ML081130739

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Revision to Generic Letter 2004-02 Response
ML081130739
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/2008
From: Spina J A
Constellation Energy Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GL-04-002, TAC MC4672
Download: ML081130739 (3)


Text

James A.Spina V ice President nstellati nuclear eneration GroupApril22,2008 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commi ssion Washington,DC20555 Calvert CliffsNuclear PowerP lan t, In c.1650Calvert CliffsParkway Lusby , Maryland2065 7 41 0.495.5200 41 0.495-3500 Fax ATTENTION:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES

Document Control Desk Calvert Cliffs NuclearPowerPlantUnitNos.I&2;Docket Nos.5 0-317&5 0-318 Revision to Generi cLetter2004

-02 Response(a)LetterfromMr.

1.E.Pollockto Document Control Desk (NRC), dated November29,2005, Supplemental ResponsetoNRC GenericLetter2004

-02,"Pot ential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Re circulation during Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors" (b)LetterfromMr.P

.D.M ilanotoMr.J.A.Spina (CCNPP), dated December18,2006, Approval of Extension Request for Compl etion of Corrective A ctionsinRespon se to Generic Lette r 2004-02(TAC N o.MC4672)(c)NEI04-07, dated May 28,2004,Pressuri zed Water Rea ctor (PWR)Sump Performan ce M ethodology The purpose of Reference(a)wastosupp lement our responsetoG eneric Letter 20 04-02 to address issuesraisedbythe Nuclear Regulatory Commi ssion (NRC)atapubli c meetingonSe ptember30,2005.As part of the effortstoresolve Generic Safety Issue-191,theNRChas conductedtestsat Argonne NationalLabsto determine the magnitude of the impact of ch emical precipitation which might occur inthe containmentsumppool during po st-loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)recirculation.

One ofthetests examined the interaction of calcium-silicate insulationwitha Trisodium Phosp hate (TSP)sumppool bufferagent.The results showedthata chemical precipitantdidformandthe impact on strainer headloss was signifi cant.Thoseplantsc ontaining both calcium-silicate insulationandTS P buffering agent were identifiedbythe NRC/Nuclear Energy In stitute (NEI)as needingtoaddre sstheimpa ct ofthisresultonplantope rability includi ngthene ed to implement additional c ompensatory measures.CalvertCliffsUnitsIand 2wereamon gtheplantsid entifi ed as having calcium-sili cate in sulation and TSP buffering agent.I n Referen ce(a)westatedthat,"...Calv ert Cliffs ha s no calcium-si licat e insulationinthezon e of influence of the LOCAbr eak;th er efore, per NEI04-07...no calcium-silicate in sulation DocumentControlDeskApril22,2008Page2willbe destroyedduringtheLOCA,andthusnonewill transporttothe containmentsumppool.Sincethereisnocalcium-silicateinsulationinour containmentsumppooltheresults of the Argonne National Labs chemicaleffectstestinghasnoimpactonplant operability

." This informationwasbasedona walkdown ofUnit1du ringthe2004 refueling outage.That walkdowndidnotidentifyanysilicateinsulationinthezone of influence ofaReactor CoolantSystem(RCS)pipebreak.However,insulationinspections performedduringtheUnit12008 refuelingoutageshowedsomeUnit1pipingdidhavecalcium-silicateinsulationinthezone ofinfluenceforanRCSpipebreak.These additionalinspectionswereperformedbasedon information obtainedduringtheUnit2 inspections performedinthe2007refuelingoutage.

Therefore, in accordancewith10CFR50

.9(a)weareprovidingthisupdated information

.Reference(a)wasusedto supporttheapproval of our extensionrequestforthe completion of correctiveactionsinresponsetoGenericLetter2004-02forUnit1 (Reference b).The information originallysuppliedisnotcorrectforUnit1,basedonthe2008 walkdown oftheUnit1 Containment.Allactionsthatwerethesubject of the extensionrequesthavebeen completedandall of theidentifiedcalciumsilicateinsu lationwasmitigatedasdescribedbelow.

Therefore,webelievethattheupdated informationprovidedbelowhasnoimpactonthe previously granted extension.Updated informationforUnit1 In accordancewithSection3.4.2

.2 ofNEI04-07 (Referencec),weidentifiedthezone of influence(17LID)fortheinsulationin Containmenthavingtheminimum destruction pressure (unjacketed insulation)andapplied thistoallinsulationtypes

.AsstatedinNEI04-07,"th is approach prov ides a conservativelylargevaluefordebris generation." WalkdownsinUnit1duringthe2008 refueling outageinspectedareasagainwithinthislargezone ofinfluenceforinsulationand specifically calcium-s ilicateinsulation.The walkdowns identified calcium-silicateinsulationonthe pressurizer reliefvalvelinesin the pressurizer compartment,ontwosteam generator blowdownlinesnearthelowerlevel of Containment,andonfour component cooling water reliefvalvelinesncarthelowerlevel of Containment.

The calcium-silicateinsulationwas jacketedandtheinsulation jacketwasheldonwithrivets.Otherlineswereidentifiedwhichhad calcium-silicateinsulationbuttheyareinareasthatwouldnotbe impacted byanRCSpipebreak

.Ithasalsobeen determinedfromNEI04-07thatinsulationwithbanded jacketinghasazone of influence ofonly5.45LID

.We contactedthesource of this informationandweretoldthatthe publisheddatawasforbandsspaced8 Y4" apart.In addition, WCAP-16720-P documentsthatwiththebandsspaced3"apartazone of influence of3LIDwas obtained.Duringthe2008Unit1 refuelingoutage,bandsspacedat6"wereplacedonthecalc ium-silicate insulation greaterthan10pipe diametersfromanRCSpipebreak,andbandsspacedat2

%"wereplacedoncalcium-silicateinsulationbetweenadistance of4and10pipediameters.Inaddition,allidentifiedcalcium-silicateinsulationlessthan4LIDfromtheRCSpipingwasreplacedwitheitherfiberglassorTempMatinsulation.

Therefore,thecalcium-silicateinsulationwithinthezone of influence ofRCSpipinghaseitherbeen eliminatedorarmoredsuchthatthereisnolongeranyidentifiedcalcium-silicateinsulationthatcouldget damagedandwashedto the containment sumpduringaLOCA

.The bandingandremoval of calcium-silicateinsulationwhich occurredduringthe2008 refuelingoutageresultsinan operable containment sump.Anoperabilityevaluation was performedtoassessthepast operability of the containmentsumpwith calcium-silicateinsulationwithriveted jacketing(preUnit1 refuelingoutage).The evaluation determinedthatthelocationandinherent strength oftheinsulationwithriveted jacketingwouldlimitthe Document Control Desk April22,2008Page3 amount of insulation impactedbyanRCSbreak.

Therefore, the evaluation concluded that past operability of Unit Iwasnot significantly affectedbythe discovered calcium-silicate insulation.

We understand that calcium-silicate insulationandits interaction with trisodium phosphate,aswellas other chemical effects,arethe subject of continued studybythe NRCandthe industry.We continue to evaluate the information provided by these efforts to determinethebest course of action to ensure the continued operability of our containment sumps.Shouldyouhave questio ns regarding this matter, please contactMr.JayS.Gaines at (410)495-5219.STATEOF MARYLANDTOWIT:COUNTYOF CALVERT I, James A.Spina, being duly sworn, state thatIamVice President-Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.(CCNPP),andthat Iamduly authorized to executeandfilethis response on behalf of CCNPP.Tothebest of my knowledgeandbelief,the statements containedinthis documentaretrueand correct.To the extent that these statementsarenotbasedonmy personal knowledge, they are based upon information provided by other CCNPP employees and/or consultants

.Such informationhasbeen reviewed in accordance with company practice and I believeittobe reliab le.Subscribed and sworn beforeNotaryPulie il\andfortheState of Maryland and County oftl!a.t'e(, thisday of'/;I ,2008.I'iilTNESS IllyHandand Notarial Seal: My Commission Expires: JAS/PSF/bjdcc:D.V.Pickett, NRC S.J.Collins, NRC Resident Inspector, NRC S.Gray,DNR