ML072970040
| ML072970040 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/2007 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 0EOP-01-UG, 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301 | |
| Download: ML072970040 (41) | |
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C. OPERATOR ACTIONS
- 1. Control Operator Immediate Actions The control operator immediate actions are those actions which may be performed following a reactor scram prior to entering the scram procedure (EOP-01). These actions are not mandatory and shall not conflict with entering the scram procedure. All the control operator immediate actions are located in the scram procedure flowchart. There are no control operator immediate actions in EOP-02 through EOP-04. In the event the actions are not performed prior to entering the scram procedure, the scram procedure shall take precedence. The control operator immediate actions which should be memorized by control operators, are defined as follows:
- a. Unit 2 Only: After steam flow is less than 3 x 10 6 lb/hr, PLACE the reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN.
Unit 1 Only: PLACE the reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN.
- b. IF reactor power is below 2% (APRM downscale trip), THEN TRIP the main turbine.
- c. ENSURE the master reactor level controller setpoint is
+170".
- d. IF two reactor feed pumps are running, AND reactor vessel level is above +170" AND rising, THEN TRIP one.
The EOP actions are those which are contained within EOP-01 through EOP-04. In the event the control operator immediate actions are not performed prior to entering EOP-01, these actions become EOP actions.
Since the EOP actions are readily available to the control operator, there is no need to memorize them.
The operator is not required to have the Operating Procedures in hand while executing the EOPs, but may use any other procedure as necessary.
The following guidance applies to referencing of supporting material that is not included in the procedure but provides information required in the performance of a step (ERFIS, instructional aids, Users' Guide, etc.).
- a. If the information is available from several sources and a specific source is preferred, then that source is explicitly referenced at the point it is needed.
- b. If the information is provided by a source which is not readily recognized by the operator, then the source is explicitly referenced at the point it is needed.
I OEOP-01-UG Rev. 47 Page 21 of 1381
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SCRAM CARD
- f-NSURE SCRAM VALVES ARE OPEN BY MANUAL
.,\
- CONTROL REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL BETWEEN +170
.AND +200 INCHES
- INSERT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION
- PLACE RECrRC PUMP SPEED CONTROLLERS TO 10%
- ENSURE HEATER DRAIN PUMPS ARE TRIPPED
- ENSURE TURBINE OIL SYSTEM OPERATING
- PLACE SULCV IN SERVICE S/907
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nvlv vt-'t:KA rlONS FOR EOPs MANUAL RCIC INJECTION (OP-16 SECTION 5.3)
- 1. ENSURE THE F0 L LOW I NG VALV ES ARE 0 PEN: E 5 1- V 8 (V ALV E PO SIT ION>. E 5 1- V 8 (A CT UAT 0 R PO SIT ION LAN 0 E5 1- V 9
- 2. OPEN E5 1- F04 6
- 3. START VAC U UM PUMP AND LEAVE SWITCH IN START.
- 4. OPEN E5 1- F0 4 5
_ _ ' 5. OPEN E51-F013 ..,'"
~7. ADJUST RC I C FLOW C ONTRO LLER TO OBTAIN DESIRED FLOW RATE.
_ _ :8. ENSURE E 5 1- F0 19 IS CLOSED WITH FLOW ABOVE 80 GPM. ~
_ _ !, 9. ENSURE THE FOLLOWING VALVES ARE CLOSED: E51-F025.
E51-F026. E51-F004. AND E51-F005 10~ 'START S BGT (OP-10) 1t :'OPEN THE S GT - V 8 AND S G T - V 9 .
_ _ . l2.ENSURE BAROMETRIC CNDSR CONDENSATE PUMP OPERATES RCIC PRESSURE CONTROL (OP-16 SECTION 8.2)
- 1. ENSURE THE F0 L LOW IN G VA LV ES ARE 0 PE N: E 5 1- V 8 (VALVE POSITION>. E51-V8 (ACTUATOR POSITION) AND E51-V9.
- 2. OPEN E5 1- F04 6
- 3. START VACUUM PUMP AND LEAVE SWITCH IN START.
- 4. ENSURE E 5 1- F013 I S CLOS E0
- 5. ENSURE E41-FOll IS OPEN
- 6. THROTTLE OPEN E51-F022 UNTIL DUAL INDICATION IS OBTAINED
- 7. OPEN E51-F045
- 8. THROTTLE OPEN E51-F022 OR ADJUST Re IC FLOW CONTROL. E51-FIC-R600. TO OBTAIN DESIRED SYSTEM PARAMETERS AND REACTOR PRESSURE.
- 9. ENSURE E 5 1- F019 IS CLOS ED WIT H FLOW ABOVE 80 GPM.
- 10. ENSURE THE FOLLOWING VALVES ARE CLOSED: E51-F025.
E51-F026. E51-F004. AND E51-F005.
- 12. OPEN THE SGT-V8 AND SGT-Y9
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- 1. ENSURE AUXILIARY OIL PUMP IS NOT RUNNING
- 2. ENSURE E41-V9 AND E41-V8 ARE CLOSED
- 3. OPEN E41-F05g-*
4" "START VACUUM PUMP AND LEAVE IN START
- 5. OPEN E41-FOOl
- 6. START AUXILIARY OIL PUMP AND LEAVE IN START
- 7. OPEN E41-F006. IMMEDIATELY AFTER E41-V8 HAS DUAL INDICATION
- 8. l;NSURE E41-V9 AND E41-V8 ARE OPEN
- 9. ENSURE HPCI TURBINE COMES UP TO SPEED
- 10. ADJUST HPCI FLOW CONTROL. E41-FIC-R600 TO OBTAIN DESIRED FLOW RATE
- 11. ENSURE E41-F012 IS CLOSED WHEN FLOW HAS INCREASED ABOVE 800 GPM
- 12. ENSURE FOLLOWING E41 DRAIN VALVES ARE CLOSED: F025. AND F026
- 14. ENSURE BAROMETRIC CNDSR CONDENSATE PUMP IS OPERATING.
_ ** _. _ . . . . . l~ I lVI'll 11'4 I:: V I"' 5 TRANSFER TO PRESSURE CONTROL FROM LEVEL CONTROL (OP-19 SECTION 8.3)
- 1. ENSURE H PC I I S NOT NEEDED FOR LEVEL CONTROL
ENSURE E5 1- F02 2 I S C LOS ED
- 4. TRANSFER HPCI FLOW CONTROL TO MANUAL (M)
- 6. OPEN E41- F011
- 7. CLOSE E41-F006
- 9. ENSURE E4 1- F012 I S C LOS ED
- 10. ADJUST SETPOINT AND TRANSFER HPCI FLOW CONTROL TO AUTOMATIC CA}
- 11. MAINTAIN REACTOR PRESSURE BY THROTTLING E41-F008 OR VARYING HPC I Ft.:OW USING THE FLOW CONTROLLER TRANSFER TO LEVEL CONTROL FROM PRESSURE CONTROL (OP-19 SECTION 8.4)
_ _ .,1. IF NECESSARY. TRANSFER HPCI FLOW CONTROL TO MANUAL (M)
- 2. REDUCE H PC I TURBI NE SPEED TO BETWEEN 3000 AND 3300 RPM
- 3. CLOSE E41-F008
- 4. OPEN E41-F006
- 5. ADJUST SETPOINT AND TRANSFER HPCI FLOW CONTROL TO AUTOMATIC (A)
- 6. ADJUST HPC I FLOW CONTROL SETPOINT FOR DESIRED FLOW RATE
- 7. ENSURE E41- Fa 12 IS CLOSED
- 8. IF DESIRED. THEN CLOSE E41-F011
~ .- - -
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I::tvICM\.1t:I\J~ Y ::)UPPRESSION POOL COOLING START AHR SW ALOOP (CONV) RHR SW ALOOP (NUCl
~ :OPEN SW-V105
- OPEN SW-V101
- CLOSE SW-V143 :CLOSE SW-V143
- If LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT _ :OPEN SW-V102 PLACE Rffl SW BOOSTER PlM'S ~F lOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT A & CLOCA OVERRIDE SWITCH PLACE Rtfl SW BOOSTER PUMPS TO MANUAL OVERRIDE A & CLOCA OVERRIDE SWITCH
_ : START Rffl SW PtvP TO MANUAL OVERRIDE
_ : ADJUST Ell-POV-F068A : START RHR SW PMP
- SUPPLY CLG WTR TO VITAL H)R : ADJUST ETI-POV-F068A
- SUPPLY CLG WTR TO VITAL HOR START RHA LOOP A
- If LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT. VERIFY SPRAY LOGIC IS MADE UP
_ :If ETI-F015A IS OPEN. THEN CLOSE ETI-F017A
- OPEN Ell-F028A
- TtflOTTLE Ell-F024A
__ S.'q--s;i1; CIVICMur::r'l~Y ~Ut-'t-'HESSION POOL COOLING START RHR SW LOOP (NUC) RHR SW BLOOP (CONV)
_ : OPEN SW-V105 _~_ :OPEN SW-V10l .
_ : ClOSE SW~V143 _ :CLOSE SW-Vl43
_ ; If LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT _ :OPEN SW-V102 PlACE RHR SW BOOSTER PUMPS _ :IF LOCA*SlGNAL IS PRESENT
TO MANUAL OVERRDE* B &0 LOCA OVERRDE SWITCH
- SUPPlY ClG WTR TO VITAL H)R ___ : ADJUST ETI-POV-f068B
_ : SUPPLY Cl6 WTR TO VITAL H)R START RHR LOOP B
_ : If LOCA SIGNAL IS PRESENT. VERIfY SPRAYLOGIC IS MADE UP
_ :If En-F015B.1S OPEN. THEN CLOSE Ell-f0178
_ :START lOOP BRHR PMP
- OPEN Ell-F0288 .
_ " : THROTTLE En-f024B
_ : THROTTLE ETI-f0488 REFERENCE OP-17 AND OP~43 5/1064
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STEP 013 NO 013 STEP BASES:
This step requires the operator to evaluate plant conditions a*nd determine the status of actual reactor water level and its indications. This critical step will direct the operator to the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure or level/Power Control should level instrumentation indicate that vessel level recovery actions are necessary.
1001-37.3 Rev. 8 Page 14 of 381
STEP 014 STEP BASES:
If reactor water level cannot be maintained above +170 inches, additional level control measures must be taken. These additional measures will be taken once the operator enters the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure or Level/Power Control procedure.
1001-37.3 Rev. 8 Page 15 of 381
STEPS 015 through 017 YES STEP BASES:
These steps are used to determine if an entry condition exists for the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure or the Level/Power Control procedure. The parameters selected are RPS Scram setpoints or critical parameters, which indicate that an emergency condition exists which requires the use of the above referenced procedures. It also directs entry to the EPG based procedures if required to scram by Containment Control procedures or the Radioactivity Release Control Procedure.
1001-37.3 Rev. 8 Page 16 of 381
STEPS 018 through 021 f'/' f?'" S ft,{J
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TABLE 1 ARE SHUTDOWN WITHOUT BORON ALL CONTROL YES RODS INSERTeD TO ONLY ONE CONTROL ROD NOT FULLY INSERTED OR BEYOND POSITION 00 NO MORE THAN 10 CONTROL RODS WITHDRAWN 018 TO POSmON 02 AND NO CONTROl ROO WITHDRAWN BEYOND POSmON 02 AS DETERMINED BY REACTOR ENGINEERING HAS IT BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE REACTOR WILL REMAIN SHUTDOWN NO UNDER ALL CONDmONS WITHOUT BORON TABLE 1 019 PERFORM "REACTOR VESSEL Gom CONTROL PROCEDURE" "LEVEUPOWER CONTROL" (EOP. 01* RVCPI AND (EOP* 01* LPCI EXECUTE IT CONCURRENT\.Y WITH THIS PROCEDURE 021 020 STEP BASES:
These steps determine whether entry to the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure or the Level/Power Control procedure is required based on whether or not a cold shutdown control rod configuration exists. If cold shutdown is not assured on control rods alone, then entry to the Level/Power Control procedure is directed where the required actions to control reactor water level, pressure, and power and to insert control rods are found.
If cold shutdown is assured, then entry to the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure, where guidance on the control of reactor water level and pressure are found, is directed.
Execution of the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure and the remainder of the Reactor Scram Procedure are then performed concurrently.
Positive confirmation that the reactor will remain shut down under all conditions is best obtained by determining that no control rod is withdrawn beyond the Maximum Subcritical Bank Withdrawal Position, of position 00. Table 1 has been added to provide a listing of those conditions for the reactor being shutdown under all conditions without boron. This was added specifically for condition where 10 control rods could be withdrawn to position 02 as long as no control rod is withdrawn beyond position 02.
On a loss of UPS or any other condition where control rod position can not be determined, then entry to the Level/Power Control procedure is required.
1001-37.3 Rev. 8 Page 17 of 381
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3.0 STEP BASES STEPS PCCP-1 and PCCP-2 ENTRY CONomONS:
- SUPPRESSION POOL TEMP ABOVE 951' Q.B ABOVE 105'F WHEN DUE TO TESTING
- AIR DRYWELLAVERAGE TEMP ABOVE 15O"F
- ORYWELL PRESS ABOVE 1.7PSlG
- SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL ABOVE* 27 INCHES
(- 2 FEET & 3 INCHES)
- SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL BELOW - 31 INCHES
(-2 FEET & T INCHES)
- PRIMARY eTm H2 CONCENTRATION ABOVE 1.5°,4 STEP BASES:
The conditions which require entry into the Primary Containment Control Procedure are symptomatic of an emergency or conditions which, if not corrected, could degrade into an emergency. This set of entry conditions is sufficient to assure that procedures will be entered for transients and accidents, which are within the design and licensing basis for BWRs and for additional events which have been evaluated as significant with respect to emergency response actions.
Similar to the rationale which formed the basis for selecting the Reactor Control Guideline entry condition parameters and setpoints, setpoints for the Primary Containment Control Procedure entry condition parameters are simple, unambiguous, operationally significant, readily identifiable, and familiar to plant operators. For example, each of the entry conditions is typically one or more of the following:
- a. Scram setpoint
- b. Annunciator alarm setpoint 1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 4 of 581
STEPS PCCP-1 and PCCP-2 (continued}
- c. Technical specification limit
- d. ECCS automatic initiation logic trip setpoint The entry condition setpoints are specified so as to provide advance warning to operators of potential emergency conditions, allowing action to be taken sufficiently early to prevent more severe consequences.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 5 of 581
STEPS PCCP-5 and PCCP-6 NO PCCP-6 STEP BASES:
If performing the actions specified in the Primary Containment Control Procedure restores the entry condition(s) to normal, and this procedure is no longer required to control primary containment parameters. then the operator may exit this procedure since primary containment will no longer be threatened at this point. EOP-01-SEP-08 is entered to ensure all jumpers and inhibits used during execution of PCCP are restored to normal and all safety systems are returned to normal.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 7 of 581
STEPS SPIT -01 through SPIT-04 MONITOR AND CONTROL SUPPRESSION POOL TEMP BELOW 95"F START AVAILABLE IUlR LOOPS IN SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING MODE AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN TEMP BELOW 95"F IOP*H)
SPIT-04 STEP BASES:
The initial action taken to control suppression pool temperature employs the same method typically used during normal plant operations: monitoring its status and placing available suppression pool cooling in operation, as required, to maintain temperature within technical specification limits. These steps thus provide a smooth transition from general plant procedures to the Emergency Operating Procedures and assure that the normal method of suppression pool temperature control is attempted in advance of initiating more complex actions to terminate rising suppression pool temperature.
As long as suppression pool temperature remains below the value of the most limiting suppression pool temperature LCO, no further operator action is required in this section of the procedure other than continuing to monitor and control suppression pool temperature using available suppression pool cooling systems.
The NPSH (Net Positive Suction Head) limits are defined to be the highest suppression pool temperature which provides adequate net positive suction head for pumps taking suction on the pool. The NPSH Limits are functions of pump flow and suppression chamber overpressure (airspace pressure plus the hydrostatic head of water over the pump suction). It is utilized to preclude pump damage from cavitation. It should be 1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 9 of 581
STEPS SPIT-01 through SPIT-04 (continued) noted that containment pressurization of up to 5 psig is credited for maintaining NPSH margins for BNP. Therefore, as actions are taken that reduce suppression chamber pressure (Le. suppression pool cooling, containment sprays), pump NPSH requirements should be considered, and closer attention directed towards observing the performance of the RHR and Core Spray pumps for signs of NPSH problems.
The vortex limits are defined to be the lowest suppression pool water level above which air entrainment is not expected to occur in pumps taking suction on the pool. These levels are functions of ECCS flow. Exceeding the limits can lead to air entrainment at the pump suction strainers.
The NPSH and vortex limits are addressed through a caution for the following reasons:
- a. It is difficult to define in advance exactly when the limits should be observed and when pumps should be operated irrespective of the limits.
- b. Pumps to which the limits apply are used in more than one parameter control path, or in different procedures. RHR pumps, for example, may be used in the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure, the Level/Power Control procedure, or the Primary Containment Control Procedure. Authorizing operation of the pumps "irrespective of NPSH and vortex limits" in one path may conflict with instructions in another path where flow would normally be controlled below the limits.
The identified systems should be operated within the NPSH and vortex limits if possible.
If the situation warrants, however, the limits may be exceeded. A judgment as to whether a pump should be operated beyond its limits in a particular event should consider such factors as:
- a. The availability of other systems
- b. The current trend of plant parameters
- c. The anticipated time such operation will be required
- d. The degree to which the limit will be exceeded
- e. The sensitivity of the pump to operation beyond the limit
- f. The consequences of not operating the pump beyond the limit Immediate and catastrophic failure is not expected if a pump is operated beyond the NPSH or vortex limit.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 10 of 581
STEPS SPIT-05 and SPIT-06 START AU AVAILABlE RHR LOOPS IN SUPPRESSION POOl COOLING MODE EXCEPT RHR PUMPS REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOLING BY CONTINUOUS OPERATION IN lPClMODE SPfT*06 STEP BASES:
When it is determined that suppression pool temperature cannot be maintained below the value of the most limiting suppression pool temperature lCO, a conclusion that may be reached in advance of suppression pool temperature actually reaching this value, the general direction of Step SPIT-04 is supplemented with the explicit instruction to place into operation all available methods by which Suppression Pool Cooling can be effected.
Step SPIT-06 assures adequate core cooling takes precedence over maintaining suppression pool temperature below the lCO since catastrophic failure of the primary containment is not expected to occur at this temperature. In addition, further action still remains available for reversing a rising suppression pool temperature trend. Therefore, only if continuous operation of a RHR pump in the LPCI mode is not required to assure adequate core cooling is it permissible to use that pump for Suppression Pool Cooling.
This step, however, does permit alternating the use of RHR pumps between LPCI injection and Suppression Pool Cooling as the need for each occurs and so long as adequate core cooling is able to be maintained.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 11 of 581
STEPS DWIT-01 through DWIT-03 Dwrr DWIT*01 MONITOR AND CONTROL DRYWELL AVERAGE AIR TEMP BELOW 15O"F STEP BASES:
The initial action taken to control drywell temperature employs the same method typically used during normal plant operations: monitoring its status and placing available drywell cooling in operation, as required, to maintain temperature within specified normal operating limits (below drywell average air temperature LeO of 150°F).
These steps provide a smooth transition from general plant procedures to the Emergency Operating Procedures, and assure that the normal method of drywell temperature control is attempted in advance of initiating more complex actions to terminate rising drywell temperature.
As long as drywell temperature remains below normal operating limits no further operator action is required in this section of the EOP other than continuing to monitor and control drywell temperature using available drywell cooling.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 15 of 581
STEPS oWIT -04 through DWIT-08 START AlL AVAILABLE ORYWEU COOLERS, DEFEATING DRYWELL COOLER INTERLOCKS IF NECESSARY PER "CIRCUIT ALTERATION PROCEDURE" (EOP SEP*10)
DW/T*08 STEP BASES:
When it is determined that drywell temperature cannot be maintained below the drywell average temperature LCO limit of 150°F, a conclusion that may be reached prior to drywell temperature actually reaching this value, the general direction of Step DWIT-03 is supplemented with the explicit instruction to place into operation all available methods by which drywell cooling can be effected as indicated in Step DWIT-07. A note is added to inform the operator at Step DWIT-06 that the drywell coolers are tripped and locked out on a LOCA signal.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 16 of 581
STEPS DWIT-04 through DWIT-08 (continued)
All available drywell coolers should be started in an effort to reduce drywell average temperature, unless actual LOCA conditions exist in the drywell. Step DWIT-07, through EOP-01-SEP-10, allows inhibiting of the LOCA signal-drywell cooler lockout if reactor water level is low. Defeating of interlocks recognizes that concurrent actions by other procedures (Le. Level/Power Control) may otherwise preclude normal drywell cooler operation.
RBCCW pressure and temperatures should be verified to ensure proper system operation. If the Reactor Building is accessible, additional RBCCW heat exchangers and/or SW to the RBCCW heat exchangers can be placed in service. In addition, nonessential equipment serviced by RBCCW can be taken out of service and isolated.
Step DW IT-05 is used to alert the operator that elevated drywell temperatures may adversely affect reactor level instrumentation. A detailed discussion of this caution is contained within the EOP User's Guide.
If drywell temperature can be maintained below 150°F, then the operator is directed back into Step DW IT -02 so that he can continue to monitor and control drywell temperatures until they reach the normal operating value.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 17 of 581
STEPS PC/P-01 through PC/P-03 PC/P PC/P*01 VENT THE DRYWB.L USING SBGT lOP* 10). AS REQUIRED PC/P*03 STEP BASES:
These steps provide the initial action taken to control primary containment pressure which employs the same methods typically used during normal plant operations:
monitoring its status and using containment and drywell pressure control systems (including Standby Gas Treatment System), as required, to maintain containment pressure below the high drywell pressure scram setpoint. These steps thus provide a smooth transition from general plant operating procedures to the Emergency Operating Procedures, and assure that normal methods of primary containment pressure control are attempted in advance of initiating more complex actions to terminate rising primary containment pressure.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 24 of 581
STEPS PC/P-04 through PC/P-07 1.7 CAN PSIG PRIMARY CTMT PRESS YES BE MAINTAINED BELOW 1.7PSIG 11.5 PSIG SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PRESS REACHES 11.5 PSIG INITIATE SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY PER EOP* 01* SEP* 03 EXCEPT RHR PUMPS REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOLING BY CONTINUOUS OPERATION IN LPCI MODE
____----'----..:..P""CIP.06 IF SUPPRESSION CHAMBER PRESS DROPS TO LESS THAN 2.5 PSIG, THEN TERMINATE SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAYS pc/p*O?
STEP BASES:
Operation of suppression pool sprays reduces primary containment pressure by condensing steam that may be present in the suppression chamber airspace, and by absorbing heat energy from the enclosed atmosphere through the processes of evaporative and convective cooling.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 25 of 581
STEPS PC/P-04 through PC/P-07 (continued)
The Suppression Chamber Spray Initiation Pressure is defined to be the lowest suppression chamber pressure which can occur when 95% of the noncondensibles in the drywell have been transferred to the airspace of the suppression chamber. This pressure is utilized to preclude chugging: the cyclic condensation of steam at the downcomer openings of the drywell vents.
When a steam bubble collapses at the exit of the downcomers, the rush of water filling the void (some of it drawn up into the downcomer pipe) induces a severe stress at the junction of the downcomer and the vent header. Repeated application of this stress can cause these joints to experience fatigue failure (Le., crack) thereby creating a pathway which bypasses the pressure suppression function of the containment.
Subsequent steam discharges through the downcomers would directly pressurize the suppression chamber airspace rather than being discharged to and condensed in the suppression pool.
Scale model tests have demonstrated that chugging will not occur so long as the drywell atmosphere contains at least 1% noncondensibles. To preclude the occurrence of conditions under which chugging may happen, the Suppression Chamber Spray Initiation Pressure is conservatively defined by specifying 5% noncondensibles.
Although operation of suppression pool sprays may not, by itself, preclude chugging, suppression pool sprays are initiated before reaching the Suppression Chamber Spray Initiation Pressure (11.5 psig) to assure that operation of this system is attempted for reducing primary containment pressure before operation of drywell sprays is directed.
The operation of suppression pool sprays is terminated when suppression chamber pressure decreases to 2.5 psig to assure that primary containment pressure is not reduced below atmospheric. Maintaining a positive suppression chamber pressure precludes air from being drawn in through the vacuum relief system to deinert the primary containment, and also assures that a positive margin to the negative design pressure of the primary containment exists.
It is acceptable to use drywell pressure instead of suppression chamber if the suppression chamber instruments are not available. It should be noted however that during transient conditions; Le., a steam leak in drywell, drywell pressure may be significantly higher than suppression chamber pressure.
The NPSH (Net Positive Suction Head) limits are defined to be the highest suppression pool temperature which provides adequate net positive suction head for pumps taking suction on the pool. The NPSH Limits are functions of pump flow and suppression chamber overpressure (airspace pressure plus the hydrostatic head of water over the 1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 26 of 581
STEPS PC/P-04 through PC/P-07 (continued}
pump suction). It is utilized to preclude pump damage from cavitation. It should be noted that containment pressurization of up to 5 psig is credited for maintaining NPSH margins for BNP. Therefore, as actions are taken that reduce suppression chamber pressure (Le. suppression pool cooling, containment sprays), pump NPSH requirements should be considered, and closer attention directed towards observing the performance of the RHR and Core Spray pumps for signs of NPSH problems.
The NPSH limit is addressed through a caution for the following reasons:
- a. It is difficult to define in advance exactly when the limits should be observed and when pumps should be operated irrespective of the limits.
- b. Pumps to which the limits apply are used in more than one parameter control path, or in different procedures. RHR pumps, for example, may be used in the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure, the Level/Power Control procedure, or the Primary Containment Control Procedure. Authorizing operation of the pumps irrespective of NPSH in one path may conflict with instructions in another path where flow would normally be controlled below the limits.
The identified systems should be operated within the NPSH and vortex limits if possible.
If the situation warrants, however, the limits may be exceeded. A judgment as to whether a pump should be operated beyond its limits in a particular event should consider such factors as:
- a. The availability of other systems
- b. The current trend of plant parameters
- c. The anticipated time such operation will be required
- d. The degree to which the limit will be exceeded
- e. The sensitivity of the pump to operation beyond the limit
- f. The consequences of not operating the pump beyond the limit Immediate and catastrophic failure is not expected if a pump is operated beyond the NPSH or vortex limit.
Suppression chamber sprays are initiated per Suppression Pool Spray Procedure (EOP-01-SEP-03).
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 27 of 581
STEPS PC/P-08 through PC/P-13 NO NO NO INmATE DRYWEU SPRAYS PER EOP-01-SEP*02 EXCEPT RHR PUMPS REQUIRED FOR ADEQUATE CORE COOUNG BY CONTINUOUS OPERATION INLPCIMODE PC/P*i2 IF DRYWEU PRESSURE DROPS TO lESS THAN 2.5 PSlG THEN TERMINATE DRYWELL SPRAY PC/P*i3 STEP BASES:
If suppression pool sprays could not be initiated or if their operation was not effective in reversing the rising trend of primary containment pressure, as evidenced by suppression chamber pressure exceeding the Suppression Chamber Spray Initiation Pressure (11.5 psig), drywell sprays are initiated to effect the desired pressure reduction.
The Suppression Chamber Spray Initiation Pressure is described in the discussion of Step PC/P-06.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 28 of 581
STEPS PC/P-08 through PC/P-13 (continued}
The NPSH (Net Positive Suction Head) limits are defined to be the highest suppression pool temperature which provides adequate net positive suction head for pumps taking suction on the pool. The NPSH Limits are functions of pump flow and suppression chamber overpressure (airspace pressure plus the hydrostatic head of water over the pump suction). It is utilized to preclude pump damage from cavitation. It should be noted that containment pressurization of up to 5 psig is credited for maintaining NPSH margins for BNP. Therefore, as actions are taken that reduce suppression chamber pressure (Le. suppression pool cooling, containment sprays), pump NPSH requirements should be considered, and closer attention directed towards observing the performance of the RHR and Core Spray pumps for signs of NPSH problems.
The initiation of drywell sprays is conditioned on the following restrictions on the plant.
First, the recirculation pumps and drywell cooling fans are required to be secured prior to the initiation of drywell sprays. These actions are covered in EOP-01-SEP-02.
A second restriction on the initiation of drywell sprays is for suppression pool water level to be below +21 inches. This provides protection for the operation of the suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers. The vacuum breakers will not function as designed if any portion of the valve is covered with water. The specified water level assures that no portion of the drywell side of the valve is submerged for any drywell below wetwell differential pressure less than or equal to the valve opening differential pressure. Spray operation with vacuum breakers inoperable (Le., with no drywell vacuum relief capability) may cause the containment differential pressure capability to be exceeded and is therefore not permitted.
Step PC/P-12 assures adequate core cooling takes precedence over initiating drywell spray in this case since catastrophic failure of the primary containment is not expected under the conditions for which spray requirements are established. The wording of the step does permit alternating between reactor vessel injection and drywell spray modes as the need for each occurs, provided adequate core cooling can be maintained.
Drywell sprays are secured if drywell pressure drops to 2.5 psig. This is a backup step to the automatic securing of the sprays during a LOCA condition when the spray permissive interlock drops out. This precludes air from being drawn in through the vacuum relief system to de-inert the primary containment and also provides a positive margin to the negative design pressure of the primary containment.
The drywell sprays are actuated in accordance with EOP-01-SEP-02.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 29 of 581
STEPS PC/P-14 through PC/P-16 PSP EMERGEHCYOEPRESSURUE TliE REACTOR PER THE RCIP SECTION OF EOP* 01 PC/P*16 STEP BASES:
If suppression pool and/or drywell sprays could not be initiated or if operation was not effective in reversing the rising trend of primary containment pressure, as evidenced by not being able to maintain suppression chamber pressure below the Pressure Suppression Pressure, the reactor is depressurized to minimize further release of energy from the reactor vessel to the primary containment. This action serves to terminate, or reduce as much as possible, any continued primary containment pressure rise.
The Pressure Suppression Pressure is defined to be the lesser of either (1) the highest suppression chamber pressure which can occur without steam in the suppression chamber airspace or (2) the highest suppression chamber pressure at which initiation of reactor depressurization will not result in exceeding Primary Containment Pressure Limit A before reactor pressure drops to the Minimum Reactor Flooding Pressure, or (3) the highest suppression chamber pressure which can be maintained without exceeding the suppression pool boundary design load if SRVs are opened. This pressure is a function of primary containment water level, and it is utilized to assure the pressure suppression function of the containment is maintained while the reactor is at pressure.
(For additional information about the Pressure Suppression Pressure see the EOP User's GUide.)
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 30 of 581
STEPS PC/P-14 through PC/P-16 (continued)
A note is added to remind the operator that rapid depressurization per the reactor pressure control guidance of the Reactor Vessel Control Procedure may be allowed prior to the direction to Emergency Depressurize. See discussion on Step SPIT-11.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 31 of 581
STEPS PC/H*01 through PC/H*04 PC/H MONITOR AND CONTROL PRIMARY CTMT HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN CONCENTRATIONS H2 AND 02 READINGS ARE COMPENSATED BY ERFIS.
H2 AND 02 READINGS ON CAC* AT. 4409 AND 4410 MUST BE COMPENSATED FOR PRIMARY CTMT CONDITIONS USING ATTACHMENT 12 OF "USERS GUIDE" (EOP* 01* UG)
STEP BASES:
The primary containment hydrogen control (PC/H) section of the Primary Containment Control Procedure specifies appropriate actions for controlling combustible gas concentration in containment.
Hydrogen and oxygen must both be present and in sufficient concentration for combustion to occur.
Measurable levels of hydrogen could appear in the primary containment from the following sources:
- a. The high temperature reaction of metal (typically zirconium) with water to produce hydrogen gas and metal oxide
- c. Feedwater injection of hydrogen to control reactor water chemistry 1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 49 of 581
,. VW"M STEPS PC/H-01 through PC/H-04 (continued)
Elevated concentrations of oxygen are not expected during normal power operations except during brief periods at startup and shutdown of the plant when the containment atmosphere is being inerted and deinerted. However, oxygen may be generated due to the radiolysis of water, and oxygen could enter the containment from leaks in the instrument air system and from operation of Reactor Building-to-suppression pool vacuum breakers. Oxygen concentration is routinely monitored and controlled during reactor operation in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
These steps are included to ensure the monitors are placed in service as required.
Step PC/H-04 alerts the operator of the need to compensate for H2/02 based on primary containment conditions.
1001-37.8 Rev. 4 Page 50 of 581