSW pump START B(D) RHR pump VERIFY 11,500 to 12,200 gpm RHR flow START remaining MPSW pump in B RHR loop START remaining RHR pump in B RHR loop VERIFY >20,000 gpm RHR loop flow Direct Equipment Operator to CLOSE stayfull injection valve HV OPEN MO-2-10-0346 OPEN MO-2-32-89D(B)10-70B.

Operator Actions ES-13-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

3 Page:

5of14 Event

Description:

SRV A inadvertently opens...continued Time Position URO URO/PRO CRS Applicants Actions or Behavior Perform a Fast Power Reduction IAW GP-9-2 when directed (Event 4)

Coordinate removal of fuses by Equipment Operator and monitor valve status during attempts to close the A SRV.

Report to the CRS when the A SRV has closed.

Declare the A SRV inoperable and verify compliance with Tech Spec 3.5.1.F.

Determine A SRV must be restored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months with A loop of RHR also out of service.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

4 ES-C>-2 Page:

6 of 14 Event

Description:

Cause:

Perform a fast power reduction Directed from OT-I 14 Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve Effects:

N/A Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct a Fast Power Reduction IAW GP-9-2.

URO Reduce recirculation flow to 61.5 Mlbs/hr IAW GP-9-2 Fast Power Reduction.

CRS When recirculation flow has been lowered IAW GP-9-2, direct EHC pressure setpoint lowered until PAM pressure is 900 psig.

URO Lower EHC pressure setpoint until PAM pressure is 900 psig, as directed.

PRO Maintain the main generator auto-manual voltage regulator balanced (when it alarms).

Notify the Power System Director of the required power change.

Operator Actions ES-C)-2 Op Test No.:

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2 Event No.:

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7 of 14 Event

Description:

Cause:

Effects:

1. Initial Alarms:

Steam leak in the primary containment / ATWS Steam leak at SRV A mounting boss; steam cutting at break increases size of leak.

0

2. Drywell pressures and temperatures will rise at an increasing rate, eventually leading to a high drywell pressure alarm and scram if not scrammed manually. ECCS automatic start signals and PClS isolation signals will be received. Conditions will escalate, requiring containment sprays.

210 F-2 Drywell Hi-Lo Press 225 A 4 Drywell Hi-Lo Press Time Position UROlPRO CRS URO PRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report rising drywell pressure, OT-I 01 High Drywell Pressure entry condition.

Enterldirect follow-up actions IAW OT-I 01 :

0 0

If drywell pressure cannot be maintained below 1.2 psig, direct a GP-4 Manual Scram.

Direct placing additional drywell cooling in service as necessary.

Direct isolation of potential leak sources.

Take scram actions when directed:

0 Runback recirc to minimum.

0 0

Verify rods are inserting.

0 Place the mode switch to SHUTDOWN.

Report an ATWS is; in progress with reactor power > 4% (T-101 entry condition).

Take scram actions when directed:

0 Transfer 13 KV house loads.

0 Verify Group I1 & Ill isolations and SGTS initiation 0

Verify HWC isolated.

0 Investigate sources of drywell leakage.

Operator Actions ES-CI-2 Op Test No.:

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2 Event No.:

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8 of 14 Event

Description:

Steam leak in the primary containment / ATWS...continued Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize drywell pressurehemperature are continuing to rise.

Recognize and report 2 psig in the Drywell as a T-101 AND T-102 entry condition.

Verify and take action for 2 psig automatic initiations and isolations (HPCI initiation, Diesel Generator auto start, Group I1/111 isolations).

CRS Enteddirect actions for T-I 01 RPV Control:

Verify URO/PRO scram actions.

Direct drywell instrument nitrogen restored.

Direct RPV pressure stabilized below 1050 psig.

Direct actions for the ATWS condition (see next page).

PRO Bypass and restore drywell instrument nitrogen.

Stabilize RPV pressure below 1050 psig.

CRS Enter/direct actions for T-I 02 Primary Containment Control:

0 Monitor primary containment conditions.

0 0

0 Direct manual isolation of RBCCW and Drywell Chilled Water using Direct restoration of Drywell cooling IAW T-223 Drywell Cooler Far!

Bypass.

Direct Torus sprays with the B loop of RHR IAW T-204.

GP-8B.

Operator Actions ES-CI-2 Op Test No.:

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2 Event No.:

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9 of 14 Event

Description:

Anticipated transient without scram (hydraulic)

Cause:

Effects:

Time -

CT CT CT CT CT Scram condition with power above 4% or unknown due to RPS failure Requires the crew to take actions to terminate the ATWS, as well as control RPV IeveVpower Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct T-I 01, RC/Q ATWS actions:

Initiation of ARI T-220 Drive Rods 0

0 SLC injection Trip recirc pumps at least 10 seconds apart T-216 Reset Scram, Drain SDV, Insert Rods...

Enter T-I 17 LeveVPower Control URO Perform T-I 01, RC/Q actions:

0 0

0 Initiate ARI; report the scram air header is depressurized.

Trip Recirc pumps at least 10 seconds apart.

Initiate SLC by starting either SLC pump (see Event #6).

Direct an Equipment Operator to perform T-216 steps 4.1 and 4.2 (install jumpers in Cable Spreading Room and Main Control Room to defeat ARI Initiation Logic and bypass all RPS Auto Scram signals)

Per T-216 (on the 2OC05A panel) o o

o o

Perform T-220 Driving Control Rods During Failure To Scram.

Reset ARI by placing ARI A & B manual pushbutton collars in Disarm.

Depress the A & B ARI reset pushbuttons.

Place the Scram Reset switch 5A-S9 to the Group 1&4 and Group 2&3 positions.

Open Scram Discharge Volume inboard and outboard vents and drains

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Anticipated transient without scram...continued ES-D-2 Page:

loofa4 Time Position CRS CT PRO CT Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct T-I 17 actions:

Inhibit ADS.

0 T-221 Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass.

T-240 Termination And Prevention Of Injection Into The RPV.

Perform T-I 17 actions:

0 Inhibit ADS.

Direct Equipment Operator to perform T-221.

Perform T-240: terrninate and prevent injection from all injection sources except RCIC, SLC and CRD; control RPV level below -60 inches and within the specific RPV level band directed by the CRS.

o o

Place HPCI Aux Oil Pump in the Pull-to-Lock position.

Press Emergency Stop for all reactor feed pumps.

Close reactor feed pump discharge valves MO-2149A, B, C.

Verify closed MO-8090 C RFP Discharge Bypass.

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11 of *14 Event

Description:

Pressure instrument failure prevents using containment sprays Cause:

Effects:

Drywell pressure input to spray logic permissive not functioning

1. Alarm 225 B-3 System II Drywell Pressure Permit Containment Spray is NOT received

2. Prevents containment spray Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRO Recognize the absence of alarm 225 B-3 System II Drywell Pressure Permit Containment Spray.

While attempting to initiate torus sprays, recognize the inability to throttle MO-38B open to obtain 1000 gpm.

Report inability to spray the containment.

CRS Recognize the inability to maintain drywell bulk average temperature less than 281 degrees F.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

Standby liquid control purrip trips Cause:

Effects:

Time ES-D-2 Page:

120f 'I4 SLC Pump first placed into service trips on overcurrent Standby SLC Pump must be placed into service manually to mitigate ATWS Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior URO Recognize the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) pump placed into service has tripped.

Place the standby SLC pump in service using keylock control switch ort the 20C05A panel.

CT CT CRS If not already performed, direct placing the standby SLC pump in service.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

2 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

C SRV fails to open Cause:

Effects:

Time -

CT CT CT CT Valve is stuck on its main seat Crew must open another SRV ES-&I-2 Page:

13of 74 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct the PRO to terminate and prevent RPV injection IAW T-240 except for RCIC, SLC and CRD.

Verify torus level is above 7 feet.

Verify RPV pressure is 50 psig or more above torus pressure.

Direct the PRO to open all ADS SRVs with the exception of SRV A, arid another non-ADS SRV, for a total of five SRVs.

PRO Perform T-240 when directed.

Place required SRV control switches to the OPEN position; recognize and report the C SRV fails to open.

CRS Direct the PRO to open another SRV so that a total of 5 SRVs are open.

PRO Open an additional SRV; report 5 SRVs are open.

CRS When RPV pressure drops below 270 psig, direct the PRO to slowly raise RPV injection rate to restore and maintain RPV level above -1 95 inches.

Re-enter T-I 02 on high torus temperature.

URO Observe control rods inserting into the core and report when all rods are fully inserted.

CRS Exit T-I 17, and enter T-101 at step RC/L-1.

Direct RPV level restored and maintained between +5 and +35 inches.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

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2 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

C SRV fails to open...continued ES-D-2 Page:

140f 14 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario may be terminated when:

5 SRVS are open, and The RPV is depressurized, and RPV level is under control, and The crew begins draining the Scram Discharge Volume per T-216 Control Rod Insertion By Manual Scram Or Individual Scram Test Switch in order to attempt another scram to insert cont-ol rods, and/or control rods are being inserted in accordance with T-220 Driving Control Rods Dur ng Failure To Scram.

Scenario Outline ES-13-1 R

URO CRS Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario NO. #3 (modified bank)

Op Test No.

2008 NRC Condensate pump trip with recirc runback failure / power reduction Examiners M

ALL C

URO CRS Operators CRS ( SRO)

Loss of #2 auxiliary bus / loss of condensate & feedwater / RClC trips on over-speed during startup and cannot be reset RPS failure requires ARI initiation to scram the reactor / ATWS ( iix control rods) requires terminating and preventing injection before emergency depressurization URO ATC)

I PRO CRS PRO \\ BOP)

Two in-series scram discharge volume (SDV) vent valves fail to automatically isolate Scenario Summary The scenario begins with the reactor at 95% power. Immediately after shift turnover the crew will commence the HPCl functional and in-service test. While the test is in progress, the running Service Water pump will trip on overcurrent, requiring the crew to place the standby pump in service using the system operating procedure. The crew will then receive a report from the field of a HPCl system cooling water leak, requiring HPCl to be shutdown and declared inoperable. Next, a loss of Dt; power to an in-service RPS MG set output breaker will occur, requiring application of the apprcpriate Tech Spec. When this is complete, the A Condensate pump will trip without the expected Recirc System runback. Power must be manually reduced using recirc flow to prevent a low-level scri3m.

When conditions have stabilized, #2 Auxiliary Bus will trip on overcurrent, removing the remairiing Condensate pumps from service. An RPS failure will prevent the automatic and manual scrams, requiring entry into T-101 RPV Control, T-I 17 Level/Power Control, and the use of Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) to shutdown the reactor. The scram discharge volume will fail to completely isolate and must be manually isolated. RClC will trip when either started manually or automatically, which will remove the final source of high pressure feed. As level deteriorates, the crew should start available low pressure ECCS pumps and when the crew determines level cannot be restored tind maintained above -195 inches, the reactor will be depressurized in accordance with T-I 12 Emergency Blowdown, after terminating and preventing injection per T-240 (due to the six-rod ATWS). Low pressure ECCS will be available to recover reactor level.

Initial IC-73, 95% power Conditions Turnover See Attached Shift Turnover Sheet Event Malfunction

I

4 1

5

/

Event Event Description surveillance testing C

URO CRS Service Water pump trip, requiring manual start of standby pump PRO HPCl cooling water leak requires HPCl shutdown

-5J-CRS Loss of DC power to RPS MG set output breaker is I

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Tech Spec

SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:

Unit 2 is steady at 95% power.

GP-5 Power Operations is in progress, complete through step 5.3.29.

INOPERABLE EQUIPMENTILCOs:

None SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

Raise power to 100% once Reactor Engineers revise ReMA guidance for returning to full power.

Complete ST-0-023-301-2 HPCI Pump, Valve, Flow And Unit Cooler Functional And In-Service Test that was started last shift. Complete through step 6.4.6; next step is 6.4.7.

Step 6.5.1 1 is NIA (more than one start has been performed in CST-to-CST mode).

SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

ST-0-023-301-2 HPCI Pump, Valve, Flow And Unit Cooler Functional And In-Service Test ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

None GENERAL INFORMATION:

In accordance with GP-5 Power Operations power was lowered to 90% under the Reactor Engineers guidance to perform a rod pattern adjustment. Rod manipulations are complete and power has been raised to 95%. The Reactor Engineers are running predictors and will revise ReMA guidance for returning to full power.

CRITICAL TASK LIST

1.

Recognize failure of the Reactor Protection System to shutdown the reactor and initiate Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) in accordance with T-101 RPV Control and RRC 3B.1-2 Alternate Rod Insertion During A Plant Event.

2.

Manually isolate the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) vent valves.

3.

Perform an emergency blowdown in accordance with T-I 12 Emergency Blowdown when RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above -195 inches.

ES-D-2 Page:

1 of 12 Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

1 Event

Description:

Cause:

NIA Effects:

NIA HPCl surveillance testing IAW ST-0-023-301 -2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct PRO to perform ST-0-023-301-2 HPCI Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-service Test beginning at step 6.4.7.

Perform ST-0-023-301 -2 beginning at step 6.4.7:

PRO Start 20K002 HPCI Vac Pump; request Equipment Operator to record data on Data Sheet 2.

Open MO-2-23-021 HPCI Full Flow Test and stop valve movemerit after approximately 4 seconds.

Verify MO-2-23-01.7 HPCI Cond Tank Suction open; direct Equipment Operator to record local data.

Verify MO-2-23-031 HPCI Flush to Torus closed.

Open MO-2-23-024 HPCI Cond Tank Return.

Perform the following actions simultaneously to initiate a HPCl quick start:

o Open MO-2-23-014 HPCI Supply.

o Start 20P026 HPCI Aux Oil Pump.

o Start stopwatch.

During pump start, throttle MO-2-23-021 to obtain desired flow and pressure. Once obtained, stop the stopwatch.

Verify MO-2-23-025 HPCI Minimum Flow Valve is closed.

Record required system parameters on Data Sheets 3 and 4.

NOTE: the next events will occur once HPCl operation is stable and the PRO is recording system parameter data on Data Sheets 3 and 4.

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2 ES-U-2 Page:

2 of 12 Event

Description:

'B' Service Water pump trips on overcurrent Cause:

Motor winding failure Effects:

1. Alarms:

0 216 H-I "'B' Service Water Pump Trip" 216 H-2 "'B' Service Water Pump OVLD" 0

216 F-I "Service Water Header Lo Press" (instructor override)

2. Loss of 'B' Service Water pump, requiring manual start of 'C' Service Water pump.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and report the following alarms and enter corresponding Alarm Response Cards:

0 0

0 Recognize and report trip of the 2B Service Water pump.

Green flag the 2B Service Water pump control switch.

Dispatch an Equipment Operator to investigate the pump and breaker.

216 H-I "'B' Service Water Pump Trip

216 H-2 "'B' Service Water Pump OVLD" 216 F-I "Service Water Header Lo Press

CRS Enter and direct actions of Alarm Response Cards 216 F-I, 216 H-I arid Direct placing the 2C Service Water pump in service IAW SO 30.1.A-2 "Unit 2 Service Water System Normal Operations".

216 H-2.

PRO Place the 2C Service Water pump in service IAW SO 30.1.A-2 as follows:

0 Direct an Equipment Operator to prepare the 2C Service Water purnp for start IAW SO 30.1.A-2, steps 4.2.3 and 4.2.4.

0 Start the 2C Service Water pump by placing the pump control switch in "Run".

0 Verify Service Water pump discharge pressure is 65-95 psig (both in the Control Room and locally).

CRS Request troubleshooting/technical assistance through the Shift Manager.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

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3 ES-CI-2 Page:

3 of I;!

Event

Description:

HPCl cooling water leak Cause:

Cooling water pipe rupture at the inlet to the lube oil cooler Effects:

1. Alarm: 221 B-3 HPCI Turb Oil Cooler Disch Oil Temp High

2. Rising HPCl lube oil temperature and cooling water system leak, requiring HPCl shutdown.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRO Recognize and report alarm 221 B-3 HPCI Turb Oil Cooler Disch Oil Temp High and enter corresponding Alarm Response Card.

CRS Enter and direct actions of Alarm Response Card 221 B-3.

NOTE: CRS may direct tripping HPCl and following up with SO 23.2.A-2 Direct HPCl System shutdown IAW SO 23.2.A-2 HPCI System Shutdown.

PRO Shutdown the HPCl System IAW SO 23.2.A-2 HPCI System Shutdowri as follows:

Verify the Aux Oil Pump control switch is in Start.

Verify the Vacuum Pump control switch is in Start.

0 Depress hold the HPCl System Remote Trip pushbutton.

Verify the Aux Oil Pump starts as turbine slows down (1 200 - 1500 RPM).

Close MO-2-23-014 Supply.

Close MO-2-23-019 To Feed Line.

0 When MO-2-23-014 is fully closed, release the Remote Trip pushbutton.

0 Close MO-2-23-021 Full Flow Test.

Close MO-2-23-024 Cond Tank Return.

0 After verifying the HPCI turbine shaft is stopped, place the Aux Oil Pump control switch in Stop.

NOTE: the crew should place the AOP in Pull-to-Lock to prevent HPCI startup.

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3 ES-D-2 Page:

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Event

Description:

HPCl cooling water leak...continued Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct closing MO-2-23-017 HPCI Cond Tank Suction to stop the cooling water leak.

Reference Tech Spec. 3.5.1 Condition C and determine that with HPCI inoperable:

0 RClC must be verified operable immediately by administrative means HPCl System must be restored to operable status within 14 days OR The plant must be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and reactor steam dome pressure must be <I50 psig within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

AND 0

PRO Close MO-2-23-017 HPCI Cond Tank Suction, as directed.

NOTE: the crew may direct an Equipment Operator to open the breaker for MO-2-23-017 at MCX 2DB-R-B.

CRS Request troubleshooting/technical assistance through the Shift Manager.

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3 Event No.:

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Event

Description:

Loss of DC power to the B RPS MG set output breaker Cause:

Loss of DC power from 2DD25, circuit 19, to breaker 86757 Effects:

1. Alarm: 208 E-2 RPS B M-G Sei: Trouble or in Test

2. Loss of trip capability for one of the two B RPS MG set output breakers Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Recognize and report alarm 208 E-2 RPS B M-G Set Trouble or in Test and enter corresponding alarm response card.

Recognize that RPS E is NOT tripped.

CRS Enter and execute ARC 208 E-2:

0 0

Recognize that 2BC757 breaker is not tripped since RPS did not trip.

Direct an Equipment Operator dispatched to verify the status of DC control power at 2BD25, circuit 17, and 2DD25, circuit 19.

PRO Use the alarm response card to assist in troubleshooting the annunciatar, as directed.

URO Monitor plant parameters/assist as directed or requested.

CRS Reference Tech Spec 3.3.8.2 Condition A to make the following determination:

0 With DC power and therefore trip capability lost for one of the two 13 RPS MG set output breakers, the B RPS MG set must be removed from service within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

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6 of 12 Event

Description:

A Condensate pump trip with automatic Recirc runback failure / power reduction Cause:

A Condensate pump trips on overcurrent / relay failure in the Recirc runback logic Effects:

1. Alarms:

0 203 E-I A Condensate Pump Overload 0

203 E-2 A Condensate Pump BKR Trip

2. Recirc automatic runback fails to occur, resulting in lowering RPV level and requiring manual recirc flow reduction to control RPV level.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Recognize and report trip of the A Condensate pump.

Recognize and report the 45% Recirc pump runback failed to occur automatically.

Recognize the RPV water level drop is caused by a lack of makeup capability, requiring power to be lowered with Recirculation.

Recognize and announce entry into the OT-I 00 Reactor Low Level:

0 Reduce power by lowering the A and B Recirc pump speed controllers to a speed demand of 45%.

0 This must be performed in a controlled manner that does not result in level swell and a high level trip of the Reactor Feed pumps.

Monitor for Thermal Hydraulic Instabilities (THI).

CRS Enter and direct actions IAW OT-I 00 Reactor Low Level.

0 0

Direct the URO to lower power by lowering Recirc flow manually to 45% speed.

(May) refer to GP-5 Power Operations to determine power must be limited to ~80%

total feedwater flow with 2 Condensate and 3 Reactor Feedwater pumps.

Enter and direct actions IAW OT-I 12 Unexpected/Unexplained Change in Core Flow.

0 Determine position on the PBAPS Power Flow Operation Map.

Direct monitoring for Thermal Hydraulic Instability (THI).

PRO Investigate the cause of the A Condensate pump trip using the applicable alarm response cards.

Direct an Equipment Operator to investigate the breaker and pump.

Green flag the A Condensate pump control switch.

Operator Actions ES-CI-2 Op Test No.:

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7 of 12 Event

Description:

Loss of #2 Auxiliary Bus / loss of Condensate and Feedwater / RClC trips 01 over-speed during startup and cannot be reset Cause:

Failure in the bus work results in an overcurrent condition and a bus lockout / RCIC triF; throttle valve failure Effects:

1. Alarms:

0 0

2. #2 Auxiliary Bus breakers trip, de-energizing the bus and its loads

3. The immediate impact of loss of #2 Auxiliary Bus is the resultant loss of the remaining Condensate pumps, causing RPV water level to drop rapidly.

4. RClC will attempt to start and then will trip when it reaches 500 RPM, removing the last source of high-pressure injection to the RPV.

21 9 A-2 2 Aux Bus Overcurrent Relays 219 8-2 2 Aus Bus Lo Voltage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRO Recognize and report the loss of #2 Auxiliary Bus.

URO Recognize and report Reactor water level is dropping rapidly.

Attempt to manually scram the Reactor by placing the Mode Selector Switch in Shutdown.

Attempt to scram B RRS by depressing the manual scram pushbutton CRS Enter and execute T-I 00 Scram.

Recognize a failure to scram condition exists.

NOTE: the CRS will exit T-100 and enter T-101 RPV Control, or may go directly to T-I 01.

PRO Perform applicable scram actions:

0 0

Verify main generator lockout.

0 Verify HWC isolated.

0 Recognize and report I W C has tripped and is NOT injecting.

Transfer 13 KV house loads (#I bus only).

Trip main turbine at approximately 50 MWe.

Verify Group II & Ill isolations and SGTS initiation.

Verify SDV vent and drain valves are closed (see Event #8).

Verify recirc pumps are tripped.

Monitor instrument air header pressure and drywell pressure; reporr instrument air header pressure is greater than drywell pressure.

Operator Actions ES-B-2 Op Test No.:

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3 Event No.:

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8 of 12 Event

Description:

RPS failure requires ARI initiation to scram the reactor / ATWS (six control rods) requires terminating and preventing injection before emergency blowdown Cause:

Effects:

Time CT CT CT RPS B automatic and manual channel failure / six control rods are mechanically stuck in the full out position

1. Full Reactor scram does not occur; manual ARI initiation is required.

2. Reactor level drop is greater because more time is spent under power conditions with no high-pressure injection.

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Recognize and report an RPS scram has failed to occur.

Report entry into T-lOli RPV Control for the ATWS condition.

CRS Enter and execute T-I 01 RPV Control.

0 0

Direct initiation of Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI).

Direct instrument nitrogen bypassed and restored IAW GP-8E.

Direct RPV pressure stabilized below 1050 psig.

URO Initiate ARI IAW RRC 3B.1-2 Alternate Rod Insertion During a Plant Event:

0 0

0 Rotate the A and B ARI pushbutton collars to Armed.

Depress the A ann B ARI pushbuttons.

Verify the following ARI solenoid valves open:

o SV-2-03-141A o SV-2-03-142A o SV-2-03-141 B o SV-2-03-142B 0

Verify and report the scram air header is depressurizing.

0 Monitor and report when control rods begin to insert.

0 Verify APRMs are downscale and report to the CRS.

0 Recognize and report six control rods did NOT insert on the scram Announce an additional entry condition for T-101 based on Reactor level below -48 inches.

Operator Actions ES-B-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

7 Page:

9 of 12 Event

Description:

RPS failure requires ARI initiation to scram the reactor / ATWS (six control rods) requires terminating and preventing injection before emergency blowdown...continued Time -

Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRO Bypass and restore drywell instrument nitrogen IAW GP-8E, as directed.

Place both instrument nitrogen valve control switches to Close.

Place both keylock switches in Bypass.

Place both instrument nitrogen valve control switches to Open.

NOTE: this activity may be coordinated between the URO and the PRO.

CRS Enter and direct actions of T-I 17 LeveVPower Control:

Inhibit ADS.

T-221 Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass.

Inject with CRD using T-246 Maximizing CRD Flow to the Reactor Vessel.

URO Maximize CRD flow using T-246 as follows:

Direct an Equipment Operator to bypass the CRD pump suction filter IAW T-246, step 4.3.

Direct an Equipment Operator to check the standby CRD pump for startup IAW T-246, step 4.4.

Start the standby CRD pump by placing the pump control switch to Start.

Direct an Equipment Operator to slowly open the standby CRD pump discharge valve IAW T-246, step 4.6.

Direct an Equipment Operator to fully open the drive water filter inleA valve IAW T-246, step 4.7.

Direct an Equipment Operator to place the standby drive water filter in service IAW T-246, step 4.8.

Verify MO-2-03-020 Drive Wtr Press is fully open.

Close Recirc pump seal purge valves MO-2-2A-8029A and 8029B.

Place the CRD flow controller in Man and, while monitoring CRD pump amps, open ithe flow control valve.

Direct an Equipment Operator to close HV-2-3-56 IAW T-246, step 4.13.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

7 Page:

10of12 Event

Description:

RPS failure requires ARI initiation to scram the reactor / ATWS (six control rods) requires terminating and preventing injection before emergency blowdown...continued Time Position PRO CRS URO CRS URO/PRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Perform T-I 17 actions:

0 0

Inhibit ADS by placing keys in both ADS Auto Inhibit keylock switches and placing them in the INHIBIT position.

Direct Equipment Operator to perform T-221.

Request outside assistance (through Shift Manager) in recovering RCIC for injection.

Per T-101, direct manual insertion of control rods using T-220 Driving Control Rods During a Scram.

Attempt insertion of the control rods IAW T-220:

0 0

0 Bypass the Rod Worth Minimizer.

Attempt to insert control rods using the Emergency In/Notch Override switch.

Report to the CRS unable to insert the control rods.

Determine that RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above -1 95 inches.

Direct terminating and preventing injection IAW T-240 (ATT. 1, Fig. 3)

When directed, perform T-240 to terminate and prevent injection into the RPV:

0 Verify HPCl is not injecting.

0 Verify Condensate / Feedwater is not injecting.

0 Prevent injection from Core Spray by placing all Core Spray pump control switches in STOP (if running).

0 Prevent injection from RHR/LPCI by placing all RHRILPCI pump control switches in STOP (if running).

0 Contact the floor operator and direct isolation of Stayfull from RHP and Core Spray.

NOTE: this step should be directed but actual isolation does not need to be completed prior to the blowdown.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

7 Page:

11of12 Event

Description:

RPS failure requires ARI initiation to scram the reactor / ATWS (six control rods) requires terminating and preventing injection before emergency blowdown...continued Time -

CT CT Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Enter T-I 12 Emergency Blowdown.

Direct all five ADS SRVs opened.

When Reactor pressure lowers below 270 psig, direct slowly raising RFW injection with RHR and/or Core Spray to control RPV water level between

-195 and +35 inches.

PRO When directed, open ALL five ADS SRVs to perform an Emergency Blowdown.

When directed, slowly raise RPV injection with RHR and/or Core Spray to control RPV water level in the band specified by the CRS.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

3 Event No.:

8 Page:

120f 12 Event

Description:

Two in-series scram discharge volume (SDV) vent valves fail to automatically isolate Cause:

Effects:

Time -

CT RPS failure in conjunction with an air header malfunction, which prevents air from ventang off two SDV vent valves (common air supply).

A failure of the SDV vent valves is effectively a primary to secondary containment leak This requires manual isolation of the SDV vent valves.

Position Applicants Actions OR Behavior PRO Recognize and report failure of two SDV vent valves (AO-032B and ACb-035B) to automatically isolate.

Upon recognizing failure to isolate, the PRO should:

0 0

0 Manually isolate the valves by moving the SDV isolation hand-switches counter-clockwise to the Close position.

Verify all vent and drain valves are closed.

Inform the CRS as conditions permit.

CRS Acknowledge SDV vent valve isolation failure.

CT Direct manual isolation of the SDV vent valves, if not already isolated.

TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario may be terminated when the RPV has been depressurized and reactor level has beeri recovered and controlled.

Scenario Outline ES. D-1 Simulation Facility Peach Bottom Scenario No.

4 (altered bank)

Op Test No.

2008 NR 1 Examiners Operators CRS SRO)

Event No.

1 2

3 4

5 6

U RO : ATC)

Malfunction Event No.

Type*

R URO CRS N

PRO CRS C

PRO TS CRS C

URO TS CRS M

ALL C

PRO CRS PRO 1 BOP)

SPARE Scenario Scenario Summary Initial Conditions Turnover The scenario begins with the reactor at 82% power and a plant shutdown in progress. The crf: w will lower reactor power using reactor recirculation flow and once below 80% power, the crew will secure a condensate pump. Following the condensate pump shutdown, the 2SU-E feeder will trip. Tie E12 bus will not fast transfer to the other startup feed, causing the E-I diesel to start and its breaker to automatically close onto the bus. Automatic cooling to the diesel will not occur, requiring the c *ew to establish cooling manually. The crew will be required to make a Tech Spec declaration for the electrical failure.

This will be followed by a trip of the B recirc pump due to a failed RPT breaker. The crew should carry out the actions of OT-I 12 UnexplainedlUnexpected Change in Core Flow, which incluctes establishing single loop operation and consulting Technical Specifications. A loss of offsite power will occur next, requiring entry into SE-11 Loss of Off-Site Power. The crew should stabilize plant parameters using T-100 Scram and should recognize and respond to a failure of the HPCl flow controller to operate in automatic. The E-4 diesel generator will fail to automatically start, and :he E-3 diesel generator will not start at all. The crew will be required to manually start the E-4 diesel generator using the quick-start pushbutton in order to spray the Drywell later in the scenario.

Following this event, a steam leak will develop in the drywell, requiring the crew to take actions in accordance with OT-101 High Drywell Pressure, and execute T-101 RPV Control and T-102 Primary Containment Control. ThF high drywell pressure condition will prevent HPCl from baing used to control reactor pressure, resulting in further challenge to the primary containment.

IC-74, 82% power See Attached Shift Turnover Sheet 7

1 I

URO I

CRS Event Description

-~

Lower reactor power with reactor recirculation flow Secure a condensate pump Loss of 2SU-E startup feed with failure of the E12 bus to fast transfer /

E l EDG auto starts with failure of ESW cooling to diesel auxiliaries

~~

Recirc RPT breaker trip / single loop operation Loss of off-site power / steam leak in the drywell E-4 diesel generator fails to auto start HPCl flow controller fails in automatic

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Tech Spec

SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:

0 Unit 2 at 82% power with a shutdown in progress IAW GP-3 Normal Plant Shutdown INOPERABLE EQUIPMENTILCOs:

0 Breaker E-232 blocked for PM.

SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:

0 0

0 Continue with plant shutdown IAW GP-3 Normal Plant Shutdown Reduce reactor power to 80%; remove the C condensate pump from service due to excessive bearing oil leakage ReMA PB2C17-58.0 in effect at step 1 - reduce to 80% power with recirc flow SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:

0 None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:

0 Breaker E-232 GENERAL INFORMATION:

0 GP-3 is complete through step 6.10

CRITICAL TASK LIST

1.

Restore diesel generator cooling prior to diesel generator failure.

2.

Re-energize the E42 bus from the respective diesel generator in order to spray the drywell before drywell temperature exceeds 281 degrees F.

3.

Spray the drywell in accordance with T-204 Initiation of Containment Sprays Using RHR when conditions permit, but before drywell temperature exceeds 281 degrees F.

Operator Actions ES-6)-2 Op Test No.:

I Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

1 Page:

1 of 13 Event

Description:

Lower reactor power with reactor recirculation flow Cause:

N/A Effects:

N/A Time Position CRS URO PRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct URO to continue power reduction to -70 MLB/HR (or as necessary to reduce reactor power to I 80%) IAW GP-3.

Reduce recirculation pump speeds to reduce total core flow to -70 MLB/HR (or as necessary to reduce reactor power to 5 80%).

0 0

0 Verify both Moore Controllers are set to monitor the V (% output) variable.

Slowly reduce Moore controller demand signals for A and 6 recirc pumps.

Observe recirc system response for approximately 30 seconds befc are making additional speed changes.

Monitor plant equipment during power reduction.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Secure a condensate pump Cause:

NIA Effects:

NIA Time Position CRS PRO URO ES-D-2 Page:

2of 13 Applicants Actions or Behavior When reactor power drops to approximately 8O%, direct the PRO to shutdown the C condensate pump in accordance with SO 5.2.A-2 Condensate System Condensate Pump Shutdown.

Review SO 5.2.A-2 and ensure prerequisites are met.

Secure the C condensate pump, as directed:

0 Close discharge valve MO-2098 C.

Stop the selected pump by turning the control switch to STOP (within 2 minutes of closing the discharge valve).

Direct an Equipment Operator to close the Seal Water Supply Valvv for the C condensate pump.

Monitor reactor parameters during condensate pump shutdown.

Operator Actions ES-CI-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

3 Page:

3 of I 3 Event

Description:

Loss of 2SU-E startup feed with failure of the E12 bus to fast transfer / E l EDG auto starts with failure of ESW cooling to diesel generators.

Cause:

Various Effects:

1. Alarms: various

2. Momentary loss of the E12 bus; auto start of the E l EDG without cooling, requirrig the crew to manually start ESW to provide diesel generator cooling.

Time CT Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRO Recognize and report alarm 006 J-I 2SU-E Bkr Trip and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Card.

Dispatch an Equipment Operator to investigate the loss of 2SU-E.

Red flag all closed breakers and green flag all tripped breakers.

Refer to SO 54.7.A 4KV Fast Transfer Load Shedding and Sequential Loading on Bus Undervoltage.

Make a list of affected control room systems/loads (MOVs, etc.).

CRS Enter and direct actions of ARC 006 J-I 2SU-E Bkr Trip.

Enter and direct actions of ARC 001 D-I El 2 Bus Undervoltage.

Direct SO 54.7.E 4KV Diesel Generator Auto Start and Loading.

Direct reset of Group 11/111 isolations IAW GP8.C.

PRO Recognize and report alarm 001 D-I E12 Bus Undervoltage and enter the corresponding Alarm Response Card.

Verify the E-I diesel output breaker auto closed.

Verify the E-I 2 bus is re-energized.

Inform the CRS the E-I 2 bus has been restored.

Recognize failure of ESW cooling to automatically start; place the A or B ESW pump in service by placing the pump control switch to START.

Direct an Equipment Operator to perform running inspection of the E-I diesel generator.

Operator Actions ES-61-2 Op Test No.:

I Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

3 Page:

4 of I 3 Event

Description:

Loss of 2SU-E startup feed and associated failures...continued Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Recognize entry into Tech Spec 3.8.1.A.

Determine the following are required to meet the LCO:

0 0

Recognize entry into Tech Spec 3.8.7.C for E12 bus inoperability (EDG is the only source of power to the bus).

Determine the following are required to meet the LCO:

0 Perform SR 3.8.1. I (ST-0-054-950-2) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE within 7 days.

Restore the electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

CRS May enter OT-I 04 Positive Reactivity Insertion if the feedwater delta-r limit is exceeded.

NOTE: the next event should be inserted before the crew reduces power IAW OT-I 04.

ES-B-2 Page:

5 of 13 Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Cause:

Effects:

1. Alarms:

Recirc RPT breaker trip (A recirc pump)

Failure of breaker control logic 0

0 0

0

2. Trip of the A recirc pump, causing reduction in core flow and reactor power 214 A-3 A Recirc Pump RPT Trip 214 B-4 A Recirc Pump Low Diff Press 214 C-2 A Recirc Gen Lockout Trip 214 C-3 A Recirc Drive Motor Trip Time -

Position URO CRS URO CRS Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognize and report trip of the A reactor recirc pump and entry into OT-I 12 Unexpected/l.Jnexplained Change in Core Flow.

Enter the corresponding Alarm Response Cards for alarms 214 A-3 A Recirc Pump RPT Trip, 214 C-2 A Recirc Gen Lockout Trip and 214 C-3 A Recirc Drive Motor Trip (as time permits).

Enter / execute OT-I 12 Unexpected/Unexplained Change in Core Flow.

Direct insertion of ALL GP-9-2 control rods.

Determine current operating point on Power-Flow Operation Map.

Direct monitoring for THI.

Direct closing A recirc pump discharge valve MO-053A (or suction valve MO-43A), then re-opening valve after 5 minutes.

Direct performing SO 2A.2.A-2 Recirculation System Shutdown.

Insert ALL GP-9-2 control rods.

Monitor for THI.

Close A recirc pump discharge valve MO-053A (or suction valve MO-43A); re-open after 5 minutes.

Perform SO 2A.2.A-2 Recirculation System Shutdown (as time permits!.

Perform A 0 2A. 1-2 Recirculation System Single Loop Operation.

Refer to Tech Spec 3.4.1 and determine requirements for operating in single loop.

NOTE: since OT-I 12 and Tech Spec 3.4.1 allow up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for transitioning to single loop, these actions may be assessed as follow-u:,

questions after the scenario is complete.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

5 ES-D-2 Page:

6 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of off-site power Cause:

Loss of the grid Effects:

Reactor scrams, emergency diesels receive start signal, emergency buses transfer to ?he diesels when available Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PRO Recognize and report the loss of off-site power URO Perform scram actions:

0 0

Verify control rods are inserting.

Place the mode switch in Shutdown.

Verify APRMs are downscale (when power is available).

Report to the CRS that the mode switch is in Shutdown, control rods are inserting, and the APRMs are downscale (when power is available).

Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

0 CRS Recognize and report the event is an entry condition for T-I 00 Scram Enter and execute T-I 00:

0 Direct the URO to maintain RPV level between +5 to +35 inches using RClC and/or HPCI.

0 Direct the URO to stabilize RPV pressure below 1050 psig using SRVs and/or HPCI in CST-to-CST mode.

Direct placing torus cooling in service.

PRO Recognize and report the E-3 and E-4 diesels failed to start (see Event

6 for details).

CRS Recognize and report the loss of off-site power as an entry into SE-11 Loss of Off-Site Power.

Enter and execute SE-11.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

5 ES-D-2 Page:

7 of 13 Event

Description:

Loss of off-site power...continued Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior PRO Perform scram actions Verify main turbine trip and generator lockout.

Verify Group I, II, and Ill isolations and verify SGTS initiation, as applicable.

0 Verify scram discharge volume vents and drains are closed.

Verify Hydrogen Water Chemistry is isolated.

Verify recirc pumps are tripped.

0 Monitor Instrument Air header pressure and drywell pressure.

URO Maintain RPV level +5 to +35 inches using RCIC.

Place RClC in service IAW RRC 13.1-2 (auto starts at -48 inches):

Verify vacuum pump starts.

0 Arm and depress RClC Manual Initiation Pushbutton.

Verify MO-131, MO-021, MO-132 open.

Verify AO-034 and AO-035 close.

Verify RClC system flow rate is 600 gpm.

Place RClC Manual Initiation Pushbutton in DISARM.

URO/PRO Place torus cooling in service IAW RRC I O. 1-2:

0 0

0 Open MO-O39A(B).

Open MO-O89A(B).

Verify associated diesel load is I 1400 KW.

Start RHR pump.

Open MO-O34A(B) while verifying diesel loading.

Verify flow is 11,500-12,200 gpm for one RHR pump in service.

Verify associated diesel load is I2300 KW.

Start HPSW pump in each loop to be used for torus cooling.

Start additional RHR and HPSW pumps as necessaryldirected (verifying diesel generator load as indicated above).

Verify flow is 1 20,000 gpm for two RHR pumps in service.

Direct Equipment Operator to close stay full injection valve(s) for tP.s RHR loop(s) in service.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

5 ES-13-2 Page:

8 of 13 Event Description :

Loss of off-site power...continued Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Stabilize RPV pressure below 1050 psig using SRVs and/or HPCl in C!?T to CST mode for pressure control IAW RRC 23.1-2 Section D:

Open MO-2-23-24 Cond Tank Return.

Verify closed MO-2-23-19 To Feed Line.

Start Vacuum Pump.

Throttle OPEN MO-2-23-21 Full Flow Test for 3 to 4 seconds.

Simultaneously START Aux Oil Pump AND OPEN MO-2-23-14 Steam Supply.

Verify HPCl system flow rate is 5000 gpm (see Event #7).

CRS Direct restoration of instrument nitrogen using either:

Backup Instrument Nitrogen to ADS using SO 16A.7.A-2, or T-261 Placing the Backup Instrument Nitrogen Supply From the CAD Tank in Service.

URO Restore drywell instrument nitrogen as directed.

If directed to use Backup Instrument Nitrogen to ADS using SO o Place SV-8130H control switch on panel 2OCOO3-03 to RESET and then in AUTO/OPEN.

o Verify open SV-81308.

o Verify Pl-8142 Backup N2 on the 2OCOO3-03 panel is 2 85 psig.

If directed to perform T-261 Placing the Backup Instrument Nitrogen Supply From the CAD Tank in Service:

o Verify closed AO-2969B on panel 2OCOO3-03.

o Dispatch an Eqiuipment Operator to the CAD Building perform step 4.2 (manual valving).

16A.7.A-2:

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

5 ES-El-2 Page:

9of 13 Event

Description:

Steam leak in the primary containment Cause:

Unknown Effects:

Various Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO/PRO Recognize and report the rise in drywell pressure.

Recognize and report the condition as an entry into OT-101 High Drywell Pressure.

CRS Enter and execute OT-101:

Direct maximizing drywell cooling, as necessary.

URO/PRO Recognize and report drywell pressure > 2 psig as an entry condition for T-I 01 RPV Control and T-102 Primary Containment Control.

CT CRS Enter and execute T-I 01.

Enter and execute T-I 02:

For PC/P:

0 For DW/T:

0 0

Direct GP-8B Manual Is01 of RBCCW and DWCW.

Direct torus sprays initiated IAW T-204 Initiation of Containment Sprays Using RHR.

Direct drywell cooling maximized by performing T-223 DW Cooler Fan Bypass.

Before drywell temperature reaches 281 degrees F, and when drywell pressure and temperature plot within the safe region of the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit Curve, direct (verify) drywell fans shut down and drywell sprays initiated IAW T-204 Initiation of Containment Sprays Using RHR.

Direct CAD placed in service.

For PC/G:

0

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

5 Page:

10 of 13 Event

Description:

Steam leak in the primary containment...continued Time Position UROIPRO UROIPRO UROIPRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Monitor T-I 02 parameters (torus temperature, torus level, drywell pressure, torus pressure, drywell temperature) and provide trends to the CRS, as appropriate.

Perform GP-8B Manual Isolation of RBCCW and DWCW (no isolation actions are required, however the Operator may modify system flow paths due to RBCCW system pressureIflow oscillations).

Spray the torus in accordance with T-204 Initiation of Containment Sprays using RHR:

Verify System 1 and 2 Drywell Pressure Permits Containment Spray annunciators (224 ID-3, 225 B-3) are lit.

Place keylock switch IOA-SI 8B in MANUAL OVERRIDE.

Momentarily place switch 1 OA-SI 7B in MANUAL.

Open or verify open MO-2-10-39B Torus Header.

Open or verify open MO-2-10-89B(D) HPSW Hx Outlet.

Verify load on EDG supplying selected pumps is below 1400 KW.

Start B(D) RHR Pump.

Start B(D) HPSW Pump.

Close or verify closed MO-2-10-34B Full Flow Test.

Throttle open MO-2-10-38B Torus Spray to obtain 1,000 gpm on Fl-2-1 0-1 36B.

Maximize drywell cooling by performing T-223 DW Cooler Fan Bypass.

rn Verify operation on safe side of Figure 1 DWCW Saturation Curve.

rn Place all Drywell Cooler Fan control switches to OFF at panel 20c012.

rn Momentarily place DW Cooler Fans control switch 43-S-J165 in BYPASS and let it spring return to NORMAL at panel 20C05A.

rn Direct Equipment Clperator to place Drywell Cooler Fan speed control switches to SLOW at their respective MCC in the Reactor Building.

rn Operate Drywell Cooler Fans to reduce Drywell temperature and pressure.

Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

5 Page:

11 O f ? 3 Event

Description:

Steam leak in the primary containment...continued Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO/PRO When directed, shutdown the drywell cooler fans by placing all fan conrrol switches in OFF.

URO/PRO Spray the drywell in accordance with T-204 Initiation of Containment Sprays Using RHR.

Verify Recirc Pumps are tripped.

0 Verify all Drywell coolers are OFF.

CT 0

Open MO-2-10-31 8 DW Spray Inboard.

CT 0

Open MO-2-10-268 DW Spray Outboard.

CT 0

Close or verify closed MO-2-10-34B Full Flow Test.

0 Monitor containment pressure.

0 Adjust spray flow rate by throttling MO-2-10-268 as necessary to maintain drywell pressure =. 2 psig.

URO/PRO Place CAD in service when directed.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

6 ES-I39 Page:

12 of '13 Event

Description:

E-3 diesel generator start failure E-4 diesel generator auto start failure Cause:

Various Effects:

E-3 diesel generator cannot be started.

E-4 diesel generator fails to start automatically but can be manually started.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior PRO Recognize the E-3 diesel generator failed to start.

Attempt a quick start of the E-3 diesel by depressing the QUICK START pushbutton.

Report the E-3 diesel failed to start from the control room.

Dispatch an Equipment Operator to the E-3 diesel generator.

Perform SE-I 1, Attachment 6 "Responding to a Diesel Generator Trip or Failure to Start".

PRO Recognize the E-4 diesel generator failed to start.

Attempt a quick start of the E-4 diesel by depressing the QUICK START pushbutton.

Recognize E-4 diesel starts and loads its busses.

Verify ESW pump is supplying cooling water to the diesel generators.

Direct an Equipment Operator to perform running inspection of the E-2 and E-4 diesel generators.

CT CRS CT Direct the E-3 diesel quick started, if not done.

Direct the E-4 diesel quick started, if not done.

Operator Actions Op Test No.:

1 Scenario No.:

4 Event No.:

7 ES.0-2 Page:

13of13 Event

Description:

HPCl flow controller fails in automatic Cause:

Instrument failure Effects:

When HPCl is initiated, it will not reach sufficient speed to inject water into the reactor due to the flow controller failure. Operator action will be required in order to inject and/or control RPV pressure with HPCI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Recognize HPCl is not injecting after system startup.

Respond to the failure by taking manual control of the HPCl flow controller and raising turbine speed.

Manually control HPCl turbine speed as necessary to establish and control HPCl injectionlRPV level.

Report the HPCI flow control failure and current status of HPCl to CRS.

TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario may be terminated when all Primary Containment parameters, RPV pressure and level, are stable and under control.

v t e Letter Sequence Draft Other
TAC:U01776, (Open)
Initiation Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers Results Approval... Other: ML090220315, ML090290221, ML090290223, ML090290224, ML090290228, ML090330087
MONTHYEAR2008-11-17 [Table View]

ML083540454

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