Text

Application for Technical Specification Change TSTF-423, Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for BWR Plants, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process
	ML071770423
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	06/21/2007
From:	Benyak D; AmerGen Energy Co, Exelon Corp
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NEDC-32988-A, RS-07-074, TSTF-423, Rev 0
	Download: ML071770423 (118)
	v • d • e

erGen AmerGen Energy Company, LLC wwwexeloncorp.corn An Exelon Company 4300 Winfield Road Warnenville, IL 6o555 10 CFR 50 .90 RS-07-074 June 21, 2007 U. S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN : Document Control Desk Washington, D .C. 20555-0001 Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket No. 50-461

Subject:

Application for Technical Specification Change TSTF-423, Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for BWR Plants, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Reference : TSTF-423, Revision 0, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A" In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license or construction permit," AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) is requesting a change to the Technical Specifications (TS) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 for Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1 . The proposed amendment would modify TS to risk-informed requirements regarding selected Required Action End States as provided in the referenced document.

Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed changes, the requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific verifications . Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed changes . Attachment 3 provides the existing TS Bases pages marked up to show the proposed changes. The TS Bases pages are provided for information only and do not require NRC approval. Attachment 4 provides a summary of the regulatory commitments made in this submittal.

Changes to TS are consistent with the changes outlined in the referenced document; minor deviations are discussed in Attachment 1 . CPS, Unit 1 TS are based on NUREG-1434, "Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/6," though it is not identical to this guidance . Therefore, an adaptation of the referenced document was required .

AmerGen requests approval of the proposed license amendment by June 21, 2008, with implementation within 120 days of issuance .

June 21, 2007 U . S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 This amendment request has been reviewed and approved by the CPS Plant Operations Review Committee and the Nuclear Safety Review Board in accordance with the requirements of the Quality Assurance Program and procedures .

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment," AmerGen is notifying the State of Illinois of this application for amendment by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Official .

If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Ms . Michelle Yun at (630) 657-2818.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 21 day of June 2007 .

Respectfully, Darin M . Benyak Director - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs AmerGen Energy Company, LLC : Description and Assessment : Mark-up of Proposed Technical Specification Changes : Mark-up of Technical Specification Bases Changes : List of Regulatory Commitments

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment

Subject:

Application for Technical Specification Change TSTF-423, Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for BWR Plants, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process 1 .0 DESCRIPTION 2 .0 ASSESSMENT 2 .1 Applicability of Topical Report, TSTF-423, and Published Safety Evaluation 2.2 Optional Changes and Variations

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination 3.2 Verification and Commitments 4 .0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION 5 .0 IMPACT ON PREVIOUS SUBMITTALS 6 .0 REFERENCES

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment 1 .0 DESCRIPTION The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specifications (TS) to risk-informed requirements regarding selected Required Action End States .

The changes are consistent with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) TSTF-423, Revision 0, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," except as described in Section 2 .2 below.

The availability of this TS improvement was published in the Federal Register on March 23, 2006 as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP).

2.0 ASSESSMENT 2.1 Applicability of Topical Report, TSTF-423, and Published Safety Evaluation AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) has reviewed the General Electric (GE) topical report (i .e ., Reference 1), TSTF-423 (i.e., Reference 2), and the NRC model safety evaluation (i .e., Reference 3) as part of the CLIIP. AmerGen has concluded that the information in the GE topical report and TSTF-423, as well as the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC, are applicable to Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1 and provide justification for the incorporation of the proposed changes into the CPS, Unit 1 TS.

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations AmerGen is proposing the following variations or deviations from the GE topical report, TS changes described in the TSTF-423, Revision 0, or the NRC's model safety evaluation, dated March 23, 2006 .

TSTF-423 is based on NUREG-1434, "Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/6." CPS, Unit 1 TS are based on NUREG-1434, but are not identical to this guidance . As a result, an adaptation of TSTF-423 was required, in some cases, for incorporation into the CPS, Unit 1 TS due to minor administrative differences in format (e .g ., condition letter designation, etc).

Changes made to CPS TS 3 .6.1 .9, "Feedwater Leakage Control System (FWLCS)," are identical to those made in TSTF-423 for STS 3.6.1 .8, "Penetration Valve Leakage Control System (PVLCS)." The FWLCS at CPS serves a similar design purpose as the PVLCS described in STS 3.6.1 .8 and CPS, Unit 1 TS 3.6.1 .9 was modeled after the STS for the PVLCS.

Changes made to CPS TS 3.6.2 .3, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling," are in accordance with the changes made in TSTF-423 for STS 3 .6.2.3, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling," with the exception of the action associated with two inoperable RHR Suppression Pool Cooling subsystems.

Condition B of STS 3.6.2 .3 allows a completion time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to return one RHR Suppression Pool Cooling subsystem to operable status in the event two RHR Suppression Pool Cooling subsystems are inoperable . Since CPS TS 3.6 .2.3 currently requires entry into Mode 3 and Mode 4 in the event that two RHR Suppression Pool Page 2 of 4

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment Cooling subsystems are inoperable, this required action is maintained in the proposed CPS TS 3 .6.2.3 markup.

The TS changes in TSTF-423, Revision 0 included changes to STS sections 3.4.4, "Safety/Relief valves (S/RVs)," and 3.6 .1 .9, "Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)

Leakage Control System (LCS)," which are not applicable to the CPS, Unit 1 TS . The CPS, Unit 1 TS 3.4.4 Conditions differ from those in STS 3.4 .4 such that the technical justification provided in Reference 1 is not directly applicable . Specifically, CPS, Unit 1 TS 3 .4 .4 Condition A addresses one or more S/RVs inoperable ; whereas, STS 3.4 .4 Condition A is limited to a single inoperable S/RV . The CPS, Unit 1 TS do not contain the equivalent of STS 3.6.1 .9. Therefore, the aforementioned TSTF changes are not part of this submittal .

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) has reviewed the proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP), (i.e., Reference 3).

AmerGen has concluded that the proposed NSHCD presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1 and is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50 .91(a), "Notice for public comment."

3.2 Verification and Commitments As discussed in the notice of availability published in Reference 3 for this TS improvement, plant-specific verifications were performed as follows.

AmerGen commits to the regulatory commitments in Attachment 4. In addition, AmerGen has proposed TS Bases consistent with the GE topical report and TSTF-423, which provide guidance and details on how to implement the new requirements .

Implementation of TSTF-423 requires that risk be managed and assessed . AmerGen's configuration risk management program is adequate to satisfy this requirement. The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be a qualitative assessment of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more systems are not able to perform their associated function . Furthermore, AmerGen has a Bases Control Program consistent with Section 5.5 of the STS .

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION The proposed amendment affects requirements with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation ." The NRC has determined that the amendment adopting TSTF-423, Revision 0, involves no significant increases in amounts of effluents that may be released offsite, no significant changes in the types of effluents that may be released offsite, and no significant increases in the individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure . The NRC has previously issued a Page 3 of 4

ATTACHMENT 1 Description and Assessment proposed finding that TSTF-423, Revision 0, involves no significant hazards considerations and there has been no public comment on said finding in the Federal Register, Notice 70 FR 74037, December 14, 2005 . The amendment request meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51 .22(c)(9), "Criterion for categorical exclusion ." In accordance with 10 CFR 51 .22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

5.0 IMPACT ON PREVIOUS SUBMITTALS The amendment seeks to execute changes on TS that currently have pending amendments . The following TS have an associated amendment pending:

TSTF-448, Control Room Habitability 3.7.3 Submitted 4/12/07

6.0 REFERENCES

NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, "Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for BWR Plants," December 2002

2. TSTF-423, Revision 0, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A"

3. Volume 71, Federal Register, Page 14726 (71FRN14726), "Notice of Availability of Model Application Concerning Technical Specifications for Boiling Water Reactor Plants to Risk-Inform Requirements Regarding Selected Required Action End States Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process," dated March 23, 2006

ATTACHMENT 2 Mark-up of Proposed Technical Specification Changes 3 .3-81 3 .5-2 3 .5-3 3 .6-1 3 .6-22 3 .6-24 3 .6 -27a 3 .6-32 3 .6-43 3.6-51 3.6-52 3.6-69 3.7-1 3.7-2 3.7-4 3.7-5 3.7-8 3.7-11 3.8-3 3.8-24 3 .8-34 3 .8-35 3 .8-40

RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3 .3 .8 .2 3 .3 INSTRUMENTATION 3 .3 .8 .2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring LCO 3 .3 .8 .2 One RPS electric power monitoring assembly shall be OPERABLE for each inservice RPS special solenoid power supply or alternate power supply .

APPLICABILITY : MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODES 4 and 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or both inservice A .1 Remove associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months power supplies with inservice power the electric power supply(s) from monitoring assembly service .

inoperable .

B. Required Action and B .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A _

not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3 . "n a C. Required Action and C .1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion fully insert all Time of Condition A insertable control rods not met in MODE 4 or 5 in core cells with any control rod containing one or more withdrawn from a core fuel assemblies .

cell containing one or more fuel assemblies .

CLINTON 3 .3-81 Amendment No . 9S, 102

ECCS - Operating 3 .5 .1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Two ECCS injection C .1 Restore one ECCS 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months subsystems inoperable . injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE OR status .

One ECCS injection and one ECCS spray subsystem inoperable .

D. Required Action and D .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, -t&B-B, or C not met .

-~6--hottrs--

E. One ADS valve E .1 Restore ADS valve to 14 days inoperable . OPERABLE status .

F. One ADS valve F .1 Restore ADS valve to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable . OPERABLE status .

AND OR One low pressure ECCS F .2 Restore low pressure 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months injection/spray ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable . subsystem to OPERABLE status .

(continued)

CLINTON 3 .5- 2 Amendment No . 95

ECCS -Operating 3 .5 .1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition E or F not met .

H. HPCS and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)

Systems inoperable .

OR Two or more ECCS injection/spray subsystems and one or more ADS valves inoperable .

CLINTON 3 .5-3 Amendment No . 95

Primary Containment 3 .6 .1 .1 3 .6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3 .6 .1 .1 Primary Containment LCO 3 .6 .1 .1 Primary containment shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES 1, 2, and 3 .

ACTIONS

--___-------------______----------NOTE-____----__-____------___--------_____-

Applicable Conditions and Required Actions are not required to be entered for the Inclined Fuel Transfer System (IFTS) penetration for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months per cycle when the IFTS blind flange is unbolted .

CLINTON 3 .6-1 Amendment No . 158

LLS Valves 3 .6 .1 .6 3 .6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3 .6 .1 .6 Low-Low Set (LLS) Valves LCO 3 .6 .1 .6 The LLS function of five safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES 1, 2, and 3 .

ACTIONS B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met .

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours CLINTON 3 .6-22 Amendment No . 95

RHR Containment Spray System 3 .6 .1 .7 3 .6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3 .6 .1 .7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Containment Spray System LCO 3 .6 .1 .7 Two RHR containment spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES 1, 2, and 3 .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR containment A .1 Restore RHR 7 days spray subsystem containment spray inoperable . subsystem to OPERABLE status .

B. Two RHR containment B .1 Restore one RHR 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months spray subsystems containment spray inoperable . subsystem to OPERABLE status .

C. Required Action and C .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time not met .

e.2 36 huuz CLINTON 3 .6- 2 4 Amendment No . 95

FWLCS 3 .6 .1 .9 3 .6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3 .6 .1 .9 Feedwater Leakage Control System (FWLCS)

LCO 3 .6 .1 .9 Two FWLCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES 1, 2, and 3 .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One FWLCS subsystem A .1 Restore FWLCS 30 days inoperable . subsystem to OPERABLE status .

B. Two FWLCS subsystems B .l Restore one FWLCS 7 days inoperable . subsystem to OPERABLE status .

C. Required Action and C .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time not met . -llcAFB-G .2 Be in ME)BE 4 . 36 itettt-s SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3 .6 .1 .9 .1 Perform a system functional test of each 24 months FWLCS subsystem .

CLINTON 3 .6-27a Amendment No . 169

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3 .6 .2 .3 3 .6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3 .6 .2 .3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling LCO 3 .6 .2 .3 Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES 1, 2, and 3 .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression A .1 Restore RHR 7 days pool cooling subsystem suppression pool inoperable . cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status .

B. Required Action and B .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A -

not met .

36 iie-Two RHR suppression C .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months pool cooling subsystems inoperable . AUQ C .2 Be in MODE 4 . 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months CLINTON 3 .6-32 Amendment No . 95

Secondary Containment 3 .6 .4 .1 3 .6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3 .6 .4 .1 Secondary Containment LCO 3 .6 .4 .1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES l, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) .

ACTIONS B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met .

(continued)

CLINTON 3 .6-43 Amendment No . 147

SGT System 3 .6 .4 .3 3 .6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3 .6 .4 .3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System LCO 3 .6 .4 .3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) .

ACTIONS B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3 .

(continued)

CLINTON 3 .6-51 Amendment No . 147

SGT System 3 .6 .4 .3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and ------------- NOTE -______-----

associated Completion LCO 3 .0 .3 is not applicable .

Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met during movement of recently C .1 Place OPERABLE SGT Immediately irradiated fuel subsystem in assemblies in the operation .

primary or secondary containment, or during OR OPDRVs .

C .2 .1 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment .

C .2 .2 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs .

D. Two SGT subsystems D .1 Tm e73-,t .,l .

inoperable in MODE 1, Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 2, or 3 .

(continued)

CLINTON 3 .6- 5 2 Amendment No . 147

Drywell Post-LOCA Vacuum Relief System 3 .6 .5 .6 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME C. Two or more drywell C .1 Restore drywell post- 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months post-LOCA vacuum LOCA vacuum relief relief subsystems subsystems to inoperable for reasons OPERABLE status .

other than Condition A.

D. Required Action and I D .1 Be in MODE 3 . 1 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition-*-,

D, or- 9 .-Rep-~

D .2 Be in MODE 4 . 136 hours0.00157 days 0.0378 hours 2.248677e-4 weeks 5.1748e-5 months E. Required Action and associated E .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time of Condition B or C not met .

CLINTON 3 .6-69 Amendment No . 95

Division 1 and 2 SX Subsystems and UHS 3 .7 .1 3 .7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3 .7 .1 Division 1 and 2 Shutdown Service Water (SX) Subsystems and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

LCO 3 .7 .1 Division 1 and 2 SX subsystems and the UHS shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES 1, 2, and 3 .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. UHS water volume not A .l Restore UHS water 90 days within limit . volume to within limit .

B. Division 1 or 2 SX ------------ NOTES ----__------

subsystem inoperable . 1 . Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3 .8 .1, "AC Sources -Operating,"

for diesel generator made inoperable by SX .

2 . Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3 .4 .9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown,"

for RHR shutdown cooling subsystem made inoperable by SX .

B .1 Restore SX subsystem 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to OPERABLE status .

(continued)

C. Required Action and associated C .1 Be in MODE 3. I 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time of Condition B not met .

CLINTON 3 .7- 1 Amendment No . 95

Division 1 and 2 SX Subsystems and UHS 3 .7 .1 Actions (continued)

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A A :r- ;; not met .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3 .7 .1 .1 Verify UHS water volume is ? 593 acre-ft . In accordance with UHS Erosion, Sediment Monitoring, and Dredging Program SR 3 .7 .1 .2 Verify each required SX subsystem manual, 31 days power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety related systems or components, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position .

SR 3 .7 .1 .3 Verify each SX subsystem actuates on an 24 months actual or simulated initiation signal .

CLINTON 3 .7- 2 Amendment No . 169

Control Room Ventilation System 3 .7 .3 3 .7 PLANT SYSTEM 3 .7 .3 Control Room Ventilation System LCO 3 .7 .3 Two Control Room Ventilation subsystems shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) .

ACTIONS B. Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3 .

(continued)

CLINTON 3 .7-4 Amendment No . 95

Control Room Ventilation System 3 .7 .3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and ------------ NOTE -____--------

associated Completion LCO 3 .0 .3 is not applicable .

Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met during movement of irradiated C .1 Place OPERABLE Immediately fuel assemblies in the Control Room primary or secondary Ventilation subsystem containment, during in high radiation CORE ALTERATIONS, or mode .

during OPDRVs .

C .2 .1 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment .

C .2 .2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS .

C .2 .3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs .

D. Two Control Room D .1 Ventilation subsystems Be in MODE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 .

(continued)

CLINTON 3 .7-5 Amendment No . 95

Control Room AC System 3 .7 .4 3 .7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3 .7 .4 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System LCO 3 .7 .4 Two control room AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES l, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control room AC A .1 Restore control room 30 days subsystem inoperable . AC subsystem to OPERABLE status .

B. Two control room AC B .1 Verify control room Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months subsystems inoperable . area temperature <_ 86

°F .

AND 3 .2 Restore one control 7 days room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status .

C. Required Action and C .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Associated Completion Time of Condition A or -MFB-B not met in MODE 1, (continued)

CLINTON 3 .7-8 Amendment No . 95

Main Condenser Offgas 3 .7 .5 3 .7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3 .7 .5 Main Condenser Offgas LCO 3 .7 .5 The radioactivity rate of the noble gases measured at the offgas recombiner effluent shall be <_ 289 mCi/second after decay of 30 minutes .

APPLICABILITY : MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and steam jet air ejector (SJAE) in operation .

ACTIONS CLINTON 3 . 7-11 Amendment No . 95

AC Sources- Operating 3 .8 .1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Two offsite circuits C .1 Declare required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from inoperable . feature(s) inoperable discovery of when the redundant Condition C required feature(s) concurrent with are inoperable . inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

AND C .2 Restore one offsite 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months circuit to OPERABLE status .

D. One offsite circuit D .1 Restore offsite 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months inoperable . circuit to OPERABLE status .

AND OR One required DG inoperable . D .2 Restore required DG 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to OPERABLE status .

E. Two required DGs E .1 Restore one required 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months inoperable . DG to OPERABLE status . OR 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months if Division 3 DG is inoperable F. Required Action and F .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Associated Completion Time of Condition A, !PaFH-B, C, D, or E not met .

F.2 (continued)

CLINTON 3 . 8-3 Amendment No . 95

DC Sources- Operating 3 .8 .4 3 .8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3 .8 .4 DC Sources- Operating LCO 3 .8 .4 The Division l, Division 2, Division 3, and Division 4 DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES 1, 2, and 3 .

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One battery charger on A .1 Restore battery 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Division 1 or 2 terminal voltage to inoperable . greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage .

AND A .2 Verify battery float current < 2 amps . Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND A .3 Restore battery 7 days charger to OPERABLE status .

B. One battery on B .1 Restore battery to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Division 1 or 2 OPERABLE status .

inoperable .

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months C. Division 1 or 2 DC C .1 Restore Division 1 electrical power and 2 DC electrical subsystem inoperable power subsystems to for reasons other OPERABLE status .

than Condition A or B.

Division 3 or 4 DC 9 .3: Declare High Pressure Immediately electrical power E .1 Core Spray System subsystem inoperable . inoperable .

Q Required Action and -Ft . i F.1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time not met . AND i

for Condition E Be in MODE 4 . 3 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months D. Required Action and associated D .1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time for Condition A, B, or C not met .

CLINTON 3 .8-24 Amendment No . 142

Inverters-Operating 3 .8 .7 3 .8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3 .8 .7 Inverters -Operating LCO 3 .8 .7 The Division 1, 2, 3, and 4 inverters, and A and B RPS solenoid bus inverters shall be OPERABLE .

APPLICABILITY : MODES l, 2, and 3 .

ACTIONS

---______----------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3 .8 .9, "Distribution Systems- Operating," with any uninterruptible AC bus de-energized .

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Division 1 or 2 A .1 Restore Division 1 7 days inverter inoperable . and 2 inverters to OPERABLE status .

One or more Division 3 B-+/- Declare High Pressure Immediately or 4 inverters C.1 Core Spray System inoperable . inoperable .

/. One RPS solenoid bus .-s-.-=- Transfer RPS bus to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D inverter inoperable . D - .1 alternate power source .

Verify RPS bus supply Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months D.1 .2 frequency > 57 Hz . thereafter OR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months De-energize RPS bus .

D .2 (continued)

B. Required Action and associated B .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time of Condition A not met .

CLINTON 3 .8-34 Amendment No . 174

Inverters-Operating 3 .8 .7 ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3 .8 .7 .1 Verify correct inverter voltage, frequency, 7 days and alignment to required uninterruptible AC buses and RPS solenoid buses .

CLINTON 3 .8- 3 5 Amendment No . 95

Distribution Systems- Operating 3 .8 .9 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more Division 1 C .1 Restore Division 1 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or 2 DC electrical and 2 DC electrical power distribution power distribution AND subsystems inoperable . subsystems to OPERABLE status . 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO D. Required Action and D .1 Be in MODE 3 . 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, -iodiB B, or C not met .

TE/171T 36 E. One or more Division 3 E .1 Declare High Pressure Immediately or 4 AC, DC, or Core Spray System uninterruptible AC bus inoperable .

electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable .

F. Two or more divisions F .1 Enter LCO 3 .0 .3 . Immediately with inoperable distribution subsystems that result in a loss of function .

CLINTON 3 .8-40 Amendment No . 95

ATTACHMENT 3 Mark-up of Technical Specification Bases Changes (For Information Only)

B 3 .3 -233 to B 3.3 -236 B 3 .5 -7 B 3 .5 -8 B3.5-10 to B3.5-14a B 3.6 -4 B 3.6 -5 B 3.6 -36 to B 3.6 -38 B 3.6 -41 B 3.6 -43 B 3.6 -47c B 3.6 -58 B 3 .6 -59 B 3.6 -86 to B 3.6 -88a B3.6-98 to B3.6-101a B 3.6 -130 to B 3.6 -132 B3.7-4 to B3.7-6 B3.7-12 to B3.7-16a B 3.7 -19 B 3.7 -21 B 3 .7 -23 to B 3 .7 -24a B3 .8-12 to B3 .8-16 B3 .8-18B3 .8-22 B3 .8-24B3 .8-29 B 3 .8 -31 B 3.8 -32a B 3 .8 -55 B 3.8 -58 B 3 .8 -71 b B 3 .8 -72 B 3 .8 -73 B3.8-85 to B3.8-87

RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3 .3 .8 .2 BASES APPLICABILITY in MODES 1, 2, and 3, and MODES 4 and 5 with any control rod (continued) withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies .

ACTIONS A .1 If the power monitoring assembly for an inservice power supply (UPS or alternate) is inoperable, or the power monitoring assembly in each inservice power supply is inoperable, the system protective function is lost . In this condition, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is allowed to restore the assembly to OPERABLE status for each inservice power supply . If the inoperable assembly for each inservice power supply cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the associated power supplies must be removed from service within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (Required Action A .1) . An alternate power supply with OPERABLE assemblies may then be used to power one RPS bus .

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is sufficient for the plant operations personnel to take corrective actions and is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or removal from service of the electric power monitoring assemblies .

Alternately, if it is not desired to remove the power supply(s) from service (e .g ., as in the case where removing the power supply(s) from service would result in a scram or isolation), Condition B or C, as applicable, must be entered and its Required Actions taken .

In addition to the actions identified in Condition A, if the frequency of the supply to the RPS solenoid bus is S 57 Hz, the OPERABILITY of all Class lE equipment which could have been subjected to the abnormal frequency on the associated RPS solenoid bus must be demonstrated by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST or CHANNEL CALIBRATION, as required . These tests should be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovering the underfrequency condition .

B . 1 -and B . 2 the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .3-233 Revision No . 1-1

RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3 .3 .8 .2 BASES ACTIONS B .1 and- B.2 (continued)

The plant shutdown is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

__ ' The allowed Completion Time

- Vreasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met in MODE 4 or 5, with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, the operator must immediately initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies (Required Action C .1) . This Required Action results in the least reactive condition for the reactor core and ensures that the safety function of the RPS (e .g ., scram of control rods) is not required .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .3 .8 .2 .1 REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each overvoltage, undervoltage, and underfrequency channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function . A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay . This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay . This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions . Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology .

As noted in the Surveillance, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is only required to be performed while the plant is in a condition in which the loss of the RPS bus will not jeopardize steady state power operation (the design of the system is such that the power source must be removed from service to conduct the Surveillance) . The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is intended to indicate an outage of sufficient duration to allow for scheduling and proper performance of the (continued)

CLINTON 13 3 .3-234 Revision No . 5-5

RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3 .3 .8 .2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .3 .8 .2 .1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Surveillance . The 184 day Frequency and the Note in the

_Surveillance are sed on guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-09 Ref .~"S .

SR 3 .3 .8 .2 .2 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor . This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy . CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology .

The Frequency is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis .

SR 3 .3 .8 .2 .3 Performance of a system functional test demonstrates a required system actuation (simulated or actual) signal . The logic of the system will automatically trip open the associated power monitoring assembly circuit breaker . Only one signal per power monitoring assembly is required to be tested . This Surveillance overlaps with the CHANNEL CALIBRATION to provide complete testing of the safety function . The system functional test of the Class 1E circuit breakers is included as part of this test to provide complete testing of the safety function . If the breakers are incapable of operating, the associated electric power monitoring assembly would be inoperable .

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .3-235 Revision No . 10-7

RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3 .3 .8 .2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .3 .8 .2 .3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power .

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance .

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 8 .3 .1 .1 .3 .1 .

3. NRC Generic Letter 91-09, "Modification of Surveillance Interval for the Electric Protective Assemblies in Power Supplies for the Reactor Protection System ."

CLINTON B 3 .3- 23 6 Revision No . 10-7

ECCS -Operating B 3 .5 .1 BASES ACTIONS _C .1 (continued)

With two ECCS injection subsystems inoperable or one ECCS injection and one ECCS spray subsystem inoperable, at least one ECCS injection/spray subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystems provide adequate core cooling during a LOCA . However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced in this Condition because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems concurrent with a design basis LOCA may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function . Since the ECCS availability is reduced relative to Condition A, a more restrictive Completion Time is imposed . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on a reliability study, as provided in Reference 12 .

D .1 and B .2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of overall plant risk Condition A, B, or C qre not met, the plant must be brought is minimized . to a MODE in which the To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at, least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months - aze-t=e MG9E-T=w~ti,}ft.J6 mss .

Insert 1 The allowed Completion Time Trre reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

uires seven ADS valves to be OPERABLE to provide the ADS function . Referenceyr3 contains the results of an analysis that evaluated the effect of one ADS valve being out of service . Per this analysis, operation of only six ADS valves will provide the required depressurization .

However, overall reliability of the ADS is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE ADS valves could result in a reduction in depressurization capability . Therefore, operation is only allowed for a limited time . The 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref . 12) and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .5-7 Revision No . 0

ECCS -Operating B 3 .5 . 1 BASES ACTIONS F .l and F .2 (continued)

If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable in addition to one inoperable ADS valve, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of HPCS and the remaining low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems .

However, the overall ECCS reliability is reduced because a single active component failure concurrent with a design basis LOCA could result in the minimum required ECCS equipment not being available . Since both a portion of a high pressure (ADS) and a low pressure subsystem are inoperable, a more restrictive Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is required to restore either the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the ADS valve to OPERABLE status . This Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref . 12) and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience .

G . 1 --...alit'--v^~

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition E or F are not met or if two or more,,P DS valves are inoper ble, the plant must be brought to a'-ca i;dit-i-en- in MODE overall plant risk which the 1,C-E) 4ees net appi:7- . To achieve this status, the is minimized plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s-amd-Insert 1 3-6-°~r ~ .V The allowed Completion Times' reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

When multiple ECCS subsystems are inoperable, as stated in Condition H, the plant is in a degraded condition not specifically justified for continued operation, and may be in a condition outside of the accident analyses . Therefore, LCO 3 .0 .3 must be entered immediately .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .5-8 Revision No . 0

ECCS -Operating B 3 .5 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .5 .1 .2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable . This allows operation in the RHR shutdown cooling mode during MODE 3 if necessary .

SR 3 .5 .1 .3 Verification every 31 days that ADS accumulator supply pressure is ? 140 psig assures adequate air pressure for reliable ADS operation . The accumulator on each ADS valve provides pneumatic pressure for valve actuation . The designed pneumatic supply pressure requirements for the accumulator are such that, following a failure of the pneumatic supply to the accumulator, at least two valve actuations cap occur with the drywell at 70% of design pressure (Refr,1< . The ECCS safety analysis assumes only one actuation to achieve the depressurization required for operation of the low pressure ECCS . This minimum required pressure of 140 psig is provided by the Instrument Air System . The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration administrative control over operation of the Instrument Air System and alarms for low air pressure .

With regard to ADS accumulator supply pressure values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties .

This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties, for implementation in the associated plant procedures (Ref . .

SR 3 .5 .1 .4 The performance requirements of the ECCS pumps are determined through application of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix K, criteria (Ref . 8) . This periodic Surveillance is performed (in accordance with the ASME Code,Section XI, requirements for the ECCS pumps) to verify that the ECCS pumps will develop the flow rates required by the respective analyses .

The ECCS pump flow rates ensure that adequate core cooling is provided to satisfy the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50 .46 (Ref . 10) .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .5-10 Revision No . 4-6

ECCS--Operating B 3 .5 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .5 .1 .4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The pump flow rates are verified with a pump differential pressure that is sufficient to overcome the RPV pressure expected during a LOCA . The pump outlet pressure is adequate to overcome the elevation head pressure between the pump suction and the vessel discharge, the piping friction losses, and RPV pressure present during LOCAs . These values may be established during pre-operational testing . The Frequency for this Surveillance is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program requirements .

With regard to pump flow rates and differential pressures values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Refs . -+/-'7 ---q18 J-9) .

18, 19, 20 SR 3 .5 .1 .5 The ECCS subsystems are required to actuate automatically to perform their design functions . This Surveillance test verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the automatic initiation logic of HPCS, LPCS, and LPCI will cause the systems or subsystems to operate as designed, including actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating sequence, automatic pump startup, and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions . This Surveillance also ensures that the HPCS System will automatically restart on an RPV low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV high water level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the RCIC storage tank to the suppression pool . The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3 .3 .5 .1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation," overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function .

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power .

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR, which is based on the refueling cycle .

Therefore, the Frequency (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .5-11 Revision No . 10-7

ECCS -Operating B 3 .5 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .5 .1 .5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveillance . Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance .

SR 3 .5 .1 .6 The ADS designated S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals .

A system functional test is performed to demonstrate that the mechanical portions of the ADS function (i .e .,

solenoids) operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated initiation signal, causing proper actuation of all the required components . SR 3 .5 .1 .7 and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3 .3 .5 .1 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function .

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power .

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR, which is based on the refueling cycle .

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation .

This prevents an RPV pressure blowdown .

SR 3 .5 .1 .7 A manual actuation of each required ADS valve (those valves removed and replaced to satisfy SR 3 .4 .4 .1) is performed to verify that the valve is functioning properly . This SR can be demonstrated by one of two methods . If performed by Method 1, plant startup is allowed prior to performing this test because valve OPERABILITY and the setpoints for over -pressure protection are verified, per ASME requirements Re . k), prior to valve installation . Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that states the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test . The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed for manual actuation after the required pressure is reached is sufficient to achieve stable (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .5-12 Revision No . 10-7

ECCS -Operating B 3 .5 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .5 .1 .7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR . If performed by Method 2, valve OPERABILITY has been demonstrated for all installed ADS valves based upon the successful operations of a test sample of S/RVs .

1. Manual actuation of the ADS valve, with verification of the response of the turbine control valves or bypass valves, by a change in the measured steam flow, or any other method suitable to verify steam flow (e .g .,

tailpipe temperature or acoustic monitoring) . Adequate reactor steam pressure must be available to perform this test to avoid damaging the valve . Also, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the ADS valves divert steam flow upon opening . Sufficient time is therefore allowed after the required pressure and flow are achieved to perform this test . Adequate pressure at which this test is to be performed is consistent with the pressure recommended by the valve manufacturer .

2. The sample population of S/RVs tested to satisfy SR 3 .4 .4 .1 will also be stroked in the relief mode during "as-found" testing to verify proper operation of the S/RV . The successful performance of the test sample of S/RVs provides reasonable assurance that all ADS valves will perform in a similar fashion . After the S/RVs are replaced, the relief-mode actuator of the newly-installed S/RVs will be uncoupled from the S/RV stem, and cycled to ensure that no damage has occurred to the S/RV during transportation and installation . Following cycling, the relief-mode actuator is recoupled and the proper positioning of the stem nut is independently verified . This verifies that each replaced S/RV will properly perform its intended function .

SR 3 .5 .1 .6 and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3 .3 .5 .1 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function . The STAGGERED TEST BASIS Frequency ensures that both solenoids for each ADS valve relief-mode actuator are alternately tested . The Frequency of the required relief-mode actuator testin is based on the tests required by ASME OM, Part 1, (Ref . .) as implemented by the Inservice Testing Program of Specification 5 .5 .6 . The testing Frequency required by the Inservice Testing Program is based on operating experience and valve performance . Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .5-13 Revision No . 7-2

ECCS -Operating B 3 .5 .1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .5 .1 .8 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR ensures that the ECCS RESPONSE TIMES are within limits for each of the ECCS injection and spray subsystems .

The response time limits (i .e ., _<42 seconds for the LPCI subsystems, _<41 seconds for the LPCS subsystem, and _<27 seconds for the HPCS system) are specified in applicable surveillance test procedures . This SR is modified by a Note which identifies that the associated ECCS actuation instrumentation is not required to be response time tested .

This is supported by Reference_k3' 16 Response time testing of the remaining subsystem components is required . However, of the remaining subsystem components, the time for each ECCS pump to reach rated speed is not directly measured in the response time tests . The time(s) for the ECCS pumps to reach rated speed is bounded, in all cases, by the time(s) for the ECCS injection valve(s) to reach the full-open position . Plant-specific calculations show that all ECCS motor start times at rated voltage are less than two seconds . In addition, these calculations show that under degraded voltage conditions, the time to rated speed is less than five seconds .

ECCS RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted every 24 months . The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power .

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR, which is based on the refueling cycle .

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

With regard to ECCS RESPONSE TIME values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .5-14 Revision No . 10-7

ECCS--Operating B 3 .5 .1 BASES REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6 .3 .2 .2 .3 .

2. USAR, Section 6 .3 .2 .2 .4 .

3. USAR, Section 6 .3 .2 .2 .1 .

4. USAR, Section 6 .3 .2 .2 .2 .

5. USAR, Section 15 .2 .8 .

6 . USAR, Section 15 .6 .4 .

7 . USAR, Section 15 .6 .5 .

8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K .

9. USAR, Section 6 .3 .3 .

10 . 10 CFR 50 .46 .

11 . USAR, Section 6 .3 .3 .3 .

12 . Memorandum from R .L . Baer (NRC) to V . Stello, Jr .

(NRC), "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCO's for Insert 2 --.> ECCS Components," December 1, 1975 .

14 . USAR, Table 6 .3-8 .

USAR, Section 7 .3 .1 .1 .1 .4 .

NEDO-32291-A, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1994 .

Calculation IP-0-0044 .

Calculations O1HP09/10/11, IP-C-0042 .

Calculations OlLP08/11/14, IP-C-0043 .

20 . Calculations 01RH19/20/23/24, IP-C-0041 .

Calculation IP-0-0024 .

22 . ASME/ANSI OM-1987, Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, Part 1 .

CLINTON B 3 . 5-14a Revision No . 7-2

Primary Containment B 3 .6 .1 .1 BASES ACTIONS A .1 (continued) time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3 . This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal .

If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status overall plant within the associated Complet' gn Time, the plant must be risk is brought to a MODE in which the To minimized .

achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at ast Insertl MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months The allowed Completion Time are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .1 .1 .1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program . Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3 .6 .1 .2 .1), secondary containment bypass leakage (SR 3 .6 .1 .3 .8), resilient seal primary containment purge valve leakage testing (SR 3 .6 .1 .3 .5), main steam isolation valve leakage (SR 3 .6 .1 .3 .9), or hydrostatically tested valve leakage (SR 3 .6 .1 .3 .10) does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR . The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program . As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required leakage test is required to be <_ 0 .6 La for combined Type B and C leakage, and <_ 0 .75 La for overall Type A leakage . At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limit of <_ 1 .0 La . At <-

1 .0 La the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis . The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program .

This Surveillance is modified by a Note that requires the leakage rate results of SR 3 .6 .1 .1 .2 for the Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System (each loop) to be included in determining compliance with required limits .

This can be accomplished either by having the loops in service during the ILRT, or if the loop is not in service during the ILRT, by separately measuring the leakage and including it in the measured ILRT results .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6- 4 Revision No . 8-6

Primary Containment B 3 .6 . 1 .1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .1 .1 .1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS (continued) With regard to leakage rate values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref . A.

SR 3 .6 .1 .1 .2 With respect to primary containment integrated leakage rate testing, the primary containment hydrogen recombiners (located outside the primary containment) are considered extensions of the primary containment boundary . This requires the smaller of the leakage from the PCIVs that isolate the primary containment hydrogen recombiner, or from the piping boundary outside containment, to be included in the ILRT results . The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program .

With regard to leakage rate values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6 .2 .

2. USAR, Section 15 .6 .5 .

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B .

4. USAR, Section 6 .2 .1 .

Insert 2

6. NEI 94-01, Revision 0, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J ."

1151, ANSI/ANS-56 .8-1994, "American National Standard for Containment System Leakage Testing Requirement ."

8. Calculation IP-0-0056 .

CLINTON 3 3 .6-5 Revision No . 4-6

LLS Valves B 3 .6 .1 .6 BASES APPLICABLE LLS S/RVs are specified, all five LLS S/RVs do not operate SAFETY ANALYSES in any DBA analysis .

(continued)

LLS valves satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement .

LCO Five LLS valves are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the assumptions of the safety analysis (Ref . 1) . The requirements of this LCO are applicable to the mechanical and electrical/pneumatic capability of the LLS valves to function for controlling the opening and closing of the S/RVs .

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, an event could cause pressurization of the reactor and opening of S/RVs . In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES .

Therefore, maintaining the LLS valves OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 .

ACTIONS A .1 With one LLS valve inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE LLS valves are adequate to perform the designed function .

However, the overall reliability is reduced . The 14 day Completion Time takes into account the redundant capability afforded by the remaining LLS S/RVs and the low probability of an event in which the remaining LLS S/RV capability would be inadequate .

B .1--tmd B .2 the overall inoperable LLS valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status plant risk is within the required Completior ~Time, the plant must be minimized .

brought to a MODE in which the " To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to . a t east Insert 1 MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed Completion TimeX .a4Fe reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-36 Revision No . 0

LLS Valves B 3 .6 . 1 .6 BASES ACTIONS (continued) power conditions in an orderly manner and without Insert 2 challenging plant systems .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .1 .6 .1 REQUIREMENTS A manual actuation of each required LLS valve (those valves removed and replaced to satisfy SR 3 .4 .4 .1) is performed to verify that the valve is functioning properly . This SR can be demonstrated by one of two methods . If performed by Method 1, plant startup is allowed prior to performing this test because valve OPERABILITY and the setpoints for ov. .erpressure protection are verified, per ASME requirements 3 (Ref . .~), prior to valve installation . Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that states the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test . The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed for manual actuation after the required pressure is reached is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR . If performed by Method 2, valve OPERABILITY has been demonstrated for all installed LLS valves based upon the successful operation of a test sample of S/RVs .

1. Manual actuation of the LLS valve, with verification of the response of the turbine control valves or bypass valves, by a change in the measured steam flow, or any other method suitable to verify steam flow (e .g .,

tailpipe temperature or acoustic monitoring) . Adequate reactor steam pressure must be available to perform this test to avoid damaging the valve . Also, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the LLS valves divert steam flow upon opening .

Sufficient time is therefore allowed after the required pressure and flow are achieved to perform this test .

Adequate pressure at which this test is to be performed is consistent with the pressure recommended by the valve manufacturer .

2. The sample population of S/RVs tested to satisfy SR 3 .4 .4 .1 will also be stroked in the relief mode during "as-found" testing to verify proper operation of the S/RV . The successful performance of the test sample of S/RVs provides reasonable assurance that all LLS valves will perform in similar fashion . After the S/RVs are replaced, the relief-mode actuator of the newly-installed S/RVs will be uncoupled from the S/RV stem, and cycled to ensure that no damage has occurred to the S/RV during transportation and installation . Following cycling, the relief-mode actuator is recoupled and the (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-37 Revision No . 7-2

LLS Valves B 3 .6 . 1 .6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .1 .6 .1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS proper positioning of the stem nut is independently verified . This verifies that each replaced S/RV will properly perform its intended function .

The Frequency of the required relief-mode actuator t ing is based on the tests required by ASME OM Part 1 (Ref . ,

as implemented by the Inservice Testing Program of Specification 5 .5 .6 . The testing Frequency required by the Inservice Testing Program is based on operating experience and valve performance . Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

SR 3 .6 .1 .6 .2 The LLS designed S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals . A system functional test is performed to verify that the mechanical portions (i .e ., solenoids) of the automatic LLS function operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal . The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3 .3 .6 .5 .4 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function .

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power .

Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance . Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation .

This prevents a reactor pressure vessel pressure blowdown .

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 5 .2 .2 .2 .3 .

ASME/ANSI OM-1987, Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, Part 1 .

CLINTON B 3 .6-38 Revision No . 10-7

RHR Containment Spray System B 3 .6 .1 .7 BASES ACTIONS _B .1 (continued)

With two RHR containment spray subsystems inoperable, one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . In this Condition, there is a substantial loss of the drywell bypass leakage mitigation function . The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methods to remove heat from primary containment are available .

C . 1 -a4ldr~

If the inoperable RHR containment spray subsystem cannot be overall plant restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion risk is Time, the plait must be brought to a MODE in which the-bE'8-minimized _.___ ____ _ rr _ 1 . To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at leapt MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and t-e allowed Completion TimeX-are-reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .1 .7 .1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RHR containment spray mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for system operation . This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing . This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation ; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position . This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves .

The 31 day Frequency of this SR is justified because the valves are operated under procedural control and because improper valve position would affect only a single subsystem . This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-41 Revision No . 1-1

RHR Containment Spray System B 3 .6 . 1 .7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .1 .7 .3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

SR 3 .6 .1 .7 .4 This Surveillance is performed following activites that could result in nozzle blockage to verify that the spray nozzles are not obstructed and that flow will be provided when required . Such activities may include a loss of foreign material control (of if it cannot be assured),

following a major configuration change, or following an inadvertent actuation of containment spray . This Surveillance is normally performed by an air or smoke flow test . The Frequency is adequate due to the passive nozzle design and its normally dry state and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience .

REFERENCES .

1 1,. USAR, Section 6 .2 .1 .1 .5 .

Insert 2

3. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI .

USAR, Section 5 .4 .7 CLINTON 3 3 .6-43 Revision No . 10-7

FWLCS B 3 .6 .1 .9 BASES ACTIONS C .1 and G .2 (continued)

If the inoperable FWLCS subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the heB 4ees n~`

coverall plant risk _, ~, ,

-, - apply . To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to

'is minimized at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months z~c~rs . The allowed Completion Time, -i-3~reasonable, based Insert1 on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .1 .9 .1 REQUIREMENTS A system functional test of each FWLCS subsystem is performed to ensure that each FWLCS subsystem will operate through its operating sequence . This includes verifying automatic positioning of valves and operation of each interlock, and that the necessary check valves open .

Adequacy of the associated RHR pumps to deliver FWLCS flow rates required to meet the assumptions made in the supporting analyses concurrent with other modes was demonstrated during acceptance testing of the system after installation . Periodic verification of the capabilities of the RHR pumps is performed under SR 3 .5 .1 .4 .

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power .

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15 .6 .5 .

Insert 2 CLINTON B 3 .6-47c Revision No . 10-7

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling B 3 .6 .2 .3 BASES ACTIONS B.l - overall plant risk is minimized (continued)

If the Required Action and required Completion Time of Condition A cannot be met ; f `w^ RIIR =l the giant must be brought to a MODE in which th T G^ deee net-apply . To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at, ~east MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .y The allowed omp etion ime - - reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

Insert 2 SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .2 .3 .1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves, in the RHR suppression pool cooling mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation . This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to being locked, sealed, or secured .

A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis . This is acceptable, since the RHR suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated . This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation ; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position . This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves .

The Frequency of 31 days is justified because the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve position would affect only a single subsystem, the probability of an event requiring initiation of the system is low, and the subsystem is a manually initiated system . This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable, based on operating experience .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-58 Revision No . 0

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling B 3 .6 .2 .3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .2 .3 .2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying each RHR pump develops a flow rate >_ 4550 gpm, with flow through the associated heat exchanger to the suppression pool, ensures that pump performance has not degraded during the cycle . Flow is a normal test of

.,,-Z')

Ref cent fugal pump performance required by ASME Section XI This test confirms one point on the pump design curve, and the results are indicative of overall performance . Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance . The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program .

With regard to RHR pump flow rate values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties . This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties for implementation in the associated plant procedures . (Ref`VX) .

REFERENCES USAR, Section 6 .2 .

ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI .

4. i3'. USAR, Section 5 .4 .7 .

141, Calculations 01RH20/25 and IP-C-0041 .

CLINTON B 3 .6-59 Revision No . 6-4

Secondary Containment B 3 .6 .4 .1 BASES ACTIONS A .1 (continued) containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3 . This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal .

If the secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant' must be brought to a MODE in which the T G^ deeB ie# - 0 achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at east MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion TLme -trc reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

C.2 C . 1,/ and - -:-3 Movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment . In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment . Movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable .

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position . Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release . Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended .

Required Action C .1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3 .0 .3 is not applicable . If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3 .0 .3 would not specify any action . If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations . Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-86 Revision No . 7-3

Secondary Containment B 3 .6 .4 . 1 BASES ACTIONS C .1 and C .2 (continued) movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the secondary containment boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions . The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related to secondary containment vacuum variations during the applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring between surveillances .

Furthermore, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal secondary containment vacuum condition .

With regard to secondary containment vacuum values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a A.

nominal value and therefore does not require co pensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .

SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .2 and SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .3 Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches and access doors are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur . Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur . In this application the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness . Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit . The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other controls on secondary containment access openings .

(continued)

CLINTON 3 3 .6-87 Revision No . 7-3

Secondary Containment B 3 .6 .4 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .4 and SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment .

To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .4 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the lowest postulated pressure external to the secondary containment boundary . This is confirmed by demonstrating that one SGT subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to >_ 0 .25 inches of vacuum water gauge within the required time .

Specifically, the required drawdown time limit is based on ensuring that the SGT system will draw down the secondary containment pressure to >_ 0 .25 inches of vacuum water gauge within 12 minutes (i .e ., 10 minutes from start of gap release which occurs 2 minutes after LOCA initiation) under LOCA conditions . Typically, however, the conditions under which drawdown testing is performed pursuant to SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .4 are different than those assumed for LOCA conditions . For this reason, and because test results are dependent on or influenced by certain plant and/or atmospheric conditions that may be in effect at the time testing is performed, it is necessary to adjust the test acceptance criteria (i .e .,

the required drawdown time) to account for such test conditions . Conditions or factors that may impact the test results include wind speed, whether the turbine building ventilation system is running, and whether the containment equipment hatch is open (when the test is performed during plant shutdown/outage conditions) . The acceptance criteria for drawdown test are thus based on a computer model fl (Ref .), verified by actual performance of drawdown tests, in which the drawdown time determined for accident conditions is adjusted to account for performance of the test during normal but certain plant conditions . The test acceptance criteria are specified in the applicable plant test procedure(s) . Since the drawdown time is dependent upon secondary containment integrity, the drawdown requirement cannot be met if the secondary containment boundary is not intact .

SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .5 demonstrates that each SGT subsystem can maintain >_ 0 .25 inches of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months at a flow rate S 4400 acfm . The 1-hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions . Therefore, the tests required per SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .4 and SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .5 are performed to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity . Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem and an inoperable SGT subsystem does not result in this SR being not met . The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3 .6 .4 .3, either SGT subsystem will perform this test . Operating experience has (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-88 Revision No . 10-5

Secondary Containment B 3 .6 .4 .1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .4 and SR 3 .6 .4 .1 .5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS shown these components usually pass the Surveillance .

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

With regard to drawdown time values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Refs . 4,_ S) .

5,6 REFERENCES 1. USA-R, Section 15 .6 .5 .

2. USAR, Section 15 .7 .4 .

-.3'.' Calculation IP-0-0082 .

Calculation IP-0-0083 .

6. Calculation IP-0-0084 .

Calculation 3C10-1079-001 .

CLINTON 3 3 . 6-88a Revision No . 10-7

SGT System B 3 .6 .4 .3 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these (continued) events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES . Therefore, maintaining the SGT System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies (i .e ., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ) in the primary or secondary containment .

ACTIONS A .1 With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days . In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function . However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed . The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period .

If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the overall plant plant must be brought to a MODE in which the heG d°-- _

risk is -: To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to minimized. at least OODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Insert 1 The allowed Completion Timg9 reasona e, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

C .1, C .2 .1 and C .2 .2 During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A .1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem should be immediately placed in operation . This Required Action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-98 Revision No . 7-3

SGT System B 3 .6 .4 .3 BASES ACTIONS C .1, C .2 .1 and C .2 .2 (continued) that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected .

An alternative to Required Action C .1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the unit in a Condition that minimizes risk . If applicable, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended . Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position . Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release . This action should be chosen if the OPDRVs could be impacted by a loss of offsite power . Action must continue until OPDRVs are suspended .

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3 .0 .3 is not applicable . If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3 .0 .3 would not specify any action . If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations . Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown .

If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT System may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function . ~'14ei~ e¬eEe, I~GG Insert 2 E .1 and E .2 When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment must be immediately suspended . Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-99 Revision No . 7-3

SGT System B 3 .6 .4 .3 BASES ACTIONS E .1 and E .2 (continued) position . Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release . Action must continue until OPDRVs are suspended .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .4 .3 .1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each SGT subsystem from the main control room for

_> 10 continuous hours ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly . It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action . Operation with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature) for >_ 10 continuous hours every 31 days eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters . The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy available in the system .

With regard to operating time values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref . X) .

SR 3 .6 .4 .3 .2 This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) . The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber bypass leakage and efficiency, minimum system flow rate, combined HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber pressure drop, and heater dissipation .

The frequencies for performing the SGT System filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1 .52 (Ref . 4) and include testing initially, after 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of system operation, once per 24 months, and following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system . The laboratory test results will be (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-100 Revision No . 10-7

SGT System B 3 .6 .4 .3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .4 .3 .2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS verified to be within limits within 31 days of removal of the sample from the system . Additional information is discussed in detail in the VFTP .

With regard to filter testing values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .

SR 3 .6 .4 .3 .3 This SR requires verification that each SGT subsystem automatically starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal .

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3 .3 .6 .2 .5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function .

While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance, which is based on the refueling cycle . Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

SR 3 .6 .4 .3 .4 This SR requires verification that the SGT filter cooling bypass damper can be opened and the fan started . This ensures that the ventilation mode of SGT System operation is available . While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance, which is based on the refueling cycle . Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-101 Revision No . 10-7

SGT System B 3 .6 .4 .3 BASES REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41 .

2. USAR, Section 6 .2 .3 .

3. USAR, Section 15 .6 .5 .

4. Regulatory Guide 1 .52 .

5. USAR, Section 6 .5 .1 .

6. USAR, Section 15 .6 .4 .

7. USAR Appendix A .

ASME/ANSI N510-1980 .

Insert 3 Calculation IP-0-0086 .

Calculation IP-0-0087 .

CLINTON B 3 . 6-101a Revision No . 4-6

Drywell Post-LOCA Vacuum Relief System B 3 .6 .5 .6 BASES ACTIONS A .1 (continued)

A Note has been added to provide clarification that separate Condition entry is allowed for each vacuum relief subsystem not closed .

With one drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days . In these Conditions, the remaining OPERABLE vacuum relief subsystems are adequate to perform the depressurization mitigation function since three 10-inch lines remain available . The 30 day Completion Time takes into account the redundant capability afforded by the remaining subsystems, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of an event requiring the vacuum relief subsystems to function occurring during this period .

With two or more drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, the inoperable subsystems must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of an event requiring the vacuum relief subsystems to function occurring during this period .

D .1 and D .2 If the inoperable drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief subsystem(s) cannot be closed within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply . To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-130 Revision No . 7-5

Drywell Post-LOCA Vacuum Relief System B 3 .6 .5 .6 BASES ACTIONS D .1 and D .2 (continued) experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .5 .6 .1 REQUIREMENTS Each drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valve is verified to be closed (except when being tested in accordance with SR 3 .6 .5 .6 .2 and SR 3 .6 .5 .6 .3 or when the drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valves are performing their intended design function) to ensure that this potential large drywell bypass leakage path is not present . This Surveillance is normally performed by observing the drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valve position indication . The 7 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is considered adequate in view of other indications of drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valve status available to the plant personnel, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience .

Two Notes are added to this SR . The first Note allows drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valves opened in conjunction with the performance of a Surveillance to not be considered as failing this SR . These periods of opening drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valves are controlled by plant procedures and do not represent inoperable drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valves . A second Note is included to clarify that valves open due to an actual differential pressure, are not considered as failing this SR .

SR 3 .6 .5 .6 .2 Each drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valve must be cycled to ensure that it opens adequately to perform its design function and returns to the fully closed position . This provides assurance that the safety analysis assumptions are valid . A 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide additional assurance that the drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valves are OPERABLE .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .6-131 Revision No . 1-1

Drywell Post-LOCA Vacuum Relief System B 3 .6 .5 .6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .6 .5 .6 .3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verification of the drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valve opening differential pressure is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumptions of _< 0 .2 psid for drywell vacuum relief are valid . The safety analysis assumes that the drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief valves will start opening when the dry well pressure is approximately 0 .2 psid less than the containment and will be fully open when this differential pressure is 0 .5 psid . The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for violating the drywell boundary . Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance, which is based on the refueling cycle .

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6 .2 . Insert 2 CLINTON 3 3 .6-132 Revision No . 10-7

Division 1 and 2 SX Subsystems and UHS B 3 .7 .1 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A .1 If the UHS is inoperable (i .e ., the UHS water volume is not within the limit), action must be taken to restore the inoperable UHS to OPERABLE status within 90 days . The 90 day Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the required UHS volume, the margin contained in the available heat removal capacity, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period .

If the Division 1 or 2 SX subsystem is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE Division 1 or 2 SX subsystem is adequate to perform the heat removal function . However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE Division 1 or 2 SX subsystem could result in loss of the SX function . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period .

The Required Action is modified by two Notes indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3 .8 .1, "AC Sources-Operating," and LCO 3 .4 .9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown," be entered and the Required Actions taken if the inoperable SX subsystem results in an inoperable DG or RHR shutdown cooling subsystem, respectively . This is in accordance with LCO 3 .0 .6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components .

Insert 1 D CDTV. 1 and Z2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, or both Division 1 and 2 SX subsystems are inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply . To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

CLINTON 3 3 .7-4 Revision No . 0

Division 1 and 2 SX Subsystems and UHS B 3 .7 .1 BASES ACTIONS C .1 and C .2 (continued) and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .7 .1 .1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies UHS water volume is >_ 593 acre-feet (excluding sediment) . The Surveillance Frequency is in accordance with UHS Erosion, Sediment Monitoring and Dredging Program .

With regard to UHS water volume values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref,2f) .

SR 3 .7 .1 .2 Verifying the correct alignment for each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each Division 1 and 2 SX subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for Division 1 and 2 SX subsystem operation . This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing . A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position within the required time .

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation ;

rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position . This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .7-5 Revision No . 4-6

Division 1 and 2 SX Subsystems and UHS B 3 .7 .1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .7 .1 .2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Isolation of the SX subsystem to components or systems does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the associated SX subsystem . As such, when all SX pumps, valves, and piping are OPERABLE, but a branch connection off the main header is isolated, the associated SX subsystem needs to be evaluated to determine if it is still OPERABLE . Alternatively, it is acceptable and conservative to declare an SX subsystem inoperable when a branch connection is isolated or a supported ventilation system is inoperable .

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions .

SR 3 .7 .1 .3 This SR verifies that the automatic isolation valves of the Division 1 and 2 SX subsystems will automatically switch to the safety or emergency position to provide cooling water exclusively to the safety related equipment during an accident event . This is demonstrated by use of an actual or simulated initiation signal and is performed with the plant shut down . This SR also verifies the automatic start capability of the SX pump in each subsystem .

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR . Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

REFERENCES 1. Regulatory Guide 1 .27, Revision 2, January 1976 .

2. USAR, Section 9 .2 .1 .2 .

3. USAR, Table 9 .2-3 .

4. USAR, Section 6 .2 .1 .1 .3 .3 .

5. USAR, Chapter 15 .

6. USAR, Section 6 .2 .2 .3 .

7. USAR, Table 6 .2-2 .

Insert 2

9. ..8.': Calculation IP-0-0095 .

CLINTON B 3 .7-6 Revision No . 10-7

Control Room Ventilation System B 3 .7 .3 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the Control Room Ventilation System must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release .

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES . Therefore, maintaining the Control Room Ventilation System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated :

a. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) ;

b. During CORE ALTERATIONS ; and

c. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment .

ACTIONS A .1 With one Control Room Ventilation subsystem inoperable, the inoperable Control Room Ventilation subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days . With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE Control Room ventilation subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection . However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of Control Room Ventilation System function . The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities .

B . 1-arrd-$-

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable Control Room Ventilation subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completio Time, the unit must be overall plant placed in a MODE that minimizes risk . To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within se-Ti]

In-12 hours The allowed (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .7-12 Revision No . 0

Control Room Ventilation System B 3 .7 .3 BASES ACTIONS B .1 =etnd-$ .2 (continued)

Completion Time/ reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems .

C .1, C .2 .1, C .2 .2, and C .2 .3 The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3 .0 .3 does not apply . If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE l, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations .

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown .

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if the inoperable Control Room Ventilation subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE Control Room Ventilation subsystem may be placed in the high radiation mode . This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected .

An alternative to Required Action C .1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room . This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk .

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment must be suspended immediately . Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position . Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release . Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .7-13 Revision No . 0

Control Room Ventilation System B 3 .7 .3 BASES ACTIONS _D .1 (continued)

If both Control Room Ventilation subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Control Room Ventilation System may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside of the accident ana lyses Insert 2 E .1, E .2, and E .3 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with two Control Room Ventilation subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require treatment of the control room air . This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk .

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment must be suspended immediately . Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position . If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release . Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .7 .3 .1 and SR 3 .7 .3 .2 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate . Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly . As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each subsystem once every month provides an adequate check on this system . Monthly heater operation dries out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air . The Makeup Filter System must be operated from the main control room for >_ 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized . The Recirculation Filter System (without heaters) need only be operated for > 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system . Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two subsystem redundancy available .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .7-14 Revision No . 4-6

Control Room Ventilation System B 3 .7 .3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .7 .3 .1 and SR 3 .7 .3 .2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS With regard to subsystem operation time values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .-B-,9 ) .

9, 16 SR 3 .7 .3 .3 This SR verifies that the required Control Room Ventilation System testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) . The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber bypass leakage and efficiency, minimum system flow rate (scfm), combined HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber pressure drop, and heater dissipation . The frequencies for performing the Control Room Ventilation System filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1 .52 (Ref .Xa - nd include testing initially, after 720 hours0.00833 days 0.2 hours 0.00119 weeks 2.7396e-4 months of system operation, once per 24 months, and following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system . The laboratory test results will be verified to be within limits within 31 days of removal of the sample from the system . Additional information is discussed in detail in the VFTP .

With regard to filter testing parameter values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Refs . -+/-,&;, ) .

SR 3 .7 .3 .4 This SR verifies that each Control Room Ventilation subsystem starts and operates on an actual or simulated high radiation initiation signal . While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance, which is based on the refueling cycle . Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .7-15 Revision No . 10-7

Control Room Ventilation System B 3 .7 .3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .7 .3 .5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies the integrity of the negative pressure portions of the Control Room Ventilation System ductwork located outside the main control room habitability boundary between fan OVC04CA(B) and isolation dampers OVC03YA(B) inclusive and fire dampers OVC042YA(E), OVC042YB(F),

OVC042YC(G), and OVC042YD(H) . In addition, the integrity of the recirculation filter housing flexible connection to fan OVC03A(B) must be verified . This testing ensures that the inleakage through the negative pressure portion of the Control Room Ventilation System remains within the design basis accident analysis basis . This inleakage would be filtered by the Control Room Ventilation System recirculation filters . An additional allowance of 144 cfm of unfiltered inleakage is also considered in the design basis accident analysis . Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR . Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

With regard to inleakage values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties . This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties, for implementation in the associated plant procedures (Ref ., - .

SR 3 .7 .3 .6 This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air . The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper function of the Control Room Ventilation System . During the high radiation mode of operation, the Control Room Ventilation System is designed to slightly pressurize the control room to _> 1/8 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas to prevent unfiltered inleakage . The Control Room Ventilation System is designed to maintain this positive pressure at a flow rate of <_ 3000 scfm to the control room in the high radiation mode . The Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with the refueling cycle and other filtration system SRs .

With regard to control room positive pressure values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties .

This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties, (Ref .,

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .7-16 Revision No . 10-7

Control Room Ventilation System B 3 .7 .3 BASES REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6 .5 .1 .

2 . USAR, Section 9 .4 .1 .

3 . USAR, Chapter 6 .

4. USAR, Chapter 15 .

USAR, Appendix A .

Regulatory Guide 1 .52, Revision 2, March 1978 .

8. ASME/ANSI N510-1980 .

9. Calculation IP-0-0096 .

1p . Calculation IP-0-0097 .

11 . Calculation IP-0-0098 .

Calculation IP-0-0099 .

Calculation IP-0-0100 .

Calculation IP-0-0101 .

CLINTON B 3 .7- 1 6a Revision No . 4-6

Control Room AC System B 3 .7 .4 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A .1 With one control room AC subsystem inoperable, the inoperable control room AC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days . With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE control room AC subsystem is adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function . However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning function . The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring Control Room Ventilation System operation in the high radiation mode, the consideration that the remaining subsystem can provide the required protection, and the availability of alternate cooling methods .

B .1 and B .2 If both control room AC subsystems are inoperable, the Control Room AC System may not be capable of performing its intended function . Therefore, the control room area temperature is required to be monitored to ensure that temperature is being maintained low enough that equipment in the control room is not adversely affected . With the control room temperature being maintained within the temperature limit, 7 days is allowed to restore a control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status . This Completion Time is reasonable considering that the control room temperature is being maintained within limits, the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, and the availability of alternate cooling methods .

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the control room area temperature overall plant cannot be maintained <_ 86 °F or if the inoperable control room AC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completi n Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk . To achieve this status the unit must be placed in at lealst MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months The allowed Insert Completion TimeA-fe-treasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .7-19 Revision No . 0

Control Room AC System B 3 .7 .4 BASES ACTIONS E .1, E .2, and E .3 (continued)

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B is not met, action must be taken to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require operation of the Control Room Ventilation System in the high radiation mode .

This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk .

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and handling of irradiated fuel in the primary and secondary containment must be suspended immediately . Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position . Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release . Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .7 .4 .1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis . The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation . The 24 month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the Control Room AC System is not expected over this time period .

With regard to heat removal capability values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .,2-) .

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6 .4 .

2. USAR, Section 9 .4 .1 .

Insert 2

4. Calculation IP-0-0102 .

CLINTON B 3 .7-21 Revision No . 10-7

Main Condenser Offgas B 3 .7 .5 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable when steam is being exhausted to the main condenser and the resulting noncondensibles are being processed via the Main Condenser Offgas System . This occurs during MODE 1, and during MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and the SJAE in operation . In MODES 4 and 5, steam is not being exhausted to the main condenser and the requirements are not applicable .

ACTIONS A .1 If the offgas radioactivity rate limit is exceeded, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is allowed to restore the gross gamma activity rate to within the limit . The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment considering the time required to complete the Required Action, the large margins associated with permissible dose and exposure limits, and the low probability of a Main Condenser Offgas System rupture occurring .

and B .3 B .1, B .2, n-.~ . ..a .3 .2 If the radioactivity rate is not restored to within the limits within the associated Completion Time, all main steam lines or the SJAE must be isolated . This isolates the Main Condenser Offgas System from the source of the radioactive steam . The main steam lines are considered isolated if at least one main steam isolation valve in each main steam line is closed, and at least one main steam line drain valve in each drain line is closed . The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems . overall plant risk is minimized .

An alternative to Required Actions B .1 and B .2 is t place the unit in a MODE in which the To (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .7-23 Revision No . 0

Main Condenser Offgas B 3 .7 .5 BASES and B .3 ACTIONS B .1, B .2, B .-, . . (continued) achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at 1 MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed Completion Time/ wreasonable, based on experience, to reach the required unit conditions power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .7 .5 .1 and SR 3 .7 .5 .2 REQUIREMENTS SR 3 .7 .5 .2, on a 31 day Frequency, requires an isotopic analysis of an offgas sample to ensure that the required limits are satisfied . The noble gases to be sampled ar Xe-133, Xe-135, Xe-138, Kr-85m, Kr-87, and Kr-88 (Ref . X) .

If the measured release rate of radioactivity increases significantly (by >_ 50% after correcting for expected increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER), an isotopic analysis is also performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after the increase is noted, as required by SR 3 .7 .5 .1, to ensure that the increase is not indicative of a sustained increase in the radioactivity rate . The required isotopic analysis is intended to support determination of the cause for the increase in offgas radiation release rates, such as the onset of leakage from a fuel pin(s) . However, there are certain evolutions (e .g ., swapping of the steam jet air ejectors and regeneration of the offgas system desiccant dryers) which are known to result in a predictable and temporary increase in the indicated offgas radioactivity release rate . These indicated increases in offgas radioactivity release rates can be caused solely by increases in offgas flow . Since these increases are due to an evolution(s) known to cause such an increase and not due to an actual increase in the "nominal steady state fission gas release rate," isotopic analysis of an offgas sample is not required for these evolutions . In any of these cases, it is prudent to ensure that the offgas radiation level (radioactivity release rate) returns to previous or expected levels within four hours or as soon as possible following the evolution . This will confirm that there are no other causes for the increase in the radioactivity release rate indication . The 31 day Frequency is adequate in view of other instrumentation that continuously monitor the offgas, and is acceptable based on operating experience .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .7-24 Revision No . 1-1

Main Condenser Offgas B 3 .7 .5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .7 .5 .1 and SR 3 .7 .5 .2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS SR 3 .7 .5 .2 is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line is not isolated and the SJAE is in operation .

Only in this condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates .

With regard to radioactivity rate values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .,6 .

6 REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15 .7 .1 .

2 . NUREG-0800 .

10 CFR 100 .

Insert 2 NEDE-24810, "Station Nuclear Engineering," Volume 1A .

6. Calculation IP-0-0103 .

CLINTON B 3 .7-24a Revision No . 4-6

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 .1 BASES ACTIONS E .1 (continued)

According to Regulatory Guide 1 .93 (Ref . 6), with both DGs inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . This Completion Time assumes complete loss of onsite (DG) AC capability to power the minimum loads needed to respond to analyzed events . In the event Division 3 DG in conjunction with Division 1 or 2 DG is inoperable, with Division 1 or 2 remaining, a significant spectrum of breaks would be capable of being responded to with onsite power . Even the worst case event would be mitigated to some extent-an extent greater than a typical two division design in which this condition represents complete loss of onsite power function . Given the remaining function, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is appropriate . At the end of this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period, Division 3 systems could be declared inoperable (see Applicability Note) and this Condition could be exited with only one required DG remaining inoperable . However, with a Division 1 or 2 DG remaining inoperable and the HPCS declared inoperable, a redundant required feature failure exists, according to Required Action B .2 .

overall plant risk is minimized.

If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the-bee-To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to~ MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Insert 1

-t . The allowed Completion TimeK a-r-e-Teasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

Condition G corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost . At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function . Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation . The unit is required by LCO 3 .0 .3 to commence a controlled shutdown .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-12 Revision No . 0

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and REQUIREMENTS testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have_ a stan Jy function, in accordance with 9 50, GDC 18 (Ref .'X) . Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages under simulated accident conditions . The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are in accordance wit the recommendations of Regulatory, Guide 1 .9 (Refs . 3 an , Regulatgr~ y Guide 1 .108 (Ref .', and laEory Guide 1 .137 (Ref . ,.1_1:~) .

Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the minimum and maximum steady state output voltages of 4084 V and 4580 V respectively, are equal to

- 2% and + 10% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage . The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG is 58 .8 Hz and 61 .2 Hz, respectively, are equal to t 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency . The specified steady state voltage and frequency ranges are derived from the recommendations given in Regulatory Guide 1 .9 (Ref . 3) . However, the minimum voltage was increased to ensure adequate voltage to operate all safety-related loads during a DBA (Ref .

In general, surveillances performed for each of the required DGs are similar, with one notable difference due to the fact that the Division 3 DG utilizes a mechanical governor, while the Division 1 and 2 DGs utilize an electronic governor . As such, the Division 1 and 2 DGs are capable of operating in both an isochronous mode as well as a "droop" mode for when the DGs are paralleled to the offsite source during testing .

The Division 3 DG, on the other hand, is capable of operating only in the droop mode (through a droop setting of zero can be utilized) . This difference may affect the Division 3 DGs capability to achieve rated frequency following automatic switchover from the test mode to ready-to-load operation upon receipt of a LOCA initiation signal (as verified per SR 3 .8 .1 .17) .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-13 Revision No . 4-3

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .2 and SR 3 .8 .1 .7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The normal 31 day Frequency for SR 3 .8 .1 .2 (see Table 3 .8 .1-1, "Diesel Generator Test Schedule") is th the industry guidelines for assessment of diesel generator performance (Ref .,I-ff~ . The 184 day Frequency for SR 3 .8 .1 .7 is a reduction in cold testing consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref . 7) . These Frequencies provide adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing .

With regard to required voltage and frequency values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties .

This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties, for implementation in the associated plant procedures (Refs . ,

17, 18, 19, 22, 23 SR 3 .8 .1 .3 This Surveillance demonstrates that the DGs are capable of synchronizing and accepting greater than or equal to the equivalent of the maximum expected accident loads . However, consistent with,t)e recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .9, 16 Revision 3 (Ref . ,1-S'), this surveillance is performed with a DG load equal to or greater than 90 percent of its continuous rating . A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source .

Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0 .8 lagging and 1 .0 . The 0 .8 value is the design rating of the machine, while 1 .0 is an operational limitation to ensure circulating currents are minimized .

The normal 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance (see Table 3 .8 .1-1) is consistent with the industry guid ines for assessment of diesel generator performance (Ref . .mil_)

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-14 Revision No . 4-6

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Note 1 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized .

Note 2 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test .

Note 3 indicates that this Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations .

Note 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement for performance of this SR . A successful DG start must precede this test to credit satisfactory performance .

With regard to DG loading values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require co pi ensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .

SR 3 .8 .1 .4 This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the low level alarm setpoint .

The level is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of DG operation at maximum expected post LOCA loads .

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and facility operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period .

With regard to fuel oil level values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require coMpensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .V;Q)

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-15 Revision No . 7-7

AC Sources -Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation . There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive . Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival . This is an effective means of controlling microbiological fouling . In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation . Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel ail by bacteria .

Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system . The Surveillance Frequency is established by Regulatory Guide 1 .137 (Ref .,1"T) . This SR is for preventive maintenance . The presence of water does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that accumulated water is removed during performance of this Surveillance .

SR 3 .8 .1 .6 This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank . It is required to support the continuous operation of standby power sources . This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer systems are OPERABLE .

The design of fuel transfer systems is such that pumps operate automatically in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following DG testing . Therefore, a 31 day Frequency is specified to correspond to the maximum interval for DG testing .

SR 3 .8 .1 .7 See SR 3 .8 .1 .2 .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-16 Revision No . 4-6

AC Sources -Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The referenced load for DG 1A is the low pressure core spray pump ; for DG 1B, the residual heat removal (RHR) pump ; and for DG 1C the HPCS pump . The Shutdown Service Water (SX) pump values are not used as the largest load since the SX supplies cooling to the associated DG . If this load were to trip, it would result in the loss of the DG . The use of larger loads for reference purposes is acceptable . This Surveillance may be accomplished by :

1) Tripping the DG output breaker with the DG carrying greater than or equal to its associated single largest load while paralleled to offsite power, or while supplying the bus, or

2) Tripping its associated single largest load with the DG supplying the bus .

As required by IEEE-308 (Ref . .Y3), the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower .

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the ref uel c recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .9 (Ref .

This SR has been modified by two Notes . The intent of Note 1 is to indicate that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR . Examples of unplanned events may include :

1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available ; and (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-18 Revision No . 10-7

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS (continued) 2) Post maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability .

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, Note 2 requires that, if synchronized to offsite power, testing be performed using a power factor <_ 0 .9 .

This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience .

Testing performed for this SR is normally conducted with the DG being tested (and the associated safety-related distribution subsystem) connected to one offsite source, while the remaining safety-related (and non-safety related) distribution systems are aligned to the other offsite source (or unit auxiliary transformers) . This minimizes the possibility of common cause failures resulting from offsite/grid voltage perturbations .

With regard to diesel speed values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation v

for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref . 24 SR 3 .8 .1 .10 This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load, i .e ., maximum expected accident load, without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits . However, consistent with the commendat_ion_s of 16 Regulatory Guide 1 .9, Revision 3 (Ref . ), this surveillance is performed with a DG load equal to or greater than 90 percent of its continuous rating .

The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping . This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions .

This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load .

These acceptance criteria provide DG damage protection .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-19 Revision No . 5-9

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .10 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event and continue to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated .

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor

<_ 0 .9 . This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience .

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the refuel cycle recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1 .9 (Ref*7 an is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths .

This SR has been modified by a Note . The intent of the Note is to indicate that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR . Examples of unplanned events may include :

1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available ; and

2) Post maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability .

Testing performed for this SR is normally conducted with the DG being tested (and the associated safety-related distribution subsystem) connected to one offsite source, while the remaining safety-related (and non-safety related) distribution systems are aligned to the other offsite source (or unit auxiliary transformers) . This minimizes the possibility of common cause failure resulting from offsite/grid voltage perturbations .

This Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite of grid perturbations .

With regard to DG load and voltage values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref . .

24 (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-19a Revision No . 10-7

AC Sources -Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .11 10 REQUIREMENTS As required by Regulatory Guide 1 .108 (Ref .),

paragraph 2 .a .(1), this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source . This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the Division 1 and 2 nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG . It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time .

With regard to required voltage and frequency values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties .

This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties, for implementation in the associated plant procedures (Refs .

17, 18, 19 The DG auto-start time of 12 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA . The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved .

With regard to DG auto-start time values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties . This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties, for implementation in the associated plant procedures (Ref .,,) .

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and auto-connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic . In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation . For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, systems are not capable of being operated at (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-20 Revision No . 4-6

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .11 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation . In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable . This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified .

The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the uel cycle recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .9 (Ref .

takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths .

This SR is modified by two Notes . The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing . For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions . Standby conditions mean that the lube oil is heated by the jacket water and continuously circulated through a portion of the system as recommended by the vendor . Engine jacket water is heated by an immersion heater and circulates through the system by natural circulation . This allowance is not intended to impose a maximum limit on engine temperatures . The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge plant safety systems .

Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR . Examples of unplanned events may include :

1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available ; and

2) Post maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-21 Revision No . 10-7

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .12 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (12 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal) and operates for >_ 5 minutes .

The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability .

With regard to DG start time, required voltage and frequency values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties . This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties, for implementation in the associated plant procedures (Refs_k~,

17. 18. 19. 2223 The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths . Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint .

This SR is modified by two Notes . The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing . For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions . Standby conditions mean that the lube oil is heated by the jacket water and continuously circulated through a portion of the system as recommended by the vendor . Engine jacket water is heated by an immersion heater and circulates through the system by natural circulation . This allowance is not intended to impose a maximum limit on engine temperatures . The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems . Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR . Examples of unplanned events may include :

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-22 Revision No . 10-7

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .13 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS

2) Post maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability .

SR 3 .8 .1 .14 Regulatory Guide 1 .9, Revision 3 (Ref . ,Y5) requires demonstration once per 24 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at or near full-load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The DGs are to be loaded equal to or greater than 105 percent of the continuous rating for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and equal to or greater than 90 percent of the continuous rating c th e remaining hours of the test (i .e ., 22 hours2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months ) (Ref . T . The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions . The provisions for prelube and warmup, discussed in SR 3 .8 .1 .2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3 .8 .1 .3, are applicable to this SR .

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor 5 0 .9 . This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience .

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the refuel cycle recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .9, Revision 3 (Ref .<

>5) ; takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance ; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths .

This Surveillance is modified by two Notes . Note 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test . Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test . The intent of Note 2 is to indicate that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR . Examples of unplanned events may include :

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-24 Revision No . 10-7

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .14 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS

1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available ; and

2) Post maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability .

Testing performed for this SR is normally conducted with the DG being tested (and the associated safety-related distribution subsystem) connected to one offsite source, while the remaining safety-related (and non-safety related) distribution systems are aligned to the other offsite source (or unit auxiliary transformers) . This minimizes the possibility of common cause failures resulting from offsite/grid voltage perturbations .

With regard to DG loading capability values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .

SR 3 .8 .1 .15 This Surveillance is consis~gnt with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .108(Ref ~',4 , paragraph 2 .a .(5), and demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 12 seconds . The 12 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA .

With regard to DG loading values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication 20 uncertainties (Ref . ~~'j .

With regard to DG start time, frequency and voltage values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties . This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to 17, 18, 19, 22, 23 compensate for instrument uncertainties , for implementation in the associated plant procedures (Refffs'~' ) .

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the refuel cyc recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .9, Revision 3 (Ref .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-25 Revision No . 10-7

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .15 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This SR has been modified by two Notes . Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot . The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months at full load conditions (i .e ., equal to or greater than 90 percent of the continuous rating) prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions . Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test . Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing .

SR 3 .8 .1 .16 10 As required by Regulatory Guide 1 .108 (Ref .,),

paragraph 2 .a .(6), this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and load transfer from the DG to each offsite power source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored . It also ensures that the undervoltage logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs . The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset .

Portions of the synchronization circuit are associated with the DG and portions with the offsite circuit . If a failure in the synchronization requirement of the Surveillance occurs, depending on the specific affected portion of the synchronization circuit, either the DG or the associated offsite circuit is declared inoperable .

The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the fuel 16 cycle recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .9 (Ref . ), and takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance .

(continued)

CLINTON 3 3 .8-26 Revision No . 10-7

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .16 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note . The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems . Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR .

Examples of unplanned events may include :

1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available ; and

2) Post maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability .

SR 3 .8 .1 .17 Demonstration of the test mode override is consist r~t with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .108 (Ref .,X),

paragraph 2 .a .(8)and ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions is not compromised as the result of testing . Except as clarified below for the Division 3 DG, interlocks to the LOCA sensing circuits cause the DG to automatically reset to ready-to-load operation if an ECCS initiation signal is received during operation in the test mode . Ready-to-load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open .

These provis3,~s for automatic switchover are required by 14 IEEE-308 Re .,18'), paragraph 6 .2 .6(2), as further amplified by IEEE 387, sections 5 .6 .1 and 5 .6 .2 . (Clarification regarding conformance of the Division 3 DG design to these standards is provided in the USAR, Chapter 8 (Reference 2) .)

Automatic switchover from the test mode to ready-to-load operation for the division 3 DG is also demonstrated, as described above, by ensuring that DG control logic automatically resets in response to a LOCA signal during the test mode and confirming that ready-to-load operation is attained (as evidenced by the DG running with the output breaker open) . However, with the DG governor initially operating in a "droop" condition during the test mode, operator action may be required to reset the governor for (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-27 Revision No . 10-7

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .17 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS ready-to-load operation in order to complete the surveillance for the Division 3 DG . Resetting the governor ensures that the DG will supply the Division 3 bus at the required frequency in the event of a LOCA and a loss of offsite power while the DG is in a droop condition during the test mode .

The requirement to automatically energize the emergency loads with offsite power is essentially identical to that of SR 3 .8 .1 .12 . The intent in the requirement associated with SR 3 .8 .1 .17 .b is to show that the emergency loading is not affected by the DG operation in test mode . In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable .

This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified .

The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the efue l cycle recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .9 (Ref . ); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance ; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths .

This SR has been modified by a Note . The intent of this note is to indicate that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR . Examples of unplanned events may include :

1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available ; and

2) Post maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability .

Testing performed for this SR is normally conducted with the DG being tested (and the associated safety-related distribution subsystem) connected to one offsite source, while the remaining safety-related (and non-safety related) distribution systems are aligned to the other offsite source (or unit auxiliary transformers) . This minimizes the possibility of common cause failures resulting from offsite/grid voltage perturbations .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-28 Revision No . 10-7

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .18 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Under accident conditions with a loss of offsite power, loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the load sequencing logic (except for Division 3 which has no load sequence timers) . The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents .

The 10% load sequence time tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated and is consistent With the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .108 (Ref .,), paragraph 2 .a .(2) .

Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses .

The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the refuel cycle recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .9 (Ref . ) ;

takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance ; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths .

This SR is modified by a Note . The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance during these MODES may perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge plant safety systems . Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR . Examples of unplanned events may include :

1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available ; and

2) Post maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability .

With regard to sequence time values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref . ,'i4) .

25

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-29 Revision No . 10-7

AC Sources -Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .19 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS

1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available ; and

2) Post maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability .

With regard to DG start time, required voltage and frequency values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties . This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties, for implementation in the associated plant procedures (Refs . y&'`

1.-q, i° -,,, .

17, 18, 19, 22 SR 3 .8 .1 .20 This Surveillance is performed with the plant shut down and demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised . Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously .

The 10 year Frequency is consi4 ent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 .108 (Ref .,g) .

This SR is modified by a Note . The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing . For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions . Standby conditions mean that the lube oil is heated by the jacket water and continuously circulated through a portion of the system as recommended by the vendor . Engine jacket water is heated by an immersion heater and circulates through the system by natural circulation . This allowance is not intended to impose a maximum limit on engine temperatures .

With regard to required voltage and frequency values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-31 Revision No . 5-3

AC Sources -Operating B 3 .8 . 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .1 .20 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS instrumentation, the specified limit is not considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties .

This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties, for implementation in the associated plant procedures (Refs .

2-z) . 17, 18, 19, 22, 23 Diesel Generator Test Schedule The DG test schedule (Table 3 .8 .1-1) implements the industry quid 'nes for assessment of diesel generator performance Re . ,~en) . The purpose of this test schedule is to provide timely test data to establish a confidence level associated with the goal to maintain DG reliability at > 0 .95 per test .

According to the industry guidelines (Ref-114` each DG unit should be tested at least once every 31 days . Whenever a DG has experienced 4 or more valid failures in the last 25 valid tests, the maximum time between tests is reduced to 7 days . Four failures in 25 valid tests is a failure rate of 0 .16, or the threshold of acceptable DG performance, and hence may be an early indication of the degradation of DG reliability . When considered in the light of a long history of tests, however, 4 failures in the last 25 valid tests may only be a statistically probable distribution of random events . Increasing the test Frequency allows a more timely accumulation of additional test data upon which to base judgment of the reliability of the DG . The increased test Frequency must be maintained until seven consecutive failure free tests have been performed .

The Frequency for accelerated testing is 7 days, but no less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Tests conducted at intervals of less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months may be credited for compliance with Required Actions . However, for the purpose of re-establishing the normal 31-day Frequency, a successful test at an interval of less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months should be considered an invalid test and not count towards the seven consecutive failure free starts, and the consecutive test count is not reset .

A test interval in excess of 7 days (or 31 days, as appropriate) constitutes a failure to meet SRs and results in the associated DG being declared inoperable . It does not, however, constitute a valid test or failure of the DG, and any consecutive test count is not reset .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-32 Revision No . 5-3

AC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 .1 BASES REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 .

2. USAR, Chapter 8 .

3. Regulatory Guide 1 .9, Revision 2 .

4. USAR, Chapter 6 .

5. USAR, Chapter 15 .

6. Regulatory Guide 1 .93 .

7. Generic Letter 84-15, July 2, 1984 .

Insert 2

9. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 .

10. °. Regulatory Guide 1 .108 .

Regulatory Guide 1 .137 .

ANSI C84 .1, 1982 .

NUMARC 87-00, Revision 1, August 1991 .

IEEE Standard 308 .

IP Calculation 19-AN-19 .

16. 1,F5' Regulatory Guide 1 .9, Revision 3 .

Calculation IP-C-0050 .

Calculation IP-C-0051 .

Calculation IP-C-0054 .

Calculation IP-0-0114 .

Calculation IP-C-0111 .

22 . Calculation IP-0-0106 .

23 . Calculation IP-0-0143 .

Calculation IP-0-0110 .

25 . .2e- Calculation IP-0-0116 .

CLINTON B 3 .8-32a Revision No . 7-7

DC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 .4 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

With one or more Division 3 or 4 DC electrical power subsystems inoperable, the HPCS System may be incapable of performing its intended functions and must be immediately declared inoperable . This declaration also requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3 .5 .1, "ECCS -Operating ."

F .1 and F .2 If the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply . To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems . The Completion Time to bring the unit to MODE 4 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1 .93 (Ref . 7) .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .4 .1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge helps to ensure the effectiveness of the battery chargers, which support the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function . Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery in a fully charged state while supplying the continuous steady state loads of the associated DC subsystem . On float charge, battery cells will receive adequate current to continually charge the battery . The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the minimum float voltage established by the battery manufacturer (2 .20 Vpc or 127 .6 V at the battery terminals)

This voltage maintains the battery plates in a condition that supports maintaining the grid life (expected to be approximately 20 years) . The 7 day Frequency is consistent with manufacturer's recommendations and IEEE-450 (Ref\`?`,?) .

with regard to battery terminal voltage values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref-1-21 .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-55 Revision No . 6- 5

DC Sources-Operating B 3 .8 .4 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3 .8 .4 .2 This SR verifies the design capacity of the battery chargers . According to Regulatory Guide 1 .32 (Ref . :), the battery charger supply is recommended to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences . The minimum required amperes and duration ensure that these requirements can be satisfied . This SR provides two options . One option requires that each battery charger be capable of supplying 300 amps for Divisions 1 and 2 (100 amps for Divisions 3 and 4) at the minimum established float voltage for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The ampere requirements are based on the output rating of the chargers .

The voltage requirements are based on the charger voltage level after a response to a loss of AC power . The time period is sufficient for the charger temperature to have stabilized and to have been maintained for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

The other option requires that each battery charger be capable of recharging the battery after a service test coincident with supplying the largest coincident demands of the various continuous steady state loads (irrespective or the status of the plant during which these demands occur) .

This level of loading may not normally be available following the battery service test and will need to be supplemented with additional loads . The duration for this test may be longer than the charger sizing criteria since the battery recharge is affected by float voltage, temperature, and the exponential decay in charging current .

The battery is recharged when the measured charging current is < 2 amps .

The Surveillance Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 24 month intervals . In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths .

With regard to minimum required amperes and duration values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require com ensation 13 for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-56 Revision No . 10-7

DC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 .4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .4 .3 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

A battery service test is a special test of the battery's capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system . The discharge rate and test length are established with a dummy load that corresponds to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4 .

The Surveillance Frequency of 24 months is an exception to the recommendations of Requl ,t cry Guide 1 .32 (Ref =

Regulatory Guide 1 .129 (Ref .which state that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations or at some other outage, with intervals between tests not to exceed 18 months .

This SR is modified by two Notes . Note 1 allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test SR 3 .8 .6 .6 in lieu of SR 3 .8 .4 .3 . This substitution is acceptable because SR 3 .8 .6 .6 represents an equivalent test of battery capability as SR 3 .8 .4 .3 . The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems . Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance . Examples of unplanned events may include :

1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available ; and

2) Post maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability .

With regard to battery capacity values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .)yl) .

(continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-57 Revision No . 10-7

DC Sources- Operating B 3 .8 .4 BASES REFERENCES l. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, CDC 17 .

2. Regulatory Guide 1 .6, March 10, 1971 .

3. IEEE Standard 308, 1978 .

4. USAR, Section 8 .3 .2 .

5. USAR, Chapter 6 .

6. USAR, Chapter 15 .

7. Regulatory Guide 1 .93, December 1974 .

Insert 2

9. IEEE Standard 450, 1995 .

Regulatory Guide 1 .32, February 1977 .

X. Regulatory Guide 1 .129, December 1974 .

y1 . Calculation IP-0-0123 .

CLINTON B 3 .8-58 Revision No . 6- 5

Inverters- Operating B 3 .8 .7 BASES ACTIONS A .1 (continued) 2 . Evaluate concurrent maintenance or inoperable status of any of the remaining three instrument bus inverters for the unit .

3 . Evaluate simultaneous EDG maintenance .

Insert 1 With one or more Division 3 or 4 inverters inoperable, the associated Division 3 ECCS subsystem may be incapable of performing intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable . This also requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3 .5 .1, "ECCS - Operating ."

Fn M2 With one RPS solenoid bus inverter inoperable it may be incapable of providing voltage and frequency regulated power (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-71b Revision No . 11-3

Inverters -Operating B 3 .8 .7 BASES ACTIONS --to-.2 (continued) sufficient to protect the loads connected to the bus . In D .1 .1, D .1 .2, and D .2 this condition, the source of power must be transferred or removed from service . If the RPS bus power is transferred to its alternate source, an additional ACTION is required to periodically monitor the frequency on the bus . This frequency is designed to be limited by the in-line RPS electric power monitoring assembly (required by LCO 3 .3 .8 .2, "RPS Electric Power Monitoring"), however, in the event of a single failure, frequency protection would not be available .

Should frequency be discovered < 57 Hz, additional ACTIONS are required in LCO 3 .3 .8 .2 due to the inoperable RPS electric power monitoring assembly .

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is sufficient for plant personnel to take corrective actions and is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration, transfer or removal of the RPS bus power supply from service .

With both RPS solenoid bus inverters inoperable both RPS buses may be incapable of providing voltage and frequency regulated power sufficient to protect the loads connected to the buses . In this condition, the source of power must be transferred or removed from service, however, only one RPS bus is allowed to be powered from an alternate source at any one time . Therefore, at least one RPS solenoid bus must be de-energized . The remaining affected bus will be de-energized or powered from its alternate source in accordance with Condition /.

D The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is sufficient for plant personnel to take corrective actions and is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or removal of the RPS bus power supply from service .

F .1 and F .2 If the inoperable devices or components cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply . To achieve this status, the plant must be (continued)

CLINTON 3 3 .8-72 Revision No . 0

Inverters-Operating B 3 .8 .7 BASES E~-- arre - 2 (continued) brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .7 .1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and uninterruptible AC buses energized from the inverter . The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the uninterruptible AC buses . The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions .

With regard to voltage and frequency values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require com for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref) .

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter 8 .

2. USAR, Chapter 6 .

3. USAR, Chapter 15 .

Insert 2 ----

yf. Calculation IP-0-0131 .

CLINTON B 3 .8-73 Revision No . 4-6

Distribution Systems -Operating B 3 .8 .9 BASES ACTIONS C .1 (continued)

b. The potential for decreased safety when requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power while not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected division ; and

c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component .

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1 .93 (Ref . 3) .

The second Completion Time for Required Action C .1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO . If Condition C is entered while, for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months , since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the DC distribution system . At this time, an AC division could again become inoperable, and DC distribution could be restored OPERABLE . This could continue indefinitely .

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock ."

This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition C was entered . The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet the LCO indefinitely .

D.1 "-csrtd-inz If the inoperable electrical power distribution system cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated overall plant risk Completion Times, the _. lant -- u t be bought to a MODE in is minimized. which the To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months an -

The allowed Completion Time a_

Insert 1 (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-85 Revision No . 0

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3 .8 .9 BASES ACTIONS D .l - pd --~ (continued) reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

With one or more Division 3 or 4 electrical power distribution system(s) inoperable, the Division 3 or 4 powered systems are not capable of performing their intended functions . Immediately declaring the high pressure core spray inoperable allows the ACTIONS of LCO 3 .5 .1, "ECCS-Operating," to apply appropriate limitations on continued reactor operation .

Condition F corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost . When more than one Condition is entered, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis . Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation . LCO 3 .0 .3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .9 .1 REQUIREMENTS Meeting this Surveillance verifies that the required AC, DC, and uninterruptible AC bus electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment . The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical divisions is maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus . The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to (continued)

CLINTON B 3 .8-86 Revision No . 0

Distribution Systems- Operating B 3 .8 .9 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .8 .9 .1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS these buses . The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC, DC, and uninterruptible AC bus electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions .

With regard to voltage values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value and therefore does not require compensation for instrument indication uncertainties (Ref .

A-- 6 REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter 6 .

2. USAR, Chapter 15 .

3 . Regulatory Guide 1 .93, December 1974 .

Insert 2 USAR, Section 8 .3 .

Calculation IP-0-0132 .

CLINTON B 3 .8- 8 7 Revision No . 4-6

Clinton Power Station TSTF-423 LAR Technical Specification Bases Page Inserts LCO 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protectio n System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state .

Insert 2

2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3 .5.1 ECCS-Operating Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 13) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state .

Insert 2 13 . NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3 .6 . 1 .1 Primary Containment Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref . 5), because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Insert 2

5. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3.6.1 .6 Low-Low Set (ILLS) Valves Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Insert 2 C .1 and C.2 If two or more LLS valves are inoperable, there could be excessive short duration S/RV cycling during an overpressure event. The plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 and MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 3

2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3.6 .1 .7_ Residual Heat Re moval (RHR) Containment Sprav System Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state .

Insert 2

2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3 .6 .1 .9 Feedwater Leakage Control System (FWLCS)

Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status

will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Insert 2

2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3.6.2 .3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref . 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Insert 2 If two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply . To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

Insert 3

2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3 .6.4 .1 Secondarv Containment Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3), because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state .

Insert 2

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3 .6 .4.3 Standbv Gas_ Treatment (SGT) System Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref . 9) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Insert 2 Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 9) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state . The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 3

9. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3 .6 .5.6 Drywell Post-LOCA Vacuum Relief System Insert 1 If one drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief subsystem is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or two or more drywell post-LOCA vacuum relief subsystems are inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, and not restored within the provided Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short . However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 2

2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3 .7 .1 Division 1 and 2 SX Subsystems and UHS Insert 1 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B is not met, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the overall plant risk is minimized . To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 8) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state . The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 2

8. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3 .7 .3 Control Room Ventilation Svstem Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref . 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short . However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Insert 2 Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref . 5) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state . The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions is an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems .

Insert 3

5. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3.7.4 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state .

Insert 2

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state .

Insert 2

4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating Insert 1 Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 8) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short . However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Insert 2

8. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating Insert 1 If a Division 1 or 2 DC electrical power subsystem is inoperable and not restored within the provided Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 8) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state . The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 2

8. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3.8.7 Inverters - Operating Insert 1 If a Division 1 or 2 inverter is inoperable and not restored within the provided Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the overall plant risk is minimized . To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state . The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 2

4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

LCO 3.8 .9 Distribution Systems - Operating Insert 1 If one or both Division 1 and 2 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems are inoperable and not restored within the provided Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the overall plant risk is minimized . To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref . 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.

However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Insert 2

4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002 .

ATTACHMENT 4 List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen) in this document . Any other statements in the submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENT TYPE COMMITMENT COMMITTED ONE-TIME PROGRAMMATIC DATE ACTION (Yes/No)

Yes/No AmerGen will follow the guidance established in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guidance for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Ongoing No Yes Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear Management and Resource Council, Revision 3, July 2000 .

AmerGen will follow the guidance established in TSTF-IG-05-02, Implement "Implementation Guidance for with No Yes TSTF-423, Revision 0, 'Technical amendment Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A,"' Revision 1, March 2007 .

RS-07-074, Application for Technical Specification Change TSTF-423, Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for BWR Plants, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

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RS-07-074, Application for Technical Specification Change TSTF-423, Risk Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for BWR Plants, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

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