ML070820446
| ML070820446 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 02/20/2007 |
| From: | NRC Region 1 |
| To: | Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Sykes, Marvin D. | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML060800104 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML070820446 (44) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 C - RO N - BOP I - BOP M - ALL d
Control rod 22 - 31 drifts outward. (TS) (AOP)
RFP A intermittent TBCCW leak, place RFP B in service.
RWCU Pump A RBCCW Temp High, pump fails to auto trip.
RWCU leak leading to scram. (EOP)
M -ALL C - BOP Facility:
PILGRIM Scenario No.:
2 Op Test No.:
2007 NRC RWCU leak leads to Emergency Depressurization. (EOP - C)
SRV B fails to open.
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
Power is 2.5% with a startup in progress.
0 2.2.96, Attachment 15, preset checks are done on all feed pumps.
Two Condensate pumps in service. Running additional second condensate pump to wear it in.
Override - mode switch in RUN (mode switch failure) 0 Startup in progress from a refuel outage IAW PNPS 2.1.I. At 5% power, transfer RMS to run and resume pulling control rods.
Tu mover:
B secondary condensate pump is being run to wear it in.
Critical Task:
initiates ARI.
Emergency Depressurization.
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Enter 5.3.24 and supplement emergency depressurization.
No.
NM21 E RD02 4 rRDO22-23 5
I NIA 6
1 8
1 RP14A
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9 I RM07 10 I RH04B Event Type*
Event Description
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rods to continue power ascension.
RMS to run.
I-RO I APRM E fails downscale. (TS)
C - RO I In service CRD flow control valve fails closed. (AOP)
I - RO I Manual scram failure. ARI rewired.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Pilqrim 2007 NRC Scenario #2 The crew will take the watch with a reactor startup in progress. They will withdraw control rods, continuing the startup until 5% power is obtained and the reactor mode switch is placed in run.
ii After the mode switch is in run, APRM E will fail downscale. The APRM will be bypassed, and after Tech Specs have been referenced, the startup will continue.
When the startup continues, the crew will discover that the in-service CRD Flow Control Valve has failed closed requiring action to remove the failed FCV from service and place the standby CRD Flow Control Valve in service.
After place the standby CRD Flow Control Valve in service the startup will continue until control rod 22-31 drifts outward. The crew will take actions in accordance with PNPS 2.4.1 1, Control Rod Positioning Malfunctions and address Tech Specs for the inoperable control rod. The startup will be halted.
While waiting for troubleshooting and reactor maneuvering plans, an intermittent TBCCW leak will develop on RFP A requiring the crew to place RFP B in service and secure RFP A in accordance with PNPS 2.2.96, Condensate and Feedwater.
After RFP B in service, an RBCCW high temperature condition will develop on the A RWCU Pump. RWCU pump A will fail to automatically trip and the crew will take action in accordance with the ARP to manually stop the pump.
.u.
When RWCU Pump A is stopped, a leak will develop on the RBCCW pump and temperatures will rise in the RWCU pump room requiring entry into EOP-4. RWCU area temperatures will continue to rise until a manual scram is required, and the crew will enter and execute EOP-1.
When manual scram is attempted, the scram push buttons and reactor mode switch will fail to initiate rod movement; however, all control rods will insert when the ARI pushbuttons are depressed (Critical Task).
Following control rod insertion, RWCU area temperatures will continue to rise until conditions are degraded in two of the areas specified in EOP-4 and Emergency Depressurization is required (Critical Task). The crew will execute EOP-17; however, one SRV will fail to open requiring the crew to utilize Alternate RPV Depressurization Systems (SRV Remote SD Panel) to augment emergency depressurization (Critical Task).
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Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
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RO Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
1 ull Rods to Continue Power Ascension and Transfer RMS to RUN 0
Regularly checks APRM channel indications.
1
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CRS I Brief/Direct power increase IAW PNPS 2.1.I and 2.1.I4 RO 1
RO I
Withdraws control rods in a safe and controlled manner.
Plots power to flow.
Bop Serves as peer checkedsecond verifier during control rod movement.
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r-I RO 1 Monitors RPV power, pressure and level.
Direct transfer of RMS to run.
r-
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I CRS/RO 1 Verify the following are clear:
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RO 0
APRM downscale alarm.
0 All APRM downscale indicators.
0 Low main steam line pressure alarm.
Transfer RMS to run.
CRS Log time and date RMS to run.
CRS CRS RO Notify chemistry RMS to run.
Brief/direct power increase continue:
0 Withdraws control rods in a safe and controlled manner.
RO RO 0
Plots power to flow.
Regularly checks APRM channel indications.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
I 7
II Rods to Continue Power Ascension and Transfer RMS to RUN When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
c RO RO Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Stops raising power with control rods.
Refer to ARP C905L, D8.
Page 5
of 16 I 1 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
2
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Ro APRM E Fails Downscale At Panel C905, check APRM power level and status lights, recognize/report failure of APRM E downscale.
I 1
RO I Recognize/announce APRM downscale alarm.
CRS CRS Send the BOP operator to check the failed APRM on Panel 1
CRS 1 c937.
Recognize / announce that the plant will enter a tracking LCO for the failed APRM.
Direct I&C to troubleshoot APRM E failure.
Go to C937 to verify that E APRM has failed low based on meter indication the lights in alarm.
CRS Direct power increase continue IAW PNPS 2.1. I I
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1 RO I At Panel C905, bypass APRM E.
Refer to Tech Specs. Table 3.1.1 and Table 3.2.C.1 for the I
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Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
RO I
Withdraws control rods in a safe and controlled manner.
I 0
Regularly checks APRM channel indication.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
3 Page 7
of In Service CRD Flow Control Valve Fails CLOSED I
Ro I
CRS 0
Determines no rod movement while attempting to withdraw rods.
Identifies CRD flow indication low.
0 0
Identifies FCV failed closed.
Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.1 1.I, Attachment 5. (page 19) 0 Places CRD FLOW CONTROLLER to MANUAL.
0 Positions controller to CLOSED.
0 Directs standby inlet valve verified locally.
0 Directs standby flow control outlet valve opened slowly 0
Directs in-service flow control valve outlet closed.
Directs selector switch to standby position.
0 Directs valve 301 -29 positioned to standby.
Raise CRD controller setpoint to 50 gpm.
0 Verify flow increases.
Check DRIVE WTR and COOLING WTR DlFF PRESS indicators adjust as needed.
Return flow controller to AUTO.
Adjust DRIVE WTR PCV as necessary.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
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Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
4 Control Rod 22-31 Drifts Outward I
CRS CRS 1
CRS I
CRS Checks full core display.
0 Acknowledges/announces selected rod is drifting.
Acknowledge Alarm refers to ARP C905L, A3.
Verifies rod selected, identifies affected rod drifting out.
Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.1 1, Determines power cannot be reduced further by Recirc flow.
Directs RO to ensure cooling water DIP normal.
Inserts affected rod to 00 position.
Identifies rod remains at 00 position.
Contacts Reactor engineering to modify Rod Sequence sheet and power maneuvering guidance.
Notifies I&C to develop troubleshooting guide IAW PNPS
- 3. M. 1-34.
Refers to Tech Spec 3.3.H for verifying BPWS.
Initiates condition report to document rod drift.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
5 Event
Description:
RFP A Intermittent TBCCW Leak, Place RFP B In Service BOP BOP BOP Acknowledge alarmslreport intermittent TBCCW alarms A RFP.
Direct NLO investigate TBCCW status at A RFP.
Acknowledge/report intermittent TBCCW leak A RFP.
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CRS BOP Exam i ner note Direct B RFP to be placed in service per PNPS 2.2.96, 7.
Place RFP B in service IAW PNPS 2.2.96, Attachment 17.
0 Verify RFP suction pressure > 250 psig.
0 Place FV-3436, RFP B Recirc Vlv C/S to open.
Crew may elect to scram due to TBCCW leak. This action is permissible by procedure. If that occurs, the next event will 1 occur after the scram.
RO Verify reactor water level stable.
I 0 Verify RFP Trip Sys Enable switch is off.
CRS I
Direct A RFP to be removed from service per PNPS 2.2.96, 6 L-start^^^ B.
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I BOP I Place FV-3436, RFP B Recirc Valve C/S to auto:
I 0 Verify RFP B suction pressure > 200 psig at PI-3429
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0 Verify RFP B motor current 650 amps.
0 Verify RFP B discharge pressure at PI-3448.
Verify Aux Oil Pump shutdown light on at C-I.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
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RO Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
5 Event
Description:
RFP A Intermittent TBCCW Leak, Place RFP B In Service 0
Acknowledge and reset expected alarms.
Verify reactor water level stable
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Remove RFP A from service IAW PNPS 2.2.96, 6:
0 Verify RFP Trip Sys Enable switch is off.
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BOP I
Stop RFPA.
0 Verify RFP B motor current 650 amps.
0 Verify Aux Oil Pump running light ON at C-I for RFP C.
I Verify FV-3436, RFP C Recirc Valve CLOSES.
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Verify FV-3436, RFP B Recirc Valve OPEN.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 BOP Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
6 Event
Description:
RWCU Pump " A RBCCW Temp HIGH, Pump Fails to AUTO TRIP 0
Acknowledge/report RWCU pump RBCCW Temp Hi alarm.
CRS Refer to ARP-C904RCl A2.
Direct actions per ARP-C904RCl A2.
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I BOP I Determine/report failure of RWCU pump A to trip.
Stop RWCU pump A.
At panel C l, check RBCCW loop B temp on TR-3835.
At panel C904, check water to RWCU temps on TI-1290-21.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
7 & 8 Event
Description:
I BOP I
Acknowledge/report Steam Leakage Area Temp Hi alarm.
0 Refer to ARP-C904L, A6.
Direct actions per ARP-C904L, AB.
Read temperature of alarming module at panel C921.
Check/monitor RWCU area temps for EOP-4 entry conditions.
Direct RWCU manual isolation.
Attempt RWCU manual isolation. Report failure to isolate.
Recognize/report EOP-4 entry conditions.
Before any area temperature exceeds Max Normal Value, enter EOP-04.
Direct RWCU isolated from 1201-2 and 1201-5 valve motor breakers.
Direct RP to take EOP-04 surveys.
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Direct NLO to start all area coolers.
Dispatch Maintenance or NLO's to attempt to isolate RWCU 1201-2 and 1201-5 locally.
Recognize a primary system is discharging into secondary containment
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Examiner Note Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
7 & 8 Page 13 May be in EOP-I sooner due to scram from TBCCW leak Event
Description:
RWCU Leak Leading to SCRAM; Manual Scram Failure, ARI Required 0
Before any area temperature exceeds Max Safe Value, enter EOP-01.
Directs a manual scram be inserted.
0
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RO 0
Depress both manual scram pushbuttons 0
Place mode switch in shutdown and enter PNPS 2.1.6.
EXAM1 N ER NOTE RO Recognize/report failure to scram.
Override - mode switch in RUN (mode switch failure)
Enters EOP-01 and immediately transitions to EOP-02 based on all controls rods not at or beyond position 02.
CRS Performs the following actions:
0 Verifies mode switch in SHUTDOWN.
CRS CRITICAL I I
Accomplishes reactor scram with either channel of ARI.
TASK Exits EOP-02 and re-enters EOP-01 based on all controls rods inserted to or beyond position 02.
I I 0 Recognizes all control rods inserted fully and informs CRS
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Ro RO Insert IRM and SRM detectors, select two SRMs for recording, and place selector switch for APRM/IRM to IRM.
Verify reactor recirc pumps at minimum speed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
7 & 8 Page 14 of Event
Description:
RWCU Leak Leading to SCRAM; Manual Scram Failure, ARI Required
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0 ECCS initiations.
0 Emergency Diesel Generator initiations.
Direct reactor water level +20 - +40.
Direct reactor pressure 900 to 1050 psig with bypass valves.
Direct a cooldown at <lOO°F.
Commence cooldown at < I 00°F.
1 RO I Verify trip of the turbine.
CRS I
I CRS I Direct verification of:
Determine that Reactor Building Ventilation cannot be restored as a primary system is discharging into secondary containment (EOP-04 override).
I I
I 0 Isolations
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I OP Test No.:
2007 Scenario #
2 Event#
Page 15 -
9 & 1 0 Event
Description:
RWCU Leak Leads to Emergency Depressurization; SRV B Fails to OPEN CRS CRS I
CRITICAL TASK 1
BOP CRITCAL -c I
CRS Recognize and report when any area temperature exceeds Max Safe Value.
Direct the reactor be rapidly depressurized to the main condenser via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves, disregarding the cooldown rate.
Rapidly depressurize the reactor to the main condenser via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves, disregarding the cooldown rate Due to GROUP 1 Isolation - MSlVs close and depressurization will continue with SRVs.
Recognize and report when two or more area temperature exceeds Max Safe Value.
Exit EOP-01 Pressure leg. Enter and direct the activities of EOP-17:
0 Determines steam cooling is not required.
0 Verifies Torus water level is > 50 inches.
0 Directs that all 4 SRVs opened.
Attempts to opens all 4 SRVs. ONLY 3 OPEN - B does not open Enter 5.3.24 to supplement depressurization. ORDERS that 4th SRV is opened from field.
Verify (Acoustic Monitor or Tailpipe Temperature) that all 4 SRVs are open.
Remain in EOP-17 and EOP-01 level control leg.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
9 & I O Page 16 of 16 Event
Description:
RWCU Leak Leads to Emergency Depressurization; SRV B Fails to OPEN The scenario will be terminated at the direction of the Chief Examiner after the Emergency Depressurization is complete.
r-1 I Expected EAL is 4.2.1.3 I
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No.
1 2
3 Facility:
PILGRIM Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
2007 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
Malf.
Event No.
Type*
NIA R - R O NIA N -BOP R R l l A C - R O Initial Conditions:
0 Power is -55%.
0 Defeat Group V Isolation 0
HPCl 00s for Aux Oil Pump Replacement - 14 Day LCO.
RBCCW Pump A (P-202A) OOC, Tracking LCO.
LPRM 36-13-8 is bypassed.
Turnover:
Insert control rods to lower reactor power to 50% for emergency backwash.
The first two steps of the RPR array have been inserted.
Seawater Pump B amps are elevated. Remove Seawater Pump 6 from service and perform emergency backwash.
Engineering is standing by in the screen house to determine when to secure the backwash.
Critical Task:
Inject SLC.
Prevent all injection into the vessel except from SBLC and CRD.
Insert all control rods via manual scram.
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4 IRR04B I I - R O 5
I RD05A I C - R O 6
RR13A C - R O I RR13B I C - BOP M - ALL C-RO 10- I I C - R O Event Description Insert control rods to lower reactor power to 50%
Remove Seawater pump B from service for emergency backwash.
A RRP pump motor vibration high.
B Recirc Loop flow unit failure (TS)
A RRP Inner Seal Failure. A RRP Outer Seal Failure. (AOP) (TS)
RClC Steam Leak, failure to auto isolate. (TS)
Main Turbine Trip, ATWS. (EOP)
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First squib valve fails to open when fired.
RWCU M080 fails to isolate automatically.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Pilqrim 2007 NRC Scenario #3 After taking the watch, control rods will be manually inserted to lower power to 50% prior to the crew removing Seawater pump 8 from service for emergency backwash of the inlet water boxes.
-W*
After backwash is in progress, the crew will respond to a Recirc Pump Motor Vibration High alarm. Recirc Pump speed will be lowered as directed by the ARP. When Recirc pump speed has been reduced a small amount, the Recirc Pump Motor Vibration Monitor will reset.
After the Recirc Pump Motor Vibration High alarm is reset, the B Recirc Flow Unit will fail. The crew will take actions in accordance with the ARP and a Tech Spec LCO will be entered.
After Tech Specs have been evaluated, the A CRD Pump will trip. The crew will take actions per PNPS 2.4.4, Loss of CRD Pumps, including immediate action to verify reactor pressure is greater than 950 psig. When directed, the RO will place the standby CRD Pump in service.
When the standby CRD Pump is in service, the A Recirc Pump inner and outer seals will fail in sequence. Initially, the inner seal will fail requiring action to monitor seal status and drywell conditions per the ARP as well as entry into PNPS 2.4.22. After a brief period of time, the outer seal will fail. When the crew determines a catastrophic seal failure has occurred, the A Recirc Pump will be tripped and isolated. After the A Recirc Pump is tripped, the crew will estimate total core flow, plot the location on Power/Flow Map, and take actions in accordance with PNPS 2.4.17, Recirc Pump Trip.
\\/
When conditions have stabilized, a steam leak will develop in the RClC steam line, and RClC will fail to isolate automatically. The crew is expected to take action to isolate RClC manually.
When RClC is isolated (and with HPCl already inoperable), the CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and enter a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO.
After Tech Specs have been addressed, the main turbine will trip and an ATWS will result due to hydraulic lock of the scram discharge volume. The CRS is expected to enter and direct actions per EOP-02, including SLC initiation. When the SLC Actuate switch is placed in the SYS A
or SYS B position, the selected SLC pump will start; however, the associated squib valve will fail to open as indicated by high SLC pump discharge pressure and zero indicated flow. The reactor operator is expected to select the alternate train and inject SLC (Critical Task).
Additionally, the RWCU return isolation valve (M080) will fail to auto isolate, requiring manual operator action to isolate the RWCU system. Injection will be prevented from all systems except boron and CRD (Critical Task), and ATWS actions will continue per EOP-02 until all rods have been fully inserted (Critical Task); EOP-01 has been entered, and reactor level is in the normal band.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS RO RO Op Test No.:
Scenario#
3 Event#
I Page 3 of 13
-d Event
Description:
Insert Control Rods to Lower Power to 50%
Directs control rod insertion using the RPR array IAW PNPS 2.1.I4 Section 7.9 to lower power to 50%.
Inserts control rods IAW PNPS 2.1.I4 Section 7.9 Closely monitors power, level, and pressure on C905.
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Track location on power to flow map.
w e d i r e c t e d b y Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
2 Event
Description:
I I
Remove Seawater Pump B from Service and Backwashing Inlet Water Boxes through Pump 8 Examiner
I
1 CRS 1
BOP BOP EN-OP-I 15 describes limitations of 2 handed control board operations.
Direcffbrief removing seawater pump B from service and backwashing 1-1 and 1-3 inlet water boxes through pump B Remove Seawater pump B from service for backwash 0
RECORD Circulating Water Pump amps.
0 VERIFY Outlet Crossover Valves MO-3866 and MO-3876 OPEN.
0 Close Water Box Outlet Valves MO-3883 and MO-3881.
0 0
Close Water Box Inlet Valves MO-3872 and MO-3870.
When the first Water Box Inlet Valve white light (12 to 18%
OPEN position) comes on stop Seawater Pump B, P-l05B Backwash 1-1 and 1-3 inlet water boxes through pump B 0
0 0
Open Water Box Inlet Valves MO-3872 and MO-3870.
Close Water Box Outlet Valves MO-3882 and MO-3880.
Verify vapor valves to the steam jet air ejectors AO-3710 and AO-3704 are open.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
L Atmendix D OPerator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
A RRP Pump Motor Vibration HIGH Recognizelannounce RRP Pump Motor Vibration High alarm and refer to ARP C904RC, 66.
Directs action taken IAW ARP C904RC, 66.
At panel C904, attempt to reset vibration monitor by depressing vibration monitor reset button.
Lower Recirc Pump A speed. (May raise speed to clear vibration alarm - permitted by Alarm Response)
Monitor power, pressure and level.
I Reset vibration monitor.
Plot position on power to flow map.
I When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
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2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
4 Acknowledges/announces 6 Recirc Flow Converter Failure alarm (refers to ARP).
Determines B Recirc Flow Converter has failed.
Refers to Tech Spec Tables 3.1.1
-1 CRS I Initiates LCO for Table 3.1.I condition C When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Page 7
of 13 I Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
5 Event
Description:
A CRD Pump Trip Time Position I
Applicants Actions or Behavior
--P-I CRS I
CRS RO Acknowledges/announces trip of A CRD pump. Refer to ARP C905R, A6.
Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.4.
Checks power, pressure, level. Performs immediate actions of PNPS 2.4.4:
0 0
No inoperable accumulator alarms.
Notes pressure greater than 950 psig.
Directs RO to start standby CRD pump IAW with PNPS 2.4.4.
0 Transfers FCV to manual and closes.
0 Starts B CRD pump.
0 Balances deviation meter.
Verifies pump amp and discharge pressure stabilize.
Transfers CRD controller to AUTO.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
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A p p e n d i x 7
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-Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Ro Op Test No.:
Scenario #
3 Event#
6 Event
Description:
'A' RRP Inner Seal Failure. A RRP Outer Seal Failure Acknowledges/announces Recirc pump A seal staging flow high alarm. Refers to ARP C904RC, D6.
Ro CRS Ro I
I CRS I Directs action taken IAW ARP C904RC, D6.
At Panel C904, checks RRP A seal cavity pressures on Pl-262-17A and Pl-262-18A. Determines/reports inner seal has failed.
References PNPS 2.4.22, Failure of Recirc Pump Seal.
Acknowledges/announces Recirc pump A seal leakage high alarm. Refers to ARP C904RC, C6.
CRS Ro Directs action taken IAW ARP C904RC, C6.
At Panel C904, checks RRP A seal cavity pressures on Pl-262-17A and Pl-262-18A. Determines/reports outer seal has failed.
CRS I
Directs 'A RRP tripped and isolated.
Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.22, Failure of Recirc Pump Seal:
0 Determines a catastrophic seal failure has occurred.
I RO I
Stops RRP'A.
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0 0
Closes Seal Water Block Valve AO-5150A Closes Pump Suction Valve MO-202-4A.
0 When MO-202-4A indicates closed, closes Pump Discharge Valve MO-202-5A.
Closes Recirc Pump Purge Block Valve F-008A.
0 Monitors drywell leakage, drywell temperature, and drywell pressure.
1 CREW 1
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Ro 1
Scenario#
3 Event#
6 Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
'A RRP Inner Seal Failure. A RRP Outer Seal Failure Monitors the idle recirculation loop suction temperature in accordance with Attachment 6 of, PNPS 2.2.84.
RO/CRS CRS I
CRS I Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.17, Recirc Pump Trip.
I Estimate total core flow and plot location on Power/Flow Map.
Restores compliance with Tech Spec 3.6.F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
7 RClC Steam Leak, Failure to Auto Isolate BOP CRS BOP CREW I
1 BOPKRS I
Acknowledgeheport Steam Leakage Area Temp Hi alarm.
0 Refer to ARP-C904L, A6.
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Direct actions per ARP-C904L, A6.
Read temperature of alarming module at panel C921.
Check/monitor RClC area temps for EOP-4 entry conditions.
Determine RClC steam IeaWfailure to auto isolate.
Direct RClC manual isolation.
Manually isolate RCIC.
Close RClC Inboard and Outboard Isolation Valves MO-1301-16 and MO-1301-17.
Reference Tech Specs 3.5.C.3 and 3.5.D.3 - 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO for RClC and HPCl inoperable.
1 When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
8,9,& 10 Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
Main Turbine Trip, ATWS; First Squib Valve Fails to Open When Fired; RWCU M080 Fails to Isolate Automatically CRITICAL TASK RO CRS CRS RO CRS RO/BOP RO Recognize/report failure to scram.
Enters EOP-01 and immediately transitions to EOP-02 based on all controls rods not at or beyond position 02.
Verifies the immediate actions required by EOP-02:
0 Verifies mode switch in SHUTDOWN.
Verifies both channels of ARI initiated.
0 Verifies the turbine has tripped.
I 0
0 Recognizes reactor power is above 3%.
Verifies both Recirc. pumps are tripped.
Performs the following actions:
0 Verifies mode switch in SHUTDOWN.
0 0
Initiates both channels of ARI.
Recognizes the turbine has tripped.
0 Recognizes reactor power is above 3%.
I Tripdverifies tripped both Recirc. Pumps.
I When RPV level is determined to be greater than - 25 inches enters the Q Leg of EOP-02 and performs the following steps:
0 Orders stop and prevent all injection into the vessel except from SBLC and CRD.
Stops and Prevents injection IAW PNPS 5.3.35.1, AT. 35.
Closes/verifies closed the feedwater heater downstream block valves and Startup Feed Reg. Valve.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Ro Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
8,9, & 10 Page 12 of 13 I Start one SBLC system by placing the SLC ACTUATE switch to SYS A or SYS B position on Panel C905.
Event
Description:
Main Turbine Trip, ATWS; First Squib Valve Fails to Open When Fired; RWCU M080 Fails to Isolate Automatically Recognize/report that after starting the first SBLC train that the pump starts but the squib valve fails to open.
Direct using other train of SBLC.
Start the opposite SBLC train with the SLC ACTUATE switch.
CRITICAL TASK Ro RO CRITICAL TASK Recognizelreport that the A SBLC pump is running & injecting.
Verifies Boron.
Recognizes/reports failure of RWCU M080 to auto isolate.
Places the control switches for the RHR and Core Spray pumps in the PTL position.
CRS RO Direct RWCU manual isolation as required by EOP-02 or Operations Policy Statement.
Manually close RWCU M080.
Enters PNPS 5.3 23, Alternate Rod Insertion. Determines that there is an hydraulic lock and goes to Section 3.3 of the procedure and performs it concurrently with the General Actions section of the procedure.
When requested, I&C defeats RPS and ARI interlocks IAW PNPS 5.3.23 ATT.l and 2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Main Turbine Trip, ATWS; First Squib Valve Fails to Open When Fired; RWCU M080 Fails to Isolate Automatically Page Of 7 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
8,9, & 10 Event
Description:
0 Initiates a manual scram.
Verifies and announces all rods in.
When all rods are in transitions to EOP-01. Orders RPV water level be restored and maintained between +20 and +40 inches.
Initiates a cooldown using HPCl or SRVs at less than 100 per hour.
CRITICAL TASK BOP CRS I Asks the crew to report any of the following plant conditions:
The scenario will be terminated at the direction of the Chief Examiner when level has been restored to between +20 and
+40 and a cooldown has been initiated.
Rx power ~ 3 %
(APRM downscales are in).
RPV water level reaches -125 inches TAF.
Performs the following actions to reset and scram the reactor:
Ro I
Resets and verifies reset the scram using the RPS reset switch.
Places the Air Dump System Test Switch to ISOLATE.
Waits forherifies the SPVAH Pressure Lo alarm clears.
I Places the Air Dump System Test Switch to NORMAL.
Verifies either SDlV Level Hi or SDlV East Not Drained 7
and SDlV West Not Drained alarms are clear.
Restores and maintains RPV level +20 to +40. Initiates a cooldown at less than 100 per hour.
I Expected EAL is 2.3.1.3. (SAE) e
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 5
6 Facility:
PILGRIM Scenario No.:
4 Op Test No.:
2007 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
RR20A I - R O B Recirc Flow Controller fails upscale. (TS) (AOP)
MS14D M-ALL D SRV fails open. Manual reactor scam. (AOP) (EOP)
Initial Conditions:
0 Power is 100%.
0 HPCl 00s for Aux Oil Pump Replacement - 14 Day LCO.
~-
0 0
LPRM 36-13-B is bypassed.
RBCCW Pump A (P-202A) OOC, Tracking LCO.
Turnover:
Shift TBCCW Pumps in preparation for vibration checks on B Pump.
0 Lower power to 90% for control rod pattern adjustment.
~~
Critical Task:
Spray Drywell.
Emergency Depressurization.
Event No.
Event Description Shift TBCCW Pumps in preparation for vibration checks on B lNiA IN-BoP IPump.
2 I NIA-I R - RO I Reduce power with Recirc.
~~ 3 1 NMG 1 I -ALL 1 LPRM 36-45-B fails upscale. (TS) (AOP) 36-45-B 4
I TC06 I I BOP I EPR Pressure Oscillations. (TS) (AOP) 7 I
R H
0 4
B I C - BOP-I PASS H2/02 Sample valves fail to Isolate.
8 1
I C - BOP I RBCCW to A RHR HX inlet valve fails shut.
D SRV tail pipe fails leading to Emergency Depressurization.
I pc22 IM-ALL I (EOP - C)
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Pilqrim 2007 NRC Scenario #4 After taking the watch, as directed in the shift turnover, the crew will shift TBCCW pumps. After the TBCCW pumps have been swapped, the crew will proceed with a planned power reduction using Recirc flow.
e While the planned power reduction is underway, LPRM 36-45-B will fail upscale, and the CRS will enter and direct actions per PNPS 2.4.38, LPRM Failure. The crew will bypass the failed LPRM and verify that APRM AGAFs and thermal limits are in spec. The crew will also determine that the affected APRM has less than 2 LPRM inputs in a level, making the affected APRM inoperable per TS 3.1, Table 3.1.
After the power reduction is complete, the EPR will begin to oscillate, and the CRS will direct actions per PNPS 2.4.37, Turbine Control System Malfunctions. The crew will take control with the MPR, and the EPR power control switch will be placed to off, stabilizing reactor pressure and power. With the EPR removed from service, the plant will enter an administrative LCO requiring both pressure regulators be restored within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or the plant be 25% CTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
After the administrative LCO has been addressed, the B Recirc flow controller will fail upscale resulting in an increase in core flow and reactor power. When the flow controller failure has been diagnosed, the crew will initiate a scoop lockup per PNPS 2.4.20, Reactor Recirculation System Speed or Flow Control System Malfunction. The crew will then take actions per PNPS 2.4.1 9, Recirculation Pump MG Set Scoop Tube Lockup, including an evaluation of Recirc pump speeds against the Tech Spec 3.6.F limits. The CRS should also identify and brief the crew on the need to trip the B Recirc pump in the event of a reactor SCRAM.
I W
When the required actions have been directed for the Scoop Tube Lockup, the D SRV will indicate open and Torus temperature will rise. The CRS will enter and direct actions per PNPS 2.4.29, Stuck Open Safety Relief Valve; however, the D SRV will fail to close, requiring a manual reactor scram. Following the scram, the RO should trip the B Recirc pump. The CRS will enter and direct EOP-01, and the BOP operator should identify a failure of PASS H202 Sample valves to isolate, requiring operator action to close the valves. With the SRV still open, Torus cooling will be initiated. The RBCCW inlet to the A RHR HX inlet valve will fail shut requiring additional operator action to lineup RBCCW. When Torus temperature rises to 80°F, EOP-03 will be entered.
After Torus cooling has been placed in service, the D SRV tail pipe will fail, resulting in rising Torus and Drywell pressure, and EOP-03 and EOP-01 will be re-entered on high drywell pressure. Torus and drywell spray (Critical Task) will be initiated as Torus bottom pressure continues to rise; however, with the broken SRV tail pipe continuing to degrade, Torus bottom pressure will rise, and emergency depressurization (EOP Contingency) (Critical Task) will be required prior to exceeding the limits of the Pressure Suppression Pressure curve.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
1 2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
Direct Starting B TBCCW pump and securing A TBCCW pump IAW PNPS 2.2.31 section 7.6.
At Panel C1, verify TBCCW system pressure of approximately 50 to 60 psig on PI-4162.
Start B TBCCW pump. Verify proper indications, TBCCW system pressure between 50 and 60 psig.
Stop A TBCCW pump. Monitor/verify proper system response.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Anoendix D OPerator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
2 Event
Description:
Reduce Power With Recirc Inform I&C standby to adjust AGAFs to less than or equal to 0.975.
I I
CRS I BrieflDirect power decrease IAW PNPS 2.1.I4 section 7.5.
I Ro BOP At Panel 904, use the Recirc. Pump speed controllers to lower core flow.
Verify SPEED LOAD CHANGER position 100 percent.
I RO I Plot position on power to flow map.
I When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 RO RO RO I
I Recognize/announce LPRM Hi alarm.
Stops reducing power with recirc.
Refer to ARP C905L, F8.
Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
3 RO Event
Description:
LPRM 36-45-B Fails Upscale Check amber HI status lights on full core display.
Send the BOP operator to check the failed LPRM on Panel CRS c937.
I
~~
~
Ro I
CRS I Directs action taken IAW ARP C905L, F8.
I Notify Reactor Engineering.
Direct LPRM 36-45-8 bypassed on Panel C937.
Verify failed LPRM by demanding "Instrument Readings /
Status Raw LPRM Readings Log" 3D Monicore, FIO key.
I I
CRS I Enter and direct PNPS 2.4.38, LPRM Failure.
I I
I Verify failed LPRM.
I I
I Bypass failed LPRM on Panel C937 in accordance with PNPS 2.2.66: Attachment 4.
Record the LPRM to be bypassed.
Bypass the APRM channel in which the LPRM inputs.
Verify APRM channel bypass light ON at C905 and C937.
At Panel C937, bypass LPRM 36-45-B by placing the thumb switch (S-I) to the "BY" position.
Determine number of LPRM inputs to affected APRM.
I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 RO Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
3 Event
Description:
LPRM 36-45-B Fails Upscale Select the control rods around the bypassed LPRM AND VERIFY that the RBM HVINOP AND the Rod Withdrawal Block lights are NOT lit.
0 0
Demand a 3D Monicore Core Power and Flow Log.
Demand an official monitoring case.
CRS r
Determines effected APRM has less than 2 LPRM inputs per level.
0 Ensure APRM AGAFs and thermal limits are within acceptable li mi ts.
~~
~
References TS 3.1, Table 3.1.I and declares effected APRM CRS inoperable.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 RO/BOP CRS Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
4 Page 7 of 15 Event
Description:
EPR Pressure Oscillations Recognize/announce EPR failure.
Enter and direct PNPS 2.4.37, Turbine Control System Malfunctions.
CRS RO I Monitors reactor pressure and power.
When MPR takes control, place the EPR power control switch to the off position.
Enter administrative LCO to restore both pressure regulating devices within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be c 25% CTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Attempt to take control of Reactor pressure with the MPR by holding the MPR set point control switch in the lower position.
BOP 1
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
5 I RO/BOP 1
I CRS RO/CRS CRS/RO I
I CRS 1
CRS I
CRS Recognize/announce increasing reactor power.
Refer to PNPS 2.4.13.
Determine the cause of the unexplained rapid increase:
Reactor Recirculation System Speed or Flow Control System Malfunction, PNPS 2.4.20.
Refer to PNPS 2.4.20.
Direct initiating scoop lockup of B Recirc pump.
~~
Initiates 6 Recirc pump scoop tube lockup.
Direct entry into PNPS 2.4.19.
Direct assessment of power to flow conditions.
Plot power and flow on power to flow map.
Monitor PBDS recorders for oscillations.
Ensures loop flows balanced IAW PNPS 2.2.84.
above 80% power.)
(Within 10%
Notify I&C to investigate and repair.
Request licensed operator standby for manual operation of scoop tube positioner.
Verify pump speeds within Tech Spec limits 3.6.F.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS CRS Page 9 of 15 -
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
5 B Recirc Flow controller Fails Upscale 1
Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
Determines that if pump speeds cannot be brought within limits within 30 minutes shutdown will be required.
Identifies need to trip Recirc pump in event of SCRAM.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
6,7, & 8 Page 10 Event
Description:
mple Valve Fails to I
BOP CRS CRS CRS Identify/announce D SRV open.
Reference ARP C903L, B2.
Direct entry into PNPS 2.4.29.
Direct monitoring of Torus bulk temperature and note time.
~~
Direct BOP to attempt cycling of D SRV switch.
Cycles D SRV switch identifies D SRV remains open.
As time permits, attempt to lower power either by reducing A Recirc Pump Speed or Tripping the B Recirc Pump IAW PNPS 2.1.14 NOTE: Administrative limit of 10% loop to loop flow difference )
~~
Briefs requirement for manual reactor scram if D SRV remains open.
When it has been determined that the safety relief valve cannot be closed, direct a manual reactor scram.
0 Depress both manual scram pushbuttons.
Place mode switch in shutdown and enter PNPS 2.1.6.
~~~
Verify and announce the status of APRM downscales.
Verifv all control rods are fully inserted.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario #
4 Event#
6,7, & 8 Page 11 of 15 I Event
Description:
I I
D SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor scram; PASS H2/02 Sample Valve Fails to Isolate (CV91); RBCCW to A RHR HX inlet Valve Fails Shut RO RO RO RO BOP/RO CRS CRS RO CRS BOP Insert IRM and SRM detectors, select two SRMs for recording, and place selector switch for APRM/IRM to IRM.
Verify reactor recirc pump A at minimum speed.
Trip Recirc pump B (scoop tube lockup).
Verify trip of the turbine.
Report EOP-01 entry conditions.
Enters EOP-1. Direct verification of:
0 Isolations.
0 ECCS initiations.
0 Emergency Diesel Generator initiations.
Direct reactor water level +20 - +40 inches.
Immediate Actions of 2. I
.6 - step [5]
Close Feed Reg Valves and FW HP Block Valves.
Secure Feed Pumps and Condensate as reuired to maintain level in band.
Reactor will be fed thru Startup Reg Vlv.
Direct reactor pressure 900 to 1050 psig with bypass valves and open SRV.
Identifies/reports PASS H2/02 Sample valve CV91 failed to Isolate.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
I Manually closes PASS H2/02 Sample valve CV91.
Recognize/announce EOP-03 entry conditions.
2007 Scenario #
Event#
When Torus temperature cannot be maintained that Torus cooling be maximized.
80°F, directs Maximizes Torus cooling.
Identify RBCCW to A RHR HX inlet valve failed shut.
6,7, & 8 Event
Description:
D SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor scram; PASS H2/02 Sample Valve Fails to Isolate (CV91); RBCCW to A RHR HX inlet Valve Fails Shut CRS I Directs PASS H2/02 Sample valve CV91 manually closed.
BOP I Places 2 loops of Torus cooling in service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1
1 I Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
9 Page 13 of 15 I Event
Description:
D SRV Tail Pipe Fails Leading to emergency Depressurization CREW CRS CRS RO/BOP RO/BOP
---P
I
RO/BOP CRS Recognize/report rising Torus and Drywell Pressure.
~~
Recognize/announce EOP-03 re-entry.
Recognize/announce EOP-01 re-entry.
Continues to maintain reactor level in band directed by CRS (approx. 20 to 40 inches)
Report to the CRS when out of current RPV IeveVpressure band.
Establish new pressure bands as the reactor depressurizes due to the leak.
When Drywell temperature cannot be maintained c 1 50°F, directs that Drywell cooling be maximized.
Maximizes Drywell cooling.
Maximizes RBCCW on the B loop of RBCCW.
Before torus bottom pressure reaches 16 psig, directs that Torus spray be placed in service using A or B RHR. Directs that Torus Spray secured if Drywell pressure goes below 2.2 psig.
Starts Torus Spray using A or B RHR.
When Torus Bottom pressure exceeds 16 psig:
Verifies Drywell temperature and pressure within DSlL (Fig. 5).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
9 Page 14 of 15 1 I
d Event
Description:
D SRV Tail Pipe Fails Leading to emergency Depressurization 0
Verifies torus water level below 180 inches.
0 Verifies Recirc pumps shutdown.
~
0 Directs that Drywell sprays be placed in service using A/B RHR loops.
0 Directs that Drywell spray secured if Drywell pressure goes below 2.2 psig.
CRITICAL TASK BOP initiates Drywell Sprays as directed.
One of the drywell spray valves will fail and only one loop of drywell spray will be available.
EXAMINER NOTE CREW Recognize Containment pressure approaching limits of PSP.
If available, Direct the reactor be rapidly depressurized to the main condenser via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves, disregarding the cooldown rate.
CRS If directed, Rapidly depressurize the reactor to the main condenser via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves, disregarding the cooldown rate BOP CRS Before exceeding the limits of the PSP curve, directs Exit EOP-01 Pressure leg. Enter and direct the activities of EOP-17:
0 0
Determines steam cooling is not required.
Verifies Torus water level is > 50 inches.
0 Directs that all 4 SRVs opened.
If determined D SRV tail pipe has failed, directs remaining SRVs opened and 5.3.24 to supplement depressurization.
Opens all 4 SRVs.
CRITICAL TASK BOP
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS 2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
9 Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
D SRV Tail Pipe Fails Leading to emergency Depressurization Remain in EOP-17 and EOP-01 level control leg.
Verify (Acoustic Monitor or Tailpipe Temperature) that all SRVs I
I are open.
The scenario will be terminated at the direction of the Chief Examiner after the Emergency Depressurization is complete.