ML070610472
| ML070610472 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 12/11/2006 |
| From: | Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| To: | Johnson G Operations Branch I |
| Sykes, Marvin D. | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML060800104 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML070610472 (61) | |
Text
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility:
PILGRIM Scenario No.:
1 Op Test No.:
2007 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
initial Conditions:
Power was lowered to 90% for control rod pattern adjustment which has been completed.
HPCl 00s for Aux Oil Pump Replacement - 14 Day LCO.
RBCCW Pump A (P-202A) OOS, bearing work - Tracking LCO.
0 LPRM 36-13-B is bypassed.
Turnover:
B CRD Suction filter D/P is high. Replace filter IAW 2.2.87, Attachment
- 2.
Return power to 100% using recirc flow.
Zritical Task:
Manually align RClC and inject to the vessel.
Places the ADS Inhibit switch in the INHIBIT position.
Emergency Depressurization.
Event No.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 I O Inject with Low Pressure ECCS.
Malf.
Event Event No.
Type*
Description N/A N-RO Swap CRD Pumps for suction filter replacement.
NIA R-RO Raise reactor power with Recirc.
Fwo9 I - RO Master FWLC fails as is. (AOP) c w o 5 8 l E P -1 pE3CW B pump trip with failure of standby pump to auto start.
~.
R N r l I -% -~
I FWLC NR Channel B fails high. (AOP) (TS)
FW21B C -ALL Condensate pump B trips. (AOP)
ED06 M - ALL Loss of all offsite power. (EOP)
I/O C - BOP RClC Injection Mode Push Button Fails.
RClC auto initiation fails.
PCOl CS02A CS02B RH04B M -ALL C - BOP Recirc leak in Drywell leads to Emergency Depressurization on low RPV level. (EOP - C)
A CS Injection valve (25A) failure to auto open.
B CS Injection valve (25A) failure to auto open.
B RHR LPCl injection valve failure to auto open (298).
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrurnent, (C)omponent.
(M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Pilqrim 2007 NRC Scenario #I Power was reduced to 90% for a control rod pattern adjustment. Due to CRD Pump suction filter high DIP, the FSS will request the crew to swap CRD Pumps. After CRD pumps have been swapped, the crew will raise reactor power with recirc as directed in the shift turnover.
When raising power with recirc, the FWLC Master Controller will fail as is requiring the crew to enter procedure 2.4.49, Feedwater Malfunctions and place the Master FWLC Controller in manual.
After level is stable with the FWLC Master Controller in manual, RBCCW pump B will trip and the standby pump will fail to auto start requiring operator action to start the standby RBCCW pump.
After Tech Specs are evaluated for RBCCW, FWLC Narrow Range Channel B fails high, requiring the crew to swap to Narrow Range Channel A and evaluate Tech Specs.
When Tech Specs have been referenced for the narrow range transmitter failure, Condensate Pump B will trip resulting in a trip of the B RFP and an automatic Recirc runback when RPV drops to I 9 inches. Because the WdLC Master Controller is in manual, the crew must closely monitor and control RPV level during the Recirc runback.
When conditions have stabilized following the Condensate Pump trip and recirc runback, a loss of all offsite power will occur resulting in a loss of all feedwater and a reactor scram. The crew will enter and execute EOP-1. Following the scram, RCIC will fail to initiate automatically, and the RCIC Injection Mode Push Button will also fail, requiring the crew to manually align RClC and inject to the vessel (Critical Task). The crew will also maximize injection with the available CRD pump, SLC, and inhibit auto ADS (Critical Task).
Once conditions have stabilized post scram, a recirc leak will develop in the drywell and drywell pressure will rise, requiring EOP-3 entry and EOP-I re-entry. Torus cooling, torus spray, and drywell spray will be directed in accordance with EOP-3. As required by EOP-1, the crew will maximize flow with available high pressure injection systems; however, the recirc leak in Drywell will continue to worsen and vessel level will lower until Emergency Depressurization (Critical Task) (EOP Contingency) and injection with low pressure ECCS systems is required. When all SRVs have been opened and the low RPV pressure valve permissives are received, both Core Spray injection valves and the B LPCI injection valve will fail to open automatically requiring manual operator action to open the valves and recover vessel level (Critical Task).
Amendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 I
I Page 3
of 15 I I Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
1 Event#
1 Event
Description:
Swap CRD Pumps for Suction Filter Replacement Time
[
Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior R"
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~
~~
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BriefIDirect Swap of CRD Pumps Establish communications between Control Room and the CRD pump area Direct NLO to check valve lineup of standby CRD pump A At Panel C905, place FIC-340-1, CRD Flow Control in manual and slowly lower flow to 20 GPM Start standby CRD pump A Direct NLO to check standby CRD pump A normal operation At Panel C905, stop CRD pump B Direct NLO to check CRD pump B has stopped spinning Verify charging water pressure on PI-340-3 2 950 psig At Panel C905, slowly raise setpoint of FIC-340-1, CRD flow control, to 50 GPM, observing the flow rises as setpoint is raised At Panel C905, return FIC-340-1, CRD Flow Control to auto At Panel C905, v e r i charging header pressure on PI-340-3 reads approximately 1475 psig.
At Panel C905, check the following AP indicators and adjust
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
Page 4
of 15 I
I OpTestNo.:
2007 Scenario#
1 Event#
1 1 pressures if needed:
Event
Description:
Swap CRD Pumps for Suction Filter Replacement Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Direct CRD Pump B suction filter replacement.
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Drive water differential pressure.
Cooling water differential pressure.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
1 Event#
2 Page 5 of 15 Event
Description:
Raise Reactor Power with Recirc Brief/Direct power increase IAW PNPS 2.1.14 section 7.2 Time I
Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO RO RO At Panel 904, use the Recirc. Pump speed controllers to raise core flow and reactor power at less than 5% per minute Plot position on power to flow map Monitor power, pressure and level
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
i Page Of -=i Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario #
1 Event#
3 I
Event
Description:
Master FWLC Fails As Is I
R*
I CRS I
R*
-t CRS I
Recognize/announce reactor level lowering.
If alarming, recognize/announce Rx Water Level Lo alarm and refer to ARP C905R, D7.
0 At Panel C905, check LWFR-640-26 NR level.
~~
~~~
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0 0
At Panel C905, check LI-640-29A & B NR level.
At Panel C905, check Ll-263-IOOA & B NR level.
Direct power increase stopped.
Stops raising power with Recirc flow.
If Rx Water Level Lo alarming, directs action taken IAW ARP C905R-D7.
Enter and direct actions IAW PNPS 2.4.49, Feedwater Malfunctions:
0 Place the Master Level Controller in manual and restore level to normal.
At Panel C905, place the Master Level Controller in manual and restore level to normal.
Direct 18C to investigate and repair Master Level Controller failure.
Directdbriefs actions for reactor level control.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Page Of 9 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
1 Event#
4 Event
Description:
RBCCW "B" Pump Trip Time I
Position 1
Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1
ti"'-
I BOP CRS BOP CRS CRS Acknowledgeslannounces trip of 'B' RBCCW pump.
At panel C1, checks PI-4058, RBCCW Loop A pressure.
At panel C1, starts 'C' RBCCW pump.
Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.42 section 4.4.
Monitordverifies RBCCW system for proper response.
Refer to Tech Spec 3.5.B.3.A.l to initiate active LCO.
Determine EAL not exceeded.
I When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action F
o
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ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario #
1 Event#
5 Page 8 of 15 Event
Description:
FWLC NR Channel '6" Fails HIGH Ro I
Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
At Panel C905, select channel 'A' on the REACTOR LEVEL SELECTOR switch.
I RO I Recognize/announce Rx Water Level Hi alarm:
CRS At Panel C905, check LWFR-640-26 NR level.
Direct entry into PNPS 2.4.49.
T O
I Refer to ARP-C905R, C-8 CRS
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~-
Determine that channel '6' of the RNLC range has failed 1
1 upscale and is currently selected.
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Direct 18C to investigate and correct cause of alarm.
p~
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Acknowledge and announce that REACTOR WTR LEVEL HI I
Ro I alarm has cleared.
I I
CRS I Refer to Tech. Specs. Table 3.2.F, Note 7.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action F
o
~
2007 Scenario#
1 Event#
6 Page 9 of 15 I
Plot position on power to flow map.
Event
Description:
Condensate Pump B TRIPS Time I
Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledges/announces trip of B Condensate pump and B 1
IRFP.
~~~
~~~~
r RO 1 Acknowledges/announces Recirc runback to 44% speed.
I RO I Monitor power, pressure and level.
1 RO 1 Controls reactor level in manual, restores level to normal band.
I BOP I Refers to ARP-ClL, A-6 and A-2.
1 CRS I Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.49, Loss of Feed.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
1 Event#
7 & 8 Page 10 of 15 Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power; RClC Injection Mode Push Button Fails, RClC Auto Initiation Fails; Recirc Leak in Drywell Leads to Emergency Depressurization on Low RPV Level Time I
Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CRS Recognizelreport reactor scram.
Directs mode switch taKen to SHUTDOWN and perform action of PNPS 2.1.6.
1 RO I Place mode switch in shutdown and enter PNPS 2.1.6.
RO Ro I
RO 1 Verify and announce the status of APRM downscales.
Verify all control rods are fully inserted.
Insert IRM and SRM detectors, select two SRMs for recording, and place selector switch for APRM/IRM to IRM.
RO I
RO I Verify reactor recirc pumps at minimum speed.
Verify trip of the turbine.
CRS Direct reactor water level +20 - +40 inches using RCIC.
I I
CRS 1 Direct reactor pressure 900 to 1050 psig with SRVs.
ALL BOPlRO Identify LOSP.
Report EOP-01 entry conditions.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1
I Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
1 Event#
7 & 8 Page 11 of 15 I
Event
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power; RClC Injection Mode Push Button Fails, RCIC Auto Initiation Fails; Recirc Leak in Drywell Leads to Emergency Depressurization on Low RPV Level I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1
1 1
BOP I
ALL cR5 CRITCAL I TASK I
BOP I
I BOP Enters EOP-1. Direct verification of:
Isolations.
ECCS initiations.
0 Emergency Diesel Generator initiations.
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Announces entry into 2.4.1 6, "Distribution Alignment Electrical Systems Malfunctions". Directs actions be taken per 2.4.16.
As directed, take actions IAW PNPS 2.4.16.
Recognize that the MSlVs have closed.
Directs that RPV pressure maintained using SRVs.
Attempt to manually initiate RCIC.
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Recognize/report failure of RClC to start and inject.
Direct RClC manually aligned for injection per PNPS 5.3.35.1, 9.
Manually align RClC for injection per PNPS 5.3.35.1, 9.
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Maintain RPV level using RCIC +20 - +40 inches.
Maintains RPV pressure using SRVs 900 - 1050 psig.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
A CS Injection Valve (25A) Failure to Auto Open; B CS Injection Valve (25A)
Failure to Auto Open; 8 RHR LPCl Injection Valve Failure to Auto Open (298)
CRS 1 BOP/RO Recognize/announce EOP-03 entry on High DW pressure Recognize/announce rising drywell parameters Report to the CRS when out of current RPV IeveVpressure 1 RoBoP 1 band.
1 CRS Establish new pressure bands as the reactor depressurizes due to the leak.
When Drywell temperature cannot be maintained 150°F, I directs that Drywell cooling be maximized.
CRS Note:Drywell area cooler load shed must be defeated
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NOTE:
Drywell area cooler load shed must be defeated.
Maximizes RBCCW on the B loop of RBCCW.
Maximizes Drywell cooling.
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When Torus temperature cannot be maintained < 80°F, directs that Torus cooling be maximized.
Maximizes RBCCW. Maximizes Torus cooling.
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Recognize/announce EOP-01 re-entry.
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Before drywell pressure reaches 16 psig, directs that Torus spray be placed in service using A or B RHR. Directs that Torus Spray secured if Drywell pressure goes below 2.2 psig.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
2007 Scenario#
1 Event#
981 IO Page 13 of I
Starts Torus Spray using A or B RHR.
Directs that CRD pump load shed be defeated per PNPS 2.4.4, LOSS of CRD Pumps.
Using PNPS 2.4.4, Loss of CRD Pumps calls I&C and has CRD Pump load shed defeated.
Event
Description:
I
~~
CRS A
CS.Injection Valve (25A) Failure to Auto Open; B CS Injection Valve (25A)
Failure to Auto Open; B RHR LPCl Injection Valve Failure to Auto Open (29B)
Determines water level cannot be maintained above + 12 and establishes a new band between -125 and +45.
0 Directs CRD lined up for injection with one pump.
Time I
Position I
Applicants Actions or Behavior I
RO Lines up CRD for injection with one pump IAW PNPS 2.2.87 I
RO I Recognizelannounce that RClC is not keeping up with the leak.
RO CRS Injects SBLC When Drywell pressure exceeds 16 psig:
I 0 Directs SBLC injection to RPV.
0 Verifies torus water level below 180 inches.
0 Verifies Recirc pumps shutdown.
0 Directs that Drywell sprays be placed in service using N B RHR loops.
BOP Recognizedannounces any/all of the following:
Verifies Drywell temperature and pressure within DSlL I
(Fig. 5).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
1 Event#
9&10 Event
Description:
"A" CS Injection Valve (25A) Failure to Auto Open; "B" CS injection Valve (25A)
Failure to Auto Open; "E!" RHR LPCl Injection Valve Failure to Auto Open (298) 0 Verifies Torus water level is > 50 inches.
Directs that all 4 SRVs opened.
TASK I
I CRS NOTE:
0 RPV water level at or below -46 inches.
0 2 minute timer initiated.
Directsthat the ADS Fnhibit keylock switch be taken to the "INHIBIT' position.
Places the ADS Inhibit switch in the "INHIBIT" position.
Orders a cooldown at a rate < 100"Flhr..
The RPV will be depressurizing slowly on its own due to the Recirc leak I
BOP I Monitors pressure bands established by the CRS CRS BOP Determines water level cannot be maintained above -125.
Directs that 2 or more Injection Systems, Table C lined up for injection and the pumps started.
Lines up for injection and starts all available RHR and Core Spray pumps.
If RPV level reaches TAF, determines that Alternate RPV n _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
---A:--
- - _-___:--A ---I --A^--
r-nn 4 7 TASK CR'TCAL I Opens all 4 SRVs.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTest No.:
2007 Scenario#
1 Event#
9&10 Page 15 of 15 Event
Description:
A CS Injection Valve (25A) Failure to Auto Open; B CS Injection Valve (25A)
Failure to Auto Open; B RHR LPCl Injection Valve Failure to Auto Open (BB)
Time I
Position I
Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITCAL TASK BOP CRS BOP/RO CRS BOP BOP
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BOP BOP Verifies SRVs have opened:
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~~~
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Checks the acoustic monitor lights on Panel C171.
Checks SRV tail pipe temperatures on Panel C921.
Asks if RPV water level can be determined.
Report that RPV water level can be determined.
When RPV pressure goes below the shutoff head of the low pressure ECCS directs that RPV level restored and maintained
+20 to +40 using the low pressure ECCS pumps.
Recognize/report A CS Injection valve (25A) failure to auto open Recognize/report B CS Injection valve (25A) failure to auto open
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Recognize/report 6LPCI injection valve failure to auto open (29W Restores RPV using low-pressure ECCS pumps.
The scenario shall be terminated when RPV level is being restored to +20 and +40 and when directed by the Chief Examiner.
~~~
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Expected EAL is Alert 3.4.1.2.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
PILGRIM Scenario No.:
2 Op Test No.:
2007 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
Power is 2.5% with a startup in progress.
2.2.96, Attachment 15, preset checks are done on all feed pumps.
0 Two Condensate pumps in service. Running additional second Continue startup. At 5% power, transfer RMS to run and resume pulling control rods.
condensate pump to wear it in.
Turnover:
Critical Task:
Initiates ARI.
Emergency Depressurization.
Enter 5.3.24 and supplement emergency depressurization.
Event Type*
Event Description Event Malf. No.
No.
I NrA 1
R - R O N - CRS Pull rods to continue power ascension.
Transfer RMS to run.
2 I NM21E I - R O APRM E fails downscale. (TSI 3
I RD02 C - R O In service CRD flow control valve fails closed. (AOP) 4 I RDO22-23 Control rod 22 - 23 drifts inward. (TS)
(AOP)
RFP A intermittent TBCCW leak, place RFP B in service.
RWCU Pump A RBCCW Temp High, pump fails to auto trip.
C - R O N - BOP I - BOP M -ALL 5
N/A 6
7 PC02 RM07 RWCU leak leading to scram. (EOP) 8 I RP14A I-RO Manual scram failure. ARI required.
RWCU leak leads to Emergency Depressurization. (EOP - C)
-%-E&-
M - ALL C - BOP SRV 6 fails to open.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Pilqrim 2007 NRC Scenario #2 The crew will take the watch with a reactor startup in progress. They will withdraw control rods, continuing the startup until 5% power is obtained and the reactor mode switch is placed in run.
After the mode switch is in run, APRM E will fail downscale. The APRM will be bypassed, and after Tech Specs have been referenced, the startup will continue.
When the startup continues, the crew will discover that the in-service CRD Flow Control Valve has failed closed requiring action to remove the failed FCV from service and place the standby CRD Flow Control Valve in service.
After place the standby CRD Flow Control Valve in service the startup will continue until control rod 22-23 drifts inward. The crew will take actions in accordance with PNPS 2.4.1 1, Control Rod Positioning Malfunctions and address Tech Specs for the inoperable control rod. The startup will be halted.
While waiting for troubleshooting and reactor maneuvering plans, an intermittent TBCCW leak will develop on RFP A requiring the crew to place RFP B in service and secilre RFP A in accordance with PNPS 2.2.96, Condensate and Feedwater.
After RFP B in service, an RBCCW high temperature condition will develop on the A RWCU Pump. RWCU pump A will fail to automatically trip and the crew will take action in accordance with the ARP to manually stop the pump.
When RWCU Pump A is stopped, a leak will develop on the RBCCW pump and temperatures will rise in the RWCU pump room requiring entry into EOP-4. RWCU area temperatures will continue to rise until a manual scram is required, and the crew will enter and execute EOP-1.
When manual scram is attempted, the scram push buttons and reactor mode switch will fail to initiate rod movement; however, all control rods will insert when the ARI pushbuttons are depressed (Critical Task).
Following control rod insertion, RWCU area temperatures will continue to rise until conditions are degraded in two of the areas specified in EOP-4 and Emergency Depressurization is required (Critical Task). The crew will execute EOP-17; however, one SRV will fail to open requiring the crew to utilize Alternate RPV Depressurization Systems (SRV Remote SD Panel) to augment emergency depressurization (Critical Task).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
1 Page 3 of 16 Event
Description:
Pull Rods to Continue Power Ascension and Transfer RMS to RUN Time I Position J
Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
I CRS CRS/RO CRS CRS RO RO RO BrieflDirect power increase IAW PNPS 2.1.I and 2.1.14 Withdraws control rods in a safe and controlled manner.
0 Regularly checks APRM channel indications.
I Plots power to flow.
movement.
Monitors RPV power, pressure and level.
Verify the following are clear:
0 APRM downscale alarm.
0 All APRM downscale indicators.
Low main steam line pressure alarm.
I Direct transfer of RMS to run.
I Transfer RMS to run.
Log time and date RMS to run.
Notify chemistry RMS to run.
~~
Brief/direct power increase continue:
0 Withdraws control rods in a safe and controlled manner.
I
-~
0 0
Plots Dower to flow.
Regularly checks APRM channel indications.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event b
1 Page 4
of 16 I OpTestNo.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
1 I
Event
Description:
Pull Rods to Continue Power Ascension and Transfer RMS to RUN Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 RO RO I
1 Recognize/announce APRM downscale alarm.
Stops raising power with control rods.
Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
2 I
Ro At Panel C905, check APRM power level and status lights, recognize/report failure of APRM E downscale.
I RO 1 Refer to ARP C905L, 08.
CRS Direct power increase continue IAW PNPS 2.1.1 Send the BOP operator to check the failed APRM on Panel 1
CRS 1 c937.
Go to C937 to verify that E APRM has failed low based on I
I meter indication the lights in alarm.
I I
I 1
RO 1 At Panel C905, bypass APRM E.
Refer to Tech Specs. Table 3.1.1 and Table 3.2.C.1 for the failed APRM.
CRS Recognize I announce that the plant will enter a tracking LCO for the failed APRM.
-=
E r e c t l&C to troubleshoot APRM E failure.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 RO OpTestNo.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
2 Page 6 of 16 Event
Description:
APRM E Fails Downscale 0
Withdraws control rods in a safe and controlled manner.
I I
RO I 0 Regularly checks APRM channel indication.
I When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
3 Page 7_ of 16 Event
Description:
In Service CRD Flow Control Valve Fails CLOSED Time J
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
Ro I
CRS I
RO I
Ro Determines no rod movement while attempting to withdraw rods.
Identifies CRD flow indication low.
s 0
Identifies FCV failed closed.
Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.1 I.?, Attachment 4.
Places CRD FLOW CONTROLLER to MANUAL.
Positions controller to CLOSED.
Directs standby inlet valve verified locally.
0 Directs standby flow control outlet valve opened slowly.
0 Directs in-service flow control valve outlet closed.
Directs selector switch to standby position.
Directs valve 301-29 positioned to standby.
Raise CRD controller setpoint to 50 gpm.
0 Verify flow increases.
Check DRIVE WTR and COOLING WTR DlFF PRESS indicators adjust as needed.
Return flow controller to AUTO.
Adjust DRIVE WTR PCV as necessary.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
4 Page 8 of 16 Event
Description:
Control Rod 22-23 Drifts Inward Time I
Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior I
CRS I
CRS I
CRS Checks full core display.
0 Acknowledges/announces rod 22-23 drifting.
0 Acknowledge Alarm refers to ARP C905L, A3.
Verifies rod selected, identifies affected rod drifting in.
Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.1 1.
Determines power cannot be reduced further by Recirc flow.
Directs RO to ensure cooling water D/P normal.
Inserts affected rod to 00 position.
Identifies rod remains at 00 position.
Contacts Reactor engineering to modify Rod Sequence sheet and power maneuvering guidance.
Notifies I&C to develop troubleshooting guide IAW PNPS 3.M.1-34.
Refers to Tech Spec 3.3.H for verifying BPWS.
initiates condition report to document rod drift.
I When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action F O I ~
ES-D-2 BOP BOP BOP Page 9 of 16 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
5 Event
Description:
RFP A Intermittent TBCCW Leak, Place RFP B In Service Time I
Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge alarms/report intermittent TBCCW alarms A RFP.
Direct NLO investigate TBCCW status at A RFP.
Acknowledgeheport intermittent TBCCW leak A RFP.
CRS BOP Direct B RFP to be placed in service per PNPS 2.2.96, 7.
Place RFP B in service JAW PNPS 2.2.96, Attachment 17.
0 Verify RFP suction pressure > 250 psig.
0 Place FV-3436, RFP B Recirc Vlv C/S to open.
~~
RO 0
Verify RFP Trip Sys Enable switch is off.
0 Start RFP B.
Verify reactor water level stable.
~~~
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Place FV-3436, RFP B Recirc Valve C/S to auto:
0 Verify RFP B suction pressure > 200 psig at Pl-3429
_s
~~
0 0
e Verify RFP B discharge pressure at Pl-3448.
Verify RFP E? motor current < 650 amps.
Verify Aux Oil Pump shutdown light on at C-I.
1 1
BOP Direct A RFP to be removed from service per PNPS 2.2.96, 6 Remove RFP C from service IAW PNPS 2.2.96, 6:
Verifv RFP Trip Sys Enable switch is off.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
1
~~
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0 Stop RFPC.
0 Acknowledge and reset expected alarms.
RO Verify reactor water level stable BOP 0
Verify RFP B motor current < 650 amps.
0 Verify Aux Oil Pump running light ON at C-I for RFP C.
I Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
5 Page 10 Event
Description:
RFP "A" Intermittent TBCCW Leak, Place RFP "B" In Service Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior 0
0 Verify FV-3436, RFP C Recirc Valve CLOSES.
Verify FV-3436, RFP B Recirc Valve OPEN.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 BOP I
0 0
Refer to ARP-C904RC, A2.
Acknowledge/report RWCU pump RBCCW Temp Hi alarm.
Page 1 1 of 16 I Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
Description:
RWCU Pump A RBCCW Temp HIGH, Pump Fails to AUTO TRIP Time I
Position 1
Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine/report failure of RWCU pump A to trip.
Stop RWCU pump A.
At panel C1, check RBCCW loop B temp on TR-3835.
At panel C904, check water to RWCU temps on TI-1290-21.
u I
I CRS I Direct actions per ARP-C904RC, A2.
~
~~
1 When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 BOP I
I 0
0 Refer to ARP-C904L, A6.
Acknowledgelreport Steam Leakage Area Temp Hi alarm.
I OpTest No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
7 & 8 Page 12 CREW CRS Event
Description:
RWCU Leak Leading to SCRAM; Manual Scram Failure, ARI Required Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
Checklmonitor RWCU area temps for EOP-4 entry conditions.
Direct RWCU manual isolation.
CRS CRS I
CRS I Direct actions per ARP-C904L, A6.
Direct RWCU isolated from 1201-2 and 1201-5 valve motor breakers.
Direct RP to take EOP-04 surveys.
I 1
BOP I Read temperature of alarming module at panel C921.
CRS Dispatch Maintenance or NLO's to attempt to isolate RWCU 1201-2 and 1201-5 locally.
1 BOP
-1 Attempt RWCU manual isolation. Report failure to isolate.
I CREW I Recognize/report EOP-4 entry conditions.
Before any area temperature exceeds Max Normal Value, enter I
I 1
CRS 1 Direct NLO to start all area coolers.
Recognize a primary system is discharging into secondary containment CRS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
i I Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
7 8 8 Event
Description:
RWCU Leak Leading to SCRAM; Manual Scram Failure, ARI Required Time I
Position 1
Applicants Actions or Behavior I
CRITICAL TASK 1
1 CRS RO Before any area temperature exceeds Max Safe Value, enter EOP-01.
0 Directs a manual scram be inserted.
0 Depress both manual scram pushbuttons Place mode switch in shutdown and enter PNPS 2.1.6.
Recoqnize/report failure to scram.
Enters EOP-01 and immediately transitions to EOP-02 based on all controls rods not at or beyond position 02.
~~
~
Performs the following actions:
~
0 Verifies mode switch in SHUTDOWN.
0 Initiates both channels of ARI.
~~
Recognizes all control rods inserted fully and informs CRS Exits EOP-02 and re-enters EOP-01 based on all controls rods inserted to or beyond position 02.
Insert IRM and SRM detectors, select two SRMs for recording, and place selector switch for APRM/IRM to IRM.
Verify reactor recirc pumps at minimum speed.
Verify trip of the turbine.
Direct verification of:
0 Isolations 0
ECCS initiations.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
7 & 8 Page 14 of 16 Event
Description:
RWCU Leak Leading to SCRAM; Manual Scram Failure, ARI Required Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
~~
~
~
Emergency Diesel Generator initiations.
CRS Direct reactor water level +20 - +40.
~~
~
CRS Direct reactor pressure 900 to 1050 psig with bypass valves.
CRS Direct a cooldown at <lOO°F.
BOP Commence cooldown at 50 inches.
0 Directs that all 4 SRVs opened.
Attempt to opens all 4 SRVs.
Enter 5.3.24 to supplement depressurization.
~
Verify (Acoustic Monitor or Tailpipe Temperature) that all SRV's are open.
Exit EOP-17 and re-enter EOP-01 pressure control leg.
The scenario will be terminated at the direction of the Chief Examiner after the Emergency Depressurization is complete.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
2 Event#
9& 10 Page 16 of 16 Event
Description:
RWCU Leak Leads to Emergency Depressurization; SRV B Fails to OPEN Time 1
Position 1
Applicants Actions or Behavior I Expected EAL is 4.2.1.3
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
PILGRIM Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
2007 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
Power is 50%.
HPCl 00s for Aux Oil Pump Replacement - 14 Day LCO.
RBCCW Pump a (P-202A) OOC, Tracking LCO.
~~
~
LPRM 36-13-B is bypassed.
Turnover:
Insert control rods to lower reactor power to 50%
Remove Seawater pump B from service and perform emergency backwash.
-~
~
Critical Task:
Inject SLC.
Prevent all iniection into the vessel except from SBLC and CRD.
Insert all control rods via manual scram.
Event Type*
Event Description Insert control rods to lower reactor power to 50%
Event Malf.
R - R O Remove Seawater pump B from service for emergency backwash.
N - BOP 3
~ R - I ~ A IC-RO A
RRP pump motor vibration high.
~~
4 rRR04B I I - R O B Recirc Loop flow unit failure (TS)
A RRP Inner Seal Failure. A RRP Outer Seal Failure. (AOP) (TS) 5 I RDO5A I C - R O C - R O RRI 3A RRl3B
~~~
RClC Steam Leak, failure to auto isolate. (TS) 7 ITC06 I C - B O P 8-ITCOl I M - A L L Main Turbine Trip, ATWS. (EOP)
First squib valve fails to open when fired.
RWCU M080 fails to isolate automatically.
9 1
I C - R O 10 I C - R O I
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Pilgrim 2007 NRC Scenario #3 After taking the watch, control rods will be manually inserted to lower power to 50% prior to the crew removing Seawater pump B from service for emergency backwash of the inlet water boxes.
After backwash is in progress, the crew will respond to a Recirc Pump Motor Vibration High alarm. Recirc Pump speed will be lowered as directed by the ARP. When Recirc pump speed has been reduced a small amount, the Recirc Pump Motor Vibration Monitor will reset.
After the Recirc Pump Motor Vibration High alarm is reset, the B Recirc Flow Unit will fail. The crew will take actions in accordance with the ARP and a Tech Spec LCO will be entered.
After Tech Specs have been evaluated, the A CRD Pump will trip. The crew will take actions per PNPS 2.4.4, Loss of CRD Pumps, including immediate action to verify reactor pressure is greater than 950 psig. When directed, the RO will place the standby CRD Pump in service.
When the standby CRD Pump is in service, the A Recirc Pump inner and outer seals will fail in sequence. Initially, the inner seal will fail requiring action to monitor seal status and drywell conditions per the ARP as well as entry into PNPS 2.4.22. After a brief period of time, the outer seal will fail. When the crew determines a catastrophic seal failure has occurred, the A Recirc Pump will be tripped and isolated. After the A Recirc Pump is tripped, the crew will estimate total core flow, plot the location on Power/Flow Map, and take actions in accordance with PNPS 2.4.17, Recirc Pump Trip.
When conditions have stabilized, a steam leak will develop in the RClC steam line, and RCIC will fail to isolate automatically. The crew is expected to take action to isolate RCIC manually.
When RClC is isolated (and with HPCl already inoperable), the CRS will evaluate Tech Specs and enter a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO.
After Tech Specs have been addressed, the main turbine will trip and an ATWS will result due to hydraulic lock of the scram discharge volume. The CRS is expected to enter and direct actions per EOP-02, including SLC initiation. When the SLC Actuate switch is placed in the SYS A or SYS B position, the selected SLC pump will start; however, the associated squib valve will fail to open as indicated by high SLC pump discharge pressure and zero indicated flow. The reactor operator is expected to select the alternate train and inject SLC (Critical Task).
Additionally, the RWCU return isolation valve (M080) will fail to auto isolate, requiring manual operator action to isolate the RWCU system. Injection will be prevented from all systems except boron and CRD (Critical Task), and ATWS actions will continue per EOP-02 until all rods have been fully inserted (Critical Task); EOP-01 has been entered, and reactor level is in the normal band.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 i
CRS Page Of -I Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
3 Event#
1 Event
Description:
Insert Control Rods to Lower Power to 50%
Directs control rod insertion using the RPR array IAW PNPS 2.1.14 Section 7.9 to lower power to 50%.
Time I
Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1
RO RO Closely monitors power, level, and pressure on C905.
Track location on power to flow map.
I RO 1 Inserts control rods IAW PNPS 2.1.I4 Section 7.9 I
I When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:
Direcubrief removing seawater pump B from service and backwashing 1-1 and 1-3 inlet water boxes through pump B 2007 Scenario #
~
BOP 3
Event#
0 0
Close Water Box Outlet Valves MO-3883 and MO-3881.
Close Water Box Inlet Valves MO-3872 and MO-3870.
When the first Water Box Inlet Valve white light (12 to 18%
OPEN position) comes on stop Seawater Pump B, P-105B Backwash 1-1 and 1-3 inlet water boxes through pump B 0
0 Open Water Box Inlet Valves MO-3872 and MO-3870.
Close Water Box Outlet Valves MO-3882 and MO-3880.
2 Page 4
14 Of -
Event
Description:
Remove Seawater Pump B from Service and Backwashing Inlet Water Boxes through Pump B Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP I Remove Seawater pump B from service for backwash I
RECORD Circulating Water Pump amps.
0 VERIFY Outlet Crossover Valves MO-3866 and MO-3876 1
OPEN.
0 Verify vapor valves to the steam jet air ejectors AO-3710 and AO-3704 are open.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Page Of Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
3 Event
Description:
"A" RRP Pump Motor Vibration HIGH Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
E RO CRS RO RO RO RO RO Recognize/announce RRP Pump Motor Vibration High alarm and refer to ARP C904RC, 66.
Directs action taken IAW ARP C904RC, 86.
At panel C904, attempt to reset vibration monitor by depressing vibration monitor reset button.
Lower Recirc Pump A speed.
Monitor power, pressure and level.
Reset vibration monitor.
Plot position on power to flow map.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
I 1 OP Test 2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
4 Event
Description:
B RR Loop FT Failure Time I
Position 1
Applicants Actions or Behavior I
1 CRS Acknowledges/announces B Recirc Flow Converter Failure alarm (refers to ARP).
Determines B Recirc Flow Converter has failed.
Refers to Tech Spec Tables 3.1.I Initiates LCO for Table 3.1.I condition C When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario# -
3 Event#
5 Page 7 of 14 Event
Description:
"A" CRD Pump Trip Time I
Position
[
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ro CRS Ro Acknowledgeslannounces trip of 'A' CRD pump. Refer to ARP C905R,A6.
Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.4.
Checks power, pressure, level. Performs immediate actions of PNPS 2.4.4:
1 Notes pressure greater than 950 psig.
0 No inoperable accumulator alarms.
RO I
I CRS I Directs RO to start standby CRD pump IAW with PNPS 2.4.4.
0 Transfers FCV to manual and closes.
I I
I Starts 'B' CRD pump.
I I
1 0 Verifies pump amp and discharge pressure stabilize.
1 0 Balances deviation meter 0
Transfers CRD controller to AUTO.
~~
~~
~
~~
I When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
1 I OP Test No.:
1 Scenario #
3 Event#
6 Page 8 Event
Description:
A RRP Inner Seal Failure. A RRP Outer Seal Failure Acknowledges/announces Recirc pump A seal staging flow high alarm. Refers to ARP C904RC, D6.
I CRS I
CRS I
I Directs action taken IA\\N ARP C904RC, D6.
At Panel C904, checks RRP A seal cavity pressures on Pl-262-17A and Pl-262-18A. Determines/reports inner seal has failed.
References PNPS 2.4.22, Failure of Recirc Pump Seal.
Acknowledgeslannounces Recirc pump A seal leakage high alarm. Refers to ARP C904RC, C6.
Directs action taken IAW ARP C904RC, C6.
At Panel C904, checks RRP A seal cavity pressures on P1-262-17A and Pl-262-18A. Determines/reports outer seal has failed.
~~
~
Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.22, Failure of Recirc Pump Sear -1 Determines a catastrophic seal failure has occurred.
I 0
Directs A RRP tripped and isolated.
Stops RRP A.
Closes Seal Water Block Valve AO-5150A 0
Closes Pump Suction Valve MO-202-4A.
I 0
When MO-202-4A indicates closed, closes Pump Discharge Valve MO-202-5A.
Closes Recirc Pump Purge Block Valve F-008A.
~~
Monitors drywell leakage, drywell temperature, and drywell pressure.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
I Ro Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
3 Event#
6 Page 9 of I
Monitors the idle recirculation loop suction temperature in accordance with Attachment 6 of PNPS 2.2.84.
Event
Description:
'A RRP Inner Seal Failure. A RRP Outer Seal Failure Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO/CRS CRS Estimate total core flow and plot location on Power/Flow Map.
Restores compliance with Tech Spec 3.6.F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 1
CRS I Directs entry into PNPS 2.4.17, Recirc Pump Trip.
Appendix D Operator Action F O I ~
ES-D-2 I
1 I Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
7 Page 10 of 14 Event
Description:
RClC Steam Leak, Failure to Auto Isolate Time I
Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP CRS I
BOP I
I CREW B 0 P/C R S CRS BOP Acknowledae/report Steam Leakage Area Temp Hi alarm.
Refer to ARP-C904L, A6.
Direct actions per ARP-C904L, A6.
Read temperature of alarming module at panel C921.
ChecWmonitor RClC area temps for EOP-4 entry conditions.
Determine RClC steam IeaWfailure to auto isolate.
~~
~
Direct RClC manual isolation.
Manually isolate RCIC.
Reference Tech Specs 3.5.C.3 and 3.5.D.3 - 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO for RClC and HPCl inoperable.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario #
3 Event #
8,9, & 10 Page 11 of 14 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Trip, ATWS; First Squib Valve Fails to Open When Fired; RWCU M080 Fails to Isolate Automatically Time I
Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CRS Recognize/report failure to scram.
Enters EOP-01 and immediately transitions to EOP-02 based on all controls rods not at or beyond position 02.
CRS 0
Verifies both channels of ARI initiated.
Verifies the immediate actions required by EOP-02:
0 Verifies mode switch in SHUTDOWN.
0 0
Verifies the turbine has tripped.
Recognizes reactor power is above 3%.
~~
~
CRS 1 0 Verifies both Recirc. pumps are tripped.
Direct initiation of SBLC as required by EOP-02 or Operations Policy Statement.
1 RO 1 Performs the following actions:
0 0
0 Verifies mode switch in SHUTDOWN.
Initiates both channels of ARI.
Recognizes the turbine has tripped.
I I
1 0 Recognizes reactor power is above 3%.
0 Trips/verifies tripped both Recirc. Pumps.
I CRS I Orders new RPV level and pressure bands:
I I 0 Level -25 to 4 5 inches.
~
~
0 0
Pressure 1000 to 1050 psig using SRVs.
Orders the RO to enter into PNPS 5.3.23, Alternate Rod Insertion.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
8,9,& 10 Page 12 of 14 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Trip, ATWS; First Squib Valve Fails to Open When Fired; RWCU M080 Fails to Isolate Automatically Time I
Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior 1
Ro CRS RO CRITICAL TASK RO RO CRS RO RO
-I, CRITICAL TASK 1
RO Start one SBLC system by placing the SLC ACTUATE switch to SYS A or SYS B position on Panel C905.
Recognize/report that after starting the first SBLC train that the pump starts but the squib valve fails to open.
Direct using other train of SBLC.
Start the opposite SBLC train with the SLC ACTUATE switch.
Recognize/report The a SBLC pump is running injecting.
Verifies Boron.
Recognizes/reports failure of RWCU M080 to auto isolate.
~~~
~
Direct RWCU manual isolation as required by EOP-02 or Operations Policy Statement.
Manually close RWCU M080.
~~~
~
Enters PNPS 5.3 23, Alternate Rod Insertion. Determines that there is an hydraulic lock and goes to Section 2.3 of the procedure and performs it concurrently with the General Actions section of the procedure.
When RPV level is determined to be greater than - 25 inches enters the Q Leg of EOP-02 and performs the following steps:
0 Orders stop and prevent all injection into the vessel except from SBLC and CRD.
Cioseslverifies closed the feedwater healer downstream block valves and Startup Feed Reg. Valve.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
8,9,&10 Page 13 of 14 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Trip, ATWS; First Squib Valve Fails to Open When Fired; RWCU M080 Fails to Isolate Automatically Time I
Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK 1
---I---
TASK I
~
~
Places the control switches for the RHR and Core Spray pumps in the PTL position.
Asks the crew to repolt any of the following plant conditions:
Rx power <3% (APRM downscales are in).
RPV water level reaches -1 25 inches TAF.
Performs the following actions to reset and scram the reactor:
0 Resets and verifies reset the scram using the RPS reset switch.
0 Places the Air Dump System Test Switch to ISOLATE.
0 0
0 Initiates a manual scram.
Waits forherifies the SPVAH Pressure Lo alarm clears.
Places the Air Dump System Test Switch to NORMAL.
Verifies either SDlV Level Hi or SDlV East Not Drained and SDlV West Not Drained alarms are clear.
0 Verifies and announces all rods in.
When all rods are in transitions to EOP-01. Orders RPV water level be restored and maintained between +20 and +40 inches.
Initiates a cooldown using HPCl or SRVs at less than 100 per hour.
Restores and maintains RPV level +20 to +40. Initiates a cooldown at less than 100 per hour.
The scenario will be terminated at the direction of the Chief Examiner when level has been restored to between +20 and
+40 and a cooldown has been initiated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
3 Event#
8,9,&10 Page 14 of 14 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Trip, ATWS; First Squib Valve Fails to Open When Fired; RWCU M080 Fails to Isolate Automatically Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Expected EAL is 2.3.1.3.
Amendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I 2
3
~
~~
~~~
~
Facility:
PILGRIM Scenario No.:
4 Op Test No.:
2007 NRC Examiners:
Operators:
~~~
~
~~
~
NIA R - R O Reduce power with Recirc.
NM17 I - ALL LPRM 36-45-8 fails upscale. (TS) (AOP) 36-45-6 Initial Conditions:
Power is 100%.
4 5
6 e
0 LPRM 36-13-6 is bypassed.
HPCl 00s for Aux Oil Pump Replacement - 14 Day LCO.
RBCCW Pump A (P-202A) OOC, Tracking LCO.
TC06 I BOP EPR Pressure Oscillations. (TS) (AOP)
RR20A I - R O B Recirc Flow Controller fails upscale. (TS) (AOP)
MS14D M-ALL D SRV fails open. Manual reactor scam. (AOP) (EOP)
Turnover:
e Shift TBCCW Pumps in preparation for motor replacement.
9 e
Lower power to 90% for control rod pattern adjustment.
Critical Task:
Spray Drywell.
PC22 M -ALL D SRV tail pipe fails leading to Emergency Depressurization.
(EOP - C)
Emergency Depressurization.
Event I Malf. I Event I
Event No.
I No.
I Type*
I Description 1
I NIA I N - BOP I Shift TBCCW Pumps in preparation for motor replacement 7
(RH04B I C - BOP I PASS H2/02 Sample valves fail to Isolate.
8 1
I C - BOP I RBCCW to A RHR HX inlet valve fails shut.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Pilgrim 2007 NRC Scenario #4 After taking the watch, as directed in the shift turnover, the crew will shift TBCCW pumps. After the TBCCW pumps have been swapped, the crew will proceed with a planned power reduction using Recirc flow.
While the planned power reduction is underway, LPRM 36-45-B will fail upscale, and the CRS will enter and direct actions per PNPS 2.4.38, LPRM Failure. The crew will bypass the failed LPRM and verify that APRM AGAFs and thermal limits are in spec. The crew will also determine that the affected APRM has less than 2 LPRM inputs in a level, making the affected APRM inoperable per TS 3.1, Table 3.1.
After the power reduction is complete, the EPR will begin to oscillate, and the CRS will direct actions per PNPS 2.4.37, Turbine Control System Malfunctions. The crew will take control with the MPR, and the EPR power control switch will be placed to off, stabilizing reactor pressure and power. With the EPR removed from service, the plant will enter an administrative LCO requiring both pressure regulators be restored within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or the plant be < 25% CTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
After the administrative LCO has been addressed, the B Recirc flow controller will fail upscale resulting in an increase in core flow and reactor power. When the flow controller failure has been diagnosed, the crew will initiate a scoop lockup per PNPS 2.4.20, Reactor Recirculation System Speed or Flow Control System Malfunction. The crew will then take actions per PNPS 2.4.19, Recirculation Pump MG Set Scoop Tube Lockup, including an evaluation of Recirc pump speeds against the Tech Spec 3.6.F limits. The CRS should also identify and brief the crew on the need to trip the B Recirc pump in the event of a reactor SCRAM.
When the required actions have been directed for the Scoop Tube Lockup, the D SRV will indicate open and Torus temperature will rise. The CRS will enter and direct actions per PNPS 2.4.29, Stuck Open Safety Relief Valve; however, the D SRV will fail to close, requiring a manual reactor scram. Following the scram, the RO should trip the 6 Recirc pump. The CRS will enter and direct EOP-01, and the BOP operator should identify a failure of PASS H2/02 Sample valves to isolate, requiring operator action to close the valves. With the SRV still open, Torus cooling will be initiated. The RBCCW inlet to the A RHR HX inlet valve will fail shut requiring additional operator action to lineup RBCCW. When Torus temperature rises to 80°F, EOP-03 will be entered.
After Torus cooling has been placed in service, the 0 SRV tail pipe will fail, resulting in rising Torus and Drywell pressure, and EOP-03 and EOP-01 will be re-entered on high drywell pressure. Torus and drywell spray (Critical Task) will be initiated as Torus bottom pressure continues to rise; however, with the broken SRV tail pipe continuing to degrade, Torus bottom pressure will rise, and emergency depressurization (EOP Contingency) (Critical Task} will be required prior to exceeding the limits of the Pressure Suppression Pressure curve.
~~
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
i CRS OpTestNo.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
1 Page -
3 of 15 Event
Description:
Shift TBCCW Pumps for Maintenance Vibration Test Time I
Position I
Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct Starting B TBCCW pump and securing A TBCCW pump IAW PNPS 2.2.31 section 7.6.
~~
At Panel C1, verify TBCCW system pressure of approximately 50 to 60 psig on PI-4162.
Start 6 TBCCW pump. Verify proper indications, TBCCW system pressure between 50 and 60 psig.
~
~~
~
BOP Stop A TBCCW pump. Monitor/verify proper system response.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Page 4
of 15 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
2 Event
Description:
Reduce Power With Recirc Ro BOP Time I
Position 1
Applicant's Actions or Behavior 1
At Panel 904, use the Recirc. Pump speed controllers to lower core flow.
Verify SPEED LOAD CHANGER position 100 percent.
I CRS I BrieWDirect power decrease IAW PNPS 2.1.14 section 7.3.
Inform I&C standby to adjust AGAFs to less than or equal to 1
CRS 10.975.
I RO I Perform channel check PBDS IAW PNPS 2.1.5.
~~
I RO 1 Plot position on power to flow map.
I I
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario# -
4 Event#
3 Page 5 of 15 RO Event
Description:
LPRM 36-45-B Fails Upscale Time I
Position 1
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize/announce LPRM Hi alarm.
RO RO Stops reducing power with recirc.
Refer to ARP C905L, F8.
~~
~-
~
~
CRS Directs action taken IAW ARP C905L, F8.
I RO I Check amber HI status lights on full core display.
CRS Send the BOP operator to check the failed LPRM on Panel I
CRS I c937.
Enter and direct PNPS 2.4.38, LPRM Failure.
Verify failed LPRM.
0 Direct LPRM 36-45-6 bypassed on Panel C937.
Ro Notify Reactor Engineering.
Verify failed LPRM by demanding "Instrument Readings /
Status Raw LPRM Readings Log" 3D Monicore, FIO key.
Bypass failed LPRM on Panel C937 in accordance with PNPS 2.2.66: Attachment 4.
I BOP/RO I Record the LPRM to be bypassed.
Bypass the APRM channel in which the LPRM inputs.
I Verify APRM channel bypass light ON at C905 and C937.
r
~
e At Panel C937, bypass LPRM 36-45-5 by placing the thumb switch (S-I) to the "BY" position.
1-I 0
Determine number of LPRM inputs to affected APRM.
Appendix D Operator Action FOIIYI ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
3 Page 6 _ of 15 Event
Description:
LPRM 36-45-8 Fails Upscale Time I
Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
Ro I
CRS Demand a 3D Monicore Core Power and Flow Log.
~
0 Demand an official monitoring case.
Ensure APRM AGAFs and thermal limits are within acceptable limits.
Select the control rods around the bypassed LPRM AND VERIFY that the RBM HVINOP AND the Rod Withdrawal Block lights are NOT lit.
~~
~~
~~
Determines effected APRM has less than 2 LPRM inputs per level.
References TS 3.1, Table 3.1.1 and declares effected APRM inoperable.
When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
I CRS RO Page Of "1 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
4 Event
Description:
EPR Pressure Oscillations Enter and direct PNPS 2.4.37, Turbine Control System Malfunctions.
Monitors reactor pressure and power.
I Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
CRS I
Enter administrative LCO to restore both pressure regulating devices within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be < 25% CTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
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1 RO/BOP 1 Recognize/announce EPR failure.
Attempt to take control of Reactor pressure with the MPR by holding the MPR set point control switch in the lower position.
When MPR takes control, place the EPR power control switch to the off position.
I d d i r e c t e d by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
5 Page 8 of 15 Event
Description:
B Recirc Flow controller Fails Upscale Time 1
Position 1
Applicants Actions or Behavior CRSIRO I RO/BOP I Recognizelannounce increasing reactor power.
Refer to PNPS 2.4.20.
I I
Direct assessment of power to flow conditions.
Plot power and flow on power to flow map.
Refer to PNPS 2.4.13.
Determine the cause of the unexplained rapid increase:
0 Reactor Recirculation System Speed or Flow Control System Malfunction, PNPS 2.4.20.
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I CRS
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Direct initiating scoop lockup of B Recirc pump.
Initiates B Recirc pump scoop tube lockup.
Direct entry into PNPS 24.19.
Monitor PBDS recorders for oscillations.
Ensures loop flows balanced IAW PNPS 2.1.5. within 10%
I Ro I above 80% power.)
I CRS I Notifj-l&C to investigate and repair.
CR5 Request licensed operator standby for manual operation of scoop tube positioner.
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I CRS I Verify pump speeds within Tech Spec limits 3.6.F.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS CRS Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
5 Page 9 of 15 Event
Description:
" B Recirc Flow controller Fails Upscale Time I
Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Determines that if pump speeds cannot be brought within limits within 30 minutes shutdown will be required.
Identifies need to trip Recirc pump in event of SCRAM.
I When directed by Lead Examiner, proceed to next event
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
6,7,&8 Page I O of 15 Event
Description:
D SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor scram; PASS HZ02 Sample Valve Fails to Isolate (CV91); RBCCW to A RHR HX inlet Valve Fails Shut Time 1
Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior E
E ALL BOP CRS CRS CRS BOP CRS CRS RO RO RO RO RO ldentifylannounce D SRV open.
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Reference ARP C903L, B2.
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Direct entry into PNPS 2.4.29.
Direct monitoring of Torus bulk temperature and note time.
Direct BOP to attempt cycling of D SRV switch.
Cycles D SRV switch identifies D SRV remains open.
Briefs requirement for manual reactor scram if D SRV remains open.
When it has been determined that the safety relief valve cannot be closed, direct a manual reactor scram.
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0 Depress both manual scram pushbuttons.
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0 Place mode switch in shutdown and enter PNPS 2.1.6.
Verify and announce the status of APRM downscales.
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Verify all control rods are fully inserted.
Insert IRM and SRM detectors, select two SRMs for recording, and place selector switch for APRMARM to IRM.
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Verify reactc: recirc pump A at minimum speed.
Appendix D Operator Action F
O
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ES-0-2 RO RO Page 11 2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
6,7,&8 Trip Recirc pump B (scoop tube lockup).
Verify trip of the turbine.
Event
Description:
D SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor scram; PASS H2102 Sample Valve Fails to Isolate (CV91); RBCCW to A RHR HX inlet Valve Fails Shut Time 1
Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior
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. CRS
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Emergency Diesel Generator initiations.
Direct reactor water level +20 - +40 inches.
Direct reactor pressure 900 to 1050 psig with bypass valves and open SRV.
BOP/RO 1 Report EOP-01 entry conditions.
I CRS BOP CRS CRS I Enters EOP-1. Direct verification of:
I Directs PASS H2/02 Sample valve CV91 manually closed.
Manually closes PASS H2/02 Sample valve CV91.
Recognize/announce EOP-03 entry conditions.
1 Isolations.
ECCS initiations.
I When Torus temperature cannot be maintained < 80°F, directs that Torus cooling be maximized.
Maximizes Torus cooling.
Identifies/reports PASS H2/02 Sample valve CV91 failed to I
I isolate.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
6,7,&8 Page 12 of 15 Event
Description:
'ID" SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor scram: PASS H2/02 Sample Valve Fails to Isolate (CV91); RBCCW to "A" RHR HX inlet Valve Fails Shut I Time 1
Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP I Identify RBCCW to A RHR HX inlet valve failed shut.
I BOP 1 Places 2 loops of Torus cooling in service.
I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
9 Page 13 of 15 Event
Description:
D SRV Tail Pipe Fails Leading to emergency Depressurization CREW CRS CRS RoBoP I Time I
Position I
Applicants Actions or Behavior 1
Recognizeheport rising Torus and Drywell Pressure.
Recognize/announce EOP-03 re-entry.
Recog nize/announce EOP-0 1 re-entry.
Report to the CRS when out of current RPV IeveVpressure band.
CRS Establish new pressure bands as the reactor depressurizes due to the leak.
I I
I
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When Drywell temperature cannot be maintained < 150°F, directs that Drywell cooling be maximized.
CRS NOTE:
Drywell area cooler load shed must be defeated.
RO/BOP 0
Maximizes RBCCW on the B loop of RBCCW.
0 Maximizes Drywell cooling.
. Before drywell pressure reaches 16 psig, directs that Torus CRS spray be placed in service using A or B RHR. Directs that Torus Spray secured if Drywell pressure goes below 2.2 psig.
BOP Starts Torus Spray using A or B RHR.
I I
I When Drywell pressure exceeds 16 psig:
0 Verifies Drywell temperature and pressure within DSlL (Fig. 5).
Verifies torus water level below 180 inches.
0 0
Verifies Recirc pumps shutdown.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
9 Page 14 of 15 Event
Description:
"D" SRV Tail Pipe Fails Leading to emergency Depressurization Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior TASK I
I CREW I
CRS 1
BOP TASK CR'TICAL I I
CRS 0
Directs that Drywell sprays be placed in service using N B RHR loops.
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0 Directs that Drywell spray secured if Drywell pressure goes below 2.2 psig.
Initiates Drywell Sprays as directed.
Recognize Containment pressure approaching limits of PSP.
Direct the reactor be rapidly depressurized to the main condenser via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves, disregarding the cooldown rate.
Rapidly depressurize the reactor to the main condenser via the Main Turbine Bypass Valves, disregarding the cooldown rate Before exceeding the limits of the PSP curve, directs Exit EOP-01 Pressure leg. Enter and direct the activities of EOP-17:
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0 0
Determines steam cooling is not required.
Verifies Torus water level is > 50 inches.
0 Directs that all 4 SRVs opened.
0 If determined D SRV tail pipe has failed, directs remaining SRVs opened and 5.3.24 to supplement depressurization.
Opens all 4 SRVs.
Verify (Acoustic Monitor or Tailpipe Temperature) that all SRV's are open.
Exit EOP-17 and re-enter EOP-01 pressure control leg.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Page 15 of 15 I 2007 Scenario#
4 Event#
9 I Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
D SRV Tail Pipe Fails Leading to emergency Depressurization Time I
Position I
Applicants Actions or Behavior The scenario will be terminated at the direction of the Chief Examiner after the Emergency Depressurization is complete.
I Expected EAL is 3.4.1.3.
1