Text

WCAP-12655, Rev. 2, Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Study, Indiain Point Unit 2.
	ML073270507
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	06/30/2002
From:	Frantz E, Hundal R, Kolano J, Konopka G, Marcucci P, Roehlich D; Westinghouse
To:	; Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	WCAP-12655, Rev 2
	Download: ML073270507 (348)
	v • d • e

WCAP-12655 Non-Proprietary Class 3 June 2002 Revision 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Study Entergy Nuclear Northeast Indian Point Unit 2 Westinghouse

Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3 WCAP-12655 June 2002 Revision 2 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING STUDY FOR INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 E. R. Frantz D. M. Roehlich G. G. Konopka R. Hundal J. A. Kolano P. J. Marcucci Prepared by Westinghouse Electric Company LLC for Entergy Nuclear Northeast WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY LLC 4350 Northern Pike Monroeville, PA 15146 2002, Copyright Westinghouse Electric Company LLC All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT This report provides a loading analysis for the Indian Point 2 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) for a number of loss of offsite power events requiring safety injection (SI). Limiting EDG loads for large LOCA, small LOCA, steamline break, steam generator tube rupture, and spurious SI actuation are determined. The loss of offsite power transient without SI is also analyzed. This study is updated to reflect "as-is" systems and conditions at Indian Point Unit 2 near the end of 2001.

With the possible exception of short periods during the injection phase and post-LOCA switchover to cold leg recirculation, EDG loads for the design basis events are determined to be less than 2100 kw, the two hour emergency rating for the EDGs.

Short term loads during injection and switchover are within the half hour rating of 2300 kw. Longer term loads are less than or readily controllable to be less than the EDG continuous rating of 1750 kw.

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING STUDY FOR INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1-1 2.0 OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING STUDY 2-1 3.0 EQUIPMENT POWER REQUIREMENTS 3-1 3.1 Safeguards Pumps 3-1 3.2 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Motors 3-15 3.3 Essential Motor Control Centers 3-24 3.4 Non-Essential Equipment 3-37 4.0 LOGIC FOR AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT LOADING 4-1 4.1 Safety Injection Sequence 4-1 4.2 Switchover to SI Recirculation Phase 4-8 4.3 Loss of Offsite Power Without SI Sequence 4-11 5.0 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADINGS FOR LARGE BREAK LOCA 5-1 5.1 General Equipment Requirements for Large LOCA 5-1 5.2 Large LOCA with All Emergency Diesel Generators Operating 5-10 5.3 Large LOCA with Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator 21 5-19 5.4 Large LOCA with Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator 22 5-27 5.5 Large LOCA with Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator 23 5-34 5.6 Summary of Results for Large LOCA With Low-Head 5-41 Recirculation 5.7 Large LOCA with High-Head Recirculation 5-43 6.0 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADINGS FOR OTHER ACCIDENT CASES 6-1 6.1 Emergency Diesel Generator Loadings for Small LOCA 6-1 6.2 Emergency Diesel Generator Loadings for Non-LOCA 6-14 Transients 1

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING STUDY FOR INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)

SECTION TITLE PAGE 7.0 STATION BLACKOUT AND LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER WITHOUT SI 7-1 7.1 Background 7-1 7.2 Cases Considered 7-1 7.3 Emergency Operating Procedures 7-2 7.4 EDG Loads During Hot Standby 7-2 7.5 EDG Loads Added During Cooldown To Cold Shutdown 7-5 7.6 Summary and Conclusions 7-7 8.0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS 8-1

9.0 REFERENCES

9-1 APPENDICES A SAFETY EVALUATION CHECKLISTS A-1 SECL No.89-743 - Safety Evaluation for Securing the A-2 Motor-Driven AFW Pumps During the Post-LOCA Switchover SECL No.89-744, Rev. 1 - Changes in Switch Sequences for Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover A-7 SECL No. 91-231-High Head Safety Injection A-14 Flow Changes Safety Evaluation SECL No.92-339, Rev. 2 - Increase in the Containment A-63 Pressure High ESF Safety Analysis Limit (SAL) Setpoint to 10 psig B CONTAINMENT RESPONSE FOLLOWING A LARGE LOCA B-1 B.1 Introduction B-1 B.2 Containment Response Calculations B-1 B.3 Large Break Long-Term LOCA For Containment Integrity B-2 B.4 Main Steam Line Break For Containment Integrity B-7 B.5 Small Break LOCA B-9 B.6 References B-15 ii

LIST OF TABLES TABLE TITLE PAGE 1-1 480 V Bus Loading Summary 1-6 3.1-1 Safeguard Pumps Replacement Motor Frame Status 3-12 3.1-2 EDG Power Requirements Summary 3-13 3.2-1a Containment Fan Cooler Motor Power Requirements for Large LOCA, All EDGs Operating 3-19 3.2-1b Containment Fan Cooler Motor Power Requirements for Large LOCA, EDG Failure Cases 3-20 3.2-2 Containment Fan Cooler Motor Power Requirements for Main Steamline Break 3-21 3.2-3 Containment Fan Cooler Motor Power Requirements for Small Break LOCA (3" / 4" Composite Cold Leg Break) 3-22 3.2-4 Summary of Small LOCA Cases Analyzed 3-23 3.3-1a MCC 26A Component Load Summary 3-29 3.3-1b MCC 26B Component Load Summary 3-31 3.3-1c MCC 26C Component Load Summary 3-33 3.3-2a Automatic Loads for MCC 26A 3-34 3.3-2b Automatic Loads for MCC 26B 3-35 3.3-2c Automatic Loads for MCC 26C 3-36 3.4-1 Loads on MCC 24A 3-42 3.4-2 Loads on MCC 27A 3-43 3.4-3 Loads on MCC 29A 3-44 3.4-4 Loads on MCC 211 3-45 4.1-1 Safety Injection Major Equipment Loading Summary 4-3 4.1-2 Safety Injection Equipment Loading 4-4 4.3-1 Loss of Offsite Power without SI Major Equipment Loading Summary 4-12 5.1-1 Summary of RWST Switchover and Recirculation Switch Times for Large LOCA 5-9 5.2-1 Time Table of Events - Large LOCA with All Diesel Generators Operating 5-11 5.2-2a Large LOCA With All EDGs Operating -

Loads on EDG 21 5-16 5.2-2b Large LOCA With All EDGs Operating -

Loads on EDG 22 5-17 5.2-2c Large LOCA With All EDGs Operating -

Loads on EDG 23 5-18 5.3-1 Time Table of Events - Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 21 Failure 5-20 iii

LIST OF TABLES (Cont.)

TABLE TITLE PAGE 5.3-2a Large LOCA with Failure of EDG 21-Loads on EDG 22 5-25 5.3-2b Large LOCA with Failure of EDG 21 -

Loads on EDG 23 5-26 5.4-1 Time Table of Events - Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 22 Failure 5-28 5.4-2a Large LOCA with Failure of EDG 22 -

Loads on EDG 21 5-32 5.4-2b Large LOCA with Failure of EDG 22 -

Loads on EDG 23 5-33 5.5-1 Time Table of Events - Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 23 Failure 5-35 5.5-2a Large LOCA With Failure of EDG 23 -

Loads on EDG 21 5-39 5.5-2b Large LOCA With Failure on EDG 23 -

Loads on EDG 22 5-40 5.7-1 Limiting High-Head Recirculation Phase Loads for Large LOCA - EDG 21 5-45 __

5.7-2 Limiting High-Head Recirculation Phase Loads for Large LOCA - EDG 22 5-46 5.7-3 Limiting High-Head Recirculation Phase Loads for Large LOCA - EDG 23 5-47 6.1-1 Time Table of Events - Small 3" to 4" LOCA with Composite Failures 6-4 6.1-2a Small 3" to 4" LOCA With Composite Failures - Loads on EDG 21 6-9 6.1-2b Small 3" to 4" LOCA With Composite Failures - Loads on EDG 22 .6-10 6.1-2c Small 3" to 4' LOCA With Composite Failures - Loads on EDG 23 6-11 6.2-1a Steamline Break - Maximum EDG 21 Loading 6-21 6.2-1 b Steamline Break - Maximum EDG 22 Loading 6-22 6.2-1c Steamline Break - Maximum EDG 23 Loading 6-23 6.2-2a Steam Generator Tube Rupture - Maximum EDG 21 Loading 6-24 6.2-2b Steam Generator Tube Rupture - Maximum EDG 22 Loading 6-25 6.2-2c Steam Generator Tube Rupture - Maximum EDG 23 Loading 6-26 6.2-3a Spurious SI Actuation - Maximum EDG 21 Loading 6-27 6.2-3b Spurious S1 Actuation - Maximum EDG 22 Loading 6-28 6.2-3c Spurious SI Actuation - Maximum EDG 23 Loading 6-29 0

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LIST OF TABLES (Cont.)

TABLE TITLE PAGE 7-1 Time Table of Events for Loss of Offsite Power Without Safety Injection, One EDG Starts, ES-0.1 (Rev. 36) Recovery Actions Considered 7-9 7-1a Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 21 (using ES-0.1) 7-10 7-1b Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 22 (using ES-0.1) 7-11 7-1c Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 23 (using ES-0.1) 7-12 7-2 Time Table of Events for Loss of Offsite Power Without Safety Injection, Delayed Start for One EDG, ECA-0.1 (Rev. 34) Recovery Actions 7-13 Considered 7-2a Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 21 (using ECA-0.1) 7-15 7-2b Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 22 (using ECA-0. 1) 7-16 7-2c Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 23 (using ECA-0.1) 7-17 7-3 Time Table of Events for Natural Circulation Cooldown to RHR Entry Conditions, One EDG Operates, ES-0.2 (Rev. 34) Recovery Actions 7-18 Considered 7-3a Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 21 (using ES-0.2) 7-19 7-3b Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 22 (using ES-0.2) 7-20 7-3c Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 23 (using ES-0.2) 7-21 7-4 Summary and Comparison of Hot Shutdown and Cold Shutdown EDG Loads for Recovery from a Station Blackout Event at Indian Point 7-22 Unit 2 Using a Single EDG V

LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE TITLE PAGE 3.4-1 Charging Pump Motor Power Versus Pump Pressure 3-46 6.1-1 RCS Pressure for the 4" Diameter Small Break LOCA 6-12 6.1-2 RCS Pressure for the 3" Small Break LOCA 6-13 6.2-1 Reactor Coolant Pressure, Reactor Vessel Inlet Temperature vs. Time for Steamline Break 6-30 6.2-2 Pressurizer Water Volume vs. Time for Steamline Break 6-31 vi

O

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Emergency alternating current (a.c.) power at Indian Point Unit 2 is provided by three emergency diesel generators (EDGs), each of which has a continuous rating of 1750 kw. In the event of loss of offsite power, EDGs 21, 22, and 23 will feed the 480 V Safeguards Bus groups 5A, 2A/3A, and 6A, respectively. Table 1-1 summarizes the equipment which receives power from these buses. Associated one-line diagrams of the emergency power system are contained in Section 8.2 of the FSAR (Ref. 1-1).

For accident conditions, prior to the 1991 refueling outage, the EDGs were permitted limited operation at 1950 kw for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period (Ref. 1-2). This emergency rating exceeded the continuous rating of the EDGs. This 1950 kw limit was consistent with the 2000 hour0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months diesel overhaul limit listed in an EDG rating tabulation contained in a 1970 Con Edison memo (Ref. 1-3). This tabulation is shown below:

Maximum 1/2 Hour 2000 kw 2520 horsepower (BHP)

Peak 2000 Hour 1950 kw 2460 horsepower Continuous 1750 kw 2200 horsepower Maximum non-warranted 2250 kw 2800 horsepower Stall rating* 2385 kw 2950 horsepower The BHP to kw conversion used above assumes an averaged value of 94% for the

shaft or motor efficiency of the major safeguards loads.

Early EDG loading design studies confirmed the adequacy of the EDGs at meeting various post-accident power requirements. As reported in the original Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (Ref. 1-4), the EDG loads following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) were estimated at 1813, 2210, and 2353 horsepower for the first one-half hour, for EDGs 21, 22 and 23, respectively. Limiting loads during the recirculation phase then changed to 2438, 2235, and 2043 horsepower. Referring to the above tabulation, the limiting loads (i.e., EDG 23 during injection and EDG 21 during recirculation) were less than the 1950 kw limit allowed for accident conditions.

The loads reported in the SER were consistent with EDG loading studies performed by Westinghouse in early 1970. The values reported in the SER were actually derived from tables supplied by Westinghouse in Reference 1-4.

Through the years, a number of informal loading verifications have been performed to confirm the loads on the EDGs. The overall result of these studies has been that the loads originally reported in the SER and early 1970 loading studies have remained largely unchanged. Con Edison recognized the need to re-evaluate the expected DG loading in more detail for the purpose of providing flexibility in future plant design

GE/ALCO, the diesel manufacturer, does not recognize this stall rating.

However, the diesel capacity is limited by the fuel rack adjustments.

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changes. As a result, Con Edison contracted Westinghouse to perform an analysis to determine the current limiting loads on the EDGs (Ref. 1-5).

Con Edison and Westinghouse met in early March 1989 to discuss preliminary results of this EDG loading study (Ref. 1-6). It was determined that under certain conditions, the loads on the EDGs could exceed the two hour emergency rating of 1950 kw.

Proposed changes to reduce the loading were discussed and a Licensee Event Report (LER) was subsequently issued in April 1989 (Ref. 1-7). This LER describes the modifications made to the recirculation switches and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) during the 1989 spring refueling outage to keep the EDG loads within acceptable limits. Draft reports of the EDG loading study were then issued in June 1989 (Ref. 1-8) and August 1989 (Ref. 1-9). These reports describe the limiting EDG loads prior to and immediately following the 1989 spring outage, respectively. The pre-stretch analysis of Reference 1-9 confirmed that the modifications described in the LER would result in EDG loads less than the 1950 kw short term emergency limit and the 1750 kw longer term limit.

In late September 1989, an audit team from the NRC Region 1 met at the Indian Point, Unit 2 site to review the draft EDG loading studies of References 1-8 and 1-9. With some minor exceptions, they agreed with the results and the conservative approach used in these analyses. The audit supported the conclusion that, for pre-stretch operation, the EDGs would not be loaded beyond the 1950 kw emergency limit. A presentation on the EDG loading study was then given to the NRC at the Rockville offices October 2-3, 1989. A copy of the presentations and summary of most of the site audit comments is provided in Reference 1-10.

On January 29, 1990, Con Edison obtained approval to operate Indian Point Unit 2 at the 3083.4 MWt NSSS stretch rating. Due to the higher flow and power requirements for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps for stretch, it was necessary to eliminate some small loads on EDG 23 to accommodate this uprate in reactor power.

Reference 1-11 describes these modifications. These changes were made during the spring 1990 mid-cycle outage. To make the EDG loading study as complete and current as possible, the EDG loading study report was updated to include the changes made for stretch as well as those previously made during the 1989 refueling outage.

Changes and corrections made following the NRC site audit were also included. The previous EDG loading study (WCAP-12655, Rev. 0, dated July 1990) therefore bounded stretch operation immediately following the spring 1990 mid-cycle outage.

Since the completion of WCAP-1 2655 Rev. 0, a number of modifications have been made that impact the EDG loading study. Many of these changes were made during the 1991 refueling outage. These changes include the following:

1. Per the diesel enhancement project, the ratings on the EDGs have increased.

The two hour emergency rating has increased from 1950 kw to 2100 kw. The EOPs also allow the EDG load to increase to 2300 kw for up to one half hour in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period.

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2. The power feed for CCW pump 23 has been switched with the feed for MCC 211. Thus, MCC 211 is now powered by EDG 22 and CCW pump 23 by EDG 23. As a result, each EDG now provides power to its own CCW pump.

3. A new vital MCC (26C) has been added to EDG 22.

4. Some of the "optional" loads on the MCCs previously controlled by selective loading were moved to smaller MCCs (24A, 29A, and 27A) to allow easier control by the operator.

5. A number of improvements were also made to the EOPs. Because of the electrical improvements made above, the "Blue" set of EOPs previously used to limit the loads on the EDGs could be eliminated. Also, with the increased diesel ratings, it was possible to allow the motor-driven AFW pumps to remain operable during switchover.

The above electrical modifications are described in References 1-12 through 1-15 and the increased EDG load ratings are documented in Reference 1-16.

Additional changes were made during the 1993 refueling outage. These include the following:

1. Power feeds for Switchgear Room exhaust fans 213 and 215 were changed from MCC 29 to MCC 26C (213) and MCC 29A (215).

2. EDG Building exhaust fan 318 was moved to MCC 26B and a new fan (323) was added, also to MCC 26B.

3. CRAC Booster fans 21 and 22 were replaced with higher capacity fans with increased horsepower ratings.

The above modifications are described in References 1-18 through 1-20.

In addition to the electrical modifications, a number of calculational changes have been made:

1. Large motor loads for the safeguards pumps and fan coolers have been revised based on calculated design data for motor efficiencies.

2. MOV valve loads for MCCs 26A and 26B have been revised based on their kVA rating.

3. Fan cooler power requirements for small LOCA and steamline break have been revised based on containment integrity reanalysis performed to 1-3

incorporate the SI flow balancing modification and the containment high-1 setpoint increase.

Con Edison (now Entergy) provided the necessary input for the first two items above

'(References 1-21, 1-22). The revised containment integrity calculations for small LOCA and steamline break are described in Reference 1-23.

The above 1991 and 1993 refueling outage modifications and calculation changes have resulted in changes to the EDG loadings previously reported in the WCAP-12655 Rev. 0 report (July 1990). A draft loading study was therefore completed to bring the document current to the end of 1994, just prior to the February 1995 outage. The Westinghouse proposal for this update is given in Reference 1-24.

After the 1995 refueling outage, additional changes were made to some of the fan cooler power requirements for large LOCA to reflect the containment high-1 setpoint increase. Revisions were also been included for steam generator refill with AFW following a large LOCA. The revised EOPs, Rev. 21 (August 1995), were also used for this update (Reference 1-17). The Westinghouse proposal to include these changes following the 1995 refueling outage is given in Reference 1-25. This revision (WCAP-12655, Rev. 1), therefore included changes to the Rev. 0 loading study to bring the EDG loading study document current to the end of 1995. The Revision 1 version of the load study was issued in May 1996.

Since the completion of WCAP-1 2655, Rev. 1, a number of additional changes have been made that impact the EDG loading study. Many of these were captured in the restart update performed near the end of year 2000 (References 1-26, 1-27). Changes include the following:

1. A Rev. 1B update for some miscellaneous small load changes plus shifting of some loads early in the recirculation switch sequence,

2. A significant number of pump changes (AFW, SW, SI 23, Recirc, and CCW),

3. A potential increase in fan cooler loads as a result of recent containment reanalysis,

4. A major revision to the plant Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs, Rev. 35, including the LOCA switchover procedure ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, and

5. Most recently, the original Model 44 SGs have been replaced with Model 44F SGs.

Since the restart update focused primarily on large LOCA as a limiting initiating event, loads for other events were not updated. To update the load study for other events and make it more complete, Con Edison approved a more comprehensive update.

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The inputs used for the Revision 2 update to WCAP-12655 have been provided in References 1-28 through 1-32. Revisions to the EOPs (Ref. 1-28) are also included so that the load study reflects with reasonable accuracy the plant configuration at the end of year 2001.

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Table 1-1 480 V Bus Loading SummaryI Bus 5A Bus 2AN3A Bus 6A Desciption EDG No. 21 EDG No. 22 EDG No. 23 SI Pumps 21 22 23 Cont. Spray Pumps 21 22 RHR Pumps 21 22 Aux. FW Pumps 21 23 Cont. Fans 21/22 23/24 25 Recirc. Pumps 21 22 Service Water Pumps 21/24 22/25 23/26 CCW Pumps 21 22 23 MCCs 28/29/29A 24A/24/28A 26B/BB 26A/AA 21/210/211 27/27A 23/25/22 26C Charging Pumps 21 22 23 Prz. Htrs. Gp. 23 Gp. 21/22 Contr. 24 Lighting Trans 23 21/22 21 Service Air 2

Comp.2 x M-G Set 2 21 22 Turb. Aux. Lube x 1 Con Edison Drawing A208088-37 2 Equipment Not Considered In This Study (Does Not Auto-Start, Not Required per the EOPs for Design Basis Events) 1-6

2.0 OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING STUDY This section describes the method and scope of the EDG loading analysis and provides an overview of the major sections that follow.

Since initial operation of Indian Point Unit 2 in the early 1970's, a number of plant modifications have been made that have an impact on the loading requirements for some of the major safety-related components. Changes in flow rates and motor efficiencies affect the corresponding horsepower requirements. Several motors and pumps at the plant have also been replaced. Since the power required for these major components is the dominant contribution to the total EDG load, an important part of this study is to consider the various changes in equipment and operating parameters to accurately but conservatively determine the expected loading for these major components during various design basis accident scenarios. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 describe these calculations for the safeguards pumps and containment fan coolers, respectively.

-In addition to the major safeguards equipment, a number of smaller components, including safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs), automatically connect (are not stripped) during the Safety Injection (SI) sequence. This equipment is powered by the vital motor control centers (MCCs) 26A, 26B, and 26C (Buses 5A, 6A and 3A). Section 3.3 summarizes the loads and valve stroke times for these components.

In Section 3.4, "optional" loads are reviewed. This equipment would be added to aid in plant recovery as directed by the Emergency Operaiing Procedures (EOPs). Examples include restart of a charging pump (for RCP seal injection), and components powered by other non-safety related MCCs that could automatically start if the MCC is reset (note: all MCCs except 26A, 26B, 26AA, 26BB, 26C, and 211 strip on loss of offsite power).

Section 4 describes the logic associated with the auto-connected loads. The loading sequence for the injection phase of the accident is presented in Section 4.1. A description of the semi-automatic recirculation switch sequence is presented in Section 4.2. Included in Section 4.2 is a description of the recirculation switch modifications made during the 1989 and 1991 spring refueling outages. Section 4.3 describes the loss of offsite power without SI sequence.

Section 5 combines the information from Sections 3 and 4 to determine limiting EDG loads applicable *to the large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). In defining these loads, the EOPs were reviewed to determine the sequence and approximate timing of In the EOPs, the EDG loading limits are established in several or more places (e.g., ES-1.3 foldout page, ES-1.4 caution prior to Step 11, and ECA-0.0 caution prior to Step 6): The EDG load should be maintained less than 1660'kw, but may be increased to 2010 kw for maximum of 2 hrs in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period. These limits allow for 90 kw instrument uncertainty for the continuous (1750 kw) and 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months emergency (2100 kw) limits when the operator manually loads equipment on the EDGs.

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operator actions that would be used for recovery. The total load on each EDG includes a conservative allowance for miscellaneous losses, including frequency tolerance and bus and cable losses.

Section 5 is subdivided into six subsections. In Section 5.1, the large LOCA plant response and equipment requirements are discussed in general. Hypothetical scenarios or event time tables are then constructed for each of the four major conditions of interest. These include all EDGs operational with selected limiting single failures or equipment out of service (Section 5.2), single failure of EDG 21 (Section 5.3), single failure of EDG 22 (Section 5.4), and single failure of EDG 23 (Section 5.5).

Spreadsheets are developed for each of these scenarios to track the expected EDG loads for the sequence of actions based on the EOPs. Results for large LOCA with low-head recirculation are summarized in Section 5.6. Results for large LOCA with high-head recirculation are summarized in Section 5.7.

Other accident cases are considered in Section 6. The EDG loads for small LOCA are presented in Section 6.1. To complete Section 6, the non-LOCA cases are discussed in Section 6.2. These events include the steam line break accident, the steam generator tube rupture accident, and the spurious Sl event.

Section 7 includes an update to the Station Blackout and Loss of Offsite Power Without SI Study. Section 8 provides a summary, conclusions, and some recommendations for future improvements. References are then given in Section 9.

Four Westinghouse safety evaluation check lists (SECLs) are presented in Appendix A.

One SECL supports a recirculation switch change (switch 2 and 3 interchange) that reduces transient peak loads during the switchover to cold leg recirculation. The other SECL supports Sl pump flow degradation. Both of these changes were implemented by Con Edison (now Entergy). A third SECL justifies securing the motor-driven AFW pumps during the switchover procedure. With the enhanced diesel ratings, this action is no longer required nor performed per the EOPs. However, this SECL still provides bounding justification for reducing AFW flow to the minimum during recirculation. The fourth SECL is for the containment high-1 setpoint increase, a change implemented at the plant as a result of the change from an 18 to 24 month refueling cycle. These still remain valid for the current update.

Appendix B describes the containment pressure and temperature response analysis for large break LOCA, small break LOCA and main steam line break mass and energy release transients based upon various equipment-loading scenarios. These cases were performed and are summarized in Section 3.2.

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3.0 EQUIPMENT POWER REQUIREMENTS Power requirements for equipment automatically or manually loaded (as established in the EOPs) on the EDGs are described in this chapter.

Requirements for safeguards pumps, fan cooler motors, essential motor control centers (MCCs), and non-essential equipment are documented in the following sections.

3.1 Safeguards Pumps Power requirements based on steady-state operation have been estimated for the following safeguards pumps:

0 Safety Injection (SI) Pumps

SI Circulating Water Pumps

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pumps

Recirculation Pumps

Containment Spray (CS) Pumps

'Service Water (SW) Pumps 9 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pumps

Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps The power requirements are based on conservative assumptions for both pump flow and equipment performance (i.e., motor efficiency). The pump flowrates have been established for different system alignments, where applicable. These are based on a single failure criteria for EDGs and the related pumps. Loss of a single injecting pump results in an increased power demand for each of the remaining pump(s) due to an increased flowrate.

Once the pump operating flow is determined, vendor pump performance curves are used to estimate the brake horsepower (BHP) required to deliver the specified flow. The BHP is conservatively based on a fluid specific gravity (S.G.)

of 1.0 if the fluid temperature is 200'F or less. With the BHP defined, the motor power input (i.e., EDG load) is then calculated by use of the following generalized equation:

Motor Input Power (kw) = BHP

0.746 kw per BHP / Motor Efficiency 3-1

Provided below is a summary of major conservatisms and assumptions utilized in the determination of pump motor load requirements:

1) The lowest reported motor efficiency in the expected operating range as defined on the motor data sheet or calculated design data output is used. The calculated design efficiencies are typically 1-2 percent higher than those given in the motor data sheets.

Equipment aging has an insignificant effect on the motor efficiencies, so this effect can be neglected.

2) The power requirements described in this section are based on steady-state operation. Loading sequence and resulting starting loads are not included.

Reference 3-16 documents the flowrates for the pumps (including references to the sources for the flowrates) and the calculations that support the motor power requirements for the safeguards pumps.

Table 3.1-2 summarizes the EDG power requirements for major safeguards pumps powered from the 480 volt buses. A discussion is provided for each pump of the detailed evaluations used to determine these power requirements.

3.1.1 Safety Iniection Pumps The plant is provided with three SI pumps connected in parallel. Each pump has a minimum flow recirculation line. Depending on available power and which single active failure is considered, two or three SI pumps could be operational during a design basis event. The motor power requirement is primarily dependent on pump flow, and the pump flowrates are influenced by the system backpressure against which the pumps are assumed to deliver against. For this study, motor power requirements are calculated at several RCS/containment backpressures to cover both primary and secondary system breaks.

SECL-91-231, Table 3-2-E in Appendix A gives 1659 gpm injected flow (no lines are spilling) at 0 psig RCS pressure, which gives 553 gpm/pump. Additionally, Reference 3-17 gives a maximum miniflow for the HHSI pumps as 35 gpm. The maximum pump flow for 3 pumps injecting is therefore (553+35)= 588 gpm.

For the LBLOCA, Reference 3-16 gives a pump flow of 650 gpm or higher for two pumps injecting and for recirculation. For conservatism, the maximum BHP for the strongest HHSI pump (which occurs near 650+ gpm) was used to establish the required motor power. This was based on the ongoing flow balance investigation (fall 2001), which indicated that with the current alignment HHSI pump #22 may run out passed a runout flow of 650 gpm for the two pump injecting case, and for the recirculation case. The maximum pump BHP of 435 3-2

(at S.G.=1.0) for the strongest HHSI pump, occurring at 650+ gpm, was therefore used to establish the motor power requirements for these two cases.

For SBLOCA and Non-LOCA the pump flows given in Reference 3-16 were estimated based on the current HHSI flow balance work of record, as documented in SECL-91-231 (HHSI Flows of record) in Appendix A.

In an effort to utilize the available data for the small break LOCA/non-LOCA, the minimum safeguards calculated flows documented in WCAP-12656 were used.

The maximum flows were calculated by increasing the minimum flows to account for the non-conservative EDG loading modeling assumptions (see Reference 3-16).

The original vendor SI pump performance curves showed BHP at a specific gravity (S.G.) of 0.918 (300'F). Since pump operation with a higher fluid S.G.

(lower fluid temperature) would require a higher BHP, the vendor BHP data were revised upward to reflect a fluid S.G. of 1.0.

As noted in Table 3.1-1, two sets of replacement frames have been procured.

Motor efficiency data for both the original and replacement frames were available. For the replacement frames, the lowest motor efficiency in the expected operating range is for the replacement motor frame (data sheet for Reliance 1&2XF-883704) at the 3/4 load condition (94.3 percent). This value is used to calculate EDG power requirements for BHP above 300 and below 398.

The full load efficiency of 94.5 percent is used for BHP of 398 and above.

Provided below is a discussion of the flow assumptions and calculated power requirements for the SI pumps for various design basis events.

The flow rates assumed for the SI pumps are those following installation of throttle valves at the SI pump discharge. These flow restrictions were added to improve the SI flow balancing. This change is described in the Westinghouse Safety Evaluation SECL-91-231 which is included in Appendix A. The HHSI pump flow rates, as applied for the EDG loading study, are conservatively high.

The calculations of pump motor power which follow are accordingly conservative.

3.1.1.1 Large Break LOCA Injection and Recirculation For a large break LOCA, motor power requirements are calculated with the RCS/Containment pressure at 0 psig. With three pumps operational, the maximum HHSI pump flow is calculated to, be 588 gpm, per pump. At this flow, the calculated motor power requirement is 339 kw per pump. With two pumps operational, the pump flow may reach 650 gpm runout flow or higher, based on ongoing flow balancing evaluations. For conservatism it is therefore assumed that the pumps will operate at the maximum BHP (flow of 650+ gpm) and require 345 kw motor power/pump. For recirculation the flow may also reach 650 gpm or 3-3

higher, and the resulting motor power requirement is 345 kw/pump.

3.1.1.2 Small Break LOCA Injection For a small break LOCA, power requirements with RCS pressure of 1000 psig and one line spilling to 0 psig containment pressure are calculated. At a pressure of 1000 psig, the maximum HHSI flow with three pumps operational is calculated to be approximately 517 gpm per pump. At this flow, the motor power requirement 330 kw per pump. With two pumps operating, the expected pump flow is approximately 600 gpm per pump. At this flow, the motor power requirement is 339 kw per pump.

3.1.1.3 Non-LOCA Injection For this event, pump motor power requirements are calculated with all lines injecting based on a RCS pressure of 1000 psig. With three pumps operational, the maximum HHSI pump flow is calculated to be approximately 367 gpm per pump. At this flow, the motor power requirement is 297 kw per pump. With two pumps operational, the calculated pump flow is approximately 447 gpm per pump. At this flow, the motor power requirement is 315 kw per pump.

3.1.1.4 Small Break LOCA High-Head / Hot-Leg Recirculation The SI pumps are needed for post-LOCA recirculation to perform Hot-Leg recirculation. Depending on the break size, the pumps may also be required for high-head recirculation. In this alignment, a low-head pump (RHR or recirculation) would provide flow and NPSH to the suction of the operating HHSI pumps. For this report, the runout flow was assumed for these operating modes since the low-head pump would provide suction boost to the operating SI pumps. As such, the power requirement calculated for the large break LOCA recirculation phase is applicable (345. kw per pump).

3.1.2 SI Circulatinq Water Pumps During the injection phase of a LOCA concurrent with blackout, the CCW pumps are not in operation, and the CCW system is used as a heat sink. To provide forced cooling to the SI pump coolers during this period, a small centrifugal pump is provided for each SI pump. These pumps are attached to the individual shafts of each SI pump motor and would be operational whenever a SI pump is in operation.

To maximize the EDG power requirement, the vendor performance curve runout flow (50 gpm) is considered. At this flow, the BHP is 2.8 HP. Using the SI pump motor efficiency (93.4 percent), the additional EDG power requirement for the SI pump motor is 2.2 kw per pump.

3-4

3.1.3 RHR Pumps The plant is provided with two RHR pumps in parallel. Depending on available power and which single failure is assumed, one or two RHR pumps could be operational during a design basis event. During recirculation, the RHR pumps provide a redundant backup to the in-containment recirculation pumps.

Normally, the RHR pump(s) would be shut down during the switchover to recirculation.

The RHR pump motor power requirement is dependent on pump flow which is influenced by the back pressure that the pumps deliver flow against. For this study during the injection phase, RHR pump maximum flow and motor power requirements were calculated based on 0, 10, and 20 psig RCS/containment back pressure. Reference 3-16 documents the RHR pump flow rates for different system alignments and containment pressure, the reference sources of the pump flows, and the calculation of the pump motor power requirements.

As noted in Table 3.1-1, a replacement frame was procured. Motor efficiency data are available for both the original and replacement frames. For the replacement frame, the lowest motor efficiency in the expected operating range is for the replacement motor frame. The calculated design data sheet at the one-half and full load conditions is 94.4 percent. For this report, this value was used to calculate EDG power requirements.

The following sections provide discussions of the RHR pump flow rates and the calculated power requirements for the various design basis events.

3.1.3.1 Large Break LOCA Injection With both pumps operational and RCS pressure at 0 psig, the maximum safeguards pump flow is calculated to be 2903 gpm per pump. At this flow, the motor power requirement is 260 kW per pump. With one pump operational, the calculated pump flow is 4720 gpm. At this flow, the pump motor power requirement is 307 kW.

With RCS pressure at 20 psig, the maximum safeguards flow is calculated to be 2764 gpm per pump. At this flow, the motor power requirement is 255 kW per pump. With only one RHR pump operating, the maximum pump flow is 4508 gpm, with a motor power requirement of 303 kW. Containment analysis shows that the containment pressure for LBLOCA will not drop below 20 psig during this event. For this reason, the 20 psig case motor power requirements are conservative for this event, and are therefore listed in Table 3.1-2.

3.1.3.2 Small Break LOCA / Non-LOCA Injection 3-5

During the subject events, the RHR pump(s) would be operated on miniflow.

With both pumps operating, the expected flow is approximately 215 gpm per pump (no deadheading assumed). At this flow,1the power requirement is 165 kw per pump. With only one pump operating, the expected flow is approximately 430 gpm. At this flow, the power requirement is 171 kw.

3.1.3.3 Large Break LOCA Recirculation Emergency operating procedure ES1.3 provides instructions for the alignment of low-head recirculation to establish minimum flows to the core and spray header (the containment integrity analysis does not take credit for recirculation spray).

As stated previously, the RHR pumps would be manually stopped during the switchover to cold leg recirculation. The pumps provide a redundant backup to the recirculation pumps. Since the low-head system is manually aligned, the actual pump flow can not be easily calculated. As such, pump runout flow (approximately 5500 gpm) will be considered for both the one and two RHR pump operating cases. At pump runout flow, the motor power requirement is 316 kw per pump.

3.1.3.4 Small Break LOCA High-Head / Hot Leg Recirculation As noted in Section 3.1.1.4, a low-head pump is used to deliver flow (and NPSH) to SI pumps during the recirculation phase of a LOCA. This configuration is needed since the SI pumps do not take suction directly from the containment sump. In this alignment, RHR pump flow is conservatively estimated to be approximately 1350 gpm, the runout flow of two SI pumps (675 gpm each).

Note, the recirculation (i.e., miniflow) flow path is assumed to be isolated to minimize leakage outside of containment. At this flow, the pump power requirement is 202 kw.

3.1.4 Recirculation Pump The recirculation pumps are manually started during the switchover to containment recirculation. Emergency operating procedure ES-1.3 provides instructions for the alignment of low-head recirculation which establishes minimum flow to the core and spray header (if required).

As noted in Table 3.1-1, replacement frames have not been procured for the recirculation pumps. The lowest reported motor efficiency in the expected operating range on the original motor frame data sheet is at the one-half load condition (93.4 percent). For this report, this value is used to calculate EDG power requirements, except at runout where the full load efficiency (93.7 percent) is used.

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Provided below is a discussion of the flow assumptions and calculated power requirements for the recirculation pumps for various design basis events.

3.1.4.1 Large Break LOCA Recirculation Reference 3-16 Table 6.3 gives the maximum flow rates for recirculation mode for 5 PEGISYS LBLOCA cases representing different system alignments and single failure conditions, and the corresponding motor power requirements.

For the large LOCA cases analyzed in appendix B and discussed in Section 3.2, the containment sump temperature remained above 200'F for 104 seconds (2.8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ) or longer following the accident. On this basis, 200'F fluid temperature is a conservatively low sump temperature for the initial phase of recirculation following a large break LOCA event. At this temperature, the pumped fluid SG is 0.964.

The maximum pump flow rates from Reference 3-16 are dependent on the system alignment. For 2 recirculation pumps delivering flow to two RHR heat exchangers, the flow is 3523 gpm which requires 287 kw motor power. For one pump delivering flow to one heat exchanger, the flow is 3885 gpm, which requires 294 kw. For one pump delivering flow to two heat exchangers, the flow is 4607 gpm, which requires 299 kw.

3.1.4.2 Small Break LOCA High-Head / Hot Leg Recirculation For a small break LOCA, motor power requirements was based on a S.G. of 1.0 since the sump temperature could be less than 200'F. When containment recirc spray was active, a recirculation pump flow of 3704 gpm was calculated, with a corresponding motor power requirement of 301 kw. When containment recirc spray was not active, a pump flow of 1380 gpm is calculated, with a motor power requirement of 194 kw.

3.1.5 Containment Spray Pumps The CS pumps are started on a Phase B actuation signal.- Since the pumps take suction from only the RWST, they are not a long-term load on the EDGs. One pump, however, is kept on during the LOCA switchover procedure until the RWST is empty. Approximately 80,000-100,000 gallons are left in the RWST at the start of switchover.

Following an initiating event, containment pressure will rise and approach the design pressure of 47 psig. Spray flow and fan cooler heat removal tums around the pressure increase and reduces it over time. The CS pump flow is not dependent on the number of operating pumps since the flow paths are independent. Pump flow, however, is sensitive to containment backpressure.

3-7

For this report, CS pump motor power requirements at selected containment back pressures are calculated based on new system performance calculations (see Reference 3-16). These calculations utilized piping data and system layout reflecting the current system configuration to estimate the maximum spray flow at containment back pressures of 0 psig and 20 psig, in order to maximize the pump BHP. For a LBLOCA event, 20 psig containment pressure is conservatively low and results in conservatively high pump motor power requirements.

As shown in Table 3.1-1, replacement frames have been procured for the CS pumps. Of the two sets of frames, only motor efficiency data for the original frames were available for this study. The lowest reported motor efficiency in the expected operating range on the original motor frame data sheet is at the one-half and full load conditions (94.4 percent). For this report, this value is used to calculate EDG power requirements.

Provided below is a discussion of the flow assumptions and calculated power requirements for the CS pumps for various design basis events.

3.1.5.1 Large Break LOCA with Containment Spray Injection For the large break LOCA cases considered (see Sections 3.2 and Appendix B),

20 psig is a conservatively low pressure above which the CS pumps will operate against prior to the operating CS pump being secured in ES-1.3. The low containment back pressure results in a higher CS pump flow, BHP, and required motor power.

The calculated CS pump flows (see Reference 3-16) reflect a 3% enhanced pump curve based on the vendor CS pump performance curves, a derated system flow resistance, and containment back pressures of 20 psig and 0 psig.

The spray flow is calculated to be 3384 gpm for 20 psig containment pressure.

For 0 psig containment pressure the flow is 3562 gpm.

The pump motor power requirements are based on the bounding pump performance from the vendor pump curves, and the motor efficiency data. The pump motor requirement for 0 psig containment pressure is 360 kW, and for 20 psig containment pressure 350 kW is calculated.

3.1.5.2 Small Break LOCA with Containment Spray Injection For a small break LOCA, the containment pressure will rise more slowly and stay lower after spray is actuated (assuming the spray setpoint of 24 psig is ever reached). The CS pump motor power requirements are therefore generated at reduced containment backpressure of 0 psig. This approach is conservative 3-8

since the CS actuation does not occur until a containment post accident pressure of 24 psig is reached.

At a containment pressure of 0 psig, the CS pump flow is estimated to be approximately 3562 gpm per pump. At this flow, the motor power requirement is 360 kw per pump.

3.1.6 Service Water Pumps The plant has six SW pumps with three on the essential header and three on the non-essential header. The pumps on the essential header are required for the injection phase of a design basis event. The non-essential pumps are required for post-LOCA recirculation.

As noted in Table 3.1-1, replacement frames have been procured for the SW pumps. However, only motor efficiency data for the original frames were available for this study. Based on the original pump motor data sheets (see Reference 3-16, page 16), 94.7 % motor efficiency was used for this calculation.

Based on a review of the vendor SW pump curves, the BHP is relatively constant and is at its maximum over the pump flow range of 5000 to 7000 gpm. The SW pumps are expected to operate at flows near the maximum BHP. For this reason the maximum BHP for each of the SW pumps is determined from the pump curves.

Con Edison (now Entergy) completed a modification at the plant which added the pump strainer load directly to the pump motor power supply. The nameplate rating of the strainer and control load is 0.5 HP, and the corresponding power requirement is 0.37 kw. In order to bound the required pump motor power, pump SW#23 (which has the highest BHP) was considered for both the essential and non essential headers., The bounding value for the SW pumps (including the 0.37kw for the strainer) was 282 kw for injection and recirculation.

3.1.7 Component Coolinq Water Pumps The plant has three CCW pumps installed of which one is required for minimum safeguards. In addition, a spare pump has been procured. The BHP for this pump is bounded by the BHP for the installed pumps.

As noted in Table 3.1-1, replacement frames have been procured for the CCW pumps. Of the two sets of frames, the motor efficiency data for the replacement frames are lower, and used for this study. The reported motor efficiency for the replacement motor in the expected operating range is 92.6 percent.

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CCW pump runout flow is 5500 gpm for a single pump operating (see Reference 3-16). The bounding motor power requirement for this flow is 230 kW (based on S.G.=1.0). With two CCW pumps each pump will pump 4000 gpm, which will require 213 kW for each pump motor.

As part of the UHS project, a revised operating methodology was developed to ensure CCW pump post-LOCA runout protection. The CCW system has been configured such that CCW pump header pressure is maintained above a minimum value during plant power operation. During post-LOCA recirculation, one or both RHR heat exchanger shell-side flow paths could be opened. The use of a minimum CCW pump header pressure allows total system resistance to be fixed such that a single CCW pump operates within its maximum (i.e., runout) flow capability with both RHR heat exchanger shell sides opened.

CCW pump runout flow is 5500 gpm for a single pump operating (see Reference 3-16 and CR 200106582). The bounding motor power requirement for this flow is 230 kw (based on S.G.=1.0). With two CCW pumps each pump will pump 4000 gpm, which will require 213 kw for each pump motor.

3.1.8 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps The plant is provided with two motor-driven AFW pumps with each pump feeding two steam generators. The pump flowpaths are separated such that pump flow is not affected by the number of operating pumps.

As noted in Table 3.1-1, replacement frames have been procured. For the Reliance VH-883732 data, the motor efficiency varies dependent on the load as given in Reference 3-16. For this report, these values are used to calculate EDG power requirements.

For the design basis loss of feedwater event, a minimum AFW flow of 380 gpm is required at stretch power (3083.4 MWt NSSS power). Taking into account uncertainties in the flow control loop (including consideration of the 24 month setpoints), Con Edison (now Entergy) determined the maximum expected AFW flow to be 467gpm per pump (Ref. 3-13 and 3-14). Note, this approach conservatively assumes that the loop uncertainties result in higher than nominal flows. Since the individual pump recirculation (i.e., miniflow) flow paths automatically close on high pump flow, the maximum expected pump flow is also 467 gpm per pump. At this flow, the motor power requirement is 387 kw. It should be noted that for the 467gpm pump flow the BHP is 495 which exceeds the motor design service factor rating (400 HP

1.15 = 460 HP). Based on discussions Con Edison had with the motor vendor, operation at this load for a limited time period is acceptable.

3-10

Following accident recovery, operator action can be taken to reduce AFW pump flow. The following table gives motor power requirements at selected reduced pump flows based on the bounding pump (see Reference 3-16, Table B1 -2):

Flow qpm Bounding kw 467 386.6 460 385 455 383.9 440 379.6 429 376.2 420 373.4 400 367.1 350 347.6 300 328.1 250 308.6 200 281.2 150 257.8 100 232.1 85 222.7 50 200.7 3-11

. Table 3.1-1 Safeguard Pumps Replacement Motor Frame Status Original Replacement Motor Name Frame Frame Safety Injection & 509US E5008S (1&2XF-883704)

Circulating Water1 E5008S (VH-883732)

Residual Heat Removal 509UPZ 5008P20 Recirculation 588.5PH N/A Containment Spray 509US 5009S Service Water 509UPH 5008P24 Component Cooling 504US 5006SX Auxiliary Feedwater 509US E5008S

'The SI circulating water pump is shaft-driven by the SI pump motor.

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Table 3.1-2 EDG Power Requirements Summary No. Pump Performance Data Oper. Specific Pres. Flow Motor Motor Power Design Basis Event Pumps Gravity (PSIG) (GPM) Eff.% (kW)

HH SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS LB LOCA - Inject. 3 1.0 0 588 94.5 339 2 1.0 0 >=650 94.5 345 LB LOCA - Recirc. 1.0 N/A >=650 94.5 345 SB LOCA - Inject. 3 1.0 1000 517 94.5 330 2 1.0 1000 600 94.5 339 Non LOCA - Inject. 3 1.0 1000 367 94.3 297 2 1.0 1000 447 94.5 315 SI CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS SI Pump Operation 1-3 1.0 N/A 50 93.4 2.2 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMPS LB LOCA - Inject. 2 1.0 20 2764 94.4 255 1 1.0 20 4508 94.4 303 SB LOCA & Non LOCA 2 1.0 N/A 215 94.4 165

- Inject. (Miniflow) 1 1.0 N/A 430 94.4 171 T Sl Pump flows and power requirements have been reduced due to installation of throttle valves (added for flow balancing). Refer to SECL-91-231 in Appendix A.

2 The SI circulating water pump is attached to the Si pump and is shaft-driven by the Si pump motor.

3-13

Table 3.1-2 (cont)

EDG Power Requirements Summary No. Pump Performance Data Oper. Specific Pres. Flow Motor Motor Power Design Basis Event Pumps Gravity (PSIG) (GPM) Eff.% (kW)

RECIRCULATION PUMPS LB LOCA - Recirc. 1-2 0.9643 0 4607 93.7 299 SB LOCA - Recirc. 1-2 1.0 0 3704 93.4 301 (with recir. spray)

CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS Phase B Actuation 1-2 1.0 20 3384 94.4 350 1-2 1.0 0 3562 94.4 360 SERVICE WATER PUMPS Safeguards Actuation 1-3 1.0 N/A 5000+ 94.7 282 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMPS Safeguards Actuation 1 1.0 N/A 5500 92.6 230 2 1.0 N/A 4000 92.6 213 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS 5 Safeguards Actuation 1/2 1.0 N/A 467 95.5 387 1/2 1.0 N/A 429 95.5 376 1/2 1.0 N/A 250 95.5 309 1/2 1.0 N/A 85 94.8 223 T Specific gravity corresponds to a sump temperature of 2000F.

4 Load includes pump strainer (0.4 kW) which is powered from the motor power supply.

5 Operator action is needed to throttle pump flow to achieve lower loads.

3-14

3.2 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Motors Power requirements for the containment fan cooler unit motors have been calculated as a function of steam/air density. The fan motor BHP and power inputs are calculated as described below. Note that these power requirements include the elimination of the charcoal and HEPA filers.

As analyzed in Reference 3-18, the elimination of the charcoal and HEPA filters from the system results in an increase in the fan volumetric flow rate from 64,500 CFM to 69,300 CFM under maximum design accident conditions. The static pressure of the system during design accident operating pressure and density reduces from 23.2 "WG to 18.6 "WG, and the fan brake horsepower is reduced from 310 bhp to 307.7 bhp. The maximum design accident atmospheric conditions are 271OF temperature, 47 psig pressure, and 0.175 Ibm/ft3 density.

As a result of the Reference 3-18 evaluation, the relationship between the CR fan brake horsepower (BHP) and containment density, in the accident range of 0.11 Ibm/ft3 to 0.19 Ibm/ft can be determined by the following equation:

BHP = 1758*Density + 6.847E-14 The 6.847E-1 4 term is negligible, so the BHP for containment design pressure conditions wou)d be BHP = 1758*(0.175) = 307.7 hp.

The containment atmosphere density is based on the calculated steam/air densities from the pressure/temperature time response of the containment integrity analyses.

Once the fan BHP is determined, the fan motor power input requirement can be calculated based on the following equation:

Fan Motor Power Input (kw) = Fan BHP

0.746 / Motor Efficiency (%)

Motor efficiency data from motor data sheets were not available for this project on the existing frames and replacement frames have not been procured. As such, calculated design data efficiencies were used. These efficiencies ranged from 93.8% @ 175 HP to 94.8% @ 350 HP. Except for t=0, the fan'cooler motor brake HP requirements range from approximately 200 to 300 HP. The motor efficiency for this range is conservatively assumed to be 93%. For t = 0 (i.e., normal conditions), a more conservative value of 90% is used.

Tables 3.2-1 a and 3.2-1b provide results for the containment pressures and fan cooler power requirements for the various large LOCA scenarios. All cases include stretch rating conditions of 3083.4 MWt (NSSS power), 95°F service water temperature and 130°F initial containment temperature. Additional details are provided as Cases 1 through 5 in Appendix B. Appendix B also has plots of these parameters, as well as containment temperature and density and sump temperature.

3-15

For all EDGs operating (Table 3.2-1a), it is assumed one fan cooler may be out of service so that 2 CS pumps and 4 fan cooler units are available for cooling. Case 1 in Appendix B (see Table 3.2-2b) corresponds to a "minimum safeguards" case (with 1 CS pump and 3 fan cooler units. This case is bounding for both the EDG 21 and the EDG 23 failure cases. Case 2 is used to represent the EDG 22 failure case (2 CS pumps, 3 fan cooler units). The fan cooler motor power requirements are based on steady-state operating conditions. No credit is taken for recirculation spray (which would lower the containment pressure and density for the long term containment response).

For the "maximum safeguards" case (first case in Table 3.2-1a), the fan cooler motor powers should be increased for a limiting single failure of one CS pump with all EDGs operating (applicable at certain times for loads on EDGs 21 and 22). This case is run explicitly (Appendix B Case 5) to determine the expected containment pressure increase.

The fan cooler motor power requirements for I CS pump with 4 fan coolers are higher by the amounts shown in the last column of Table 3.2-1a. For example, at 30 minutes (1800 seconds), the impact of a CS pump failure would be an additional 17 kw per fan cooler, due to the higher containment pressure and density. These increases would be doubled if the EDG supplies power to two fan cooler units.

Appendix B Case 2 (EDG 22 failure) conservatively assumes (for purposes of calculating the fan cooler motor.power requirements only) that containment spray is terminated at 20 minutes, i.e., at a time corresponding to a conservatively early start of switchover. In the switchover procedure EOP ES-1 .3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, one CS pump is left operating until the RWST empty alarm is reached. As noted in Table 3.2-1b, Case 4 (all EDGs, with 4 CR fans) would be similar to EDG 22 failure case. The CR Fan Sensitivity results in the last column of Table 3.2-1b can be applied to Case 4 to adjust the results for the EDG 22 failure case after 20 minutes (1200 seconds). If this refinement is done for the EDG 22 failure case, the CR fan load at 30 minutes (1800 seconds) becomes 194+12 = 206 kW (versus 215 kW, a reduction of 9 kW). Likewise, the load at 60 minutes (3600 seconds) becomes 184+18 = 202 kW (versus 215 kW, a reduction of 13 kW). Long term results are then consistent with the "minimum safeguards" case (Appendix B Case 1, the first case in Table 3.2-1 b).

It should be noted all large LOCA cases consider failure / unavailability of one RHR pump. This is the assumed basis for the mass and energy release rates for the limiting containment integrity case. This is conservative for containment integrity (and EDG loading) since it maximizes the steaming rate into containment (and the resulting power requirements for the fan coolers). The various cases therefore address only the different containment cooling configurations (CS pumps and fan coolers).

Tables 3.2-1a and 3.2-1b, which summarize selected containment pressures and fan cooler power requirements, provide sufficient detail to include the peaks and secondary peaks of interest for the large LOCA scenarios. When inputting the fan cooler power requirements into the EDG loading tables of Section 5, the peaks are "broadened" to avoid any potential non-conservative combination of loads on the EDGs.0 3-16

WAppendix B, Cases 6 and 7, describe the analysis for two main steamline break (MSLB) cases. The first (Case 6) is a regeneration of the limiting MSLB case reevaluated for restart in December 2000 (SECL-00-164, Reference 1-27). This case is run for 605 seconds and assumes maximum safeguards for containment cooling (2 CSIpumps plus 5 fan coolers). The mass and energy release for this case is based on a MSLB with failure of a feedwater flow control valve to close (this maximizes the energy release into containment). Case 7 uses the same mass and energy release rates (from Case 6) but further assumes "minimum safeguards" conditions for containment cooling (1 CS pump and 3 fan coolers). Both cases have comparable containment pressures occurring at approximately the same time (350 seconds) with the peak pressure for Case 7 slightly higher (39.5 psig versus 37.5 psig). Case 7 was run for two hours (7200 seconds) with spray secured at 1500 seconds (25 minutes) to simulate operator action in the emergency procedures. (Note: in EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, containment spray flow can be stopped for non-LOCA events when the indicated containment pressure is less than 17 psig).

Results for the containment pressure and fan cooler power requirements for the MSLB cases are provided in Table 3.2-2. Again, additional details and plots (including other parameters, containment temperature and density, and sump temperature) are provided in Appendix B. Note that since the energy release is limited to a single SG, there is no appreciable long-term energy release to containment. Containment conditions'return to normal (less than 4 psig, as per the EOPs) after approximately two hours.

In addition to large LOCA and MSLB, the fan cooler motor power requirements for the small LOCA event were determined. Cases equivalent to the 4 inch and 3 inch cold leg break described in the FSAR were analyzed for their containment response. The containment pressure and fan cooler motor power transient for the "composite" small LOCA with "minimum safeguards" (3 fan coolers, 1 CS pump) is given in Table 3.2-3.

Spray actuation did not occur for the 3 inch LOCA with 3 fan coolers (Appendix 8, Cases 16 and 17), and this case bounds the 4 inch LOCA later in time (after spray actuation occurs for the 4 inch case). (Note: values in Table 3.2-3 for 100 and 120 minutes are for the 3 inch LOCA).

Spray actuation did not occur for the 4 inch LOCA with 5 fan coolers (Appendix B, Cases 12 and 13) and results for this case are bounded by the composite values in Table 3.2-3.

Containment pressure reaches 26.5 psig and is slowly increasing at the end of two hours for the 4 inch LOCA with 4 fan coolers (Appendix B, Cases 10 and 11). However, this is a consequence of assuming the steaming rate for the break flow does not change after 2485 seconds (41 minutes), the end of the 4" LOCA analyzed for the peak clad temperature transient. Had the mass and energy release rates for this case decreased in a more realistic manner (i.e., varied as the decay heat), it is expected that the pressure transient would turn around later in time. Therefore, the "composite" case depicted in Table 3.2-3 table remains bounding for small LOCA.

3-17

Table 3.2-4 summarizes all of the small LOCA cases, peak containment pressures, and the sump temperatures at the end of two hours. A large number of small LOCA cases were performed in Appendix B to bound the expected sump temperatures for high head recirculation. Whereas the sump temperature for the large LOCA cases generally remained above 200°F for 104 seconds (several hours or more) before significant cool off, small LOCA cases with SI spill modeled cooled to less than 200°F in less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . For a given scenario, the true sump temperature should lie somewhere between the results for "no spill" and "with spill". (Note: SI spill refers to safety injection water that spills directly onto containment floor and does not first enter the RCS. If modeled, SI spill flow is higher than anticipated, so the sump will cool more than anticipated.) As can be observed, the impact of the spill flow cools the sump temperature below 2000 F, especially for the smaller break size. Therefore, it is conservative to assume a specific gravity (S.G.) of 1.0 for long term recirculation following a small LOCA.

3-18

Table 3.2-1a Containment Fan Cooler Motor Power Requirements for Large LOCA, All EDGs Operating (Four Fan Coolers, Two CS Pumps, No Recirculation Spray)

Appendix B Case 4, Appendix B Case 5, All EDGs Operating, All EDGs Operating, CS Pump Both CS pumps One CS pump fails Sensitivity inject (Case 5 - Case 4)

Containment CR Fan Containment CR Fan ACont. AFan Time Pressure Power Pressure Power Press. Power (psi (k1w_ 0DS0I LkýW 0 2.0 110 2.0 110 0.0 0 23 39.4 221 39.4 221 0.0 0 100 38.4 219 38.6 220 0.2 1 300 210 215 1.8 5 35.2 37.0 500 37.2 216 40.3 225 3.1 9 600 36.2 213 39.9 224 3.7 11 900 34.2 207 39.7 223 5.5 16 203 39.7 224 6.8 21 1200

32.9 1400 203 39.6 223 6.6 20 33.0 1500 32.0 200 38.3 219 6.3 19 1800 29.8 194 35.3 210 5.5 17 30.7 196 4.3 13 2400 26.4 183 3600 26.6 184 29.7 193 3.1 9 6000 21.1 167 22.8 172 1.7 5

Note: only One CS pump is left running after 20 minutes; this pump is then stopped when the RWST empty alarm is reached.

0 3-19

Table 3.2-1 b Containment Fan Cooler Motor Power Requirements for Large LOCA, EDG Failure Cases (Three Fan Coolers, One or Two CS Pumps, No Recirculation Spray)

Appendix B Case 1, Appendix B Case 2, EDG 21 or 23 Failure EDG 22 Failure, CR Fan Sensitivity One CS Pump 2 CS Pumps (Case 5 - Case 1)

Operating Operating Containment CR Fan Containment CR Fan ACont. AFan Time Pressure Power Pressure Power Press. Power (sec) 0kW) 0.0 0 2.0 110 2.0 110 0 0.0 23 39.4 221 39.4 221 0 0.1 100 38.7 220 38.5 220 0 0.7 300 37.7 217 35.8 212 2 500 41.4 229 38.2 219 1.2 4 600 41.3 228 37.4 217 1.4 4 900 41.8 230 36.1 213 2.1 6 1200 42.5 232 35.2 210 2.8 8 1400 43.0 234 36.8 215 3.4 10 1500 41.9 230 36.7 215 3.6 11 1800 39.3 223 36.9 215 4.0 12 2400 35.2 210 37.1 216 4.5 14 3600 35.6 211 36.9 215 5.9 18 6000 30.6 196 31.3 198 7.8 24

For EDG 22 failure (Case 2), both CS pumps are assumed stopped at 20 minutes (1200 seconds). Since Case 4 (all EDGs, with 4 CR fans) would be similar, the CR Fan Sensitivity results can be applied to Case 4 to adjust the results for the EDG 22 failure case.

3-20

Table 3.2-2 Containment Fan Cooler Motor Power Requirements for Main Steamline Break Appendix B Case 6, Appendix B Case-7, MSLB with Feedwater MSLB (M&E for Case 6)

FCV Fails to Close Minimum Safeguards (2 CS Pumps, 5 CR (1 CS Pump, 3 CR Fans)

Fans)

Containment CR Fan Containment CR Fan Time Pressure Power Pressure Power (sec) (DsiQ) (kw) (kw) ip-jg) 0 2.0 110 2.0 110 100 21.7 167 21.7 167 200 29.9 193 30.4 194 300 35.6 210 36.9 214 350 37.5 216- 39.4 222 353 37.5 216 39.5 222 400 35.6 210 38.2 218 500 32.0 199 35.8 210 600 29.2 190 34.0 205 700 NA NA 31.8 198 900 NA NA 28.1 187 1200 NA NA 23.5 173 1500

NA NA 19.6 161 1800 NA NA 17.9 156 2100 NA NA 16.3 -151 2400 NA NA 14.8 146 3000 NA NA 12.2 139 5000 NA NA 7.0 125 7200 NA NA 4.5 118

CS pump stopped per EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

3-21

Table 3.2-3 Containment Fan Cooler Motor Power Requirements for Small Break LOCA (3 Inch / 4 Inch Composite Cold Leg Break)

RCS Time Pressure Motor Min) (psigq) Power (kw) 1 9.7 130 5 18.8 160 10 23.8 175 15 25.4 180 20 26.0 182 30 27.4 186 40 28.1 188 50 29.0 191 60 29.8 193 64+ 30.1 194 67 29.2 192 100 26.4 183

> 120 26.2 182 /

+ One CS Pump Starts (24 psig setpoint plus 6 psi uncertainty).

3-22

Table 3.2-4 Summary of Small LOCA Cases Analyzed Number Maximum Sump Case in Break of Fan Containment SI Spill Temperature Appendix B Size Coolers Pressure (psiq) Modeled? (at 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 8 4 inch 3 30.15 (at 64 no 225 min) 9 4 inch 3 30.18 (at 64 yes 202 min) 10 4 inch 4 26.4 (at 2 no 222 hours0.00257 days 0.0617 hours 3.670635e-4 weeks 8.4471e-5 months ) 11i 4 inch 4 26.5 (at 2 yes 182 hours0.00211 days 0.0506 hours 3.009259e-4 weeks 6.9251e-5 months ) 12 4 inch 5 23.0 (at 23 min) no 216 13 4 inch 5 23.0 (at 23 min) yes 179 14 3 inch 3 28.8 (at 2 no 211 hours0.00244 days 0.0586 hours 3.488757e-4 weeks 8.02855e-5 months ) 15 3 inch 3 28.9 (at 2 yes 167 hours0.00193 days 0.0464 hours 2.761243e-4 weeks 6.35435e-5 months ) 16

3 inch 3 26.28 (at 94 no 211 min) 17

3 inch 3 26.35 (at 95 yes 165 min)

° Mass and energy releases for these cases reduced in proportion to the decay heat.

Containment spray actuated at 30 psig (24 psig setpoint plus 6 psi uncertainty).

3-23

3.3 Essential Motor Control Centers As defined in Table 1-1, Motor Control Centers (MCCs) 26A, 26B, and 26C receive power from 480 volt busses 5A, 6A, and 3A, respectively. The equipment loaded on these MCCs is essential to mitigate/monitor design basis events. As such, these MCCs remain loaded on the EDGs during automatic sequencing (per Section 4.1, these MCCs are not stripped).

Provided in Tables 3.3-1a, 3.3-1b, and 3.3-1c are listings of equipment and their respective power requirements for MCC 26A, 26B, and 26C, respectively. Some of the components are motor-operated valves (MOVs); for these, the maximum expected stroke times are provided since valve loads are present only when the valve is in motion.

In general, the valve stroke times are based on design data contained in equipment specification data sheets. As noted, information provided by Con Edison in References 3-2 and 3-4 was used to update some of these loads. For plant valves, Con Edison reviewed and provided updates to some of the valve stroke times in Reference 3-3.

Additional changes have been made to these loads and valve stroke times in the Rev.

1B update, as documented in Reference 3-19.

For the EDG loading study, it is important to know which components on MCCs 26A, 26B, and 26C are energized at the start of the accident. These loads were determined based on information given in the schematic diagrams for MCCs 26A and 26B (Dwg.

9321-LL-3126 and associated reference drawings), and other information confirmed with Con Edison. The loads on these vital MCCs that could be energized at approximately one minute following the start of an accident are listed in Tables 3.3-2a, 3.3-2b, and 3.3-2c. The total loads on these MCCs should be less than that indicated since some of the components do not become energized unless specific setpoints are reached or a particular piece of equipment was in use when the accident first occurs. For example, the fans, heat tracing, and some of the control room HVAC loads may not all be in operation simultaneously.

The information in Tables 3.3-2a, 3.3-2b, and 3.3-2c will be used to determine the peak injection phase loads after all the major component loads have been sequenced onto the EDGs. As noted in Section 4.1 (see Table 4.1-1), the load sequencing generally takes at least 30-40 seconds but less than 60 seconds (including the assumed 10 second EDG start time). Therefore, it is appropriate to ignore the fast acting MOVs and include only those with valve stroke times of approximately 60 seconds or longer.

When component loads are defined in hp, a conversion factor of a 0.746 kw/hp was used to convert the load to kw. Motor and/or fan efficiency corrections have not been accounted for in the conversion to kw since the loads are small in comparison to those discussed earlier for the large motors. Furthermore, in selecting motors for these smaller components, it has generally been found that the motors providing power to the smaller miscellaneous loads have excess capacity when compared to the power actually required to operate the pump or fan. For example, boric acid transfer pump 22, when operating at the higher speed, requires about 9.1 kw (based on plant measurements).

3-24

The load assumed in Tables 3.3-1 b, 3.3-1c, 3.3-2b and 3.3-2c is 11.2 kw. Some of the measured or more accurately determined control room HVAC and other loads have also been confirmed to be less than those assumed.

In the evolution of the MCC 26A, 26B, and 26C tables, there have been several corrections and also some changes resulting from modifications made during the spring 1989 refueling outage, the spring 1990 mid-cycle outage, the spring 1991 refueling outage and the spring 1993 refueling outage. These corrections and changes are discussed below.

Boric Acid Pump 22 (MCC 26B)

Based on information from the Con Edison (now Entergy) operations personnel in the Generation Support group, this pump is normally left in automatic and recirculates at the lower pump speed (7.5 hp). During a boration operation, however, it could be in operation at the higher speed (15 hp). The corresponding load (11.2 kw) is conservatively assumed to be present on EDG 23.

Service Water Pump Heaters and Strainers As described in Reference 3-8, modifications were made during the spring 1989 refueling outage so that each service water pump motor also powers its associated strainer (refer to Section 3.1.6). In Reference 1-11 (spring 1990 mid-cycle outage modifications) the 4 kw SW strainer pit heater load is also taken off MCC 26A and 26B and moved to MCC 29. These heaters are not energized (on EDG 21) when the MCCS are later reset (Ref. 1-2) (note: Con Edison (now Entergy) determined that there would be no freezing concern associated with this change).

Use For Control Room HVAC Loads (MCC 26B)

During the 1991 refueling outage, some of the redundant control room HVAC loads (CRAC backup fan and booster fan 21) were taken off MCC 26B and placed on the new MCC 26C (Ref. 1-13). The resulting HVAC loads remaining on EDG 23 that could auto-start include a 10 hp motor for the evaporator fan, the motor for booster fan 22 (auto-starts if booster fan 21 fails), and humidifier loads (3 hp humidifier and 1/3 hp booster pump).

Plant PA System The 7.6 kw (9 kVA) PA System load is taken off MCC 26B (also a spring 1990 mid-cycle outage change described in Reference 1-11). This load is re-connected to a new static inverter from battery 22. During the 1991 refueling outage, the alternate power source for this inverter was changed from MCC 24 to MCC24A.

3-25

Liahtina Panel 223 (MCC 26B)

The only essential Lighting Panel 223 loads left powered by MCC 26B are the EDG building emergency lighting (1.1 kw), the crankcase exhaust for EDG 23 (0.8 kw), and some miscellaneous valve loads for the fuel oil system (approximately 0.3 kw). The remaining loads on this lighting panel (see Dwg. A20921 1-0) would be powered by MCC

27. These loads on MCC 27 would not be energized. Thus, the total lighting panel 223 load energized would be that on MCC 26B, approximately 1.1+0.8+0.3 = 2.2 kw. This change for lighting panel 223 is also a spring 1990 mid-cycle outage change described in Reference 1-11.

Battery Chargers The full battery charger load is conservatively assumed to be 25 kw. For battery chargers that are supplied by MCC's that are stripped, the load could be as high as 45 kw because of battery recharging. Battery Chargers 21, 22, and 24 are supplied by MCCs 29A, 24A and 27A, respectively. These MCCs are stripped on loss of offsite power in conjunction with an accident. The resetting of these MCCs is an immediate action step in the EOPs, and these battery chargers can be loaded onto the diesels within 5 minutes. Therefore, Battery Chargers 21, 22 and 24 are shown as being supplied by their respective diesels at 5 minutes. However, since the batteries have been discharged for 5 minutes, recharging of the batteries will result in the battery charger load being 45 kw. This load will drop and approach 25 kw in 6-7 minutes as the batteries are recharged. Therefore, the conservatism, the load for Battery Chargers 21, 22 and 24 will be assumed to be 45 kw added at 5 minutes and drop to 25 kw at 10 minutes. The load for Battery Charger 23, which is supplied by MCC 26C (which is not stripped), is 25 kw for all time intervals.

EDG 23 Auxiliaries The EDG 23 Auxiliaries (fuel oil pump, compressor, jacket water heaters, etc.) are moved from MCC 27 to MCC 26B. Of these loads, modifications are made so that the jacket water heaters (9 kw) do not automatically load (the lube oil heaters would cut-out).

Of the remaining components, the fuel oil pump (2 hp) and compressor (3 hp, later increased to 5 hp) can automatically start. However, the fuel oil pump component would not start until after approximately 20 minutes, after level in one or more of the day tanks becomes low.

Hydrogen Analyzer Heat Tracinq (MCC 26AA, 26BB)

Per Reference 3-9, it is recommended that manufacturer data for the H2 0 2 analyzer heat tracing be used:

3.261 kw for Channel 1 (MCC 26AA, EDG 21) 3.120 kw for Channel 2 (MCC 26BB, EDG 23) 3-26

These are supported by plant measurements of 3.2 kw for Channel 1 and 2.7 kw for Channel 2. For simplicity, the heat tracing load for either MCC is rounded up to 3.3 kw for the EDG loading study. Another small load on MCC 26BB (0.3 kw) for transformer 2H was added by Con Edison in their update to the loading tables.

During the spring 1991 refueling outage, modifications were completed to create MCC 26C. Other modifications, including the transferring of some electrical loads, were completed during that outage or during the 1993 refueling outage. The modifications pertinent to MCCs 26A, 26B, and 26C are listed below.

Control Room HVAC Loads (MCC 26B and 26C)

As mentioned previously, the power feeds for the CRAC backup fans and booster fan 21 were transferred from MCC 26B to MCC 26C. While both are automatic loads, the 7.5 hp backup fan would not operate if the 10 hp evaporator fan was running on MCC26B (Ref. 1-13). During the 1993 outage, new 7.5 HP Carbon Filter Booster Fans replaced the 2 HP Booster Fans on MCC 26B and MCC 26C (Ref. 1-20). Dampers were replaced and small motors added as part of this modification.

EDG Ventilation System (MCC 26A. 26B and 26C)

As part of an effort to upgrade the emergency diesel generators to handle higher loads, the EDG ventilation system was modified for the increased capacity. This 1991 refueling outage modification involved replacing the two horsepower fans with five horsepower fans. Two fans, 319 and 320 were powered by MCC 26A,-and two additional fans, 321 and 322, were powered by MCC 26C. A fifth "swing" fan (fan 318) was powered by MCC 26A with an alternate feed to MCC 26C if power at MCC 26A was lost (Refs. 1-12, 1-14).

During the 1993 refueling outage, additional modifications (Ref. 1-19) were made to the EDG Ventilation System by realigning fan 318 and installing a new (sixth) fan on MCC 26B. This alignment provides a 2 fan/train alignment to increase cooling redundancy by allowing maintenance requirements to take a fan out of service at any time while assuring that at leastthree fans will be available for any single failure (a failure of a diesel would take out 2 fans). Currently, fans 319 and 320 are powered from MCC 26A, fans 318 and 323 are powered by MCC 26B and fans 321 and 322 are powered by MCC 26C (see Reference 3-20 for details).

Wall Exhaust Fans (MCC 26C)

Wall exhaust fans 213 and 215 were transferred from MCC 29 to MCCs 26C and 29A, respectively. Fan 216 remained connected to MCC 29. Two temperature switches were also installed in the switchgear room to allow annunciator response when the temperature is high (Ref.1-18). The Rev. 38 version of the EOPs (Ref. 1-28) calls for operation of either fan 213, 215, or 216 when PAB ventilation is established. Since an annunciator may alarm early in the event, the fans on MCC 26C (213) and MCC 29A (215) are assumed manually loaded by the operator within minutes after the respective MCCs are reset.

3-27

In addition to the above changes, several others were made during the spring 1991 refueling outage to shift redundant loads or to move desired loads to the automatically energized MCC 26C. These changes are as follows: PAB exhaust fan 21, primary water makeup pump 21, BAT heaters 21, BA transfer pump 21, and spent fuel pump 21 were all transferred from MCC 27 to MCC 26C. Also, battery charger 23 was transferred from MCC 22 to MCC 26C (Refs. 1-12, 1-13).

3-28

Table 3.3-1a MCC 26A Component Load Summary (Con Edison Drawing 9321 -F-3006-91)

Stroke Load Time Desciption ID (HP) (kw) (sec) 15 kVA Transf (Alt Feed) 23 N/A 10.0+ N/A Spray Recirc. Stop Valve 889A 0.75 0.6 120 SI Pump 22 Stop Valve 851 A 1.0 0.7 55 Accumulator Stop Valve 894A/C 7.5 5.6* 10 SI Branch Stop Valve 856A/C/F 1.6 1.2 12 Press. PORV Stop Valve 536 0.6 0.4 16 RCP CCW Supply Iso. Valve 797 1.9 1.4 15 RHRS Suction Stop Valve 730 5.0 3.7 240 RCP TB CCW Out. Iso. Valve 625 2.0 1.5 13 RHX Outlet Stop Valve 746 10.3 7.7 11 RCP CCW Return Iso. Valve 784 1.3 1.0 10 RHX Inlet Isolation Valve 745B 1.6 1.2 120 RHX CCW Supply Iso. Valve 822A 1.6 1.2 150 Recirc. Pump Iso. Valve 1802A 1.0 0.7 114 Elec. Tunnel Exhaust Fan 21 10 7.4 N/A BA Heat Tracing (Nor) N/A N/A 16.8** N/A Hydrogen Recombiner 21 15+200w 11.4 N/A Miniflow Iso. Valve 842 0.75 0.6 120 Reactor Vent Valve 3100 0.33 0.25 120 BFP Discharge Valve BFD2-21 19.2 14.3 60 SI Pump Suct. Iso. Valve 887A 1.6 1.2 120 EDG Bldg. Vent Fans 319,320 5 3.7* N/A EDG Crankcase Exhaust Nor. 21 0.5 0.4 N/A Aux CCW Pump 21 5.0 3.7 N/A RHRS Control Valve 640 0.75 0.6 10 Recirc. Stop Valve 888A 1.0 0.7 12 Cont. Sump Stop Valve 885A 4.0 3.0 117 CS Pump Stop Dich. Valves 866A/C 0.75 0.6* 15 RWST Discharge Valve 1810 1.6 1.2 14 Radiation Monitor EPX3 N/A 15"** N/A HVAC Dist. EPV21 N/A 7.5++ N/A 3-29

Table 3.3-1a (cont)

MCC 26A Component Load Summary Stroke Load Time Description ID (HP) (kw) (see)

Seal Water Ret. Line Valve 222 0.7 0.5 10 VCT Discharge Valve 112C 0.5 0.4 10 RHR Pump Iso. Valve 744 7.8 5.8 16 MCC 26AA:

Misc MOVs ... 1.0+++ N/A H2/02 Anlyz. Heat Tracing Chan 1 N/A 3.3 N/A

The load is on a per component basis.

- See Calculation FEX-00008-00.

- - See Dwg. # C235288.

+ Load is 1OKVA static inverter, unity power factor is assumed for conservatism.

++ See Mod.# MPE-87-15561-E Rev. 4

+..Provided by Con Edison in References 3-2 or 3-4.

Note: General updates to this table have been made per Reference 3-19.

3-30

Table 3.3-1 b MCC 26B Component Load Summary (Con Edison Drawing 9321-F-3006-91)

Stroke Load Time Description ID (HP) (sec)

(jw)

Spray Recirc. Stop Valve 889B 0.75 0.6 120 SI Pump 22 Stop Valve 851 B 1.0 0.7 55 Accumulator Stop Valve 894B/D 7.5 5.6* 10 SI Branch Stop Valve 856B/D/E 1.6 1.2* 12 Press. PORV Stop Valve 535 1.6 1.4 16 RCP CCW Supply Iso. Valve 769 1.9 1.4 15 RHRS Suction Stop Valve 731 5.0 3.7 240 RCP TB CCW Out. Iso. Valve 789 1.6 1.2 15 RHX Outlet Stop Valve 747 10.3 7.7 11 RCP CCW Return Iso. Valve 786 1.1 0.8 10 RHX Inlet Isolation Valve 745A 1.6 1.2 11 RHX CCW Supply iso. Valve 822B 1.0 0.7 150 Recirc. Pump Iso. Valve 1802B 1.0 .0.7 114 Elec. Tunnel Exhaust Fan 22 10 7.4 N/A Emerg. Boration Valve 333 0.5 0.4 45 BA Heat Tracing (Emg-Man) N/A N/A 16.8*** N/A Hydrogen Recombiner 22 15+200w 11.4 N/A Miniflow Iso. Valve 843 0.75 0.6 120

-Reactor Vent Valve 3101 0.33 0.25 13 BA Transfer Pump (2 speeds) 22 7.5/15 5.6/11.2 N/A BFP Discharge Valve BFD2-22 19.2 14.3 60 Cont. Sump Iso. Valve 1805 2.0 1.5 10 SI Pump Suct. Iso. Valve 887B 1.6 1.2 120 RHR Pump Recirc. to RWST 883 3.0 2.2 120 Aux CCW Pump 22 5.0 3.7 N/A RHRS Control Valve 638 0.75 0.6 10 Recirc. Stop Valve 888B 1.0 0.7 12 Cont. Sump Stop Valve 885B 4.0 3.0 117 CS Pump Stop Dich. Valves 866B/D 0.75 0.6* 15 RHR Pump Suct. Stop Valve 882 3.0 2.2 20 EDG Bldg. Vent Fans 318,323 5.0 3.7* N/A 3-31

Table 3.3-1b (cont)

MCC 26B Component Load Summary Stroke Load Time Description ID (HP) L (sec)

Lighting Panel 223: **

DG Bldg Emg Lights N/A N/A 1.1 N/A EDG Crankcase Exhaust 23 N/A 0.8 N/A Eng Aux Control Panel N/A N/A 0.3 N/A EDG 23 Support Loads: **

Fuel Oil Pump 23 2.0 1.5 N/A Air Compressor (Man) 23 5.0 3.7 N/A Jacket Water Heaters (Man) 23 N/A 9.0 N/A Lube Oil Heaters (Man) 23 N/A 12.0 N/A CRAC, Humidifier, and Fans:

Evap Fan Motor (1 Auto) N/A 10 7.5 N/A AC Motor (Man) N/A 15/7.5 11.2/5.6 N/A Boost Fan Motor (1 Auto) 22 7.5 5.6 N/A CRAC Dampers (.15 + .06 kw) N/A N/A 0.21 N/A Transf. for 0.75 hp Motor N/A 2 kVA 1.0 N/A Bypass Fan(Off if Evap On) N/A 0.75 0.6 N/A Humidifier (May be On) N/A 3.0 2.2 N/A Booster Pump (May be On) N/A 0.33 0.25 N/A MCC 26BB:

Misc MOVs ...... 1.0+ N/A H2/02 Anlyz Heat Tracing Chan 2 N/A 3.3 N/A Transf. 2H N/A N/A 0.3 N/A

The load is on a per component basis.

+ Provided by Con Edison in References 3-2 or 3-4.

- Change made during the spring 1990 mid-cycle outage (Reference 1-11)

See Calculation FEX-00008-00.

Note: General updates to this table have been made per Reference 3-19.

3-32

Table 3.3-1 c MCC 26C Component Load Summary (Con Edison Drawing B248513-10)

Stroke Load Time Description ID (HP) (kw) (sec)

PAB Exhaust Fan 21 125 93 N/A Battery Charger 23 N/A 25 N/A Boric Acid Transfer Pump 21 15/7.5 11.2/5.6 N/A DG Exhaust Fan 22 N/A 0.5 kVA N/A EDG Bldg. Vent Fans 321,322 5 3.7* N/A BAT Heaters 21 N/A 15 N/A Spent Fuel Pump 21 100 75 N/A CRAC Backup Fan N/A 7.5 5.6 N/A CRAC Booster Fan 21 7.5 5.6 N/A CRAC Dampers N/A N/A 0.08 N/A Motor for Dampers N/A 0.17 0.15 N/A Pri. Water Makeup Pump 21 20 15 N/A Wall Exhaust Fan 213 2 1.5 N/A Load is on a per component basis.

3-33

Table 3.3-2a Automatic Loads for MCC 26A Loads at One Components Load (kw) Man/Auto Minute MCC 26A Loads MOVs:

MOV-822A 0.7 A 0.7 MOV-894A 5.6 A MOV-894C 5.6 A MOV-866A 0.6 A MOV-866C 0.6 A 0.7 A 0.5*

MOV-851A MOV-744 5.8 A MOV-746 7.7 A 7.7 MOV-887A 0.4 A MOV-784 1.0 A FCV-625 1.5 A HCV-640 0.6 M BFP-2-21 14.3 A 14.3 MOV-1802A 0.7 M MOV-889A 0.6 M MOV-842 0.6 M HCV-3100 0.25 M MOV-1810 1.2 M CCW Boost Pmp 21 (5) 3.7 A 3.7 Elec Tun Exh Fan 21 7.4 A 7.4 H2 Recomb 21 11.4 M DG Exh Fan 21 (nor) 0.5 A 0.5 EDG Bldg Vent Fans 319,320 7.5 A 7.5 EPX3 15 A 15 EPV21 7.5 A 7.5 BA Ht Trace (nor) 16.8 A 16.8 XMFR 23 (Inv 21)(max) 15 M/A MCC 26AA Loads Misc MOVs 1 A 1 H2/02 Anlyz Ht Trc 1 3.3 A 3.3 Total Load on MCC 26A 85. 9 kw

These Loads Are Energized on MCC 26A Only If There Are Other Component Failures (e.g., EDG 23 Fails to Start).

3-34

Table 3.3-2b Automatic Loads on MCC 26B Loads at One Components Load (kw) Man/Auto Minute MCC 26B Loads MOVs:

MOV-822B 0.7 A 0.7 MOV-894B 5.6 A MOV-894D 5.6 A MOV-866B 0.6 A MOV-866D 0.6 A MOV-851 B 0.5 A 0.5*

MOV-882 2.2 M MOV-887B 0.4 A MOV-747 7.7 A 7.7 MOV-786 0.8 A MOV-789 1.2 A HCV-638 0.6 M BFP-2-22 14.3 A 14.3 MOV- 1802B 0.7 A MOV-889B 0.6 M MOV-843 0.6 M HCV-31 01 0.25 M CC Boost Pmp 22 (5) 3.7 A 3.7 Elec Tun Exh Fan 22 7.4 A 7.4 BA Heat Trace (Emg) 16.8 M H2 Recomb 22 11.4 M CRAC, Humidifier, & Fans 9.9 A 9.9 (10+3+.33 hp)

CRAC Booster Fan 22, 6.8 A Dampers & Motors DG 23 Support Loads (6.5+21kW)

Fuel Oil Pmp (2) 1.5 A Compressor (5) 3.7 A 3.7 Lighting Panel 223:

DG Exh Fan 23 0.8 A 0.8 DG Bldg Emg Lights 1.1 A 1.1 Eng Aux Cntr Pnl 0.3 A 0.3 BA Trans Pmp 22 (7.5/15) 11.2 A 11.2 EDG Bldg Vent Fans 318,323 7.5 A 7.5 MCC 26BB Loads Misc MOVs 1 A 1 H2/02 Anlyz Ht Trc 2 3.3 A 3.3 TRANSF. 2H 0.3 A 0.3 Total Load on MCC 26B 80.2

These loads are energized on MCC 26B only ifthere are other component failures (e.g.,

EDG 21 Fails to Start).

These loads are energized on MCC 26B only ifCRAC Booster Fan 21 fails to start.

3-35

Table 3.3-2c Automatic Loads on MCC 26C Loads at Components Load (kw) Man/Auto One Minute MCC26C Loads DG Exhaust Fan 22 0.8 A 0.8 PAB Exhaust Fan 21 93 M EDG Bldg Vent Fans 321,322 7.5 A 7.5 Battery Charger 23 25 A 25 CRAC Backup Fan 5.6 M CRAC Booster Fan 21 Dampers & Motors 5.8 A 5.8 BA Transfer Pump 21 11.2 A 11.2 BAT Heaters i5 M Spent Fuel Pump 87.7 M Pri. Water Make-up Pump 15 M Wall Exhaust Fan 213 1.5 M Total Load on MCC 26C 50.3 kw 3-36

3.4 Non-Essential Equipment In addition to the required loads described in the previous three sections, the EOPs allow the operator to manually load various "optional" equipment to aid in plant recovery. In the original EDG loading study (WCAP-12655, Rev. 0) equipment most important for recovery early in the accident was selectively loaded on the MCCs or 480 V buses according to instructions in the "Blue" set of EOPs, specifically EOP ES-0.5. In the revised EOPs, a "Blue" set no longer exists. Much of the "optional" equipment has been placed on smaller MCCs (MCCs 24A, 27A and 29A) and energized early in EOP E-0. Additional "optional" equipment (redundant feedwater isolation valves) is contained on MCC 211. This small MCC is designed to remain energized in the event ofa reactor trip with loss of offsite power. Tables 3.4-1 through 3.4-4 give the loads on these MCCs. Additional details are explained below.

1. In addition to energizing certain MCCs, the operator starts one charging pump eady in EOP E-0. The speed is increased to a maximum to limit the temperature of the gyrol fluid drive oil (maximum speed is required until backup cooling or CCW can be placed in service).

2. In the same step of EOP E-0, the operator verifies that MCCs 26A, 26B, and 26C are energized. If offsite power is not available (as assumed for the EDG loading study), theoperator energizes only the small MCCs noted above (MCCs 24A, 27A and 29A) plus any of the automatic ones (MCCs 26A, 26B, 26C and 211) that did not remain loaded.

3. Normal lighting loads can be significant, so these loads are not added to EDGs 21, 22, and 23. Operators are dispatched to establish a backup power supply for lighting transformer 23 to aid in plant recovery. This does not affect the load on the EDGs.

4. The EOP E-0 procedure is structured so that a CCW and non-essential SW pump are not started as part of the immediate actions of EOP E-0. For large LOCA, these pumps would later be started in the ES-1.3 switchover procedure. For small LOCA and non-LOCA events, these pumps may later be started provided there is sufficient loading capacity on one or more of the EDGs.

Some additional information on some of the larger or more significant optional loads is given below.

Charginq Pumps Although not crucial for large LOCA, a charging pump is desirable for cooling the RCP seals for less severe accidents where RCP thermal barrier cooling would be lost if SI occurs and the CCW pumps are not automatically sequenced onto the emergency buses. The operator is directed to start one charging pump early in EOP 3-37

E-0 to prevent the back-flow of hot RCS water that would otherwise cause the seals to heat-up (see Section 10.1.1 of Reference 3-6). For a LOCA, the operator stops the charging pump prior to adding loads via Recirc Switch 2 while performing the switchover actions of EOP ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

Since charging pump operation is, important for these other transients, it is included as one of the more essential optional loads. As described below, the charging pump power requirements have been calculated for maximum flow conditions over the range of possible discharge pressures.

As indicated above, the charging pump is started early in the EOP E-0 procedure.

The speed is adjusted to provide maximum flow to limit the temperature of the gyrol fluid drive oil until CCW or backup cooling can be established (Reference 3-10).

Therefore, only the case of full rated flow (98 gpm) and corresponding main shaft speed of approximately 208 rpm has been considered. Full flow is generally conservative since the brake horsepower of the pump is directly proportional to the flow or the speed. The curve defining the power requirement for the EDGmust also appropriately account for the mechanical and volume efficiencies of the pump, the efficiency of the gyrol speed controller, and the motor efficiency of the charging pump motor.

The charging pump power requirement for full flow conditions, as a function of pump developed pressure, is shown in Figure 3.4-1 (curve provided in Reference 3-11).

The pump developed pressure is approximately the same as the pump discharge pressure since the elevation difference between the top of the RWST and the RCS cold legs is only approximately 60 ft (equivalent to approximately 25 psi). Line losses between the RWST and the charging pump would make the two pressures more nearly equal.

As noted from Figure 3.4-1, the power requirement previously assumed in Reference 1-8 at 2500 psig (150 kw) remains conservative for very small LOCA and non-LOCA events (where RCS pressure remains comparatively high). For other cases, the power requirements can be reduced due to the nature of the transient. These cases are discussed below.

For a design basis SG tube rupture following SI termination, the RCS pressure will be near the ruptured SG pressure, i.e., less than 1100 psig if controlled below the lowest SG safety valve set-pressure. Assuming a delta p of 250 psi to account for line losses, the charging pump discharge pressure would be approximately 1350 psig.

Referring to Figure 3.4-1, a charging pump power requirement of only 80 kw can be justified for a design basis SG tube rupture following SI termination.

For design basis. small LOCAs, RCS pressure will stabilize at approximately 1150 psia (i.e., above the SG pressure) for a brief period of time. This time decreases as the break size increases. For the 4" diameter break (see Figure 6.1-1), this period lasts until approximately 400 seconds (6.7 minutes). For the 6" diameter break 3-38

(Reference 5-1), this time is reduced to approximately 150 seconds (2.5 minutes). As the break size increases, the small LOCA will "act" more like a large LOCA in terms of RCS and containment pressure response. Since the charging pump is assumed to be started early in the transient (within the 1-5 minute time interval), it will be conservative to assume RCS pressure remains high (i.e., 1150 psia) to bound the intermediate sized LOCA cases. Thus, allowing for 250 psi line losses, the charging pump power requirement for intermediate and small LOCA can be evaluated at 1400 psi in Figure 3.4-1. At this pressure, the charging pump power requirement is 81 kw.

Using results for section 3.2 for the containment fan coolers, it is possible to justify a lower power requirement for the charging pumps for large LOCA. This is based on the following argument. During the 1 to 5 minute period for the 4" break, the containment fan cooler motors can be estimated to be operating at 160 kw (from Table 3.2-3). If RCS pressure is reduced faster (as for large LOCA), the power requirement for the charging pumps can be relaxed to 50 kw (at 350 psi in Figure 3.4-1). The fan cooler power requirements can be estimated at about 220 kw (Table 3.2-1a or Table 3.2-1 b) for the large LOCA situation. The power increase for one fan cooler more than offsets the decrease in power for the charging pump. Thus, since each EDG has at least one fan cooler, a power requirement of 50 kw can be assumed for the charging pump for large LOCA.

As noted above, the charging pump discharge pressure was estimated given a known RCS pressure assuming line losses of 250 psi, Ifthe normal charging line isolates at the start of the accident and only the seal injection lines are open, the flow losses would be based on seal injection flow of approximately 25 gpm per RCP.

Conservatively assuming all this flow is directed down the RCP shaft across the labyrinth seal (i.e., ignoring the seal injection flow), the delta p between the RCP inlet injection point and the cold leg is estimated to be quite low on the order of 10 psi (estimate based on calculations used in support of Reference 3-6). Based on discussions with the plant site, losses in the remaining piping are expected to be on the order of 100-200 psi. Thus, the 250 psi delta-p assumed is expected to be conservatively high for the intended application.

Pressurizer Heaters For non-LOCA events, it is desirable to have 150 kw of pressurizer heaters to control RCS pressure during the hot standby period or during a subsequent natural circulation cooldown. This value is noted in the Technical Specifications (Section 3.1 .A) and is consistent with a generic study performed for the Westinghouse Owners Group (Ref. 3-7). Upon closer review of Reference 3-7, it is evident that 150 kw is a conservative value to be used as a guideline for maintaining RCS pressure following a loss of offsite power event. The heater power from two individual heater banks (i.e., 139 kw based on Ref. 3-12, Westinghouse Sketch ED-SK-329412) will be adequate to overcome expected pressurizer heat losses and maintain RCS pressure control (each heater is rated at 69.24 kw).

3-39

The minimum desired heater capacity (i.e., 139 kw) is less than the capacity of each of the four heater groups. Thus, some of the individual heater breakers for the heater group energized could be locally opened before the heater group is energized if the operator needs to manage loads on the EDGs to keep loads below the 2100/1750 kw limits. Future EOP revisions could consider limiting the pressurizer heater loads in this manner if it becomes desirable to add additional optional loads. However, for the non-LOCA tables (which follow in Section 6.2), this pressurizer heater load stripping is not assumed since this action is not necessary to reduce the EDG loads to acceptable values.

MCC 211 During the 1991 refueling outage, power feeds for CCW pump 23 were exchanged with the feeds for MCC 211. This resulted in MCC 211 being powered by EDG 22.

In addition, the automatic trip feature of MCC 211 was removed. Thus, MCC 211 will remain energized in the event of a reactor trip. MCC 211 contains redundant main and bypass feedwater isolation valves. While the stroke times for these MOVs are small, they would be required to operate at the beginning of the accident to provide additional isolation of the feedwater system.

Other "Non-Essential" Required Loads As noted in Tables 3.4-1 through 3.4-3 and 3.3-1C, MCC 29A (EDG 21), MCCs 24A and 26C (EDG 22), and MCC 27A (EDG 23) each supply power to a 25 kVA battery charger. Per FSAR Section 8.2, these become required loads after approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . As explained on Section 3.3, the loads due to battery chargers 21 (MCC 29A),

22 (MCC 24A), and 24 (MCC 27A) are assumed to be 45 kw (high recharging rate) when their MCCs are reset. After 10 minutes, this load is reduced to 25 kw. Battery charger 23 (on MCC 26C) remains energized and its load is assumed to be 25 kw.

MCCs 24A and 29A also supply power to the 75 hp instrument air compressors and associated support loads. These compressor(s) would operate intermittently to re-establish instrument air when the receiver pressure falls below approximately 100 psi.

Instrument air compressors are not required for large LOCA since nitrogen bottles provide an adequate back-up supply for required components (mostly valves) used during the post-accident recovery. For other accident scenarios (e.g., those in which the RCS is to be cooled down and depressurized), a higher volume of instrument air would be needed and the instrument air compressor (or the station air compressor) would eventually be required.

MCCs 24A and 29A also provide power to two of the three sets of EDG auxiliaries (starting air compressor and fuel oil pumps). MCC 26B, one of the vital MCCs not stripped, supplies power to the third set of EDG'auxiliary loads. The 5 hp air compressor would not be needed if the associated EDG is operating. However, the air compressors for EDGs 21 and 22 would automatically start and operate briefly (minutes) to re-establish starting air pressure once MCCs 24A and 29A are reset. As 3-40

noted in Section 3.3, the EDG 23 air compressor now powered by MCC 26B would also automatically start. Per FSAR Section 8.2.3.2 (and Systems Description 10.0 Section 5.1), at least one of the fuel oil pumps would need to be operable by approximately 30 minutes to replenish the day tank(s). One or more of the fuel oil pumps would begin operating based on low level in the EDG fuel oil day tanks at approximately 15-20 minutes.

The remaining optional loads consist of ventilation fans for the PAB and fuel storage building on MCC 27A, and a spent fuel pump on MCC 27A. A number of main turbine and BFP support loads on MCCs 22, 23, and 25 do not get energized for loss of offsite power events. However, emergency pumps will be powered by the batteries to protect this equipment. The other support loads requiring ac power can be energized if conditions stabilize and loadings can be easily controlled by the operator.

In the next two sections of this load study, the required and optional loads will be compiled to determine the limiting EDG loads for the Indian Point Unit 2 design basis events.

3-41

Table 3.4-1 Loads on MCC 24A #

(Con Ed Dwg. A249956-15)

FUSE/BKR APPROX BRK. RATING RATING LOAD RESET NO. DESCRIPTION (AMP) (HP) AUTO/MAN REMARKS 2A RAD. MONITOR R-45 DIST. 50 1.60 PANEL 3C INSTR. AIR COMPRESSOR 150 75.00 56.00 A* Auto if Press <100 psi 22 3M INST. AIR CLSED COOL 15 1.50 1.10 A*

RECR. PUMP 22 2E BATTERY CHARGER 22 80 25 kVA 45.00 A High Recharging Load When MCC Reset 5H TO 480/120 VAC XFORMER 50 15 kVA 10.00 M Alternate Feed 24/INVTR 22 6DL DIESEL GEN 22 70 5.00 3.70 A* Brief Operation to Resupply COMPRESSOR Starting Air FUEL OIL PUMP 2.00 1.50 A+ Auto at Approx. 20 Min.

JACKET WATER & LUBE 21 kw 21.00 A+ Expect off if DG Running OIL HEATERS Notes:

This MCC creation outlined in reference 1-12.

Equipment may auto start when pressure, level, temperature, etc. call for. contact closure.

+ Potential A* equipment not expected to auto start due to other circumstances.

Equipment loads in kw estimated using the nameplate hp ratings multiplied by the 0.746 conversion factor (except for battery charger).

3-42

Table 3.4-2 Loads on MCC 27A #

(Con Ed Dwg. 9321 -F-3005-72)

FUSE/BKR APPROX BRK RATING RATING LOAD RESET NO. DESCRIPTION (AMP) (HP) AUTO/MAN REMARKS 3A PLANT VENT SAMPLE 15 2.00 1.50 A STATION COMPRESSOR 125.00 93.00 3J PAB EXHAUST FAN 22 225 M 4E BATTERY CHARGER 24 80 25 kVA 45.00 A High Recharging Load When MCC Reset 4J SPENT FUEL PUMPS 225 100.00 75.00 M Not Required for Several Hours or Longer 5E TRANSF..22480/120V ALT. 30 15 kVA 15.00 M TO INVTR. 24 5J FUEL STORAGE BLDG. 225 100.00 75.00 A EXHAUST FAN 6L PAB SUPPLY FAN 150 50.00 37.50 M May Run with Purge Fan Notes:

This MCC creation outlined in reference 1-12.

Equipment may auto start when pressure, level, temperature, etc. call for contact closure.

+ Potential A* equipment not expected to auto start due to other circumstances.

Equipment loads in kw estimated using the nameplate hp ratings multiplied by the 0.746 conversion factor (except for battery charger).

3-43

Table 3.4-3 Loads on MCC 29A #

(Con Ed Dwg. A249955-07)

FUSE/BKR APPROX BRK RATING RATING LOAD RESET NO. DESCRIPTION (AMP) AUTO/MAN REMARKS DIESEL GEN 21 60 5.0 3.7 A* Brief Operation to Resupply 3E COMPRESSOR Starting Air FUEL OIL PUMP 2.00 1.50 Auto at Approx. 20 min JACKET WATER & LUBE 21 kw 21.00 Expect Off if DG Running OIL HEATERS 3C INST. AIR CLSED COOL 15 1.50 1.10 A*

RECR. PMP 21 3G WALL EXHAUST FAN 215 15 2.00 1.50 M Operator starts if 480v SWGR Room Temp. is high.

3J BATTERY CHARGER 21 80 25 kVA 45.00 A High Recharging Load When MCC Reset 3L INSTR. AIR COMPRESSOR 150 75.00 56.00 A* *Auto if Press < 100 psi 21 3A 480/120 TRANSF 21/IVTR 60 15 kVA 15.00 A 23 Notes:

This MCC creation outlined in reference 1-12.

Equipment may auto start when pressure, level, temperature, etc. call for contact closure.

+ Potential A* equipment not expected to auto start due to other circumstances.

Equipment loads in kw estimated using the nameplate hp ratings multiplied by the 0.746 conversion factor (except for battery charger).

3-44

Table 3.4-4 Loads on MCC 211 (Con Ed Dwg. A208241-16)

APPROX BRK RATING LOAD RESET NO. DESCRIPTION (HP) AUTO/MAN 1C 21 SG FW BYPASS VALVE #BFD- 1.60 1.2 A 90 1F 22' SG FW BYPASS VALVE #BFD- 1.60 1.2 A 90-1 ,"

1J 23 SG FW BYPASS VALVE #BFD- 1.60 1.2 A 90-2 1M 24 SG FW BYPASS VALVE #BFD- 1.60 1.2 A 90-3 2C 21 SG MAIN FW VALVE #BFD-5 6.60 4.9 A 2F 22 SG MAIN FW VALVE #BFD-5-1 6.60 4.9 A 2J 23 SG MAIN FW VALVE #BFD-5-2 6.60 4.9 A 2M 24 SG MAIN FW VALVE #BRD-5-3 6.60 4.9 A Notes:

Equipment loads in kw estimated using nameplate hp ratings multiplied by the 0.746 conversion factor.

3-45

Figure 3.4-1 Charging Pump Motor Power Versus Pump Pressure Motor Power vs. Pump Pressure Pump Speed: 208 RPM Pump Flow: 98 GPM 200 180 160 140 0 120 100 80 0

60 40 20 0

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 Pump Developed Pressure (PSI)

Note: Power levels shown in this curve are conservative levels intended only for evaluating the adequacy of the power supply. This curve is applicable only for the identified speed and flow.

3-46

4.0 LOGIC FOR AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT LOADING This section describes the automatic safety injection sequence (SIS) and recirculation switch logic. Section 4.1 describes the injection phase. Section 4.2 describes the recirculation phase. Section 4.3 describes the automatic loading for a loss of offsite power event without SI actuation.

4.1 Safety Injection Sequence Table 4.1-1 provides a summary of major safeguards equipment loaded during the safety injection sequence. Details of safeguards equipment loaded during the safety injection sequence are provided in Table 4.1-2.

The following information was used to develop the start times for safety injection sequencing of equipment automatically loaded during an accident.

1. At Time = 0 seconds, the following events occur simultaneously:

- an "S" signal is generated

- a safety injection signal with blackout is generated

- a signal to start the diesel generators is generated

2. For a blackout condition, all loads are stripped off the 480 volt buses, except MCC 26A/26AA, MCC 26B/26BB, MCC 26C, and MCC 211.

Reference documents:

1. Consolidated Edison Drawing A225100, Emergency Generator Starting Logic (Ref. 4- 1)

2. FSAR Section 8.2, ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN, Sub-section 8.2.3.4 (Ref. 4-5)

3. For MCC 26C, see References 4-14 and 4-15.

4. For MCC 211, see Reference 4-17.

3. The emergency diesel generators are capable of starting and load sequencing within 10 seconds after the initial start signal. In addition, the starting system is redundant for each emergency diesel generator.

Reference document:

1. FSAR Section 8.2, ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN, Sub-section 8.2.3.1 (Ref. 4-5) 4-1

4. EDG output breaker 52/EG1 (52/EG2 & 52/EG3) closure is enabled by voltage permissive relay CVX/EDG21 (CVX/EDG22 & CVX/EDG23) in < 10 seconds.

Reference document:

1. Consolidated Edison Drawing A225100, Emergency Generator Starting Logic (Ref. 4-1)

5. The emergency diesel generators have the capability of being fully loaded within 30 seconds after the start of load sequencing.

Reference document:

1. FSAR Section 8.2, ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN, Sub-section 8.2.3.1 (Ref. 4-5) 4-2

Table 4.1-1 Safety Injection Major, Equipment Loading Summary MCC or Bkr. Component EDG 21# EDG 22# EDG 23#

I.,D. Energized Bus 5A Bus2A Bus 3A Bus 6A MCC 26A/AA 10 52/S11 St Pump 21 13 52/SW1 or SW4. +SW Pump 21 or 24 25 52/CRF1 CR Fan 21 30 52/CRF2 CR Fan 22 35 52/CS1 CS Pump 21 40 ++

MCC26C (1) 10 MCC211 (2) 10 52/SI2A SI Pump 22 13*

52/RHR1 RHR Pump 21 18 52/SW2A or SW5B +SW Pump 22 or 25 25*

52/CRF4 CR Fan 24 30 521CRF3 CR Fan 23 35 52/AF1 AFW Pump 21 40 52/SI2B SI Pump 22 50 52/SWSA or SW2B +SW Pump 25 or 22 55 MCC 26B/BB 10 52/SI3 SI Pump 23 13 52/RHR2 RHR Pump 22 18 52/SW3 or SW6 +SW Pump 23 or 26 25 ++

52/CRF5 CR Fan 25 30 ++

52/AF3 AFW Pump 23 35 ++

52/CS2 CS Pump 22 40 ++

+ Only pump on essential header will start: SW Pump 21, 22, and 23 or SW Pump 24, 25 and 26.

++ Timing changes and elimination of the early CS pump start time are documented in References 4-20 and 3-19..

Pump will be given another automatic start signal if not running.

- Miscellaneous pump, valve and fan motors.

All times are in seconds and are based on a 10 second delay for diesel startup and contact closure of the EDG output breakers.

(1)

References:

4-14, 4-15, and 4-8.

(2)

References:

4-17 and 4-8.

4-3

Table 4.1-2 Safety Injection Equipment Loading Equip Time EDG Bus I.D. (sec) No. No. Description Notes CCBP1 10 21 5A MCC 26A (Ref. 4-2 and 4-7) 746 10 21 5A MCC 26A (Ref. 4-2 and 4-7) 822A 10 21 5A MCC 26A (Ref. 4-2 and 4-7)

BFD-2-21 10 21 5A MCC 26A (Ref. 4-4 and 4-7) 52/MCC6A 10 21 5A Not stripped (Ref. 4-8) 52/SI1 13 21 5A SI Pump 21 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/CC1 16 21 5A CCW Pump 21 Automatically loaded for loss of offsite power without SI, not automatically loaded for loss of A offsite power with SI. (Ref. 4-2 AW and 4-8)

.52/SWl 25 21 5A SW Pump 21 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) or 52/SW4 25 21 5A SW Pump 24 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/CRF1 30 21 5A CR Fan 21 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/CRF2 35 21 5A CR Fan 22 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/CS1 40 21 5A CS Pump 21 (Ref. 4-2, 4-8, 4-20 and 3-19) 4-4

Table 4.1-2 (cont)

Safety Injection Equipment Loading Equip Time EDG Bus I.D. (secJ No. No. Description Notes 866A 10 21 5A MCC 26A (Ref. 4-2 and 4-7) 866C 10 21 5A MCC 26A (Ref. 4-2 and 4-7) 851 A 133 21 SA MCC 26A Includes 120 second time delay. (Ref. 4-2, 4-6 and 4-7) 52/SI2A 13 22 2A SI Pump 22* 52/SI2A can be closed provided that 52/SI2B is open. (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/MCC6C 10 22 3A Not Stripped Ref. 4-14 and 4-15) 52/RHR1 18 22 3A RHR Pump 21 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/CC2 19 22 2A CCW Pump 22 Automatically loaded for loss of offsite power without SI, not automatically loaded for loss of offsite power with SI.

(Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/SW2A 25 22 2A SW Pump 22* 52/SW2A can be closed provided that both 52/SW2B is open and selector switch 43 is or in position 1, 2, 3.

(Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/SW5B 25 22 2A SW Pump 25* 521SW5B can be closed provided that both 52/SW5A is open and selector switch 43 is in position 4, 5, 6.

(Ref. 4-2 and 4-8)

Pump will be given another automatic start signal if not running.

4-5

Table 4.1-2 (cont)

Safety Injection Equipment Loading Equip Time EDG Bus I.D. (sec) No_- No. Description Notes 52/CRF4 30 22 3A CR Fan 24 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/CRF3 35 22 2A CR Fan 23 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/AF1 40 22 3A AFW Pump 21 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/SI2B 50 22 3A Si Pump 22 52/SI2B can be cJosed provided that 52/S12A is open. (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/SW5A 55 22 3A SW Pump 25 52/SW5A can be closed provided that both 52/SW5B is open and selector switch 43 is in or position 1, 2, 3.

(Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/SW2B 55 22 3A SW Pump 22 52/SW2B can be closed provided that both 52/SW2A is open and selector switch is in position 4, 5, 6.

(Ref. 4-2 and 4-8)

CCBP2 10 23 6A MCC 26B (Ref. 4-2 and 4-7) 747 10 23 6A MCC 26B (Ref. 4-2 and 4-7) 822B 10 23 6A MCC 26B (Ref. 4-2 and 4-7)

BFD-2-22 10 23 6A MCC 26B (Ret. 4-4 and 4-7) 52/MCC6B 10 23 6A Not stripped (Ref. 4-8) 52/S13 13 23 6A SI Pump 23 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 52/RHR2 18 23 6A RHR Pump 22 (Ref. 4-2 and 4-8) 4-6

Table 4.1-2 (cont)

Safety Injection Equipment Loading Equip Time EDG Bus I.D. (sec) No_. No. Description Notes 52/CC3 21 23 6A CCW Pump 23 Automatically loaded for loss of offsite power without SI, not automatically loaded for loss of offsite power with SI.

(Ref. 4-2, 4-8, 4-16 and 4-17) 52/CS2 40 23 6A CS Pump 22 (Ref. 4-2, 4-8, 4-20 and 3-19) 52/SW3 25 23 6A SW Pump 23 52/SW3 can be closed provided that selector switch or 43 is in position 1, 2, 3.

(Ref. 4-2, 4-8, 4-20 and 3-19) 52/SW6 25 23 6A SW Pump 26 52/SW6 can be closed provided that selector switch 43 is in position 4, 5, 6.

(Ref. 4-2, 4-8, 4-20 and 3-19) 52/CRF5 30 23 6A CR Fan 25 (Ref. 4-2, 4-8, 4-20 and 3-19) 52/AF3 35 23 6A AFW Pump 23 (Ref. 4-2, 4-8, 4-20 and 3-19) 851 B 133 23 6A MCC 26B Includes 120 second time delay. (Ref. 4-2, 4-6 and 4-7) 866B 10 23 6A MCC 26B (Ref. 4-2 and 4-7) 866D 10 23 6A MCC 26B (Ref. 4-2 and 4-7) 0 4-7

4.2 Switchover to SI Recirculation Phase 4.2.1 Introduction I In this section the methodology developed to perform the switchover from the injection phase to the recirculation phase following a LOCA is described. When in the injection phase any operating Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or CS pump takes suction from the RWST. In the recirculation phase, water is supplied from the recirculation sump or (as a backup) the containment sump.

To accomplish the switchover to recirculation, an eight switch sequence was developed.

The switchover sequence is initiated when the RWST level decreases to less than 9.24 feet.

Although the recirculation switches described below are manually operated, each automatically initiates certain operations. An indicating lamp for each switch is provided to show the operator when the operations of a given switch have been performed and when he should proceed to the next operation. The indicating lamps are adjacent to the switches.

Should an individual component fail to respond, the operator can take manual corrective action. All switches and lamps are on the Safeguards Panel.

4.2.2 Operational Sequence of Recirculation Switches Operation of the recirculation switches is detailed in Reference 1-17 in EOP ES-1.3, .ask" "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation." Performance Test PT-R13A, "Recirculation Switches,"

(Ref. 4-12) also describes the actions of these switches. The description which follows incorporates the changes summarized in Reference 1-7 which were made during the spring 1989 refueling outage. Some additional changes were made to recirculation switches 2 and 5 during the 1991 refueling outage. These are described in Reference 4-19.

4.2.2.1 Switch One Switch one is intended to remove and isolate unnecessary loads from the EDGs. When the operator closes switch one, SI pump 22 is automatically tripped provided SI pumps 21 and 23 are both running. If SI pump 22 is tripped, its suction valves (887A and 887B) are automatically closed.

If both CS pumps are operating, closing switch one automatically stops CS pump 21 and closes the pump discharge valves 866A and 866B. As explained in Reference 1-7, CS pump 21 is secured to reduce the load on EDG 21 during switchover. If CS pump 22 is not operating, however, CS pump 21 would continue to run.

The CS pump discharge valves will not shut unless the Containment Spray Signal has been reset. The Containment Spray Signal is reset in EOP ES-1.3 prior to operation of switch one.

4-8

4.2.2.2 Switch Three As explained in Reference 1-7, switch three is operated before switch 2 to reduce some transient loads on the EDGs during the switchover sequence. Justification for this modification is provided in one of the SECLs of Appendix A and in a follow-up phone conversation with the NRC (Ref. 4-13).

When switch three is closed, both RHR pumps are automatically tripped and valves 744 and 882 are closed (if these valves are not energized, at this time, they are energized and closed later in ES-1.3). This removes additional unnecessary loads from EDGs 22 and 23. The recirculation pumps inside containment (which are started by switches four and five) are used for long term cooling.

4.2.2.3 Switch Two Switch two establishes cooling flow to the RHR heat exchangers. When switch two is closed, one CCW pump and one non-essential (NE) SW pump receive signals to automatically start. Manual start of the CCW pump could be necessary since these pumps could be placed in PULLOUT to prevent undesired startup during S! reset. The order of priority for starting the CCW pumps is pump 22 followed by pump 21 and then pump 23.

Thus, if CCW pump 22 is unavailable, CCW pump 21 is started. If CCW pumps 22 and 21 are both unavailable, CCW pump 23 is started.

Per References 1-17 and 4-19, the order of priority for starting the NE SW pump via recirculation switch two has been changed to "2-3-1" if pumps 21, 22, and 23 are on the non-essential header or to "5-6-4" if pumps 24, 25, and 26 are on the non-essential header.

4.2.2.4 Switch Four Cold leg recirculation through the low head safety injection lines is initiated once switch four is closed. Closing this switch results in the automatic starting of recirculation pump 21 as well as the automatic opening of the discharge valves 1802A and 1802B. If recirculation pump 21 fails to start, the operator is directed to manually start recirculation pump 22. After switch four is closed, the operating recirculation pump takes suction from the recirculation sump and injects through the RHR heat exchangers into the RCS cold legs.

4.2.2.5 Switch Six Upon completion of recirculation switch four, Step 10 of EOP ES-1.3 essentially checks to see if at least 600 gpm flow is being delivered to the core (by checking if low-head flow indications are greater than 600 gpm, plus uncertainties). This is used to determine if low or high-head recirculation is required. If both flow criteria for low-head injection given in ES-1.3 Step 10 are not met, then switch six is used to establish a high-head recirculation flow path with the recirculation pump supplying fluid to the suction of the SI pumps. Closing switch six will automatically close the RHR heat exchanger valves 746 and 747 to stop injection flow through the low head injection lines to the RCS cold legs, and automatically open valves 4-9

888A and 888B to provide a flow path from the recirculation pump discharge to the high head SI pump suction. The SI pumps then inject into the RCS cold legs.

Closing switch six also automatically closes SI pump test line valves 842 and 843.

4.2.2.6 Switch Seven If either of the flow criteria for low head injection given in ES-1.3 Step 10 are met, then switch seven is closed. Closing switch seven automatically trips both running SI pumps.

With sufficient flow through the low head injection lines, the SI pumps are no longer required for core cooling.

4.2.2.7 Switch Eight When switch eight is closed, SI pump suction valve 1810 is automatically closed (if this valve is not energized, at this time, it is energized and closed later in ES-1.3). This isolates the SI pumps from the RWST. At this time, the SI pumps are either being fed by the recirculation pumps (see Section 4.2.2.5) or are tripped (see Section 4.2.2.6).

Closing switch eight also results in the CS pump test line valve 1813 automatically closing.

4.2.2.8 Switch Five Switch five performs no action unless all three EDGs are operational (or offsite power is available). If all three EDGs are functional, switch five establishes additional cooling capability (beyond minimum requirements) by automatically starting a second NE SW pump, starting a second COW pump, and starting recirculation pump 22 (if it is not already running).

The order of priority for starting the second NE SW pump is pump 23 (or 26) followed by 21 (or 24). As with switch number two, manual (versus auto) start of one of the remaining CCW pumps (21 or 23) could be required to complete switch 5. To avoid transfer of a high heat load to the COW system, the operator is directed to stop one of the recirculation pumps if only one COW or one NE SW pump is running after switch five is performed.

Because switch five establishes additional cooling (beyond minimum requirements), this switch is not required and is not used until operation of the remaining recirculation switches is complete.

4.2.3 Recirculation Spray After completion of switch eight, one CS pump (left operating by switch one) will continue to deplete the RWST. When the RWST level drops to the 2 ft empty alarm setpoint, the operator is to manually trip the CS pump. After this, they may establish recirculation spray by diverting some of the recirculated water to the RHR spray header through MOV-889B (or 889A). For low-head recirculation, the RHR discharge valves HCV-638 and/or 640 are adjusted to control the low-head and recirculation spray flows. High-head recirculation is established if the specified low-head and spray flows can not be established. If RHR spray is to be operated and the system is aligned for high-head recirculation, one of the spray 0

4-10

header valves is simply opened and then high-head recirculation flow'is verified.

4.2.4 Technical Specifications Related to Switchover Technical Specifications currently allow operation with any one (of three) non-essential service water pumps out of service for an extended period of time. To conservatively account for this scenario, the loading tables of sections 5 and 6 assume the backup service water pump (next in firing order) will be powered at the same time the primary pump is loaded. Thus, if the primary pump is out of service, the load would automatically be transferred to the EDG which powers the backup pump 4.3 Loss of Offsite Power Without S! Sequence If there is no accident, the SI pumps, RHR pumps, CS pumps, and CR fans are not immediately required for core cooling and containment heat removal. Therefore, this equipment is not sequenced onto the EDGs if loss of offsite power without SI occurs.

Without the additional safeguards loads, the EDGs have sufficient capacity for running the CCW pumps, which supply cooling to the RCP seals and other equipment. The AFW pumps can also start earlier in the sequence.

Table 4.3-1 shows the timing sequence for the major equipment loads for loss of offsite power without SI. MCCs 26A, 26B, and 26C and MCC 211 remain energized at the assumed EDG start time of 10 seconds (refer to Section 4.1). However, MOVs that change position with the SI signal do not change position if there is no accident. This also applies to the feedwater pump discharge valves (BFD valves) on MCCs 26A / 26B and the redundant main and bypass feedwater isolation valves on MCC 211.

4-11

Table 4.3-1 Loss of Offsite Power without SI Major Equipment Loading Summary MCC or Bkr. Component EDG 21 # EDG 22# EDG 23#

I. Q. Energized Bus 5A Bus 2A Bus 3A Bus 6A MCC 26A/AA 10 52/CC1 CCW Pump 21 16 52/SWI or SW4 +SW Pump 21 or 24 25 MCC26C 10 MCC211 10 52/CC2 CCW Pump 22 19 52/SW2A or SW5B +SW Pump 22 or 25 25*

52/AF1 AFW Pump 21 30 52/SW5A or SW2B +SW Pump 25 or 22 55 MCC 26B/BB 10 52/CC3 CCW Pump 23 21 52/SW3 or SW6 +SW Pump 23 or 26 25 52/AF3 AFW Pump 23 30

+ Only pump on essential header will start: SW Pump 21, 22, and 23 or SW Pump 24, 25 and 26.

Pump will be given another automatic start signal if not running.

- Miscellaneous pump, valve and fan motors.

All times are in seconds and are based on a 10 second delay for diesel startup and contact closure of the EDG output breakers.

'W 4-12

5.0 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADINGS FOR LARGE BREAK LOCA In this section, the EDG loadings for large LOCA are presented. Section 5.1 describes the general RCS response and equipment requirements for large LOCA. In Sections 5.2 through 5.5, the EDG loading transients are determined for the various limiting failure cases. A summary for large LOCA with low-head recirculation is presented in Section 5.6. High-head recirculation is considered in Section 5.7.

5.1 General Equipment Requirements for Large LOCA The large break LOCA imposes a challenging load for the EDGs due to the required operation of much of the safeguards equipment for extended periods of time. This section briefly describes the large LOCA event and the equipment required for mitigation of the accident.

5.1.1 SI, RHR, and Recirculation Pumps The licensing basis for Indian Point Unit 2 assumes a minimum of two SI pumps and one RHR pump operate during the initial phase of the accident to refill the vessel (core recovery) to satisfy the clad temperature and metal-water reaction limits specified in IOCFR50.46. The RCS rapidly depressurizes to containment pressure, so these pumps reach run-out-or maximum flow conditions near the beginning of the accident.

Based on UFSAR Table 14.3-1, this blowdown time for large LOCA is typically about 30 seconds. Additional discussion related to the large LOCA safety analysis can be found in Section 14.3 of the UFSAR (Reference 5-5).

After the level in the RWST reaches the low-level setpoint (9.24 ft), the system is aligned for cold leg recirculation per EOP ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

The time for this transition is approximately 20 minutes if all safeguards pumps are running (longer if less than full safeguards equipment is operating). Per the description given in Section 4.2, two SI pumps are left operating while the RHR pump(s) are stopped and the makeup source is switched to the recirculation sump. During this switchover, the injection flow from the two SI pumps will be at least 750 gpm (or 105 Ibm /sec (see Appendix A, Table 4-5 of SECL-91-231). This exceeds the boil-off requirement by approximately a factor of two (see EOP ECA- 1.1, Rev. 34, Figure ECA 1-1). This ensures that the core will remain covered during switchover if there are any delays in re-establishing low-head SI flow (refer to Appendix A, SECL-89-744).

After switchover, one (of two) recirculation pumps aligned to the recirculation sump and discharging through one (of two) RHR heat exchangers will be adequate for makeup and long term cooling following the large LOCA event. As back-up to the recirculation pumps, the RHR pump(s) can be operated in the recirculation mode. Following verification of adequate recirculation flow in EOP ES-1.3, the SI pumps are stopped via Recirculation Switch No. 7.

Longer term (i.e., after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ), the system is aligned for hot leg recirculation for 5-1

boron precipitation concerns using EOP ES-1.4. This mode of operation is established by opening the SI hot leg injection valves (MOV-856B and 856F), opening the SI to RHR heat exchanger suction valves (MOV-888A and 888B), and restarting two SI pump(s) to establish hot leg recirculation. The above alignment makes use of the automatic features of Recirc Switches 6 (turn ON) and 7 (turn OFF) to open the 888A/B valves and restart the SI pumps. If SI pump 22 is to be used, it will also be necessary to place Recirculation Switch No. 1 in the OFF position and open the SI pump 22 suction valves MOV-887A and 887B. After hot leg recirculation for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the EOPs again direct the operators to align cold leg recirculation (within ES-1.4 instructions).

Since the tirnme into the accident is now more than 2 days, the operations manager is consulted for further instructions.

5.1.2 Containment Spray Pumps and Cooling Fans The large LOCA ECCS calculations described briefly in the previous sub-section assumed minimum RCS injection'/ core flow but maximum containment cooling based on operation of both containment spray (CS) pumps and 5 containment recirculation (CR) fans. For the ECCS acceptance model, low containment back-pressure is conservative since it minimizes the RCS injection flow from the RHR and SI pumps.

For containment integrity and EDG loading concerns, however, minimum containment cooling requirements are important.

A recent containment integrity analysis for large LOCA is based on operation of one CS pump and 3 CR fans. As summarized in Section 3.2, Table 3.2-1 b (or Case 1 of Appendix B), the peak containment pressure based on 3083.4 MWt NSSS power and other limiting conditions was found to be 43.0 psig at 1400 sec. (More precisely, the time is reported as 1399 seconds in Appendix B). High initial containment temperature of 130OF and a high service water temperature of 95°F are assumed in this analysis.

The peak pressure is significantly less than the containment design pressure of 47 psig.

After switchover to recirculation, one CS pump continues to operate until the level in the RWST reaches the empty alarm level (2 feet). This would occur at approximately 30 minutes if all safeguards equipment operates prior to switchover. For the limiting case analyzed, however, the spray pump continues to inject until somewhat later (2354 seconds = 39 minutes, based on the minimum safeguards conditions assumed). After the spray pump is secured, the 3 CR fans are adequate for containment cooling, capable of reducing containment pressure to less than 50% of the peak value within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

In the current version of ES-1.3 (Rev. 36), the operator is directed to establish recirculation spray after securing the CS pump. However, since operation of the CR fans without recirculation spray is adequate for long term containment cooling, the EDG loading study will conservatively assume (by maximizing the fan cooler power required) that recirculation spray is not established when determining the fan cooler loads. The study will then remain bounding if recirculation spray is eliminated in a future revision to ES-1.3 (Note: for dose considerations, containment spray is required for 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months 5-2

following a LOCA. The EDG load study conservatively assumes the recirculation pumps operate at high flows as needed to provide recirculation spray.)

5.1.3 Component Cooling and Service Water Pumps Post-accident requirements for the component cooling and service water systems can be found in FSAR Sections 9.3 and 9.6, respectively. Requirements for each system are briefly described here.

During the injection phase of the accident, there is no immediate need to operate a component cooling pump. Safety related components that do require component cooling during injection have auxiliary pumps to provide this function and /or rely on the component cooling water volume as a heat sink. Auxiliary component cooling pumps provide cooling water for the recirculation pump motor coolers to protect them from the harsh containment environment. Bearings for each SI pump are also cooled by a smaller auxiliary pump connected directly to the SI pump shaft. If a charging pump is operated, studies have indicated that it will operate for an extended period of time without CCW cooling provided the charging pump operates at full flow (Ref. 3-10). At reduced flow, the pump is less efficient and this will cause the speed control unit to heat up within about one minute. Therefore, in EOP E-0, the operator is instructed to operate the charging pump at maximum speed. If CCW cooling to the charging pumps is not in service, the operator is directed to establish -backup cooling using city water (per SOP 4.1.2).

During recirculation, one CCW pump and one non-essential service water pump are required for cooling one (or both) RHR heat exchangers. This assumes that only one recirculation pump is operated. A second CCW pump and non-essential service water pump are needed if a second recirculation pump is operated. Additional details on the various "ultimate heat sink" (UHS) configurations can be found in References 5-6 and 5-7. Note that the EOPs currently require a second CCW pump be operated if the river water temperature exceeds 85°F. In view of the recent UHS work (specifically Cases 3, 4, 8, and 4b in References 5-6 and 5-7), the second pump is no longer required if only one recirculation pump operates. This would allow the EOPs to be changed to resolve a low probability EDG overloading concern identified in CRS 200105357.

Essential service water provides cooling to the EDGs and containment fan coolers.

Three service water pumps operate on the essential header. A minimum of two essential service water pumps are required during the accident.

5.1.4 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps The AFW flow requirements had been considered in detail in the original EDG loading study (WCAP-12655, Rev. 0), since it was desirable to secure the motor-driven pumps during switchover to reduce the loads on EDGs 22 and 23. For this reason, requirements for large and small LOCA and non-LOCA events are described. A safety 5-3

evaluation for stopping the motor driven AFW pumps during switchover is given in Appendix A. A presentation to the NRC was also made on this issue (Reference 1-10).

For large LOCA, AFW is not required for decay heat removal since safety injection and break flow will adequately maintain-vessel inventory and provide for core decay heat removal. However, in EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, the operator is instructed to maintain the total feed flow greater than some minimum value until level in at least one steam generator is confirmed to be on span in the narrow range. For stretch-rated conditions (3083.4 MWt NSSS power), the minimum feed flow requirement currently in the EOPs is 400 gpm (this allows for 20 gpm uncertainty in excess of the 380 gpm minimum feed flow requirement). Note that the SG level step in EOP E-1 is a continuous action step, i.e., the operator could reduce feed flow at some later time or step in E-1 provided the level criterion is satisfied.

The minimum feed flow requirement mentioned above is established by the loss of main feedwater transient described in Chapter 14 of the FSAR. Since E-1 must apply for secondary breaks and very small LOCAs where the SGs are important for decay heat removal, it is appropriate that the SG level step be included. For large LOCAs and even for small LOCA several inches in diameter, however, -the feed flow restriction is conservative. For these cases, the motor-driven AFW pumps could be secured (or flow reduced) to reduce the loading on EDGs 22 and 23, particularly during the recirculation phase of the accident when the operator is performing the recirculation switch sequence directed in ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

For this Revision 2 update, it is assumed the operator reduces AFW flow from the motor-driven AFW pumps to the minimum recirculation value (85 gpm), instead of stopping the pump completely, when indicated level reaches 26% in the narrow range.

This is the indication required for level to be on span and above the top of the SG U-tubes for adverse containment conditions. For normal containment conditions, this uncertainty is only 9%4 (Note: in the Indian Point Unit 2 EOPs, adverse containment conditions are assumed if the containment pressure is greater than 4 psig or if containment radiation levels exceed 10s R/hr. Based on the results in Section 3.2, adverse containment conditions based on the containment pressure criterion clearly apply.)

Expected SG Level Response for Large LOCA At full power operation, the mixture mass in each SG is calculated to be approximately 77,000 Ibm (Section 6.3 of Reference 5-8). This is based on current operating parameters of 3083.4 MWt NSSS power, Model 44F SGs, loop average temperature of approximately 5590F, and initial narrow range level of 49%. A 3% variation in narrow range level (from 46% to 52%) causes the SG liquid mass to change approximately 2.4%, with higher level corresponding to higher mass and vice versa. For the remaining This EOP setpoint will change to 10% in a future revision to the EOPs (Rev. 39). The 26% value for adverse containment will also increase to 27%.

5-4

sensitivities investigated (tube plugging up to 10%, feedwater temperature decreased 40F, blowdown flow at zero and several times nominal, and Tavg 3oF higher or lower),

results change by less than 500 Ibm (0.65%). Therefore, for purposes of determining the SG refill times, the approximate "base estimate" liquid mass of 77,000 Ibm will be assumed. If the plant is operated at higher levels in the future (as proposed for the Model 44F SGs), the liquid mass would be higher and refill time reduced. The refill time would also be reduced if the turbine-driven AFW pump is operated (as instructed early in EOP E-0). In the evaluation that follows, the impact of the T-D AFW pump is not considered (conservative).

In the post-trip response for large LOCA, the SGs will not steam since the break removes all the decay and sensible energy. Instead, the SGs will remain near saturated conditions at approximately 500oF (approximate initial temperature) for several minutes and subsequently depressurize to RCS conditions since they remain higher in temperature and pressure than the primary. The secondary pressure in the SG of the broken loop could depressurize somewhat faster than the others for a cold side break downstream of the SG.

To determine whether or not the operator would reduce AFW flow prior to switchover, the principal sources of uncertainties comprising the 26% level requirement will be reviewed. They are approximately as listed below:

9% Uncertainties associated with normal containment conditions 8% Approximate amount reading could be high due to reference leg heatup 8% Environmental allowance of the DP transmitters 1% Miscellaneous (includes IR degradation) 26% Total SG NR level requirement for adverse containment conditions A more exact tally of these contributions is provided in the SG EOP Set-point calculations for SG level (Reference 5-9).

Of the above contributions, only the reference leg heatup portion causes the reading to be predictably high, given that the event is a LOCA or high energy line break that heats up containment to around 2500F. The remaining contributions are for the most part random. The environmental allowance is added absolutely (instead of statistically combined by the square-root sum of the squares method) to be conservative. This uncertainty contribution could be positive, negative, or (if the instrumentation is accurate) close to zero.

Based on the above description, an indicated narrow range level of 26% would correspond to 18% actual level, adjusting only for the reference leg heatup effect for large LOCA. The time to refill the SG can then be determined based on the-time to refill to 18% NR at the assumed flowrate of 400 gpm.

Based on the expected density at 500OF and volume of 2238 ft3 (water volume at 18%

narrow range for a Model 44F SG), the SG liquid mass would have to be increased to 5-5

109,500 Ibm to meet the heat sink level criterion for adverse containment. Based on a flow of 400 gpm (approximately 27.6 Ibm/sec to each of two SGs), it takes 19.6 minutes to reach 18% actual (26% indicated) on the narrow range, starting from the initial liquid mass of 77,000 Ibm (these results are documented on page 24 of Reference 5-8).

Therefore, after 20 minutes, it is reasonable to assume operator reduces AFW flow to the minimum recirculation value of 85 gpm.

Table 5.1-1 summarizes the estimated times to switchover for the large LOCA scenarios of interest. Also included are approximate times at which recirculation switches would be operated. The flowrates assumed for the RWST draindown are based on those obtained in Section 3.1, excluding mini-flow (note: this table was taken from Table 6-6 of Reference 5-8). Results indicate that in all cases, switchover occurs after an elapsed time of 20 minutes, i.e., after SG level indicates on span (26% NR).

Simulator results for the four cases are similar but typically have slightly longer times to switchover. A combination of the calculated / simulator times in Table 5.1-1 will be used in the large LOCA loading spreadsheets described in the sections which follow.

Expected SG Level Response for Small LOCA For a small LOCA, the reference leg heat-up would not be as high (containment.

temperature significantly less than 240 F). Depending on the break size, some secondary inventory would also be relieved through the atmospheric relief valves (or safety valves) until safety injection matches break flow and is sufficient for removing decay heat.

Results for the 6" small LOCA described in Reference 5-1 are not significantly different from the large break from the standpoint of AFW flow requirements. By 500 seconds, the RCS pressure was less than 300 psia and the break flow and SI flow (approximately 100 Ibm/sec for both) was capable of removing decay heat and maintaining vessel inventory. Since the 6" break transient demonstrated that AFW was not required at a comparatively early time, the smaller 3" and 4" diameter break cases are considered in more detail.

The 3" and 4" break cases in the FSAR (Reference 5-5) have been analyzed out to 3000 seconds (50 minutes) and 2500 seconds (41 minutes), respectively. For the 4" break, the balance between break flow and SI flow, which matches or exceeds decay heat, occurs at around 900 seconds (15 minutes) (when the two flows are approximately 78.8 Ibm/sec). For the 3" break, this balance occurs somewhat later, at approximately 1550 seconds (26 minutes). For "better estimate" decay heat and SI flows, shorter times would be anticipated. Considering the SG refill trends (Table 6-4 of Reference 5-8) and the times at which break flow and SI flow remove decay heat, the expected time to reach 26% NR level would be around 30 to 40 minutes for a small LOCA. (The smaller time would be applicable to the larger of the two break cases).

5-6

For the 3" and 4" break cases, RCS pressure remains at or above the shutoff head pressure of the low-head SI (RHR) pumps for a prolonged period of time. Therefore, the minimum switchover time can be estimated assuming operation of 3 SI pumps and 2 CS pumps (in the FSAR analysis, only 2 SI pumps are considered). Using maximum SI and CS flows, and considering spray actuation at the 24 psig set-point, an "early" spray actuation time of -10 to 15 minutes is determined for the 4" break (see also Table 3.2-3). The earliest time to switchover is estimated to be 40 to 45 minutes for this case.

For spray actuation at 30 psig (at approximately 65 minutes), switchover is delayed until about 105 minutes. Thus, for these smaller break sizes, the operator would be able to reduce AFW flow to the minimum recirculation value prior to ES-1.3 entry. For long term cooling and EDG loads, these cases are generally more limiting than large LOCA since SI pumps must be operated in addition to the recirculation (or RHR) pumps. For large LOCA, the recirculation pumps are sufficient for core cooling and the SI pumps can be stopped.

Summary and Conclusion Based on this evaluation, it can be concluded that the motor-driven AFW pumps can be reduced to minimum recirculation flow for any small or large LOCA of interest upon entry into ES-1.3. At the presentation noted above (Reference 1-10), the NRC accepted stopping the motor-driven AFW pumps during switchover as an interim solution for limiting the loads on EDG 22 and 23 in the original loading study (WCAP-12655, Rev. 0). Since these pumps are safety-related, they indicated their expectation that these pumps remain on during after switchover once the EDG ratings were increased.

Based on current operating conditions, calculations support reducing AFW flow at approximately 20 minutes for large LOCA. This is the time calculated to reach the indicated 26% narrow range level for adverse containment conditions. After this time, the operator could reduce flow to the minimum recirculation value and maintain SG narrow range level on span as directed in the EOPs. This time coincides with the time to switchover for the large LOCA scenario with all EDGs operating. Times to switchover would be somewhat longer for EDG failure cases (Table 5.1-1).

For small LOCA (4" or 3" break cases), the time at which narrow range level reaches the indicated 26% value would be 30 to 40 minutes. Since AFW flow is not required for decay heat removal at these times, flow can also be reduced. The earliest switchover times for these cases exceeds 40 minutes, so the action can be accomplished during the injection phase prior to recirculation.

AFW Flow Rates and Power Requirements Per Reference 1-30, the AFW flow controllers for the motor-drive AFW pumps are set to deliver between 200 - 205 gpm per line with an accuracy of +9.59 gpm. For the maximum setting, the AFW flow delivered would be 410 + 2*9.59 = 429 gpm. Referring 5-7

to Section 3.1, the power requirement at this flow rate is 376 kw.

The expected flow rate for minimum recirculation flow is approximately 85 gpm per Reference 1-32. Again referring to Section 3.1, the power requirement at this flow rate is 223 kw.

5.1.5 Miscellaneous Losses These are treated the same as assumed in the EDG load study update done for the 2000 restart (page 11 of Reference 1-26).

Including bus and cable losses (ranging from 82 to 87 kw) and frequency fluctuations of up to 0.5% (60 Hz + 0.3 Hz), which add 1.5% (or 35 kw at the 2300 kw rating), the following miscellaneous loss are included:

EDG 21:117 kw EDG 22:122 kw EDG23: 119 kw These loads are not precise and constant in time, but are judged to be conservative and appropriate for this load study. These are used for large LOCA as well as small LOCA and other transients analyzed in Sections 6.0 and 7.0.

5-8

Table 5.1-1 Summary of RWST Switchover and Recirculation Switch Times for Large LOCA (all times are in minutes from the initiation of the accident)

Switchover Actions: All EDGs EDG 21 EDG 22 EDG 23 Operating Fails Fails Fails RWST Switchover (Note 1) 20 (22) 34 (30) 22 (24) 35 (38)

Recirc Switches 1 and 3 22 36 24 37 Recirc Switch 2 24 38 26 39 Recirc Switch 4 25 (26) 39 (33) 27 (28) 40 (41)

Recirc Switch 7 27 41 29 42 Recirc Switch 8 28 42 (35) 30 (32) 43 (43)

Recirc Switch 5 (Note 2) 31 (30) NA NA ' NA RWST Empty Alarm 33 50 36 51 IsolateNent Accumulators 45 (46) 62 (57) 48 (43) 63 (63)

Notes:

1. Maximum flow rates from the safeguards pumps have been used in determining the switchover times. Times for all EDGs operating would be delayed by approximately one minute if one SI or one RHR pump fail or 6 minutes if one CS pump fails.

2. Switch 5, which aligns a second cooling train, is performed only if all 480V busses are energized.

3. Results informally provided based on simulator tests are provided in parentheses ().

5-9

5.2 Large LOCA with All Emergency Diesel Generators Operating Table 5.2-1 is a time table of events describing the large LOCA transient with all EDGs operating. Revision 38 of the Indian Point Unit 2 EOPs (Ref. 1-28) plus information presented in previous sections of this report was used to construct this scenario. The times used for manual actions are based on times that should be typical for performing the actions in the EOPs. These times can be confirmed by the operations staff and /or with Indian Point 2 specific simulations for large LOCA. The exact timing of the manual actions is not critical. The order in which the recirculation switches are performed is important, so this relative timing must be preserved.

To be conservative, optional loads that could be added (per E-0 Step 6) are assumed to be loaded before switchover. This equipment includes instrument air compressors, battery chargers (required after about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) plus other component loads listed in Table 5.2-1. During the semi-automatic switchover procedure, it has been assumed that each switch takes 1 to 2 minutes to complete. Since many of the valves operated during switchover have a stroke time of approximately 2 minutes (see Section 3.3), a 2 minute time delay for each switch was usually assumed. Note that based on SECL 89-744 in Appendix A, Recirculation Switch 3 is performed before Switch 2.

The time table of events in Table 5.2-1 was used to define the EDG loads for the all EDGs operating case. The loading "spreadsheets" for this scenario are provided in Tables 5.2-2a (EDG 21), 5.2-2b (EDG 22) and 5.2-2c (EDG 23). At the bottom of each spreadsheet, the total EDG loads are provided. The total EDG load includes the effect of one non-essential service water pump out of service. As noted in section 4.2, Indian Point Unit 2 Technical Specifications allow one non-essential service water pump to be out of service at any time. Should the preferred pump be out of service, the backup pump (next in firing order) would be required to operate. Thus, the spreadsheets conservatively account for this by loading the backup pump when the preferred pump is loaded. Below the total EDG loads, the EDG loads for limiting single failures are given.

Also included is the limiting single failure assumed at the various times during the accident.

Tables 5.2-2a, 2b, and 2c show acceptable results (loads < 2100 kw) excluding limiting single failures. With the single limiting failure, the loads on EDG 23 may surpass the 2100 kw 2-hour limit, but do not exceed the 2300 kw half-hour limit.

The limiting load for this case is the switchover phase load for EDG 23 (with failure of RC Pump 21). The maximum load is calculated to be 2176 kw. However, this load is reduced to 1822 kw within several minutes, once the SI pumps are stopped.

During the injection phase, the next most limiting load on EDG 23 is 2135 kw (if RHR Pump 21 fails). Since this injection phase load exceeds 2100 kw for only -20 minutes, the loads are well within the 2-hr and half-hour ratings of the EDGs.

5-10

Table 5.2-1 Time Table of Events Large LOCA with All Diesel Generators Operating Event Time (min)

Large LOCA with Loss of Offsite Power, SI and 0 Containment Spray Actuation All Diesels Start, Major Equipment Sequences 0-1 Onto 480 V Buses per Description in Section 4.1 Other Miscellaneous Equipment on MCCs 26A, 26B, 26C, 0-1 and 211 Load Automatically:

Control Room A.C.-Incident Mode Cable Tunnel Exhaust Fans (Auto-Temp)

EDG Support Loads (Emg. Lighting, Vent and Exhaust Fans)

MOV Loads for Valves Moving to Safeguards Positions Operators Directed to Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 1 Operators Verify Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, and 3 SI Actuation MCCs 24A, 27A, and 29A reset per EOP E-0 4 The following components are loaded automatically:

EDG 21, Bus 5A MCC 29A Inst. Air Comp. 21 (and Support Loads) 60 kw Battery Charger 21 45 kw EDG 21 Auxiliaries (Compressor) 4 kw Additional EDG 21 Load 109 kw EDG 22, Buses 2A /3A MCC 24A EDG 22 Auxiliaries (Compressor) 4 kw Inst. Air. Comp. 22 (and Support Loads) 60 kw Battery Charger 22 45 kw Radiation Monitor 45 2 kw Additional EDG 22 Load = 111 kw 5-11

Table 5.2-1 (page 2)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with All Diesel Generators Operating Event Time (min)

EDG 23, Bus 6A:

MCC 27A Battery Charger 24 45 kw Additional EDG 23 Load = 45 kw Operator Starts a Charging Pump at Maximum Speed, 4 Verifies Flow Path From RWST, and Dispatches Operator to Establish Backup Cooling per SOP 4.1.2 Control Room Operators Continue with Immediate 5-10 Actions of EOP E-0 Transition to EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary 12 Coolant Operator Resets SI and Containment Spray, Places 16 CCW Pumps in PULLOUT Establish PAB Ventilation per EOP E Operator 18 Establishes Portable Ventilation per AOI 27.1.9 (high EDG 22 and 23 loads). Operator Confirms Operation of Switchgear Room Exhaust Fan Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status (per E-1) 19 SG NR Levels Indicate >26%- Operator Reduces 20 AFW Flow (action assumed completed 3 minutes later)

RWST Level Less Than 9.24 ft - Transition to ES-1.3, 20 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation Operator Dispatches NPO to Open CCW Hx SW Outlet Valves, 21 Verifies or Completes St and Spray Reset 5-12

Table 5.2-1 (page 3)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with All Diesel Generators Operating Event Time (min)

Perform No. I and No. 3 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 22 SI Pump 22 Stops Valves 887A and 887B Close CS Pump 21 Stops Valves MOV-866A and 866B Close RHR Pumps 21 and 22 Stop Valves MOV-882 and 744 Close Operator confirms SW alignment 23 and stops charging pumps Perform No. 2 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 24 Non-Essential SW Pump 22 (or 25) Starts (If SW Pump 22/25 Out of Service, Pump 23/26 Starts)

CCW Pump 22 Started Manually Perform No. 4 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 26 Recirc Pump 21 Starts Valves MOV-1 802A and 1802B Open Operator continues with ES- 1.3 assuming low-head recirculation:

Perform No. 7 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 28 Sl Pumps 21 and 23 Stop Perform No. 8 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 29 Valve MOV-1 810 Closes (if energized)

CS Test Line Valve 1813 Closes Operator Confirms All EDGs Operating 30 (Allows Recirc. Switch 5)

Perform No. 5 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 31 Non-Essential SW Pump 23 (or 26) Starts (If SW Pump Out of Service, Pump 21/24 Starts)

CCW Pump 21 Started Manually Recirc Pump 22 Starts 5-13

Table 5.2-1 (page 4)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with All Diesel Generators Operating Event Time (mini After No. 5 Recirculation Switch, the 31 Following Major Equipment may be Operating:

Bus 5A: CR Fans 21 and 22 (EDG 21) Essential SW Pumps 24 (or 21)

Non-ESS SW Pump 21 (or 24), if other SW Pump Out of Service Recirc Pump 21 CCW Pump 21 Selected Equip. on MCCs 26A, 26AA, and 29A Bus 2A /3A: CR Fans 23 and 24 (EDG 22) Non-Ess Service Water Pump 22 (or 25)

Essential SW Pumps 25 (or 22)

CCW Pump 22 AFW Pump 21 (at recirc flow)

Selected Equipment on MCCs 24A, and 26C Bus 6A: CR Fan 25 (EDG 23) CS Pump 22 Essential SW Pump 26 (or 23)

Non-Ess SW Pump 23 (or 26)

Recirc Pump 22 AFW Pump 23 (at recirc flow)

Selected Equip. on MCCs 26B, 26BB, and 27A Other Valves Close by Manual or Local Operator Action: 29-32 MOV-743 MOV- 1870 MOV-842 MOV-843 RWST Level Reaches 2.0 ft, Operator Aligns Spray to 33 Recirculation per ES-1.3:

CS Pump 22 is Stopped Valves MOV-866C and 866D Closed Valve MOV-746 or MOV-747 Closed Valve MOV-889B Opened 5-14

Table 5.2-1 (page 5)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with All Diesel Generators Operating Event Time (min)

Operator Confirms Core Flow and Recirc Spray Requirements 35 Recirculation Water pH Verified to be in Proper Range 40 (otherwise a charging pump and BA transfer pump are operated to raise or lower pH)

Operators Isolate Accumulators by Closing 45 Discharge Valves 894A-894D Valves HCV-3100 and 3101 Opened to Vent the Upper Head 48 Operator Establishes PAB Ventilation on EDG 22 50 (less loaded than EDG 23 if limiting single failures taken into account)

End of Transient Modeled 60

Operator Continues Efforts to Energize AC 480 V Busses from Offsite Power 0/

5-15

Table 5.2-2a Large LOCA With Aft EOGs Operating - Loads on EOG 21 06/24/02 le-circuloli.o Swilch Soequece Reire BuS SA Loading . EDG 21 Time in Minutes No, 1&3 No. 2 No. 4 No 7&8 No. 5 Spray Eq.ipIe I Max*......

kW... Man/AIOl

.......... - ......15 to 15

.... . ...... 20 -- . ......- 22 . .- -24 ...... 27 .... .. ....

25

31 --

...... ...... 30 32 34 45

...... . ..... . ...... 48 ...... 60

.. ...-- ..... - -- ....... 38

- --- ..... ...I... ... ... 3..

St Pimg 21 (400) 345 A 345 345 345 345 345 345 - 345 345 345 -345 0 o o 0 0 - 0 0 SI Cir Wit Prop 21 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 22 2.2 2.2 2.2 -2.2 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 CS Pmo21 (400) 350 A - 350 350 -350 350 0 350 -350 0 8 a 0 a 0 0 0 0 CR Fan 21 (350) 250 A 721 -5 216 0 0 0 216 -9 207 -4 203 203 203 -3 200 200 -6 194 194 194 194 194 COP Fan 22 (350) 250 -A 221 -5 216 216 -9 207 .104 -10 184 184

-4 203 203 203 -3 200 200 -6 194 194 19(1 R8 Pmp 21 (350) 194 194 -194 -10 108 184 383 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 207 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 GasSW Poip 24 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282-NO SW Pomp 21 (350) 282 M 0 0 282 0 0 0 0 a 5 0 282 282 282 282 282 CCW Prnp 21 (250) 230 M 282 282 282 0 0- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 213 213 213 213 213 Chg Prmp 21 (200) 150 M 50 50 50 50 80 213 - 213 213 50 -50 0 5 8 0 0 0 S 0 S, Air Comp (125) 93 M 0 0 0 0 0 5 "O 0 0 0 0 a 0 Pzr Ittis 23 485 M 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0- 0 0 S Ltg Bus 23 (120/208V) L30 M 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0- 0 0 0 0 -0 08 0 Bus 23 (480V-Enmg) 1tg 100. M 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 MCC26A Loads MOVs: -D 2 0 MOV-822A 0.7 A 0.7 -0.7 D - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-894A 5.6 A O 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 00 0 5.6 5( -586 MOV-894C 56 A 0 0 0 O 0

,,OV-566A ( 0 0 0 o a 0 0 5,6 56 -5.6 0 08s A 0 0 0 0.6 0,6 -06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV- 65C 8.8 A 0 0 0 0- 0 0 0 0 8 0 0.6 0a6 -0.6 O 0 MOV - 8 5 1A 07 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 MOV-744 5.8 A 0 0 0 58 5.8 -5.8 a0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-746 7.7 A 7.7 -7.7 0 a 0 .-0 0 a0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.7 7.7 -7.7 MOV-887A 0.4 A 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 -04 a 00 0 a 0 0 0S HOCV-64 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08 0 0 Q 0 a O 0 o S 0 BFP-2-21 143 A 14.3 -14.3 0 0 0O 0 0,7 -. 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 8 0 0 MOV-1802A 0.7 M S 0 0 MOV-889A n O 0 o 0 0 0 06 M S 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 - o 8 0 0 0 0 O MOO 42 0.6 M S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08 0,6 -0.6 0 - 0 HCV.3100 8.25 M o 0 0 O 0 0 OV-1810 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S O 12 M 0 0 5 025 025 0 0 a 1.2 1.2 -1.2 0 0 CCW lBoast Prop 21 ( 5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 0 0 0 0 3.7 3.2 37 37 3.7 3.7 3.7 Elec Ton Exh Fan 21 3.7 3.7 3.7 33 3.7 3.7 3,7 37 74 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 DO Exh ran 21 (.or) 7.4 7.4 7.4 74 7.4 7.1 7.4 7,4 05 A 0.5 0.5 8.5 0.5 05 0,5 0.5 0,5 EUG Bldg. Vent Fan 319,321 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 05 0.5 O'5 0.5 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 75 75 7.5 BA H!*Iracoe (-or) 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 75 16.8 A 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 168 7.5 XMFR 23 {(nv21 )(man) (80 168 - 168a 1&.8 168 16.8 16.8 18.8 (0.8 16.8 N- V I(/0 (0 MIA O 0 16.8 16.8 16.8 "e'p 0 -tTr 0 0 0 S 0 0 0 0 0 0 EPX3 15 A 15 15 a O 0 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 is 15 I5 5 15 EPV21 1i 15 15 7.5 A 75 7.5 75 7.5 7.5 7.5 7-5 7.5 7.5 7,5 7.5 7.5 T7,5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 MCC26AA Miss MOVs 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 121~02 Anly HiTa, I 02 1.2 -9.2 1 I 1 1 1 3,3 A 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 33 33 33 3.3 3.3 3-3 3.3 33 3.3 33 3.3 3.3 3.3 MCC29A DG 21 Suppore Loads FGol Oil Pop (2) 1.5 A . 0 - 0 0 i.s 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 I.5 1.5 1.5 Compressor 5) 37 A 3.7 3.7 -3.7 0 0 0 0 (.0 1.5 1.5 0 S 0 0 0 gal Charger 21 (Ma.) 45 A 0 0 0 0 45 45 45 -20 25 25 25 25 25 lnstAir Cortp 2 1(75) 56 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 -25 25 A 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 - 555 a6 56 50 lA. Coal Prmo 21 (3) 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 56 55 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2,2 2.2 2.2 22 Wall I/rh F-o 215 (2) 1.5 M 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.2 2,2 2.2 15 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 I'5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 (.5 15 1.5 M

Misc. Loss ( ax) 117 A 117 117 117 /17 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 82 82 82 82 82 82 TO040 EDG 21 Load: 1674 1749 1746 L708 (701 1358 1So0 1295 1583 1224 1718 1684 1691 I83 1683 1674 16863 Total EDG 21 Lsar wilh Single Failure 1674 1749 1764 1742 1743 1750 1693 1683 Sirgle Faile Assured: 1971 1606 2100 2066 1723 1715 1715 1698 1882 Cs Porn OSPump OS Primp OSPrimp OS Frp 00 Pomp OS Pump CS Pump CS Purp CS Pump CS Prmp " CS Pump CS Purmp CS Pump - CS Pump CS Pump C- Pimp 5-16

Table 5.2-2b Larme LOCA Wilh All EDOs Operating - Loads on EDG 22

. Bus 2AI3ALeoadre - EOG22 01!24/02 Time io in.ues Recirculalion Switch SequenCe pN0.1S3 No. 2 No. 4 No. 700 No. 5 nRcsi Spray Equipmenta MaokWMansAut0o 1 5 - 10 15 20 22 24 25 27 30 31 32 34 380 45 48 Go SI Prep 22 (400) 345 A 345 345 345 345 345 -345 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 SI Cir PWtrPmp 22 - 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 0 0 2.2 2.2 -2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 RHR Pomp21 (400) 316 A 255 255 0 0 0 0 255 255 255 -250 0 0 0 0 0 0 AFW Prnp 21 (400) 0 0 0 0 O 0 387 A 376 376 376 376 376 376 -153 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 22a 223 223 223 CR Fon 23 (350) 250 A 221 -5 216 216 -9 207 -4 P03 203 203 -3 200 200 -6 194 104 194 194 194 194 -10 184 184 CR Fan 24 (350) 250 A 221 -5 216 216 -9 207 -4 203 203 !94 203 -3 200 200 -6 194 194 194 194 194 -10 184 184 Ess SW Prep 25 (350) 202 A 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 202 282 282 282 NE SW Prep 22(350) 202 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 202 CCW Prop 22 (250) 230 M 8 0 2-82 202 0 0 0 0 230 230 230 220 -17 213 213 213 Chg Prop 22 (200) 150 M 50 50 213 213 213 213 50 50 50 50 -50 0 0 O Pot Hur 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 554 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PZr HIu 22 405 M 0 0 0 0 LIg Trap 21 (Nor) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (50 M 0 0 0 0 L10 T~an 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 L19T.ir 22 150 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lrg Bus 23 )480V-Nor) 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 211 MOV'S RFD-90 1.2 A 1.2 -:.2 0 U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OFD-00-2 1.2 A 1.2 -. 2 0 0 0 0 F'FD-90-2 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 A 1.2 -r.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 FD-:O-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 A 1.2 O 0 0 0 0

-L.2 0 0 0 0 O O OFD-5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-S-1 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-5-2 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-5-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 24A 0 DG 22 Support loads 0

a Fuel .l Ptrp )2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1,5 1.5 1.5 1.5 is f.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 -3.7 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 XMFR 24 (In 22)(maxo 15 1IA 0 0 o 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Inst Air Comp 22 (75) 56 A 56 50 55 56 0 0 0 0 0 56 56 56 56 56 L.A.Cool Prop 22 (3) 2.2 A 2.2 56 56 55 56 56 56 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Bat Chargeo 22 (Mao) 2.2 22 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 7.2 2.2 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 25 25 Radiaoon Monitor -15 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 1.6 A 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 25 25 1.6 1.6 160 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.0 MCC26C DG Exhausl Fan 22 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 08 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 00 PAB Exhaust Ean21 (125) 93 M 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 7.5 T5 0 0 0 EDG Bldg Vent Foe 320,322 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 0 0 03 03 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 Batlery Charger 23 25 A 25 25 25 25 7.5 7.5 7.5 25 25 25 25 25 CRAC Backup Fan (7.5) 5.6 A 0 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 CRAG Booster FPn21 (7.5), 5.8 A 5.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.0 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.80 5.8 58 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.0 5.0 Dampers 0 Molors 5.8 BA Trans Pump 21 (15) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 BAT Healers 21 15 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 0 0 Spent Fuel Pump 2I (100) 75 M 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .8 0:

Wall Exhaust Fn 213 (2) 1.5 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 (.5 (.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Misc. Loss (Mao) 122 A 122 122 122 122 122 122 - 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 102 T.o............................

........... 2 L :1....... --.... . . ........... ............ -.

Total EOG22 Load:

1949 2025 20211 1983 1976 1374 1171 1677 1677 1665 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648 1628 1721 Total EDG 22 Load with Single Failure: 1997 2073 2069 2031 2024 Single Failure Assumed: 1721 1518 2024 2024 1697 1680 1680 1600 RHERPump RHR Pump RHH Pump RHR Pump RHR Pump SI Pump 1000 1600 r652 airs S Primp St Pump SI Pomp CS Pump CS Pump CS Pomp CS Pump CS Pump CS Pump CS Pump CS Puamp

.17

Table 52-2c Large LOCA With A0 EOGs Opcraotr - Loads on EDG 23 0624100 Recilculation Switch Sequece Bus 6A Loading - EDG 23 Rei:c I Time in Minutes No.193 No 2 No. 4 Nto 7&8 No. 5 Sprty Equipment Ma, kW Man/Auto I 1 5 tO 15 20 22 24 25 27 30 31 32 34 38 45 48 0 St Pntp 23 (400) 345 A 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 3-IS -345 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SI CitWlt Prop 23 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2. 2.2 2.2 2.2 -2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 CS Prop 22 (400) 350 A 350 350 350 00 300 350 350 350 300 350 350 350 350 -350 RHO Pmp 22 (400) 316 A 255 25S 0 0 0 0 0 255 255 255 -255 0 0 0 0 0 AlW Pmp 23 (400) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 307 A 376 320 376 376 376 376 -153 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 CR Fan 25 (350' 250 A 221 -5 216 2l6 -9 207 -4 203 203 203 -3 200 200 -6 194 194 194 194- 194 194 -t0 RC Prmp 22 (350) 303 M 0 0 0 0 1&16 184 0 0 0 0 0 287 202 287 207 287 Ess SW Prnp 26(350) 282 A 282 262 282 287 287 287 282 282 282 282 282 262 282 282 282 282 282 282 078 282 282 NE SW Pmp 23 (350) M 0 0 0 0 0 0 282 282 282 22 282 282 262 282 282 282 Cht Pmp 23 (200) 150 14 50 50 50 50 50 56 .50 0 282 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 Tit AUr Lub(150) 112 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Pot HIt Cnrd Gp 227 M4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ll* Trta 21 (Emg) M 01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CCW Pmp 23 230 Il 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 268 Loads MO~s:

4OV-8822B 0.7 A 0.7 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14OV-894B 5.6 A 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4V0-89413 5.6 A 0 0 0 0 5.6 5.0 -5.6 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 8 0 MOV-866Ub 0.6 8 0 0 0 0 r G 56 -5.6 0 A 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 t4OV-8660 06 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 -5.0 tOV -51tF 0.7 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-882 2.2 4 0 0 0 0 0" 0 0 0 0 0 2.2 2.2 -2.2 5 0 0 0 0 0 i4OV-8870 0.4 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 -0.4 0 0 0 0 0 AOV-747 7.7 A 7.7 -7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 HCV-638 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0.6 P1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.

PFP-2-22 14.3 A 14.3 -0.0 0 0 0

-14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 tOlOV-1n028 07 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.7 -0.7 0 0 0 7.7 10V-0889B 06 1, 0 7.7 -77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-843 0.6 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 86 0.0 -0.6 0 HCOV-3101 025 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CC Boost Pop 22 (5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 0 3. 0 0 0.25 025 3.7. 3.7 3.7 37 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 Eleo Tat ExPoFan 22 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 5. 37 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 7.4 74 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.1, 7.4 BAHeoo Trace (Emq 16.0 M 0 1o 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.,I 7.4 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 CRAG Hurmidifer 2.2 A 22 2.2 0. 0 0 0 p . 0 2.2 272 2.2 2,2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 CRAG Far (10) 7.5 A 75 7.5 I o. 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.S 7.5 7.5 7.5 CRAG Boost Fao 22 (7.5). 6.8 A 7.5. 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 0 0 0 0 2 0 Dampers Moltors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DO 23 Soppoe Loads 3.5 Funl Oi Pmp (2) 1.5 A 0 O 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 '.5 1.5 1.5 Compressor (5)

Lighling Panel 223:

3.7 A 3.7 3.7 0 112.2 7.5 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 0 1.5 0

1.5 0

1.5 1.5 1.5 0 0 0 33 Exhausl Eon 23 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 8.8 0,8 0.8 DG Bd9 Emg Ltghos 1.1 A 11 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 Eng Aoo Cntr Pnt 0.3 A 5.3 0.3 11 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0,3 0.3 0.3 0.3 8A Trans Pmp 27 (7.0515) 11.2 A 11,2 11.2 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 112 11.2 11.2 E10G Bldg Vent Fan 318,323 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 11.2 11.2 11,2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 75 7,5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 MCC2688 Loads Mise MOVs 1 A 1 I I I 1 H2102 Anlyz HI Trace 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.2 1.2 -0.2 1 1 1 33 A 3.3 33 3. 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 33 3.3 3,3 33 3.3 Transf 2H (45KVA) 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 MCC27A Loads BatCharger 24 (Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 25 25 25 XFMR 22 (tw 24)(maX) 15 M 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAB Exhaust Fan 22 (125) 93 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 a 0 0 0 PAB Supply Fan (50) 37 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Spool' Fuel Pump 22 (100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Msc. Loss (Mae) 119 119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A 110 119 119 119 119 113 110 119 119 119 119 119 110 119 119 119 2087 0123 L0d:

Tlotl EDG 2073 2087 2058 2055 1803 1597 1876 1877 1523 1810 1811 1468 1400 1460 hI-tt 1450 Total E6G 23 Load iOthSingle Failrr: 2121 2135 2135 2106 2103 1851 1618 1895 2176 1822 2023 Single Failure Assumed; RHR Pot mp Fi4n Pump RHR Pump 2024 1681 1673 1073 167-1 1663 6HR Pump RHO Pump RIin Pump CS Porip CS Purrrp RC Pump FC Pump CCW Pump CCWPump CCW Pump CCW Puorrp CCW Pump CCW Pump CCO4 Pomp 5-18

5.3 Large LOCA with Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator 21 Table 5.3-1 is a time table of events describing the large LOCA transient with failure of EDG 21. The EDG loading spreadsheets for this EDG failure case are given in Tables 5.3-2a (EDG 22) and 5.3-2b (EDG 23). The times used for manual actions are similar to those assumed previously for all the EDGs operating case (Section 5.2) except that the time to switchover and RWST depletion are both delayed approximately 10 to 15 minutes (with loss of SI pump 21 and CS pump 21, the RWST would not be depleted as fast). As with the all EDGs operating case, the spreadsheets have conservatively assumed that one non-essential service water pump may be out of service.

The injection phase loads for both EDGs are generally the same or lower than the limiting loads calculated in the previous Section 5.2 for all EDGs operating. The limiting load for this case is on EDG 23 during switchover (2193 kw) and is slightly less than before for the all EDGs operating case (with limiting failure of recirculation pump 21) and is still below the 2300 kw half-hour limit. The switchover loads on EDG 22 show acceptable results (loads < 2100 kw).

5-19

Table 5.3-1 Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 21 Failure Event Time (min)

Large LOCA with Loss of Offsite Power, SI and 0 Containment Spray Actuation Diesels 22 and 23 Start, Major Equipment Sequences 0-1 Onto Energized 480 V Buses per Description in Section 4.1 Other Miscellaneous Equipment on MCCs 26B, 26C, and 211 0-1 Load Automatically:

Control Room A.C. - Incident Mode Cable Tunnel Exhaust Fan (Auto-temp)

EDG Support Loads (Emg. Lighting, Vent and Exhaust Fans)

MOV Loads for Valves Moving to Safeguards Positions Operators Directed to Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 1 1 Operators Verify Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, and SI Actuation 3 Operator Starts Charging Pump 22 or 23 at Maximum Speed, 4 Verifies Flow Path From RWST, and Dispatches Operator to Establish Backup Cooling per SOP 4.1.2 MCCs 24A and 27A, are reset per EOP E-0 4 The following components are loaded automatically:

EDG 21, Bus 5A: None EGD 22, Buses 2A /3A MCC 24A EDG 22 Auxiliaries (Compressor) 4 kw Inst. Air Comp. 22 (and Support Loads) 60 kw Battery Charger 22 45 kw Radiation Monitor 45 2 kw Additional EDG 22 Load = 111 kw 5-20

Table 5.3-1 (page 2)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 21 Failure Event Time (min EDG 23, Bus 6A:

MCC 27A Battery Charger 24 45 kw Additional EDG 23 Load= 45 kw Control Room Operators Continue with Immediate Actions of E-0 5-10 Transition to EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 15 Operator Resets SI and Containment Spray, Places CCW 16 Pumps in PULLOUT Establish PAB Ventilation per EOP E Portable Ventilation 20 Established since EDG 22 and 23 Load Exceeds 1860 kw, Operator Confirms Operation of Switchgear Room Exhaust Fan Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status (per E-1) 20 SG NR Levels Indicate >26%, Operator Reduces AFW Flow 21 RWST Level Less Than 9.24 ft - Transition to ES-1.3, 30 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

Operator Dispatches NPO to Open CCW Hx SW Outlet Valves, 31 Verifies or Completes SI and Spray Reset Perform No. 1 and No. 3 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 32 No Actions Since Equipment on Bus 5A Not Operational:

SI Pump 22 Continues to Inject (SI Pump 21 Not Running)

CS Pump 22 Continues to Inject (CS Pump 21 Not Running)

RHR Pumps 21 and 22 Stop Valve MOV-882 Closes 5-21

Table 5.3-1 (page 3)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 21 Failure Event Time (min)

Operator confirms SW alignment 33 and stops charging pumps Perform No. 2 Recirculation Switch Sequence:

Non-Essential SW Pump 22 (or 25) Starts 34 (If SW pump 22 /25 out of service, pump 23/26 starts)

CCW Pump 22 Started Manually Perform No. 4 Recirculation Switch Sequence:

Recirc Pump 22 Starts 36 Valve MOV-1802B Opens Operator continues with ES-1.3 assuming low-head recirculation:

Perform No. 7 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 38 Sl Pumps 22 and 23 Stop Perform No. 8 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 39 Valve MOV-1 810 Closes (No Power to MCC 26A -

Valve Locally Closed later)

CS Test Line Valve 1813 Closes Recirculation Switch No. 5 Not Performed (due to EDG 21 Failure). 40 After No. 8 Recirculation Switch, the Following Major Equipment may be Operating: 40 Bus 5A: None Bus 2A /3A: CR Fans 23 and 24 (EDG 22) Essential SW Pumps 25 (or 22)

Non-Ess Service Water Pump 22 (or 25)

CCW Pump 22 AFW Pump 21 (at recirc flow)

Selected Equipment on MCC 24A 5-22

Table 5.3-1 (page 4)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 21 Failure Event Time (mini Bus 6A: CS Pump 22 (EDG 23) CR Fan 25 Non-Ess Service Water Pump 23 (or 26),

if 22 /25 Out of Service Essential SW Pumps 26 (or 23)

Recirc Pump 22 AFW Pump 23 (at recirc flow)

Selected Equipment on MCCs 27A, 26B, and 26BB Other Valves Close by Manual or Local Operator Local Action: 39-42 MOV-743 MOV-744 (Local Action Req'd)

MOV-1 810 (Local Action Req'd)

MOV-1 870 (Local Action Req'd)

MOV-842 (Local Action Req'd)

MOV-843 RWST Level Reaches 2.0 ft, Operator Aligns Spray to Recirculation per ES-1.3: 48 CS Pump 22 is Stopped Valve MOV-866D Closed Valve MOV-889B Opened Operator Confirms Core Flow and Recirc Spray Requirements 50 Recirculation Water pH Verified to be in Proper Range 55 (otherwise a charging pump and BA transfer pump are operated to raise or lower pH)

Operators Isolate Accumulators by Closing 58 Discharge Valves 894B and 894D (894A and 894C not operable, so these accumulators would be vented) 5-23

Table 5.3-1 (page 5)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 21 Failure Valve HCV-3101 Opened to Vent the Upper Head 62 Operator Establishes PAB Ventilation 65 on EDG 23 (less loaded than EDG 22)

End of Transient Modeled 70 5-24

Table 5.3-2a Large LOCA with Failure ol EDG 21 - Loads on EGG 22 6/24/02 Recirculalion Switch Sequence Bus 2A/2A Loading - EDG 22 Time in Minules Recirc No.1&3 No. 2 No. 4 No. 7 No. 8 Spray Equipment Max kw Man/Aulo 1 5 10 15

20 30 32

34 35 " 37 39 40 ' 45 50 - 55 60 70 345 A 345 345 345 345 345 345 3,15 345 345 345 -345 0 0 0 Si Cir WtProp 22 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 0 0 0 0 RIIR Prop 21 (400) 316 A 219 219 2.2 2.2 2,2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 -2.2 5 219 219 219 219 -219 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AFW Prop 21 (407) 387 A 376 376 376 376 0 0 0 0 376 -153 223 223 223 223 223 223 CIt Fan 23 (350) 250 A 223 223 223 223 223 223 221 221 9 230 230 4 234 -11 223 223 223 223 223 223 -12 211 211 211 CG% Fan 24 (350) 250 A 221 221 9 230 230 211 211 211 4 234 -11 223 223 223 223 223 Ess SW Prop 25 (3350) 282 A 223 -12 211 211 211 " 211 211 211 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW Prop 22(350) 282 Ml 0 282 282 282 282 0 0 0 0 0 0 282 282 282 CCW Peip 22 (250) 230 282 202 282 282 282 282 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 202 0 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 Chg Prop 22 (200) 150 M 50 50 50 230 230 00 50 so 5s -50 0 0 o 0 Pzr Htr 21 554 M O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o PZr HI' 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 485 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lg Tran 21 (Nor) 150 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Utg Tran 22 150 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lig 8ts 23 (480V-Nor( 100 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 211-MOV Loads BFD-90 SFD-90-1 1.2 A 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 A 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 13F0-90.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 A 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-90-3 1.2 A 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 RFD-5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-5-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-5-2 0 0 0 0 0 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 U 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-5-3 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 U 0 0

MCC 24A Loads DG 22 Support Loads S Fuel Oil Prep f2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 Compresso JS) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.r 1.5 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 -3.7 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 XMI-H 24 110 22)(mrau) 15 MIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 lost Air Camp 22 (75) 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A 56 56 56 56 56 56 0 56 56 f6 56 50 56 L.A.Cool Prip 22 (3) 22 A 2.2 2.2

53 50 56 56 56 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Bar Charger 22 (Max) 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 2.2 2.2 25 20 25 25 25 25 Radiation Monitor 45 1.6 A 1.6 1.6 1.6 25 25 25 25 25 25 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 IF6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 MCC 26C Loads 0G Ehaust Fan 22 0.8 A 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 PAR EoxnFan 21 (125) 93 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.11 0.8 0.6 0.8 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 EDG Bldg Vent Farr 320,322 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 0 0 0 0 7.5 7,5 7.5 7.5 7.5 75 7.5 Sat Charger 23 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 25 A 25 25 25 25 25 25 7.5 7.5 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 CRAG Backup Fan (7.5) 5.03 0 0 0 25 25 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CRAG Boost Fan21 (7.5), 5.8 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 0 5.8 5.8 5.0 5.8 5.8 5.8 Dampers &Motors 5.8 5.8 5.0 5.8 5.8 BA Trans Prop 21 (15) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 BAT Irtrs 21 15 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 11.2 11.2 0 0 0 0 0 Spenl Fuel Pump 21 (100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wall Exhaust Fan 213 (2) 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 M 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 .1.5 0 - 0 0 0 Misc. LosS (max) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 122 A 122 122 122 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 122 122 122 122 122 122

...... 1 122 t22 122 122 122 122 0.........

0. .. ... ....

-- ... 0- 1027-... 122 122 Total EOG 22 Load: 1913 ' 199 2013 1993 2001 1827 1600 1558 2070 2070 1723 1899 1699 1599 1699 1699 1699 5-25 0

Table 5.3-21, Large LOA will Failure of EDG 21 - Loads on EDG 23 6t24102 Recirculation Switch Sequence Recirc Bus 6A Loading - EDG 23 Time in Minudes NO.I& 3 No. 2 No. 4 No. 7 Noa 8 Spray

. W au.5..... . 13....... . . ..... 1 . 23...........

..... 3. ...... ..... .... ..... ..... 3-. ........ . .. .... ...... 3- ...... .... - 40...

Cquipment Max kW Man/Aulo 1" 0 1 0 ' 303 4 1 3 070 7

3940 ' 5Su 5607 St Cir Wtr Prop 23 345 A 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 0 0 0 0 .0 0 345 -345 0 CS Prp 22 (400) 2.2 A 22 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 -2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 HR Prop 22 (400) 350 A 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 -350 0 0 0 0 319 A 219 219 219 219 219 219 -219 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AFW Pmnp23 (400) 387 A 376 376 376 376 376 -153 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 CR Fan 25 (350) 250 A 221 221 9 230 230 4 234 234 -11 223 223 223 223 223 -12 211 211 211 211 211 211 RC Pmp 22 (350) 303 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 294 294 294 294 204 294 294 294 294 ESS SW Prep 26 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 202 282 282 282 282 NE-SW Prep 23 (350) 282 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 282 282 262 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 CCW Prop 23 (250) 230 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chg Prep 23 (200) 150 M 60 50 50 s0 50 50 50 -50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Trb Aua Lub (a50) 112 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 Pzr HIr CnGdGp 277 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ltg Tran 21 (Emg) 150 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 268 Leads MOVs:

MOV-8228 0.7 A 0.7 -0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-8941 5.6 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.6 5.6 -5.6 0 MOV-894D 5.6 A 0 6 90 0 0 0 5.6 5.6 -5.6 0 0 0 C 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-8666B 0.6 A 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-866D 0.6 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0 0 0 MOV-651B 0.7 A 0.7 -0,7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-882 2.2 M 0 0 0 0 0 2.2 2.2 -2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-887B 0.4 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-747 7,7 A 7.7 -7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 HCV-638 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFP-2-22 14.3 A 14.3 -14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-18028 0.7 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.7 0 -0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MDV-6895 0.6 0 0 0 MOV-843 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 M 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0 0 0 0 HCV-3101 0.25 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 SCC Boost Prop 22 (5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 0 37 3.7 3.7 3,7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 37 3.7 3.7 3.7 EaecTun Exh Fan 22 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 BA Heat Trace (Emg) 16.8 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CRAG Booster Fan 22 (7.5). 6.8 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Dampers & Motors CRAG Fan (10) 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 1.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.5 7.5 CRAG Humidifier (3+33) 2.5 A 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 DG 23 Saporp Loads Fuel Oil Prep (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.56 1,5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 3.7 -3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 Lighting Panel 223:

DG Exhausl Fan 23 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 08 0.8 DG Bldg Emg Lights 0.8 0,8 0.8 1.1 oa 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.8. 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 09a 1.1 A 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1,1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1 1.1 Eng Aux Cnlr PhI 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 BA TranmPrnp 22 (7.5/15) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 EDG BldgVent Fan 318,323 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7-5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 MCC 26163 Loads Misc MOVS 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.2 1.2 -0.2 1 1 1 1 H2/O2 Anlyz HI Trc 2 3.3 A 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 Tressf 2H (45KVA) 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0,3 0.3 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 MCC 27A Loads Bat Charger 24 (Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 XFMR 22 (Inv 24)(max) 15 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAD Exh Fan 22 (125) 93 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 93 PAB Supply Fan (50) 37 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 37 0

Spent Fuel Pump 22(100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Misc. Loss (ma.) 119 A 119 110 119 119 119 110 119 1190 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 Ttll6 EDG 23 Load: 1670 " ............1609 ... 2184-040-2038 2056 2065 2045 2049 1897 1834 1835 1485 1484 1495 1614 5-26

5.4 Large LOCA with Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator 22 The time table of events for this scenario is provided in Table 5.4-1. The loading spreadsheets for EDGs 21 and 23 are given in Tables 5.4-2a and 5.4-2b, respectively.

The loads for EDG 21 remain below the 2100 kw 2-hour emergency limit except for the short period of time following completion of Recirculation Switch No. 4, which starts Recirc Pump 21. The load reaches 2129 kw for a brief period of time (up to -3 minutes) until SI Pump 21 is stopped via Recirculation Switch No. 7.

The limiting load for this case is 2147 kw and occurs on EDG 23 during the injection phase. Since this injection phase load exceeds 2100 kw for only -20 minutes, the loads are well within the 2-hour and half-hour ratings of the EDG.

As noted on Table 5.4-2a, the long term load on EDG 21 can be reduced to below 1750 kw (1660 kw including uncertainties) by EDG load management, e.g., operation of either the recirc pump (299 kw), CCW pump (230 kw), or NE-SW pump (282 kw)on EDG 23. A non-essential SW pump is already considered on EDG 23 since the spreadsheets consider the possibility that one SW pump on the non-essential header can be out of service (as allowed per Technical Specifications). Addition of either the recirc pump or CCW pump will result in acceptable long term loads on EDG 23.

5-27

Table 5.4-1 Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 22 Failure Event Time (min)

Large LOCA with Loss of Offsite Power, SI and 0 Containment Spray Actuation Diesels 21 and 23 Start, Major Equipment Sequences 0-1 Onto Energized 480 V Buses per DescriptionJ in Section 4.1 Other Miscellaneous Equipment on MCCs 26A and 26B 0-1 Load Automatically:

Control Room A.C. - Incident Mode Cable Tunnel Exhaust Fans (Auto-temp)

EDG Support Loads (Emg. Lighting, Vent and Exhaust Fans)

MOV Loads for Valves Moving to Safeguards Positions Operators Directed to Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 1 1 Operators Verify Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, and SI Actuation. 3 Operator Starts Charging Pump 21 or 23 at Maximum Speed, 4 Verifies Flow Path From RWST, and Dispatches Operator to Establish Backup Cooling per SOP 4.1.2 MCCs 27A and 29A are reset per EOP E-0. 4 The following components are loaded automatically:

EDG 21, Bus 5A MCC 29A Inst. Air Comp 21 (and Support Loads) 60 kw Battery Charger 21 45 kw EDG 21 Auxiliaries (Compressor) 4 kw Additional EDG 21 Load = 109 kw EDG 22, Buses 2A /3A: None EDG 23, Bus 6A:

Battery Charger 24 45 kw Additional EDG 23 Load = 45 kw 5-28

Table 5.4-1 (page 2)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 22 Failure Event Time (min)

.Control Room Operators Continue with Immediate Actions of E-0 5-10 Operator Starts Turbine Driven AFW Pump to Supply AFW to 10 SGs Nos. 21 and 22 Operators Verify Remainder of Automatic Actions in E-0 10-15 Transition to EOP E-l, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 15 Operator Resets SI and Containment Spray, Places CCW Pumps 16 in PULLOUT Establish PAB Ventilation per EOP E Portable Ventilation 20 Established since EDG 23 load exceeds 1860 kw, Operator Confirms Operation of Switchgear Room Exhaust Fan 0 Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status (per E-1) 20 SG NR Levels Indicate >26% in SGs Nos. 23 and 24, Operator 21 Reduces AFW Flow RWST Level Less Than 9.24 ft.- Transition to ES-1.3, 22 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

Operator Dispatches NPO to Open CCW Hx SW Outlet Valves, 23 Verifies or Completes Sl and Spray Reset Perform No. 1 and No. 3 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 24 SI Pump 22 - already stopped Valves 887A and 8872 Close CS Pump 21 Stops Valves MOV-866A and 866B Close RHR Pump 22 Stops Valves MOV-882 and 744 Close Operator confirms SW alignment 25 and stops charging pumps 5-29

Table 5.4-1 (page 3)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 22 Failure Event Time (min Perform No. 2 Recirculation Switch Sequence:

Non-Essential SW Pump 23 (or 21) Starts 26 (If SW Pump 23/26 Out of Service, Pump 21/24 Starts)

CCW Pump 21 Started Manually Perform No. 4 Recirculation Switch Sequence:

Recirc Pump 21 Starts 28 Valves MOV-1802A and 1802B Open Perform No. 7 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 29 SI Pumps 21 and 23 Stop Perform No. 8 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 31 Valve MOV-1810 Closes (if energized)

CS Test Line Valve 1813 Closes Recirculation Switch No. 5 Not Performed (due to EDG 22 Failure) 32 After No. 8 Recirculation Switch, the Following Major Equipment may be Operating: 32 Bus 5A: CR Fans 21 and 22 (EDG 21) Essential SW Pumps 24 (or 21)

Non-ESS SW Pump 21 (or 24), if 23/26 out of service Recirc Pump 21.

CCW Pump 21 Selected Equipment on MCCs 29A, 26A, and 26AA Bus 2A/3A: None (EDG 22)

Bus 6A: CS Pump 22 (EDG 23) CR Fan 25 Essential SW Pumps 26 (or 23)

Non-Ess SW Pumps 23 (or 26)

AFW Pump 23 (at recirc flow)

Selected Equipment on MCCs 27A, 26B, and 26BB 5-30

Table 5.4-1 (page 4)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 22 Failure Event Time (min)

Other Valves Close by Manual or Local Operator Action: 32-35 MOV-743 MOV- 1870 MOV-842 MOV-843 RWST Level Reaches 2.0 ft, Operator Aligns Spray to Recirculation per ES-1.3: 36 CS Pump 22 is Stopped Valves MOV-866C and 866D Closed Valve MOV-746 or MOV-747 Closed Valve MOV-889B Opened Operator Confirms Core Flow and Recirc Spray Requirements 40 Recirculation Water pH Verified to be in Proper Range 44 (otherwise a charging pump and BA transfer pump are operated to raise or lower pH)

Operators Isolate Accumulators by Closing 46 Discharge Valves 894A-894D Valves HCV-3100 and 3101 Opened to, Vent the Upper Head 48 Operator Establishes PAB Ventilation on EDG 23 50 End of Transient Modeled 60 5-31

Table 5.4-2a Large LOCA with Failure of EOG22 - Loads on EDG 21 G6124/02 Recirculation Switch Sequence Bas 5A Loadin - EDO 21 Timp in Minutes Reciro

1111 .1 Mae MlarAueo 1 5 to 150 22 No. 1 &3 24 26 Na. 2

- 27 No. 4 29 No. 7 30 No.0 32 35 Spry 40 44 . 48 60 Sl Prnpt2 (400) 345 , A 345 345 345 345 345 345 34,5 -34 5 5 0 0 St3Cir W2r.prpt 2.7 A 2.2 2.2 0 0 0 0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 0 0-2.

CS Prop 2 J400) 350 A 0 0 a 00 350 350 350 350 350 -350 0 0 0 CR Fal 21 )3 ) 250 A 221 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 221 221 -8 213 -2 2tI Stt 211 21 CR Fan 22(350) 2lt 2t1 -5 206 206 206 206 206 -4 202 250 A 2"2 22t 221 -8 2t3 -2 21t 2S1 PC Prp 21 (350) 211 211 211 S1t -5 206 206 206 206 303 M 0 0 0 0 206 -4 202 0 0 0 299 299 299 299 2J9 299 Es. SW Prop 24 (350) 202 A 252 252 282 299 299 29q 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 NESW Prop 21 (350) 282 M 0 282 282 028 292 202 0 0 0 0 0 200 282 282 CCW Prop 21 (250) 282 282 282 282 292 282 282 230 M 0 0 0 9 0 5 230 230 230 230 2230 230 230 230 ChgProp 21 (200) 150 M 50 55 50 50 230 230 50 50 -50 9 0 0 0 0 0 S, Air Corp (125) 93 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P. Ht,. 23 485 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 L:gBus 23lt2O200v) 135 M 0 P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lg[EtrsZ3 (480V.E9g) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 5 0 0 0 0 MCC26A Loads MOVs:

1OV-822A 0,7 A 0.7 -0.7 O 50. 0 MOV-894A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5Z A 0 0 0 5 5 0 ( 0 MOV-894C 0 5 p 0 0 0 0 0 5,6 5.6 -5.6 5.6 A 0 0 MOV8I6AC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 A 0 0 0 0 5 5.6 5.9 -5.6 0 MOV.866C 0 0 0 0 - 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0.6 A 0 0 0 0 O MOV-85IA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,1 0.6 -0.6 0 5 0.7 A 8 0 0 MOV-e44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-74 5.0 A 0 0 0 5.9 59 -58 0 0 0 0 .0 0 00 0 MOO-867A 7.7 A 7.7 -7.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 A 0 0 0 0 0 7.7 7,7 -7.7 0 0 5 0.4 04 -0.4 0 0 0 INCV-640 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFP.'.2 14.3 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV- 802AI 14.3 .14.3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 07 M 9 0 0 0 MOO-80056 0

0 0 0 0.7 0.7 -0.7 0 0 0 0 00 06 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 MOV-812 0,6 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 HCV-31010 0.25 M 0 5 0 0 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0 0 0i 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-1081` 05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,025 0.25 1.2 M 0 0 COW Roust Prop 2115) 0 0 0 0 5 1.2 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 27 37 3 0 0 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 37 3.7 3.7 Elec Tun EAh Fan 21 7.4 A 7I4 7.4 37 3.7 37 37 0 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 DG bus Fant I2fo,) 0.5 A 05 05 7.4 7A4 7.4 7.4 7.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Y55 0.5 0.5 EOG ,Bldg Venl Fan 310,321 7.5 A 7.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 7.5 7-5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 BAHI Trace (nor) 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 16.8 A 16.8 16.8 16.0 16.0 10.8 ¶6.

XMFR 23 (tno 71)(max) 0 19.0 ¶6.0 06.8 16. 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 10 MIA 0 16.8 16.8 EPX3 0 0 a 0 Q 0 0 0 15 A ts 15 15 15 is 0 0 0 O I6 I5 15 15 15 15 15 EPV21 7.S A 7.5 7.5 7.5 I1Sr, 15 15 I6 7.5 7.5 7.5 1.5 7.5 7.5 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 T 7.5 3.5 MCC 6AA Ltoads Misc MOVs 1 A 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 I 1 l_12102Anlyz HI Trc I 3.3 A 3.3 1 0.2 1.2 -02 1 1 1 1 3.3 3.3 23 23 323 3 3.3 3.3 33 3.3 33 3.3 3.3 MCC29A Loads 3.3 3.3 DG 21 Support Ltoals Fuel On Prp (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 1.5 Vs 1.5 1.5 1.5 Compressor 15) 3.7 A 37 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.7 -3.7 9 0 9 0 0 Bar Charger 21 (Mae) 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 6 45 - A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 25 Inst Air Camp 21 f75) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 56 A 56 56 56 56 56 25 25 I.A.CoolProp21 (3) 56 56 56 56 56 56 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 56 56 56 56 56 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Wall baharrol Fan 215 (2) 1.5 M 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 I's 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 Misc. Lass tMax) 1.5 117 A I1T T 13 117 117 117 117 1674 - 75 -717

-- 117 117 ¶1777 117 117 117 117 179- ....-.......

17-0 ........... .......... 117 117 TPuolEOG 21 Load; 1674 1759 17S6 -1720 1717 1374 1317 1829 2129 1781 1772 1772 1779 1771 1782 1763 This long OernloadPile 5-32 be rrduced be51w 1750 kw by load0rarraoeoetnl.

Table 5.4-2b Large LOCA ,ith Failure of EDG 22 - Loads on E0G 23 06124/02 Hecir-llion Swth Sequerce Lan60ALoading - E6G 23 Heeirc Tiee tn Mionles Ho. I 8 3 No. 2 Nu. 4 rio. 7 No. 8 EquItmetl Spray MaxkWIMan/Aelo 1 5 10 15 22 24 26 27 2q 30 32 " 35 40 44 40 0 SI Prep 23 (400) 345 A 345 345 345 345 345 ý345 345 345 345 -345 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SI Cir WIr Prep 23 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2,2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 .23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CS Prep 22 (400) 350 A 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 -350 0 0 0 RHR Prep 22 (400) 310 A 303 303 303 303 0 303 -303 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AFW Prep 23 (400) 387 A 376 370 376 376 0

-153 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 CR Fan 25 (350) 250 A 221 221 221 223

-8 213 -2 211 211 21 211 211 211 -5 206 206 206 RC Prep 22 (350) 303 M 0 0 0 206 206 .4 202 0 0 0 0 0 Ess SW Prep 26 (350) 282 A 282 0 0 0 0 0 282 282 262 282 282 282 282 282 I-E SW Prep 23 (350) 282 1A 282 282 202 - 282 282 282 282 0 0 0 0 0 0 282 282 282 CCW Prnp 23 (250) 230 14 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Chg Prep 23 (200) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I50 M 50 50 50 50 50 -50 0 Trb ASa Lub (150) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 Par HIrCorl Gp 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 277 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lght Tran 21 (Eng) 150 IA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 26B loads MOVs:

MOV-8228 0.7 A 0.7 -0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-894g 5.6 A 0 0 0 0 MOV-894D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-86613 5.6 A 0 0 0 0 5.6 5.6 -56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 U 0 06 A 0 0 0 5, 5.0 -56 0 tMOV.83661) 0 0 0.6 0.6 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NIOV-851 3 0.7 A 0 0.6 0.6 -0.0 0 0 0 MOV-882 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.2 A 0 0 0 0 0 MOVO887B 0 0 0 0 2.2 2.2 -2.2 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-747 A 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 -0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.7 7.7 -7.7 0 0 0 737 A 7.7 .7.7 0 0 0 0 0 JCV-6,38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 BFP-2-22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0o 0 0 MOV-1002B 14.3 A 14.3 -143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o 0 0 0 0.2 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 mov-88'13 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.7 -0.7 0 0 0 MOV 843 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 -0.6 HCV-3101 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0 0.25 M 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 CC Boost Prop 22 (.5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ElMO TO- Eh Fan 22 2.7 A 3.7 3.7 3.7 37 0 0 5.25 0.25 3,7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3,7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 37 3.7 3.7 7A4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 BAHeat Trace (Emg) 16.8 M 0 0 7.4 7.4 7.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CRAC BooesrtoFPn 22 (7.5), 6.8 A 6.8 6.8 6.8 0 0 0 0.8 68- 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 68 Dampers & Motors 6.8 6.8 68 6.8 CRAG Fan (I0) 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7,5 7., 7,5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 75 7.5 CRAC I lucrdiliter (3.33) 2.5 A. 2.5 2.5 2.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 2.5 2,5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5. 2.5 2.5 2.5 OG 23 Support leads 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 Fuel OrIPrep (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 1.5 1,5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Compressor(s) 3.7 A 37 -3.7 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lighting Panel 223: 0 0 0 0 DU Exhaust F"e23 0.*1 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 DG Bldg Emg Lights 1.1 A 1.1 11 1.1 1I1 0.8 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 Eng Ato Cotr PnI 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 BA Trans Prep 22 (7.5/15) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 1 1.2 E6G BOdg Venl Fan 318.323 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 11.7 11.2 112 11.2 11.2 7.5 7.5 7,5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.S 7.5 7.5 7.5 MCC 26B8 Loads Misc MOVs I A 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 0.2. V2 -0.2 1 H2102 Anlyz HI Trc 2 3.3 A 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3,3 I I 1 33 3.3 3,3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 Transf 2H 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 3.3 3,3 3.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0,3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 MCC27A Loads BaRCharger 24 (Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 25 25 25 XFMR 22 (leo 24)(rax) 15 1M 0. 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAB Eeh Fan 22 (125) 93 1M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAD Supply Fan (50) 37 111 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sperd FurelPump 22 J100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 Misc. Loss (Max) 11 A 119 119 0 0 0 0 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 11, 119 119 119 110 119 119 Tofal E6G 23 Load: 2128 2147 2147 " 2119 1965 1665 1512 1894 1895 1547 1542 1543 1201 1192 1203 1318 5.33 0

5.5 Large LOCA with Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator 23 The time table of events for this final large LOCA scenario is provided in Table 5.5-1.

The loading spreadsheets for EDGs 21 and 22 are given in Tables 5.5-2a and 5.5-2b, respectively.

Again, the loads for both diesel generators are reasonable. For EDG 21, the highest load occurs after Recirculation Switch 4. This peak load is 2268 kw, which is still below the half-hour limit. Note that in the previous loading study (WCAP-12655, Rev. 0),

Technical Specification / administrative control limits prevented addition of the non-essential SW pump (previously 272 kw) on this EDG. This administrative control has been removed, and thus the non-essential service water pump was added on the spreadsheet. EDG 22 shows acceptable results with a peak load of 2059 kw during the injection phase and 2076 kw during the recirculation phase.

As noted on Table 5.5-2a, the long term load on EDG 22 can be reduced to below 1750 kw by EDG load management, e.g., operation of the CCW pump (230 kw) on EDG 21, if the non-essential SW pump (282 kw) remains powered by EDG 22. (The spreadsheets consider the NE SW load on either EDG 21 or 22 to allow for the possibility that any one SW pump on the non-essential header can be out of service, as allowed per Technical Specifications). One fan cooler (211 kw) can also be secured on EDG 22 since each EDG (21 and 22) supplies power to two fan cooler units.

0(

0 5-34

Table 5.5-1 Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 23 Failure Event Time (min)

Large LOCA with Loss of Offsite Power, SI and 0 Containment Spray Actuation Diesels 21 and 22 Start, Major Equipment Sequences 0-1 Onto Energized 480 V Buses per Description in Section 4.1 Other Miscellaneous Equipment on MCCs 26A, 26C, and 211 0-1 Load Automatically:

Cable Tunnel Exhaust Fan 21 (Auto-temp)

EDG Support Loads (Vent and Exhaust Fans 21 and 22)

Boric Acid Heat Tracing MOV Loads for Valves Moving to Safeguards Positions Operators Directed to Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 1 1 Operators Verify Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, and SI Actuation. 3 Operator Starts Charging Pump 21 at Maximum Speed, 4 Verifies Flow Path From RWST, and Dispatches Operator to Establish Backup Cooling per SOP 4.1.2 MCCs 24A, 29A, and 211 reset per EOP E-0 4 Note: MCC 211 not stripped, reset not required The following components are loaded automatically when MCCs reset:

EDG 21, Bus SA:

MCC 29A:

Inst. Air Comp. 21 (and Support Loads) 60 kw Battery Charger 21 45 kw EDG 21 Auxiliaries (Compressor) 4 kw Additional EDG 21 Load = 109 kw 5-35

Table 5.5-1 (page 2)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 23 Failure Event Time (min)

EDG 22, Buses 2A /3A:

MCC 24A EDG 22 Auxiliaries (Compressor) 4 kw Inst. Air Comp. 22 (and Support Loads) 60 kw Battery Charger 22 45 kw Radiation Monitor 45 2 kw Additional EDG 22 Load = 111 kw EDG 23, Bus 6A: None Control Room Operators Continue with Immediate Actions of E-0 5-10 Operator Starts Turbine Driven AFW Pump to Supply AFW to 10 SGs Nos. 23 and 24 Operators Verify Remainder of Automatic Actions in E-0 10-15 Transition to EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 15 Operator Resets SI and Containment Spray, Places CCW Pumps 16 in PULLOUT Establish PAB Ventilation per EOP E Portable Ventilation 20 Established Since EDG 22 Load Exceeds 1860 kw, Operator Confirms Operation of Switchgear Room Exhaust Fan Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status (per E-1) 20 SG NR Levels Indicate >26% in SGs Nos. 21 and 22, Operator 21 Reduces AFW Flow RWST Level Less Than 9.24 ft - Transition to ES-1.3, 35 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

Operator Dispatches NPO to Open CCW Hx SW Outlet Valves, 36 Verifies or Completes SI and Spray Reset 5-36

Table 5.5-1 (page 3)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 23 Failure Event Time (min Perform No. 1 and No. 3 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 36 No Actions Since Equipment on Bus 6A Not Operational:

SI Pump 22 Continues to Inject (SI Pump 23 Not Running)

CS Pump 21 Continues to Inject (CS Pump 22 Not Running)

Valve MOV-866C Closes (MOV-866D not powered)

RHR Pump 21 Stops Valve MOV-744 Closes Operator confirms SW alignment and stops charging pumps 38 Perform No. 2 Recirculation Switch Sequence:

Non-Essential SW Pump 22 (or 25) Starts 39 CCW Pump 22 Started Manually Perform No. 4 Recirculation Switch Sequence:

Recirc Pump 21 Starts 40 Valve MOV-1 802A Opens Operator continues with ES-1.3 assuming low-head recirculation:

Perform No. 7 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 42 SI Pumps 21 and 22 Stop Perform No. 8 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 44 Valve MOV-1810 Closes (if energized)

CS Test Valve 1813 Closes Recirculation Switch No. 5 Not Performed (due to EDG 23 Failure) 45 After No. 8 Recirculation Switch, the Following Major Equipment will be Operating: 45 Bus 5A: CR Fans 21 and 22 (EDG 21) Essential SW Pumps 24 (or 21)

Non-Ess SW Pumps 21 (or 24),

if 22 /25 Out of Service Recirc Pump 21 CS Pump 21 Selected Equipment on MCCs 29A, 26A, and 26AA 5-37

Table 5.5-1 (page 4)

Time Table of Events Large LOCA with Emergency Diesel Generator 23 Failure Event Time (min)

Bus 2A/3A: CR Fans 23 and 24 (EDG 22) Essential SW Pumps 25 (or 22)

Non-Ess SW Pumps 22 (or 25)

CCW Pump 22 AFW Pump 21 Selected Equipment on MCC 24A Bus 6A: None (EDG 23)

Other Valves Close by Operator or Local Action: 44-48 MOV-743 (Local Action Req'd)

MOV- 1870 MOV-842 MOV-843 (Local Action Req'd)

RWST Level Reaches 2.0 ft, Operator Aligns Spray to Recirculation per ES-1.3: 50 CS Pump 21 is Stopped Valve MOV-866A Closed Valve MOV-889A Opened Operator Confirms Core Flow and Recirc Spray Requirements 55 Recirculation Water pH Verified to be in Proper Range (otherwise a charging pump and BA transfer pump are 60 operated to raise or lower pH)

Operators Isolate Accumulators by Closing Discharge Valves 894A and 894C (894B and 894D not operable, 63 so these accumulators would be vented)

Valve HCV-3100 Opened to Vent the Upper Head 65 Operator Establishes PAB Ventilation on EDG 22 68 End of Transient Modeled 70 5-38

Table 5.5-2. Large L[CA With Failure ol EGG 23 - Loads on EOG 2 I 06/24102 Recirculat/on Switch Sequence

Bus 56AL.oadirtg -

B upmets SI Prrp2l (400)

G 21 Mae OW Ma,/Oslo 345 A fine in Minutes 345 1 5 " 10 " 20 30 :35 No. 1 03 37 39 NO.2 40 No. 4 42 No. 7 43 No. 6 45 50 Pee/re Spray 52 60 65 70 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 s45 SI Cir WIr Prop 21 ,2.2 A 345 -345 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 -2.2 CS Prop 21 (400) 350 A 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 -350 0' 0 CR Fan 21 (350) 250 A 221 221 9 230 4 234 234 -II 223 0 0 223 223 223 223 -12 211 211 211 211 CR Foe 22 (350) 250 A 221 221 9 230 4 234 234 211 211 211

-11 223 223 223 223 223 -12 211 FICPerg 21 (350) 303 M 0 0 211 211 211 211 211 2t1 0 0 0 0 0 294 294 294 EsS SW Prri 24 (350) 282 A 282 294 29,4 294 294 294 224 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 202 NE SW Prop 21 (350) 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CCW Prop 21 (250) 282 282 282 28 2 2 02 202 282 230 M 0 0 0 0 0 202 282 Chg Prrp 21 (200) 50 50 0 0 0 0 0 800 0 150 M 50 50 50 70 50 -50 0 0 0 S, Air Come (125) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 M 0 0 0 0 Par litrs 23 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 485 M 0 0 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 5 0 L[g BSa 23 (1200:08V) 135 hi 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 Ltg Bus 23 (480V-Emg) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 M 0 0 O 0 g 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MCC26A Loads MO~s:

MOV-822A 0.7 A 0.7 -0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 Q 0 MOV-894A 5.8 A 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 MOV-894C 56 A 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.6 5.6 -5.6 0 MOV.86GA 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0.6 A 0 0 0 0 0 5.6 5.6 .5.6 0 MOV-866C 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0.6 A 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.6 -0.6 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0 0 0 MOV-851A= 0.7 A 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 MOV-744 0.7 -0.7 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.8 A 0 0 O 0 5 0 0 0 MOV-746 0 5.8 5.8 -58 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.7 A 7.2 -7.7 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-8870 0,4 A 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 HCV-640 0.6 M 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8FP-2-21 14.3 A 14.3 -14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 MOV-1802A 0.7 M 0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 07 0.7 -0.7 0 MOV-889A 0.6 M 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 MOV-842 0.6 M4 0 0 0 S 0 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0 0 0 S HCV-31 00 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.25 M 0 0 O 0 0.6 -0.6 0 8 0 0 MOV-1810 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 00 0 O 00.2 0.25 1.2 M 0 0 0 0 CCW Boost Pantp21 (5) 0 0 0 1.2 1.2 -12 0 0 0 0 3.7 A 3,7 3U 37 3.7 3.7 3.7 0 Elen Tun Exh Fan 21 3.7 37 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 37 37 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 3.7 3.7 3,7 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7A4 7.4 DO Enh Foe 21 (no) 0. A 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 7.4 7.4 f.I 7.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 EDO BldgrVee Fan 319,321 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 BA Ht Irace (nor) 16.8 A 16.8 16.8 18.8 16.8 16.8 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 16.8 16.8 1&.8 168 16.8 16.0 10.8 16.8 XMFO 23 (Inv 21)(lrr(x) 10 1/A 0 0 0 O 10.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 0 0 0 0 0 EPX3 15 A IS 15 150 I5 0 0 0 0 0 15 Is0 150 15 15 15 15 15 EPV2f 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 15 is IS 15 15 7.5 1.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7T5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 MCC26AA Loads Mi/s MOVs 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.2 H9/02 AelyzHI Tre1 3.3 A 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 1,2 -0.2 1 I 1 1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3,3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 MCC 29A Loads DG 21 Support Loads Fuel Oil Prop (2) 1.5 A 8 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 '.5 1.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 3.7 317 -3.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1.5 Bat Charger 21 (Max) 45 A 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 45 -20 25 25 25 25 25 lostA',Comp 21 (75) 56 A 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 56 56 56 50 56 56 56 55 25 l.A. Cool Prop 21 (3) 2.2 A 56 56 56 50 56 56 56 50 56 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.9 22 2.2 2.2 Wall Exhausl Fan 215(2) 1.5 M 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.2 22 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1,5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Misc. Loss (Max) 117 A 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 ToalE......... . ...................... --- 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 Total EDG 21 Load: 7..... 74............

1 .........

748----

1674 167 1759 1774 1762 1762 1741 1748 1691 1973 2268 1896 1897 1897 1547 1540 1557 1546 5.39

Table 5.5-2b Large LOCA With Failure of EDG 23 - Loads on EDG 22 0t124102 Efus 2cV3A Loading - EDG ?2 Lleoirculation Switch Sequence Time in Minutes Pectin No. 1 8 3 No. 2 No. 4 No. 7 No. 8 Spray Equipment Max kW ManAto 1 10 20 30 . 35 37" 39

4

-0 42 43 60 "

45

50

52 05

70 SI Prop 22 (400) 345 A 345 345 345 345 345 345 SI Cii W! Prop 22 345 345 345 345 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2

-345 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2,2 PHR Prop 21 (400) 316 A 272 2.2 -2:2 272 272 272 272 272 AFW Pp 21 (.100) -272 0 0 0 0 0 387 A 376 320 376 376 .153 223 223 0 0 0 0 0 0 223 223 223 223 CR Fan 23 (350) 250 A 221 221 9 230 4 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 234 234 -it 223 223 223 CR Fan 24 (350) 250 A 221 221 9 230 223 -12 211 2It 211 211 211 211 211 211 4 234 234 AIt 223 223 223 SW Oiy 25(350) 1Ess 202 A 223 .12 211 211 21 21f 211 211 211 211 282 282 282 282 282 NP SwNPop 22 (350) 202 282 282 202 2P2 282 M 0 0 0 282 202 202 282 282 282 282 0 0 0 0 282 282 CCW Pop 22 (250) 230 M 282 2B2 282 282 282 282 282 282 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 210 230 230 Ch roPp 22 (200) 150 h 50 50 50 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 50 50 50 50 50 0 OzrH 21 554 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 M 0 0 0 Po1t:,y2 0 0 O 0 0 405 U0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ltg Trao21 (Nor) 0 0 0 0 0 150 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 L I "rran 22 0 0 0 0 0 150 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

-1 13,s 23 (48O'-Nor) 00 'M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 21 1-MOVLoads SF0-90 .1.2 A 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 FDO-Sot L2 A 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SFO-90-2 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 A 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Q 0 0 0 0 t3FD-90-3 0 0 0 0 1.2 A 1.2 1.2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFOD-5 0 0 0 0 0 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SOFD-5-1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BF0-5-2 0 0 0 0 0 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 SFD-5-3 0 0 0 0 0 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 24A Loads 0 0 0 0 o 0 P0 22 Support Loads FPrl 01 Prop (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 0 1.5 VS 1.5 1.0 1.5 Compressor (5) 37 A 3.7 37 1.5 t.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5

-3.7 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 1.5 2/MFR 24 too 22)(m..) 15 IVA 0 0 0 0 0 latAlComp 22 (75) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 A 0 0 0 c 0 0 0

.A.L Cý'iofprop 22 (3) 55 56 56 56 56 A6 55 2.2 A 2.2 56 50 56 56 56 56 5C' 9.1 Chargo, 22 (Max}l 2.2 2.2 2.2 2,2 22 2.2 56 56 45 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 45 45 45 -20 25 25 2.2 2.2 Radiation Moniter 45 1.6 A 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 25 25 25 25 1.0 1.6 16 1.6 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 MCC 20C Loads DC Exhaust tan 22 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 08 08 0.1 PAR Exh Pan21 (25) 93 M 0 0 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 5.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 50G Slitg VeCt Fan 320,322 7.5 A 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 75 7.5 7.5 0 03 93 DaniChargye 23 25 A 25 75 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 -7. 7.5 2.5 25 25 25 25 25 725 7.5 CFAC Backup FPan(7.5) 5.6 A 2 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 5.6 5.6 5.6 5,0 56 5.6 25 25 CRAC Booster Fan 21 (7.5). 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.0 A 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.0 5z 56 5.0 Dampors0 Motors 5.8 5.8 5.8 50 5.08 5. 58 5. 5.8 5.8 5.8 BA Trans Prep 2) (I5) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 BAT Hlrs 21 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 I1.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 15 M 0 0 0 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Spoet Foel POup 21 (100) 75 M 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 WaSl Enhaust Fan 213 (2) 1.5 M 0 1.5 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.S 1.5 Misc. Loss (Max) 122 A 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 Load: ..... 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 Total EDG 22 Load: 122 122 1972 2057 2071 2059 1705-- 10........5 -

1906 1806 1614 1564 2076 1705 1705ý 2052 L705 1705 1705 1705 1798 Ihis long lemc load can F

540 be cduned bclow 1750km by load management.

0

5.6 Summary of Results for Large LOCA with Low-Head Recirculation In the previous sections, Sections 5.2 through 5.5, limiting loads for large LOCA have been determined. The all EDGs operating case, with and without limiting single failure and EDG failure cases were analyzed. For long term cooling, it is assumed that the operator aligns low-head recirculation (using Recirc switch 7), i.e., the break is large enough that the recirculation pump(s) provide sufficient flow for core cooling.

Therefore, the high-head SI pumps and stopped. Summarized below are some of the key results from this effort.

" For all EDGs operating and no failures, all EDG loads are less than 2100 kw, i.e.,

none of the loads exceed the 2-hour emergency rating for the EDG.

During the injection phase of the accident, all EDG loads remain less than 2100 kw with the following exceptions:

- All EDGs Operating, Load on EDG 23 (with RHR pump 21 failure) -

The injection phase load reaches 2135 kw due primarily to high flow operation of RHR pump 22. The duration of time that the load exceeds 2100 kw is - 20 minutes (i.e., until the operator reduces flow from the AFW pump 23).

- EDG 22 Failure, Load on EDG23 - The injection phase load reaches a similar peak load of 2147 kw, again due primarily to high flow operation of RHR pump 22. The duration of time this load also exceeds 2100 kw is for - 20 minutes (i.e., until the operator reduces flow from the AFW pump 23).

- All other injection phase loads have - 20 kw margin or more to the 2100 kw limit. Note that none of the loads approach the 2300 kw half-hour limit.

During the recirculation phase of the accident, the following peak loads occur:

- All EDGs Operating, Load on EDG 23 (with Recirc pump 21 failure) -

The load reaches 2176 kw for several minutes following operation of Recirc Switch 4. The load is subsequently reduced (to 1822 kw) when Switch 7 is operated to stop Sl pump 23.

- EDG 21 Failure, Load on EDG 23 - The load reaches 2193 kw, again for several minutes following operation of Recirc Switch 4. The load is then reduced (to 1845 kw) when Switch 7 is operated to stop SI pump 23.

- EDG 22 Failure, Load on EDG21 - The load reaches 2129 kw for 5-41

several minutes following operation of Recirc Switch 4. The load is subsequently reduced (to 1781 kw) when Switch 7 is operated to stop SI pump 21.

- EDG 23 Failure, Load on EDG 21 - The load reaches 2268 kw, again for several minutes following operation of Recirc Switch 4. The load is then reduced (to 1896 kw) when Switch 7 is operated to stop SI pump

21. Note that this is the highest load calculated. The margin to 2300 kw is 32 kw.

- All EDGs Operating, Load on EDG 21 (with CS pump 22 failure). The load reaches 2100 kw following operation of Recirc Switch 5 (which adds a redundant cooling train). The load stays at approximately this value for several minutes, until CS pump 21 is stopped and recirculation spray is aligned.

- All loads on EDG 22 remain less than 2100 kw throughout switchover to recirculation. However, the load on this EDG typically increases above 2000 kw following Recirc Switch 2 if any failure occurs that requires SI pump 22 to continue to operate (i.e., SI pump 21 or 23 failure or EDG 21 or 23 failure). The limiting loads for this situation are 2076 kw (for failure of EDG 23) and 2070 kw (for failure of EDG21).

All the above loads are well within the 2100 kw 2-hour and 2300 kw half-hour ratings for the EDGs. Long-term loads (after recirc spray is aligned) are typically less than or controllable to less than the 1750 kw continuous rating. Therefore, these loads are considered acceptable.

In view of the high loads following'recirculation switch 2 (for EDG 22) or 4 (for EDG 21 or 23), the impact of high head recirculation will be investigated. This is done in the next section.

5-42

5.7 Large LOCA With High-Head Recirculation Large LOCA is limiting for the injection phase and initial portion of the recirculation phase of the accident. Longer term, it is conservative to assume the operator aligns to high-head recirculation with the recirculation pump(s) feeding the suction of 2 SI pumps. The loading spreadsheets in the pervious sections have been completed assuming low-head recirculation (SI pumps tripped by switch 7). Expected loads for high-head recirculation (switch 6 performed after switch 4) have been developed and compiled in Tables 5.7-1, 5.7-2, and 5.7-3. A high load for recirc typically occurs after switches 2 and 4 (which are performed sequentially), so loads are compiled starting from recirculation switch 4. In addition to the high loads after switch 4, another peak can occur after switch 5. This switch is performed only if all EDGs are operating. This switch effectively adds a redundant cooling train (recirculation, non-essential SW and CCW pumps).

High-head recirculation tends to be limiting since the SI pumps operate at high flow (for large LOCA). With recirc spray included, the recirculation pumps also operate at high flow. Therefore, with the addition of the SI pumps, high-head recirculation is more limiting than low-head recirculation. Because of the high flow conditions for the St pumps, the loads bound small LOCA. High-head recirculation is also the alignment used for hot leg recirculation (EOP ES-1.4), so it should be analyzed to ensure long term loadings on the EDOs will be acceptable.

Peak loads in Tables 5.7-1, 5.7-2, and 5.7-3 are all less than 2300 kw, so none of them exceed the half-hour rating.

For the next most limiting loads, note that none of the cases have prolonged operation between 2100 and 2300 kw (exceeding 1/22 hour) if some optional loads are shed. For example, if the PAB fan or instrument air compressor (IAC) loads are removed from EDG 22 (these are optional and/or redundant loads), the loads on EDG 22 decrease 93 kw (for the PAB fan) or 57 kw (for the lAC). Either load reduction is sufficient to decrease the loads on EDG 22 below 2100 kw. Likewise, removal of the IAC from EDG 21 will reduce its load below 2100 kw for the long term (recirc spray) period. It is also possible to reduce the load on EDG 22 by operation of the non-essential SW pump or CCW pump on another EDG. The non-essential SW pump is "double-counted" in these tables to allow any SW pump to be out of service (OOS) per Technical Specifications. Based on these.considerations, it is unlikely the load on any EDG will exceed the 2100 kw rating for more than 1/2 hour.

Long term loads will next be considered to demonstrate capability to reduce the loading to less than the 1750 kw continuous rating. It is sufficient to consider only the EDG failure cases for this effort. For the all EDGs running cases, the redundant cooling train can be eliminated and resulting loads managed between the 3 EDGs. Thus, the 2 EDG cases will be more limiting.

5-43

For EDG 21 failure, refer to Tables 5.7-1 and 5.7-3. If the AFW pump on EDG 22 remains operating but the non-essential SW pump and one CR fan are stopped, the load on EDG 22 becomes 2139 - 282 - 211 = 1646 kw. The non-essential SW pump is already considered on EDG 23, but its AFW pump (23) can be stopped since AFW 21 is operating. One CR fan on EDG 22 and one CR fan on EFDG 23 will be left operating. This should be adequate for containment cooling long term, with or without recirc spray. Stopping AFW 23 on EDG 23 results in a load of 1840-223 = 1617 kw.

Thus, the resulting loads on EDGs 22 and 23 become 1646 kw and 1617 kw, respectively, both of which are well below the continuous rating of 1.750 kw.

For EDG 22 failure, refer to Tables 5.7-1 and 5.7-3. The load on EDG 23 is already low (1550 kw) and includes a non-essential SW pump. By dropping the non-essential SW pump and one CR fan on EDG 21 results in a load of 2121 -282-206 = 1633 kw. An alternate scheme would be to operate the non-essential SW pump on EDG 21 and CCW pump on EDG 23. The PAB exhaust and supply fan (93 + 37 = 130 kw) can also be included on EDG 23. The resulting loads are 2121 - 230 - 206 = 1685 kw on EDG 21 and 1550 - 282 + 230 + 130 = 1628 kw on EDG 23. Again, this represents an acceptable set of results.

For EDG 23 failure, refer to Tables 5.7-1 and 5.7-2. One CR fan can be secured on each of the operating EDGs and the non-essential SW pump can be operated on EDG

21. For this situation, the long term loads become 1901 - 211 = 1690 kw on EDG 21 and 2145 - 282 - 211 = 1652 kw on EDG22. Again, both EDG loads are well below the continuous rating of 1750 kw.

For each of the EDG failure cases discussed above, there are multiple ways to achieve an acceptable long term loading scheme such that each EDG can operate long term at loads well below 1750 kw. It is reasonable to assume the operator will have sufficient time to achieve this without operating near the 2100 kw emergency rating for more than two hours. Based on these considerations, the loads on the EDGs will remain within acceptable limits.

5-44

Table 5.7-1. Limiting High-Head Recirculation Phase Loads for Large LOCA - EDG 21 After Recirc Spray After Recirc After Recirc (Includes Switch 5 EDG 21 Loads Switch 4 Switch 6 for All EDGs case) Remarks All EDGs Operating w/ limitinq failure Sl Pump 21 347 347 347 CS Pump 21 350 350 Limiting failure CR Fans 21&22 438 438 420 Recirc Pump 21 287 188 291 Ess.SW Pump 282 282 282 Non-Ess.SW Pmp 282 SW 23/26 OOS CCW Pump 21 213 MCC 26A/AA 64 72 74 MCC 29A 86 86 86 Bus/Cable Loss 117 117 117 Total Load (kw) 1971 1880 2112 EDG 21 Loads, EDG 22 Fails SI Pump 21 347 347 347 CS Pump 21 CR Fans 21&22 422 422 412 Recirc Pump 21 299 188 291 Ess.SW Pump 282 282 282 Non-Ess.SW Pmp 282 282 282 SW 23/26 OOS CCW Pump 21 230 230 230 MCC 26A/AA 64 72 74 MCC 29A 86 86 86 Bus/Cable Loss 117 117 117 Total Load (kw) 2129 2026 2121 EDG 21 Loads, EDG 23 Fails S! Pump 21 347 347 347 CS Pump 21 350 350 CR Fans 21&22 446 446 422 Recirc Pump 21 294 188 291 Ess.SW Pump 282 282 282 Non-Ess.SW Pmp 282 282 282 SW 22/25 OOS CCW Pump 21 MCC 26ANAA 64 72 74 MCC 29A ,86 86 86 Bus/Cable Loss 117 117 117 Total Load (kw) 2268 2170 1901 5-45

Table 5.7-2. Limiting High-Head Recirculation Phase Loads for Large LOCA - EDG 22 After Recirc Spray After Recirc After Recirc (Includes Switch 5 EDG 22 Loads Switch 4 Switch 6 for All EDGs case) Remarks All EDGs Operating w/ limiting failure SI Pump 22 347 347 347 Limiting failure AFW Pump 21 223 223 223 CR Fans 23&24 400 388 388 Ess.SW Pump 282 282 282 Non-Ess.SW Pmp 282 282 282 CCW Pump 22 230 230 213 MCC 26C (w/o PAB) 52 52 52 PAB Fan 93 93 MCC 24A 86 86 86 Bus/Cable Loss 122 122 122 Total Load (kw) 2024 2105 2088 EDG 22 Loads, EDG 21 Fails SI Pump 22 347 347 347 AFW Pump 21 223 223 223 CR Fans 23&24 446 446 422 Ess.SW Pump 282 282 282 Non-Ess.SW Pmp 282 282 282 CCW Pump 22 230 230 230 MCC 26C (w/o PAB) 52 52 52 PAB Fan 93 93 MCC 24A 86 86 86 Bus/Cable Loss 122 122 122 Total Load (kw) 2070 2163 2139 EDG 22 Loads, EDG 23 Fails SI Pump 22 347 347 347 AFW Pump 21 223 223 223 CR Fans 23&24 422 422 422 Ess.SW Pump 282 282 282 Non-Ess.SW Pmp 282 282 282 CCW Pump 22 230 230 230 MCC 26C (w/o PAB) 58 58 58 PAB Fan 93 93 MCC 24A 86 86 86 A Bus/Cable Loss 122 1242 122 Total Load (kw) 2052 2145 2145 5-46

Table 5.7-3. Limiting High-Head Recirculation Phase Loads for Large LOCA - EDG 23 After Recirc Spray After Recirc After Recirc (Includes Switch 5 EDG 23 Loads Switch 4 Switch 6 for All EDGs case) Remarks All EDGs Operating w/ limiting failure Sl Pump 23 347 347 347 CS Pump 22 350 350 AFW Pump 22 223 223 223 CR Fan 25 200 194 194 Recirc Pump 21 299 188 291 Limiting failure Ess.SW Pump 282 282 282 Non-Ess.SW Pmp 282 282 282 SW 22/25 OOS CCW Pump 23 213 Limiting failure MCC 26B/BB 49 58 60 MCC 27A 25 25 25 Bus/Cable Loss 119 119 119 Total Load (kw) 2176 2068 2037 EDG 23 Loads, EDG 21 Fails SI Pump 23 347 347 347 CS Pump 22 350 350 AFW Pump 22 223 223 223 CR Fan 25 223 223 211 Recirc Pump 22 294 188 291 Ess.SW Pump 282 282 282 Non-Ess.SW Pmp 282 282 282 SW 22/25 OOS MCC 26B/BB 49 58 60 MCC 27A 25 25 25 Bus/Cable Loss 119 119 119 Total Load (kw) 2194 2097 1840 EDG 23 Loads, EDG 22 Fails SI Pump 23 347 347 347 CS Pump 22 350 350 AFW Pump 22 223 223 223 CR Fan 25 211 211 206 Recirc Pump 22 Ess.SW Pump 282 282 282 Non-Ess.SW Pmp 282 282 282 MCC 26B/BB 56 64 66 MCC 27A 25 25 25 Bus/Cable Loss 119. 119 119 Total Load (kw) 1895 1903 1550 5-47

6.0 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADINGS FOR OTHER ACCIDENT CASES In Section 5.0, EDG loadings for large LOCA were described in considerable detail. In this section, small LOCA EDG loadings are considered in Section 6.1. Non-LOCA cases are then described in Section 6.2.

6.1 Emergency Diesel Generator Loadings for Small LOCA In this section, EDG loadings for small LOCA are described. A limiting 3" to 4" diameter LOCA case with composite failures is analyzed. For reasons explained, this case serves as a bounding case.

The EDG loads for the small (3" to 4" diameter) LOCA are determined in a conservative manner, considering composite failures. For example, all EDGs are assumed to operate but the CR fans operate at a high power characteristic of minimum containment safeguards (1 CS pump, 3 CR fans). Limiting single failures are also considered during the switchover to recirculation. For example, both CS pumps remain operating following operation of Recirc switch 1, both recirculation pumps operate following operation of Recirc switch 4, and SI pump 22 is left on following operation of Recirc switch 1. Any one non-essential SW pump is also allowed out of service, so the next pump in firing order is assumed to start via Recirc switch 2 and 5. Because of these composite failure assumptions, any potential EDG over-load condition will become evident.

This case is considered as a "representative worst case" small LOCA. This is because the break is small enough to require high-head recirculation (RCS pressure near the shut-off head pressure of the RHR or recirculation pumps) but large enough to require containment spray if only 3 CR fans are operating. Figures 6.1-1 and 6.1-2 (taken from the FSAR) show the RCS pressure transient for these two small LOCAs.

Referring to Section 3.2 and Table 3.2-3, spray actuation occurs for the 4" LOCA case; for the 3" LOCA, spray is not required, but containment pressure remains near the spray actuation setpoint. The time to switchover for this case is calculated to be 105 minutes (Reference 5-8), assuming injection from two SI pumps and one spray pump (CS pump is started at 64 minutes when containment pressure reaches 30 psig, 24 psig setpoint with 6 psi uncertainty applied).

For small LOCA, as in the large LOCA cases, the operator would be directed to EOP E-1 (from E-0) upon diagnosis of high containment radiation and possibly increasing containment sump level and pressure. Prior to switchover (ES-1.3), the operator may also transition to ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. If and when the RWST reaches the low level switchover setpoint (9.24 ft), the operator would transition to ES-1.3 based on a caution in ES-1.2. If the ES-1.2 transition is taken before switchover occurs, the operator could start the following optional equipment in addition to the charging pump and automatic MCC loads added per EOP E-0.

6-1

1. PAB ventilation may be established if the load on EDG 22 or 23 is less than 1860 kw.

2. Additional charging pumps may be started.

3. A CCW pump may be started if the load on any EDG is less than 1760 kw (EDG with least load would likely be selected).

4. A non-essential SW pump may be started if the load on any EDG is less than 1730 kw (again, the EDG with the least load would be selected).

In the scenario analyzed, charging pumps are started on each EDG. A CCW pump is also started on EDG 21. These are the only additional significant loads that are added prior to the transition to ES-1.3.

Table 6.1-1 describes the significant events for this 3" to 4" small LOCA transient with composite failures. The EDG loading spreadsheets for this case are given in Tables 6.1-2a (EDG 21), 6.1-2b (EDG 22), and 6.1-2c (EDG 23).

The times used for early manual actions are similar to those assumed for the large LOCAs. For the 4" small LOCA case, RCS pressure will approach the shutoff head pressure of the RHR pump (approximately 200 psig). This is high enough to prevent significant flow from the RHR pump but low enough to not allow the pump to be stopped per the EOPs (i.e., less than 340 psig for adverse containment).

Prior to switchover, the operator may transition to ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. Because the RCS is saturated, actions performed in ES-1.2 would be minimal. Capacity permitting, however, the operator could add a CCW pump and possibly a non-essential service water pump while in ES-1.2. For this scenario, CCW pump 21 is added, however, a non-essential service water pump can not be added on any EDG because of the anticipated load increase if containment spray actuates (on EDGs 21 and 23). The operator is then directed to ES-1.3 when RWST level reaches 9.24 ft.

In ES-1.3, recirculation switches 1 through 4 are completed as described before for large LOCA. However, since low-head flow is small, the system is aligned to high-head recirculation using recirculation Switch 6 (one recirculation pump supplies the suction of two high-head pumps). Switch 5 is also completed, which adds a second and redundant cooling train. After 135 minutes transient time, most of the actions in ES-1 .3 would be complete (including stopping the CS pump). Once hot leg temperatures reach 350°F, the accumulators are isolated to prevent nitrogen injection.

As evident in the spreadsheets, all EDG loads are generally less than 2100 kw, the 2-hour rating for the EDG. There are two exceptions - the loads on EDGs 21 and 23 following operation of Switch 5 (which establishes a redundant cooling train). The load 6-2

on EDG 21 reaches 2300 kw. However, it gets this high primarily because of the composite failure, i.e., it is assumed CS pump 22 (on EDG 23) is not running (following Recirc Switch 1), the non-essential SW pump on EDG 23 is out of service, and further assumes a high calculated flow through the recirc pump. (Note: at the time of this high load, two recirc pumps are supplying 2 Sl pumps but not recirc spray. The power requirement is based on 1380 gpm from a single pump instead of two recirc pumps.

The power reduction if operating at half this flow is estimated to be 10 kw. There is also margin in the CR fans and other equipment loads that could be identified to help further reduce this peak load.) The corresponding peak load on EDG 23 is 2266 kw. This high load is caused by failure of a CCW pump on another EDG and also the high calculated load for the recirculation pump. These peak transient loads last less than 10 minutes and are well within the 2300 kw half-hour rating for the EDGs. The loads prior to switch 5 operation are all considerably less than 2100 kw.

Referring to Section 5.1.5, the miscellaneous losses do include a conservative allowance for frequency tolerance. Therefore, the short term calculated loads close to 2300 kw would be acceptable. Note that these high loads (> 2200 kw) occur only after completion of Switch 5, which establishes a second (redundant) cooling train. If the EDG load indication is reading high, the operator may elect to not perform Switch 5 and thereby avoid overloading that EDG. This would be acceptable since the redundant cooling train is not needed for accident recovery. If the reading is low and the operator performs Switch 5, it is unlikely the actual load would exceed 2300 kw since the EOPs restrict the amount of optional loads the operator is allowed to place on the EDGs.

Long term, the small LOCA high-head recirculation loads are bounded by those determined for large LOCA in Tables 5.7-1, 5.7-2, and 5.7-3. Using EDG load management load similar to that discussed in Section 5.7, it is possible to demonstrate that the load on any EDG can be decreased below the continuous rating of 1750 kw and still satisfy the minimum core and containment cooling requirements, assuming any credible limiting single failure.

It should also be noted that although the calculated loads exceed 1750 kw at the end of the 140 minute (2.33 hour3.819444e-4 days 0.00917 hours 5.456349e-5 weeks 1.25565e-5 months ) small LOCA transient, the amount of time that the EDG load exceeds 1750 kw is much less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months (120 minutes) for any EDG. Referring to Table 6.1-1 and the spreadsheets Tables 6.1-2a, -2b, and -2c, these times are estimated to be 140 - 64 = 76 minutes for EDGs 21 and 23 and 140 - (109-40) = 71 minutes for EDG 22. Therefore, there is considerable time left (-120-76 = 44 minutes) to implement the load management strategy explained in Section 5.7 to reduce loads to below the 1750 kw continuous rating.

Based on consideration of the above loading limits, the loads for small LOCA are acceptable.

6-3

Table 6.1-1 .

Time Table of Events Small 3" to 4" LOCA with Composite Failures Event Time (min)

Small LOCA with Loss of Offsite Power and SI Actuation 0 (Containment Spray Actuation Delayed)

All Diesels Start, Major Equipment Sequences 0-1 Onto Energized 480 V Buses per Description in Section 4.1 Other Miscellaneous Equipment on MCCs 26A, 26B, and 26C, 0-1 and 211 Load Automatically:

Control Room A.C. - Incident Mode Cable Tunnel Exhaust Fans (Auto-temp)

EDG Support Loads (Emg. Lighting, Vent and Exhaust Fans)

MOV Loads for Valves Moving to Safeguards Positions Operators Directed to Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 1 1 Operators Verify Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, and SI Actuation. 3 MCCs 27A, 24A, and 29A Reset per EOP E-0 4 The Following Components Automatically Load When MCCs Reset:

EDG 21, Bus 5A:

MCC 29A:

Inst. Air Comp. 21 (and Support Loads) 60 kw Battery Charger 21 45 kw EDG 21 Auxiliaries (Compressor) 4 kw Additional EDG 21 Load = 109 kw EDG 22, Buses 2A/3A:

MCC 24A:

Inst. Air Comp. 22 (and Support Loads) 60 kw Battery Charger 21 45 kw EDG 22 Auxiliaries (Compressor) 4 kw Radiation Monitor 45 2 kw Additional EDG 22 Load = 111 kw 6-4

Table 6.1-1 (cont.)

Time Table of Events Small 3" to 4" LOCA with Composite Failures Event Time (min)

EDG 23, Bus 6A:

MCC 27A:

Battery Charger 24 45 kw Additional EDG 23 Load = 45 kw Operator Starts Charging Pump at Maximum Speed, Verifies Flow Path From RWST, and Dispatches Operator to Establish Backup Cooling per SOP 4.1.2 (E-0) 4 Control Room Operators Continue with Immediate Actions of E-0 5-10 Operators Verify Remainder of Automatic Actions in E-0 10-15 Transition to EOP E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 20 Establish PAB Ventilation per EOP E Operator 30 Establishes Portable Ventilation per AOI 27.1.9 Operator Confirms Operation of Switchgear Room Exhaust Fan SG Narrow Range Levels Indicate >29%, Operators Reduce AFW Flow per E-1 (Continuous Action) or ES-1.2 40 Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status (per E-1) 45 Operators Performing Actions in ES-1.2 - May Include Cooldown 50-111 If Cold Leg Temperature Limits Permit. SI Pumps Not Stopped Since RCS Remains Close to Saturation Operator Starts CCW Pump 21 per E-1 or ES-1.2 55 EDG Load is Less Than 1760 kw Containment Spray Actuated When Pressure Reaches 30 psig 64 (24 psig setpoint plus 6 psi uncertainty)

RWST Level Less Than 9.24 ft - Transition to ES-1.3, 104 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation 6-5

Table 6.1-1 (cont.)

Time Table of Events Small 3" to 4" LOCA with Composite Failures Event Time'(min)

Operator Dispatches NPO to Open CCW Hx SW Outlet Valves, 105 Verifies or Completes SI and Spray Reset Perform No. 1 and No. 3 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 106 Sl Pump 22 - Stops (assumed to keep running)

Valves 887A and 887B Close CS Pump 21 Stops (assumed to keep running)

Valves MOV-866A and 866B Close RHR Pumps 21 and 22 Stop Valves MOV-882 and 744 Close Operator confirms SW alignment 108 and stops charging pumps Perform No. 2 Recirculation Switch Sequence:

Non-Essential SW Pump 22 (or 25) Starts 109 (SW 23/26 Starts if 22/25 Out of Service) -

CCW Pump 22 Started Manually (CCW Pump 21 left running)

Perform No. 4 Recirculation Switch Sequence:

Recirc Pump 21 Starts (Recirc Pump 22 also assumed to start) 110 Valves MOV-1 802A and 18026 Open Continue with ES-1.3 assuming high-head recirculation:

(transition based on low injection flow):

Perform No. 6 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 113 Valves MOV-746 and 747 Close Valves MOV-888A and 888B Open (Establishes HH Recirc)

Valves MOV-842 and 843 Close Perform No. 8 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 115 Valve MOV-1 810 Closes (if energized)

CS Test Line Valve 1813 Closes Operator Confirms All EDGs Operating 116 (Allows Recirc. Switch 5) 6-6

Table 6.1-1 (cont.)

Time Table of Events Small 3" to 4" LOCA with Composite Failures Event Time(mm)

Perform No. 5 Recirculation Switch Sequence: 118 Non-Essential SW Pump 23 (or 26) Starts (If SW Pump Out of Service, Pump 21/24 Starts)

CCW Pump 21 Started Manually Recirc Pump 22 Starts Bus 5A: CR Fans 21 and 22 (EDG 21) Essential SW Pumps 24 (or 21)

Non-ESS SW Pump 21 (or 24), if other SW Pump Out of Service SI Pump 21 Recirc Pump 21 CCW Pump 21 Selected Equip. on MCCs 26A, 26AA, and 29A CS Pump 21 (if 22 fails)

Bus 2A /3A: CR Fans 23 and 24 (EDG 22) Non-Ess Service Water Pump 22 (or 25)

Essential SW Pumps 25 (or 22)

SI Pump 22 CCW Pump 22 AFW Pump 21 (at recirc flow)

Selected Equipment on MCCs 24A, and 260 Bus 6A: CR Fan 25 (EDG 23) CS Pump 22 Essential SW Pump 26 (or 23)

Non-Ess SW Pump 23 (or 26)

SI Pump 23 Recirc Pump 22 AFW Pump 23 (at recirc flow)

Selected Equip. on MCCs 26B, 26BB, and 27A CCW Pump 23 (if 21 or 22 fail)

Other Valves Close by Manual or Local Operator Action: 119-122 MOV-743 MOV-1870 MOV-842 MOV-843 6-7

Table 6.1-1 (cont.)

Time Table of Events Small 3" to 4" LOCA with Composite Failures Event Time (min)

RWST Level Reaches 2.0 ft, Operator Aligns Spray to Recirculation per ES-1.3: 125 CS Punp 22 (and 21) Stopped Valves MOV-866C and 866D Close Valve MOV-889B is Opened Recirculation Water ph Verified to be in Proper Range, 130 (otherwise a charging pump and BA transfer pump are operated to raise or lower ph)

Operators Isolate Accumulators by Closing 134 Discharge Valves 894A-894D End of Transient 140 0

6-8

Table 6.1-2a Small 3 to 4' LOCAWith Composite Failures - Loads on EDG 21 06t24102 Recirculation Switch Sequence Rlcire BusSA Loading - E0G 21 S

Time inMinules Nlo. 183 No. 2 NO.4 No.:6&8 No. 5 Spray Equipment Ma1 t 55rManfAul tO 30 60 105 107 109 11to 113 116 118 124 126 130 135 140 St Pmp 21 (400) 345 A 339 339 339 6 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 GSCit Wt Prop 21 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.2 CS Prnp 21 (400) 350 A 0 0 0 0 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 -350 0 0 0 0 CII Fan 21135)

CHFan21)350) 250 A 130 130 30 38 165 160 15 18 175 11 186 88 194 -I1

-It 13 113 1 183 93 183 113 183 183 CR Fan 22 0650) 150 30 t50 5 510 9 3 183 183 132 103 -l 82 112 182 182 182 12 -10

-10 172 33 183 3 8282 1ýB 1822 ; 172 RC Prep 21 (350) 303 M 0 5 0 5 0 8 - 0 0 194 194 194 194 194 107 3.1 301 301 301 Es. SW Prop 24 (350) 282 A 282 202 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 - 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW prop 21(350) 202 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 282 262 282 282 212 282 282 CCW Prmp21 (250) 230 M 8 0 0 230 230 236 235 230 230 230 230 -17 213 213 213 213 213 213 Chg Prep 21 (200) 150 M 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 -81 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sr Air Comp (125) 93 M 0 O 0o 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 5O 0 0 PZl Ilirs 23 485 M 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 1.g1 uS 23(132086OSV) 135 M 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 8 8 0 I.g' US23 (480V-)mg) 100 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 MCC26A Loads 0 MOVs: 0 MOV-822A 07 A 8)7 .0.7 0 8 0 8 0 0 0 8 8 MOV-894A 56 A 0 0 0 0 60 0 0 8 8 8 0 8 8 0 8 0 8 0 o 5.6 5.6 -5.6 0 MOV-894C 5.6 A 8 0 8 0 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 8 0 5.6 5.6 -5.6 0 MOV-866A 06 A 0 0 0 0 O 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0 0 0 0 1 O 0 0 0 8 MOV-866C 0.6 A 0 0 0 8 8 0 8 8 0 1 0 8 0.8 0.110-0. 8 0 0 MOV.868A 0.2 M 8 0 0 0 08 0 0 0 87 8.7 -07 0 1 0 8 0 0 MOV-744 5.8 A 8 0 0 6 8 5.8 8 -5.8 0 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-746 77 A 7.7 -7.7 0 0 0 0 8 0 11 0 0 7.7 7.7 -7.7 0 0 8 0 0 0 MOV-887A 0.4 A 0 8 0 8 0 0.4 0.4 .0.4 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 8 0 0 HCV-640 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFP,2-21 14.3 A 14.3 -14.3 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 MOV-1802A 0.7 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 087 -0.7 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 OV-89A 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 MOV-842 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 P 0 8 0 0 8 0.1

-HCV3106 0.6 -0.6 0 0 0 0.25 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 MOV-1817 1.2 M 0 1 8 ,0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 12 12 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 COW Boost Prep 21 (5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 37 EloC Tee EnsFan 21 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 7.4 7.4 7,4 7.4 7.4 7.4 . 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 1)GExh lan 21 (nor) 8.5 A 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 EDO Bldg. Vent Fan 319.321 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 75 7'5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 B1A1, Trace(nor) 16.8 A 16.8 16.8 16.6 10.8 168 16.8 16.8 1118 16.8 16.8 168 16.8 168 111. 1608 160 1618 XMFR 23 (Iwn21)(ma') 10 MWA 0 0 0 to 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 EPX3 t5 A IS l5 IS 15 15 I5 15 15 t5 5 t5

-91*r i5 15 . 15 I5 15 15 7.5 A 75 75 7.5 75 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 71 7 7.5 7.5 75 7.5 75 7.5 7.5 MCC26AA I A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1r 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1-2/02 Anlyz Ht Trc I 3.3 A 3.3 33 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 33 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3,3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 MCC29A 1G21 SupportLods FrelOil Prep (2) t.5 A .0 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 15 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Compresson (5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 -37 8 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sat Charger21 (Maxc) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 lnst Air Gnmp 21 (75) 56 A 56 5s 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 50 56 S6 58 56 56 51 56 l.A. Cool Prip 21 (3) 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 22 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Wall Exe Fan 215 (2) 1IS M 1.5 15 1.5 1.5 1., 1.5 1.5 15 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 - 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.5 MiS. Lss (Max) . 117 A fil 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 Total EDG 21 Lead: $167 1312 1339 1347 1593 1922 1029 1841 1841 2036 2045 2300 + 2299 r 2056 2055

2066 - 2035 r These sort lern high loeadsoccur as Tire long lerm EDIGload can a result .t cnr*e0y composite failures. be reduced below 1760 kw et.er to Senticn 6.1 or lead rnrrrgin by load mrnragrmeel, Rlfer 6-9 and additional discussion. to Sention 5.7 for more delails

Table 6.1-2b Small 3' to 4" LOG CA WilhComposite Failures - Loads on EDG 22 S Bus 2A/3A Loading - EUG 22 06/24102 Recirculalion Switch Seqaence Recirn Time in Mi-uls No. 1&3 No. 2 No. 4 No. 6&8 No. 5 Spray Equ pm Ao MaxkW ManfAuto I 1 5 I0 30 G6 ' 105 107 - 109 - 110 113 11

- 110 - 124 120 ' :30 " 135 ' 14D SI Prp 22 (400) 345 A 339 339 339 6 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 SI Cit Wtr Prop 22 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 . 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2,2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 BBHRProp 21 (400) 316 A 171 171 171 171 171 171 -171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AFW Prop 21 (400) 387 A 370 376 376 376 -153 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 723 223 223 223 223 CR Fan 23 (350) 250 A 130 30 160 15 175 11 too 14 -Il 103 183 103 103 183 183 183 -l 102 182 CR Fan 24 (350) 182 182 -tO 172 250 A 130 30 200 15 175 11 lIS O 8 104 11 103 103 183 103 183 183 /03 -1 182 182 182 102 -10 172 Ess SW Prop 25 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 202 282 202 282 2B2 282 282 282 282 2P2 282 282 282 282 NE SW Prop 22 (350) 282 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 782 CCW Prop 22 (250) 230 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -17 213 230 230 230 230 213 213 213 213 213 Chg Prop 22 (200) 150 M 81 81 81 01 81 81 8 g81 0 (

Pz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r 21 554 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o Pzr HIr 23 485 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LIg Tran 21 (Nor) 150 0 0 0 0 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LUgTran 22 150 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LIg Bus 23 (480V- Nor) 100 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 211 MOV'S B3FD -0 1.2 A 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 aFD-90-S 12 A 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-90-2 1.2 A 12 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-9Z 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 A 1.2 -1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD5 -1 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S 0 BFD-52 5 A 0 0 0 0 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BFD-53 0 0 0 0 5 A 5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5_

MCc DIG 2224A S, ppo. Load.

Fuel OIJProp (2)

.5 A 0 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 15 1.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A ft.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.7 3.7 -3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 XMFR 24 (1m,22)(max) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 ,A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 rnslAir Cornp 22 (75) 56 A 56 56 55 56 56 50 56 56 50 50 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 L.A.Cool Prop 22 (3) 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 22_ 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Bat Charger 22 (Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 Raraltire Monitor 45 1.6 A 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1t6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.0 MCC 26C DG Exhaust Fan 22 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0,8 0,8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 08 0.8 0.8 PAR Exhaust Fan 21 (125) 93 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Q8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 EDG Bldg Vent Fan 320,322 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 0 0 0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 2.5 7.5

- Battery Charger 23 25 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 25 25 25 25.. 25 25 25 25 25 CHAC Backup Fan (7.5) 5.6 27 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CRAC Booster Fan 21 (7.5), 5.8 A 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.6 5.8 5.0 5. 5.8 5.0 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 Dampers & Motors 0 SA Trans Pumpp21 (15) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 I1.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 SAT Healers 21 15 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Spent Fuel Pump 21 (100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wall Exhaust Fan 213 (2) 1.5 M 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 15 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Misc. Loss (Mao) 122 A 122 122 122 122 122 122 172 1Q2 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122

. ............ 05....10...0..0..7....17..

.. 30-----------

Total EOG 22 Load: 1708 1854 1880 1888 . ..... ... ... ...... . ..... .....

1751 1730 1559 1478 1990 1900 1990 1973 1971 l971 1971 1971 1 1951 The long term EOG load can

-10 be reduced below 1750 kw by load munagemool. Rele, to Section 5.7 lotmore details.

0

Tfble 6.1-2c Small 3'Io 4" LOCA WithComposite Failures - Loads on EDG 23 06t24102 RacircoljalionSwitch Sequence - Raciro No. 1&3 NO 2 No 4 No. 6&8 No. 5 Spiny fus 6A Loading - E6 D23 Time in Minutes A

MaxoW MangAulo 1 . 5

10 " 30 8 60 " 105 107 ' 109 " 110 " 113 116 I 110 124 126 " 130) " 135 ' 140 345 A 339 339 339 6 345 345 345 345 3-n5 345 34S 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 (400)23 23 Prop

$IC4t Prp WNr CS 2.2 A 2,2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 22 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 a.2 7. 2.2 2,2 2.2 CS Prnp 22 (400) 350 A 0 0 0 0 350 350 350 350 350 350 300 " 350 350 -250 0 0 0 0 RI01 PRop22 (100) 316 A 171 171 171 171 171 121 -171 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 Q 8 0 AVWProp 23 f4 O0) 387 A 3 6 328 328 376 -. 53 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 273 223 223 223 CR Fto 25(350) 250 A 130 30 160 15 175 I1 186 8 194 -11 183 183 163 183 183 183 183 -1 182 182 180 102 -10 172 RC Pmp 22 (350) 303 M 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 194 194 194 194 194 101 301 301 301 301 Eso SW Pmp 26 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 202 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 202 NE SW Pmp 23 (350) 282 M 0 0 0 0 00 0 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 262 282 202 Chg Prop 23(200) 150 M 81 .1 111 81 81 81 81 -81 0 0 0 0 213 213 213 21 3 213 213 Orb A.. Lub (150) 112 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Par lItr Cntl Gp 277 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Li Iran 21 (Emg) 150 M 0 0 0 ) 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CCW Prmp 23 230 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 MCC268 Loads MOrs:

MOV-822B 0.7 A 0.7 -0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-894l 56 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 56 5.6 -5.6 MOV-8940 56 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 56 5.6 -56 0 MOV-8668 0.6 A 0 0 5 0 0 0.6 06 -0.6 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-806D 06 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 U.6 06 -06 0 0 0 MoOV-0888 0 0.7 M 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0.7 017 -0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-882 2.2 M 0 0 0 8 0 2.2 22 -2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

MOV-887B 0.4 A 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 04 -04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.7 A 7.7 -727 0 0 0 0 0 7.7 -7.7 0 0 0 0 0 MOV- 47 0 0 0 0 0 7.7 00 HCV-638 86 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 1FP-2-22 14.3 A 14.3 -14.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o o 0 o Q 0 Mvov-1802B 0.7 A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.7 -01 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-813 MCIV-8 136 0 00 M 0 0 , 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 06 0.6 -0.6 2 0 0 0 8.6 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 -06 0 0 0 14V3101 025 M 0 0 0 - 0 0 S o S O 0 0 0 0 0 0 CC Boosl Prap 22 (5) 37 A 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 37 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 37 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 37 Elec Tru EbhFta 22 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 2.4 7.4 74 7.4 7.4 74 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 BA Heai Trace (F.rg) 16.8 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 o o 0 C1("AC-la;idi*io 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 22 a2, 2.2 22 2.2 2.2 22 22 22 2.7 2.2 CRAG Fan (in) 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 0 7.5 75 75 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 75 7.5 7,5 CRAC Boosl Fan 22 (7.5), 0. A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Oamrpers & Motors 0 0 DG 23 Support Loads Fuel Oil Prop (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Comrprossor (5) 1.50 1.5 3.7 A 3.7 -3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 Lighlng Panel 223: 0 0 D0 Exhausl Fan 23 08 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 DG Bid E6mgLighls 1.1 A I 1 1.1 1*1 1 1. 1 1. I'I 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 11 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 Eng Au, Cnar Pol 0.3 A 6.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 8A Trans Prp 22 (7.5/I5) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 - 112 11.2 11,2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 E0G Bidg VPoo Fan 318,323 7.5 A 7.5 7a5 7.5 75 7.5 7.5 7.5 75 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7P5 0 0 MCC26B1BLeads 0 0 Misc MOVs 1 A I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I 1 1 1 1 H2702 Anlyr "I T l.ace 2 3.3 A 33 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 33 3,3 33 3.3 33 3.3 33 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.3 Iruosl 2H (45KVA) - 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.3 MCC27A Loads Sal Ch*rger, 2-2 4(Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 25 25 95 25 25 20 25 25 25 25 25 It 20 XFMR 22 (In )(max) IS M 0 O O 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAG Exhausl Fan 22 (125) 93 M 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PAS Supply Fan (50) 37 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 "0 0 0 0

Spenl firel Pomp 22 (100) 75 M 0 8 O 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Misc. Loss (Max) 119 A Ito 119 118 119 119 119 119 119 110 119 110 119 119 119 119 119 110 6T0ll OG 21 Load 1573 1622 1637 1634 1489 1029 1501 1077 1805 2054 2061 2266 2200 c 2023 2022' 2033 - 2012

+ ahese shob term high loads ocWr as - The long term 1DG load cn

-asnui el unIiely conpsile flailuros. be reduced below 1750 )w Reler to Section 6.1 for load margin by load management. Refer 6-11 and nddilonnl discussion. 1o Selion 5.7 oi osi. details.

z tn

~svo

~

0.

0 IUUO

o 2000 ;-5C-*

WEt (SEC)

CONSOLIDATED EDISON INDIAN POINT UNIT No. 2 UFSAR FIGURE 14.3-65 4.0" SMALL BREAK LOCA RCS PRESSURE MIC. No. 2001MB1246 IREV. No. 16A Figure 6.1-1 RCS Pressure for the 4" Small Break LOCA 0

6-12

1,

z W 750OO Uj TIkMr (SEC)

CONSOLIDATED EDtSON INDIAN POINT UNIT No. 2 UFSAR FIGURE 14.3-54 3.0" SMALL BREAK LOCA RCS PRESSURE MIC. No. 2001MB1235 REV. No. 16A Figure 6.1-2 RCS Pressure for the 3" Small Break LOCA 6-13

6.2 Emergency Diesel Generator Loadings for Non-LOCA Transients In this section three non-LOCA transients with Sl are discussed. These are steamline break, steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) and spurious safety injection signal (SIS).

Although the EOPs used for these three events differ, many of the equipment requirements end up being about the same, at least from the standpoint of EDG operation.

For a steamline break the following EOPs and POP would be used:

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev. 38)

E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (Rev. 34)

E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (Rev. 36)

ES-1.1, Sl Termination (Rev. 36)

POP 3.2, Plant Recovery from Reactor Trip For a SGTR the following EOPs would be used:

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev. 38)

E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (Rev. 36)

ES-3.1, Post SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill, or alternate cooldown and depressurization procedure ES-3.2 or ES-3.3 (all are Rev. 34)

For a spurious SIS the following EOPs and POP would be used:

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev. 38)

ES-1.1, Sl Termination (Rev. 36)

POP 3.2, Plant Recovery from Reactor Trip For the design basis accidents (and for spurious SIS), the usual minimum set of safeguards equipment would start following safety injection actuation. The required equipment is similar to that previously listed for LOCA, i. e., 2 SI pumps, 1 RHR pump, 2 essential header SW pumps, 3 CR fans and one motor driven AFW pump. For secondary break inside containment, 1 CS pump would also be required to operate until containment pressure decreases to less than 17 psig per EOP E-1 instructions.

Figures 6.2-1 and 6.2-2 show the RCS pressure and pressurizer water volume transients for a design basis steamline break performed as a part of the Stretch Rating Study (Reference 6-1). The containment pressure transient representative for this case is given in Table 3.2-2.

For the large secondary break design basis event, the operator would typically be able to diagnose the event within 10 minutes and satisfy the criteria for SI termination in E-1 within about 30 minutes. To satisfy these criteria for the secondary break, the operator would need to start one charging pump in EOP E-0 or E-1. After the faulted SG 6-14

blowdown has stopped and cooldown shrink has been terminated, RCS pressure would start to increase and pressurizer level would return on span. These conditions (along with subcooling greater than uncertainties, RCS pressure greater than the shutoff head pressure of the HHSI pumps, plus reestablishment of secondary heat sink) satisfy the requirements for SI termination.

The SI and RHR pumps would then be stopped in ES-1.1 (the RHR pumps may have also been stopped prior to this in E-1). Per EOP E-1 instructions, containment spray would be stopped after containment pressure is reduced to less than 17 psig. For the design basis secondary break this would occur at approximately 20 to 40 minutes after event initiation (see Table 3.2-2). For this evaluation, we assume spray is secured at 30 minutes.

The RCS subcooling required in E-1 to terminate SI is 26°F with adverse containment conditions. The RCS is only slightly subcooled (<1 5°F) at 300 seconds into the transient. However, at 600 seconds (10 minutes), subcooling exceeds 50'F, which is sufficient for Si termination. RCS pressure must also be greater than 1690 psig in order to terminate SI with an adverse containment environment. Based on Figure 6.2-1, this condition is met therefore SI and spray can be terminated at 30 minutes.

For the SGTR accident, the SI termination criteria would be satisfied in EOP E-3 following operator actions to identify and isolate the ruptured SG, cooldown the RCS by approximately 50'F (typically) using the intact SGs atmospheric steam dump valves, and then depressurize the RCS using one pressurizer PORV. For the design basis (i. e., double ended) SGTR analysis in the FSAR, it was assumed SI would be terminated within 30 minutes after event initiation. For the EDG loading study, load changes are summarized between a hypothetical 15 minute end of injection phase and 40 minute start of SGTR recovery phase. The RHR pump would be stopped midway through the E-3.procedure (this is now done after SI termination). A charging pump would be started following the initial cooldown, if not already operating per E-0, Step 5.

After the EOP E-3 SI termination criteria are satisfied, the SI pumps would be stopped.

The criteria for Si termination in EOP E-3 are pressurizer level on span, RCS subcooling greater than uncertainties, RCS pressure stable or increasing, plus establishment of a secondary heat sink.

For the spurious SIS the operator would typically be able to diagnose the event within 10 minutes and terminate Si within about 15 minutes. Since the SI termination criteria

,(which are the same as those for the secondary break) are immediately met following the spurious SIS, the operator would go directly from EOP E-0 to EOP ES-i .1 and stop the SI and RHR pumps.

Following SI termination in ES-1.1 or E-3 (and stopping of the CS pump for the secondary break), the required major equipment left operating are the essential SW pumps, the CR fans, the motor driven AFW pump, and one charging pump. The EOPs also direct the operator to start a service water pump on the non-essential header and also to start a CCW pump (provided concurrent CS pump operation does not cause an 6-15

EDG loading problem). this set of equipment clearly represents a less limiting set of loads than that described for LOCA. The equipment requirements for SGTR, spurious SIS or secondary break are essentially identical after the SI, RHR and CS pumps are stopped. For post-secondary break recovery in ES-i.1, pressurizer heaters, charging flow, letdown, and AFW would be controlled to maintain hot standby conditions. Per ES-I.1, unnecessary equipment would be shut down. ES-1.1 also allows the operator to place the main turbine and main boiler feed pump turbines on turning gear after their shafts stop. The operator would then transition to the appropriate shutdown procedure, POP 3.2. For post-SGTR recovery with backfill, a similar set of equipment would be operated (i.e., charging, letdown, pressurizer heaters and AFW). The plant would then be cooled down to cold shutdown using the SG atmospheric steam dump valves and later the RHR system. For recovery after spurious SIS, POP 3.2 is exercised. A set of equipment similar to that for the SGTR would be required (i. e., charging, letdown, pressurizer heaters and AFW). The SG atmospheric steam dump valves and RHRS would also be used to cool down the plant to cold shutdown.

It is possible that SI termination for secondary break or SGTR may not be accomplished before the 30 or 40 minutes noted previously. This would be particularly true for a small (less than design basis) SGTR where additional time may be required to identify which of the steam generators contains the rupture. The EDG loading should therefore account for the possibility that the SI pumps may be operating for longer than 30 minutes, possibly as long as one or two hours until a clear indication on the SG narrow range level instrumentation appears to confirm which SG has the rupture.

The EDG loads for each of these three non-LOCA transients are described below. For many of the loads, certain equipment is redundant (i.e., on two or more EDGs) to allow for the possibility of equipment unavailability. The loading tables for these events were constructed in this manner to allow for possible equipment failures and/or for components to be allowed out of service per the Technical Specifications. Even with this redundancy, it is possible to load additional optional equipment to aid in plant recovery.

In the current (Rev. 38) version of the EOPs (Ref. 1-28), there is a step in the E-3 SGTR procedure and the ES-I.1 SI termination procedure that directs the operator to reset (normal) lighting. This step also instructs the operator to reset other MCCs in addition to those already energized (i.e., MCCs 26A/AA, 26B/BB, 26C, 211, 24A, 27A, and 29A). The normal lighting loads when lighting is reset in these procedure steps is assumed to be as follows:

Lighting Transformer 21 - 150 kw (normal supply-EDG 22, emergency-EDG 23)

Lighting Transformer 22 - 130 kw (EDG 22)

Lighting Transformer 23 - 100 kw (EDG 21)

The load for transformer 21 is simply based on the "kVA"-rating of the transformer. For transformers 22 and 23 (both rated at 225 kVA), credit is taken for a more detailed estimate based on the expected power requirements for the various lighting panels (see 6-16

Table 3.4-2 of WCAP-12655, Rev.0). An additional 10% has been added to account for possible lighting loads added over the years.

In addition to the lighting loads, the following other MCCs would be energized (note:

MCCs 28 and 28A are reset if containment conditions are normal and the containment sump level is less than 44' 3"):

EDG 21: EDG 22: EDG 23:

MCC 29 ) MCC 21,22 MCC 27 MCC 28 MCC 23,24 MCC 25,28A MCC 210 Loads for many of these MCCs, before the creation of MCCs 24A, 27A, 29A, and 26C, are described in Section 3.4 of WCAP-1 2655 Rev. 0. For purposes of constructing loading tables for the transients described in this section, it will be assumed that the operator controls the total addition of automatic loads from these other MCCs to approximately 100 kw per EDG. Additional BOP support loads on MCCs 22 and 25 (e.g., bearing oil pump, MBFP oil console main oil pump, etc.,) will also be accounted for separately since EDG 22 powers considerably more equipment than the others.

Note that when this reset lightingfreset MCC step is encountered in the EOPs, the accident will have been mitigated and the operator will be able manage loads on the EDGs without difficulty.

Steamline Break For this transient, the operator initially follows E-0, E-2, and E-1. As discussed previously, after the faulted SG blowdown has stopped and cooldown shrink has been terminated, plant conditions are assumed to be sufficient to meet the criteria to terminate SI and stop containment spray within 30 minutes. Therefore, following through the EOPs, two time-based loading summaries (columns) can be used to determine the EDG loadings during this transient:

1. E-0, E-2, E-1:

Auto loads, Add a charging pump, Auto MCC reset loads.

2. ES-1.1:

Stop Sl (and RHR) pumps, Stop CS pumps, Add a CCW pump and non-essential SW pump (if not already on and EDG loading permits),

Add pressurizer heaters (if loading permits),

Add normal lighting and other MCC loads.

6-17

Place main turbine and BFP turbines on tuming gear.

The EDG loading tables for steamline break with the above two columns are provided in Tables 6.2-1a, -1b, and -1c. Inputs to these tables were taken from Tables 3.1-2, 3.3-2a, 3.3-2b, 3.3-2c and 3.4-1 through 3.4-3. Power requirements for the fan cooler motors were determined from Table 3.2-2. As can be noted, the EDG loads are typically less than 2100 kw during the first 30 minutes of the transient. Following SI and spray termination, the peak transient loads on either EDG 21 or EDG 22 may exceed 2100 kw if additional loads such as a non-essential service water pump, a CCW pump, or pressurizer heaters are assumed. However, any combination of two EDGs can power a minimum of additional loads (for example, one CCW pump, one NE SW pump, and pressurizer heaters) without exceeding 2100 kw on either EDG as shown below:

EDG 21 & 22 EDG 21 & 23 EDG 22 & 23 oerating Operatin Operating Drop CCW 21 Drop CCW 21 Drop CCW 22 from EDG 21 from EDG 21 from EDG 22 AND OR Drop NE SW 22 Drop PZR Htrs from EDG 22 from EDG 21 -

All EDG loads remain well below the 2300 kw 1/2 hour rating throughout the transient. In the longer term (e.g., after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) individual EDG loads are controllable to establish less than 1750 kw.

Steam Generator Tube Rupture For this event, EOPs E-0 and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, are used. Long term, it is assumed that the operator uses ES-3.1, Post-SGTR Cooldown with Backfill.

EDG loads for the other post-SGTR recovery procedures (ES-3.2 and ES-3.3) would be similar. Following the EOPs, it is possible to use three columns to summarize the SGTR loads:

1. E-0, E-3:

Auto loads, Add a charging pump, Auto MCC reset loads.

6-18

2. E-3:

Stop SI pumps, Add PAB Ventilation Stop RHR pumps, Add a CCW pump and non-essential SW pump (if EDG loading permits),

Add pressurizer heaters, Add Normal Lighting and other MCC loads.

3. ES-3.1 Loads are the same as the end of E-3 except AFW is assumed throttled.

The EDG loading tables for SG tube rupture are provided in Tables 6.2-2a, -2b, and 2c.

As with steamline break, inputs to these tables were taken from Tables 3.1-2, 3.2-1, 3.3-2a, 3.3-2b, 3.3-2c and 3.4-1 through 3.4-3. It should be noted that in column 2, the load for the SI pumps is shown as zero even though the SI pumps may be running during part of this time interval. Since the power required for the loads assumed added later in E-3 (after SI termination) exceed the power requirement for the SI pump, the loadings will be bounded by displaying the results as provided in these tables. The EDG loads for SG tube rupture are less than 2100 kw. Long term loads are controllable to less than 1750 kw with EDG load management.

O Spurious SI Actuation The EDG loads for spurious SI with SI termination (ES-1.1) are very similar to those found for SGTR. Three columns are again used to describe the EDG loading:

1. E-0 Auto loads, Add a charging pump, Add MCC reset loads.

2. ES-1.1:

Stop RHR and SI pumps, Add a CCW pump and non-essential SW pump (if EDG loading permits),

Add pressurizer heaters, Add normal lighting and other MCC loads Add PAB ventilation, Place main turbine and BFP turbines on turning gear.

3. ES-1.1 after 40 min:

Throttle AFW.

The EDG loading tables for spurious SI actuation are provided in Tables 6.2-3a, -3b, and -3c. Loads for EDG 22 and EDG 23 remain less than 2100 kw throughout the transient. For EDG 21, loading may exceed 2100 kw if additional loads such as a non-6-19

essential service water pump, a COW pump, or pressurizer heaters are assumed.

However, as discussed for the steamline break, any combination of two EDGs can power a minimum of additional loads (for example, one CCW pump, one NE SW pump, and pressurizer heaters) without exceeding 2100 kw on either EDG. Long term loads are controllable to less than 1750 kw with EDG load management.

Conclusion for Non-LOCA Transients The calculated EDG loads for the non-LOCA transients are typically less than the two hour EOP limit of 2100 kw, with certain exceptions when additional loads such as non-essential service water pumps, COW pumps, or pressurizer heaters are assumed. In those cases, it may be necessary to split the additional loads between the operating EDGs in order to maintain loading below 2100 kw during the first two hours of the transient. Successful EDG load management may be required by the operator for long term loads to ensure that an overload situation does not occur on any of the EDGs.

This load management could involve'selectively loading the COW and non-essential SW pump on separate diesels to ensure a more balanced loading situation. The loading tables compiled in this section used at least two COW and two non-essential SW pumps for redundancy and conservatism. An attachment to EOP E-3 and ES-1.1 should be considered to direct the operator on MCC automatic loads (similar to Tables 3.4-1, -2, -3, and -4) while they are being energized. Alternatively, Attachment 2 to -'

these EOPs could be expanded to include information on the maximum expected load increase for each MCC as it is reset.

6-20

Table 6.2-1 a Steamline Break Maximum EDG 21 Loading (kw)

EOPs Followed: E-0, E-2 ES-1.1 and E-1 After SI / Spray Injection Termination (0-30 min) (>30 min)

Si Pump 21 315 0 CS Pump 21 350 0i CR Fans 21 &22 444 312"')

Ess SW Pump 24 282 282 NE SW Pump 21 0 282 CCW Pump 21 0 230 Przr Htrs 23 0 485 Chg Pump 21 150 150 MCC 26A & 26AA 86 65 OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT MCC 29A 86 86 Other MCCs 0 -100 Lighting Transf 23 0 100(2)

Misc Losses 117, 117 Total EDG Load (kw) 1830 -2209(3" Notes:

(1) One of these CR fans can be secured after normal containment conditions are established.

(2) Lighting and other MCC loads are assumed added after CS pump is turned off.

(3) Loads are readily controllable to limit EDG load to less than 2100 kw.

6-21

Table 6.2-1b Steamline Break Maximum EDG 22 Loading (kw)

EOPs Followed: E-0, E-2 ES-1.1 and E-1 After Si / Spray Injection Termination (0-30 min) (>30 min)

Si Pump 22 315 0 RHR Pump 21 171 0(1)

AFW Pump 21 376 309(1"4' CR Fans 23&24 444 312(2)

Ess SW Pump 25 282 282 NE SW Pump 22 0 282 CCW Pumps 22 0 230 Chg Pump 22 150 150 MCC 26C 52 52 OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT MCC 24A 86 86 Lighting Transf 22 0 130"3)

Other MCCs 0 -100(3)

Bearing Oil Pump or 0 56 Turning Gear Oil Pump MBFP Oil Pump 21 or 22 0 45 Turning Gear Motors 0 38 (turbine and MBFPs)

Misc Losses 122 122 Total EDG Load (kw) 1998 -2194 Notes:

(1) The AFW pump can be stopped if RHR is placed in service for cooldown.

(2) One of these CR fans can be secured after normal containment conditions are established.

(3) Lighting and other MCC loads are assumed added after CS pump is turned off.

(4) Flow would be throttled to maintain SG NR level within control band.

The loading shown corresponds to 250 gpm. 0 6-22

W Table 6.2-1c Steamline Break Maximum EDG 23 Loading (kw)

EOPs Followed: E-0, E-2 ES-1.1 and E-1 After Si / Spray Injection Termination (0-30 min) (>30 min)

SI Pump 23 315 0 CS Pump 22, 350 0 RHR Pump 22 171 0(1) 376 309(1 2)

AFW Pump 23 CR Fan 25 222 156 Ess SW Pump 26 282 282 NE SW Pump 23 0 0 CCW Pump 23 0 230 Prz Htr Cont Gp 0 277 Charging Pump 23 150 150 MCC 26B & 26BB 80 48 O OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT MCC 27A 25 155 Lighting Transf 21 0 150(3)

Other MCCs 0 -100(3)

Misc Losses 119 119 Total EDG Load (kw) 2090 -1976 Notes:

(1) The AFW pump can be stopped if RHR is placed in service for cooldown.

(2) Flow would be throttled to maintain SG NR level within control band.

The loading shown corresponds to 250 gpm.

(3) Lighting and other MCC loads are assumed added after CS pumps are turned off 6-23

Table 6.2-2a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Maximum EDG 21 Loading (kw)

EOls Followed: E-0 and E-3 E-3 ES-3.1, Post-Injection SI Termination SGTR Recovery (0-15 min) (15-40 min) (>40 min)

SI Pump 21 315 0 0 CS Pump 21 0 0 0 CR Fans 21&22 220 220 220(1)

Ess SW Pump 24 282 282 282 NE SW Pump.21 0 282 282 CCW Pump 21 0 230 230 Przr Htrs 23 0 485 485(2)

Chg Pump 21 150 80 80(3)

MCC 26A & 26AA 86 65 65 OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT

-MCC 29A 86 86 86 Lighting Transf 23 0 100 100 Other MCCs 0 -100 -100 Misc Losses 117 117 117 Total EDG Load (kw) 1256 -2047 -2047 Notes:

(1) One of these CR fans can be secured after normal containment conditions are established.

(2) One pressurizer heater group from any EDG may be energized to control the RCS and ruptured SG pressures, provided the 2100 kw limit is not exceeded.

(3) With RCS pressure reduced to the ruptured SG pressure, the charging pump discharge pressure is expected to be less than 1400 psig.

6-24

Table 6.2-2b Steam Generator Tube Rupture Maximum EDG 22 Loading (kw)

EOPs Followed: E-0 and E-3 E-3 ES-3.1, Post-Injection SI Termination SGTR Recovery (0-15-min) (15-40 min) (>40 min SI Pump 22 315 0 0 RHR Pump 21 171 0 0(11 376 376 309(1'4)

AFW Pump 21 220 220 220(2)

CR Fans 23&24 Ess SW Pump 25 282 282 282 NE SW Pump 22 0 282 282 CCW Pumps 22 0 230 230 150 80 80(3)

Chg Pump 22 MCC 26C 52 52 52 OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT MCC 24A 86 86 86 Bearing Oil Pump or 0 56 56 Turning Gear Oil Pump MBFP Oil Pump 21 or 22 45 45 45 Turning Gear Motors 0 38 38 (turbine and MBFPs)

Lighting Transf 22 0 130 130 Other MCCs 0 -100 -100 Misc Losses 122 122 122 Total EDG Load (kw) 1819 -2099 -2032 Notes:

(1) See note (1) in Table 6.2-2c.

(2) One of theseCR fans can be secured after normal containment conditions are established.

(3) With RCS pressure reduced to the ruptured SG pressure, the charging pump discharge pressure is expected to be less than 1400 psig.

(4) Flow would be throttled to maintain SG NR level within control band. The loading shown corresponds to 250 gpm.

6-25

Table 6.2-2c Steam Generator Tube Rupture Maximum EDG 23 Loading (kw)

EOPs Followed: E-0 and E-3 E-3 ES-3.1, Post-Injection SI Termination SGTR Recovery (0-15 min (15-40 min) (>40 min SI Pump 23 315 0 0 CS Pump 22 0 0 0 RHR Pump 22 171 0 0(1) 376 376 309(1'4)

AFW Pump 23 CR Fan 25 110 110 110 Ess SW Pump 26 282 282 282 NE SW Pump 23 0 0(2) 0 CCW Pump 23 0 230 230 Przr Htr Cont Gp 0 277 277 Charging Pump 22 150 80 80(3)

MCC 26B & 26BB 80 48 48 OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT MCC 27A 25 155 155 Lighting Trans. 21 0 150 150 Other MCCs 0 -100 -100 Misc Losses 119 119 119 Total EDG Load (kw) 1628 -1927 -1860 Notes:

(1) The AFW pump can be stopped if RHR is placed in service for cooldown.

During the backfill process, however, it may still be necessary to operate an AFW pump periodically to maintain a high level in the ruptured SG. Sufficient optional loads (including one or more CR fans) could be stopped to limit the EDG loadings for this situation.

(2) A NE SW pump may be added if the EDG loading is less than 1800 kw.

(3) With RCS -pressure reduced to the ruptured SG pressure, the charging pump discharge pressure is expected to be less than 1400 psig.

(4) Flow would be throttled to maintain SG NR level within control band. The loading shown corresponds to 250 gpm.

6-26

WTable 6.2-3a Spurious SI Actuation Maximum EDG 21 Loading (kw)

EOPs Followed: E-0 ES-1.1 ES-1.1 Injection SI Termination Longer Term (0-15 min) (15-40 min) (>40 min)

Pump 21 315 0 0 CS Pump 21 0 0 0 CR Fans 21&22 220 220 220(1)

Ess SW Pump 24 282 282 282 NE SW Pump 21 0 \282 282 CCW Pump 21 0 230 230 Przr Htrs 23 0 485 485(2)

Chg Pump 21 150 150 150 MCC 26A & 26AA 86 65 65 OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT MCC 29A 86 86 86 O Lighting Transf 23 0 100 100 Other MCCs 0 -100 -100 Misc Losses 117 117 117 Total EDG Load (kw) 1256 -2117 -2117 Notes:

(1) One of these CR fans can be secured after normal containment conditions are established.

(2) One pressurizer heater group from any EDG may be energized for RCS pressure control provided the 21.00 kw limit is not exceeded.

6-27

Table 6.2-3b Spurious SI Actuation Maximum EDG 22 Loading (kw)

EOPs Followed: E-0 ES-1.1 ES-1.1 Injection SI Termination Longer Term (0-15 min) (15-40 min) (>40 min)

SI Pump 22 315 0 0 RHR Pump 21 171 0 0(1)

AFW Pump 21 376 376 3 0 9 (t4) 220 220 220(2)

CR Fans 23&24 Ess SW Pump 25 282 282 282 NE SW Pump 22 0 0(3) 0 CCW Pumps 22 0 230 230 Chg Pump 22 150 150 150 MCC 26C 52 52 52 OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT MCC 24A 86 86 86 Bearing Oil Pump or 0 56 56 Turning Gear Oil Pump MBFP Oil Pump 21 or 22 45 45 45 Turning Gear Motors 0 38 38 (turbine and MBFPs)

Lighting Transf 22 0 130 130 Other MCCs 0 -100 -100 Misc Losses 122 122 122 Total EDG Load (kw) 1819 -1887 -1820 Notes:

(1) The AFW pump can be stopped if RHR is placed in service for cooldown.

(2) One of these CR fans can be secured after normal containment conditions are established.

(3) A NE SW pump may be added if the EDG loading is less than 1800 kw.

(4) Flow would be throttled to maintain SG NR level within control band. The loading shown corresponds to 250 gpm.

6-28

Table 6.2-3c Spurious SI Actuation Maximum EDG 23 Loading (kw)

EOPs Followed: E-0 ES-1.1 ES-1.1 Injection Sl Termination Longer Term (0-15 min) (15-40 min) (>40 min)

SI Pump 23 315 0 0 CS Pump 22 0 0 0 RHR Pump 22 171 0 0(1) 376 376 309(1,3)

AFW Pump 23 CR Fan 25 110 110 110 Ess SW Pump 26 282 282 282 NE SW Pump 23 0 282 282 CCW Pump 23 0 0(2) " 0 Przr Htr Cont GP 0 277 277 Charging Pump 150 150 150 MCC 26B & 26BB 80 48 48 OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT MCC 27A 25 155 155 Lighting Trans 21 0 150 150 Other MCCs 0 -100 -100 Misc Losses 119 119 119 Total EDG Load (kw) 1628 -2049 -1982 Notes:

(1) The AFW pump can be stopped if RHR is placed in service for cooldown.

(2) A CCW pump may be added if the EDG loading is less than 1850 kw.

(3) Flow would be throttled to maintain SG NR level within control band. The loading shown corresponds to 250 gpm.

6-29

2500 2000 1500 U) 1000 U

500 0

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 TIME (SEC) 600 550 U.. Intact Loops 500 450 CL E 400 350 -J Faulted Loop 300 250!

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 TIME (SEC)

(From Reference 6-1)

Figure 6.2-1: Reactor Coolant Pressure, Reactor Vessel Inlet Temperature vs.

Time for Steamline Break.

6-30

IPP SLB C.R. - DE BRK UPSTREAM DE BRK UPSTREAM FLOW RESTRICTOR - W/O OFFSITE POWER 800 700 600 U-

2 500 -!

-j 0

400 i I- 300 J w 200 IL2 100 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 TIME (SEC)

(Used in Steamline Break Analysis described in Reference 6-1)

Figure 6.2-2: Pressurizer Water Volume vs. Time for Steamline Break 6-31

7.0 STATION BLACKOUT AND LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER WITHOUT SI 7.1 Background In previous sections of this report, limiting loads on the EDGs were determined for accident conditions for various design basis accident conditions with Safety Injection (SI). An example scenario considered would be large LOCA with loss of offsite power and 2 of 3 EDGs operating, i.e., only limiting single failures were considered.

For recovery from a station blackout at Indian Point Unit 2, it is desirable to have the capability to supply power to the equipment needed for recovery using only 1 of 3 EDGs. In determination of the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months station blackout coping duration, the assumption of 1 of 3 EDGs (versus 2 of 3) has been made in the NRC Safety Evaluation of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2, Response to the Station Blackout Rule, dated November 21, 1991 (Reference 7-2). In their SER, the NRC refers to a "draft" EDG load list compiled in June 1990, prior to the EDG enhancement project. However, the SER assumes increased EDG loading capability resulting from the EDG enhancement project to demonstrate acceptable recovery for both hot and cold shutdown conditions.

Because the "draft" load list had never been officially documented and since it reflected a plant configuration that existed prior to the 1991 refueling outage (i.e., before addition of MCCs 24A, 26C, 29A, and 27A), Con Edison authorized Westinghouse to perform a EDG load study for station blackout recovery using a single EDG (Reference 7-1).

Results for loss of offsite power with a single EDG available are provided in this section.

This section is essentially the same as WCAP-126255, Rev. 1, Supplement 1 (Ref. 7-1) except it has been updated to reflect various load changes in Section 3 and EOP changes (Ref. 1-28). It should be noted that for the Station Blackout SER, a gas-turbine generator is credited as an alternate source of AC power at the end of one hour. No credit is taken for the gas turbine alternate AC power source since the intent of this report is to demonstrate recovery capability using any single EDG.

7.2 Cases Considered For hot standby recovery, it is assumed the reactor is initially operating at full power prior to loss of offsite power. Two situations or cases are then credible here:

Case 1. Loss of offsite power occurs, only one EDG starts Case 2. Complete loss of AC power occurs (station blackout), one EDG is recovered.

To demonstrate capability to recover for cold shutdown conditions, a third case is included:

Case 3. Natural circulation cooldown to cold shutdown conditions, only one EDG is used for recovery.

Conditions at the end of hot standby (from Cases 1 and 2) are used to define the initial conditions for Case 3.

7-1

7.3 Emergency Operating Procedures The EDG loading analysis for this section is based on the Indian Point Unit 2 Emergency Operating Procedures, Rev. 38 (Reference 1-28). An overview of the EOP actions is provided for each of the above cases.

In the first case, the operator is directed to Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Since it is assumed an accident has not occurred (SI not actuated), the operator is directed to EOP ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, soon after entry into E-0 (from Step 3 of E-0). A timetable of events for this case is provided in Table 7-1.

In the second case, no EDG initially operates so the operator follows the instructions in EOP ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. A single EDG is then recovered after performing the initial actions in ECA-0.0 (e.g., major equipment loads placed in PULLOUT). A time of 30 minutes is arbitrarily selected as the time at which power is restored using a single EDG. This time frame is considered reasonable since it is comparable to but less than the time at which a gas turbine would be credited as an alternate AC (ACC) power source (i.e., 60 minutes). Since SI is not assumed to be required, the operator is directed to ECA-0.1, Loss of All Power Recovery Without SI Required, after verification that a service water (SW) pump on the essential header has started. A timetable of events for this case is provided in Table 7-2.

The times used in the development of Tables 7-1 and 7-2 are not necessarily absolute or required times for operator actions. They are considered typical times that reflect the sequence of actions taken in the EOPs and the order in which equipment is added onto the assumed operating EDG.

Note that at the end of each of Tables 7-1 and 7-2 (ihe., at the end of ES-0.1 and ECA-0.1), the operator would be directed to EOP ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown.

Assuming this transition occurs at approximately one hour for either case, the ES-0.2 timetable applicable for the transition from hot standby to cold shutdown is provided in Table 7-3. Again, the times used in Table 7-3 reflect the sequence of operator actions and order in which the loads on the operating EDG changes. They are representative but not absolute times. Note that the time scale has been, changed from "minutes" (in Tables 7-1 and 7-2) to "hours" in Table 7-3.

7.4 EDG Loads During Hot Standby EDG loading spreadsheets corresponding to the Table 7-1 (ES-0.1) scenario and the Table 7-2 station blackout (ECA-0.1) scenario have been developed for each single EDG assumed started. Table 7-1a describes the loading on EDG 21 for the Table 7-1 scenario; Tables 7-1 b and 7-1c describe the loadings on EDGs 22 and 23, respectively, again'for the Table 7-1 scenario. Likewise, Tables 7-2a, 7-2b, and 7-2c describe the loads on EDGs 21, 22, and 23, respectively, for the limited duration station blackout case.

7-2

7.4.1 Major Equipment Loads W) Sincecontainment The there is no accident pressure (SI andnot actuated), are temperature the also SI and RHR pumps expected do not to remain operate.

in normal range, so the CS pump does not operate. The Containment Recirculation (CR) fan loads (when manually started) are based on normal containment density. Without SI actuation, the CCW pump on the operating EDG automatically starts (see Section 4.1 or 4.3). Equipment loadings for the MD-AFW pumps, SW pumps, CCW pumps, and CR fans are as previously determined in Section 3. Maximum component loads are conservatively assumed unless otherwise indicated (e.g., loads due to the CR fans are based on normal containment density).

7.4.2 Other Component Loads Following reactor trip and during hot standby, the charging pump is conservatively assumed to operate at full flow (98 gpm). The RCS/pressurizer pressure is assumed to decrease below and subsequently recover to normal operating pressure (2235 psig). At these conditions, the power requirement for the charging pump is 150 kW, as determined in Section 3.4. The maximum flow rate (98 gpm) is several times higher than that required to compensate for RCP seal leak-off (typically 2 to 5 gpm per RCP) plus any identified and unidentified RCS leakage allowed per Indian Point Unit 2 Technical Specifications (10 gpm identified and 1 gpm unidentified). Ifthe RCP seals heat due to loss of seal cooling for a limited period of time (Case 2), the RCP seal leak-off flow rate may increase to greater than 5 gpm per RCP; however, this leakage is expected to be limited to approximately 21 gpm per RCP (less for silicon nitride seals),

based on WCAP-1 0541, Rev. 2, and WCAP-1 0541, Rev. 2, Supplement 2 (References 7-5 and 7-6). At the assumed maximum flow rate of 98 gpm, a single charging pump would still have sufficient capacity to compensate for the increased RCP seal leak-off plus allowed leakage per Technical Specifications (21*4 + 10 + 1 = 95 gpm).

Also as described in Section 3.4, the pressurizer heater requirement sufficient to compensate for pressurizer heat losses and maintain system pressure for natural circulation cooling is 139 kW (i.e., two heater "banks" or six elements). Attachment 1 of ES-0.1 provides guidance on the number of heater banks in each heater group. It is expected that the operator would energize only one or two banks, as required, and not the entire heater group, to control RCS pressure. It is also anticipated that the operator would exercise similar caution to avoid overload of the AC power source when using pressurizer heaters in ECA-0.1.

When the operating EDG supplies power to the 480 V bus(es), the vital MCCs that automatically load on the bus become energized (MCC 26A for EDG 21, MCCs 26C plus 211 for EDG 22, and MCC 26B for EDG 23). Automatic loads on these MCCs are the same as those previously determined in Section 3.3 except that the safeguards valves do not change position and the CCW booster pumps do not start (since a CCW pump is started). Abbreviated lists of these miscellaneous equipment loads, including those that potentially start, are provided in the applicable spreadsheet tables (Tables 7-la, 7-1b, 7-1c, 7-2a, 7-2b, and 7-2c). These loads have been updated per recent calculations performed by Con Edison (Reference 7-7).

7-3

For Cases 1 and 2, it is also assumed that certain MCCs are reset that supply power to some equipment important, but not necessarily vital, for the recovery (MCC 29A for EDG 21, MCC 24A for EDG 22, and MCC 27A for EDG 23). The operator may be allowed to energize additional MCCs (e.g., in ES-0.1, Step 1), however, it is assumed that only these smaller MCCs are reset until directed to explicitly operate a component on another MCC. (Note: if all MCCs were reset, EDG 22 could potentially over-load).

The station batteries supply adequate emergency lighting (for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ), until normal lighting can be restored or the batteries can be recharged by the battery chargers. Again, the operator may be allowed to reset normal lighting (e.g., in ES-0. 1, Step 1), but it is assumed only the normal lighting in the CCR building is reset at that time. The CCR lighting is provided by Lighting Panel No. 220 (19.62 kW), as shown on Con Edison Drawing 9321-F-3040 (Reference 7-8). The normal supply for the CCR lighting is from the 120/208V Lighting Bus 23 (Lighting Transformer 23 on Bus 5A, EDG21) and the alternate supply is from Lighting Transformer 22 (Bus 3A, EDG 22).

In addition to the above loads, various fans and EDGO support loads operate as required.

Instrument air compressors (on MCC 29A/EDG 21 or MCC 24A/EDG 22) operate to re-supply air for various functions (e.g., letdown, if established, or atmospheric steam dump valves - these steam dump valves have nitrogen back-up and can be operated manually for cooldown; however, they are not needed to maintain hot standby conditions since the SG safety valves operate to control SG pressure and RCS temperature). Finally, miscellaneous losses (bus and cable losses, and increased frequency loads) are also assumed based on previous results used for the large LOCA scenarios (see Section 5.1.5). Although not precise for this study, these miscellaneous losses are expected to be representative but conservative.

7.4.3 Limiting Loads During Hot Standby The EDG loads for Case 1 (ES-0.1) are provided in Tables 7-1a, 7-1b, and 7-1c.

Typically, these loads are higher than the corresponding Ibads for Case.2 (ECA-0.1) in Tables 7-2a, 7-2b, and 7-2c, for the following reasons:

, Major equipment loads are automatically sequenced onto each operating EDG in ES-0.1. In ECA-0.1 (and ECA-0.0), loads are selectively added.

,, Initially in ES-0.1, the operator is directed to reset lighting and all MCCs (except MCCs 28 and 28A). As analyzed here, only the lighting for the CCR Building plus MCCs 29A, 24A, or 27A are reset to limit the number of non-essential loads.

In ES-0. 1, the operator is directed to establish PAB ventilation if adequate capacity exists on EDG 22 or 23 (EDG load < 1860 kW prior to addition of the PAB fans - this allows margin for - 100 kW uncertainty on the EDG watt-meter without exceeding the 2100 kW emergency rating of the diesel).

7-4

Limiting loads on EDG 21, after addition of the pressurizer heaters and non-essential SW pump, are 1590.4 kW (ES-0.1, Case 1 -Table 7-1a) and 1480.2 kW(ECA-0.1, Case 2 - Table 7-2a). Both of these loads are considerably less than the continuous rating of the EDG, 1750 kW. The two cases differ by the addition of CCR lighting, the sump pump, plus two (versus one) CR fans for Case 1 (19.6 + 5.6 + 110 = 135.2 kW).

The only additional load included for Case 2 is the alternate supply for the static inverters (10 + 15 = 25 kW), a load not included for Case 1 (normal supply from the station batteries is available). Thus, the Case 1 load is higher by the amount 135.2 - 25

= 110.2 kW (1590.4 - 1480.2 = 110.2 kW). Operation of the turbine-driven AFW pump plus portable ventilation for the PAB would be needed for the EDG 21 cases since this EDG does not supply power to a PAB exhaust fan and motor-driven AFW pump.

Since EDG 22 does supply power to a MD-AFW pump and PAB exhaust fan, in addition to loads like those on EDG 21, the load on EDG 22 is higher, roughly by the amount of power required for these two additional components (376 kW for the MD-AFW pump at full flow applicable to both cases, and 93 kW for the PAB exhaust fan, added for Case 1 only). The peak loads on EDG 22 during hot standby are more precisely 2057.3 kW for ES-0.1 (Case 1, Table 7-1b) and 1839.1 kW for ECA-0.1 (Case 2, Table 7-2b). Both loads are less than the 2-hour emergency rating of 2100 kW. As shown in Tables 7-1b and 7-2b, the operator could secure the MD-AFW pump and operate the TD-AFW pump as a means to limit the load on EDG 22 to less than the continuous rating of 1750 kW.

The limiting load on EDG 22 then becomes 1681.3 kW (Case 1), approximately 70 kW less than the continuous rating.

EDG 23 supplies power to a MD-AFW pump and a PAB exhaust (and supply) fan (93 +

37 = 130 kW). Since the associated 480 V bus (6A) has only one CR fan, the limiting loads on EDG 23 for hot standby are less than those of EDG 22. For Case 1 (ES-0.1),

the peak load on EDG 23 is 1893.9 kW (Table 7-1c). For ECA-0.1 (Case 2), the PAB fans are not loaded but the backup supply for inverter 24 is (15 kW). Thus, the limiting load for this case is 1893.9 - 130 + 15 = 1778.9 kW (Table 7-2c). To reduce the longer term loading to less than the 1750 kW continuous rating (with - 100 kW margin for uncertainties), the TD-AFW pump can be used (MD-AFW pump stopped), as illustrated in the bottom row and last two columns of Tables 7-1c and 7-2c.

7.5 EDG Loads Added During Cooldown To Cold Shutdown EDG loading spreadsheets corresponding to the Table 7-3 (ES-0.2) scenario have been developed for each single EDG assumed operating. These results are provided in Table 7-3a (for EDG 21), Table 7-3b (for EDG 22), and Table 7-3c (for EDG 23). As explained previously, the loads for Case 2 are less than those of Case 1 since the EDG loads are selectively added in ECA-0. 1. Therefore, as a starting point for the Case 3 cooldown scenario, the EDG loads at the end of the ES-0.1 (Case 1) scenario were used. Since the operator is directed to reset lighting and MCCs and add ventilation equipment in Steps 1 through 3 of ES-0.2, the EDG loads become nearly the same, regardless of the EOP used prior to ES-0.2 entry.

7-5

7.5.1 Major Equipment Loads For EDG 22 or 23 cases, the MD-AFW pump is assumed to be secured for the cooldown since the TD-AFW pump is available and capable of operation until the RHR System can be aligned for service. Major equipment loads are otherwise assumed to be maximum loads as previously determined for hot standby conditions. It is also conservatively assumed that two CR fans operate (EDG 21 or EDG 22 cases) throughout the natural circulation cooldown scenario. Prior to addition of the RHR pump, one of these redundant CR fans is stopped to allow the EDG load to remain less than the continuous limit of 1750 kW.

Allowing for a maximum cooldown rate of 25°F/hr, it is anticipated that the RHR System can be placed in service (hot leg temperature < 350*F) as early as 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Allowing for reasonable delays, including an upper head soak time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months if CRDM fans are not operational, it is assumed RHR is placed in service between 15 and 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months . A redundant CR fan, the CRDM fans, and/or the PAB fans are stopped to allow addition of the RHR pump onto the operating EDG. Per Section 3.1.3.1, the power requirement for this component is conservatively assumed to be 307 kW, based on maximum density (62 Ibm/ft3 , or Specific Gravity =1.0) and high flow rate (4720 gpm, actual flow rate expected to be < 4000 gpm). Since Bus 5A does not sul5ply power to an RHR pump, one or more of the 480 V cross-ties would be closed to allow EDG 21 to supply power to an RHR pump. (Note: once the RCS temperature is below 350°F, the Indian Point Unit 2 Technical Specifications allow closure of these cross-ties). -

7.5.2 Other Component Loads The initial power requirement for the charging pump (150 kW) is conservatively based on nominal RCS pressure (2235 psig) and full charging flow (98 gpm). As the RCS pressure decreases, the power full flow power requirement decreases to approximately 80 kW (at RCS pressures - 1000 to 1200 psig) and finally to 60 kW (at RCS pressures less than 400 psig). This latter value is used when RHR is placed in service.

Throughout the transient, the pressurizer heater input is also held constant at 139 kW (two banks/six heater elements). Note that if a steam bubble is to be maintained after placing RHR in service and during cold shutdown, most likely this could be achieved with only one of the two pressurizer heater banks (i.e., 68.3 kW). This would then make available 68 kW for other desired loads (e.g., bus cross-tie of an instrument air compressor if EDG 23 is the only operating EDG, or operation of the SFP pump to limit heatup of the spent fuel pool).

Note that in Table 7-3, the only significant loads added in ES-0.2 after Step 3 are the CRDM fans (about 90 kw) and the RHR pump (after cooldown and depressurization to RHR conditions). The CRDM fans are added prior to cooldown (EDG 21 and 22 cases) and stopped to reduce the load on the EDG prior to adding the RHR pump.

Since EDG 23 does not provide power to an instrument air compressor, cooldown would need to be accomplished locally and by manual operation using nitrogen back-up instead of the normal air supply. A description of the actions performed to accomplish nitrogen back-up to the atmospheric steam dump valves is given in Section 4.4 of 7-6

Reference 7-9. Similar local actions may be needed to control flow from the TD-AFW pump.

7.5.3 Limiting Loads For Cooldown To Cold Shutdown The limiting loads for each EDG can be obtained from the associated spreadsheet provided in Tables 7-3a, 7-3b, and 7-3c. These loads are as follows:

EDG 21: 1697.4 kW, after RHR placed in service EDG 22: 1771.3 kW, prior to cooldown, after CRDM fans started 1695.3 kW, after RHR placed in service EDG 23: 1604.9 kW, after RHR placed in service All of the above loads, with the exception of the hot standby load on EDG 22, are less than the continuous rating for the EDG, i.e., 1750 kW.

The load on EDG 22 (1771.3 kW), prior to and at the start of the cooldown, is controllable to less than 1750 kW by various means, including securing one or more CRDM fans, securing one CR fan, operating the turbine-driven AFW pump instead of the motor-driven AFW pump, or operating the motor-driven AFW pump at reduced flow

(-250 gpm), as needed for decay heat removal and cooldown of the RCS.

7.6 Summary And Conclusions This section addresses the EDG loading and plant capability to recover from a station blackout event at Indian Point Unit 2 using a single EDG. By restricting the lighting and

,MCCs that are reset in the EOPs (ECA-0.0, ECA-0.1, ES-0.1, and ES-0.2), it is feasible to bring the plant to hot standby conditions without exceeding the 2-hour emergency rating of the EDGs (2100 kW). Use of the TD-AFW pump instead of the MD-AFW pump ensures that the load on any EDG assumed for recovery will be less than the continuous rating of the EDG, 1750 kW.

By shedding redundant CR fans or non-essential fan loads (e.g., use portable ventilation instead of PAB exhaust fans), it is possible to provide the necessary AC power to achieve (or maintain) cold shutdown using a single EDG without exceeding its continuous rating of 1750 kW.

Table 7-4 provides for each EDG a summary of the resulting limiting hot shutdown (HSD) loads, with and without credit for operation of the TD-AFW pump for decay heat removal. These loads are the same as the limiting ones listed in the last columns of Tables 7-1a, 7-1 b, and 7-1c. The corresponding loads at the time RHR is placed in service for cooldown to cold shutdown (CSD) are also provided for each EDG. These loads are the same as those provided in the last columns of Tables 7-3a, 7-3b, and 7-3c. Since some of the support loads are not redundant on all three EDGs (e.g., cable tunnel exhaust fans, instrument air compressor), notes have been added to the table to explain provisions for satisfying the support function, if necessary. Also shown in Table 7-4 for comparison is the HSD load referred to in the Reference 7-2 SER (from the June 8, 1990 draft) along with the CSD load obtained by adding a conservatively high RHR 7-7

pump load of 332 kW to the HSD load. Although the basis for the loadings differ somewhat for the more recent calculations (assumed higher charging flows, pressurizer heater loads, additional loads for bus and cable losses and frequency fluctuations), the total EDG loadings (per the SER) are comparable to those analyzed in this section.

This assessment is based on Revision 38 of the Indian Point Unit 2 EOPs. Recognizing that the operator has a certain degree of flexibility in addition of optional loads used during the recovery, the following EDG load management techniques were assumed following the loss of offsite power event for the scenarios developed in this section:

In Step I of ES-0.1 and ES-0.2, the operator restricts the normal lighting to the CCR Building on Lighting Panel 220 (approximately 20 kW). Emergency lighting would also be supplied by the station batteries.

Also in Step 1 of ES-0.1 and ES-0.2, the MCCs reset are the vital MCCs that automatically load (MCCs 26A, 26B, 26C, and 211) plus several small MCCs important for recovery (MCCs 24A, 29A, and 27A).

The operator limits the number of pressurizer heaters on any EDG to 139 kW (i.e., two banks, or six individual heater elements). Attachment 1 to ES-0.1 permits the operator to energize individual heaters instead of the entire heater bank.

These actions can be considered either as potential changes to the EOPs or as EDG load management training issues for loss of offsite power or station blackout recovery.

Based on this assessment, the EDG loadings for station blackout recovery using a single EDG are acceptable for both hot and cold shutdown conditions.

7-8

Table 7-1 Time Table of Events for Loss of Offsite Power Without Safety Injection One EDG Starts, ES-0.1 (Rev. 36) Recovery Actions Considered Description Time (min)

Loss of offsite power, one EDG automatically starts, operator refers to 0 EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 1.

Operator verifies reactor trip and turbine trip. SI not actuated and not 2 required; transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Step 1.

Operator performs actions in ES-0.1, Step 1: 2-5 Start one charging pump on energized bus (Step 1.f)

Reset lighting on energized bus (reset only for CCR) (Step 1.g.)

Reset MCCs on energized bus, except MCCs 28 and 28A (Step 1.h)

(only MCCs 29A, 24A, or 27A reset)

Operator performs verifications in Steps 2 through 6 of ES-0.1. 5 - 8 Pressurizer heaters energized to increase pressure to 2235 psig (Step 7) 10 Operator performs Steps 8 and 9 of ES-0.1: 12 Verifies 400 gpm AFW flow, CCW and Essential SW pumps. FCUs (CR Fans) and non-essential SW pump also started at this time.

Operator aligns/starts ventilation systems per Step 10 of ES-0.1 14 Add PAB ventilation (EDG 22 or 23 running)

Confirm fans 213, 215, or 216 running Containment conditions normal, reset MCCs 28 and 28A 15 Sump pumps 29 or 210 operate (EDGs 21 or 22).

Operator performs remaining actions in ES-0.1. 15-20 Stabilizes plant, prepares for natural circulation cooldown to RHR (iransition to EOP ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, Step 1).

7-9

Table 7-1a. Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 21 (using ES-0.1)

Bus 5A Loading - EDG 21 Time in Minutes Equipment Max Man/Auto 5 10 15 20 kW Sl & Cir Wtr Pmp 21 (400) 345 M 0 0 0 0 CS Pmp 21 (400) 320 M 0 0 0 0 0 CR Fan 21 (350) 250 M 0 0 0 110 110 110 250 M 0 110 110 110 CR Fan 22 (350) 0 RC Pmp 21 (350) 303 M 0 0 0 0 E SW Pmp 24 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW Pmp 21 (350) 282 M 0 0 282 282 282 CCW Pmp 21 (250) 230 A 230 230 230 230 230 Chg Pmp 21 (200) 150 M 150 150 150 150 150 Srv Air Comp (125) 93 M 0 0 0 0 Pzr Htrs 23 485 M 0 139 139 139 139 Ltg Bus 23 (120/208V)(CCR Only) 135 M 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 Ltg Bus 23 (480V-Emg) 100 M 0 0 0 0 MCC 26A MOV-822A 0.7 A 0 0 0 0 MOV-744 5.8 A 0 0 0 0 MOV-746 7.7 A 0 0 0 0 HCV-640 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 BFP-2-21 14.3 A 14.3 -14.3 0 0 0 0 Elec Tun Exh Fan 21 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 H2 Recomb 21 11.4 M 0 0 0 0 DG Exh Fan 21 (nor) 0.5 A 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 EDG Bldg. Vent Fan 319,321 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 BA Ht Trace (nor) 16.8 A 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 XMFR 23 (Inv 21)(max) 15 M/A 0 0 0 0 EPX3 30 A 15 15 15 15 15 EPV21 15 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 MCC 26AA Misc MOVs I A 1 1 1 1 1 H2/02 Anlyz Ht Trc 1 3.3 A 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 MCC 29A DG 21 Support Loads Fuel Oil Pmp (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 -3.7 0 0 0 Bat Charger 21 (Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 Inst Air Comp 21 (75) 56 A 56 56 56 56 56 L.A. Cool Prmp 21 (1.5) 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Wall Exh Fan 215 (2) 1.5 M 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 XMFR 21 (Inv 23)(max) 15 M/A 0 0 0 0 MCC 28 Sump Pump 29 (7.5) 5.6 A 0 0 5.6 5.6 5.6 CRDM Fans (4 at 30 hp) 90 M 0 0 0 0 Misc. Loss (Max) 117 A 117 117 117 117 117 Total EDG 21 Load (kW): 702.3 966 1101.3 1588.9 1590.4 7-10

Table 7-1b. Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 22 (using ES-0.1)

Bus 2A/3A Loading - EDG 22 Time in Minutes Equipment Max Man/Auto 1 5 10 S 15

20 kW SI & Cir Wtr Pmp 22 (400) 345 M 0 0 0 0 RHR Pmp 21 (400) 316 M 0 0 0' 0 AFW Pmp 21 (400) 387 A 376 376 376 376 376 CR Fan 23 (350) 250 M 0 0 110 110 110 110 CR Fan 24 (350) 250 M 0 0 110 110 110 110 E SW Pmp 25 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW Pmp 22 (350) 282 M 0 0 282 282 282 CCW Pmp 22 (250) 230 M 230 230 230 230 230 Chg Pmp 22 (200) 150 M 150 150 150 150 150 Pzr Htr 21 554 M 0 0 0 0 Pzr Htr 22 485 M 0 139 139 139 139 Ltg Tran 21 (Nor) 150 M 0 0 0 0 Ltg Tran 22 (CCR Only) 150 M 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 100 M 0 0 0 0 Ltg Bus 23 (480V-Nor)

MCC 211 MOVs BFD-90, -1 ,-2,-3 4.8 A 4.8 4.8 -4.8 0 0 0 MOVs BFD-5, -1 ,-2,-3 20 A 20 20 -20 0 0 0 MCC 26C DG Exhaust Fan 22 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 PAB Exh Fan 21 (125) 93 M 0 0 0 93 93 93 EDG Bldg Vent Fan 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 320,322 Battery Charger 23 25 A 25 25 25 25 25 CRAC Backup Fan (7.5) 5.6 A 0 0 0 0 CRAC Boost.Fan 21 (7.5), 5.8 A 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 Dampers & Motors BA Trans Pump 21 (15) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 BAT Heaters 21 15 M 0 0 0 0 0 Spent Fuel Pmp 21 (100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 0 Wall Exhaust Fan 213 (2) 1.5 M 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 MCC 24A DG 22 Support Loads Fuel Oil Pmp (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 -3.7 0 0 0 XMFR 24 (Inv 22)(max) 15 M/A 0 0 0 0 Inst Air Comp 22 (75) 56 A 56 56 56 56 56 I.A. Cool Pmp 22 (1.5) 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Bat Charger 22 (Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 1.6 A 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 Radiation Monitor 45 MCC 28A Sump Pump 210 (7.5) 5.6 A 0 0 5.6 5.6 5.6 0 0 0 "0 CRDM Fans (4 at 30 hp) 90 M Misc. Loss (Max) 122 A 122 122 122 122 122 Misc. Lots (Max) 122 Total EDG 22 Load (kW): 1085.1 1364.7 1475.2 2055.8 2057.3 Total EDG 22 Load, without MD-AFW (use TD-AFW) (kW): 1679.8 1681.3 7-11

Table 7-1c. Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 23 (using ES-0. 1)

Bus 6A Loading - EDG 23 Time in Minutes Equipment Max Man/Auto 1 5 10 ' 15' 20 kW SI & Cir Wtr Pmp 23 (400) 345 M 0 0 0 0 CS Pmp 22 (400) 350 M 0 0 0 0 RHR Prp 22 (400) 316 M 0 0 0 0 AFW Pmp 23 (400) 387 A 376 376 376 376 376 CR Fan 25 (350) 250 M 110 110 110 RC Pmp 22 (350) 303 M 0 0 0 0 E SW Pmp 26 (350) - 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW Pmp 23 (350). 282 M 0 0 282 282 282 CCW Pmp 23 230 A 230 230 230 230 230 Chg Prop 23 (200) 150 M 150 150 150 150 150 Trb Aux Oil Pmp (150) 112 M 0 0 0 0 Pzr Htr Cntrl Gp 277 M 0 139 139 139 139 Ltg Tran 21 (Emg) 150 M 0 0 0 0 MCC 26B MOV-822B 0.7 A 0 0 0 0 MOV-882 2.2 M 0 0 0" 0 MOV-747 7.7 A 0 0 0 0 HCV-638 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 BFP-2-22 14.3 A 14.3 - 0 0 0 0 14.3 Elec Tun Exh Fan 22 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.41 7.4 7.4 BA Heat Trace (Emg) 16.8 M 0 0 0 0 H2 Recomb 22 11.4 M 0 0 0 0 CRAC Humidifier (33+.33) 2.5 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 CRAC Fan (10) 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 CRAC Boost Fan 22 (7,5), 6.8 A 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 Dampers & Motors DG 23 Support Loads Fuel Oil Pmp (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 -3.7 0 0 0 Lighting Panel 223:

DG Exhaust Fan 23 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 DG Bldg Emg Lights 1.1 A 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 Eng Aux Cntr Pnl 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 BA Trans Pmp 22 (7.5/15) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 EDG Bldg Vent Fan 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 318,323' MCC 26BB Misc MOVs 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 H2/O2 Anlyz Ht Trace2 3.3 A 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 Transf 2H (45KVA) 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 MCC 27A Bat Charger 24 (Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 XFMR 22 (Inv 24)(max) 15 M 0 0 0 0 PAB Exhaust Fan 22 (125) 93 M 0 0 93 93 93 PAB Supply Fan (50) 37 M 0 0 37 37 37 Spent Fuel Pump 22 (100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 Misc. Loss (Max) 119 A 119 119 119 119 119 Total EDG 23 Load (kW): 1070.7 1255.1 1390.4 1892.4 1893.9 Total EDG 23 Load, without MD-AFW (use TD-AFW) (kW): 1616.4 1517.9 7-12

Table 7-2. Time Table of Events for Loss of Offsite Power Without Safety Injection Delayed Start for One EDG, ECA-0.1 (Rev. 34) Recovery Actions Considered Description Time (min)

Loss of all AC. Power (loss of offsite power, EDGs fail to start) 0 Operator refers to EOP ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Step 1.

Operator verifies reactor trip, turbine trip, and RCS isolation. 2 Turbine-driven AFW pump delivers flow to all SGs.

Operator attempts to restore AC power to any 480V bus. 2-5 Major equipment loads placed in PULLOUT position per ECA-0.0, Step 7.

(Si, CS, MD-AFW, CCW, and RHR pumps; also FCUs, turning gear oil pump, bearing oil pump, and turbine aux. oil pump.)

Operator performs other limited actions in ECA-0.0. 5 - 29 (equipment isolation, DC load shedding, SG depressurizations)

One EDG recovered. Transition to Step 26 of ECA-0.0. 30 Stabilize SG pressures (Step 26)

Essential SW pump aligned and running on energized bus (Step 27)

Vital MCCs energized on energized bus (Step 28)

(26A - EDG 21; 26C and 211 - EDG 22, or 26B - EDG 23)

Other MCCs important for recovery energized per Step 28 of ECA-0.0 32 - 34 (29A on EDG 21; 24 and 24A on EDG 22, 27A on EDG 23)

Also, static inverters aligned to alternate supply.

(21-MCC26A, 23-MCC29A, 22-MCC24A, 24-MCC27A)

Operator confirms RCS subcooling > uncertainties, PRZR level on span. 35 Transition ECA-0.1, Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required, Step 1 Operator confirms RCP seal isolation and Phase A not actuated. Step 3 of 37 - 40 ECA-0.1 then performed for energized bus/EDG:

Start one SW pump on non-essential header (Step 3.b)

Start one CCW pump on energized bus (Step 3.c)

Start one charging pump on energized bus (Step 3.d)

Start FCUs (CR Fans), as necessary, on energized bus (Step 3.e)

Operator confirms Si flow not required, adjusts charging flow (max. assumed). 40 Operator starts motor-driven AFW pump (EDGs 22 or 23), per Step 7 42 Operator performs Steps 8 through 14 in ECA-0.1 43-47 7-13

Table 7-2. Time Table of Events for Loss of Offsite Power Without Safety Injection (Cont.)

Delayed Start for One EDG, ECA-0.1 (Rev. 34) Recovery Actions Considered Description Time (min)

Pressurizer heaters energized to establish PRZR pressure control (Step 15) 48 Operator performs remaining actions in ECA-0.1 50 -60 Stabilizes plant, prepares for natural circulation cooldown to RHR (transition to EOP ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, Step 1) 7-14

Table 7-2a. Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 21 (using ECA-0.1)

Bus 5A Loading - EDG 21 Time in Minutes Equipment Max Man/Auto 30 35 40 45

50 kW SI & Cir Wtr Pmp 21 (400) 345 M 0 0 0 0 CS Pmp 21 (400) 350 M 0 0 0 0*

CR Fan 21 (350) 250 M 0 110 110 110 110 CR Fan 22 (350) 250 M 0 0 0 0 RC Pmp 21 (350) 303 M 0 0 0 0 E SW Pmp 24 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW Pmp 21 (350) 282 M 0 282 282 282 282 CCW Pmp 21 (250) 230 A 0 230 230 230 230 Chg Pmp 21 (200) 150 M 0 150 150 150 150 Srv Air Comp (125) 93 M 0 0 0 0 Pzr Htrs 23 485 M 0 0 0 139 139 Ltg Bus 23 (120/208V)(CCR Only) 135 M 0 0 0 0 Ltg Bus 23 (480V-Emg) 100 M 0 0 0 0 MCC 26A MOV-822A 0.7 A 0 0 0 0 MOV-744 5.8 A 0 0 0 0 MOV-746 7.7 A 0 0 0 0 HCV-640 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 BFP-2-21 14.3 A 14.3 -14.3 0 0 0 0 Elec Tun Exh Fan 21 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4. 7.4 H2 Recomb 21 11.4 M 0 0 0 0 DG Exh Fan 21 (nor) 0.5 A 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 EDG Bldg. Vent Fan 319,321 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 BA Ht Trace (nor) 16.8 A 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 XMFR 23 (Inv 21)(max) 15 M/A 10 10 10 10 10 EPX3 30 A 15 15 15 15 15 EPV21 15 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 MCC 26AA Misc MOVs, 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 H2/02 Anlyz Ht Trc 1 3.3 A 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 MCC 29A DG 21 Support Loads Fuel Oil Pmp (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 3.7 0 Compressor (5) A 3.7 3.7 -3.7 0 0 Bat Charger 21 (Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 Inst Air Comp 21 (75) 56 A 56 56 56 56 56 I.A. Cool Pmp 21 (1.5) 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Wall Exh Fan 215 (2) 1.5 M 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 XMFR 21 (Inv 23)(max) 15 M/A 15 15 15 15 15 MCC 28 Sump Pump 29 (7.5) 5.6 A 0 0 0 0 CRDM Fans (4 at 30 hp) 90 M 0 0 0 0 Misc. Loss (Max) 117 A 117 117 117 117 117 Total EDG 21 Load (kW): 472.3 591.4 1359.7 1339.7 1480.2 7-15

Table 7-2b. Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 22 (using ECA-0.1)

Bus 2AN3A Loading - EDG 22 Time in Minutes Equipment Max 30 35

40

45 50 kW Man/Auto S1 & Cir Wtr Pmp 22 (400) 345 M 0 0 0 0 RHR Pmp21 (400) 316 M 0 0 0 0 AFW Pmp 21 (400) 387 A 0 0 376 376 376 CR Fan 23 (350) 250 M 0 110 110 110 110 CR Fan 24 (350) 250 M 0 0 0 0 E SW Pmp 25 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW Pmp 22 (350) 282 M 0 282 282 282 282 CCW Pmp 22 (250) 230 M 0 230 230 230 230 Chg Pmp 22 (200) 150 M 0 150 150 150 150 Pzr Htr 21 554 M 0 0 0 0 Pzr Htr 22 485 M 0 0 0 139 139 Ltg Tran 21 (Nor) 150 M 0. 0 0 0 Ltg Tran 22 (CCR Only) 150 M 0 0 0 0 Ltg Bus 23 (480V-Nor) 100 M 0 0 0 0 MCC 211 MOVs BFD-90,-1,-2,-3 4.8 A 4.8 4.8 -4.8 0 0 0 MOVs BFD-5,-1,-2,-3 20 A 20 20 -20 0 0 0 MCC 26C DG Exhaust Fan 22 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 PAB Exh Fan 21 (125) 93 M 0 0 0 0 0 EDG Bldg Vent Fan 320,322 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 Battery Charger 23 25 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 CRAC Backup Fan (7.5) 5.6 A 0 0 0 0 0 CRAC Boost.Fan 21 (7.5), 5.8 A 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 Dampers & Motors BA Trans Pump 21 (15) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 BAT Heaters 21 15 M 0 0 0 0 0 Spent Fuel Pmp 21 (100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 0 Wall Exhaust Fan 213 (2) 1.5 M 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 MCC 24A DG 22 Support Loads Fuel Oil Prp (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 -3.7 0 0 0 XMFR 24 (Inv 22)(max) 15 M/A 10 10 10 10 10 Inst Air Comp 22 (75) 56 A 56 56 56 56 56 I.A. Cool Pmp 22 (1.5) 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Bat Charger 22 (Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 Radiation Monitor 45 1.6 A 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 MCC 28A Sump Pump 210 (7.5) 5.6 A 0 0 0 0 CRDM Fans (4 at 30 hp) 90 M 0 0 0 0 Misc. Loss (Max) 122 A 122 122 122 122 122 Total EDG 22 Load (kW): 499.1 619.1 1362.6 1698.6 1839.1 Total EDG 22 Load, without MD-AFW (use TD-AFW) (kW): 1322.6 1463.1 7-16

Table 7-2c. Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 23 (using ECA-0.1)

Bus 6A Loading - EDG 23 Time in Minutes

,It Equipment Max 30 35 40 45 50 kW Man/Auto SI & Cir Wtr Pmp 23 (400) .345 M 0 0 0 0 CS Pmp 22 (400) 350 M 0 0 0 0 RHR Pmp 22 (400) 316 M 0 0 0 0 AFW Pmp 23 (400) 387 A 0 0 376 376 376 CR Fan 25 (350) 250 M 0 110 110 110 1.10 RC Pmp 22 (350) 303 M 0 0 0 0 E SW Pmp 26 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW Pmp 23 (350) 282 M 0 282 282 282 282 CCW Pmp 23 230 A 0 230 230 230 230 Chg Pmp 23 (200) 150 M 0 150 150 150 150 Trb Aux Oil Pmp (150) 112 M 0 0 0 Pzr Htr CntrI Gp 277 M 0 0 0 139 139 Ltg Tran 21 (Emg) 150 M 0 0 0 0 MCC 26B MOV-822B 0.7 A 0 0 0 0 MOV-882 2.2 M 0 0 0 0 MOV-747 7.7 A 0 0 0 0 HCV-638 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 BFP-2-22 14.3 A 14.3 -14.3 0 0 0 0 Elec Tun Exh Fan 22 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 BA Heat Trace (Emg) 16.8 M 0 0 0 0 H2 Recomb 22 11.4 M 0 0 0 0 CRAC Humidifier (3+.33) 2.5 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 CRAC Fan (10) 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 CRAC Boost Fan 22 (7.5), 6.8 A 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 Dampers & Motors DG 23 Support Loads Fuel Oil Pmp (2) 1.5 A 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 3.7 3.7 -3.7 0 0 0 Lighting Panel 223:

DG Exhaust Fan 23 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 0.8' 0.8 0.8 DG Bldg Emg Lights 1.1 A 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 Eng Aux Cntr Pnl 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 BA Trans Pmp 22 (7.5/15) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 EDG Bldg Vent Fan 318,323 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 MCC 26BB Misc MOVs 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 H2/02 Anlyz Ht Trace 2 3.3 A 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 Transf 2H (45KVA) 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 *0.3 MCC 27A Bat Charger 24 (Max) 45 A 45 45 45 -20 25 25 XFMR 22 (Inv 24)(max) 15 M 15 15 15 15 15 PAB Exhaust Fan 22 (125) 93 M 0 0 0 0 PAB Supply Fan (50) 37 M *0 0 0 0 Spent Fuel Pump 22 (100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 Misc. Loss (Max) 119 A 119 119 119 119 119 Total EDG 23 Load (kW): 464.7 514.1 1282.4 1638.4 1778.9 Total EDG 23 Load, without MD-AFW (use TD-AFW) (kW): 1262.4 1402.9 7-17

Table 7-3. Time Table of Events for Natural Circulation Cooldown to RHR Entry Conditions One EDG Operates, ES-0.2 (Rev. 34) Recovery Actions Considered Description Time (hours)

Operator transition from ES-0.1 or ECA-0.1 to Step 1 of EOP ES-0.2, 1 Natural Circulation Cooldown Operator performs actions in ES-0.2, Step 1: 1 -2 Reset lighting on energized bus (reset only for CCR) (Step 1 .h)

Reset MCCs, except MCCs 28 and 28A (Step 1.i)

(only MCCs 29A, 24A, or 27A reset)

Containment conditions normal, reset MCCs 28 and 28A (Step 2) 1-2 Sump pumps 29 or 210 operate (EDGs 21 or 22)

Operator aligns/starts ventilation systems per Step 3 of ES-0.2 1- 2 Add PAB ventilation (EDGs 22 or 23)

Confirm fan 213, 215, or 216 running Operator performs Steps 4 through 7 of ES-0.2: 1 -2 Attempts to restart RCP, Boration using boric acid transfer pumps plus charging (B.A. transfer pumps running on EDGs 22 and 23)

Operator energizes CRDM fans on MCCs 28 or 28A (EDGs 21 or 22) 1-2 (Step 8) (approx. load -90 kw total, 4 fans @ 30 hp per fan)

Operator initiates < 250 F/hr cooldown to cold shutdown (Step 9) 1- 2 RCS cooldown and depressurization to < 350"F (Steps 10 through 22) 2 - 15 RCS pressure < 1000 psig, accumulators isolated or vented (Step 18) - 8 Operator depressurizes RCS to < 370 psig (RHR cut-in) (Step 22) - 15 RHR System placed in service, continue cooldown to cold shutdown 20 (TD-AFW pump operated as necessary to refill SGs, MD-AFW pump secured) 7-18

Table 7-3a. Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 21 (using ES-0.2)

Bus 5A Loading - EDG 21 Time in Hours Equipment Max' Man/Auto 1 21 -* 10

15 20 kW SI & Cir Wtr Pmp 21 (400) 345 M 0 0 0 0 0 CS Prop 21 (400) 350 M 0 0 0 0 0 CR Fan 21 (350) 250 M 110 110 110 110 110 CR Fan 22 (350) 250 M 110 110 110 -110 0 RC Pmp 21 (350) 303 M 0 0 0 0 0 E SW Pmp 24 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW Pmp 21 (350) 282 M 282 CCW Pmp 21 (250) 230 A 230 230 230 230 230 Chg Pmp 21 (200) 150 M 150 150 -70 80 -20 60 60 Srv Air Comp (125) 93 M 0 .0 0 0 0 Pzr Htrs 23 485 M 139 139 139 139 139 Ltg Bus 23 (1201208V)(CCR Only) 135 M 19.6 19.6 19.6 19,6 19.6 Ltg Bus 23 (480V-Emg) 100 M 0 0 0 0 0 RHR 21 or 23 (via Cross-ties) 316 M 0 0 0 0 307 307 MCC 26A 0 "0 0 0 0 MOV-822A 0.7 A MOV-744 5.8 A 0 .0 0 0 0 MOV-746 7.7 A 0 0 0 0 0 HCV-640 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 0 BFP-2-21 14.3 A 0 0 0 0 0 Elec Tun Exh Fan 21 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 H2 Recomb 21 11.4 M 0 0 0 0 0 DG Exh Fan 21 (nor) 0.5 A 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 EDG Bldg. Vent Fan 319,321 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7,5 BA Ht Trace (nor) 16.8 A 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 XMFR 23 (Inv 21)(max) 15 MIA 0 0 0 0 0 EPX3 30 A 15 15 15 15 15 EPV21 15 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7,5 MCC 26AA Misc MOVs 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 H2/O2 Anlyz Ht Trc 1, 3.3 A 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 MCC 29A DG 21 Support Loads Fuel Oil Prmp (2) 1.5 A 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 0 0 0 0 0 Bat Charger 21 (Max) 45 A 25 25 25 25 25 Inst Air Comp 21 (75) 56 A 56 56 56 56 56 l.A. Cool Prop 21 (1.5) 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Wall Exh Fan 215 (2) 1.5 M 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 XMFR 21 (Inv 23)(max) 15 M/A 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 28 Sump Pump 29 (7.5) 5.6 A 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 CRDM Fans (4 at 30 hp) 90 M 0 90 90 90 90 -90 10 Misc. Loss (Max) 117 A 117 117 117 117 117 Total EDG 21 Load (kW): 1590.4 1680.4 1610.4 1590.4 1697.4 7-19

Table 7-3b. Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 22 (using ES-0.2)

Bus 2A/3A Loading - EDG 22 Time in Hours Equipment Max Man/Auto 1 2 10 15 20 kW Sl & Cir Wtr Pmp 22 (400) 345 M 0 0 0 0 0 RHR Pmp 21 (400) 316 M 0 0 0 0 307 307 AFW Prop 21 (400) 387 A 0 0 0 0 0 CR Fan 23 (350) 250 M 110 110 110 110 110 CR Fan 24 (350) 250 M 110 110 110 110 -110 0 E SW Pmp 25 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW Pmp 22 (350) 282 M 282 282 282 282 282 CCW Pmp 22 (250) 230 M 230 230 230 230 230 Chg Pmp 22 (200) 150 M 150 150 -70 80 -20 60 60 Pzr Htr 21 554 M 0 0 0 0 0 Pzr Htr 22 485 M 139 139 139 139 139 Ltg Tran 21 (Nor) 150 M 0 0 0 0 0 Ltg Tran 22 (CCR Only) 150 M 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 Ltg Bus 23 (480V-Nor) 100 M 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 211 MOVs BFD-90, -1,-2,-3 4.8 A 0 0 0 0 0 MOVs BFD-5,-1,-2,-3 20 A 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 26C DG Exhaust Fan 22 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 PAB Exh Fan 21 (125) 93 M 93 93 93 93 -93 0 EDG Bldg Vent Fan 320,322 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 Battery Charger 23 25 A 25 25 25 25 25 CRAC Backup Fan (7.5) 5.6 A 0 0 0 / 0 0 CRAC Boost.Fan 21 (7.5), 5.8 A 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 Dampers & Motors BA Trans Pump 21 (15) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 BAT Heaters 21 15 M 0 0 0 0 0 Spent Fuel Pmp 21 (100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 0 Wall Exhaust Fan 213 (2) 1.5 M 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 MCC 24A DG 22 Support Loads Fuel Oil Pmp (2) 1.5 A 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 0 0 0 0 0 XMFR 24 (Inv 22)(max) 15 WA 0 0 0 0 0 Inst Air Comp 22 (75) 56 A 56 56 56 56 56 I.A. Cool Pmp 22 (1.5) 2.2 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 Bat Charger 22 (Max) 45 A 25 25 25 25 25 Radiation Monitor 45 1.6 A 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 MCC 28A Sump Pump 210 (7.5) 5.6 A 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 CRDM Fans (4 at 30 hp) 90 M 0 90 90 90 90 -90 0 Misc. Loss (Max) 122 A 122 122 122 122 122 Total EDG 22 Load (kW): 1681.3 1771.3 1701.3 1681.3 1695.3 7-20

Table 7-3c. Loss of Offsite Power Loads on EDG 23 (using ES-0.2)

Bus 6A Loading - EDG 23 Time in Hours Equipment Max Man/Auto 1 2 10 15 20 kW S1 & Cir Wtr Pmp 23 (400) 345 M 0 0 0 0 0 CS Pmp 22 (400) 350 M 0 0 0 0 0 RHR Pmp 22 (400) 316 M 0 0 0. 0 307 307 AFW Pmp 23 (400) 387 A 0 0 0 0 0 CR Fan 25 (350) 250 M 110 110 110 110 110 RC Pmp 22 (350) 303 M 0 0 0 0 0 E SW Pmp 26 (350) 282 A 282 282 282 282 282 NE SW Pmp 23 (350) 282 M 282 282 282 282 282 CCW Pmp 23 230. A 230 230 230 230 230 Chg Pmp 23 (200) 150 M 150 150 -70 80 -20 60 60 Trb Aux Oil Pmp (150) 112 M 0 0 0 0 0 Pzr Htr Cntrl Gp .277 M 139 139 139 139 139 Ltg Tran 21 (Emg) 150 M 0 0 0 0 0 MCC 26B MOV-8226 0.7 A 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-882 2.2 M 0 0 0 0 0 MOV-747 7.7 A 0 0 0 0 0 HCV-638 0.6 M 0 0 0 0 0 BFP-2-22 14.3 A 0 0 0 0 0 Elec Tun Exh Fan 22 7.4 A 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 BA Heat Trace (Emg) 16.8 M 0 0 0 0 0 H2 Recomb 22 11.4 M 0 0 0 0 0 CRAC Humidifier (3+.33) 2.5 A 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 CRAC Fan (10) 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 CRAC Boost Fan 22 (7.5), 6.8 A 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 Dampers & Motors DG 23 Support Loads Fuel Oil Pmp (2) 1.5 A 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 Compressor (5) 3.7 A 0 0 0 0 0 Lighting Panel 223:

DG Exhaust Fan 23 0.8 A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 DG Bldg Emg Lights 1.1 A 1..1 1.1 1.1 1:1 1.1 Eng Aux Cntr Pni 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 BA Trans Pmp22 (7.5115) 11.2 A 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 EDG Bldg Vent Fan 318,323 7.5 A 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 MCC 26BB Misc MOVs 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 H2/O2 Anlyz Ht Trace 2 3.3 A 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 Transf 2H (45KVA) 0.3 A 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 MCC 27A Bat Charger 24 (Max) 45 A 25 25 25 .25 25 XFMR 22 (Inv 24)(max) 15 M 0 0 0 0 0 PAS Exhaust Fan 22 (125) 93 M 93 93 93 93 -93 0 PAB Supply Fan (50) 37 M 37 37 37 37 -37 0 Spent Fuel Pump 22 (100) 75 M 0 0 0 0 0 Misc. Loss (Max) 119 A 119 119 119 119 119 Total EDG 23 Load (kW): 1517.9 1517.9 1447.9 1427.9 1604.9 7-21

Table 7-4 Summary and Comparison of Hot Shutdown and Cold Shutdown EDG Loads for Recovery from a Station Blackout Event at Indian Point Unit 2 Using a Single EDG Equipment 6/8/90 Draft EDG 21 EDG 22 EDG 23 HSD CSD HSD CSD HSD CSD HSD CSD MCC 24A&28A a a 0 0 91.9 91.9 0 0 MCC 26A/AA a a 59 59 0 0 0 0 MCC 26B/BB a a 0 0 0 0 50.9 50.9 MCC 26C (note d) a a 0 0 144.8 51.8 0 0 MCC 27A (note d) a a 0 0 0 0 155 25 MCC 29A&28 a a 91.8 91.8 0 0 0 0 Instrument Air & Support 59.1 59.1 c C c c f f Service Water (2) 554 554 564 564 564 564 564 564 Aux. Feedwater Pump 300 (e) 300 (e) 0 0 376 0 376 0 RHR Pump 0 332 0 307 (g) 0 307 0 307 Charging Pump 50 50 150 60 150 60 150 60 Fan Cooler(s) 123 123 220 110 220 110 110 110 Component Cooling Pump 228 228 230 230 230 230 230 230 Battery Charger 50 50 C c c c c c Lighting 150 150 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 0 0 Pressurizer Heaters 69 69 139 139 139 139 139 139 EDG Support and Lighting 7.9 7.9 c C c C C C Cable Tunnel Fan 7.4 7.4 c c h h c C Ventilation - PAB 130 130 c C C c c C

- CCR 11.4 11.4 i i c c c c Misc. Losses b b 117 117 122 122 119 119 TOTAL EDG LOAD (kW) 1739.8 2071.8 1590.4 1697.4 2057.3 1695.3 1893.9 1604.9 TOTAL w/o AFW Pump 1439.8 1771.8 same same 1681.3 same 1517.9 same Notes for Table 7-4 a - A specific component load is listed.

b - Miscellaneous losses (bus, cable, and frequency fluctuations) were not considered in prior calculations.

c - Component is part of an MCC load.

d - PAB ventilation fans are assumed turned off during cooldown to cold shutdown.

e - AFW flow is considered throttled to - 250 gpm after NR level is on span in the SGs.

f - Capability exists to locally operate SG atmospheric steam relief valves.

g - Operation of 480V bus cross-ties is required to place RHR in service (below 350*F).

h - Temperature limits determined to be acceptable without cable tunnel fan for > 8 hrs (Ref. 7-10).

i - CCR temperatures acceptable (<120'F) per station blackout submittal (Ref. 7-11).

7-22

8.0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS This report provides a diesel generator loading analysis for a number of loss of offsite power events requiring safety injection. Limiting EDG loads for large LOCA, small LOCA, steamline break, SG tube rupture, and spurious S1 actuation are determined. In addition, a section on station blackout / loss of offsite power without SI is included.

Significant plant and EOP modifications have been factored into this study. Some of these changes had been incorporated into previous versions of this report, WCAP-12655, Rev. 0, dated July 1990, and Rev. 1, dated May 1996. For Rev. 0, these modifications include changes to the recirculation switches as described in an LER (Ref. 1-7) and increased component power requirements for the stretch rating (3083.4 MWt' NSSS power). For Rev. 1, changes have been included to reflect modifications made during the 1991 and 1993 spring refueling outages, the increased loading capabilities of the EDGs due to the diesel enhancement program, a number of calculational changes, and Rev. 21 of the EOPs (August 1995). The Rev. 1 update, therefore, reflects the Indian Point Unit 2 Plant near the end of 1995.

For Rev. 2, modifications include the Rev. 1B update for miscellaneous small loads, streamlining of the LOCA switchover procedure EOP ES-1 .3 (updated to Rev. 36), plus a number of pump changes and replacements, revised fan cooler loads, and steam generator replacement (Model 44F). The loading study closely reflects the plant near the end of 2001.

The EDG loading validation for Rev. 2, based on these up-to-date changes, demonstrates that most EDG loads for the above events will be less than 2100 kw, the two hour emergency rating for the diesel generators. In a few instances during the injection phase of the accident, the loads on EDG 23 for large LOCA may surpass the 2100 kw two hour emergency rating but remain well below the 2300 kw half hour limit.

The peak injection phase load as described in Section 5.6 is 2147 kw.

During recirculation, short-term transient loads may also exceed 2100 kw, but still have reasonable margin to the 2300 kw half-hour rating. The limiting large LOCA load as described in Section 5.6 is 2268 kw (load on EDG 21, with EDG 23 failure). A similar high load on EDG 23 is 2176 kw (for EDG 21 failure). Both of these loads are transient ones lasting only a few minutes (the time take between Recirculation Switch 4 and completion of Recirculation Switch 7).

Large LOCA with high head recirculation is evaluated in Section 5.7. Generally this configuration bounds small LOCA and is the one used for long term cooling (in ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation). Transient loads remain acceptable and have adequate margin to the 2300 kw half-hour rating and the 2100 kw two-hour rating.

Longer-term EDG loads are also determined for both low-head and high-head recirculation, high-head recirculation being more limiting. These loads are typically less than the diesel generator continuous rating of 1750 kw. Operator actions are required in some cases to limit the EDG loads to meet this more restrictive long-term EDG 8-1

loading limit. These actions consist primarily of load balancing between EDGs and/or

,elimination of certain optional loads. Since the operator would have adequate time to evaluate the longer-term loads, he would be able to readily control them to be less than the 1750 kw continuous rating limit.

In Section 6.1, a very conservative small LOCA with composite failures is evaluated. In an extreme situation, the load can approach the 2300 kw limit. However, generally the small LOCA loads will be bounded by large LOCA.

For the remaining events with SI (steamline break, SGTR, and spurious Si), EDG loads are within the appropriate limits during the initial phase of the accident. Long term, they are controllable to less than the 1750 kw continuous rating.

Finally, note that for the design basis loss of offsite power events with SI, recovery using any 2 of 3 EDGs (or other limiting single failure) is possible without exceeding the EDG loading limits. In Section 7, for station blackout / loss of offsite power with SI, it is demonstrated that plant recovery using a single EDG is possible without exceeding the EDG loading limits.

8-2

S

9.0 REFERENCES

1-1 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Consolidated Edison of New York, Rev. 16, July 2001.

1-2 Indian Point No. 2 Emergency Operating Procedures, Rev. 12/12B, May 1990.

1-3 Con Edison Memorandum from F. G. Flugger,

Subject:

Westinghouse Meeting Electrical Design Backfit Items - Indian Point Unit 2, March 20, 1970.

1-4 Westinghouse Speed Letter from H. N. Skow to D. R. Grain (et al) dated March 30, 1970. This information was given to the AEC (3/26170) and subsequently used as the basis for the Unit 2 SER.

1-5 G.O. No. GN24270, Indian Point 2 Diesel Generator Loading Study, Reference Letter from J. Kern (Westinghouse) to L. Liberatori (Con Ed), GN-1 3-1169, dated July 27, 1988.

1-6 Letter from J. R. Gasperini (Westinghouse) to B. Shepard (Con Edison) transmitting Minutes of March 9 1989 Meeting at Indian Point, IPP-89-61 1, March 21, 1989.

1-7 Indian Point Unit No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Analysis, LER 06-00, Docket No. 50-247, April 24, 1989.

1-8 Letter from J. R. Gasperini (Westinghouse) to B. Shepard (Con Edison) transmitting Diesel Loadinq Study - Final Draft, IPP-89-677, June 5, 1989.

1-9 Letter from J. R. Gasperini (Westinghouse) to B. Shepard (Con Edison) transmitting Diesel Loading Study - Final Appendix, IPP-89-737, August 15, 1989.

1-10 Letter from J. R. Gasperini (Westinghouse) to B. Shepard (Con Edison) transmitting trip report for the October 2-3 1989 NRC Meeting - Diesel Generator Loading, IPP-89-825, November 17, 1989.

1-11 Con Edison Indian Point Station Mod. No. EGP-89-04136-E, "EDG No.23 Load Modification," Rev. 1, March 20, 1990.

1-12 Con Edison Indian Point Station Mod. No. EGP-90-04584-E, "IP-2 480V Non-Essential Load Isolation," Rev. 1, September 30,1991.

1-13 Con Edison Indian Point Station Mod. No. EGP-89-03380-E, F, G, H, & I, "IP-2 Rearrangement of 480V Loads," June 30, 1991.

. 1-14 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation No.

EGP-89-03369-D & E, "EDG Building Ventilation System Upgrade/Electrical,"

9-1

February 7, 1991 and November 9, 1990, respectively.

1-15 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation No.

CPC-06847-91-H "Install 6th Fan in EDG building at IP#2," April 29, 1992. (Not Implemented during 1991 refueling outage; later implemented during 1993 outage-see Ref. 1-19).

1-16 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation No.

MMM-89-03369-P, "EDG Upgrade" May 1991.

1-17 Indian Point No. 2 Emergency Operatin Procedures, Rev. 21, August 1995.

1-18 Con Edison Indian Point Station Mod. No. FPX-91-06956-F, "480 V Switchgear Room Exhaust Fans," June 30, 1992.

1-19 Con Edison Indian Point Station Mod. No. CPC-91-06847-H, "Install 6th Fan in EDG Building at Indian Point #2, Rev. 1, December 1992.

1-20 Con Edison Indian Point Station Mod. No. CPC-92-62112-H, "IP-2 CCR Carbon Filter Replacement," May 1993.

1-21 Letter from J. J. Maylath (Con Edison) to E. Frantz (Westinghouse), Revised Sections 3.1, 3.2, 5.1.4 and 5.6 from WCAP-1 2655, December 22, 1994.

1-22 Letter from R. K. Sullivan (Con Edison) to E. Frantz (Westinghouse), WCAP 12655, Rev. 1 EDG Loading Study for IP-2, March 5, 1993. Attachment for "480V AC Load Tracking and Update." (This reference includes revised valve loads based on KVA ratings. These are superceded by Ref. 3-19.)

1-23 Letter from M. D. Hameedy (Westinghouse) to R. K. Sullivan (Con Edison) transmitting Indian Point Unit 2, Containment Response Analysis for 4" Small LOCA and Main Steamline Break, IPP-95-591, April 17, 1995.

1-24 Letter from M. D. Hameedy (Westinghouse) to R. K. Sullivan (Con Edison) transmitting Diesel Loading Study Update, Revision I (proposal), IPP-94-718, September 6, 1994.

1-25 Letter from S. M. Sconce (Westinghouse) to R. Sullivan (Con Edison) transmitting Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Study Update (change notice proposal), IPP-95-689, September 26, 1995.

1-26 Letter from S. M. Ira (Westinghouse) to James Tuohy (Con Edison) transmitting Update of the Emergency Diesel Generator Loadinq Study, IPP-00-409 (LTR-POE-00-142), December 18, 2000.

1-27 Letter from S. M. Ira (Westinghouse) to James Tuohy (Con Edison) transmitting SECL-00-164 - Indian Point Unit 2 Restart Support, IPP-00-413, December 20, 9-2

2000.

1-28 Indian Point No. 2 Emergency Operating Procedures, Rev. 38 (fatest rev.),

effective date July 31, 2001:

EOP Revision Date EOP Title Number No.

REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 38 3/19/0 1 8/25/00 ES-0.0 REDIAGNOSIS 34 ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE 36 12/21/00 ES-0.2 NATURAL CIRCULATION 34 8/25/00 COOLDOWN NATURAL CIRCULATION ES-0.3 COOLDOWN WITH STEAM VOID 34 8/25/00 (N VESSEL (WITH RVLIS)

NATURAL CIRCULATION ES-0.4 COOLDOWN WITH STEAM VOID 34 8/25/00 IN VESSEL (WITHOUT RVLIS)

LOSS OF REACTOR OR 36 12/21/00 SECONDARY COOLANT ES-1.1 SI TERMINATION 36 12/21/00 ES-i.2 POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND 36 12/21/00 DEPRESSURIZATION ES-i.3 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG 36 12/21/00 RECIRCULATION ES-I 4 TRANSFER TO HOT LEG 36., 12/21/00 RECIRCULATION FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION 34 8/25/00 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 36 12/21/00 POST-SGTR COOLDOWN USING BACKFILL 34 8/25/00 ES-3.2 POST-SGTR COOLDOWN USING 34 8/25/00 BLOWDOWN ES-3.3 POST-SGTR COOLDOWN USING 34 8/25/00 STEAM DUMP ECA-0.0 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER 37 7/31/01 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER ECA-0.1 RECOVERY WITHOUT SI 34 8/25/00 REQUIRED ECA-0.2 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER 34 8/25/00 RECOVERY WITH SI REQUIRED ECA-1.1 LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT 34 8/25/00 RECIRCULATION 9-3

1-29 Letter from James Tuohy (Con Edison) to S. M. Ira (Westinghouse) to transmitting Con Ed Inputs to the WCAP-1 2655 Revision, EDG Loading Study, W-034, August 30, 2001.

1-30 Letter from Arshad M. Shekh (Entergy) to S. M. Ira (Westinghouse) to transmitting Entergy Inputs to the WCAP-1 2655 Revision, EDG Loading Study, Calculation Number FIX-00004-01, W-035, September 18, 2001.

1-31 Letter from Arshad M. Shekh (Entergy) to S. M. Ira (Westinghouse) to transmitting Entergy Inputs to the WCAP-12655 Revision, EDG Loading Study, Two CRs and Logic Diagrams, W-040, October 19, 2001.

1-32 Letter from Arshad M. Shekh (Entergy) to S. M. Ira (Westinghouse) transmitting Entergy Calculation Number FIX-00069-00, W-041, December 17, 2001.

3-1 Mark's Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, 17th Edition, McGraw Hill, New York, NY.

3-2 Con Edison Speedletter from L. Liberatori to T. Wong dated September 23, 1988.

3-3 Letter from B. Shepard (Con Edison) to E. Frantz (Westinghouse), dated January 17, 1989.

3-4 Letter from B. Shepard (Con Edison) to E. Frantz (Westinghouse), dated February 1, 1989.

3-5 Letter from B. Shepard (Con Edison) to E. Frantz (Westinghouse), dated March 24, 1989.

3-6 C. H. Campen and W. D. Tauche, Westinghouse Owners Group Report:

Reactor Seal Performance Following the Loss of All AC Power, WCAP-1 0541, Rev. 2 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2), November 1986.

3-7 L. A. Campbell, "Emergency Power for Pressurizer Heaters," Westinghouse Owners Group Study, Westinghouse internal memo NS-RPA-1l-3342, September 18,1979.

3-8 Con Edison Indian Point Station Mod. No. EGP-88-00918-E, "Service Water Strainer No. 21 - 26 Power Supply Mod.," January 12, 1989.

3-9 Con Edison Memo from M. Entenberg to R. Louie, "Heat Tracing for H 2 0 2 Analyzer," March 28, 1990.

9-4

3-10 "Charging Pump Operation During Station Blackout," Westinghouse Internal Letter MED-AEE-2279.

3-11 "Charging Pump Electrical Requirements," Westinghouse Internal Letter MED-AEE-2351 from J. G. Dudiak to E. R. Frantz dated June 14, 1989.

3-12 Westinghouse Sketches for Pressurizer Heaters, Dwgs. ED-SK-32941 1, -

329412 and -329413, November 18, 1966.

3-13 Consolidated Edison Cakc. No. MMM-SO1AFW-001, Rev. 0 3-14 T. P. Williams, et al, Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection and Control Systems - Indian Point Unit 2, WCAP-13871 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2), October 1993.

3-15 Letter from M. D. Hameedy (Westinghouse) to C. Jackson (Con Edison) transmitting SECL-92-339, Rev. 2, "Increase in the Containment Pressure High Setpoint to 10 Psig," IPP-93-744, July 13, 1993.

3-16 Westinghouse Calculation CN-SEE-00-63, Rev. 1, "IPP2 Diesel Loading Study -

Pumps," prepared by R. Hundal, October 15, 2001.

3-17, Letter from S. M. Ira (Westinghouse) to Diane Storrick (Westinghouse),

Verification of Additional Input Data, IPP-00-390, December 9, 2000 (this letter attaches Con Edison letter W-008 from James J. Tuohy to S. M. Ira, dated December 8, 2000).

3-18 Westinghouse Calculation CN-EMT-00-222, Rev. 0, "IP2 RCFC HEPA &

Charcoal Filter Elimination Fan Performance," prepared by C. Scrabis, November 2000 (summarized in letter Westinghouse letter LTR-EMT-00-1791, dated 11/29/00).

3-19 Con Edison Calculation FEX-00039-01, "Emergency Diesel Loading Study,"

prepared by D. Ghosh, approved 12/5/97. (This calculation documents the Rev. 1B changes to WCAP-12655, Rev. 1.)

3-20 Con Edison Dwg. !P2--S-000231-04, One-Line Schematic for EDG Building Ventilation Distribution Panels #1 and #2 4/95.

4-1 Consolidated Edison Drawing A2251 00, Emergency Generator Starting Logic.

(UFSAR Figure 7.2-7, Rev. 16A) 4-2 Consolidated Edison Drawing A225102, Safeguards Sequence Logic Diagram.

(UFSAR Figure 7.2-8, Rev. 16B) 4-3 Consolidated Edison Drawing A225105, Safeguards Actuation Logic Diagram.

(UFSAR Figure 7.2-12, Rev. 16A) (Note: This reference is no longer used.)

4-4 Consolidated Edison Drawing A225106, Feedwater Isolation Logic Diagram.

9-5

(UFSAR Figure 7.2-12, Rev. 15A) 4-5 FSAR Section 8.2, Electrical System Design, Rev. 16.

4-6 Indian Point 2, PT-R13, Rev 16, Safety Injection System, October 1987.

4-7 Consolidated Edison Drawing 9321-F-3006-91, Rev date 6/27/01, Sinqle Line Diagram 480 V MCC26A and 26B 0

4-8 Consolidated Edison Drawing A208088-37, Rev date 5/01/01, One Line Diagram of 480 VAC Swgrs. 21 & 22, Busses 2A, 3A, 5A & 6A.

4-9 Indian Point 2 FSAR Figure 8.2-10, Revision 6 4-10 Diesel Generator Loading Study for Indian Point Unit 2, Table 1-1 4-11 Reference deleted 4-12 Indian Point 2, PT-R1 3A, Rev. 10, Recirculation Switches.

4-13 Conference call between the NRC Region I, Con Edison, and Westinghouse on February 1, 1990 (this call discussed the change in sequence of steps in the post-LOCA switchover to cold leg recirculation - see SECL-89-744 in Appendix A).

4-14 Consolidated Edison Drawing B248513-06, Single Line Diagram 480V MCC 26C & CCR Vent Dist. Panel 21.

4-15 Consolidated Edison Indian Point Station Modification Number EGP-89-03380-E through EGP-89-033080-1, Indian Point Unit 2 Rearrangement of 480V Loads, (documents that MCC 26 remains automatically energized).

4-16 Consolidated Edison Indian Point Station Modification Number EGP-89-03376-E Rev. 0, IP2 Diversity CCP21, 22 & 23 Feeders.

4-17 Consolidated Edison Indian Point Station Modification Number EGP-89-03376-E Rev. 2, IP2 Diversify CCP21, 22 &23 Feeders.

4-18 Consolidated Edison Drawing A208088-26, One Line Diag. of 480 VAC Sw-r 21 and 22 Busses 2A, 3A, 5A & 6A. (This is the same as Ref. 4-8.)

4-19 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station 10CFR50.54 Safety Evaluation 90-204-MD, Rev. 1, "lP2 Diversify CCP21, 22, and 23 Feeders" (Safety Evaluation for Reference 4-17, EGP-89-03376-E, Rev. 2).

9-6

5-1 B. W. Gergos, Editor, Reload Transition Safety Report for Indian Point Unit 2, March 1989. This RTSR was transmitted via a letter from R. G. Creighton (Westinghouse Fuel Project Engineer) to S. N. Purohit (Con Edison), 891P*-G-0027, April 6, 1989. The LOCA analysis results are also attachments to a letter from S. P. Swigart (Westinghouse) to P. Malik (Con Edison), Stretchrating LOCA Results, IPP-88-842, August 5,1988.

5-2 Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines, Rev. 1C-LP, September 30, 1997 (see background document for ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization).

5-3 Memo from A. P. Ginsberg to V. Mullin, "Auxiliary Feedwater Assumptions for the Westinghouse Emergency Diesel Generator Load Study -WCAP-12655,"

February 1, 1993.

5-4 J. R. Reagan and T. P. Williams, Westinghouse Setpoint Methodoloqy Calculation Note Summary for Indian Point Unit 2 Fuel Cycle Extension to 24 Months, WCAP-13930 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2), December 1993.

5-5 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 14.3, Loss of Coolant Accidents, Rev. 16.

5-6 Letter from G. G. Konopka and D. F. Dudek (Westinghouse) to L. Libertori (Con Edison) transmitting An Additional Ultimate Heat Sink Update Evaluation Repor, IPP-01 -114, June 27, 2001.

5-7 Letter from G. G. Konopka and D. F. Dudek (Westinghouse) to L. Libertori (Con Edison) transmitting Ultimate Heat Sink Update Report, IPP-00-1 14, December 20, 2000.

5-8 Miscellaneous Calculations for the Indian Point 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Study, CN-POE-01-20, Rev. 0.

5-9 Steam Generator Level EOP Setpoints, CN-POE-01 -13, Rev. 3.

6-1 R. F. Kim, et al, Indian Point Unit 2 3083.4 MWT Stretch Rating Engineering Report, WCAP-12187 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2), March 1989.

7-1 WCAP-1 2655, Rev. 1, Supplement 1, Station Blackout Supplement to the Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Study for Indian Point Unit 2, Westinghouse Class 3, December 1998.

7-2 Letter to Stephen B. Bram, Consolidated Edison of New York from Francis J.

Williams, Project Directorate, NRR Region I, "Safety Evaluation of the Indian Point Nuclear Geherating Unit No. 2, Response to the Station Blackout (TAC No. M68556)," November 21, 1991.

9-7

7-3 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Consolidated Edison of New York.

7-4 Indian Point Unit 2 Emergency Operating Procedures. Rev. 38 (latest rev.),

effective date 7/31/01. (This is the same as Ref. 1-28.)

7-5 Westinghouse Owners Group Report: Reactor Seal Performance Following the Loss of All AC Power, WCAP-1 0541, Rev. 2 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2), November 1986.

7-6 Analysis and Transient Behavior of the Westinghouse 8-Inch Design No. 2 RCP Seal During a Loss of all Seal Cooling Event Representative of a Loss of all AC Power, WCAP-10541, Rev. 2, Supplement 2, (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2), 1988.

7-7 Con Edison Calculation FEX-00039-01, Emergency Diesel Loading Study, Con Ed Rev. 1B, December 2, 1997. (This is the same as Ref. 3-19.)

7-8 Con Edison Dwg. 9321 -F-3040-56, "Lighting Panels and Circuit Diagram -

Sheet 2" 7-9 Indian Point Unit 2 Station Blackout Report, prepared by TERERA, March 9, 1990.

7-10 TENERA calculation for "Cable Spreading Room Loss of Ventilation Analysis,"

Control I.D. No. 515402-2.2-001, dated March 29, 1993.

7-11 Letter from Stephen Brain, Consolidated Edison of New York to Document Control Desk, U.S. NRC, "Station Blackout Rule 10 CFR 50.63," April 14, 1989.

9-8

APPENDIX A SAFETY EVALUATION CHECKLISTS This appendix presents four Westinghouse Safety Evaluation Checklists (SECLs) used as part of the EDG loading study. These SECLs are briefly described below and then presented in their entirety. These SECLs were implemented except for the first one (stopping the AFW pumps during switchover). In the revised study, flow from the motor-driven AFW pumps is reduced to minimum recirculation flow when levels are on span in the narrow range (i.e.,.the symptoms allow this action to occur). The other 3 SECLs have been implemented at the plant. Some of the analyses or timing of actions are not up to date, however, this not impact the overall conclusions and acceptance of the change.

The first SECL is entitled "Safety Evaluation for Securing the Motor-Driven AFW Pumps during the Post-LOCA Switchover" (SECL-89-743, pages A-2 through A-6). This SECL provides justification for stopping the motor-driven AFW pumps during the switchover to cold leg recirculation. Prior to the EDG enhancement program, this action was performed to avoid a potential overload on EDGs 22 and 23 during the recirculation switch sequence. This action is no longer required nor performed in Rev. 38 of the EOPs (Ref. 1-28), used for this updated loading study (WCAP-1 2655, Rev. 2). This SECL is included for completeness. However, the action to stop the motor-driven AFW pumps during switchover is no longer performed in the EOPs.

The second SECL, "Changes in Switch Sequences for Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover" (SECL-89-744, Rev. 1, pages A-7 through A-13), provides justification for performing recirculation switches 2 and 3 in reverse order. This change has been implemented and is still in effect. Some of the safety analyses referenced in this SECL have been updated. However, for purposes of justifying operation of recirculation switch 3 prior to switch 2, the SECL can still be considered valid.

The third Westinghouse SECLis "High Head Safety Injection Flow Changes Safety Evaluation" (SECL-91-231, pages A-14 through A-62). This SECL provides justification for reducing the flow from the high head Si pumps as a result of installing throttle valves (for flow balancing) in the discharge piping for these pumps. This change has been implemented and its impact on the EDG loading study is given on pages 2 and 43 of the SECL (pages A-55 and A-56).

The fourth Westinghouse SECL is entitled "Increase in the Containment Pressure High ESF Safety Analysis Limit (SAL) Setpoint to 10 psig" (SECL-92-339, Rev. 2, pages A-63 through A-78). This SECL describes the changes to various safety analyses due to an increase in containment pressure uncertainties (resulting from increased surveillance time due to fuel cycle extension to 24 months). This change has been implemented.,

A-1

SECt NO.89-743 Customer Reference No(s).

Westinghouse Reference No(s).

WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR SAFETY SAFETY EVALUATION CHECK LIST 1.) NUCLEAR PLANT(S) Indian Poifit Unit_2 2.) SUBJECT (TITLE): Safety Evaluation for Securing the Motor-Driven AFW Pumps Pump durinc the Post-LOCA Switchover 3.) The written safety evaluation of the revised procedure, design change or modification required by 10CFRSO.59 (b) has been prepared to the extent required and is attached. If a safety evaluation is not required or is incomplete for any reason, explain on Page 2.

Parts A and B of this Safety Evaluation Check List are to be completed only on the basis of the safety evaluation performed.

CHECK LIST - PART A - IOCFR5O.59(a)(1)

(3.1) Yes X No_ A change to the plant as described in the FSAR?

(3.2) YesX No_ A change to procedures as described in the FSAR?

(3.3) Yes_ NOX_ A test or experiment not described in the FSAR?

(3.4) Yes_ No.-X A change to the plant technical specifications?

(See note on Page 2.)

4.) CHECK LIST - Part B - IOCFR50.59(a)(2) (Justification for Part 8 answers must be included on Page 2.)

(4.1) Yes_ No X Will the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.2) Yes_ No..X_. Will the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.3) Yes___ NoIL. May the possibility of an accident which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

(4.4) Yes___ No jL Will the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.5) Yes__ Noj Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.6) Yes_ NoJX_ Hay the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

(4.7) Yes_ No..L Will the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any technical specifications be reduced?

A-2

SECL NO.89-743 NOTES:

If the answers to any of the above questions are unknown, indicate under 5.) REMARKS and explain below.

If the answers to any of the above questions in Part A (3.4) or Part B cannot be answered in the negative, based on the written safety evaluation, the change review would require an application for license amendment as required by IOCFR5O.59(c) and submitted to the NRC pursuant to IOCFR5O.90.

5.) REMARKS:

The followIng summarizes the justification based upon the written safety evaluation , for answers given in Part A (3.4) and Part B of this SECL.

See the Attached Safety Evaluation

]Reference to documents containing written safety evaluation:

FOR FSAR UPQATE Section: Pages: ,, Tables: Figures:

Reason for/Description of Change:

See the Attached Safety Evaluation SAFETY EVALUATION APPROVAL LADDER:

Prepared by (Nuclear Safety):A ex aý, i Date:

Nuclear Safety Group Manager.4 . Date:

A-3

ATTACHMENT TO SECL-89-743 BACKGROUND Westinghouse is currently reviewing the Indian Point Unit 2 diesel loadings with the objective of reducing the diesel loads. To address diesel loading considerations, it has been proposed that the motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps be secured at the time of switchover to cold leg recirculation.

The areas considered in this review/evaluation for determining the effects of this recommendation on Indian Point 2 are as follows:

- LOCA, non-LOCA, and Steam Generator Tube Rupture analyses

- Containment Integrity analysis

- Radiological effects

- Technical Specifications

- Mechanical and Fluid systems Contained below are the results of evaluations addressing this change.

BASES Large Break LOCA For the large break LOCA transient, the heat transfer from the primary to the secondary is not required to mitigate the consequences of the postulated accident. Since a secondary side heat sink is not required for this event, securing of the motor-driven AFW pumps at the time of switchover to cold leg recirculation does not adversely affect the results of the large break LOCA.analysis or cause any regulatory or design limit to. be exceeded and is thus acceptable with respect to large break LOCA.

Small Break LOCA For the. small break LOCA, use of heat transfer from the primary to the secondary is required to mitigate the consequences of the postulated event. However, at some point during the transient following depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System, the primary thermodynamic conditions and flow from the ECCS will provide sufficient primary heat removal capability so that a secondary heat sink is no longer required.

Examination of the NOTRUMP small break LOCA analysis for Indian Point 2 has shown that the need for a secondary heat sink is eliminated well prior to the time of switchover for break sizes as small as a 4 inch equivalent diameter. For these cases, the proposed change is acceptable.

For smaller breaks, for which switchover will be much later (at a lower core decay heat level) but at a much higher primary pressure and lower break flow rate (heat sink required), a conservative evaluation was performed to assess the acceptability of the proposed change. Based on this evaluation, it was determined that while securing the motor-driven A-4

AFN pumps during the switchover sequence may result in some net reduction in secondary mass, a heat sink will still be available as required for these smaller breaks. The extremely slow transient behavior in terms of clad heat-up and boil-off capability in the primary system suggest that a reduced efficiency of the heat sink due to a lower secondary mass will not result in a more limiting small break LOCA scenario than those analyzed in the NOTRUMP analysis. Therefore, securing of the motor-driven AFW pumps at the time of switchover to cold leg recirculation does not adversely affect the results of the small break LOCA analysis or cause any regulatory or design limit to be exceeded and is acceptable with respect to small break LOCA.

Other LOCA Related Accidents The proposed change to the availability or sequencing of equipment during the switchover to cold leg recirculation will not affect the results of the analyses of hot leg switchover to prevent potential boron precipitation, post-LOCAlong term core cooling or LOCA hydraulic forces.

The hot leg switchover and post-LOCA long term core cooling calculations do not consider the specifics of switchover to cold leg recirculation, and assume that a successful switchover has occurred. For the LOCA hydraulic forces calculation, the peak forcing functions will be experienced within the first few seconds following the rupture, substantially before initiation of the switchover procedure.

Non-LOCA/ SGTR The non-LOCA and Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident analyses were reviewed and it has been determined that they are not impacted by this change because this is for post-LOCA only and that recirculation switchover will not occur.

Containment Integrity Analysis The containment integrity analyses are described in Chapter 14 of the FSAR and considers Short Term and Long Term Mass and Energy Release Analyses for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (LOCA's), Containment Response Analyses following a LOCA and Subcompartment Pressure Transient Analyses.

For the Short Term Mass and Energy Release and Subcompartment Pressure Analyses a change in the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) flowrate would have no effect on the calculated results, since the short duration of the transient (:. 3 seconds) does not consider AFW flow.

The long term mass and energy release and containment pressure response calculation following a LOCA are performed to ensure that the peak containment pressure remains below the design limit. A review of the containment integrity analysis has been completed to determine the effect of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps being tripped during the post-LOCA switchover on the conclusions derived in the analyses.

Sensitivity analyses reveal that a AFW pump trip has an insignificant A-5

effect on the mass and energy releases and resultant peak calculated containment pressure and temperature.

Therefore, the effect of the AFW pumps being tripped will have an insignificant impact on the containment integrity response calculations and will not compromise the conclusions or pressure margin derived in the current limiting safety analyses.

Radiological Impact of ANW Termination on LOCA The radiological consequences of a small break LOCA are not specifically evaluated in the FSAR, but are indicated as being bound by those of the large break LOCA. The large break LOCA is not affected by the'AFW termination, since no heat removal from the secondary side is required.

For the small break LOCA following AFW termination, the steam generator water level is expected to fall below the primary-to-secondary leakage sites. Hence, leaking reactor coolant is assumed to bypass the secondary coolant, i.e., neither mixing with the secondary coolant nor partitioning is assumed to occur, resulting in a direct activity leakage path to the environment. An evaluation has been performed, and the results confirm that the radiological consequences of a small break LOCA, with steam generator tube uncovery, are still bounded by the large break LOCA, and are within a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 dose guidelines.

CONCLUSION The LOCA, non-LOCA, Steam Generator Tube Rupture and Containment Integrity Accident analyses have been reviewed for the impact of this safety evaluation and it has been determined that tripping the motor-driven AFW pumps during the recirculation switchover for small and large break LOCA will not affect any of the accident analysis results. Also, the Technical Specifications and Mechanical and Fluid Systems were reviewed and it has been determined that they are not impacted.

Based upon the above evaluation, it has been determined that the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report is not-increased; the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report will not be created; and the margin of safety is not reduced. Therefore, the implementation of this recommendation will not adversely impact safe plant operations at Indian Point 2 and will not result in an unreviewed safety question as defined in the criteria of 10CFRS.59.

A-6

SECL-89-744, Rev. I July 23, 1990 WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR SAFETY SAFETY EVALUATION CHECK LIST 1.) NUCLEAR PLANT(S) Indian Point Unit-2 2.) SUBJECT (TITLE): Changes in Switch Seguences for Cold Leq Recirculation Switchover 3.) The written safety evaluation of the revised procedure, design change or modification required by IOCFR50.59 (b) has been prepared to the extent required and is attached. If a safety evaluation is not required or is incomplete for any reason, explain on Page 2.

Parts A and B of this Safety Evaluation Check List are to be completed only on the basis of the safety evaluation performed.

CHECK LIST - PART A - 10CFR50.59(a)(1)

(3.1) Yes_ No X A change to the plant as described in the FSAR?

(3.2) Yes X No A change to procedures as described in the FSAR?

(3.3) Yes_ No_ X A test or experiment not described in the FSAR?

(3.4) Yes_ No X A change to the plant technical specifications?.

(See note on Page 2.)

4.) CHECK LIST - Part B - IOCFRSO.59(a)(2) (Justification for Part B answers must be included on Page 2.)

(4.1) Yes_ No X Will the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.2) Yes_ No X Will the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.3) Yes__ No X May the possibility of an accident which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

(4.4) Yes__, NoX__ Will the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.5) Yes_ No X Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.6) Yes_ NoNoX_ May the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

(4.7) Yes_ No X Will the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any technical specifications be reduced?

A-7

SECL-89-744, Rev. I NOTES:

If the answers to any of the above questions are unknown, indicate under 5.) REMARKS and explain below.

If the answers to any of the above questions in Part A (3.4) or Part B cannot be answered in the negative, based on the written safety evaluation, the change review would require an application for license amendment as required by 10CFR50.59(c) and submitted to the NRC pursuant to IOCFR50.90.

5.) REMARKS:

The follow~ng summarizes the justification based upon the written safety evaluation , for answers given in Part A (3.4) and Part B of this SECL."

See the Attached Safety Evaluation

'Reference to documents containing written safety evaluation:

FOR FSAR UPDATE Section: Pages: Tables: Figures:

Reason for/Description of Change:

See the Attached Safety Evaluation_

SAFETY EVALUATION APPROVAL LADDER:

Prepared by (Nuclear Safety): R. Date: ;-2,-10 Nuclear Safety Group Manager-.

A-8

SECL-89-744, Rev. I BACKGROUND Indian Point Unit 2 has a semi-automatic sequence of eight switches that help the operator accomplish the realignment from injection to recirculation during the post-LOCA recovery phase of an accident. A brief description of the switches is provided below and additional details are in Chapter 6 of the FSAR.

Switch 1: Ensures two and only two high-head SI pumps continue to inject, still aligned to the RWST (the switch actually stops SI pump 22 provided SI pumps 21 and 23 are both running). Switch I also stops one of the containment spray (CS) pumps if both are operating.

Switch 2: Starts one component cooling pump and one non-essential service water pump. These pumps are needed for cooling the water from the recirculation sump (heat exchanged in one or both of the RHR heat exchangers).

Switch 3: Trips both RHR pumps.

Switch 4: Starts one recirculation pump (takes water from the recirculation sump and directs it to one or both RHR heat exchangers).

If offsite power is available or all diesel generators are operating, Switch 5 will start a second CCW pump, a second non-essential SW pump, and the second recirculation pump (if a diesel fails, this additional equipment would not be operated).

Switches 6 or 7 align for high-head or low-head recirculation (but not both). For small LOCAs, Switch 6 aligns for high-head recirculation (recirculation pumps feed the SI pump suction). For low-head recirculation, Switch 7 stops the SI pumps; flow from the RHR heat exchanger remains aligned as it was originally, i.e., directly feeding the cold legs.

Switch 8 then causes two valves to close: the spray pump test line valve and the SI pump suction valve from the RWST.

In the current design, the CCW pump and non-essential SW pump started via Switch 2 will normally be powered by different 480 V busses or diesel generators. For certain limiting failure conditions (e.g., failure of DG 21),

both pumps started by Switch 2 would be powered by diesel 22 (a load of approximately 500 kw for both pumps). Furthermore, SI pump 22 (approximately 350 kw) would remain operating after Switch 1. The resulting load on DG 22 is potentially too high until the RHR pump (300 kw) powered by DG 22 is stopped by Switch 3.

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SECL-89-744, Rev. 1 To reduce the transient load on DG 22, Consolidated Edison requested that Westinghouse investigate the possibility of interchanging the order or actions of Switches 2 and 3, i.e., effectively performing Switch 3 before Switch 2.

(The EOPs would most likely simply direct the operator to perform and verify Switch 3 actions before Switch 2, if the logic so permits). Note that with this change, there would be a longer period of time without low-head flow between the time the RHR pumps are stopped and the time the recirculation pumps are started. However, it is important to emphasize that two SI pumps will still be injecting from the RWST during this time period.

Per discussions with the Consolidated Edison, the maximum delay expected between the time the RHR pumps are stopped and the time the recirculation pumps are started is five minutes. For the DG 21 failure case of primary interest, switchover would not be reached for approximately 20 minutes (for a large LOCA); however, to bound the case where there are no failures, the time to switchover should be reduced to about 15 minutes. Thus, for the bounding scenario, the following time table of events should be considered:

Event Time (minutes)

Large LOCA, Limiting Set of 0 W Safeguards Equipment Available Start of Recirculation: 15 2 SI Pumps Left Operating RHR Pump(s) Stopped One CCW Pump and One Non-Ess. SW 15-20 Pump Started One Recirculation Pump Started 20 To address diesel loading considerations, it has been proposed that a modification to the switchover switch sequence be made for Indian Point 2.

This modification will result in an extended period of operation (up to 5 minutes) during recirculation in which pymped ECCS flow will be limited to that of 2 High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pumps.

The areas considered in this review/evaluation for determining the effects of this recommendation on Indian Point 2 are as follows:

- LOCA, non-LOCA, and Steam Generator Tube Rupture analyses

- Containment Integrity analysis

- Mechanical and Fluid Systems

- Radiological effects

- Technical Specifications Contained below are-the results of evaluations addressing these changes.

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SECL-89-744, Rev. I BASES Large Break LOCA An evaluation was performed to address the effects of an extended period of flow with only 2 HHSI pumps during switchover for Indian Point 2. This evaluation was based on conservative assumptions relative to transient behavior, HHSI flow, and time required to begin and complete the switchover procedure. The evaluation demonstrated that the vessel inventory remained high throughout the switchover procedure and that an adequately high level of heat transfer from the fuel cladding to the fluid was maintained. Based on this evaluation, it was determined that the extended period of delivery from 2 HHSI only during the switchover period would not result in any significant cladding heat-up and that the proposed change would not result in a scenario which could be more limiting than that analyzed in the Large Break LOCA (BASH) analysis to be used as the licensing basis for Indian Point 2 beginning with Cycle 10 operation. In addition, the combined effects of the proposed change in conjunction with securing the motor-driven AFW pumps during the switchover procedure (previously evaluated per SECL-89-743) were evaluated. From this evaluation, it was determined that the combined effects will be no more limiting than the conservative evaluation of the singular effects for each independent change. Therefore, the proposed change is acceptable and will not cause any regulatory or design limit to be exceeded with respect to Large Break LOCA.

Small Break LOCA An evaluation was 'performed to address the effects of an extended period of flow with only 2 HHSI pumps during switchover for Indian Point 2. This evaluation was based on conservative assumptions relative to transient behavior, HHSI flow, and time required to begin and completed the switchover procedure. The evaluation considered the small break cases included in the small break LOCA analysis with NOTRUMP for Indian Point 2, as well as bounding scenarios for break cases not analyzed in the NOTRUMP spectrum. Calculations of bounding cases demonstrated that the core would remain covered throughout the switchover procedure. Based on this evaluation, it was determined that the extended period of delivery from 2 HHSI only during the switchover period would not result in any significant cladding heat-up and that the proposed change would not result in a scenario which could be more limiting than that analyzed in the small break LOCA (NOTRUMP) analysis to be used as the licensing basis for Indian Point 2 beginning with Cycle 10 operation. In addition, the combined effects of the proposed change in conjunction with securing the motor-driven AFW pumps during the switchover procedure (SECL-89-743) were evaluated. From this evaluation, it was determined that the combined effects will be no more limiting than the conservative evaluation of the singular effects for each independent change. Therefore, the proposed change is acceptable and will not cause any regulatory or design limit to be exceeded with respect to small break LOCA.

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SECL-89-744,'Rev. I Other LOCA Related Accidents The proposed change to the availability or sequencing of equipment during the switchover to cold leg recirculation will not affect the results of the analyses of hot leg switchover to prevent potential bbron precipitation, post-LOCA long term core cooling or LOCA hydraulic forces. The hot leg switchover and post-LOCA long term core cooling calculations do not consider the specifics of switchover to cold leg recirculation, and assume that a successful switchover has occurred. For the LOCA hydraulic forces calculation, the peak forcing functions will be experienced withinthe first few seconds following the rupture, .substantially before initiation of the switchover procedure.

Non-LOCA/SGTR The non-LOCA and Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident analyses were reviewed and it has been determined that they are not impacted by this change because this is for post-LOCA only and that recirculation switchover will not occur.

Containment Intecrity Analysis The containment integrity analyses are described in Chapters 14 of the FSAR and considers Short Term and Long Term Mass and Energy Release Analyses for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (LOCA's); Containment Response Analyses following a LOCA or Steamline Break Inside Containment and Subcompartment Pressure Transient Analyses.

For the Short Term Mass and Energy Release and Subcompartment Pressure Analyses a change in the recirculation switch sequence would have no effect on the calculated results, since the short duration of the transient (< 3 seconds) does not consider safety injection flow.

For the Main Steamline Break Containment Response analysis, RHR pump flow is not considered due to the fact that the primary does not depressurize low enough to allow Low Head Safety Injection flow to initiate. Thus stopping the RHR pump delivery for a period following the accident would not affect this analysis for Containment Integrity.

The long term mass and energy release and containment pressure response calculation following a LOCA does take credit for the safety injection, including that from the RHR pump, supplied to the Reactor Coolant System. The limiting safeguards case for containment integrity is the minimum safeguards case. The proposed change in the recirculation switch sequencewould result in essentially the limiting analyzed design base case for containment integrity, and therefore no change in the base assumptions. Thus, the conclusions presented in the current Indian Point Unit 2 FSAR will remain valid as related to the containment integrity analyses.

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SECL-89-744, Rev. I Mechanical and Fluid Systems During ECCS injection, the safety injection pumps and thq recirculation pumps are cooled by safety injection circulating water pumps (driven by the safety injection pump shafts) and auxiliary component cooling pumps, which circulate CCW through the pump coolers. During this time, the CCW pumps may not be operating (following a design basis accident, with off-site power), and thus, the CCWS slowly heats up, absorbing the pump heat.

When ECCS switchover is reached, and Switch 2 is operated, CCW cooling is established, and the CCWS provides cooling to these ECCS pumps.

Delaying the time when the CCW pumps are started, by delaying the initiation

.of Switch 2, will cause the CCW temperature to increase further before CCW cooling is established.

The design basis calculation performed to determine the CCWS heatup rate resulted in the CCWS temperature increasing from its initial temperature of Ocooling 95°F, to 116'F in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Based on this heatup rate, delaying CCW another 5 minutes will cause the CCWS temperature to increase by an additional 0.44°F. This is considered to be insignificant, and will have no effect on the ability of the auxiliary component cooling pumps or the CCWS to provide cooling to the safety injection and recirculation pumps during ECCS injection.

Therefore, delaying the initiation of CCW cooling at the time of ECCS switchover (a 5 minute delay is assumed) by revising the recirculation switch sequencing will not increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.

CONCLUSION The LOCA, non-LOCA, Steam Generator Tube Rupture and Containment Integrity Accident analyses have been reviewed for the impact of this safety evaluation and it has been determined that changing the recirculation switch sequence will not affect any of the accident analysis results. Also, the Technical Specifications and radiological doses were'reviewed and it has been determined that they are not impacted.

Based upon the above evaluation, it has been determined that the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report is not increased; the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report will not be created; and the margin of safety is not reduced. Therefore, the implementation of this recommendation will not adversely impact safe plant operations at Indian Point 2 and will not result in an unreviewed safety question as defined in the criteria of 10CFR50.59.

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SECL-91-231 WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR SAFETY EVALUATION CHECKLIST

1) NUCLEAR PLANT(S):INDIAN POINT UNIT 2

2) CHECK LIST APPLICABLE TO:HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW CHANGES (Subject of Change) SAFETY EVALUATION

3) The written safety evaluation of the revised procedure, design change or modification required by 10 CFR 50.59 has been prepared to the extent required and is attached. If a safety evaluation is not required or is incomplete for any reason, explain on Page 2.

Parts A and B of this Safety Evaluation Check List are to be completed only on the basis of the safety evaluation performed.

CHECK LIST - PART A - 10 CFR 50.59 (a) (1)

(3.1) Yes X No A change to the plant as described in the FSAR?

(3.2) Yes___ NoXL A change to procedures as described in the FSAR?

(3.3) Yes__ NoX A test or experiment not described in the FSAR?

(3.4) Yes__ NoX A change to the plant technical specifications (See note on Page 2)

A

4) CHECK LIST - PART B - 10 CFR 50.59 (a) (2) (Justification for Part B answers must be included on page 2.)

(4.1) Yes_ NoX Will the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.2) Yes_ No X Will the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.3) Yes__ No X May the possibility of an accident which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

(4.4) Yes__.No_ X Will the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.5) Yes_ No X Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

(4.6) Yes___ No X May the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

(4.7) Yes_ No X Will the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any technical specification be reduced?

Page 1 of 49 w

A-14

SECL-91-231 If the answers to any of the above questions are unknown, indicate under 5) REMARKS with an explaination.

If the answer to question 3.4 of Part A or any of the questions in Part B cannot be answered in the negative, based on written safety evaluation, the change review would require an application for license amendment as required by 10 CFR 50.59(c) and submitted to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.

5) REMARKS:

The answers given in Sections 3 and 4, Parts A and B of the Safety Evaluation Checklist are based on the attached safety evaluation.

(1)Reference to document(s) containing written safety evaluation:

SAFETY EVALUATION IS ATTACHED FOR FSAR UPDATE Section: Pages: Tables: Figures:

Reason for / Description of Change:

Recommended FSAR changes are not included with this safety evaluation.

SAFETY EVALUATION APPROVAL LADDER:

DII va kw~ '0i.'90 - -/E Date: OZ64ql R.R.Laubham Operating Plant Licensing II Reviewed by: Date: __/__/C_

Oe.JrtOeBl as Plant Oprai io Licensing 11 Approved by: o_**'J -*

4*. Date: __ __ ,

7 SY. D.Kupprech1~flianager Operating Plant Licensing 11 Page 2 of 49 A-15

SECL-91-231 INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW CHANGES SAFETY EVALUATION June 1991 Prepared By:

Westinghouse Electric Corporation Principal Contributors:

P.B.Cowan O.E.Burkosh E.R.Frantz R.R.RLaubham R.N.Lewis T.A.Miller E.H.Monahan K.Rubin W.R.Rymer L.C.Smith Page 3 of 49 A-16

SECL-91-231 INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW CHANGES SAFETY EVALUATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Section # Title Page #

1.0 BACKGROUND

5 2.0 LICENSING BASIS 7 3.0 HHSI SYSTEM ANALYSIS and REVISED BALANCING 8 CRITERIA 3.] System Post-Accident Operation 8 3.2 System Performance Analysis Objectives 10 3.3 Modelling and Methodology 11 3.4 Key Inputs/Assumptions 12 3.5 Results 13 4.0 SAFETY EVALUATION 26 4.1 LOCA Evaluation 26 4.2 Non-LOCA Transient Evaluation 35 4.3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture and Radiological 36 Consequences Evaluation 4.4 Coimtainment Integrity Evaluation 37 4.5 Pump Integrity and Operability Evaluation 39 4.6 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Study Affects 42 5.0 ASSESSMENT OF NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION 44 6.0 RESULTS and CONCLUSIONS 47

7.0 REFERENCES

49 Page 4 of 49 A-17

SECL-91-231 INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW CHANGES SAFETY EVALUATION

1.0 BACKGROUND

The purpose of this safety evaluation is to assess two optional changes to the Indian Point Unit 2 (IP2) nuclear power station High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) system flow balancing criteria, and the associated changes to the HHSI flows used in the various plant safety analyses, to ensure that the changes will not adversely affect the safety analyses ... , therefore, safe plant operation.

During the current IP2 Cycle 10/11 refueling outage, Con Edison has installed variable orifices (throttle valves) in the discharge piping of the HHSI pumps to facilitate balancing the pumps during system testing. Per Con Edison's authorization, Westinghouse had previously developed revised flow balancing acceptance criteria for use in confirming HHSI line balancing and ensuring system performance. Two flow balancing criteria ranges were developed to enable Con Edison to select one criteria range that they would find most suitable to apply. These ranges, which were initially identified to Con Edison on May 17, 1990, are:

Aiowable HHSI Pump Total Header Case # 'Head Deviation Flow (qpml 1 +3%- -7% 570 - 585 2 +0%- -5% 565 - 590 Section 3 provides more detail concerning the proper application of these criteria. Section 3 and section 4 also identify certain items that Con Edison must confirm to ensure the validity of the supporting HHSI system performance analyses and this safety evaluation.

As of this time, the HHSI lines have been balanced, and the full-flow test has been performed verifying HHSI system performance. This report documents a safety evaluation of the effect of the subject flow balancing criteria revisions on HHSI system performance and, hence, on the flow data used in the various IP2 safety analyses.

Several years ago, as part of the IP2 Stretch Power Rating Program (reference 9), revised minimum and maximum safeguards injection flows for the HHSI system were calculated as a function of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure. The results of those calculations employed the Page 5 of 49 A-18

SECL-91-231 original system performance assumptions and were used as the basis for revised safety analyses performed in support of the Cycle 10 fuel reload and the stretch power (3083.4 MWt NSSS power) licensing amendment. Since those revised safety analyses, several generic potential safety issues have been identified which can impact the flow performance capability of the HHSI system. These issues are:

(1) Excessive suction boost during recirculation (2) Imbalance in the cold leg injection lines (3) Flow measurement bias/uncertainty in HHSI branch line flow orifices These issues were all previously identified within Westinghouse and communicated to all utilities including Con Edison. The revised HHSI system flow balancing criteria was dgveloped in consideration of the above three issues.

The evaluations and conclusions addressed by this safety evaluation represent the result of individual reviews performed by Westinghouse in areas which include Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Analyses, Non-LOCA Transient Analyses, Containment Integrity Analyses, Instrumentation and Control, Technical Specifications, Mechanical and Fluid Systems, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident Analysis, Radiological Assessment, and Emergency Operating Procedures. Since only the LOCA, Non-LOCA, Containment Integrity, Mechanical and Fluid Systems, SGTR, and Radiological Assessment areas were determined to be potentially impacted by the affect of the revised HHSI flow balancing criteria, the scope of this safety evaluation was limited to these areas. Con Edison will evaluate the affect of the subject change to HHSI flows on the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) loading analysis to ensure that the EDG loads remain acceptable.

The principal conclusion of this safety evaluation is that the changes to the IP2 HHSI flows employed in related plant, safety analyses that are associated with the subject revisions to the HHSI flow balancing criteria will not involve a change to plant technical specifications, will not represent an unreviewed safety question and, therefore, will not adversely affect safe plant operation.

_Page 6 of 49 A-19

SECL-91-231 2.0 LICENSING BASIS This evaluation was performed according to the regulations set forth in Title I0 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, (10 CFR 50.59). This regulation allows the holder of a license authorizing operation of a nuclear power facility the capacity to evaluate changes to the plant and/or procedures, and tests or experiments not described in the Final Safity Analysis Report (FSAR) (reference 1).

Furthermore, prior Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval is not required to implement the change provided that it does not involve an unreviewed safety question or result in a change in the plant technical specifications. It is, however, the obligation of the licensee to maintain a record of the change or modification to the facility to the extent that such a change impacts the FSAR. 10 CFR 50.59 further stipulates that these records shall include a written safety evaluation which provides the basis for the determination that the subject condition (a change in the HHSI safety analyses flows) does not involve an unreviewed safety question. This document supports the requirement for a written safety evaluation.

The determination by this safety evaluation that the subject change in the IP2 HHSI safs-.y analyses flows does not involve an unreviewed safety question was made based on individual evaluations performed against pertinent licensing-basis acceptance criteria for IP2. These acceptance criteria are:

(a) The LOCA Analyses safety evaluation (section 4.1) demonstrates compliance with the Peak Clad Temperature (PCT) limit of 2200F as specified in 10 CFR 50.46 b(1), and was performed consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix K. The analyses also demonstrate compliance with other 10 CFR 50.46 criteria paraphrased as follows:

The total cladding oxidation must be less than 17% of the total cladding thickness prior to oxidation.

- The total hydrogen generated must be less than 1% of the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all the cladding were to react with water or steam.

- The core must remain amenable to cooling.

- The core temperature must be maintained acceptably low, and decay heat must be removed for the period of time required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core.

(b) The Non-LOCA Analysis safety evaluation (section 4.2) demonstrates that the minimum DNBR will not violate the current limit value.

Page 7 of 49 A-20

SECL-91-231 (c) The SGTR Analyses and Radiological Dose Consequences safety evaluation (section 4.3) demonstrates that the SGTR offsite dose increases are small (less that 0.5 rem), and that the total dose is very low, being below the NRC definition of a "small fraction" of the 10 CFR 100 exposure guideline. This "small fraction" is defined as 10% of the guideline value (30 rem thyroid and 2.5 rem whole body), and is the smallest of the exposure limits defined by the NRC in Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Section 15.6.3, "Radiological Consequences of Steam Generator Tube Failure". This acceptance criteria is consistent with that applied by the NRC in their Safety Evaluation Report (SER) of the Stretch Core Power Uprating to 3071.4 tWt (reference 2). The SGTR analysis performed in support of the Stretch Power Uprating is still the current SGTR analysis of record for IP2.

(d) The Containment Integrity Accident Analyses safety evaluation (section 4.4) demonstrates that the peak calculated containment pressure is expected to be less than the containment design value of 47 psig which was stated in reference 3, and which was used as an acceptance criteria by the NRC in their Stretch Core Power Uprating SER (reference 2). Reference 3 documents the current licensing basis containment analysis.

(e) The Mechanical and Fluid Systems safety evaluation demonstrates that the subject revisions to the HHSI balancing criteria will not adversely affect HHSI system and pump operability based on an IP2 HHSI pump runout limit of 650 gpm when suction is taken from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), and an extended runout limit of 675 gpm during high head recirculation.

3.0 HHSI SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND REVISED BALANCING CRITERIA The following sections present general background information needed to establish the bases of the HHSI system performance analysis supporting this safety evaluation. The information includes an overview of Safety Injection System (SIS) post-accident operation, the performance analysis objectives, the modelling and methodology, key assumptions, and a summary of the revised calculated Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) flows.

3.1 System Post-Accident Operation The active portion of the IP2 SIS is comprised of low head and high head subsystems. The HHSI system is comprised of three HHSI pumps

(#'s 21, 22, & 23) which provide flow though a common pump header to two HHSI discharge headers. All three HHSI pumps receive a start signal on a Safety Injection (SI) signal and are initially aligned to take suction from the RWST. Each header can deliver flow to the RCS via two cold leg (normally opened) and one hot leg (normally closed) branch lines. Overall flow in each of the headers is limited by pump discharge orifices, and branch lines flows can be "balanced" by the use of HHSI branch line throttle valves (856A through F).

Page 8 of 49 A-21

SECL-91-231 The system was designed such that, with a single active failure, two of the three HHSI pumps would be available to deliver ECCS flow. Each pump would deliver flow to one of two discharge headers. The two HHSI discharge headers are physically isolated from each other via check valves 852A/B (located in the common pump discharge header) when the two outer HHSI pumps (#'s 21 & 23) are running. With the failure of either one of the two outer HHSI pump to start (#'s 21 or 23), and with HHSI pump #22 running, the two HHSI discharge headers are automatically isolated via a closure of either valve 851A or 851B, as appropriate.

The closure of either valve 851A or 851B maintains the system design feature of one pump per discharge header, and maximizes flow delivered to the RCS when a branch lines delivers flow to the containment as a result of an RCS pressure boundary break. The maximum closing stroke time for these isolation valves is 120 seconds following receipt of a closure signal.

The low bead subsystem is comprised of two SI recirculation pumps and two Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps which normally deliver flow to the RCS cold legs via one or two RHR heat exchangers. Following SI actuation, both RHR pumps are automatically started and initially take suction from the RWST.

When the low level setpoint in the RWST is reached, the SIS is manually realigned to support cold leg recirculation following a LOCA. During this switchover from injection to recirculation, the RHR pumps are normally shut down. This is done to prevent sump fluid from being recirculated (and potentially leaked) outside containment (the RHR pumps are physically located outside of containment). To provide low head flow, one or two SI recirculation pumps (located inside containment) would be used to circulate sump flow back to the RCS.

For a Large-Breik LOCA, sump flow would be directed to the RCS cold legs via the low head subsystem. For smaller breaks which result in RCS pressures above the shutoff head of the SI recirculation pump, sump flow would be directed to the RCS cold legs via the HHSI cold leg branch lines. In this high head recirculation alignment, a portion of the recirculated sump flow can also be directed to the containment spray headers for containment pressure reduction, as appropriate. The RHR pumps are also capable of taking suction from a separate sump inside containment and providing redundant backup to the SI recirculation pumps for long-term cooling.

At approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months following a LOCA, the SIS is switched over to hot leg recirculation. In this realignment, the low head safety injection (LHSI) recirculation system would be realigned to deliver flow to two HHSI pumps (if the system was not already aligned for high head recirculation). The RIIR heat exchanger discharge isolation valves (746 & 747) would normally be closed to isolate flow to the LUSI cold leg injection lines, and valves 888A/B would be opened to allow LHSI flow and Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) to be directed to the common suction header of the HHSI pumps.

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SECL-91-231 To deliver hot leg recirculation flow, one of the two HHSI cold leg branch line isolation valves would be closed and the corresponding hot leg branch line isolation valve would be opened on each HHSI discharge header. The hot leg valve is interlocked with the corresponding cold leg valves on each header (that is, one cold leg valve must be closed prior to opening the hot leg valve).

During recirculation, the SIS has capability to perform core cooling following a single active failure. Also, to accommodate a passive failure, the SIS design includes an alternative flow path from the discharge header of the RHR pumps to the suction piping of HHSI pump

22. The HHSI pump #22 suction piping is provided with two power operated isolation valves in series (887A/B) which can be used to isolate the common HHSI pump suction header (where the leak/break could be postulated) from the alternate suction flow path.

To facilitate detection of loss of flow in the normal supply line, a pressure instrument and low pressure alarm is provided in the HHSI pump suction header (alarm at about 75 psig). In this configuration, only HUSI pump #22 would be available for continued high head recirculation. To provide adequate pump runout protection, one of the two HHSI pump discharge headers would have to be isolated to provide pump runout protection (MOV 851A or 851B would have to be closed).

In this modified alignment, one RHR pump would feed one HHSI pump which, in turn, would deliver "hot" recirculated sump flow to the RCS via a hot leg and cold leg branch lines from a single HHSI discharge header. Note, the IP2 SIS design does not provide for hot leg flow to the RCS using the LHST system alone.

3.2 System Performance Analysis Objectives The objectives of the HHSI system performance analysis were:

(1) Develop revised balancing criteria for the IP2 HHSI system.

The three potential safety issues identified in section I were factored into this effort.

(2) Analyze the revised HHSI system performance, and to calculate revised HHSI system flows to be used in the safety analyses and evaluations documented herein.

A key consideration used in the hydraulic analysis was a HHSI pump runout limit of 675 gpm. The previous maximum HHSI pump runout flow limit had been 650 gpm (see reference 4). The limiting system alignment for runout protection was identified as LOCA high head recirculation alignment with the HHSI pumps taking suction from either the SI recirculation or RHR pumps. With either LHSI pump delivering flow to only the HHSI pumps, total pump flow would be low and the discharge pressure of the LHSI pump could approach its shutoff head.

Conservatively neglecting piping friction losses from the discharge of the LHSI pump to the suction of the HHSI pumps, the HHSI pump suction pressure was estimated to be 215 psig. This compares to a normal HHSI pump suction pressure of about 10-25 psig when aligned to the RWST.

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SECL-91-231 The discharge pressure of the HHSI pump is dependent on overall system resistance and available pump suction pressure. At a given pump flow, higher the pump suction boost results in higher the pump discharge pressure. For the fixed resistance (i.e., "throttled") HHSI system, the net effect of higher pump suction pressure is higher pump flow.

To address higher suction boost to the HHSI pumps during high head recirculation, the existing HHSI flow balancing range for IP2 had to be shifted downward to lower flows.

3,3 Modelling and Methodology Provided below is an overview of the approach used to develop both sets of balancing criteria and to calculate the associated HHSI system flows:

(1) The HHSI system hydraulic model used for the Stretch Core Power uprating program was updated to reflect the replacement of the fixed pump discharge orifices with variable orifices. Resistance was also added to the piping network to better estimate header pressures, and revised pump head criteria were developed.

(2) Using the revised hydraulic model, a maximum allowable header balancing flow in the RWST suction alignment (test condition),

which would yield a total pump flow of 675 gpm during the high head recirculation alignment with maximum suction boost, was calculated. The allowable ranges for HHSI pump head, RWST elevation, and HHSI pump miniflow capacity were used to set this maximum allowable analysis flow. This flow was then appropriately reduced to account for branch line flow measurement uncertainty.

(3) A minimum allowable header balancing flow was then determined based on a balancing window size defined by Con Edison.

(4) Using the step 2 & 3 criteria, allowable branch line imbalance, and branch line flow measurement uncertainty, the hydraulic model was conservatively "flow balanced" to established branch line resistances at the zero (0) psig RCS pressure test condition.

(5) Using the branch line resistances from step 4, the hydraulic model was used to calculate minimum and maximum delivered RCS flow as a function of RCS pressure. The flows were calculated over the operating range of the pump with and without one line spilling to containment pressure. The calculated flows conservatively reflect the allowable ranges in HHST pump and miniflow capacity and RWST elevation (suction boost).

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SECL-91-231 3.4 Key Inputs/Assumptions A summary of key inputs and assumptions used to set the revised HHSI flow balance criteria and/or to perform the analysis include:

(1) HHSI Branch Line Flow Measurement Uncertainty.

A +/- 7 gpm measurement uncertainty was defined by Con Edison for the cold and hot leg flow measurements. This uncertainty was based on calibration results for replacement branch line flow measurement orifices which were procured, tested, and installed in the system prior to the flow balance test.

(2) HHSI Branch Line Flow Measurement Indicated Imbalance.

A 10 gpm maximum indicated flow imbalance criterion was defined by Con Edison when two cold leg injection line throttle valves are set on each header. This imbalance, combined with flow measurement uncertainty, was used to define the maximum variation in branch line flows. In general, larger differences in branch line flows would tend to lower the injection line flow with one branch line spilling to containment pressure. The spilling fraction increases significantly as the relative pressure difference between the injection and spilling line pressures increases.

(3) HHSI Pump Suction Read Due to RWST Water Elevation (the tank is physically located above the RCS cold legs).

The plant elevation of the RWST water level was assumed to be anywhere between 80 and 120 ft. The plant elevation of the centerline of the RCS cold legs is 62 ft.

(4) HHSI Pump Miniflow Capacity.

The analysis considered flows between 25 to 35 gpm when one pump is operated near shutoff conditions on miniflow only. This range does not include measurement error. The actual pump miniflow corrected for uncertainty must be within this range to validate this analysis.

(5) HHSI Pump Discharge Orifice.

The plant was previously provided with a fixed orifice located at the discharge of each HHSI pump. The function of each orifice was to provide pump runout protection. The plant has replaced these orifices with variable orifices to facilitate balancing the HHSI pump developed head. This balancing flexibility was added since both headers also have to be balanced with the middle HHSI pump

(#22). The variable resistance was assumed to be set initially for each pump with the cold leg branch line throttle valves in their full open position. Subsequent readjustment of the pump variable orifice to increase header total flow (i.e. reduce orifice resistance) is acceptable during the cold leg throttle valve adjustment phase of the flow balance.

Page 12 of 49 0C A-25

SECL-91-231 (6) HHSI Pump Developed Head.

Two sets of minimum and maximum HHSI pump head curves were considered. The first set considers +3% to -7% of the vendor head consistent with ASME Section XI criteria. The second set considers ÷0% to -5% of the vendor head consistent with the analysis of record. The enhancement/degradation was taken at each point on the pump curve rather than using the pump design head as a reference point.

The original vendor certified head/flow curve for each HHSI pump was used to define pump head at 50 gpm intervals over the entire operating range of the pump. A composite curve (enveloping the highest and lowest values of all three original vendor head/flow curves) was then defined. The analysis pump head curves were then developed by applying the allowable percent variations from the appropriate composite curve. Table 3-1 presents a summary of the HHSI pump head/flow data used for this project.

From table 3-1, note that the maximum composite pump head curve was used as the upper bound for the +0% to -5% head criterion. For the system flow balance and performance analysis, the HHSI pumps are allowed to operate anywhere within either head criterion. The actual pump performance, considering measurement uncertainty, must be within the applicable pump head criteria presented in table 3-1. At a minimum, the pump developed head at miniflow and at full flow must be che'cked (when tested).

3.5 Results 3.5.1 Revised Balancing Criteria The two optional revised HHSI flow balancing criteria developed for the IP2 HHSI system are provided in this section. Con Edison will select the particular criteria-that they will adhere to in their full-flow testing.

GENERAL CRITERIA o The uncertainty associated with the HHSI hot and cold leg branch line flow measurement shall be < +/- 7 gpm.

o The HHSI pump miniflow shall be within 30 gpm +/- 5 gpm with one pump operating near shutoff conditions on miniflow alone. The specified miniflow range does not account for measurement uncertainty. The indicated flow must be corrected for measurement uncertainty before comparison to the specified range.

o Only one HHSI pump feeding one HHSI discharge header shall be used to flow balance each header. Valve 851A or 8518 shall' be manually closed, as appropriate, to isolate the two HHSI discharge headers. The acceptance criteria for each header shall be met when both the appropriate HHS1 pump (#21 or #23) an4d HHS1 pump #22 feed the same header separately.

Page 13 of 49 A-26

SECL-93-231 o The HHSI pump variable orifice shall be set first with the cold leg branch line throttle valves fully opened and the hot leg isolation valve fully closed. Next, the cold leg branch line throttle valves shall be set. Finally, the hot leg branch line throttle valve shall be set. During the hot leg branch line flow balance, the cold leg branch line throttle valve on the same header shall not be repositioned. The positions of the cold and hot leg valves shall be recorded for future reference and controlled to prevent valve movement from the established throttled position for each valve.

o The HHSI pump total developed head shall be maintained within either one or the other allowable head range (not a combination of both).

HHSI FLOW BALANCING CRITERIA (1) COLD LEG INJECTION LINES o The cold leg injection lines on each header shall be throttled to within a 10 gpm indicated flow imbalance.

o The cold leg injection lines on each header shall be throttled such that the sum of the indicated flows in the two cold legs are within either of the following two balancing ranges:

- 570 gpm to 585 gpm considering a +3% to -7% allowable HHSI pump head range OR

- 565 gpm to 590 gpm considering a +0% to -5% allowable HHSI pump head range (2) HOT LEG INJECTION LINES o The hot leg injection line flow shall be throttled to achieve a minimum 250 gpm indicated flow with only one cold leg injection line opened. This criteria shall be met with both cold legs isolated separately on each header.

o The sum of the hot and cold leg flow on each header shall be less than or equal to the following:

- 585 gpm considering a +3%/ -7% allowable HHSI pump head range OR

- 590 gpm considering a +0% / -5% allowable HHSI pump head range Page 14 of 49 A-27

SECL-91-231 3.5.2 Revised System Performance Using the criteria presented in section 3.5.1, HHSI flows based on the RWST suction alignment were calculated for the following conditions:*

CASE A Non-LOCA Event (Minimum Safeguards) considering two degraded HISI pumps in operation and all lines injecting. This case is also applicable to the LOCA Containment Integrity event.

CASE B Large Break/Small Break LOCA Event (Minimum Safeguards) with two degraded HHSI pumps in operation, one line spilling to zero pressure (0 psig), and with HHSI header isolation (valve 851A or 851B closed, as appropriate).

CASE C Large Break/Small Break LOCA Event (Minimum Safeguards) with two degraded HHSI pumps in operation, one line spilling to zero pressure (0 psig), and without HHSI header isolation (HHSI pump #22 operating with valves 851A/B open).

CASE 0 Large Break LOCA Event (Minimum Safeguards) with three degraded HHSI pumps in operation, one line spilling to zero pressure (0 psig), and without HHSI header isolation (valves 851A/B open).

CASE E Large Break LOCA/SGTR Events (Maximum Safeguards) with three enhanced HHSI pumps in operation and all lines injecting.

CASE F Non-LOCA Event (Minimum Safeguards) with three degraded HHSI pumps in operation and all lines injecting. This case is also applicable to the LOCA Containment Integrity event.

For the LOCA Minimum Safeguards events, separate cases were analyzed regarding the status of valves 851A/B. This was done to address loss of injection flow with HHSI pump #22 operating and the header isolation valve (851A or 851B) opened. The maximum time in which the HHSI headers would be interconnected was conservatively set at 130 seconds. This time considers the delay in the generation of the valve closure signal, and the valve stroke time needed to fully close.

The above six cases were calculated for both sets of HHSI pump head criteria (See table 3-1). Comparison of the two sets of HHSI flows showed that the larger HHSI pump head range (+3% to -7%) provided the most conservative injection flows. As such, the safety evaluation was based on this limiting set of flows to conservatively bound the affects of both pump head ranges.

Page 15 of 49 A-28

SECL-91-231 Table 3-2 (parts A through F) provides the sets of revised calculated HHS1 flows as a function of RCS pressure for each of the identified cases. Included with this table are summaries of key system assumptions/inputs for both the current (existing) and revised hydraulic flow analyses.

in addition to the cold leg injection flows, the minimum delivered flow during the hot leg recirculation alignment was also calculated.

These flows were needed to verify that delivered flows under three separate break scenarios would be adequate to remove decay heat and to control boric acid solubility in the core. The three subject conditions are listed below:

(1) Large Cold Leg Break - Define minimum hot leg injection flow at zero RCS pressure with a cold leg injection line spilling. A single failure should be postulated, as appropriate, to minimize delivered hot leg flow.

(2) Large Hot Leg Break - Define minimum delivered injection flow at zero RCS pressure with a hot leg injection line spilling. A single failure should be postulated, as appropriate, to minimize delivered flow (hot and cold leg flow).

(3) Small Hot Leg Break - Define minimum delivered injection flow at the S/G secondary side safety valve setpoint with a hot leg injection line spilling. The spill assumption should be to RCS or containment pressure depending on the location of the hot leg injection line connection to the RCS pressure boundary. A single failure should be postulated, as appropriate, to minimize delivered flow (hot and cold leg flow).

To allow evaluation of system performance in this alignment, the HHSI balancing criteria included flow requirements for the hot leg branch lines. Section 3.5.1 identifies the hot leg balancing criteria used for this analysis. Note that a minimum indicated hot leg flow of 250 gpm was specified. This value was based on the minimum measured hot leg flow that Con Edison has already used to set up one of the HHSI discharge headers.

The minimum delivered flows for each of the three subject cases under limiting active and passive failure assumptions were defined. In general, the existing cold leg calculated flows were used as a basis.

Provided below is an overview of the assumed system conditions and the minimum calculated flows for each case:

(1) Large Cold Leg Break - With this event, minimum flow delivered to the RCS via hot leg lines is of interest at zero (0) psig RCS/containment pressure. With the IP2 design, a single active failure in the power supply to a hot leg branch line power operated isolation valve would prevent the valve from opening.

Page 16 of 49 A-29

SECL-91-231 With this failure, hot leg flow could only be delivered from one HHSI discharge header. If the break was a failure in a hot leg injection line, or was a passive failure during recirculation in the LHSI supply line to the HHSI pumps, then hol leg flow would be delivered from one HHSI pump to a single hot leg line.

Considering measurement error and the allowable range of HHSI pump head, a minimum delivered hot leg flow of 234 gpm was calculated with one HHSI pump feeding one HHSI discharge header. This flow was calculated using a conservatively low suction boost (equivalent to the elevation head difference between the RWST bottom and the RCS cold leg centerline).

(2) Large Hot Leg Break - With this event, minimum flow delivered to the RCS via all non-spilling lines is of interest at zero RCS/containment pressure. For this criterion, the spilling of a hot leg branch line would assume to occur. To minimize total delivered flow, the highest credible hot leg flow has to be assumed. Although a maximum hot leg flow is not included in the balancing criteria, the sum of the hot and cold leg flows was limited to the cold leg injection line header balancing criteria.

This criterion would allow hot leg flow to be as high as cold leg branch line flow.

With this configuration, the cold leg injection phase flows provided in table 3-2 were used.to estimate the minimum delivered flow with one line spilling (hot leg line). As shown in table 3-2 (Case C), a minimum flow of 768 gpm is delivered. This minimum flow assumes a single active failure of a HHSI pump. Credit is not taken for the isolation of the two HHSI discharge headers via valve 851A or 851B.

Using the individual calculated header flows from this case, the delivered RCS flow with one HHSI pump feeding one header was used to evaluate the passive failure condition. With one injection line and one spilling line, delivered flow to the RCS is greater than 234 gpm. As such, the Criterion I minimum delivered flow is limiting with respect to this criterion.

(3) Small Hot Leg Break - With this event, minimum flow delivered to the RCS via all non-spilling lines is of interest. RCS pressure is assumed to be stuck at the steam generator safety valve setpoint (the plant has taken no actions to depressurize since the event). For this criterion, the spilling of a hot leg branch line would be assumed to occur.

Page 17 of 49 A-30

SECL-91-231 Unlike Criterion 2, however, a significant pressure differential would exist between RCS and containment pressure. At IP2, the two hot leg injection lines tie directly into the RCS pressure boundary. As such, the hot leg branch line would spill to containment pressure. Using the approach used for Criterion 2, the table 3-2 presented.cold leg injection .phase flows were used to estimate the minimum delivered flow with one injection line (hot leg) spilling. From table 3-2 (Case C), a minimum flow of only 14 gpm can be delivered at 1100 psig RCS pressure with one line spilling. This minimum flow assumes a single active failure of a HHSI pump and does not take credit for the functional operability of valve 851A or 851B to physically isolate the two HHSI discharge headers. Assuming the HHSI discharge headers are physically isolated, the minimum injection phase flow was calculated to be 206 gpm (See table 3-2, Case B).

In the high head alignment, the HHSI pump miniflow recirculation line back to the RWST is isolated to prevent sump fluid from being directed to the atmospheric tank. Taking credit for miniflow isolation, the minimum delivered flow at the above conditions was calculated to be 226 gpm. Only minimal suction boost was consider (equivalent to the elevation difference between the RWST and RCS cold legs). Compared to Criterion 1, this criterion results in limiting system delivered flow.

Under the worst case single passive failure, high head recirculation could be performed by a single HHSI pump. Using the system flow data that was used as a basis for table 3-2, the delivered RCS flow from one header via the intact injection line is small at the subject operating conditions since the majority of flow is directed to the spilling branch line. Operation of both headers would be unacceptable since HHSI pump flow would exceed the pump runout limit as RCS pressure is reduced. In this scenario, RCS pressure would have to drop to approximately 200 psig before adequate cooling flow could be delivered to the RCS from the intact branch line on a single HHSI header.

Page 18 of 49 A-31

TABLE 3-1 .

REVISED IP2 HHSI PUMP HEAD CRITERIA 0

COMPOSITE H951 PUMP VENDOR HEAD (FT) PUMP HEAD (FT) ANALYSIS HEAD RANGE (FT)

FLOW -- - -- - -- - -

(GPM) 143461 #43462 #43463 MAXIMUM MINIMUM (-7 t) (-5 %) (+3 %)

0 3500 3625 3500 3325 50 3625 3500 3255 3734 A,

3375 3500 3400 3500 3375 3139 3206 3605 100 3325 3400 3375 3400 3325 3092 3159 3502 150 3250 3350 3300 3350. 3250 3023 3088 I-3451 rM 0 200 3200 3300 3200 3300 3200 2976 3040 3399

-b 250 w 3150 3200 3100 3200 3100- 2883 2945 3296 300 3050 3100 3000 3100 3000 2790 2850 3193 350 2900 2950 2875 2950 2875 2674 2731 3039 400 2700 2800 2700 2800 2700 2511 2565 2884 450 2500 2600 2500 2600 2500 2325 2375 2678 500 2300 2350 2250 2350 2250 2093 2138 2421 550 2075 2125 2050 2125 2050 1907 1948 2189 600 16825 1825 1775 1825 1775 1651 1686 1880 650 1600 1600 1500 1600 1500 1395 1425 1648

SECL-91-231 TABLE 3-2 A REVISED IP2 HHSI INJECTION PHASE DELIVERED FLOWS CASE A - HHSI NON-LOCA MINIMUM FLOW DATA EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS MAINTAINED:

1. Miniflow path opened and sized to pass 25 gpm at shutoff head

2. All lines injecting to RCS

3. Two HHSI pumps running

4. Volumetric to mass flow conversion using 62.4 #/ft3 EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS INVALIDATED:

I. Each header balanced to approx. 630 gpm/pump at vendor head curve

2. Zero branch line flow measurement error

3. Allowable pump degradation of 5% of design head over vendor curve

4. Calculated mass flows arbitrarily reduced by 3%

REVISED HHSI SYSTEM BALANCING INPUTS/ASSUMPTIONS:

1. Each Header is balanced to lower range (570 gpm/pump - indicated)

2. +/- 7 gpm per branch line flow measurement error considered

3. Allowable pump TDH range: +3% to -7% of vendor curve

4. Calculated flows reduced by 20 gpm to address 35 gpm miniflow/pump REVISED FLOW BASIS PRESSURE DATA (psig) TOTAL VOL. TOTAL MASS RCS SPILL VOL (qpm) FLOW (lbm/sec) 0.0 N/A 1045 145.3 100.0 N/A 1002 139.3 200.0 N/A 958 133.1 300.0 N/A 914 127.0 400.0 N/A 871 121.0 500.0 N/A 825 114.6 600.0 N/A 774 107.6 700.0 N/A 721 100.2 800.0 N/A 663 92.2 900.0 N/A 598 83.1 1000.0 N/A 522 72.5 1100.0 N/A 433 60.1 1200.0 N/A 331 45.9 1300.0 N/A 172 23.9 1400.0 N/A 0 0.0 Page 20 of 49 A-33

SECL-91-231 TABLE 3-2 B REVISED IP2 HHSI INJECTION PHASE DELIVERED FLOWS CASE B8 - HHSI LARGE BREAK/SMALL BREAK LOCA MINIMUM FLOW.DATA (HEADERS SEPARATED)

EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS MAINTAINED:

1. Miniflow path opened and sized to pass 25 gpm at shutoff head

2. Three lines injecting to RCS - fourth line spills to 0 pslg

3. Two HHSI pumps running

4. Volumetric to mass flow conversion using 62.4 #/ft3 EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS INVALIDATED:

1. Each header balanced to approx. 630 gpm/pump at vendor head curve

2. Zero branch line imbalance

3. Zero branch line flow measurement error

4. Allowable pump degradation of 5% of design head over vendor curve

5. Valves 851A/B assumed inoperable (stays open)

6. Calculated mass flows arbitrarily reduced by 3%

REVISED HHSI SYSTEM BALANCING INPUTS/ASSUMPTIONS:

IA. Nonspilling header balanced to lower range (570 gpm/pump ind.)

lB. Spilling header balanced within range (585 - 570 gpm/pump - ind.)

2. 10 gpm branch line imbalance on spilling header (indicated)

3. +/- 7 gpm per branch line flow measurement error considered

4. Allowable pump TDH range: +3% to -7% of vendor curve

5. Valves 851A/B assumed operable (one valve to close to isolate header)

6. Calculated flows reduced by 20 gpm to address 35 gpm miniflow/pump REVISED FLOW BASIS PRESSURE DATA (psig) TOTAL VOL. TOTAL MASS RCS SPILL VOL (9mm FLOW (I bmlsec) 0.0 N/A 775 107.7 100.0 N/A 733 101.9 200.0 N/A 690 95.8 300.0 N/A 644 89.6 400.0 N/A 595 82.7 500.0 N/A 538 74.8 600.0 N/A 467 64.9 700.0 N/A 385 53.6 800.0 N/A 336 46.8 900.0 N/A 289 40.1 1000.0 N/A 251 34.8 1100.0 N/A 206 28.6 1200.0 N/A 155 21.5 1300.0 N/A 75 10.5 1400.0 N/A 0 0.0 Page 21 of 49 A-34

SECL-91-231 TABLE 3-2 C REVISED 1P2 HHSI INJECTION PHASE DELIVERED FLOWS CASE C - HHSI LARGE BREAK SMALL BREAK LOCA MINIMUM FLOW DATA (HEADERS NOT SEPARATED)

EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS MAINTAINED:

1. Kiniflow path opened and sized to pass 25 9pm at shutoff head

2. Three lines injecting to RCS - fourth line spills to 0 psig

3. Two HHSI pumps running

4. Valves 851A/B assumed inoperable (stay open)

5. Volumetric to mass flow conversion using "62.4 #/ft3 EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS INVALIDATED:

Each header balanced to approx. 630 gpm/pump at vendor head curve

2. Zero branch line imbalance

3. Zero branch line flow measurement error

4. Allowable pump degradation of 5% of design head over vendor curve

5. Calculated mass flows arbitrarily reduced by 3%

REVISED HHSI SYSTEM BALANCING INPUTS/ASSUMPTIONS:

]A. Nonspilling header balanced to lower range (570 gpm/pump - ind.)

1B. Spilling header balanced within range (585 - 570 gpm/pump - ind.)

2. 10 gpm branch line imbalance on spilling header (indicated)

3. +/- 7 gpm per branch line flow measurement. error considered

4. Allowable pump TOH range: +3% to -7% of vendor curve

5. Calculated flows reduced by 20 gpm to address 35 gpm miniflow/pump REVISED FLOW BASIS PRESSURE DATA (psig) TOTAL VOL. TOTAL IASS RCS SPILL VOL UAWm FLOW (lbm/sec) 0.0 N/A 768 106.8 100.0 N/A 724 100.6 200.0 N/A 675 93.8 300.0 N/A 623 86.6 400.0 N/A 570 79.2 500.0 N/A 510 70.8 600.0 N/A 446 62.0 700.0 N/A 379 52.7 800.0 N/A 304 42.3 900.0 N/A 222 30.9 1000.0 N/A 126 17.5 1100.0 N/A 14 2.0 0 1O.O 1200.0 N/A Page 22 of 49 A-35

SECL-91-231 TABLE 3-2 D REVISED IP2 HHSI INJECTION PHASE DELIVERED FLOWS CASE D - HHSI LARGE BREAK LOCA M.INIMUM FLOW DATA (3 PUMPS)

EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS MAINTAINED:

1. Miniflow path opened and sized to pass 25 gpm at shutoff head

2. Three lines injecting to RCS - fourth line spills to 0 psi 9

3. Volumetric to mass flow conversion using 62.4 #/ft3 EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS INVALIDATED:

1. Each header balanced to approx. 630 gpm/pump at vendor head curve

2. Zero branch line imbalance

3. Zero branch line flow measurement error

4. Allowable pump degradation of 5% of design head over vendor curve

5. Valves 851A/B assumed inoperable (stays open)

6. Two HHSI pumps running

7. Calculated mass flows arbitrarily reduced by. 3%

REVISED HHSI SYSTEM BALANCING INPUTS/ASSUMPTIONS:

IA. Nonspilling header balanced to lower range (570 gpm/pump - ind.)

lB. Spilling header balanced within range (585 - 570 gpnVpump - ind.)

2. 10 gpm branch line imbalance on spilling header (indicated)

3. +/- 7 gpm per branch line flow measurement error considered

4. Allowable pump TDH range: +3% to -7% of vendor curve

5. Valves 851A/B assumed operable (stays open)

6. Three HHSI pumps running (single failure is RHR pump)

7. Calculated flows reduced by 30 gpm to address 35 gpm miniflow/pump REVISED FL.OW BASIS PRESSURE DATA (psig) TOTAL VOL. TOTAL MASS SPILL VOL (qpml FLOW (Ibm/sec) 0.0 N/A 945 131.4 100.0 N/A 901 125.3 200.0 N/A 855 118.9 300.0 N/A 807 112.1 400.0 N/A 756 105.1 500.0 N/A 703 97.7 600.0 N/A 644 89.5 700.0 N/A 581 80.7 800.0 N/A 513 71.3 900.0 N/A 437 60.7 1000.0 N/A 346 48.1 1100.0 N/A 211 29.3 1200.0 N/A 145 20.1 1300.0 N/A 65 9.0 1400.0 N/A 0 0.0 Page 23 of 49 A-36

SECL-91-231 TABLE 3-2 E REVISED IP2 HHSI INaECTION PHASE DELIVERED FLOWS CASE E - HHSI LARGE BREAK LOCAISGTR"AXiHUK FLOW DATA EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS MAINTAINED:

1. Miniflow path opened and sized to pass 25 gpm at shutoff head

2. All lines injecting to RCS

3. Three HHSI pumps running

4. Volumetric to mass flow conversion using 62.4 #/ft3

5. Valves 851A/B assumed operable (stays open)

EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS INVALIDATED:

1. Each header balanced to approx. 630 gpm/pump at vendor head curve

2. Zero branch line flow measurement error

3. Vendor pump curve enhanced by 10% of design head REVISED HHSI SYSTEM BALANCING INPUTS/ASSUMPTIONS:

1. Each header is balanced to upper range (585 gpm/pump - indicated)

2. +/- 7 gpm per branch line flow measurement error considered

3. Allowable pump TDH range: +3% to -7% of vendor curve REVISED FLOW BASIS PRESSURE DATA (psig) TOTAL VOL. TOTAL MASS RCS SPILL VOL (sqml FLOW (lbm/sec) 0.0 N/A 1659 230.7 100.0 K/A 1608 223.5 200.0 N/A 1551 215.6 -I 400.0 N/A 1429 198.6 600.0 N/A 1305 181.4 800.0 NI/A 1164 161.8 1000.0 N/A 995 138.2 1200.0 N/A 796 110.6 1400.0 N/A 519 72.2 1600.0 N/A 9 1.?

1800.0 N/A 0 0.0 Page 24 of 49 A-37

SECL-91-231 Table 3-2 F REVISED IP2 HHSI INJECTION PHASE DELIVERED FLOWS CASE F - HHSI MINIMUM FLOW DATA WITH ALL PUMPS RUNNING HHSI SYSTEM BALANCING INPUTS/ASSUMPTIONS:

1. Hiniflow path opened and sized to pass 25 gpm at shutoff head

2. All lines injecting to RCS

3. Three HHSI pumps running 4.- Volumetric to mass flow conversion using 62.4 #/ft3

5. Each header is balanced to lower range (570 gpm/pump - indicated)

6. +/- 7 gpm per branch line flow measurement error considered

7. Allowable pump TDH range: +3%to -7%of vendor curve

8. Valves 851A/B assumed operable (stays open)

9. Calculated flows reduced by 30 gpm to address 35 gpm miniflow/pump AVAILABLE FLOWS PRESSURE DATA (psig) TOTAL VOL. TOTAL MASS RCS SPILL VOL (qpm) FLOW (lbm/sec) 0.0 N/A 1279 177.7 100.0 N/A 1231 171.0 200.0 K/A 1179 163.9 300.0 N/A 1127 156.6 400.0 N/A 1071 148.9 500.0 N/A 1013 140.7 600.0 N/A 951 132.2 700.0 N/A 881 122.5 800.0 N/A 807 112.2 900.0 N/A 723 100.5 1000.0 N/A 631 87.7 1100.0 N/A 528 73.4 1200.0 N/A 392 54.4 1300.0 K/A 216 30.0 1400.0 N/A 0 0.0 Page 25 of 49 A-38

SECL-91-231 4.0 SAFETY EVALUATION This section presents the individual safety evaluations made in the LOCA, Non-LOCA, SGTR and Radiological Consequences, Containment Integrity, and Mechanical and Fluid Systems areas. Each of these individual evaluations were.made against pertinent licensing-basis acceptance criteria for IP2 as identified in section 2.

4.1 LOCA Evaluatio-n 4.1.1 Large Break LOCA The IP2 FSAR Large Break LOCA (LBLOCA) analysis of record was performed with the 1981 LBLOCA Evaluation Model with BASH. The analysis resulted in a PCT of 2039°F for a double-ended cold leg guillotine break with a discharge coefficient of 0.4 and has since been supplemented by a number of safety evaluations. The penalties associated with these evaluations and those associated with several potential issues have increased the LBLOCA PCT to 2168.5°F. This information is summarized in Table 4-7.

For the LBLOCA, the limiting single failure assumption results in the failure of a RHR system pump which provides the low head safety injection. This is a standard assumption for LBLOCA analyses and is based on several factors, the most important of which is the role of containment pressure in the LBLOCA transient. For LBLOCA analyses, low containment pressure results in a more severe transient than high containment pressure. Based on this fact, the NRC requires that containment pressure reducing systems and processes be modeled (LO CFR 50 Appendix K, item 1.0.2).

Sensitivity studies were previously performed by Westinghouse to determine the limiting single failure for LBLOCA. These studies demonstrated that the loss of containment pressure reducing equipment associated with the loss of an Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) is less conservative than maintaining the equipment and losing an RIR pump. Thus, the limiting single failure used in the IP2 LBLOCA analysis was loss of an RHR pump. A detailed explanation of the limiting single failure used in the Westinghouse LBLOCA analyses was transmitted to Con Edison in letter IPP-89-712 (reference 5).

Though the limiting single failure applicable to the IP2 LBLOCA analysis was loss of an RHR pump, the analysis more conservatively assumed the loss of an H1HSI pump in addition to the loss of an RHR pump. Safety Evaluations performed prior to this for reduced HHSI have taken credit for this third HHSI pump to determine the effect on the LBLOCA analysis. For this evaluation, however, both the two pump and three pump cases were evaluated. Additionally, the effect of the revised HHSI balancing criteria on the maximum safeguards analysis results was evaluated.

Page 26 of 49 A-39

SECL-91-231 For the two HHSI pump case, the effect on PCT of a reduction in flow resulting from the revised balancing criteria was evaluated. The HHSI flows used in the analysis and those based on the revised balancing criteria are given below.

Table 4-1: Two HHSI Pump Case RCS Analysis HHSI Revised HHSI Pressure (psia) Flowrate (Ibm/sec) Flowrate (1 bm/sec) 0.0 126.4 106.8 100.0 119.9 100.6 200.0 113.3 93.8 300.0 106.1 86.6 400.0 98.3 72.3 500.0 90.2 70.8 600.0 81.8 62.0 700.0 73.1 52.7 800.0 62.9 42.3 900.0 52.0 30.9 1000.0 40.3 17.5 1100.0 24.9 2.0 1200.0 6.3 0.0 1300.0 0.0 0.0 The revised HHSI flows shown above were based on the assumptions identified in Table 3-2 C.

As Table 4-1 demonstrates, the flows based on the revised HHSI balancing criteria are substantially lower than those used in the analysis. The effect of this reduced HHSI pump flow is that 345 Ibm less water will be pumped into the RCS from the time HHSI begins in the analysis until the time the PCT is predicted to occur. To make up for this shortfall, approximately 0.8 seconds of additional safety injection flow must be delivered to provide the reactor vessel with sufficient water inventory to turn the clad temperature transient around. Based upon a maximum fuel rod heatup rate observed between the time that safety injection begins and the time at which the PCT is predicted to occur, the LBLOCA PCT will increase by,15.8"F due to the additional second of fuel rod heatup.

For the three pump case, the flows used in the analysis and those based on the revised balancing criteria are given in table 4-2.

Page 27 of 49 A-40

SECL-91-231 Table 4-2: Three HHSI Pump Case RCS Analysis HHSI Revised HHSI Pressure (psiq) Flowrate (1 bm/sec) Flowrate (Ibm/sec) 0.0 126.4 131.4 100.0 .119.9 125.3 200.0 113.3 118.9 300.0 106.1 112.1 400.0 98.3 105.1 500.0 90.2 97.7 600.0 81.8 89.5 700.0 73.1 80.7 800.0 62.9 71.3 900.0 52.0 60.7 1000.0 40.3 48.1 1100.0 24.9 29.3 1200.0 6.3 20.1 1300.0 0.0 9.0 The revised flows given in table 4-2 are based on the assumptions in table 3-2 D.

Table 4-2 demoinsi - tes that the flows based on three pumps running are greater than those used in the analysis. As such, no penalty was assessed to the LBLOCA analysis PCT for the revised balancing criteria when three pumps are assumed operating.

The effect of the revised HHSI balancing criteria on the maximum safeguards analysis was also evaluated. The flows used in the analysis and those based on maximum safeguards assumptions are given in table 4-3.

Table 4-3: Maximum Safeguards Case RCS Analysis HHSI Revised HHSI Pressure (psig) Flowrate (lbm/sec) Flowrate (1bm/sec) 0.0 232.5 230.7 100.0 225.2 223.5 200.0 217.1 215.6 400.0 200.9 198.6 600.0 182.2 181.4 800.0 162.1 161.8 1000.0 138.0 138.2 1200.0 110.2 110.6 1400.0 77.0 72.2 1600.0 16.4 1.2 1800.0 0.0 0.0 Page 28 of 49 A-41

SECL-91-231 The revised HHSI maximum flows given in table 4-3 are based on the assumptions in table 3-2 E.

As table 4-3 indicates, all revised HHSI flows at and below 600 psig are lower than those used in the analysis. Therefore, the maximum flow rates used in the analysis bound those based on the revised balancing criteria. The HHSI flows at 800 psig and above are not used in the analysis because the pressure would never get that high in a LBLOCA. Thus, the fact that some of the revised flows above 600 psig are greater than those used in the analysis is not relevant.

Based on this evaluation, the LBLOCA PCT is predicted to increase by 15.8 0 F assuming two pumps running. If three pumps are assumed running, the revised flows will actually be greater than those used in the analysis, resulting in a reduction in PCT. This benefit was not quantified as part of this analysis. Additionally, the LBLOCA analysis based on minimum safeguards remains limiting for 1P2. The LBLOCA PCT based on two pumps operating is then 2184.30F.

Therefore, the reduction in HHSI flow resulting from the revised HHSI balancing criteria will still maintain the LBLOCA PCT within the 2200°F limit defined in 10 CFR 50.46.

Also, as part of the LBLOCA analyses, it was confirmed that the calculated total oxidation of cladding will be substantially less than 17% of the total cladding thickness prior to oxidation. Furthermore, it was confirmed that the total hydrogen generation will be less than 1% of the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all the cladding were to react with water and steam.

4.1.2 Small Break LOCA The licensing basis Small Break LOCA (SBLOCA) analysis for 1P2 was performed using the NRC approved NOTRUMP Evaluation Model. That analysis resulted in an analysis PCT of 1218.5°F for a 6 inch diameter cold leg break. The term "analysis PCT" identifies a PCT that has not been supplemented by penalties based on the results of other previous safety evaluations and outstanding potential issues.

There have been several other safety evaluations that have resulted in LBLOCA PCT penalties. The penalties resulting from those evaluations, and penalties associated with applicable potential issues had previously increased the IP2 PCT to 1496"F. .This information is summarized in table 4-7.

The limiting single failure assumed in the IP2 SBLOCA analysis was the loss of an EDG resulting in the loss of an HHSI pump. The effect of the revised HHSI balancing criteria on the SBLOCA analysis was evaluated by Westinghouse. The flows used in the analysis and those based on the revised balancing criteria are shown in table 4-4.

Page 29 of 49 A-42

SECL-91-231 TABLE 4-4: SBLOCA Flow Comparison RCS Analysis HHSI Flow rate (lbm/sec)

Revised HHSI Pressure (osiul Flowrate (lbm/sec) 0.0 125.0 106.8 100.0 120.0 100.6 200.0 115.0 93.8 300.0 110.0 86.6 400.0 105.0 72.3 500.0 99.0 70.8 600.0 94.0 62.0 700.0 88.0 52.7 800.0 82.0 42.3 900.0 74.0 30.9 1000.0 66.0 17.5 1100.0 57.0 2.0 1200.0 45.0 0.0 1300.0 29.0 0.0 1400.0 7.0 0.0 1500.0 0.0 0.0 The revised flow data given in table 4-4 are based on the assumptions provided in table 3-2 C.

As this table indicates, the HHSI flows based on the revised balancing criteria are substantially lower than those used in the analysis. It was determined that it was necessary to perform a SBLOCA analysis using the NOTRUMP Evaluation Model to support this reduction in HHSI flow.

Several different break sizes were analyzed to determine if the current limiting break size of 6 inches would change and, if changed, to identify and confirm a new limiting break size. These cases and the corresponding PCT's are identified in table 4-6. Note that, to reduce the analysis PCT for the 4 inch case, another run was made using the flows in table 4-5. The revised flow data in table 4-5 is based on the assumptions in table 3-2 B which include assuming that valves 851A/B are operable.- The table 4-4 flows were used in the analysis from the beginning of the transient to the time at which the valves closed (at about 130 seconds). The flows in table 4-5 were used from the time the valves closed to the end of the transient.

Page 30 of 49 A-43

SECL-9 1-231 TABLE 4-5: SBLOCA FLOWS (Valves 851A/B Closed)

RCS Analysis HHSI Revised HHSI Pressure (Dsig) Flowrate (lbm/sec) Flowrate (lbm/sec) 0.0 125.0 107.7 100.0 .120.0 101.9 200.0 115.0 95.8 300.0 110.0 89.6 400.0 105.0 82.7 500.0 99.0 74.8 600.0 94.0 64.9 700.0 88.0 53.6 800.0 82.0 46.8 900.0 74.0 40.1 1000.0 66.0 34.8 1100.0 57.0 28.6 1200.0 45.0 21.5 1300.0 29.0 10.5 1400.0 7.0 0.0 1500.0 0.0 0.0 TABLE 4-6: SBLOCA CASES ANALYZED Break Size (inches) HHSI Flow Bases Analysis PCTL°F) 6 Table 4 1542.5 4 Table 4 2071.2 4 Tables 4 &5 1597.7 3 Tables 4 &5 2079.2 2 Tables 4 &5 1432.8 Based on the analysis PCT of 2079.2"F, and on a reassessment of previous evaluations and effects of potential issues, it was determined that the IP2 SBLOCA PCT will increase to 2152.2°F, maintaining margin to the 10 CFR 50.46 limit of 2200"F.

Also, as was done with the LBLOCA analyses, It was confirmed that the calculated total cladding oxidation criteria of 17% and the total hydrogen generation criteria of 1% will be met.

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SECL-91-231 4.1.3The LOCA Hydraulic blowdown Forces hydraulic forcing functions resulting from a postulated LBLOCA are considered in Chapter 14.3.4 of the IP2 FSAR. That section addresses the effects of a pipe rupture on the RCS and serves as a basis for the core and reactor internals integrity analysis.

The peak loads generated on the reactor vessel as a result of a LBLOCA typically occur between 10 and 500 milliseconds and subside well before 1 second. Since the forces have peaked and subsided well before the earliest possible injection of water from the HHSI or LHSI pumps, there is no effect of the revised HHSI balancing criteria on the LOCA Hydraulic Forces analysis. This ensures that the core geometry will remain amenable to cooling.

4.1.4 Post-LOCA Long Term Core Cooling The Westinghouse licensing position for satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 Section (b) Item (5), "Long-Term Cooling", is defined in WCAP-8339 (reference 6). The Westinghouse commitment is that the reactor will be maintained in a shutdown state by ECCS borated water.

Since credit is not taken for control rods in LBLOCA analyses, the ECCS water provided by the RWST and accumulators must contain enough boron, when combined with other borated and non-borated sources of water, to maintain the core subcritical following a LOCA.

For each cycle of operation, the ability of the ECCS sytem to maintain the core subcritical following a LOCA is reevaluated. The calculation of expected post-LOCA sump boron concentration is checked to determine if any of the pertinent parameters, such as water volumes and boron concentrations, have changed since the last cycle. The objective of the calculation is to conservatively determine the anticipated sump boron concentration by minimizing or maximizing RCS component boron concentrations and water volumes appropriately. The calculated sump boron conditions are then compared to the subcriticality requirements of the new core design.

As stated, the calculation to determine the anticipated post-LOCA sump boron concentration is dependent on total RCS component volumes and boron concentrations. The amount of water delivered from the RWST, however, is independent of the HHSI or LHSI flowrates. Therefore, the reduction in HHSI pump flow rate has no effect on the calculation and does not prevent the Long-Term Core Cooling requirement from being met.

4.1.5 Hot Leg Switchover to Prevent Boron Precipitation Hot leg recirculation time is determined for inclusion in the plant Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and is calculated to ensure that boron precipitation will not occur in the core as a result of post-LOCA boiling. The time at which hot leg switchover occurs is dependent on core power history and RCS component water volumes and boron concentrations.

Page 32 of 49 A-45

SECL-91-231 The input for this calculation is similar to that of the Post-LOCA Long Term Core Cooling calculation except that the boron concentrations are maximized. As stated above, HHSI pump flow rates will have no effect on the total RWST volume delivered to the RCS.

Therefore, the revised HHSI balancing criteria will have no'effect on the calculated hot leg switchover time.

Another requirement of this calculation is that the boiloff rate in the core must be matched by safety injection flow at the time of hot leg switchover, for both the LBLOCA and SBLOCA. For the LBLOCA, the total flow into the core based on the reduced HHSI pump flows has been compared to the boiloff rate in the core at the hot leg switchover time for both cold leg and hot leg injection. Since the flow rates were found to be greater than the bolloff rate, the requirement for LBLOCA is met.

For SBLOCA, the requirement is that the total recirculation flow in the hot leg mode with one hot leg line spilling must be greater than the boiloff rate. For this calculation, the RCS is assumed to be at the steam generator secondary side safety valve setpoint. Assuming a single active failure, there is sufficient flow to match boiloff at 1100 psig RCS pressure with a hot leg injection line spilling to 0.0 psig. Assuming a limiting single passive failure, only one HHSI pump would be available and would provide sufficient flow to match boiloff only if the plant would be depressurized to 200 psig or less within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months following a SBLOCA. Per a 6/13/91 telephone confirmation from Con Edison, the IP2 EOPs do require post-LOCA plant cooldown and depressurization consistent with the Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG)

Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGs). However, plant depressurization must reach 200 psig or less within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months following a SBLOCA.

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SECL-91-231 TABLE 4-7: Summary of Current Large and Small Break LOCA PCT Large Break LOCA Analysis of Record 2039.O°F

+ 10. OOF Prior ECCS EM IOCFRSO.46 Assessments Prior IOCFR50.59 Assessments + 2O.0°F

1. RHR Shorfall

2. Pressurizer, Power, RCS Uncertainties + 28.5°F

3. Fuel Temperature Discrepancy + 5.0°F

4. Transition Core Penalty + 10.O°F Temporary Margin Assessments to Address Current Issues +

1. Fuel Rod Initial Condition + 1O.O°F Inconsistency

2. S/G Tube Seismic/LOCA Assumption + 20.O°F

3. Power Distribution Assumption + 100.0o1

4. Cold Leg Streaming Temp. Gradient + 4.0OF Assessment of the Effect of Revised HHSI Balancing Criteria + 15.8 0F Margin Allocated (15Y S/G Tube Plugging) - 60. OF Overall LBLOCA PCT 2184.3 0 F Small Break LOCA Analysis of Record 2079.2 0 F Prior ECCS EM IOCFR5O.46 Assessments + 0O.°F Prior IOCFR5O.59 Assessments

1. Pressurizer, Power, RCS Uncertainties + 34. 0°F

2. AFW Delay + 30. O°F

3. Fuel Temperature Discrepancy + 5.0OF

4. Implementation of IFBA + 2.OF

5. "S" Signal Delay Time Error + 2. 0°F Assessment of the Effect of Revised HHSI Balancing Criteria NOTE 1 Overall SBLOCA PCT 2152.2 0 F NOTE 1: The reduced HHSI flows were incorporated into the analysis and is reflected in the 2079.21F analysis of record PCT.

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I SECL-91-231 4.2 Non-LOCA Transient Evaluation 4.2.1 Steamline Break - Core Response Analysis Several cases with high (including the highest) heat fluxes and low RCS pressures have been evaluated because these conditions cause the most limiting DNBR. For this event, the double-ended rupture (upstream of the steam generator flow restrictor) with available offsite power case is the most limiting with respect to peak core heat flux. Therefore, this case was used to evaluate the reduction in the HHSI flow rate.

In the current licensing-basis analysis (FSAR) for the limiting case described above, the main steamline break (SLB) is assumed to occur at time zero (t - 0 seconds). The affected steam generator depressurizes at a fast rate while the steam flow from the three intact steam generators is limited by the flow restrictor in the broken line. This results in a high differential steamline pressure signal at 1.4 seconds which subsequently initiates SI and feedwater isolation. At 14.3 seconds a signal to initiate steamline isolation is actuated, and at 21.3 seconds, isolation of the three intact SGs is completed. Due to the rapid depressurization of the faulted SG, the cooling effect on the RCS is such that the core reaches criticality at approximately 14 seconds. Borated water from the SI system reaches the core at approximately 41.6 seconds once the SIS piping purge volume is cleared. Nuclear power continues to increase, however, as a result of the low boration rate and fast cooldown. The maximum nuclear power level (i.e. peak heat flux) is reached at about 149 seconds (22.3% of nominal).

Based on the reduced HHSI flow rates as described in table 3-2 F, the following key change in the results previously described occur.

Specifically, boron injection into the core occurs at approximately 53.0 seconds (previously 47.6 seconds). Note, however, that the maximum power level remains at 22.3% of nominal and still occurs at the same time (approximately 149 seconds). As a result of the DNB evaluation, which was subsequently performed on statepoints based on the reduced HHSI flow rate reanalysis supporting this event, it has been determined that the DNBR limit continues to be met.

4.2.2 Steamline Break - Mass & Energy Release Inside Containment For the steamline break mass and energy release inside containment analysis, the limiting hot full power case was reanalyzed using the reduced HHSI flow rates. The conclusion of the evaluation show that the total integrated energy release, the energy release rate, and the mass flow out of the break into containment are insensitive to the reduced HHSI flows. Therefore, the applicable safety criteria has been met.

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SECL-91-231 4.3 SGTR and Radiological Consequences Evaluation The SGTR analysis in the IP2 FSAR was performed to evaluate the radiological consequences due to the accident. The major factors affecting the radiological doses for an SGTR event are the amount of radioactivity assumed to be available in the reactor coolant, the amount of reactor coolant transferred to the secondary side of the ruptured steam generator through the ruptured tube, and the amount of steam released from the ruptured steam generator to the atmosphere.

An evaluation has been performed with respect to these factors to determine the effect of the revised HHSI system performance.

The FSAR SGTR analysis is based on an assumption of 1% defective fuel which will not be affected by the revised high head safety injection flow rates. However, changes in the HHSI flow rates may affect both the primary to secondary break flow through the ruptured tube, and the steam release from the ruptured steam generator.

For the FSAR analysis, it was assumed that the primary to secondary break flow and the steam release from the ruptured steam generator would be terminated within 30 minutes after the accident. An SGTR results in a loss of coolant inventory and SI is actuated on a low pressurizer pressure signal. After SI actuation, it is assumed that the RCS pressure stabilizes at the equilibrium value where the incoming SI flow rate matches the tube rupture break flow rate. The equilibrium break flow is assumed to persist until 30 minutes following the accident. The maximum SI flow is conservatively assumed for the design basis SGTR analysis in order to maximize the break flow. The amount of steam released from the ruptured steam generator is then calculated based on a mass and energy balance for the RCS and the steam generators for the 30 minute period.

A review of the revised maximum HHSI flow rates (table 3-2 E) indicates that, in the pressure range of interest, the SI flow rate is higher than the values- used for the SGTR analysis of record (see reference 9). The SGTR analysis of record was performed to support operation at the Stretch Core Power rating of 3071.4 MWt, RCS operating temperatures in the range between a minimum cold leg temperature of 515.8 0 F and a maximum hot leg temperature of 611.7 0 F, and steam generator tube plugging up to 25%. An evaluation indicates that the increased HHSI flow rates would result in an increase in the calculated break flow of 7.5% and an increase in the steam release from the ruptured steam generator of 1.2%. The increased break flow and steam release would result in an increase in the offsite doses at the site boundary to 2.7 rem thyroid and 0.75 rem whole-body. The offsite doses calculated for the increased HHSI flow rates do not constitute an increase in the consequences of the accident. This judgement is based on the fact that the dose increases are small (less than 0.5 rem) and that the total dose is very low, being below the NRC definition of a "small fraction" of the 10 CFR 100 exposure guideline. This "small fraction" is defined as M0% of the guideline value, that is, 30 rem thyroid and 2.5 rem whole body, and is the smallest of the exposure limits defined by the NRC in Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Section 15.6.3.

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SECL-91-231 4.4 Containment Integrity Evaluation To demonstrate that an unreviewed safety question does not exist, the -

decrease in HHSI performance was evaluated for the Containment Analysis licensing-basis safety analyses for IP2. The criterion that the peak calculated pressure should be less than the containment design value of 47 psig, which is stated in reference 3 (the current licensing-basis containment analysis), was used in demonstrated that the conclusions for the FSAR Chapter 14 Containment Integrity safety analyses remain valid and that no safety issue exists.

Included also in the evaluation were effects previously documented in SECL-90-524-1 (Recirculation Switchover Sequence Change),

SECL-89-743-I (Securing Motor-Driven AFW Pumps During Post-LOCA Switchover), SECL-89-744 (Change to the Recirculation Switch Sequence), and SECL-89-829-I (Reduced Safety Injection Flow). It should be noted that these items were included for completeness even though any or all of the items may not be implemented at IP2.

The containment integrity analyses described in FSAR Chapter 14 consider: Short Term and Long Term Mass and Energy Release Analyses for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (LOCA's); Containment Response Analyses following a LOCA or Steam line Break Inside Containment; and Subcompartment Pressure Transient Analyses.

4.4.1 Short Term LOCA Mass and Energy Releases / Subcompartment Pressure Analyses For the Short Term mass and energy release and subcompartment pressure analysis a reduction in the safety injection flow rate would have no affect on the calculated results. This is because the safety injection flow does not factor into the analysis due to the short duration of the transient (* 3 seconds).

4.4.2 Long Term Mass and Energy Release The long term mass and energy release and containment pressure response calculations following a LOCA consider the effects of long term depressurization and secondary side heat transfer. The analyses consider the total energy available to the containment from both the primary and secondary side sources at all particular time segments of the transient.

Similar to the Short Term Analysis evaluation basis, the mass and energy release analyses were performed to conservatively maximize the mass and energy release available to the containment.

In addition to the impact of the subject HHSI performance degradation, the evaluation discussed herein included the effects documented in SECL-90-524-I, SECL-89-743-I, SECL-89-744, and SECL-89-829-I.

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SECL-91-231 Based upon the results of the evaluation there is a 1.0 psi impact of the HHSI degradation on the peak calculated containment pressure for a postulated LOCA. The cumulative effect on peak pressure is 1.20 psi, when the potential effects of the issues identified in SECL's89-743, 89-744,89-829, and 90-524 are included. The resulting peak pressure at the Stretch Core Power of 3071.4 MWt becomes 41.51 psig. At an increased power of 3216 MWt, the peak pressure becomes 42.32 psig.,

Both of these are less than the containment design pressure of 47 psig. Therefore, the IP2 design basis analysis of reference 3 and its conclusions remain valid, and margin is maintained between the peak calculated containment pressure and the design pressure.

4.4.3 HSLB Inside Containment Containment response calculations for postulated steam line break mass and energy releases inside containment are performed to ensure that the containment pressure and temperature do not exceed acceptable levels. Based upon the conclusions of the evaluation for the MSLB mass and energy release calculations, there would be no change in the mass and energy release to the containment due to the HHSI degradation. Therefore, the containment response calculations for the current licensing-basis analysis remain valid.

4.4.4 Peak Sump Temperature The peak sump temperature calculation is not an explicit FSAR Chapter 14 safety analysis. However, the results are part of the input to the Ultimate Heat Sink'Analysis (WCAP-12312 - reference 8). It has been determined that the degradation in HHSl flows considered herein does not affect the current peak sump temperature of 250 0 F.

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SECL-91-231 4.5 HJIS. System and Pump Operability and-Integrity The scope of this evaluation is limited to the safety significance of the revised HHSI balancing criteria, with respect to HHSI system and pump operability.

The IP2 Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4..5.A.1.c requires that a flow test of the HHSI system be conducted after any modification is made to either its piping and/or valve arrangement.

This test typically evaluates total pump flow and branch line flow balance.

At IP2, the HlNSI flowrates are measured by using orifice plates in the branch lines. As indicated in Westinghouse notification letter IPP-91-618 (reference 4), the potential exists for the ECCS flow measurement orifice plates flow coefficient values to be greater than originally determined using ASME standards. The potential discrepancy in orifice plate flow coefficients may result in ECCS flowrates being higher thap what is indicated by flow measurement instruments. The higher flow rate may result in a lower injected flow to the reactor core, and a higher pump runout. Con Edison has procured and installed new HHSI branch line orifices and has indicated that the flow measurement uncertainty for the new orifices is bounded by the range of +/- 7 gpm. In addition to the flow measurement orifice replacement, Con Edison has installed variable orifices (throttle valves) in the discharge piping of each HHSI pump to facilitate balancing the three pumps during system flow balance testing. The system balancing requirements to accommodate these system changes were developed based on the effects of the three potential issues identified in section 1.

At IP2, the emergency core cooling function is performed by the Safety Injection System (SIS). Therefore, the terms SIS and ECCS are synonyms in this evaluation. The primary purpose of the SIS is the automatic delivery of cooling water to the reactor core following a LOCA or non-LOCA event. The SIS is operated in three modes: passive accumulator injection, active safety injection, and long term recirculation.

During the passive injection phase, core cooling is supplied by the accumulators when the RCS pressure has decreased to approximately 600 psig. During the active injection phase, the three HHSI and the two RHR pumps are used, as needed depending on break size, to inject cooling water from the RWST. For the recirculation phase, the SIS is arranged so that the ECCS recirculation pumps take suction from the recirculation sump and deliver it back to the core and/or the containment spray headers through the RHR heat exchangers. The system is also arranged to allow either of the RHR pumps to take over the recirculation function as a backup. For smaller breaks in the RCS, where recirculated water must be injection against higher RCS pressures, the system is arranged to deliver the water from the RHR heat exchangers to the HHSI pump suction.

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SECL-91-231 It had been considered that the subject HHSI recirculation alignment could represent a potential challenge to HHSI pump operability. As previously stated, the ECCS recirculation or RHRS pumps provide flow to the HHS! pumps during recirculation. This LHSI boost increases the suction pressure and may cause the HHSI pumps to runout further.

Therefore, revised HHSI balancing criteria were developed that preclude the HHS1pumps from operating under conditions in which their runout limit is exceeded. In general, exceeding the runout limit of the pump could result in pump damage and/or loss of function.

4.5.1 HHSI Pump Operability The IP2 HHSI pumps are Dresser pumps, model 2-1/2" JTCH, with a design runout limit of 650 gpm. All JTCH pumps and all replacement rotors for these pumps were manufactured with sandcasted impellers, and there As only one (low capacity) impeller design. These pumps were evaluated to determine the amount of runout margin available.

In order to evaluate the pump runout limits, two major concerns were addressed: cavitation and motor horsepower capability. Cavitation will occur if the pump 1PSH requirements at the higher runout flow rates is not satisfied by the available system NPSH. Minor cavitation can lead to long-term pump degradation, while severe cavitation and two-phase flow can lead to short-term pump damage. Therefore, operation with cavitation should be avoided. Operation at increased runout flows also can increase the brake horsepower required by the pump. The motor must be capable of operating satisfactorily at the new horsepower level.

4.5.1.1 Pump Cavitation Characteristics The characteristics of centrifugal pump impellers often result in a specific flow capacity at which the NPSH required to suppress cavitation increases in an asymptotic manner. This condition can occur in the suction impeller of the pump or in the subsequent radial impellers, dependent on the particular characteristics of the specific impeller design. If an attempt is made to operate at or beyond this critical flow capacity, cavitation will occur regardless of the NPSH available at the suction of the pump. The developed head of the pump will degrade until it matches the system, and the pump will operate in a state of partial cavitation.

Cavitation in a pump can be associated with both long-term and short-term degradation mechanisms. Long-term degradation mechanisms would include impeller, diffuser, and wear ring erosion due to the continual presence of low level cavitation energy. Short-term degradation mechanisms would include wear ring rubbing, mechanical seal face wear, and bearing wear due to high levels of rotor vibration and deflection resulting from very high levels of cavitation. Very high levels of cavitation can be similar in effect to running a pump dry.

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SECL-91-231 The point at which the asymptotic increase in required NPSH occurs in a particular pump is critical in evaluating the increase in pump runout flow rates. Dresser Pumps test data indicates that the asymptote is located beyond 675 gpm for the IP2 HHSI pumps with the low-capacity, sandcasted impellers. This flow rate should be treated as the maximum allowable flow for acceptable pump operation. This flow rate is acceptable only if the available NPSH satisfies the identified pump requirements.

4.5.1.2 Horsepower Considerations The HHSI pumps are designed such that the pump developed head falls sharply as the flow rate approaches and surpasses the design runout flow. The falling head curve causes the brake horsepower curve to become very flat at flow rates beyond the design runout point.

Because of this horsepower curve characteristic, the horsepower at the increased runout flow rates will be essentially the same as the horsepower at the design runout flow rate. It is expected that the required horsepower at increased runout flow rates will remain within the horsepower capability of the motor. Therefore, the increased runout flow rates should not affect the qualified life of the motor insulation system. Additionally, the increased runout flow rates are not expected to change the electrical load requirements for the EDGs.

However, each of these factors should be checked on a pump specific basis before increased runout flow rates are approved.

4.5.1.3 HHSI Pump Limitations Dresser Pumps has identified that the controlling NPSH limit for the model JTCH HHSI pumps at IP2 is in the suction impeller. Thus, these pumps are limited by first stage cavitation rather than second stage cavitation. The Dresser Pumps test data indicates that these pumps should not start to cavitate until the flow rate has exceeded 675 gpm. Thus, the HHSI pumps should not be operated beyond 675 gpm in order to preclude cavitation. To support operation at 675 gpm, the 2-1/2" JTCH pumps should have an available NPSH of at least 30 feet.

4.5.2 ECCS PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS In general, the revised balancing criteria that was developed as discussed in section 3 assumed a miniflow range of 25 to 35 gpm, a 10 gpm indicated branch line imbalance, a branch line flow measurement error of +/- 7 gpm, and an allowable pump Total Developed Head (TDH) range of either +3 to -7%or +0 to -5% of the composite Vendor curves. In addition, both minimum and maximum RWST volume assumptions were used to modeling different events. These assumptions were adjusted for the different events to yield conservative results, and are detailed in section 3.

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SECL-91-231 The revised HHS1 balancing criteria require that the cold leg branch lines should be balanced to an indicated flow range of 570 to 585 gpm per pump with +3 to -7% of the composite vendor curve, or 565 to 590 gpm with a TDH range of +0 to -5%. In addition to the cold leg injection requirements, the revised HHSI.balancing criteria provide a requirement for hot leg recirculation of a minimum of 250 gpm indicated flow with only one cold leg injection line open. These flow ranges will assure that the actual pump flow does not exceed the pump runout limit of 675 gpm during high-head recirculation. As previously stated, exceeding the pump's runout limit may result in pump damage and/or loss of function. The revised HHSI balance flow ranges address the concerns of RHRS pumps boost of the HHSI pumps during the recirculation mode, the flow imbalance between HHSI cold leg injection lines, and flow measurement bias/uncertainty due to use of orifice plates in the iHHSI injection lines.

4.6 Emergencv Diesel Generator Loading Study Affects The flow rate of the SI pump can either directly or indirectly affect the loads on the EDGs. These loads are compiled in WCAP-12655 (reference 7), the EDG loading study applicable to the Stretch Power uprating (completed prior to implementation of the EDG enhancement program). Following completion of WCAP-12655, Con Edison has assumed responsibility for updating and maintaining the EOG loading study.

4.6.1 Direct Impacts for LOCA Events The SI flows can have a direct impact on the EDG loads since the brake horsepower (BHP) for the pump, and the power requirement for the pump motor, are directly affected by the flow. The maximum BHP for the pump were used to determine the limiting SI pump motor loads for LBLOCA and SBLOCA in WCAP-12655. Including the power required for the Si circulating water pumps (2 kw), the maximum SI pump load used for LBLOCA and SBLOCA in WCAP-12655 is 326 kw. A maximum BHP value bounding the three SI pumps near, but not exactly at, pump runout was selected for this load. Based on-this conservative approach, degradation of the SI pump flow does not have an adverse direct impact on the EDG loading analysis for either LBLOCA and SBLOCA.

4.6.2 Direct Impacts for Non-LOCA Events For non-LOCA events, the S] pump load used in WCAP-12655 was assumed to be 298 kw. This is conservatively based on a flow of 435 gpm per pump with two pumps operating against an RCS pressure of 1000 psig.

For design basis non-LOCA events, it is expected that the SI pumps would be terminated before the RCS pressure becomes significantly less than 1000 psig. Although the SI pump motor power requirements for the non-LOCA events could be affected by the flow degradation, the flow rates and power requirements for the non-LOCA events would generally be reduced and the affect would be small. Regardless of the direction of the change, it is expected that the EDG loads for the non-LOCA events would generally remain bounded by those determined for the LOCA events.

Page 42 of 49 A-55

SECL-91-231 4.6.3 Indirect Impacts Due to Containment Pressure Increases The degraded SI pump performance also has an indirect affect on the EDG loads because of increased loads from the containment fan cooler units. As noted in the containment integrity evaluation, the pressure following a LOCA event can increase approximately 1.0 psi due to the SI flow degradation. Including other impacts, the peak pressure increase is about 1.2 psi. Based on Table 3.2-1 of WCAP-12655, this increase is equivalent to a fan motor power requirement increase of at most 5 BHP or 4 kw. At the Stretch Core Power level of 3071.4 MWt, the revised peak pressure of 41.5 psig results in a fan cooler power requirement of 247 kw, i.e., 4 kw higher than the previous peak load of 243 kw evaluated at 40 pslg.

The above evaluation considers only the affect on the peak fan cooler motor power requirement and not necessarily the peak EOG loading. To simplify the assessment in a conservative manner and to allow for time shifts in the fan motor loads,.it is recommended that the EDG loads be evaluated assuming a 5 kw increase if the EDG has one fan cooler unit (i.e., EDG #23) and a 10 kw increase if the EQG provides power to two fan cooler units (EDG #'s 21 and 22). The peak load on EDG #23 per WCAP-12655 would then increase from 1934 kw to 1939 kw. It is recommended that Con Edison evaluate the affect on the current loading analysis to ensure the EDG loads remain acceptable for the enhanced load ratings.

Page 43 of 49 Aft A-56

SECL-91-231 5.0 ASSESSMENT OF NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION The safety significance of the change in the HISI flows used in IP2 safety analyses that is associated with the revision to the HHSI flow balancing criteria has been evaluated as required per the criteria of 10 CFR 50.59, and does not represent an unreviewed safety question oh the basis of the following responses to specific related questions.

1. Will the probability of in accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

No. The subject change in HHSI safety analyses flows is unassociated with events involved in the initiation of any accident previously evaluated in the FSAR. In any case, it has been demonstrated that all pertinent licensing-basis acceptance criteria (PCT, fuel cladding oxidation, hydrogen generation, DNBR, containment pressure, dose) have been met. Furthermore, it has been determined that the revised HHSI flow balancing criteria does not adversely affect HHSI pump operability and system integrity, and does not result in a condition where applicable design, material, and construction standards are altered. In general, the integrity of the equipment relied upon in pertinent plant safety analyses is not challenged. Therefore, the subject change in the HHSI safety analyses flows associated with the revised flow balancing criteria does not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.

2. Will the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

No. It has been demonstrated that all pertinent licensing-basis acceptance criteria (PCT, fuel cladding oxidation, hydrogen generation, DNBR, containment pressure, dose) have been met. In particular, since the LBLOCA and SBLOCA PCT's remain below the 2200"F limit, the source term used for the associated radiological consequences evaluation remains valid and dose releases do not change. Also, based on the SGTR evaluation, it was determined that dose increases are small (less than 0.5 rem),

and that the total dose is very low, being below the NRC definition of a "small fraction" of the 10 CFR 100 exposure guideline. Therefore, the subject change in the HHSI safety analyses flows associated with the revised flow balancing criteria does not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.

Page 44 of 49 A-57

SECL-91-231 3 May the possibility of an accident wtich is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

No. The subject change in the HHSI safety analyses flows and the associated revised HHSI flow balancing criteria neither results in the initiation of any accident, nor do they create any new credible limiting single failure. Furthermore, they do not result in any previously incredible event becoming credible. The plant design basis considered in the FSAR is unaffected and remains bounding. The subject changes only involves the consideration of degraded HHSI system performance, and equipment that is relied upon in pertinent plant safety analyses are not adversely affected. Also, it has been demonstrated that all pertinent licensing-basis acceptance criteria (PCT, fuel cladding oxidation, hydrogen generation, DNBR, containment pressure, dose) have been met. Therefore, the possibility of an accident which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR is not created.

4. Will the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

No. The subject change in the HHSI safety analyses flows and the associated revised HHSI flow balancing criteria do not create any new failure mode for the ECCS or any other safety-related equipment. They do not result in any original design specification to be altered, and do not result in equipment used in accident mitigation to be exposed to an adverse enviroment.

The subject flow changes do not adversely affect the operation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) or any other device used for accident mititgation, and do not affect any protection setpoints.

Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that all pertinent licensing-basis acceptance criteria (PCT, fuel cladding oxidation, hydrogen generation, DNBR, containment pressure, dose) have been met. Therefore, the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased.

5. Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

No. The subject change in the HHSI safety analyses flows and the associated revised HHSI flow balancing criteria will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of the safeguards train already considered to be'inoperable in the licensing-basis safety analyses. Also, no new equipment malfunctions have been identified that will affect fission product barrier integrity.

The subject flow changes will not challenge the integrity of the safety injection system or other equipment assumed to be operable for the plant safety analyses. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that all pertinent licensing-basis acceptance criteria (PCT, fuel cladding oxidation, hydrogen generation, DNBR, containment pressure, dose) have been met. Therefore, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased.

Page 45 of 49 A-58

SECL-91-231

6. May the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

No. The subject change in the HHSI safety analyses flows and the associated revised HHSI flow balancing criteria do not adversely affect the integrity of the ECCS and its ability to perform its intended safety functions. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that all pertinent licensing-basis acceptance criteria (PCT, fuel cladding oxidation, hydrogen generation, DNBR, containment pressure, dose) have been met. Therefore, the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety that is different than already evaluated in the FSAR has not been created.

7. Will the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any technical specifications be reduced?

No. It has been demonstrated that all pertinent licensing-basis acceptance criteria (PCT, fuel cladding oxidation, hydrogen generation, DNBR, containment pressure, dose) have been met.

Meeting these criteria, as identified in section 2, ensures that there will be no degradation in the margins to safety to pertinent design failure points. For example, demonstrating that the 2200*F PCT limit is met ensures that the margin to safety to fuel melt has not been reduced. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any technical specification will not be reduced.

Page 46 of 49 A-59

SECL-91-231

6.0 CONCLUSION

S The scope of this safety evaluation were changes to the IP2 HHSI flows employed in related plant safety analyses that are associated with the identified revisions to the HHSI flow balancing criteria. Based on individual evaluations. that.were performed against pertinent IP2 licensing-basis 'acceptance criteria as were identified in section 2, it has been demonstrated that:

(al) Both the LBLOCA and SBLOCA PCT's are less than the 2200°F limit of 10 CFR 50.46. These PCT values are 2184.39F and 2152.20F respectively. Note that the SBLOCA had to be formally reanalyzed, and it was determined that the limiting break size dropped from a 6" to a 3n break.

(a2) Regarding other 10 CFR 50.46 criteria:

- the calculated total oxidation of cladding was less than 17%

of the total cladding thickness prior to oxidation, and the total hydrogen generated will not exceed 1% of the total amount that would be generated if all the cladding were to react with the water or steam (as generically demonstrated for Westinghouse LBLOCA and SBLOCA analyses).

- the LOCA Hydraulic Forces analysis remains unaffected, thus the core geometry will remain amenable to cooling.

the Post-LOCA Long-Term Cooling Calculation is unaffected and the Hot-Leg Switchover requirement is met for LBLOCA. The Hot Leg Switchover requirement is met for SBLOCA only as long as the plant depressurizes to 200 psig or less within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months following a SBLOCA.

(b) The minimum DNBR from evaluated Non-LOCA transients will not violate the limit value.

(c) The SGTR offsite dose increase are small (less than 0.5 rem), and the total dose is very low, being below the NRC definition of a "small fraction" of the 10 CFR 100 exposure guideline. This "small fraction" is defined as 10% of the guideline value (30 rem thyroid and 2.5 rem whole body), and is the smallest of the exposure limits defined by the NRC in Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Section 15.6.3.

(d) The peak calculated containment pressure is expected to be less than the containment design value of 47 psig.

(e) The HHSI system and pump operability will not be adversely affected based on an IP2 HHSI pump runout limit of 650 gpm when suction is taken from the RWST, and an extended runout limit of 675 gpm during high head recirculation.

Page 47 of 49 A-60

SECL-9]-23]

Based on the results of this evaluation, and specifically on the responses to the 10 CFR 50.59 regulatory screening questions of section 5, it has been determined that the IP2 HHSI flows employed in related plant safety analyses that are associated with the subject revisions to the HHSI flow balancing criteria will not represent an unreviewed safety question, and will not involve a change to any plant technical specification. As such, the subject flow changes are consistent with the current IP2 licensing basis and will not adversely affect safe plant operation.

Page 48 of 49 A-61

SECL-91-231

7.0 REFERENCES

(1) "Indian Point Unit No. 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report",

Revision 8.

(2) NRC Safety Evaluation on the Stretch Power Uprating, 3/7/90, "Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Amendment No. 148 to Facility Operating License No.

DPR-26, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Indian Point Unit No.2, Docket No. 50-247".

(3) WCAP-12237, "Containment Integrity Analysis for Indian Point Unit 2, 12/89.

(4) IPP-91-618, -Safety Injection Pump Runout Flow Assessment",

5/31/91.

(5) IPP-89-712, "Information on LBLOCA Limiting Single Failure",

6/30/89.

(6) WCAP-8339, Westinghouse Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model - Sumrnzry", 6/74.

(7) WCAP-12655, "Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Study for Indian Point Unit 2", 7/90.

(8) WCAP-12312, Safety Injection for an Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase to 95F at Indian Point Unit 2, 7/89.

(9) WCAP-12187, "NSSS Stretch Rating - 3083.4 MWT Engineering Report",

Con Edison Company of New York, Indian Point Unit 2, 3/89.

Page 49 of 49 A-62

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 Customer Reference No(s).

N/A Westinghouse Reference No(s).

N/A WESTINGHOUSE SAFETY EVALUATION CECK LIST

1) NUCLEAR PLANT(S) Indian Point Unit 2

2) CHECK LIST APPLICABLE TO Increase in the Containment Pressure High ESF Safety Analysis Limit (SAL) Setpoint to 10 psig

3) The written safety evaluation of the revised procedure, design change or modification required by 10CFR50.59 has been prepared to the extent required and is attached. If a safety evaluation is not required or is incomplete for any reason, explain on Page 2. Parts A and B of this Safety Evaluation Check List are to be completed only on the basis of the safety evaluation performed.

CHECK LIST - PART A

3. 1) Yes,_X No_ A change to the plant as described in the FSAR?

3.2) Yes_ No. X A change to procedures as described in the PSAR?

3.3) Yes_ No X A test or experiment not described in the FSAR?

3.4) Yes__ No_* A change to the plant technical specifications (Appendix A to the Operating License)?

4) CHECK LIST - PART B (Justification for Part B answers must be included on page 2.)

4.1) Yes_ No X Will the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

4.2) Yes,_ No_3L W-1JI the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

4.3) Yes_ NoýX_ May the possibility of an accident which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

4.4) Yes- No... Will the probability of a unction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

i 4.5)Yes._ No2X Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

4.6) Yes_ No.X May the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

4.7) Yes_ NoX Wilthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebases to any technical specification be reduced?

See "REMARKS" on page 2.

Page I of 16 A-63

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 If the answers to any of the above questions are unknown, indicate under 5) REMARKS and explain below.

If the answer to any of the above questions in Part (3.4) or Part B cannot be answered in the negative, the change review requires an application for license amendment in accordance with t0 CFR 50.59 (c) and submitted to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.

5) REMARKS:

This safety evaluation only addresses an increase in the Containment Pressure High ESF SAL to 10 psig which is needed to accommodate an increase in the corresponding ESF TedMical Specification setpoint from 2.0 to 5.0 psig. The enclosed safety evaluation does not include the No Significant Hazards determination required by 10 CFR 50.92 for changes to the Technical Specifications.

The answers given in Section 3, Part A, and Section 4, Part B, of the Safety Evaluation Checklist, are based on the attached Safety Evaluation.

Reference documens):

FOR FSAR UPDATE Section: Pages: Tables:_ Figures:

Reason for/Descriltion of Change:

FSAR updates are not included in this package.

SIGNATURES Prepared by: Date: 11-/?

Operating Plant Licensing n Prepared by: a2~tJ i2dý Date: 7-.

R. R. Laubbam Operating Plant Licensing H Verified by:

Licensing U Page 2 of 16 A-64

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE SETPOINT INCREASE SAFETY EVALUATION CHECKLIST The purpose of this safety evaluation is to assess a change to the Indian Point Unit 2 Nuclear Power Statiot Containment Pressure High Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF) Safety Analysis Limit (SAL) setpoint to determine that the change will not adversely affect the safety analyses and.safe plant operation. The SAL is being changed to accommodate an increase in the Containment Pressure High ESF Technical Specification (IS) setpoint. The safety evaluation does not include the No Significant Hazards determination required by 10 CFR 50.92 for changes to the Technical Specifications.

1.0 BACKGROUND

Westinghouse is currently supporting Consolidated Edison's program to extend the Technical Specification refueling surveillance interval for Indian Point Unit 2 from 18 months to .24 months. One of Westinghouse's functions is to calculite instrument uncertainties for a 30-month extended surveillance cycle. During this effon, Westinghouse has calculated that the instrument uncrtainties for the containment pressure channel have increased. The containment pressure cbannel provides input to the Containment Pressure High ESF trip and the Containmeot Pressure High-High ESF trip. Westinghouse has performed a safety evaluation (Refereoce 1) to support a relaxation lin the Containment Pressure High ESF trip setpoint assumed in the safety analyseslevaluatioas of record from 2.0 psig to 7.3 psig. The SAL of 7.3 psig accommodates the increased instrument uncert=inties due to the exteaded fuel cycle length needed to keep the Technical Specification (T/S) sctpoint at 2.0 psig. Per Consolidated Edison, no relaxation in the Containment Pressure High-High ESF trip SAL is required since the corre:ponding T/S sapoiat will be changed to accommodate the increase in.the associated instrumet uncertainties.

To provide additional operating flexibility, Consolidated Edison has requested that Westinghouse perform an evaluation to support a relaxation in the Containment Pressure High ESF T/S setpoint from 2.0 psig to 5.0 psig. A 5.0 psig T/S setpoint will decrease the frequency of high containment.pres,*r alarms as well as increase the margin to ESF trip. As part of this evaluation, Westinghouse has detrmied that an SAL setpoint of 10.0 psig is required to accommodate the butrument uncetaimts asociated with the extended fuel. cycle length with a CoMninmet Presure High ESF T/S trip setpoint of 5.0 psig..

Westinghouse has subseque4 evaluad the effects of rMaxing the SAL to 10.0 psig for the Containmet Pressure High ESF trip on the rrent licensing basis Indian Point Unit 2 safety s/evaluations. As a result, the Containnent Pressure High ESF trip affects only the containmen integrity and LOCA-relazed a"alyseeevalutions, including Large Break LOCA, Smail Bteak LOCA, post-LOCA Long-Term Core Cooling, Hot Leg Switchovvt, and LOCA Hydrulic Formes. The potential effects on other safety-related componets and licensing basis analysa has also been reviewed and fouW not to be affected by the containment pressur SAL relaxation. These areas include:

- Primary Component and Systems Licensi Consideration

- Ins ntation and ControLsEquipment Qualifatioa Consiudersons

- Radiological Consequences Non-LOCA Analyses Steam Generator Tube Rupture Page 3 of 16 A-65

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2

- Probabilistic Risk Assessment

- Emergency Operating Procedures In addition, Westinghouse has reviewed the discussion on diversity as presented in a safety evaluation (Reference 2) to reaffirm that the diversity of the Reactor Protection System/ESF design is not significantly affcted for changes in the Containment Pressure High ESF trip setpoint. The principal conclusion of the safety evaluation is that the relaxation in the Containment Pressure High SAL setpoint from 7.3 to 10.0 psig assumed in the safety analyses/evaluation of record to support a new Containment Pressure High ESF TIS trip setpoint of 5.0 psig will not represent an unreviewed safety question and will not adversely affect safe plant operation.

2.0 LICENSING BASES This evaluation was performed according to the regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, (10 CFR 50.59). This regulation allows the holder of a license authorizing operation of a nuclear power facility the capacity to evaluate changes to the plant and/or procedures and tests or experiments not described in the plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Prior Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval is not required to implement a change provided that it does not involve an unreviewed safety question or result in a change to plant Technical Specifications. The holder of a license authorizing operation of a nuclear power facility who desires a change in the T/S or a change in the facility or the procedures described in the plant Safety Analysis Report (SAR) or to conduct tests or experiments not described in the SAR which involve an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) or a change in T/S must submit an application for amendment of the license pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 and subsequently provide the Commission its analysis about the issue of no significant hazards consideration using the standards in 10 CFR 50.92.

This safety evaluation only addresses an increase in the Containment Pressure High ESF SAL to 10 psig which is needed to accommodate an increase in the T/S setpoint to 5.0 psig. The safety evaluation does not include the No Significant Hazards determination required by 10 CFR 50.92 for changes to the Technical Specifications.

The determination that the Containment Pressure SAL relaxation does not involve an unreviewed safety question was made based on the individual evaluations in Section 3.0, performed according to pertinent licensing basis acceptance criteria for the Indian Point Unit 2 Nuclear Power Station. The acceptance criteria ae as follows:

The containment and radiological analyses safety evaluation (Section 3.1) demonstrates that the peak dalculated containment pressure will be less than the containment design and Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRI) value of 47 psig as identified in WCAP-12237, emtiled, "Containment Integrity Analysis for Indian Ioint Unit 2" (Reference 3) and as specified in the Indian Point Unit 2 Technical Specifications (Section 4.4 L..a). WCAP-12237 and evaluations performed in support of the High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) flow alauning criteria effort (Reference 4) document the current licensing basis containment analyses of record.

"hisevaluation accounted for the effects of other plant changes for which Westinghouse is cognizant. These Sclude effects stemming from the Ultimate Heat Sink (US)Program, the Containment Integrity Analysis t support the Stretch Power Program, degraded Residual Heat Removal (PHR) pump flows, and effect of egraded Emergency Core Cooling System (ECC) flows due to a change in the flow balance criteria Page 4 of 16 A-66

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 As described in FSAR Section 7.2.5.1.14, the Containment Pressure High ESF Trip Function also provides a diverse signal to initiate reactor trip in the event that the pressurizer signal fails and does not initiate a reactor trip for relatively small breaks in the primary system. Reactor trip is generated through the ESF signal (i.e., reactor trip on Safety Injection Signal). The Containment Pressure High ESF trip setpoint of 2.0 psig is described in the FSAR as an adequate TIS setpoint which will initiate a timely ESF/reactor trip signal to ensure that the core will be protected for a range of small break sizes.

3.0 SAFETY EVALUATIONS This section presents the individual evaluations performed for the Containment Integrity and the LOCA-Related Analyses.

3.1 Containment Integrity Analysis The containment integrity analyses are described in Chapter 14 of the Indian Point Unit 2 FSAR. This chapter considers: Short Term and Long Term Mass and Energy Release Analyses for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (LOCAs); Containment Response Analyses following a LOCA or Steamline Break Inside Containment; and Subcompartment Pressure Transient Analyses.

Shojt Term Masw and Ener=y Releases/Subcompartent Pressure Analyses For the short term mass and energy release and subcomparanent pressure analyses, the relaxation in the containment pressure SAL would have no effect on the calculated results since the SAL change does not factor into the analysis because of the short duration of the transient (L 3 seconds). Thus, the current analysis remains valid.

LOCA Mass and Enerry Release The long term mass and energy release and containment pressure response calculations following a LOCA consider the effects of long term depressurization and secondary side heat transfer. The analyses consider the total energy available to the containment from both the primary and secondary side sources at all particular time segments of the transient.

Similar to the short term analysis evaluation basis, the mass and energy release analyses were performed to conservatively maximize the mass and energy release available to dfe containment.

In addition to the effect of the subject Containment Pressure SAL Relaxation change, this safety evaluation accounted for the effects of other plant changes as identified in the Indian Point Unit 2 BRSI Performance Evaluation. Based upon the results of the evaluation, there is a reduction of 0.6 psi on the peak pressure at the current licensing basis power level of 3083.4 MWt, when the cumulative effect of the Containment Pressure SAL relaxation and the issues identified are included. At the increased power level of 3216 i MWt, a reduction of 0.8 psi is calculated. The resulting peak pressure at 3083.4 KWt becomes 40.89 psig (at the increased power of 3216 MWt, the peak pressure becomes 41.49 psig), both less than the con*ainment design and Integrated Leak Ram Test (LR) TIS value of 47 psig. Therefore, the Indian 1 Point Unit 2 design basis analysis of record and its conclusions remain valid, and margin is maintained between the peak calculated containment pressure and the design pressure. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the 3calculated peak pressures profiles for the respective 3083.4 and 3216 MWt power levels.

Page 5 of 16 A-67

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the corresponding teaperature profiles. As can be seen from Figures 3 and 4, the temperature response of the Containment is similar to and generally bounded by the temperature profile reported in WCAP-12237.

MSLB Inside Containment Containment response calculations for postulated steam line break mass and energy releases inside containment are performed to ensure that the containment pressure does not exceed acceptable levels. The hot Full Power, Feedwater Control Valve Failure case is the current limiting case for containment response following a MSLB. The existing MSLB mass and energy releases inside containment for Indian Point Unit 2 are not affected by changing the High Pressure setpoint. Specifically, no credit for these signals have been taken in the steamline break analyses used to generate the existing licensing basis mass and energy release for Indian Point Unit 2. For the containment respone calculation, credit for the outainment pressure signal is assumed. The limiting case was reanalyzed with the relaxed SAL limit of 10.0 psig. The peak containment pressure for the limiting MSLB event was calculated to be 40.1 psig, or an increase of 0.04 psi resulting from the relaxation of the SAL containment pressure limit assumed in the previous containment analysis. This pressure is less than the containment design and MLRT pressre of 47 psig. Thus, margin is maintained between the peak calculated containment pressure and the design pressure. Figure 5 is provided to illustrate the revised calculated pressure profile. The Indian Point Unit 2 licensing basis for Environmental Qualification states that equipment qualified for LOCA is also qualified for MSLB. Accordingly, no temperatare plots aTe included for this case.

Peak Sump Temperature The peak sump temperature calculation is not an explicit Chapter 14 safety analysis. However, the results are input for the Ultimate Heat Sink Analysis (Reference 5). There is an insignificant effect with respect to the Containment Pressure SAL Relaxation considered herein on the current peak sump temperature.

The value remains at 250 0 F.

Diesel Generator ,Loadin Study Indirect Impacts Due to Containment Pressure Increases As noted in the conainment integrity evaluation, the pressure following a LOCA event decreases approximately 0.6 psi for the stretch power due to the combined effects plant specific reanalysis. As a

'result of decreased peak containment pressure, the loads on the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDO) will decrease. This has an indirect impact on the EDG loads because the fan cooler units will require less power to operate at the lower containment pressure. The current EDG loading analysis is based upon the higher Indian Point Unit 2 HHSI Flow Change Performance Evaluation analysis (Reference 4); therefore, these calculations remain bounding.

3:2 LOCA-Related Analyses LIOCA-related accident analyses are described in Chapter 14 of the Indian Point Unit 2 FSAR. The following I.OCA-related analyses were evaluated:

Large Break LOCA Small Break LOCA

- Post-IOCA Long-Terin Core Cooling Page 6 of 16 A-68

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2

- Hot Leg Switchover

- LOCA Hydraulic Forces Larze Break LOCA The large break LOCA (LBLOCA) analysis is affected because the Containment High Pressure ESF SAL setpoint is modeled in a portion of the 1981 Evaluation Model with BASH. The Containment High Pressure setpoint assumed in the currently analysis is 2 psig. This was also the previous value given in the Technical Specifications. It was ddetemined that the increase in the Coutainment High Pressure SAL setpoint to 10 psig would cause an approximate delay of 3 seconds in delivering the ECCS injection. The delay time for the safety injection assumed in the analysis is equal to 25.5 seconds. Thus, the time at which the safety injection would be delivered is increased from the previous time of 25-5 seconds to the revised time of 28.5 seconds. However, from Table 14.3-4 in the Indian Point Unit 2 FSAR, the End of Bypass (BOB) time is 37.2 seconds. This is the time at which the water in the vessel has exited through the break. At this time, the refill period begins, whereby the vessel begins to refill by pumped safety injection. Since the increase in the safety injection time does not increase the delivery time of the pumped safety injection past the EOB time, the LBLOCA analysis will be unaffected (all safety injection flow before that time exits out the break). Consequently, the LBLOCA analysis is unaffected by the proposed increase in the containment high pressure SAL setpoint.

Small Break LOCA The Containment High Pressure ESF setpoint is not modeled in the Indian Point Unit 2 Small Break LOCA analysis. In Westinghouse small break LOCA analyses, the Low Pressurizer pressure ESF setpoint is assumed to be active and is typically the only ESF setpoint modeled. Since the Containment High Pressure ESF setpoint is not modeled, the results of the Indian Point Unit 2 Small Break LOCA analysis will not be affected by a change in its 'value. Thus, none of the 10 CFR 50.46 acceptance criteria will be challenged (with respect to the small break LOCA analysis) as a result of the change int he Containment High Pressure ESF setpoint for Indian Point Unit 2.

LOCA Hydraulic Forcing Functions The blowdown hydraulic forcing functions resulting from a LOCA are also considered in the FSAR. The LOCA Hydrauic Forcing Functions are primarily affected by temperature, pressure, density, enthalpy, and losses in the reactor vessel, reactor coolant loop, and steam generators. The LOCA Hydraulic Forcing Functions (LHF transient occurs over the duration of a 500 millisecond interval. In this time period, the containment pressure does not reach the containment high pressure setpoint. Furthermore, the LUFF analysis methodology does not model setpoints. As such, the proposed increase in the conmanneut high pressure setpoint does not affect the LHFFs.

Page 7 of 16 A-69

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 Post-LOCA Lon&-Term Core Cooling Following a postulated LBLOCA, the reactor becomes subcritical initially due to massive voiding in the core region. Since credit for control rod insertion is not taken for LBLOCA, the boron concentration of injected water must be sufficiently high as to maintain the core in a shutdown condition. This calculation is based on the primary system water volumes and boron concentrations. The Long Term Core Cooling (LTCC) sump criticality evaluation is affected by changes in volumes and boron concentrations of the Emergency Core Cooling System components. Since setpoints are not modeled, the LTCC evaluation methodology is not affected by the proposed increase to the containment high pressure SAL setpoint.

Hot LeM Switcghoer to Proyent Potential Boron Preipitation Post-LOCA hot leg switchover time is determined for inclusion in Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) to ensure no boron precipitation in the reactor vessel following boiling in the core. This time is strongly dependent on initial core power and the boron concentration of the fluid residing in the sump/RCS post-LOCA. The proposed increase to the containment high pressure SAL setpoint will increase the calculated time at which safety injection is initiated. The hot leg switchover analysis is not affected by the increase in the containment pressure high SAL setpoint because the net change to the integrated safety injection is negligible compared to the total integrated safety injection over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3.3 Diversity Discussion As described in FSAR Section 7.2.5.1.14, the Containment Pressure High ESF Trip Function can also provide a diverse signal to initiate reactor trip in the event that the pressurizer signal fails and does not initiate a~reactor trip for relatively small breaks in the primary system. A Containment Pressure High ESF trip stpoint of 2.0 psig is described in the FSAR as an adequate setpoint which will initiate a timely ESF/reactor tripsignal to ensure that the core will be protected for a range of small break sizes.

Th Conainment Pressure Diversity discussion presented in the FSAR was in response to Atomic Energy Commission (ABC) questions in 1970 on the diversity available in the Reactor Protection System/ESE System designs to provide core protection. In 1970, the available pressurizer automatic protection functions were aj reactor trip on low pressurizer pressure and an ESF trip on low pressurizer pressure coincident with low pressurzer water level. These two trips provided functional diversity in the event of depressurizations of the pntmy system. To provide additional diversity in the event of small breaks in the primary system, a Cn ent Pressure High ESF trip setpoint of 2.0 psig was chosen.

4V1r1979 following the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) event, EB Bulletin 79-06A (Revision 0 and I evision I) identified actions to be taken by the licensees of reactors designed by Westinghouse. One of the actions identified in IE Bulletin 79-06A was to eliminate the coincident requirement of low pressurizer water lnvel with low pressurizer pressure for an ESF trip. As a result, an ESF trip occurs on low pressurizer pressure only. In the review of the TMI-2 event, it was determined that the low pressurizer water level oincidence limited the reliability of the pressurizer OSF trip. Also, analyses of small breaks located at the t~p of the pressurizer showed that the pressurizer water level would increase (although the pressure and mass fthe primary system would be decreasing) which would preclude an ESF trip.

.isuch, the diversity of the pressurizer trip functions was strengthened by removing the pressurizer water I vel coincidence logic from the pressurizer ESF trip function. The low pressurizer pressure reactor trip 6ignal and the low pressurizer OSF trip signal are actuated by separate and diverse logic trains. Also, the Ivertemperature delta-temperature (OTDT) reactor trip is available depending on initial conditions for Page 8 of 16 A-70

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 providing a diverse reactor trip in the event of a depressurizaton of the primary system. Although the Containment Pressure High ESF trip setpoint is relaxed, it is still available to provide diverse protection for a range of breaks in the primary system. Thus, changes in the Containment Pressure High ESF trip setpoint do not significantly affect the protection system diversity available for small breaks in the primary system.

4.0 DETERMINATION OF NO UNRE VIEWED SAFETY QUESTION The safety significance of operating Indian Point Unit 2 with Containment Pressure SAL relaxation to 10 psig has been evaluated using the screening criteria of 10 CFR 50.59 and the guidance of NSAC-125 and does not represent an unreviewed safety question based on the following justification.

I. Will the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

NO. The change only involves the consideration of Containment Pressure SAL Relaxation to 10 psig in the safety analyses, the integrity of the equipment relied upon in the safety analyses is not expected to be challenged. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased.

2. Will the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

NO. The containment pressure design limit continues to be met and containment integrity is not challenged. Therefore, the consequences of the licensing basis Containment Integrity analyses remain unchanged, and no more severe radiological consequences will result. In addition, the consequences of the LOCA accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased with respect to LOCA considerations since the assumptions and results of all analyses examined are not adversely affected by the increase in the containment high pressure setpoint to 10 psig.

3. May the possibility of an accident which is different than any already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

NO. The design basis considered in the FSAR is not changed and remains bounding. The subject change involves the consideration of Containment Pressure SAL Relaxation to 10 psig; therefore, the integrity of the equipment relied upon is not expected to be challenged. Also, the subject SAL relaxation does not introduce any new mechanism (i.e., additional failure of equipment or ESF, etc.) by which a credible LOCA accident beyond design basis LOCA is created.

Therfore, the possibility of an accident which is different from any accidents previously evaluated in the Indian Point Unit 2 FSAR is not increased as a result of the containment high pressure setpoint relaxation to 10.0 psig.

4 Will the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

i NO. The Containment Analyses affected by the change consider the active single failure of a safeguards train. The assumption of Containment Pressure SAL Relaxation to 10 psig is not expected to challenge the integrity of the equipment assumed to be operable. Therefore, the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be increased.

Page 9 of 16 A-71

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2

5. 'Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

NO. Containment Pressure SAL Relaxation will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of the safeguards train already considered to be inoperable in the licensing basis safety analysis. Also, the consequences of equipment malfunction important to safety have previously been considered in the FSAR analyses and evaluations for the LOCA related events through inclusion of an assumed limiting single faHlure of ECCS equipment. The increase in the containment high pressure setpoint to 10.0 psig will not result in a more severe single failure than that assumed in the LOCA related FSAR analyses. By demonstrating conformance to the regulatory criteria for the proposed modification with continued consideraion of the limiting single failure, the consequences of these analyses will not be increased.

6. May the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than already evaluated in the FSAR be created?

No. As discussed in the answers to questions 4 and 5, Containment Pressure SAL Relaxation will not affect or chaltenge the integrity of the safety injection system components modeted in the licensing basis event. In addition, these changes are not expected to indirectly affect any other safety equipment relied upon for safety. Therefore, the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any already evaluated in the SAR would not be created.

7. Will the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any technical specifications be reduced?

NQ. The bases of the Technical Specifications are based in part on the ability of the regulatory criteria being satisfied assuming the limiting conditions for operation for various -systems. Inasmuch as conformance to the regulatory criteria for operation with the containment high pressure SAL setpoint is __

demonstrated, and the pertinent licensing basis acceptance criteria are not exceeded, the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced.

5.0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS In summary, the effects of a Containment Pressure SAL Relaxation have been evaluated. The cumulative effect of the outstanding evaluations on the peak calculated pressure result in the containment response following a postulated LOCA to be the limiting event with respect to peak calculated pressure. The peak

&dated pressure at the current licensed power level of 3083.4 MWt is 40.9 psig (at the increased power 3216 MWt, the peak pressure becomes 41.5 psig), thus the design containment pressure of 47 psig will be exceeded. In addition, based on the results of this evaluation, the increase in Containment Pressure IEigh SAL setpoint to 10 psig will not affect the assumptions or results of the LOCA-relate FSAR accident atlayses. Also, changes in the Containment Pressure High ESF trip setpoint do not significantly affect the protection system diversity available for small breaks in the primary system. It should be noted that the effect the containment temperature on Equipment Qualification is considered out of scope of this evaluation but should be addressed by others.

jIence, operation of Indian Point Unit 2 with Containment Pressure SAL Relaxation neither represents an xreviewed safety question nor compromises the conclusions or pressure margin demonstrated in the current ltdian Point Unit 2 Containment Analysis or LOCA-Related safety analyses.

Page 10 of 16 A-72

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 However, it must be noted that the implementation of a new T/S setpoim of 5.0 psig will require approval by the NRC. The safety evaluation does not include the No Significant Hazards determination required by 10 CFR 50.92 for changes to the Technical Specifications.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. Westinghouse Letter IPP-92-639, Kern, J. G. (Westinghouse) to Ellwanger, J. (Consolidated Edison),

dated December 18, 1992, "Extended Surveillance Interval Program".

2. Westinghouse Letter IPP-93-645, Hameedy, M. D. (Westinghouse) to Jackson, B. (Consolidated Edison),

dated April 5, 1993, wExtended Surveillance Intennl Program Increase in the Containment High Pressure Setpoint to 7.3 psig Safety Evaluation Checklist, Rev. 1", SECL-92-339, Rev. 1.

3. WCAP-12237, "Containment Integrity Analyses for Indian Point Unit 2', dated December 1989 (Non-Proprietary Class MI1).

4. SECL-91-231, -Indian Point Unit 2 High Head Safety Injection Flow Changes Safety Evaluation", dated June 26, 1991.

5. WCAP-12312, "Safety Evaluation for an Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature Increase to 95"F at Indian Point Unit 2", dated July 1989 (Non-Proprietary Class 11).

Page 11 of 16 A-73

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 Figure 1 Containment Pressure vs. Time Double-Ended Pump Suction - Minimum Safeguards 3083.4 MWt Page 12 of 16 A-74

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 Figure2 Containment Pressure vs. Time Double-Ended Pump Suction - Minimum Safeguards 3216 MWt

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Page 13 of 16 A-75

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 Figure 3 Containment Temperature vs. Time Double-Ended Pump Suction - Minimum Safeguards 3083.4 MWt aI-ta. "W La U

TIME IScMONOS2 Page 14 of 16 A-76

SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 0 Figure 4 Containment Temperature vs. Time Double-Ended Pump Suction - Mi:nimun Safeguards 3216 MWt 1 Jil I - -I 1 1 -111101

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SECL-92-339, Rev. 2 Figure 5 Containment Pressure vs. Time Hot Full Power, Feedwater Control Valve Failure 425 .- - -

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A-78

APPENDIX B CONTAINMENT RESPONSE ANALYSIS 8.1 Introduction The information provided is essentially identical with Westinghouse letter LTR-CRA 290 dated November 15, 2001. Information described here is used to determine the fan cooler power requirements for large LOCA, steamline break and small LOCA.

Information used in the load study is provided in Section 3.2 of the report.

B.2 Containment Response Calculations The COCO containment response computer code (Reference 3) typically used in design basis containment pressure calculations was used for the analysis cases described herein. Major assumptions for these cases are as follows:

NSSS Power (MWt) 3083.4 Reactor Core Power (MWt) 3071.4 Initial Containment Pressure (psig) 2 (16.7 psia)

Initial Containment Temperature ('F) 130 Initial Containment Relative Humidity (%) 20 Fan Cooler Data Service Water Temperature ('F) 95 Pressure Setpoint (psig) 10 Delay Time after Setpoint (Sec) 60 Fan Cooler Heat Removal Rate (Per unit, MBtu/hr at 240 'F) 53 Containment Spray System Data Pressure Setpoint (psig) 30 Delay Time after Setpoint (Sec) 60 Containment Spray Flow Rate (per pump) gpm 2200 Fan BHP converted directly to a power requirement (in kW) using:

BHP = 1758

density (References 6 and 7)

Fan Power (kW)= Fan BHP * (.746) / Motor Efficiency (%)

(Assuming a conservative motor efficiency of 0.93; Reference 9, Sec 3.2)

B-1

B.3 Large Break Long-Term LOCA For Containment Integrity The long-term LOCA mass and energy release and containment integrity analyses are performed to demonstrate the acceptability of the containment safeguards systems to mitigate the consequences of a design basis pipe break. The containment safeguards systems must be capable of removing the maximum possible discharge of mass and energy release to containment from the reactor coolant system to prevent containment pressure from exceeding the acceptance criteria peak design pressure of 47 psig (Technical Specification 3.6 Containment Bases).

The limiting single failure for the containment integrity design basis LOCA analysis is the loss of an emergency diesel generator (EDG# 23). This results in the loss of one train of safety injection (i.e., leaving two high head SI pumps and 1 RHR pump during the injection phase), the failure of one containment safeguards train (i.e., one containment spray pump), and the failure of one containment fan cooler. The Indian Point Unit 2 licensing basis (minimum safeguard case) also assumes one additional fan out of service. Loss of off-site power is assumed at event initiation.

The results of the containment integrity design basis LOCA analysis show that accounting for the plant modifications and subject changes to the accident analysis input assumptions, the calculated peak containment pressure following a postulated LOCA long-term mass and energy release is 43.0 psig. This analysis is described in the Reference 1 safety evaluation for the restart effort and is currently the analysis of record to support the licensing basis for Indian Point Unit 2.

Large break LOCA containment response transients (5 cases):

B.3.1 Case 1 (DBA / Licensing Basis Case: Double-Ended Pump Suction-Minimum Safeguards)

Mass and Enerqy Release - Minimum Safeguards

,The limiting single failure that is assumed in the design basis LOCA analysis for, containment integrity is the loss of an emergency diesel generator (EDG# 23). This results in the loss of one train of safety injection (i.e., leaving two high head SI pumps and 1 RHR pump) during the injection phase). A minimum flow alignment is assumed for the sump recirculation phase. The minimum delivered flow from either the I recirculation pump or the RHR pump is modeled; consequently, the RHR pump flowrate is modeled through one RHR heat exchanger in the containment integrity analysis.

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safeguards For minimum safeguards, 3 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 61.75 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: 71.0 seconds into transient Spray flow stopped at the RWST low-low level: 2354 seconds. (RWST is depleted; B-2

recirculation spray is not considered in containment pressure analysis)

Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 43.0 psig occurring at 1399 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 262.82" F occurring at 1399 seconds Containment Pressure @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 8.681 psig Containment Steam Temperature @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 166.880 F Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 1 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 1 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 1 B.3.2 Case 2 (DBA / Licensing Basis Case: Double-Ended Pump Suction-Minimum Safeguards; with a modified containment model to effectively address an EDG 22 Failure except crediting only 1 RHR HX)

Mass and Energy Release - Minimum Safeguards (DBA Basis; Conservative for this case)

The limiting single failure that is assumed in the design basis LOCA analysis for containment integrity is the loss of an emergency diesel generator (EDG# 23). This results in the loss of one train of safety injection (i.e., leaving two high head SI pumps and 1 RHR pump) during the injection phase). A minimum flow alignment is assumed for the sump recirculation phase. The minimum delivered flow from either the recirculation pump or the RHR pump is modeled; consequently, the RHR pump flowrate is modeled through one RHR heat exchanger in the containment integrity analysis.

Containment Equipment AlLignment Available safeguard equipment consisting of 3 fan coolers and 2 containment spray pumps was assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 61.75 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: 71.0 seconds into transient Spray flow stopped at the RWST low-low level: 1200 seconds. (Expected start of recirculation switchover; one spray pump would be left running until the RWST is empty (RWST low-low level); recirculation spray is not considered in containment integrity pressure analysis Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 39.4 psig occurring at 23.04 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 258.020 F occurring at 23.04 seconds Containment Pressure @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 8.686 psig Containment Steam Temperature @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 166.88' F B-3

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 2 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 2 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 2 B.3.3 Case 3 (DBA / Licensing Basis Case: Double-Ended Pump Suction-Minimum Safeguards; with a modified containment model to effectively address a scenario assuming all EDGs available with a limiting failure of one RHR pump; and continuous spray pump operation)

Mass and Enerqy Release - Minimum Safeguards (DBA Basis; Conservative for this case)

The limiting single failure that is assumed in the design basis LOCA analysis for containment integrity is the loss of an emergency diesel generator (EDG# 23). This results in the loss of one train of safety injection (i.e., leaving two high head SI pumps and 1 RHR pump) during the injection phase). A minimum flow alignment is assumed for the sump recirculation phase. The minimum delivered flow from either the recirculation pump or the RHR pump is modeled; consequently, the RHR pump flowrate is modeled through one RHR heat exchanger in the containment integrity analysis.

Containment Equipment Aliqnment Available safeguard equipment consisting of 4 fan coolers and 2 containment spray pumps was assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 61.75 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: 71.0 seconds into transient Spray flow stopped at the RWST low-low level: 2354 seconds (calculated time for minimum safeguards Case 1). RWST is depleted; recirculation spray is not considered in containment pressure analysis.

Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 39.4 psig occurring at 23.04 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 258.020 F occurring at 23.04 seconds Containment Pressure @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 6.655 psig Containment Steam Temperature @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 152.80 F Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 3 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 3 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 3 B-4

B.3.4 Case 4 (DBA / Licensing Basis Case: Double-Ended Pump Suction-Minimum Safeguards; with a modified containment model to effectively address a scenario assuming all EDGs available with a limiting failure of one RHR pump)

(Staggered containment spray pump operation)

Mass and Energy Release - Minimum Safeguards (DBA Basis; Conservative for this case)

The limiting single failure that is assumed in the design basis LOCA analysis for containment integrity is the loss of an emergency diesel generator (EDG# 23). This results in the loss of one train of safety injection (i.e., leaving two high head SI pumps and 1 RHR pump) during the injection phase). A minimum flow alignment is assumed for the sump recirculation phase. The minimum delivered flow from either the recirculation pump or the RHR pump is modeled; consequently, the RHR pump flowrate is modeled through one RHR heat exchanger in the containment integrity analysis.

Containment Equipment Alignment Available safeguard equipment consisting of 4 fan coolers and 2 containment spray pumps was assumed operational.

Containment Spray Pump Operation during injection phase:

a) @ CS pressure setpoint and delay: start 2 CS pumps b) @ 20 minutes into the containment response transient stop 1 CS pump c) @ RWST Low-Low level (2354 seconds) stop remaining CS pump Fan Coolers Initiation time: 61.75 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: 71.0 seconds into transient (Spray pumps stopped during switchover as described above; recirculation spray is not considered in containment pressure analysis.

Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 39.4 psig occurring at 23.04 seconds Containment Peak Steam Temperature: 258.020 F occurring at 23.04 seconds Containment Pressure @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 6.712 psig Containment Steam Temperature @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 153.030 F Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 4 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 4 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 4 B-5

B.3.5 Case 5 (DBA I Licensing Basis Case: Double-Ended Pump Suction-Minimum Safeguards; with a modified containment model to effectively address a scenario assuming all EDGs available with an alternate limiting failure of one CTS pump)

Mass and Energy Release - Minimum Safeguards (DBA Basis; Conservative for this case]

The limiting single failure that is assumed in the design basis LOCA analysis for containment integrity is the loss of an emergency diesel generator (EDG# 23). This results in the loss of one train of safety injection (i.e., leaving two high head Si pumps and 1 RHR pump) during the injection phase). A minimum flow alignment is assumed for the sump recirculation phase. The minimum delivered flow from either the recirculation pump or the RHR pump is modeled; consequently, the RHR pump flowrate is modeled through one RHR heat exchanger in the containment integrity analysis.

Containment Equipment Alignment Available safeguard equipment consisting of 4 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump was assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 61.75 seconds into transient _

Containment Sprays Initiation time: 71.0 seconds Into transient Spray flow stopped at the RWST low-low level: 2354 seconds (calculated time for minimum safeguards Case 1). RWST is depleted; recirculation spray is not considered in containment pressure analysis.

Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 40.27 psig occurring at 496.83 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 258.70 F occurring at 496.83 seconds Containment Pressure @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 6.644 psig Containment Steam Temperature @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: 152.860 F Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 5 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 5 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 5 B-6

B.4 Main Steam Line Break For Containment Integrity The long-term steam line break (SLB) mass and energy release and containment integrity analyses are performed to demonstrate the acceptability of the containment safeguards systems to mitigate the consequences of a design basis pipe break. The containment safeguards systems must be capable of removing the maximum possible discharge of mass and energy release to containment from the reactor coolant system to prevent containment pressure from exceeding the acceptance criteria peak design pressure of 47 psig (Technical Specification 3.6 Containment Bases).

The limiting single failure for the containment integrity design basis SLB analysis (References 4 and 5) is the hot full power case, with the limiting single failure assumed to be the failure of a feedwater control valve (FCV) in the faulted loop to close. The containment model credits 2 containment spray pumps and 5 fan coolers. One train of safety injection is assumed unavailable (i.e., leaving two high head SI pumps during the injection phase).

The results of the containment integrity design basis MSLB analysis show that accounting for the plant modifications and subject changes to the accident analysis input assumptions, the calculated peak containment pressure following a postulated MSLB long-term mass and energy release is 37.52 psig occurring at 349.55 seconds.

This analysis is documented in Reference 4 and presented in the RSG SECL Reference 5. The evaluation for the Restart Effort Reference 1 revalidated the results for restart and continued operation and is currently the analysis of record and the support the licensing basis for Indian Point Unit 2.

B-4.1 Case 6 (DBA Licensing Basis; -605 seconds transient)

Mass and Energy Release - Minimum Safeguards The break mass and energy release break flow rates were from Reference 4. The limiting single failure for the containment integrity design basis SLB analysis is the hot full power case, with the single limiting single failure assumed to be the failure of a feedwater control valve (FCV) in the faulted loop to close. One train of safety injection is assumed unavailable (i.e., leaving two high head SI pumps during the injection phase).

Containment Equipment Alignment -Maximum Safeguards For maximum safeguards 5 fan coolers and 2 containment spray pumps were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 76.65 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: 264.0 seconds into transient Containment Response Results 8-7

Containment Peak Pressure: 37.52 psig occurring at 349.55 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 259.40 F occurring at 39.0 seconds Containment Pressure @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: n/a .

Containment Steam Temperature @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: n/a Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 6 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 6 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 6 B.4.2 Case 7 (Double Failure Scenario: FCV -Secondary and EDG - Containment)

Mass and Eneriv Release - Minimum Safeguards The break mass and energy release break flow rates were from Reference 4. The limiting single failure for the containment integrity design basis SLB analysis is the hot full power case, with the single limiting single failure assumed to be the failure of a feedwater control valve (FCV) in the faulted loop to close. One train of safety injection is assumed unavailable (i.e., leaving two high head SI pumps during the injection phase).

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safeguards ,__

w For minimum safeguards 3 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump was assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 76.65 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: 255.0 seconds into transient Spray Pumped stopped at 1500 seconds (Note: 17.0 psig pressure setpoint occurs at: - 1963 seconds)

Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 39.48 psig occurring at 353.35 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 259.40 F occurring at 39.0 seconds Containment Pressure @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: n/a Containment Steam Temperature @ 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s: n/a Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 7 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 7 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 7 B-8

B.5 Small Break LOCA The break flow mass and energy release rates were taken from Reference 2 [SEC-SAI-4389-CO, "Indian Point Unit 2 (IPP) Small Break LOCA Analysis for Vantage+ Fuel Upgrade", January 21, 1994]. This small break study (for EDG Loading) consisted of both 3-inch and 4- inch cases. Sensitivity cases were run using the mass and energy release as presented from Reference 2 and also assuming safety injection spill to containment. Tow of three HHSI pumps inject into the RCS.

B.5.1 Case 8 (4" Small Break LOCA - I containment spray pump and 3 fan coolers; without Safety Injection (SI) water spill to containment)

Mass and Energy Release 4" LOCA (Injection phase mass and energy release)

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safeguards For minimum safeguards, 3 fan'coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 123.0 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: 3811.0 seconds into transient Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 30.15 psig occurring at 3846.99 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 240.220 F occurring at 3846.99 seconds Containment Pressure @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 20.51 psig (declining)

Containment Steam Temperature @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 216.10 F (declining)

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 8 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 8 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 8 B.5.2 Case 9 (4" Small Break LOCA - I containment spray pump and 3 fan coolers; with Safety Injection (SI) water spill flow to containment)

Mass and Enerqy Release 4" LOCA (Injection phase mass and energy release)

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safequards B-9

For minimum safeguards, 3 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 123.0 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: 3822.0 seconds into transient Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 30.18 psig occurring at 3836.13 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 240.210 F occurring at 3836.13 seconds Containment Pressure @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 20.56 psig (declining)

Containment Steam Temperature @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 216.070 F (declining)

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 9 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 9 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 9 B.5.3 Case 10 (4" Small Break LOCA - 1 containment spray pump and 4 fan coolers; without Safety Injection (SI) water spill flow to containment)

Mass and Energy Release 4" LOCA (Injection phase mass and energy release)

Containment E uipment Alignment -Minimum Safeguards For minimum safeguards, 4 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 123.0 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: Pressure setpoint not met; spray not on Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 26.4 psig occurring at 7200 seconds (Pressure still increasing due to M&E constant flow rate from -3000 seconds on.)

Containment Steam Temperature: 231.86' F occurring at 7200 seconds Containment Pressure @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 26.4 psig (increasing)

Containment Steam Temperature @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 231.860 F (increasing)

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 10 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 10 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 10 B-1 0

B.5.4 Case 11 (4" Small Break LOCA - 1 containment spray pump and 4 fan coolers; with Safety Injection (SI) water spill flow to containment)

Mass and Enercqv Release 4" LOCA (Injection phase mass and energy release)

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safeguards For minimum safeguards, 4 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 123.0 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: Pressure setpoint not met; spray not on Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 26.48 psig occurring at 7200 seconds (Pressure still increasing due to M&E constant flow rate from -3000 seconds on.)

Containment Steam Temperature: 231.920 F occurring at 7200 seconds Containment Pressure @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 26.48 psig (increasing)

Containment Steam Temperature @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 231.920 F (increasing)

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 11 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 11 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 11 B.5.5 Case 12 (4" Small Break LOCA - 1 containment spray pump and 5 fan coolers; without Safety Injection (SI) water spill flow to containment)

Mass and Energy Release 4" LOCA (Injection phase mass and energy release)

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safeguards For minimum safeguards, 5 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 123.0 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: Pressure setpoint not met; spray not on Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 22.96 psig occurring at 793 seconds B-1 1

Containment Steam Temperature: 223.490 F occurring at 792.7 seconds Containment Pressure @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 20.68 psig (Although pressure is increasing due to M&E constant flow rate from -3000 seconds on.) (increasing)

Containment Steam Temperature @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 216.980 F (increasing)

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 12 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 12 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 12 B.5.6 Case 13 (4" Small Break LOCA - 1 containment spray pump and 5 fan coolers; with Safety Injection (SI) water spill flow to containment)

Mass and EnerQy Release 4" LOCA (Injection phase mass and energy release)

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safequards For minimum safeguards, 5 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 123.0 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: Pressure setpoint not met; spray not on Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 22.98 psig occurring at 793.17 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 223.520 F occurring at 792.77 seconds Containment Pressure @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 20.76 psig (Although pressure is increasing due to M&E constant flow rate from -3000 seconds on.) (increasing)

Containment Steam Temperature.@ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 217.060 F (increasing)

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 13 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 13 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 13 B.5.7 Case 14 (3" Small Break LOCA - 1 containment spray pump and 3 fan coolers; without Safety Injection (SI) water spill flow to containment)

Mass and Enerciv Release 3" LOCA (Injection phase mass and energy release)

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safecquards B-12

For minimum safeguards, 3 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 199.5 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: Pressure setpoint not met; spray not on Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 28.78 psig occurring at 7200 seconds (Pressure still increasing due to M&E constant flow rate from -3000 seconds on.)

Containment Steam Temperature: 237.30 F occurring at 7200 seconds Containment Pressure @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 28.78 psig (increasing)

Containment Steam Temperature @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 237.3' F (increasing)

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 14 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 14 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 14 B.5.8 Case 15 (3" Small Break LOCA - 1 containment spray pump and 3 fan coolers; with accumulator spill flow to containment)

Mass and Energy Release 3" LOCA (Injection phase mass and energy release)

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safequards For minimum safeguards, 3 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 199.5 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: Pressure setpoint not met; spraynot on Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 28.88 psig occurring at 7200 seconds (Pressure still increasing due to M&E constant flow rate from -3000 seconds on.)

Containment Steam Temperature: 237.380 F occurring at 7200 seconds Containment Pressure @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 28.88 psig (increasing)

Containment Steam Temperature @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 237.380 F (increasing)

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 15 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 15

Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 15 B-13

B.5.9 Case 16 (3" Small Break LOCA - modified for reduced Decay Heat effects)- 1 containment spray pump and 3 fan coolers; without Safety Injection (SI) water spill flow to containment)

Mass and Energy Release 3" LOCA (Injection phase mass and energy release; modified for reduced Decay Heat effects),

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safeguards For minimum safeguards, 3 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 199.5 seconds into transient Containment Sprays Initiation time: Pressure setpoint not met; spray not on Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 26.28 psig occurring at 5660.38 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 231.680 F occurring-at 5650.38 seconds Containment Pressure @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 26.07 psig (decreasing)

Containment Steam Temperature @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 231.16' F (decreasing)

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 16 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 16 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 16 B.5.10 Case 17 (3" Small Break LOCA - modified for reduced Decay Heat effects)- 1 containment spray pump and 3 fan coolers; with Safety Injection (SI) water spill flow to containment)

Mass and Energy Release 3" LOCA (Injection phase mass and energy release; modified for reduced Decay Heat effects)

Containment Equipment Alignment -Minimum Safeguards For minimum safeguards, 3 fan coolers and 1 containment spray pump were assumed operational.

Fan Coolers Initiation time: 199.5 seconds into transient ContainmentSprays B-14

Initiation time: Pressure setpoint not met; spray not on Containment Response Results Containment Peak Pressure: 26.35 psig occurring at 5679.81 seconds Containment Steam Temperature: 231.740 F occurring at 5654.81 seconds Containment Pressure @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 26.16 psig (decreasing)

Containment Steam Temperature @ end of transient (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ): 231.250 F (decreasing)

Containment Pressure: Figure 1 for Case 17 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures: Figure 2 for Case 17 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power: Figure 3 for Case 17 B.6 References

1. IPP-00-413, "Consolidated Edison Company of New York Indian Point Unit 2 Transmittal of SECL-00-164 -- Indian Point Unit 2 Restart Support",

December 20, 2000.

2. SEC-SAI-4389-CO, "Indian Point Unit 2 (IPP) Small Break LOCA Analysis for Vantage+ Fuel Upgrade", January 21, 1994.

3. Bordelon, F. M. and E. T. Murphy, "Containment Pressure Analysis Code (COCO), WCAP-8327", July 1974.

4. CN-CRA-00-62-R0, "Indian Point Unit 2 (IPP) Main Steam Line Break (MSLB)

Inside Containment for the Replacement Steam Generator Model 44F, Mass and Energy Releases and Containment Response", August 21, 2000.

5. SECL-00-191, Rev. 1, "Replacement Steam Generator Evaluation".

6. CN-EMT-00-222-RO, "IP2 RCFC HEPA & Charcoal Filter Elimination Fan Performance", November 29, 2000.

7. LTR-EMT-00-1791, "Indian Point No. 2 RCFC Fan/Motor Performance Evaluation with HEPA and Charcoal Filters Removed", November 29, 2000.

8. CN-POE-01 RO, Miscellaneous Calculations for the Indian Point Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Study, October 15, 2001.

9. WCAP-12655 Revision 1, "Indian Point Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Study", May 1996. (Not attached)

B-15

Figure 1 for Case I Containment Pressure Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment Minimum Safeguards - 1 CS Pump 3 FAN Coolers PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 50 -

40-30 -

CL_

20-10 II I I I II i I I Ill! I I I I II III , I I I 1 Time (sec)

B-1 6

Figure 2 for Case 1 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment Minimum Safeguards- 1 CS Pump 3 FAN Coolers TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 280 260 240

' 220 1200-E 180 160 -

140- 120 - 1 L 2

31 2 3 10 10 Time (sec)

B-17

Figure 3 for Case 1 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure MI&E) - Containment Minimum Safeguards - 1 CS Pump 3 FAN Coolers Containment Density (Ibm/ft3)

(Mi xture Densi ty)

F an MIootor Power Input (kw)

(Fan BHP

0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

.18- -240 4

I -220

.16- ___ 20 200

.o .14 -*3

-c' 180 ci' 12 __ _ 1 c- ___ 0

" l140

.8E-01 ______"*" ,

%."..120

.6E- 01 - 11,*,,,,,11 1

,t,, fLL .L,I ,

I III,4, ,1 .' ILLLW* I , ,, 1.,1..111

-. 100

-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-1 8

Figure 1 for Case 2 Containment Pressure Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment EDG #22 Failure - 2 CS Pumps 3 FAN Coolers PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 40 30

@20 cn 10 -

0/' .* " : ~ l ' Ill Ii: ir 'l ' ,l I' ]1I I : .... I. ii *1' I' _ ! ! - L Time (sec)

B-1 9

Figure 2 for Case 2 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment EDG #22 Failure - 2 CS Pumps 3 FAN Coolers TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 260-240-220 t 200 E

E, 180 160 140 120 2 3 10 10 Time (sec)

B-20

Figure 3 for Case 2 Containment Density and Fan Motor Tower Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment EDG #22 Failure - 2 CS Pumps 3 FAN Coolers Containment Den si t y ( Ibm/f t 3)

S(Mi xture Dens i ty)

Fan Motor Power Input (kw)

(Fan BHP

0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

.16 240 220 P~~) .14 200 E

-o .12 C~) 0 0

140 ME 0 .1E+00 0

C-) .8E-01 4.- 120 4..

100

.6E-01 10-2 10-1 100 10 1

10 2 3 10 10 4 5 10 106 7 10 Time (sec)

B-21

Figure 1 for Case 3 Containment Pressure Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment All EDGs with RHR Pump Failure (2 CS Pumps, 4 FAN Coolers and 1 R-IR HX)

PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 40 30-2 20' 10 -

I 1 I1 1 1 lll I I III; I 11 1 I1 1 I I I 1T l 0 1 1111 1 111M I

-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-22

Figure 2 for Case 3 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment All EDGs with RHR Pump Failure (2 CS Pumps, 4 FAN Coolers and 1 RHR HX)

TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 260 -

240 -

220

/I S200 I l

~180 140 120 1002 3" 2 3 10 10 Time (sec)

B-23

Figure 3 for Case 3 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment All EDGs with RHR Pump Failure (2 CS Pumps, 4 FAN Coolers and 1 RHR -X)

Containment Densi ty (Ibm/ft3)

(Mixture Densi ty)

Fan Motor Power Input (kw)

(Fan 8HP

0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

.16 240

-220 N2 .14- I E 200

>-. .12 ,

__-__ __ __ _ ___ __160

- .JE+O0 _ _ _ _

-1E+00 _ __ \ _

E o 140 0

c.. .8E-01 -

I

"- ,L

.-1 120

.6E-01 100

-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-24

0 Figure 1 for Case 4 Containment Pressure Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment All EDGs with RHR Pump Failure (2 CS Pumps for 20 minutes and 1 CS thereafter until RWST LOW-LOW Level)

(4 FAN Coolers and 1 RHR HX)

PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 40

~30

~20 10 10

-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-25

Figure 2 for Case 4 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure Mt&E) - Containment All EDGs with RHR Pump Failure (2 CS Pumps for 20. minutes and 1 CS thereafter until RWST LOW-LOW Level)

(4 FAN Coolers and 1 RHR HiX)

TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 260 -

240 \

'I 220

-L. 200 /

t 180- Q)\

E - .

160 - 101 140 120 1 0 ; ;j I I l il I I ; I I 1 1 11 1 1 11 I 1 I I 1 1 0 1 1 11 1 1 1 11

-22 3 4 5 6 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

/ .*

B-26

Figure 3 for Case 4 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment All EDGs with RHR Pump Failure 2CS Pumps for 20 minutes and 1 CS thereafter until RWST LOW-LOW Level)

(4 FAN Coolers and 1 RHR HX)

Con ta iinme n t Densi t y (I bim/f t 3)

(Mixture Dens i ty)

Fan Motor Power Input (kw)

(Fan BHP 0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

.16- 240 220

.14-E -200

>- .12 - 180 c-z

.1+0 160 o 0

-140 0 .8E-01 '

/ -120

- -- 120

.6E-01 , , ., ., ,, ,, -, ,,- ,-,,-, ,,- t - ,u,,', -L. ,..J,,, i f !, ! ,,:,, 10023 2 3 10 10 Time (sec)

B-27

Figure 1 for Case 5 Containment Pressure Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment All EDGs with 1 CS Pump Failure (1 CS Pump. 4 FAN Coolers and 1 RHR HX)

PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 50*

40

--- ' 30 CL Uf)

(f) 2 20 10-I I 1 I I 1 1 1 I

-2 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-28

Figure 2 for Case 5 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment All EDGs Nith I CS Pump Failure (1 CS Pump, 4 FAN Coolers and 1 RHR Hx)

STM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 260 -

240 -

220 -

200 /

t180-E 140 120 I IlI M lI 10-2 10-1 100 101 .

102 103 104 105 106 Time (sec)

Figure 3 for Case 5 Containment Density and Fan. Motor Power Large LOCA (EDG 23 Failure M&E) - Containment All EDGs with 1 CS Pump Failure (1 CS Pump, 4 FAN Coolers and 1 RHR HX)

Containment Density (Ibm/ift3)

- (Mi xture Dens i ty)

Fan Motor Power Input (kw)

- - -- (Fan BHP.* 0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

.16 - -240

-220

.14-IA_____ ____ ____ ____

F:200

> ,.12 - 180 180 .

__.___ ____ __160 _

00 cS .8E-01 ___

120

.6E-01 - L .100 10-2 11 10 100 101 13 102 10 106 104 10 10 107 Time (sec)

B-30

Figure 1 for Case 6 Containment Pressure Main Steam Line Break (FCV Failure)-Containment Maximum Safeguards-2 CS Pumps 5 FAN Coolers PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 40 30 20 10 50

-1 0 1 2 3 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-31

Figure 2 for Case 6 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures Main Steam Line Break (FCV Failure)-Containment Maximum Safeguards-2 CS Pumps 5 FAN Coolers TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 260 -

240-220-U-

L~.

200 a,

180 E

V 160 140 120 Time (sec)

B-32

Figure 3 for Case 6 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power Main Steam Line Break (FCV Failure)-Containment Maximum Safeguards-2 CS Pumps 5 FAN Coolers Conta inment Density (Ibm/ft3)

- (Mi xture, Densi ty)

Fan Motor Power Input (kw)

(Fan BHP

746 7 / Motor Efficiency)

.16240 220

.).14 4--

E 200

>.. .12 180

-180

-- 160 0 _

a- .]E+00 10 140 4-C) .BE-01 - _ -

-120

.6E -01 f I r I i! r f I t f I I f. Iff, 100 Time (sec)

B-33

Figure 1 for Case 7 Containment Pressure Main Steam Line Break (FCV Failure)-Containment Minimum Safeguards-i CS Pump 3 FAN Coolers PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 40(

30 22 20 cD 10 0 .11 I I I 111 I I I I i I I 1 I I 1 I Time (sec)

B-34

Figure 2 for Case 7 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures Main Steam Line Break (FCV Failure)-Containment Minimum Safeguards-1 CS Pump 3 FAN Coolers TSTM. 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 260 -

240-

/ ",-

220-200-

/

180 II E

I 160 -

I, 140-I I I I 0 1 2 3 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec) 0 B-35

Figure 3 for Case 7 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power Main Steam Line Break (FCV Failure)-Containment Minimum Safeguards-i CS Pump 3 FAN Coolers Containment Density (Ibm/ft3)

-(Mixture Densi ty)

Fan Motor Power Input (kw)

(Fan BHP

0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

.16 - 240

-220

) .14- 1"I' I200's E

, .12-

- 180 160

.1E+00- i1 E 0 U -140

.8E 120 1I100 6E-01 Time (sec)

B-36

Figure 1 for Case 8 Containment Pressure 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 35 -

30-25-

_20 -

c* 15 -

10-5 I 111I ' *I I I " 1.

Time (sec)

B-37

Figure 2 for Case 8 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures 4 Inch. LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 260 240 220 "

D 200

{z) /

2.- 0-J /

'- 180 /

E H--

160 /

140 -

120 I I i11 II I Time (sec)

B-38

Figure 3 for Case 8 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

Containment Density (Ibm/f t3)

(Mixture Density)

Fan Motor Power [nput (kw)

- - ((Fan BHP

0.746 / Motor Ef f iciency)

.14 240

.13 220 I.

.12 200

-Q

=3

.11 180 CQ) 0

.1 160 0

F 0

.9E-01 140 0

(-)

.8E-01 120

.7E-01 100 Time (sec)

B-39

Figure 1 for Case 9 Containment Pressure 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - I CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 35 30 25

.20

<L) u 15 10 5

0

-1 0 1 2 3 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-40

Figure 2 for Case 9 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperal .ures 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 260 240 220

<D 200 - Oe

~-180/ /

160 /

Or 140 -

1,20 t,, LI1 I I I1l1 Time (sec)

B-41

Figure 3 for Case 9 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power 4 Inch LOCA -. Containment .Minimum Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

Con to iin e n t Dens it y ( I bm/f t 3)

(Mixture Density)

Fan Motor Power Input (kw)

(Fon BHP

0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

.14 240

.13 220 F-

.12 20011-1

=3

.11 180 E

0 0L.

.1 160 0

E .0/ 0

.9E-01 .0/ 140

.8E-01 120

.7E-01 100

-1 0 10 1 02 103 4 10 10 1e 10 Time (sec)

B-42

Figure 1 for Case 10 Containment Pressure 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump,4 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 30 -

25-20-Co)

SI 15-co 10-5 0I 1 l* i1' 1 I I Ii ! I I i I I I LI I 1 SI III Time (sec)

B-43

Figure 2 for Case 10 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 4 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 240.

220 - " -.

200 .

ci_ /

L2 180 / -

/ m-(

Q:-: /

- /

/

140 - --

-1 0 14 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-44

Figure 3 for Case 10 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 4 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

Containment Density (jbm/ft3)

(Mixture Density)

Fan Motor Power Input (kw)

(Fan BHP

0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

.13 - 240

-22 I_. .12 - _ _ __...__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ 220 200 -

- ~.11- _ -_

.IE+00

-I o I 160 )

__ __ __ _/ ~.9E-01 - _ _ /__ _ _ _ __ _ _ -__

014 0140 C3 0 _

.8E-01 -

1

- - 120 Time (sec)

B-45

Figure 1 for Case 11 Containment Pressure 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 4 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 30 -

25 20-.

15-L..

Cf,

<L) 10 5-0 J II l It I I1!1 1 1I I I I lilt r 11II111 I I I iIl

- 1 2 3 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-46

VFigure 2 for Case I I Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 4 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

SITSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 240-220-200 - O L.-_ /

180 /

- 160 /

/

140 -- -

I I 120- I Time (sec)

B-47

Figure 3 for Case 11 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 4 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

Containment Density (Ibm/ft3)

( M i x t u r e D e.n s it y)

Fon Motor Power nnput (kw)

(Fan BHP

0.746 /.Motor Efficiency)

.14 240

.13 220

.12 200 %

.11, 180 EC-4 <D

.1 /,/ 160 Cl

.9E-O1 140 0

.8E-01 120

.7E-01 t 7 II1 , 111 1 1 I '11 i LL I '1 1 1 F I I I 100

-1 0 2 3 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-48

Figure 1 for Case 12 Containment Pressure 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump. 5 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

PWTRO 0 0 0 CONTAtNMENT PRESSURE 25 -

20 -

.o),15 Cl_

?10 5

_{)l' .[ i.i li , ]

ill 1 ; I I I tl,1 1 i tll i I I I L III

-1 0 .

10 10 10 10 10 iC Time (sec) 0O B-49

Figure 2 for Case 12 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump. 5 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE

-WTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 240-220- 0 Or 200 180- /

- 160 /

/

140 - lo 1 ~-li I!II 111 I Iii: 1

-1 02 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-50

Figure 3 for Case 12 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - i CS Pump, 5 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

Containment Dens i ty (Ibm/f t,)

- (Mixture D.ens i ty)

Fan Motor Power nput (kw)

(Fan ,BHP

0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

.13 240

.12 220 200

.11 180 CI c- .1E+O0 160 a-EE .9E-01 140 ~

0

.8E-01 120

.7E-01 100 Time (sec)

B-51

Figure 1 for Case 13 Containment Pressure.

4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump. 5 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 25-20-I

- 15"

(/3 CO, Io-05 I"I I 'l I [ II 1111 I I I1111 11!1 11[ .. F ! [ 1

I/ Ii II Time (sec)

B-52

Figure 2 for Case 13 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 5 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TW TR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 240 220 200 UL-EL.

.k_

o180 10 160 140 120

-1 0 1 2 3 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-53

Figure 3 for Case 13 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power 4 Inch LOCA - Containment Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 5. Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

Con to inme n t Densi t y (I bin/ ft 3)

(Mixture Dens i ty)

Fan Motor Power Input (kw)

(Fan BHP

0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

.13 240 220

.12 200

.I1 180

0) w a) .1E+00 160

<0) 0

.9E-01 /0 0 140 Olo de 0 c-)

.8E-01 120

.7E-01 100 10 10 10 1(0 10 10 Time' (sec)

B-54

Figure 1 for Case 14 Containment Pressure 3 Inch LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - I CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

PWTRG. 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 30 -

25 20

15 a).

n-10 5-0 I I :11 i1 i l l _I I !I I t I f II l Time (sec)

B-55

Figure 2 for Case 14 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures 3 Inch LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 240 220 200 ci,

-; 180 E

160 140 120

-1 0 1 2 3 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-56

9Figure 3 for Case 14 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power 3 Inch LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - I CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

Con toa iin e n t Densi t y (I bm/ ft 3)

(Mixture Densi ty)

Foan Motor Power Input (kw)

(Fan BHP

0.746 / Motor Efficiency)

14 - _- 240

.220

~/

.12 - 200

-_ _ _ __0

~.1- -"*1/80 160 --

(a) f--

o -0

.8E-01 -* . 120

.7E-01 - [ I II I I . . I,, , 1,,

- 100 Time (sec)

B-57

Figure 1 for Case 15 Containment Pressure 3 Inch LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - I CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 30 -

25 20.

co?15 Cn 10 5

I LI II1 I1 I 1IPl I *I 1 1I I ll Time (sec)

B-58

Figure 2 for Case 15 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures 3 Inch LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - 1 CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

TSTM 0 0 0 STEAM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 240 -

220

__200 7 1- /

Z3u /

-2 180 /

//

140 - 1f /

140 -

120- _ ;[ I l iif1* i f L

I *

I iIif ~

-1. 0 t 2 3 4.

10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-59

Figure 3 for Case 15 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power 3 Inch LOCA - Containment Minimum Safeguards - I CS Pump. 3 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

Containment Density (Ibin/ft3)

(Mixture Densi ty)

Fan Motor Power I nput (kw)

(Fon BHP

0.746 / Motor Ef f c ien c y )

.14 240

.13 220 NO

.12 200 5-_

180-

-4Q 0) 160 0

(D 0

A9-01 140

.00, 400,

.8E-01 120 r-- - - - - - - - - - - --

- I I L-f 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 ( 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ýi I I I I I I I Ii

.7E-01 I I I I I ( I I 100

-1 100 3 4 10 10 1(0 10 10

Time (sec)

B-60

0 Figure 1for Case 16 Containment Pressure 3 Inch LOCA (Rev. M&E for Reduced Decay Heat)- Containment Minimum Safeguards ICS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 30-25-20-

~15-Cl) 10 -

5 1 I 0 1 III I I lI* I I 111 Time (sec)

B-61

j Figure 2 for Case 16 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures 3 Inch LOCA (Rev. M&E for Reduced Decay Heat)- Containment Minimum Safeguards 1CS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

TSTM 0 0 0 STE-AM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 240-220-200" w 180 /

" 160 /

140 -

I I f 120 - _ i.. fill I I I 1111 I II

-1 2 3 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 Time (sec)

B-62

Figure 3 for Case 16 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power 3 Inch LOCA (Rev. M&E for Reduced Decay Heat)- Containment Minimum Safeguards ICS Pump, 3 Fan Coolers (No SI Spill Flow)

Con to i nime n t Densi t y (I bm/f t 3)

(Mix ture Dens i ty)

Fan Motor Power I nput (kw)

(Fan BHP 0.746 / Motor Ef f iciency)

.13- -240

.12 220 200 "

--Q .11-"-

.- 180 IE+O0 " o C.) //0 160

E -9E-01 - __ _.° "140 -

o i, 1

Z

.8E-01 -

- I II[120

7E- 01 , I I ], 1 I ll i [ l , i - L , , , !L 100 10 Time (sec)

B-63

Figure 1 for Case 17 Containment Pressure 3 Inch LOCA (Rev. M&E for Reduced Decay Heat)- Containment Minimum Safeguards 1 CS Pump. 3 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

.,PWTRG 0 0 0 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 30 -

25 20 10 15 C',

Co 10 50 "JI l'l [ , I I '

l111 I I, I Itl' + 'I I I Ilt I - I t *il!

Time (sec)

B-64

Figure 2 for Case 17 Containment Atmosphere and Sump Temperatures 3 Inch LOCA (Rev. M&E for Reduced Decay Heat)- Containment Minimum Safeguards 1 CS(With Pump. 3 Fanflow) sI Spil Coolers TSTM 0 0 lo STE-AM TEMPERATURE TWTR 0 0 0 WATER TEMPERATURE 240 -

220 -

J-0 200 -

S..-

w- 160tz" 140 - 01 .

120, I I IJ 111*J I l i ; II Time (sec)

B-65

Figure 3 for Case 17 Containment Density and Fan Motor Power 3 Inch LOCA (Rev. M&E for Reduced Decay Heat)- Containment Minimum Safeguards 1 CS Pump. 3 Fan Coolers (With SI Spill Flow)

Con toa inme n t Dens i t y (I bm/f t 3)

(Mixture Dens i ty)

Fon Motor Power Input (kw)

(Fan BHP 0.746 Motor M/ Efficiency)

.13 - - 240 j 220

_ 42~

E -200

-" - 180

.1E+00 - __

-<- 1600 0

/---4--,,

.9E-01 "- - /,,*

,,,, *" -140 100 o - J W

(D.8E 2 Time. (sec)

B-66

ATTACHMENT 3 TO NL-07-128 (Regarding response to Question 4 in Attachment 1)

POWER FACTOR EVALUATION FOR IP2 DIESEL GENERATORS (excerpt from Operability Evaluation for CR-IP2-2006-3530 and -3685)

ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET 50-247

EXCERPT FROM OPERABILITY EVALUATION FOR CR-IP2-2006-03530 & 03685 GENERATOR / EXCITER OPERABILITY EVALUATION:

Reference 4, the EDG Loading Study, determines the worst case accident loading on IP2's EDG's for various accident scenarios. However, this study only analyzes the required kW output of the EDG's and does not address the required generator output, which is measured in kVA. The generator output, in kVA, is the vector summation of the kW output and kVAR output. In order to assess the kVA output of the generators relative to the required accident values, it is necessary to determine the expected worse case accident kVAR output. To calculate the kVAR output, the overall power factor of the accident load must be determined first. The power factor calculation is shown in Attachments 1 through 3 of this Operability Evaluation. The power factor used for this calculation is associated with the worst case peak load as shown in Table 2 above using data from Reference 5, the IP2 Load Flow Analysis, and calculating the equivalent power factor during the worst case peak output. The specific loads that are considered in the power factor calculation are those loads "running" during the time the peak is reached. The power factor data is taken from motor test data sheets for the specific motors used in the calculation. For the purpose of determining power factor, the calculations only considered running loads 50kW and above and included all major safety related motors including Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, Service Water Pumps, SI Pumps, RHR Pumps, Recirculation Pumps and Recirculation Fans. The remaining loads on the EDG's represent a mix of lighting, heating, battery charger and small motors, including MOV's and when considered together, would not significantly change the resulting power factor value. This power factor value is then used to calculate a worst case DBA peak kVAR. The worst case peak kVA is then calculated from the vector summation of the worst case peak kW and peak kVAR. It must be emphasized that the worst case peak DBA kVA load is based on the loss of one EDG, which is the assumed single failure for the accident loading analysis. The peak DBA loads used in this OE for all three EDG's occurs during the Recirculation Switch Sequence for duration of approximately one minute at the time points shown above in Table 2 with the loss of one EDG assumed. The peak DBA loads in Reference 4 for cases where all EDG's are available are significantly less than those with the loss of one EDG, including the loss of a single safety related pump on one EDG. The following table summarizes the results of Attachments 1 through 3:

Page 7 of 12

0 TABLE 3 - Summary of Results EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVAR Worst Case DBA Peak kVA 21 1224 kVAR 2577 kVA 22 1177 kVAR 2386 kVA 23 1184 kVAR 2493 kVA The capability of the generator to produce maximum required DBA kVA output, calculated above, can be found in the review of past surveillance tests.

References 9, 10 and 11 are 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months EDG load tests that were performed during Outage 2R1 5 to demonstrate compliance with the TS Surveillance Requirements that were part of the original Custom Technical Specifications (CTS) prior to implementing the Improved Technical Specification (ITS). Attachment 4 is a comparison of the worst case DBA peak loading, calculated in Attachments 1 through 3, with this load test data. Referring to the attachment, for the DBA loading, the peak kW is the values listed in Table 2, the power factor is from Attachments 1 through 3 for the respective EDG, the peak kVAR is calculated from the power factor and the peak kW, the kVA is calculated from the peak kW and peak kVAR and the load current is calculated from the kVA for the nominal safeguards bus voltage (480V) and the tested EDG output voltages (494V and 504V). For the test loading, the test kW and test kVAR is from Step 7.4 of the test procedure for each EDG, the power factor and kVA are calculated from the test kW and kVAR, and the load current is calculated from the kVA for the nominal safeguards bus voltage (480V) and the tested EDG output voltages (494V and 504V). By comparing the DBA load data for kW, kVAR, kVA, pf, and Amps to the associated test data it is concluded that the EDG testing performed prior to the implementation of ITS bounded the worst case DBA peak loading. Of particular interest is the kVA output data which shows DBA required and tested kVA output significantly higher than the generator rated kVA output of 2188kVA. IP2 generators are capable of a continuous output of 2300kW, 480 volts at 0.8pf.

This corresponds to a rated kVA output of 2875kVA. This rating is documented via a memorandum from Westinghouse included in this OE as Attachment 8.

This provides additional supporting documentation that the EDG's are operable and capable of performing their DBA safety function.

When reviewing the exciter performance in the most recent 2R17 EDG testing (References 1, 2 and 3), it was noted that when checking the relationship of the EDG test data for AC current and AC volts with the test data for field current, that the field current was significantly higher than the expected value extrapolated from the Synchronous Generator V Curves, included in this OE as Attachment 5.

Does the test result indicate potential generator degradation?

Page 8 of 12

The generator field current limits specified in the TS SR test procedures are derived from the Synchronous Generator V Curves (Attachment 5) and are based on the specified TS SR test kW output (See Table 1), power factor and the associated maximum output current. For the 2R1 7 tests, these values are shown below in Table 4.

Table 4 - Generator TS SR Field Current Limits TS SR Test kW p Output Current Field Current 1750kW 0.8 2631A 112A 1925kW 0.8 2894A 114A The output current and associated field current in the above table is based on a generator voltage of 480V. is data taken from the Operator Log for the test associated with EDG 22 (Reference 2). The particular data used in the test review was at Time =

1400 hours0.0162 days 0.389 hours 0.00231 weeks 5.327e-4 months . Using this data from Attachment 6 for AC current of 2575 amps and power factor (pf) of 0.86, enter the V Curve at a Per Unit (PU) Stator Current of 2575A/2630A = 0.98 PU. (Note: 1.0 PU Stator Current is equal to the generator rated output current or 2630A.) Move across the curve at 0.98 PU Stator Current, to an overexcited power factor equal to approximately 0.86 and then down to the PU Field Amps and the expected value is 1.9 PU or approximately 105 amps.

(Note: 1.0 PU Field Amps is equal to 55 amps for the IP2 Generators.)

Comparing this value from the V Curve with the recorded test value of 114A, shows that the generator field current was higher than indicated from the V Curve. The V Curve for the IP2 generators is based on a generator voltage equal to rated nameplate volts, which is 480 volts, and the field current is based on a power factor of 0.8 as shown in Table 4. The generator voltage (AC Volts) during the test was 494 volts as documented on Attachment 6. When the generator is operated in parallel mode with the grid, the field current may need to be varied through a wide range if the generator is required to maintain a near constant kW output while maintaining rated voltage. When it is necessary for the generator to assume a higher reactive load, for example during the higher output part of the test, it is necessary to raise the field current so that the generator takes on more reactive load from the system it is paralleled with. This is accomplished by raising the generator terminal voltage and monitoring the field current until the desired kVAR output is reached. (Note: Output voltage and field current adjustments have no impact on the kW output; this can only be varied by a change to the engine governor settings.)

Page 9 of 12

A check of the higher output voltage versus the generator field current can be performed by review of the generator "Saturation Curves" for the IP2 generators.

These curves are included in Attachment 7. Saturation Curves are provided for "No Load Saturation" and "Full Load Saturation at 0 pf". An additional check point is provided for Full Load Saturation at 0.8 pf. The Saturation Curves show the relationship between generator output voltage (Line Volts) and Field Current (Field Amps). As generator output voltage increases for a constant load, the generator field current also increases. Using the test values for AC Volts, AC Current, and power factor shown in Attachment 7 at Time = 1400 hours0.0162 days 0.389 hours 0.00231 weeks 5.327e-4 months and by interpolation of the Saturation Curve for these values, it can be shown that the expected generator field current is approximately 114A, which is consistent with the recorded data.

The exciter operation was evaluated as part of the EDG upgrade modification performed in the early 1990's. Reference 18 is the Basler exciter test report and this report concludes that the generator field current could be operated as high as 141 amps without exceeding the worst case exciter component temperature limits. Reference 19 provides a validation of the IP2 generator V Curves and this analysis shows that the expected field current values at 480V output and 0.8pf are 112 amps for 1750kW output, 124 amps for 2100kW output and 131 amps for 2300kW output. This demonstrates that the maximum expected field current value of 131 amps at the peak EDG kW loading of 2300kW is bounded by the Basler report test results and would not be exceeded by operation at the calculated DBA peak kW loading shown in Table 2.

As a final check of generator performance consistency, the rated continuous load test data from the Outage 2R15 tests were compared to the same continuous load test data from the Outage 2R1 7 tests for each generator. This data is summarized in Attachment 9.There were no significant differences noted in the generator parameter data for any of the generators when comparing between the two sets of test data. This provides a reasonable assurance that the performance of the generators, including the exciters, remains consistent and acceptable up to the present time.

Page 10 of 12

CR-IP2-2006-03530 and 3685 Operability Evaluation Attachment I Calculated DBA Load Power Factor and kVA Load for EDG 21 Calculated Calculated Load ID kW PF kVA kVAR I Sl Pump 21 345 0.910 379.12 157.18 CS Pump 21 350 0.906 386.31 163.51 CR Fan 21 223 0.850 262.35 138.20 CR Fan 22 223 0.850 262.35 138.20 RC Pump 21 294 0.874 336.38 163.45 ESW Pp 24 282 0.885 318.64 148.35 NSW Pp 21 282 0.885 318.64 148.35 IAC 21 56 0.830 67.47 37.63 Total = 2055 kW 1094.87 kVAR Calculated PF = 0.88 EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kW = 2268 kW EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVAR = 1224 kVAR EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVA = 2577 kVA Remarks:

EDG Worst Case Peak kW = This is based on Westinghouse EDG Loading Study, FEX-00039-02, Table 5.5-2a @ T=42 minutes EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVAR = (EDG DBA Peak kW) X (Tan (Acos(Calculated PF)))

EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVA = Vector Sum of Peak kW and Peak kVAR PF = Power factor based on motor data sheets (Reference 5)

Page 1 of 2-

CR-IP2-2006-03530 and 3685 OE EDG 21 Operator Log Data 2R1 7 8 Hour Test 2-PT-R084A Performed 4/27/06 Time 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 Field Current (A) 94 94 95 108 108 108 108 114 114 AC Current (A) 2010 2010 2010 2300 2400 2350 2300 2530 2500 AC Volts (V) .-494 494 494 494 494 494 494 501 500 kW 1650 1650 1650 1690 1740 1730 1650 1900 1900 kVAR 625 625 690 1125 1190 1140 1150 1250 1300 kVA 1764.4 1764.4 1788.5 2030.2 2108.0 2071.8 2011.2 2274.3 2302.2 pf 0.935 0.935 0.923 0.832 0.825 0.835 0.820 0.835 0.825 Attachment I Page 2 of 2,

CR-IP2-2006-03530 and 3685 Operability Evaluation I* Attachment 2 Calculated DBA Load Power Factor and kVA Load for EDG 22 SCalculated Calculated Load ID jkW PF kVA kVAR Si Pump 22 345 0.868 397.47 197.38 AFW Pump 21 223 0.840 265.48 144.05 CR Fan 23 223 0.850 262.35 138.20 CR Fan 24 223 0.850 262.35 138.20 ESW Pump 25 282 0.885 318.64 148.35 NSW Pump 22 282 0.885 318.64 148.35 CCW Pump 22 230 0.891 258.14 117.20 IAC 22 '56 0.830 67.47 37.63 Total = 1864 kW 1069.36 kVAR Calculated PF = 0.87 EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kW = 2076 kW EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVAR 1177 kVAR EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVA = 2386 kVA Remarks:

EDG Worst Case Peak kW = This is based on Westinghouse EDG Loading Study, FEX-00039-02, Table 5.5-2b @ T=40 minutes EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVAR = (EDG DBA Peak kW) X (Tan (Acos(Calculated PF))

EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVA = Vector Sum of Peak kW and Peak kVAR PF = Power factor based on motor data sheets (Reference 5)

Page 1 of 2

CR-IP2-2006-03530 and 3685 OE EDG 22 Operator Log Data 2R17 8 Hour Test 2-P -RO84B Performed 514/06 Time 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 Field Current (A) 112 103 107 108 108 110 109 114 114 AC Current (A) 2450 2250 2300 2300 2350 2400 2400 2550 2575 AC Volts (V) 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 496 494 kW 1750 1750 1725 1700 1740 1725 1750 1850 1870 kVAR 1150 850 1000 1025 1000 1100 1020 1100 1100 kVA 2094.0 1945.5 1993.9 1985.1 2006.9 2045.9 2025.6 2152.3 2169.5 pf 0.836 0.900 0.865 0.856 0.867 0.843 0.864 0.860 0.862 Attachment 2-Page 2 of 2

CR-IP2-2006-03530 and 3685 Operability Evaluation Attachment 3 Calculated DBA Load Power Factor and kVA Load for EDG 23 Calculated Calculated Load ID _kW PF kVA kVAR SI Pump 23 345 0.910c 379.12 157.18 CS Pump 22 350 0.906 386.31 163.51 AFW Pump 23 223 0.840 265.48 144.05 CR Fan 25 223 0.850 262.35 138.20 RC Pump 22 294 0.874 336.38 163.45 ESW Pump 26 282 0.885 318.64 148.35 NSW Punp 23 282 0.885 318.64 148.35 Total = 1999 kW 1063.09 kVAR Calculated PF = 0.88 EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kW,= 2194 kW EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVAR 1184 kVAR EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVA = 2493 kVA Remarks:

EDG Worst Case Peak kW = This is based on Westinghouse EDG Loading Study, FEX-00039-02, Table 5.3-2b @ T=37 minutes EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVAR = (EDG DBA Peak kW) X (Tan (Acos(Calculated PF)))

EDG Worst Case DBA Peak kVA = Vector Sum of Peak kW and Peak kVAR PF = Power factor based on motor data sheets (Reference 5)

Page 1 of 2.

CR-IP2-2006-03530 and 3685 OE EDG 23 Operator Log Data 2R1 7 8 Hour Test 2-PT-R084C Performed 4/20/06 Time 3:00 1 4:00 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 Field Current (A) 1081 105 105 105 110 107 114 114 114 AC Current (A) 2ý225__ 2200 2220 2350 2330 2300 2530 2550 2510 AC Volts (V) 494 494 494 494 494 494 500 499 499 kW 1650 1675 1720 50 0 1725 1740 1900 1900 1898 kVAR 1025 925 925 990 1100 1060 1200 1200 1195 kVA 1942.5 1913.4 1953.0 2010.6 2045.9 2037.4 2247.2 2247.2 2242.9 IV 0.849 0.875 0.881 0.870 0.843 0.854 0.845 0.845 0.846 Attachment .3 Page 2_of 2.

CR-IP2-2006-03530 and 3685 Operability Evaluation Attachment 4 Comrnarison of DBA Peak Load and CTS EDG Load Testinq EDG i Peak kW Peak kVAR pf kVA Amps (480V) Amps (494V) Amps (504V) 21 2268 1224 0.88 2577 3100 3012 2952 22 2076 T 1177 0.87 2386 2870 2789 2734 23 21 9 4 1184 0.88 2493 2999 2914 2856 EDG Test kW Test kVAR pf kVA Amps (480V) Amps (494V) Amps (504V) 21 2300 1280 0.87 2632 3166 3076 3015 22 1 2300 1400 0.85 2693 3239 3147 3085 23 2300 1300 0.87 2642 3178 3088 3027 Page 1 of 1

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CR-IP2-2006-03530 and 3685 OE EDG 22 Operator Log Data 2R17 8 Hour Test 2-PT-RO84B Performed 5/4106 Time 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 1 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 Field Current (A) 2 104 107 108 108 110 1090 114 114 AC Current (A). __ 2450 2250 2300 2300 2350 2400 24001 2550 2575 AC Volts (V) 494 494 4941 494 494 494 4961 494 kW i 1750 1750 1725 1700 1740 1725 17501 I ,------------I 1850 4 1870 kVAR "150 -

850 10001 1025 1000 11001 1020 1100 1100 kVA f-- 1945.5 2094.0 1993.9V 1985.1 2006.9] 2045.91 2025.6] 2152.31 2169.5 pf 0.836 0.900 0.8651 0.8561 0.8671 0.8431 0.8641 0.8601 0.862 Attachment to Page / of I

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ATTACHMENT 4 TO NL-07-128 (Regarding response to Question 6 in Attachment 1)

PROPOSED CHANGES TO INDIAN POINT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES SECTION 3.8.1 REGARDING DIESEL GENERATOR ENDURANCE TEST SURVEILLANCE ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET 50-247

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

In the event of a loss of the 138 kV offsite circuit, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the DG in the process. Within 1unit minute after theit initiating or maintain signal is received, in a- safecondition all loads are returned needed to recover the to service.

Replace with ** Ratings for DGs 21, 22 and 23 are consistent with the requirements of' NRepTc ARegulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). Each diesel generator consists of an Alco Model 16-251-E engine coupled to a Westinghouse 900 rpm, 3-phase, 60-cycle, 480 V generator. Each diesel generator has a capability of 1750 kW (continuous), 2300 kW for 1/2 hour in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period, and 2100 kW for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period. There is a sequential limitation whereby it is unacceptable to operate DGs for two hours at 2100 kW followed by operating at 2300 kW for a half hour. Any other combination of the above ratings is acceptable. The ESF loads that are powered from the 480 V ESF buses are listed in Reference 2.

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the UFSAR, SAFETY Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 14 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are ANALYSES OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded.

These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least 2 of the 3 safeguards power trains energized from either onsite or offsite AC sources during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power and

b. A worst case single failure.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36.

INDIAN POINT 2 B 3.8.1 - 4 Revision 2

INSERT A for page B 3.8.1-4:

Each diesel generator consists of an Alco Model 16-251 -E engine coupled to a Westinghouse 900 rpm, 3-phase, 60-cycle, 480 V generator. The ESF loads that are powered from the 480 V ESF buses are listed in Reference 2. The DG ratings (Reference 12) are as follows:

Continuous Normal steady-state electrical power output capability that can be maintained 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s/day, with no time constraint.

2-hour An overload electrical power output capability that can be maintained for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in any 24-hour period.

1/22-hour An overload electrical power output capability that can be maintained for up to 30 minutes in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period.

The electrical output capabilities applicable to these three ratings are as follows:

RATING DG LOAD TIME CONSTRAINT Continuous' < 1750 kW None 2-hour < 2100 kW < 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in any 24-hour period [Note A]

1/2-hour < 2300 kW < 30 minutes in any 24-hour period [Note A]

Note A: Ope'ration at the overload ratings is allowed only for < 2300 kW (1/2-hour) followed by < 2100 (2-hour), not vice versa.

The loading cycle (1/2 -hour, 2-hour, continuous) may be repeated in successive 24-hour periods. Operation in excess of 2300 kW, regardless of duration is not analyzed. In such cases, the DG is assumed to be inoperable and the vendor should be consulted.

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES REFERENCES (continued)

10. Generic Letter 84-15, July 2, 1984.

11. Calculation SGX-00073-01, dated February 6, 2004.

12. Indian Point Unit 2 License Amendment 153, dated May 9,1991.

INDIAN POINT 2 B 3.8.1 - 30 Revision 2

ML073270507

Contents

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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

SUMMARY

9.0 REFERENCES

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

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References:

SUMMARY

9.0 REFERENCES

Subject:

1.0 BACKGROUND

7.0 REFERENCES

1.0 BACKGROUND

6.0 CONCLUSION

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SUMMARY

6.0 REFERENCES

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ML073270507

Text

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

SUMMARY

9.0 REFERENCES

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

References:

References:

SUMMARY

9.0 REFERENCES

Subject:

1.0 BACKGROUND

7.0 REFERENCES

1.0 BACKGROUND

6.0 CONCLUSION

7.0 REFERENCES

1.0 BACKGROUND

SUMMARY

6.0 REFERENCES

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