ML062210539
ML062210539 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Salem, Hope Creek |
Issue date: | 03/09/2004 |
From: | Gregory Bowman NRC Region 1 |
To: | |
References | |
FOIA/PA-2005-0194 | |
Download: ML062210539 (2) | |
Text
t Grea Bowman noteslcomments ootterviewon the%woBm (03-09-041 The following are my observations/questions of the 'nterview 03-09-04.
ASSESSM &:Ž1YEIO.APIFCTO Will raise concerns and has done so before? YES See below Raises concerns for others? N/A Not specifically addressed during Interview Believes others raise concerns without hesitation? N/A Not specifically addressed during Interview Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for YES See below (mainly pressure/did not mention any raising concerns? negative job actions).
Bins for Issues:
- 1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT
- 2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES
- 3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES
- 4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES
- 5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS
- 1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT
- (p. 30 - 31) Discusses difficulties in raising concerns with thefrrne81 I&AI The Interviewee stated: ...there was a lot of discussion about the sanity c III say, - -- -So III say maybe there was some reluctance to go to him because of the pa the conversag;n might take. .
- 2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES 0 (p. 135 - 136 ) Concern that the plant operators were In a position where is operability of a piece of equipment was In questioned, it was assumed operable until proven inoperable. The interviewee stated that, while this was not the philosophy in Ops, they were being pushed that way.
- (p. 164 - 168) Discussed an Issue where the ibift manager had to convinre senior plant management to shut the plant down to correct arching and sparking In the switchyard. "thr11-hift:manage. didn't feel he was getting any support in the decision making process because it Involving taking the plant Wfiine.
- 3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES
- (p. 32 - 43, 45) Discusses an Issue related to stroke time testing the reactor head vents in preparation for startup and problems with the test rocedure. The crew was having difficulty with preforming the test as required by the procedure, and a senior manage r Rentered the control room and pushed for making an on-the-spot procedure change to allow completion o test not fliowed by plant Instructions). The Interviewee stated the senior manager's goal was to continue the plant startup.
- (p. 47 - 55, 60) Discussed another test.procedure associated with measuring leakage back from the RCS to the Boron Injection Tank (through check valves). Suspected flashing In the lines prevented quantifying the leak rate. Test performance was not a T.S. requirement, but there is a T.S. leak limit. 'Then there was some discussion a - re-performance of the test, and how we were going to do the test. And there was some reluctance part In our discussions then to even perform the test, that we weren't required [by T.S.] to do We i at wasa st performance test [required by plant procedures, but not T.S].I (p. 63 - 72) During transition from Mode 5 to Mode 4, th operators identified a leak on 14 fan coolant unit ('potential containment Integrity Issueo). The operators delayed the startup for a period (around hr team to Investigate the leakage. After holding the startup for about an hour, thf W I entered the control room and asked the interviewee who was 'holding my plant hostage." The Interviewee felt pressured for stopping the startup for a concern he had.
Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Paoef1I 2 Act, exemptions %,
FOLA - ,7 0 Jc..- /P
-S
- S Greg Bowman noteslcomments on the ,..nterview (03-09-04) -7
- (p. 79 - 90) Discussed startup in spring of 2003 following a grassing event. Operations was concerned that because of reduced circulator availability, there was an Increased likelihood of a plant transient (if any other circulators were lost).
Operators favored waiting to restore additional circulators prior to plant sta ,. , ere pressured by senior management According to the interviewee, the discussion became heated an M ereatened or challenged his manhood." There was another reference to senior management accusing ps of 'holding the plant hostage."
- 4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES (p. 23 - 25) Identified issues where union personnel refused to enter items Into the corrective action program because "it was not In their job specifications." He identified that In some cases people may be reluctant to use the corrective action program because of lack of familiarity with the system (they don't know how to enter Issues).
(p. 121 - 122) Following a simulator sessinn where the Interviewee and VOWl were both observing d the Interviewee thatI think you should fire the Qý (in spite of the fact that T indidual passed the scenario) 40!7tbasis was that "the .qe looked more professional than the ;R*,- nothing to do with the guys performance, it was at based on appeal itked like it had been awhile since he's had a haircut...and his dothe n ook like they'd been Ironed."accused the Interviewee of 'being a mouse" for not wanting to fire 1 W (p. 123 - 126) During another discussion with e interviewee stated that'.. Irected me once again to fire somebody. He didn't care who, 'Just ire saomo," to create a burning platform. The focus was on firing someone from management (rather than union) to help Increase leadership in Ops.
(p. 174)... seethat w Icoming back as as probably one of the majorchanges, IsthatI can see and I can sense that e- or the relationship between-rgainlng unit personnel and management personnel Is improving..."
- 5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES
- NONE OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS
- (p. 19 - 22, 27) Discusses issues with the corrective action program. 'The biggest weakness I've seen Is not a failure to Identify an Issue. It's to properly document the Issue." Stated that people were reluctant to write notifications (CRs) and would routinely discuss Issues with supervisors before entering it Into the corrective action program.
- (p. 117) Discusses the fact that during the startup foflowinr the spring.'003 grassing event, th ior V&verrode
.everal levels in the organization by dealing directiyyth the'*Iyt manager Specific concern was'the pressure that the
- nift managet inay feel, based on the fact that thtnIor Ve on the pfone call, discussing the plant direction that's going to be taken."
(p. 150) as a-big u and he would use that to his advantage, I'd say, and you know, almost as a presence. e's probably - what, wUNIIpr so? It wasn't uncommon that, for example, IfI was in a meeting and he was coming In, that, you know, he Would pump and slap you on the back harder than most people would... So I can see how people could take that, Interpret that as, you know, someone trying to Influence them by his presence."
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