ML072970052

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July-August Exam 50-325, 324/2007301 Final Simulator Scenarios (Scenario 2 of 4) (Section 3 of 4)
ML072970052
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/31/2007
From:
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
2APP-A-01, 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301
Download: ML072970052 (21)


Text

  • HPCI FIC POWER LOSS Unit 2 APP A-01 2-5 Page 1 of 2 AUTO ACTIONS NONE CAUSES
1. Loss of power to 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A.
2. HPCI Relay Logic A supply breaker, Circuit 2 on 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A, tripped.
3. Incoming feeder breaker on 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A, tripped.
4. 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A supply breaker, Compartment GI6 on 125/250V DC SWBD 2A, tripped.
5. Improper operation of Battery Charger 2A-1 or Battery 2A-1 (battery output voltage low).
6. Fuse E41-F25, F26, F37, or F38 on Control Panel H12-P601 blown.
7. Circuit malfunction.

OBSERVATIONS NOTE: Unless an auto initiation signal is present, the HPCI turbine will respond to the HPCI Test potentiometer. If an auto initiation signal is received and power is lost to the flow controller, but not to the initiation logic, the HPCI turbine will slow to a very low speed that would be a function of the amount of steam leakage past the turbine control valves or would stop altogether. If the turbine were to continue to run, the speed would probably be erratic due to insufficient flow to maintain the discharge check valve open.

1. If power is only lost to E41-FIC-R600, then each indicator on E41-FIC-R600 reads downscale.
2. If Pressure Indication Instrument Loop power is also lost (E41-ES-K600), then the following additional instruments read downscale:
a. Pump Suction Pressure, E41-PI-R606.
b. Turbine Steam Supply Pressure, E41-PI-R602.
c. Turbine Steam Exhaust Pressure, E41-PI-R603.
d. Pump Discharge Pressure, E41-PI-R601.
3. Possible logic power failure annunciators for the other systems.
4. HPCI Relay Logic A supply breaker, Circuit 2 on 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A, is in the OFF position or tripped.
5. The following valves go closed:
a. Condensate Pump Discharge Inboard Drain Valve, E41-F026.
b. Exhaust Drain Pot Drain Bypass Valve, E41-F053.
c. Supply Drain Pot Drain Bypass Valve, E41-F054.
6. Incoming feeder breaker on 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A is in the OFF position or tripped.
7. 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A supply breaker, Compartment GI6 on 125/250V DC SWBD 2A, is in the OFF position or tripped.
8. Battery Bus 2A-1 voltage as read on BAT-VM-737 on RTGB Panel XU1 less than normal band of 130 to 140V DC.
9. HPCI LOGIC BUS A PWR FAILURE (A-01 5-5) alarm .
  • ACTIONS Unit 2 APP A-Ol 2-5 Page 2 of 2
1. If HPCI System is in Standby, place HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump control switch to Pull to Lock.
2. If HPCI System is operating in manual, shut down and isolate the turbine per OP-19.
3. If HPCI System is operating with an auto initiation signal present, trip the HPCI turbine as follows:
a. Depress and hold HPCI Trip push button.
b. When HPCI turbine rpm is approximately zero, place HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump control switch to Pull to Lock.
c. When HPCI Turbine Control Valve, E41-V9, indicates full closed, release HPCI Trip push button.
4. If cause of the annunciator is a loss of power to 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A, then refer to AOP-39.0.
5. If the HPCI Relay Logic A supply breaker, Circuit 2 on l25V DC Distribution Panel 4A, is in the OFF position or tripped, reset the breaker.
6. If the incoming feeder breaker on 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A is in the OFF position or tripped reset the breaker.
7. If the 125V DC Distribution Panel 4A supply breaker, Compartment GI6 on 125/250V DC SWBD 2A, is in the OFF position or tripped, reset the breaker.

Verify that Battery Charger 2A-1 and Battery 2A-1 are in operation 8.

per OP-51, DC Electrical System .

9. If fuse E41-F25, F26, F37, or F38 is blown, ensure that they are replaced.
10. If a circuit malfunction is suspected, ensure that a WR/WO is prepared.

DEVICE/SETPOINTS Loss of Power Relay E41-K50 Deenergized POSSIBLE PLANT EFFECTS

1. The flow control controller (E41-FIC-R600) will not function.
2. If the HPCI System is inoperable, a technical specification LCO may result.

REFERENCES

1. LL-9364 - 16
2. Technical Specification 3.5.1, TRMS 3.6
3. OP-51, DC Electrical System
4. APP A-01 5-5, BPCI LOGIC BUS A PWR FAILURE
5. OAOP-39.0, Loss of DC Power
6. OP-19, BPCI System Operating Procedure
  • ~ Progress Energy BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT PLANT OPERATING MANUAL VOLUME XXI ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE UNIT o
  • OAOP-37.1 INTAKE STRUCTURE BLOCKAGES REVISION 12
  • IOAOP-37.1 Rev. 12 Page 1 of 10 I
  • 1.0 1.1 SYMPTOMS Condenser vacuum in jeopardy of being lost due to clogging or failure of circulating water intake traveling screens or trash racks 1.2 CW INTAKE PUMP A TRIP (UA-011-7) in alarm 1.3 CW INTAKE PUMP 8 TRIP (UA-01 2-7) in alarm 1.4 CW INTAKE PUMP C TRIP (UA-01 3-7) in alarm 1.5 CW INTAKE PUMP 0 TRIP (UA-01 4-7) in alarm 1.6 CW TRASH RACK DIFF-HIGH (UA-Q1 5-5) 1.7 The following alarms may also appear in particular instances:

- EXH HOOD A VACUUM LOW (UA-23 2-1)

- EXH HOOD 8 VACUUM LOW (UA-23 3-1)

- CW SCREEN A DIFF-HIGH OR STOPPED (UA-01 1-5)

CW SCREEN 8 DIFF-HIGH OR STOPPED (UA-01 2-5)

- CW SCREEN C DIFF-HIGH OR STOPPED (UA-01 3-5)

- CW SCREEN D DIFF-HIGH OR STOPPED (UA-01 4-5)

- CW SCREEN DIFF HI-HI (UA-01 1-4)

- CW DEBRIS FIL TER HIGH L1P (UA-01 3-9) 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 2.1 IF vacuum decreases to less than 22.4 inches HG, THEN D turbine trips, and a reactor scram occurs if reactor power is greater than 26%.

2.2 IF vacuum decreases to less than 10 inches HG, THEN MSIVs D and main steam line drains close, and a reactor scram will occur if MSIVs close with mode switch in RUN.

2.3 IF vacuum decreases to less than 10 inches HG, THEN D SAMPLE INBD ISOL VLV, 832-F019, AND SAMPLE OTBD ISOL VL V, B32-F020, close.

2.4 IF vacuum decreases to less than 7 inches HG, THEN turbine D bypass valves receive a close signal.

IOAOP-37.1 Rev. 12 Page 2 of 10 I

3.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 3.1 Immediate Actions 3.1.1 IF necessary, THEN REDUCE reactor power as required to maintain condenser vacuum greater than 25" Hg.

o 3.2 Supplementary Actions NOTE: The following steps may be performed in any order deemed necessary by the operating crew.

NOTE: The following two steps assume that either 2 or 3 CWiPs were initially running.

CAUTION Under som.e conditions, starting a CWiP may cause h9twell flashing, low *condensate pressures, auto starts of condensate and condensate booster pumps, and a lowering of reactor water level caused"by:a de9"ease in ~nqeosate pump NPSH. . .'

IOAOP-37.1 Rev. 12 Page 3 of 10 I

3.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 3.2.1 IF a CWIP has tripped with reactor power greater than 0 80%, AND a pump can be started within 5 minutes, THEN START an available CWiP as needed to maintain condenser vacuum.

3.2.2 IF a CWIP has tripped with reactor power greater than 0 80% AND an available pump can NOT be started within 5 minutes, THEN PERFORM the following as needed:

1. WHEN a CWiP is available, THEN ENSURE reactor 0 power is reduced to approximately 80% AND START a CWiP.
2. MONITOR condensate header pressures and reactor D water level for normal operation.
3. WHEN stable system operation is confirmed, THEN 0 RAISE reactor power as desired.

3.2.3 IF necessary, THEN PLACE the Screen Wash System in 0 the High Vulnerability Lineup in accordance with 1(2)OP-29.1 .

NOTE: The Intake Structure Advisor will normally be the Duty Manager.

3.2.4 NOTIFY the Intake Structure Advisor AND REFER to OAI-146, Plant Response to Degraded Conditions at the o

Intake Structure.

3.2.5 IF a CWiP trash rack differential height approaches 4 feet, THEN PERFORM the following:

1. WHEN the next high tide occurs, THEN START an available CWiP.

o

2. SECURE the CWiP with the clogging trash rack. o 3.2.6 IF a circulating water traveling screen differential pressure is high, THEN PERFORM the following:
1. IF differential pressure is sustained above 25 inches on more than one traveling screen, THEN REDUCE reactor o

power to at least 57%.

  • IOAOP-37.1 Rev. 12 Page 4 of 10 I

3.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS

2. CHECK the screens and man bars for debris. o
3. ENSURE the screens are operating in fast speed. o
4. CHECK traveling screen spray nozzles for dogging AND PERFORM 1(2)OP-29.1 to flush spray headers and o

nozzles if required.

5. MONITOR for carryover from the traveling screens. o NOTE: Fire Hose spraying of the circulating water traveling screens is only effective for removal of carryover.

NOTE: 10P-29.1 aligns fire hose spraying for both units.

6. IF necessary, THEN INITIATE fire hose spraying of the circulation water traveling screens in accordance with o

10P-29.1.

7. IF necessary, THEN CLEAN debris from the man bars AND SHIFT fish flumes.

o 3.2.7 IF debris filters differential pressures are high, THEN BACKWASH the filters in accordance with 1(2)OP-29.

o NOTE: Consideration should be given to placing mode selector switch CW ISOL VALVES to the next lower position to reduce flow while reducing reactor power if debris continues to build up on the traveling screens.

CAUTION 3.2.8 IF necessary, THEN PLACE mode selector switch CW 0 ISOL VAL VES to the next lower position.

IOAOP-37.1 Rev. 12 Page 5 of 10 I

  • 3.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 3.2.9 IF condensate temperature at the inlet to filter/demin can NOT be maintained below 160°F OR the main condenser is lost as a heat sink, THEN PERFORM the following:
1. MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor. D
2. ENTER OEOP-01-RSP. D 3.2.10 IF the NPDES permit is exceeded, THEN CONTACT D E&RC.

3.2.11 IF any CWiP has been started or stopped, THEN PERFORM the following:

1. ENSURE a running CWiP is enabled for LOCA Load D Shed in accordance with 1(2)OP-29.
2. IF a CWiP was selected for Unit Trip Load Shed at the D direction of the System Dispatcher, THEN ENSURE a running CWIP is selected for Unit Trip Load Shed in
  • accordance with 1(2)OP-50.
  • IOAOP-37.1 Rev. 12 Page 6 of 10 I
  • 4.0 GENERAL DISCUSSION IR101 This procedure satisfies the requirement as specified in CR 99-01661.

A high differential pressure across the circulating water intake traveling screens can result from a variety of malfunctions or outside influences including:

  • An increase in marine life entrained by the traveling screens.
  • An increase of debris in the intake canal from recent storms or excessively high or low tides.
  • Mechanical or electrical failure of the traveling system.

Operation at power levels above approximately 80% for longer than 5 minutes with a reduced number of CWiPs in operation creates conditions in the condenser that increase the potential for hotwell flashing and reduced condensate pump NPSH when a CWiP is subsequently started. For this reason, reactor power is reduced to approximately 80% just prior to starting an additional CWiP.

When a start signal is sent to a CWIP, it is important to remember that during the start cycle, water is being pushed back into the intake canal through the discharge valve for approximately 4 seconds before the pump receives a start signal. When a CWIP trips, it takes approximately 30 seconds for the discharge valve to travel full closed. During both of these events, significant mixing of the intake canal contents directly in front of the intake pump suction is occurring and can affect both units' screens. Historical data indicates that this makes both units fine mesh screens especially vulnerable during a detritus incursion.

The intake canal begins at the Cape Fear estuary south of Horseshoe Shoal. The entrance is provided with a diversion structure preventing the passage of large debris, fish and turtles. The canal is routed a distance of 2.57 miles northwest to the mainland. From this point the canal turns west and then southwest, terminating at the intake structure. The intake canal is designed to accommodate a flow requirement of 1390 cfs per unit, with respect to minimum and maximum tide conditions.

Traveling screen blockage caused by debris and marine life has been severe enough to force power reductions and reactor scrams. Cyclic changes in climate can affect weather patterns and environmental conditions in the vicinity of the plant. During climatic changes, the population and behavior of fish and other marine organisms can change and the amount of debris in the vicinity of the plant can fluctuate. The two major sources of debris that affect the traveling screens are gracilaria and detritius.

  • IOAOP-37.1 Rev. 12 Page 7 of 10 I
  • 4.0 GENERAL DISCUSSION Gracilaria can be identified by its reddish brown to black appearance. It usually has a somewhat thin wiry leaf. Gracilaria grows throughout the estuary and is transported into the intake canal by water flow as small to medium size bunches.

Gracilaria grows on hard substrates such as shells, docks and other hard structures. As the gracilaria grows, parts of the plant are broken off by water currents or wave action. These pieces migrate to other areas where they typically attach to hard structures and grow. Higher current velocities and increased wave action during and after storms, especially hurricanes may tend to increase the rate that gracilaria fragments are moved around the estuary and into the intake canal.

Fire hose use on gracilaria is moderately effective only on the outside portions of the traveling screens.

Detritius is the decay product of plant and animal matter. It has a characteristic brown muddy appearance and is very fine in texture. Detritius presents a significant hazard to the fine mesh screens, but will typically pass through the coarse mesh screens with minimal increase in screen dp. Detritius is a particular nuisance in the summer months during periods of lower tides. The primary reasons for this are the increase the canal bottom temperature and the higher water velocity due to larger tidal amplitudes and increased number of CWiPs and SW pumps in operation. The increase in temperature causes the organic debris in the bottom of the intake canal to decay at a higher rate. This biological decay

  • process produces a hydrogen sulfide gas which builds up in the sediments and tends to loosen the detritus, making it more available for resuspension into the water column. These resuspended partides can then be transported by the flowing water to the intake screens. Fire hose use on detritius is typically not effective because of the large quantities present. Increased pressure on the trash wash header is most effective on detritius.

Marine organisms such as fish, shrimp and jellyfish events are as unpredictable as debris events and once underway can qUickly overload the traveling screens.

Blockage from marine organisms can be caused by changes in water quality or salinity as a result of severe storm events inclUding hurricanes. Hurricanes or other significant rainfall events can dump large amounts of rain in the Cape Fear River basin which forces the salt wedge, which is normally located near Wilmington, downstream toward the intake canal. This action forces the marine life in the area to move down with the salt wedge in large numbers.

During extended periods of extremely cold weather, the marine organisms can be cold shocked and drift with the current. If large numbers of these animals are caught on the diversion structure screens, the screens will break away and allow the offending marine animals access to the intake screens where they may accumulate in large numbers. These cold conditions will have the same effect on those organisms resident in the canal. Fire hose use in conjunction with increased spray header pressure is very effective on marine organisms when carryover is present.

IOAOP-37.1 Rev. 12 Page 8 of 10 I

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(UNIT 2 IC-13)

FORM 2 Page 1 of 1 Immediate Reactor Power Reduction Instructions REACTOR ENGINEER ON CALL: UNIT TWO Night Pager 910-412-0900 Day Pager 910-412-0899 Name I EXT I Home Phone Duty RE: John McKernan I X-2061 I 910-457-2061 Backup RE: .:::.:Ja~c::.:...:k=ie:....;'G=e=e=--_ _--:-..:...X~-2:::.:0::..::6:...:.1___'/:._=91.:..:0::....-4..:.;5:::;,.:7___'-2=0=6~1_

IMMEDIATE ACTION REDUCE core flow to 47 mlb/hr ~

THEN reposition control rods per attached OGP-12 sheets. ~ 73~

Power- Flow Map Stability Region in Effect (See Attached Map)

Figure 13 _QPRM Operable, Two Loop Operation, 2923 MWt WARNINGS AND

GENERAL COMMENT

S:

1. More restrictive MCPR limits will be imposed atJ.ess than 40% rated thermal power.

Additional penalties will also be imposed at less than 26% rated thermal power. The Core Operating Limits Report should be referenced for specific penalties.

2. Reduce core flow prior to moving control rods.
3. Core flow may be increased as needed to remain above RWM constraints until a compatible rod pattern is achieved.
4. Monitor core thermal limits (CMFLCPR, CMFLPD, CMAPRAT) by performing 1(2)PT-01.11 as needed.

OENP-24.0 Page 48 of 56

(UNIT 2 IC-13)

  • ATIACHMENT 1 Page 1 of3 Co.ntrol Bo~. Movement

_:-:-_' .'((:.0_. r.o"'

The purpose of this attachment is to document rod pattern prior to power change.

Complete the rod pattern or attach Display 810 edit.

51 .,

47 43 '

48 14 14 48 39 35 48 16 08 08 16 48 31 27 16 08 08 08 08 16 23

'19 48 16. 08 08 16 48 15 11 48 14 14 48 07 03 02 06 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50

. OGP-12 Pa e31 of 37

(UNIT 2 IC-13)

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2 of 3 Control Rod Movement Page 1 of ~ SRO Initials': S'I<c:J

\

Control Correct Rod If Applicable, Control ROd \Licensed Overtravel Full Out Second Licensed Rod Selected and OPT-14.1 Position Operator Check* Position Operator Verified**" Completed*** Check" V,,*~r 14-43 / N/A 48 To 00 N/A N/A '.

Mt~'r J) 38-43 38-11

/

/

N/A N/A 48 To 00 48 To 00 N/A N/A N/A N/A 14-11 / N/A 48 To 00 N/A N/A

~

---; S-y~

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I r

/

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  • WHEN a control rod is withdrawn to the Full Out position, either MAINTAIN the continuous withdrawal signal for at least ,3 to 5 seconds OR APPLY a separate notch withdrawal signal, AND PERFORM the following rod coupling integrity check:

- CONFIRM ROD OVER TRAVEL (A-OS 4-2) annunciator does NOT alarm. (SR 3.1.3.5)

- CONFIRM rod full out light is not lost.

- CONFIRM rod position indication on the four-rod display indicates position 48.

- CONFIRM ROD DRIFT (A-OS 3-2) annunciator does NOT alarm.

    • VERIFY the rod reed switch position indicator corresponds to the control rod position indicated by the Full Out reed switch.
      • Applicable for control rods moved from intermediate to fully withdrawn position. Technical Specification SR 3,1.3.2 must be completed for these rods if NOT performed within the previous seven days. This surveillance requirement is NOT required to be performed until seven days after the control rod is withdrawn and thermal power is greater than the LPSP of RWM.
        • Concurrent Verification of rod selection required prior to rod movement.

IOGP-12 I Rev. 49 I Page 32 of 37\

(UNIT 2 IC-13)

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2 of 3 Control Rod Movement Page 2 of...-2 SRO Initials:' S ;{?J Control Correct Rod If Applicable, Control Rod

~ ... .'

Licensed / Overtravel Full Out Second Licensed Rod Selected and OPT-14.1 Position Operator Check* Position Operator Verified**** Completed***

';, Check**

jlrlfpY 46-19 I N/A 48 To 00 N/A N/A "
'y~tvv

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06-19 I N/A 48 To 00 N/A N/A 06-35 I N/A 48 To 00 N/A N/A 46-35 I N/A 48 To 00 N/A N/A "-- i/7j],

I ~

t 22-35 I N/A 08 To 00 N/A N/A v 30-35 30-19 22-19 I

I I

N/A N/A N/A 08 To 00 08 To 00 08 To 00 N/A N/A N/A N/A

'N/A N/A \

- fill

  • WHEN a control rod is withdrawn to the Full Out position, either MAINTAIN the continuous withdrawal signal for at least 3 to 5 seconds OR APPLY a separate notch withdrawal signal, AND PERFORM the following rod coupling integrity check:

- CONFIRM ROD OVER TRA VEL (A-05 4-2) annunciator does NOT alarm. (SR 3.1.3.5)

- CONFIRM rod full out light is not lost.

- CONFIRM rod position indication on the four-rod display indicates position 48.

- CONFIRM ROD DRIFT (A-05 3-2) annunciator does NOT alarm.

    • VERIFY the rod reed switch position indicator corresponds to the control rod position indicated by the Full Out reed switch.
      • Applicable for control rods moved from intermediate to fully withdrawn position. Technical Specification SR 3.1.3.2 must be completed for these rods if NOT performed within the previous seven days. This surveillance requirement is NOT required to be performed until seven days after the control rod is withdrawn and thermal power is greater than the LPSP of RWM.
        • Concurrent Verification of rod selection required prior to rod movement.

IOGP-12 I Rev. 49 I Page 32 of 371

(UNIT 2 IC-13)

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2 of 3 Control Rod Movement Page~ of § SRO Initials: ( elf?J i

Control Correct Rod If Applicable, Control Rod Licensed / Overtravel 'Full Out Second Licensed Selected and OPT-14.1 PositioA** Operator Check* Position Operator Rod Verified**** Completed*** ", Check**

j ~/,.e4K

- 14-27 / N/A 08 To 00 N/A N/A .,

~4 38-27 / N/A 08 To 00 N/A N/A - 'Y3)l

/

30-11 / N/A 14 To 08 N/A N/A 22-11 / N/A 14 To 08 N/A N/A

) 'f 22-43 / N/A 14 To 08 N/A N/A 30-43 / N/A 14 To 08 N/A N/A - j>S'2

/

/

/

  • WHEN a control rod is withdrawn to the Full Out position, either MAINTAIN the continuous withdrawal signal for at least 3 to 5 seconds OR APPLY a separate notch withdrawal signal, AND PERFORM the following rod coupling integrity check:

- CONFIRM ROD OVER TRA VEL (A-OS 4-2) annunciator does NOT alarm. (SR 3,1.3.5)

- CONFIRM rod full out light is not lost.

- CONFIRM rod position indication on the four-rod display indicates position 48.

- CONFIRM ROD DRIFT (A-OS 3-2) annunciator does NOT alarm.

    • VERIFY the rod reed switch position indicator corresponds to the control rod position indicated by the Full Out reed switch.
      • Applicable for control rods moved from intermediate to fully withdrawn position. Technical Specification SR 3.1.3.2 must be completed for these rods if NOT performed within the previous seven days. This surveillance requirement is NOT required to be performed until seven days after the control rod is withdrawn and thermal power is greater than the LPSP of RWM.
        • Concurrent Verification of rod selection required prior to rod movement.

IOGP-12 I Rev, 49 I Page 32 of 371

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2 of 3 (UNIT 2 IC-13)

Control Rod Movement Page 4 of 6 SRO Initials: S tf{/

Control Correct Rod If Applicable, Control Rod

\

\ Licensed / Overtravel

. Full Out Second Licensed Rod Selected and OPT-14.1 Posit"i6h Operator Check* Position Operator Verified**** Completed*** Check**

IllllftJK 34-07 / N/A 48 To 24 N/A N/A " KK~Wer (j) 18-07 18-47

/

/

N/A N/A 48 To 24 48 To 24 N/A N/A N/A N/A 34-47 / N/A 48 To 24 N/A N/A - ]'£'%

/

38-35 / N/A 16 To 08 N/A N/A t 14-35 / N/A 16 To 08 N/A N/A

~ 14-19 38-19

/

/

N/A N/A 16 To 08 16 To 08 N/A N/A N/A N/A - -J27

  • WHEN a control rod is withdrawn to the Full Out position, either MAINTAIN the continuous withdrawal signal for at least 3 to 5 seconds OR APPLY a separate notch withdrawal signal, AND PERFORM the following rod coupling integrity check:

- CONFIRM ROD OVER TRA VEL (A-OS 4-2) annunciator does NOT alarm. (SR 3.1.3.5)

- CONFIRM rod full out light is not lost.

- CONFIRM rod position indication on the four-rod display indicates position 48.

- CONFIRM ROD DRIFT (A-OS 3-2) annunciator does NOT alarm.

"*VERIFY the rod reed switch position indicator corresponds to the control rod position indicated by the Full Out reed switch .

....*Applicable for control rods moved from intermediate to fully withdrawn position. Technical Specification SR 3.1.3.2 must be completed for these rods if NOT performed within the previous seven days. This surveillance requirement is NOT required to be performed until seven days after the control rod is withdrawn and thermal power is greater than the LPSP of RWM .

......*Concurrent Verification of rod selection required prior to rod movement.

IOGP-12 I Rev. 49 I. Page 32 of 371

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2 of 3 (UNIT 2 IC-13)

Control Rod Movement Page 5 of ---.2 SRO Initi.als: S;(0 Control Correct Rod If Applicable, Control. Rod Licensed/ Overtravel

. Full Out Second Licensed Selected and OPT-14.1 PosHitm Operator Check* Position Operator ;1ff;{()K Rod ..

Verified**** Completed*** '

\

Check**  !\rttver 06-27 I N/A 16 To 08 N/A N/A "

(j) 46-27 I N/A 16 To 08 N/A N/A - 3/:t I

N/A N/A N/A (J) 26-15 26-39 I

I N/A 48 To 24 48 To 24 N/A N/A - -/0%

I f I

I I

  • WHEN a control rod is withdrawn to the Full Out position, either MAINTAIN the continuous withdrawal signal for at least 3 to 5 seconds OR APPLY a separate notch withdrawal signal, AND PERFORM the following rod coupling integrity check:

- CONFIRM ROD OVER TRAVEL (A-OS 4-2) annunciator does NOT alarm. (SR 3.1.3.5)

'0 CONFIRM rod full out light is not lost.

- CONFIRM rod position indication on the four-rod display indicates position 48.

- CONFIRM ROD DRIFT (A-OS 3-2) annunciator does NOT alarm.

    • VERIFY the rod reed switch position indicator corresponds to the control rod position indicated by the Full Out reed switch.
      • Applicable for control rods moved from intermediate to fully withdrawn position. Technical Specification SR 3.1.3.2 must be completed for these rods if NOT performed within the previous seven days. This surveillance requirement is NOT required to be performed until seven days after the control rod is withdrawn and thermal power is greater than the LPSP of RWM.
        • Concurrent Verification of rod selection required prior to rod movement.

IOGP-12 I Rev. 49 I. Page 32 of 371

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2 of 3 (UNIT 2 IC-13)

Control Rod Movement Page Q of Q SRO InitialS:} t j)

Control Correct Rod If Applicable, \Licensed Control Rod Overtravel Full Out Second Licensed Rod Selected and OPT-14.1 Position Operator Check* Position Operator Verified**** Completed*** Check** r;/~()/

, ~

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1/ !jtvfr-42-15 I N/A 48 To 24 N/A N/A '.

Ij) 10-15 10-39 I

I N/A N/A 48 To 24 48 To 24 N/A N/A N/A N/A 42-39 I I

N/A 48 To 24 N/A N/A

-' ~1

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34-23 I N/A 48 To 24 N/A N/A t

'f) 18-23 18-31 I

I N/A N/A 48 To 24 48 To 24 N/A N/A N/A N/A 34-31 I N/A 48 To 24 N/A N/A , - 2S%

  • WHEN a control rod is withdrawn to the Full Out position, either MAINTAIN the continuous withdrawal signal for at least 3 to 5 seconds OR APPLY a separate notch withdrawal signal, AND PERFORM the following rod coupling integrity check:

- CONFIRM ROD OVER TRAVEL (A-OS 4-2) annunciator does NOT alarm. (SR 3.1.3.5)

- CONFIRM rod full out light is not lost.

- CONFIRM rod position indication on the four-rod display indicates position 48.

- CONFIRM ROD DRIFT (A-OS 3-2) annunciator does NOT alarm.

    • VERIFY the rod reed switch position indicator corresponds to the control rod position indicated by the Full Out reed switch.
      • Applicable for control rods moved from intermediate to fully withdrawn position, Technical Specification SR 3.1.3.2 must be completed for these rods if NOT performed within the previous seven days. This surveillance requirement is NOT required to be performed until seven days after the control rod is withdrawn and thermal power is greater than the LPSP of RWM.
        • Concurrent Verification of rod selection required prior to rod movement.

IOGP-12 I Rev. 49 I. Page 32 of 371

(UNIT 2 IC-13)

  • Other Instructions :

ATIACHMENT 1 Page 3 of 3 Control Rod Movement CONTINUE shutdown using attached OGP-10,

--=~~";";"';'=~~~"';';";"':""';;;;;;;;';;';=;';';;;;;';;;;;~=';'-:'....;;;....J.. _

82 Sequence, Step 54, Item 389.;;..

DatelTime Completed _

Performed By (Print) Initials Reviewed By: _

Unit SCO

  • IOGP-12 Rev. 49 Page 33 of 371

IjGG Nuclear Fuels Management & Safety Analysis Figure 13 Design Calc. No. 2821-1267 82C18 Core Operating limits Report Revision 0 Stability Option III Power/Flow Map Page 25 OPRM Operable, Two Loop Operation, 2923 MWt This Figure supports Improved Technical Specification 3\,3',1,1 and the Technical Requirem~nts Manual Specification 3.3 120.0 I

,II .~TP Scram M 1"lm um Maxim um 110.0 i! ,I i ,~~-l ~.

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M Ib aJh r Flo w.

M Ib .'h r 1

, 100 76.1 9 60.4 7 100.0 . i , ., II  !

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I I l....oo ,I II ~I I 99 98

'7'5.04 73.89 60.4 7 80.47 90.0 rr r!-:i r- h-n I-~-

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I I' . 1I 92 91 90 67.1 3 66.03 64.93 80.4 7 80.47 80.4 7 II I ; II I!

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89 86 87 63.83 62.74 61.66 80.47 80,47 80.51 70.0 Y':i I II II II*

I I I' 86 60.58 80.80

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  • I' I I J ,4 I ,1 85 84 59.50 56.4 3 80,70 80.79

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l.._ I I , 83 57.37 80.90 0 60.0 II I I Ii, I I' 82 58.31 81 .05 II. I

  • I . ,I' ~ I 81 55.25 81 .21

'if!. I 80 54.20 81.36 50.0

'1 I  :,- ,! I . ¥ , ' , c ~I i! 79 76 53.1 6 52.12 81 .52 81 .67 I I 1\ I I : ~ IF ~.L. I 77 51 .06 81 .83

~ - stO-e tryRQqt1 u t 50.05 81 ,98 I I ~ ~~L ~~8 IK 76 d -0 i

, , I , 1 75 49.02 82.1 3 40.0 74 48.00 82.29 II Scram Avoidance Region I, I

I 73 48.98 82.4 4 II , ,  ; I I 72

, 45.96 82.60 I :1 i I, I II i , , I , 71 44.95 82.75 30.0 IOPRM

, 'I nabled RI 910n II I i I Jr , I I , ,

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70 69 68 67 43.94 42.94 41.94 40.95 82.91 83.06 83.21 83.37 I

20.0 , \ 66 39,96 83.62 10.0 t-. 'Nil nh I a

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,I 65 64 63 62 38.97 37.99 37.01 38.04 83.68 83.83 83.99 84.14

.LIn . ,j II ,I II I I It I . t \. ~i I . 61 35,06 84.29

~35%~ n' I ',I ~

1  ! ' I I ,j .* 60 34.1 0 84.45

, 8d I I 59 33.1 3 84.60

'I, II I II ,. ,II 'l I II I I I  ! i I I ,I 56 32.1 7 84.70 0.0 0.0 7.7 15.4 23.1 30.8 38.5 46.2 53.9 61.6 69.3 77.0 84.7 92.4 Mlbs/hr Core Flow o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 % Core Flow