ML061980097

Raw Information from Salem Interviews

ML061980097
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	07/07/2006
From:	- No Known Affiliation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0194
Download: ML061980097 (11)

Text

RAW INFORMATION FROM SALEM INTERVIEWS Negative

• Ji-one apart from one incident; a lot more issues with the plant are brought up now because they suffer

-Yom maintenance and the prioritization by work management-believes maybe the money is not being spent where it should be to see improved performance indicators, outage times, etc. - if it were up to him, he would only accept the plant at 100% in every issue, Salem Unit 2 spring&.03 grassing recalled issues but he -asQ o1 shift and he was not pressured-ey*n though he was a003II for only several weeks when ushed for minimum numbeW tought they could have waited a little bit longer to get the circulators back, then re-evaluate because they had a tide change and thought the screens could handle it-thought they c.uld continue w/power ascension, feluome pressure from above to start the plant (only named r

., never directed to do so by some equipment operators feel treated wrongly for bringing up industrial safety issues, in spite of safety operator designation and the fact that the issues raised are resolved "all the time",

believes union/management issues get emotional and create a lack of communication and animosity-some union members that send the feeling that management disagrees with their issues purely for production purposes-(not true), SMs. feel just as frustrated at times, especially w/ the amount of repeat work-sees part of problem with maintenance in that they do not have operational experience in supervision-schedule compliance not good, planning is questionable, mentioned parts availability problem; Lný r

the discovery hase was taking too long-wantgeto wai longer on operability calls-SMs a meeting unde and pushed ook the position'that he wanied more people to weigh inbefore the call was made, SMs wanted to look at what they had atnI and make the call cons er.ativ ly and follow the tech spec (meaning shutdown), example ot4 coming into CR to pushrto start up without proper surveillance of reactor head vents indicators, pressure to stay within the rules but work through and around i ssiles.like reactor head vent indicators, the number of telephone calls to the CR b.*

n which: SMs_"defended" their position-taldn a conservative approach-led to discomfort in operating the plant for SMs, example given o and circulators (2003) position that procedure says you can move forward-do so in site of comfort levell-"haveo manage a certain amount of risk", w d t to avoid talkin across the board w lUst a essen er" for.Ith believes eft because he was micromanaged b and ad similar problen',

believesK. Harvin had a negative affect on ealing with SMs-improved after over, explained that there are s persona ities on the crew that observed the _7 andling.of 22 S42 leak that don't like nd made this incident into the uproar it became ecause it wasjactions, management process for repairing equipment is not effective and leads to use of temporary logs for excessive periods-this leads to operator mistakes (ex. Re rad monitors 12/03 time frame)-need to dedicate the resources; saw BF-19 incident delay caused by failure to get "right people" in the room and finally coming up with solutions-eventually they found they had something stuck in the internals of the valve, Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Informatioff Act, exemptions

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but the process of ruling everything else out and getting the info from the "smait people" takes time", described the SMs as in the position to "buffer" the CRSs and operators from sr management in the u"h ty would exhibit by calling into the CR "not uncommonly" to move a start up along r

-offered xample of this as salting in switchyard in September 2003 escn ed. himselTf as feeling "uncomfortable" because he needed to shut

..down lbDh units based u on what he viewed in the switchyard-arching, presented facts to

~ including the omrnthlant who had "word for word" experienced the same problem 10 ears earlier in "disbelief' that's what was occurring, had to convince aat plant needed to be shut down-had to wal to switchyard to show him (explained should have been a no brain t

hut down when arching viewed) and still wasn't convinced until 500 KV breaker opened th aid, that's it I'm shutting down-the financial influences of who's going to make up for Yelost generation, pay for switchyard re airs and who is accountable for this should not enter the control room decis.

akingpo did not come from proper perspective and it added "at least an hour" unti decision to shut down, offered as example of what he would experience wit l

in past-resistance to shut down/offered that his confidence level current h

hisht he won'.,be in the same positioD agairyL-elieves won't have that problem with *environment; unde 7

and anwas such that you didn't want to work in it be aus-e of the constant coaching and ridicule-not conducive o bes effort, just doing what you had to to avoid coaching-nobody wanted to w,or and now improved as far as dealing with management-SMs had to figh o0 not becomeo'site managers" because of the issues that Salem would have regularly-nee ed to be in CR to be backutp for CRS~p emrgn isses Sale otl gu'y-p p.ou, emrging'issues-described as happening more than in other plants-became obvious that"lid not understand what was going on in control-this affected their rapport; qjý

ý union/management relationship *ceriorating and worsened in last 6-8 months specifica y between EOs and mgt (cited firing-

.as "incendiary device"), cited animosity over perception by'some in management that safety is being used as a weapon by operators-sees the "real organizational risk" as a supervisor may make a decision with that factored in-saying you're just beating me over the head w/safety and the supv. makes the wrong choice-has not seen it happen, believes there's potential to happen and keeps on top of his supv to prevent it-union/mgt relationship needs improvement to be good SCWE and "has a ways to go yet," his major concern is that a CRS or Supt will mishandle a concern of the union's in view of the union/mgt relationship being so poor-offered examples of union us.g safety erroneously (over 3 yrs ago, hydrazone laden water 11t issue, left bad taste for him as*,

operators returned to shift from training-did not like-started raising confined space issues-suýmmer 2003; re conservative decision rn-adng-sprin 3, wanted 4 circulators tobring the p~lant forward without the fear of having to back down=,Wushed for minimum of 3A "on the fence" and could go either way from the start-wanted defense in depth in spite of persuasive argument that IyWere still in conservative space with the # (3) they had-did not*I rating philosophy of hat sets the unit at a place that did not allow defense in depth onveyed idea, if not stated, that hey were "holding plant hostage"-means Ops being unreasonable, pointed out that'oRmfort zone was wider than his own with using 3 Case No. 1-2003-051F 2

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right from start, but believes he was persuaded by another example late 2001 of his disagreement in conservative decis'o re SJ injection valve w/significant leakage and needed to

.Ist to d rrnine which one-he and greed and went to meeting to discuss-mtade decision not going toitest for leakage they would "engineer it away" (issue paneled at Re on I ARB), when decision made to go a i mirade con Cious decision not to "defy' ihn ubhic setting-jus went along and met w after to di scuss fee engineering issu eleevesJ a rep. of his bosses, believes ust as taken aback by reversal o

• as he was and he thinks he may ha e said to "whose license is on the line here, who should make this dec...Iso know steam leak-situation raised as non-conservative decision inVlMgby m t e co. I...

ely get to the valve-no indication that sr. mgt had part) ecision to Isolate&he leak&ý M ummarized as did not think anybody was telling M o get up there and close leak, in spite of his differences w/mgt he would not believe that happened-had not seen that kind of behavior; spring 2002 started up with no vacuum, worked fine, compared this with doing upfront mid-loops at beginning of outages, also never done 3-4 years ago, now industry does the things, suggested "maybe that's the insidious creep of non-conservatism"; stuck BF 19,pbn shift and no production over safety element for him, it was delayed troubleshooting and the process to look at more and analyze more, thought 2-3 hours less would have been better, no examples of sr mgt going to more conservative direction-seems "I usually fight harder in the other direction"; K Harvin seen as threat by mgrs, did not want to say wrong thing around her or w Id lo

)osition, coaching in terms of leadership or "think like us" or we'll replace you, heard eads people the "riot act" for writing notifications-1 source only rumors.

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ineffectiveness of CAP (ineffective maintenance) in resolving long term issues led to perception that plant not operated safely, they lose continuity and focus when management changes occur-(frequently); late 2001 water gushing off nuclear header (primary heat sync for plant) opposed t m ssage being sent of "safety over production" (this was first issue recalled and big issue fo

, recurring grassing problems questions plant's ability to operate, criticized him fp.r orability call leading to 72 LCO, wanted more people on board before decision made,argued not the way it works per licensed operators-led to meeting coupled with other issues not recalled-to discuss proving something inop as opposed to op., (spring 2002), reductions in margin of safety comes from above him-could not judge new sr mgt at time of 01 interview-recall SJ valve had negative pressure on thoienvoly. d bqL_1involvement personally, MS42 leak became big issue because it involve,

.se notes), "hell of a lot of surveys" w/no results; leaking SJ check valve, thought they had a safety issue and.g~ot info from Engineenng that indicated not a nothing.. eeded to be done, some people'took this as a signal and would be reluctant to talk w...

ecau hey did not-feel he would support them; offered another example of non-ponservative w!

ilution in RCS to get to point where they could start up-had to argue vf*o not add water and "see what happens," became part of a notification written by outage management that sent the message that conservative decision making cost them productivity-was supposed to be a lessons leamed-we could improve on these Case No. 1-2003-051F 3

issues, but came across as production over conservative decision making for the operation of the station, named other SMs who got same message as he did, thought happened in late 2001, notificatiqwyritten close to it (October 2001 per doc.), discussed this notificatio. ith W

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result thatasaid it was a "lessons learned" intent, he andS. isagreed because aw it as' sometimes you c o too far with conservative, had a meeting to confront this wbout the push to have.

ing to CR to make decisions that were not his to make; offered another example of that as uggesting NA the reactor vent valve strobe time and questioning (inappropriately) why needed-purpose of meeting was to get back to working relationship where shift managers ran the shift w'thut interve tion and do the "right thing" and attempt to have SMs wait on operability calls fought that personally and encourage SMs to do what they had to-management responded to this meeting by calling them "victims" and did not want to hear thei;,gomplaints and whining (not stated at meeting, came back down from Ops Manager)-

SMs andcontinued to operate as they had, no further discussion was offered by sr. mgt. Even though teey indicated they would have follow up, packing the gland seals in spring 2002 to create vacuum-did not have a problem with testing the secondary side, but did not want to heat up the pl and do lo

',ower physics testing-everybody..rw the line there-got the sense that it came fro r

ut did not deal with themIM4 discussed as his own direction, overall believes the pressure he felt was excessive-as he compared it to prior experience at

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sees a failure to properly document concerns as part of problem W I squeio wnued use SMs to question whether they would engage in a conversacoon with himv,

questioned xJirection for on the spot change re strobe time testing for reactor head vents-had Case No. 1-2003-051F 4

to get him to ccept they could not go around the procedure-would have saved, SJ 150 valve testing and push not to do the testing-worked w/engineering, may have pushed engineering to point where t"Mey finished paperwork to support not completing the testing, fall 2001 coming out of 1R14 held ower as sion due to reporte44ce on 14 fan coolant unit-a containment integrity iss came into CR to askoWho's holding up the power ascensi~n?",

had no doubts that came..specifically because the startup had been stopped-unusual fo n

timing and different from other behavior, spring 2003 startup of Salem Unit 2, had agreed due to conditions of the river and equipment to have five circs. For margin of safety-defens.ein depth, schedule pressure came into play and the plant was ready but only 4 circs availableýushed to start and called it a "management decision" pontedut Unit 1 up with 4 and 50-55%",,

eft conversation when it became obvious to him tha ad one position and he h d-another and it would not-change, had otten personal and his "manhood was challenged" b inl saw situation oi..oriate by nd discussio. hat took place in front of SM, could fiav-e had it with

,but thepresgre fro ay have been felt by the SM (in response to questions about New SM on duty and t

e t scussion), had meeting w/SMs re challenges by o certain decisions (some discussed) -also re length of time to make operability calls-recalled-discussion about having to prove something inop as opposed to op., but did not change the way he did b *ess,

os allenges and did most defending of his position when it was a combination o nd though he thinks that's their job to challenge and question it did become thaithe defen-ed his position under this team-could not think of any time when pressure was undue, mostly had a problem when the shift or shift manager was present while challenging and questioning went on-otherwise took it as their job to do so-believes he felt otai e defensive more than discussed-just could not recall the incidents; his copnffdence level WM as not high based upon the number of incidents e e perienced wher would push for something th teupld not be done-not so much fibecau~e had more limited interaction with him an was more a personality issue-li ed to physically make himself known as a presence in room lisappointed him by ge in late 1999 that "you don't geflit", operators do not have authority to raise power,3did; sent message that SMs making wrong decisions and don't have the right to make power up decisions-questioned himself for taking the job then, after that meeting and (lightning strike event) the SM had less authority-TARP came into existence and they evaluated events and actions taken by crew then recommended corrective actions and advised sr mgt on where they.were and whether they were to go up in power, had heard hearsay r rching and sparking and SM had to prove to sr mgt

, had also heard that W

esitant based upon whd w6-ild pay for the incident, sees af*ect of former sr mgt that Ops management would be slower to do what they think is the right thing because of fear of backlash on decision-w/new team that's not there because there's no history to say you would be questioned "on half of what you do."

don't address some equipment problems timely and industrial safety issues not timely handled-agreed w/letter of Jan 04( NRC), offered one instance as part of basis for part of letter re disagreements between operators and sr mgt was the circulator issue in spring 2003-believes the problem was that the phone call should not.aye.bee,,nducted with all those people present-he should have discussed it himself witlg~

n9 then presented it to shift-Case No. 1-2003-051F 5

why? Undermines chain of command/leadership if go around them, changed his mind because he looked at i tIom

.Ioint of view-of not a safety consideration, an economic and reliability decision argued economic impact decision, BF 19 should have put the info together sooner to come to *conlusion valve physically stuck-operator raised that concern.

Positive 4

m: sees no weaknesses in the safety culture, no concern over operations he has been asked to perform, no unusual pressure recently, people can and do raise nuclear safety concerns and do so w/o fear of retaliation-includes self, some reluctance on the part of some due to an introverted personality issue, no personal experience in having operability decisions questioned by sr. mgt (however, offered only one instance as possibly feeding into rift 01 heard about between SM hInd sr mgt that in arly 2003 related th in regard to grassing and circulators on Unit 2, sr managemen had initially giv n one direction and after things did not improve re as ing, they changed teir philosophykwanted 5 in accordance w/original criteria an aid 4 OK), believes culture is far more conservative now than 6 or7 years ago and believes at's the case across the industry.

no issues with people raising issues or ability to do so, offeran incident involving_

' elling at operators (re isolating condensity) for being unsafer shut down the job-never saw a "just do it anyway" attitude (re industrial safety issues).

peo 1 alw s abile to rais Wconpems without repercussions, sees a change in senior mgt from wandandp o current as positive in that people believe their concerns are more listened to and properly dealt with-there's more emphasis and a more engaged safety committee, never saw a hesitation to bring a nuclear concern up-both operators and P level dder new management believes nuclear safety concerns will be discussed withoýii orJi-ying to talk him out of it or minimize the concern; offered that the environment now is that sr mgt asks what's the conservative and right thing to do to give operators a comfort level (example given of# of circulators for startup spring 2002 or 2003) without the ch ffdpwn owers erturbations or abnormal procedures. Added that was displayed between and Vhen they declined to start up/heat up using MS-1Os (coming out of 2R1Ili November 2003).

feels more comfortable now raising concerns-less comfortable heated arguments, confrontations, union doesn't hesit tgto raig concerns to him, no knowledge of retaliation for raising concerns-pointed out tha b

elieves this is so, but respectfully disagrees with that.

will raise concerns, no reluctance, no retal (for self believes the way he raises concerns has affected his pay raise/eval supported taking plant off line on 2 occasions and described as typical behavior forL

-nvolved circulators available in spring 2002 and MS42 steam leak).

Case No. 1-2003-051F 6

people did raise concerns and notbelieve anyone felt like they could not, sees belief th'athings will change unded SM wnill be decision maker, sees the belief from not only Ops, but workforce in general, union and maintenance mentioned. Does not echo n water gushing off nuclear header from underground-sent message opposed to safety

first,

.aid if pushed his comfort level but OK with it and sees it a lesson learned, but could see where it would send poor message to below him.

i9 peopleMai-d ould do what he thought right (negative) but believes employees were careful with how they raised the concerns-lot of anonymous in CAP, some people did not want their name associated with a concern, saw as unusual based upon industry experience.

had never heard anyone claim they did not want their name associated with a concern, mentioned positive change in environment exhibited in March 2004 example of units sharing decisi oad reduction-did right thing, sees un ma bond improving based upo return, never got the sense tha o

was putting pressure on anybody on site.

sees changes in mea em t rea"lngpnt, focus on fixing equipment-long standing equip issues, new personality i1hTInow empowered to make decisions to bring plant back up, plant managers and dedicated maintenance engineering-before lost ownership because not site specific engineers, had no sense that Newark management involved in plant eTating decisions. Offered two circulatoi exnples (after the fact re decisions) that he and upported/questioned safety issue, 13, uestioned raisin o

r w/o six circs (in same time frame th ushed for starting up w 4) and another whe tripped the unit-he was congratulate, explored decisions from both sides-only incident that came to d

disagreements (discuss in section W/incidents that caused disagreements-along with0 examples above).

perceived restart pressure resulted in push to fix a valve by flashlight rather than waiting to fix lights (resolved wltemp lighting).

perception that co. takes easiest/cheapest way out examples given: chronic problems with boron leakage and charging pump cooler cleaning during grassing season, perception of surveys is management'does them to get numbers to justify whatever they want, no corrections come from the surveys.

identified industrial safety concerns of scaffolding by flashlight, failure ofSS-661 valve, no one from management or union wants to be the one to say they held a job up.

ECP ineffective, perception that it takes too long to fix some things that union believes should be done immediately, expressed concerns of self and others that tagging is complicated and not well enough known to the people hanging them, surveys are not usef-ul]

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because they get too many to pay attention to, results not well published, regularly hear about missing parts because the warehouse sold them, known as a "general joke" that a needed part was in the warehouse as surplus to be sold at a sale.

some people just do not have the personality to raise an issue no matter where they believes the environment intentionally cumbersome to discourage-or has effect of

-discouraging-complaints, surveys can be interpreted any way and did not believe management listened to what was said, industrial safety issues overlooked to get the job done, first line supervisors push production over safety because their pay structure rewards that-could not attach any nuclear safety issues to this though, industrial safety; corrective actions are less than adequate and that's because they do not conduct post job briefs for the lessons learned (1 in 100 would be lot); company and union battle too much where they should not have to, hopes will help this, expects so.

industrial safety issues (equipment and personnel s e ratel) needsomework re backlog o notifications in CAP, perception that EDG at HC w concerned w/tech

.specs, not OSHA requirements-caused a problem for operators by term insubordinate, ECP thorough, but did not roll out findings clearly.

W: does not see production over safety yet, but does not like the trend that he sees as sitting and waiting before making a call-believes the push to not be the person to bring a unit down could affect decisions-offered BF 19 controls vs. mechanically stuck issue and it took too long to call it mechanically stuck.

v l perception that declaring the BF19 valve mechanically stuck avoided because it would have led to a 1-hour shutdown (production push-error), sees production push in issues like BF19, and the handling of two issues developed under hurricane startup in Sept 03-, re main steam isolation valves and steam dump valves-seen as examples of pushing the envelope of conservative decision making to keep units on line, id'd three incidents involving&

that sent a message to operators indicating no regard for personal safety and believes it sent message thats its ok to take short cuts because it happened w/ another supervisor, different situation.

stuck BF19 troubleshooting allowed them to generate more megawatts, then continued w/shutdown, cites problem with work week scheduling and bumping of one issue as another one becomes immediate or next priority-effect is to just keep postponing an issue-example given CR indicators-keep sliding and don't get addressed, seemed resources and or time not applied, this works the same way w/CAP, notification system cumbersome to use, sees difference in CR staff in deregulated environment in a swing in emphasis on production, maintain fine line between what is acceptable risk and what is not, concerned re push to move to four man crews (from five) and potential effect on safe Ops.

Case No. 1-2003-051F 8

conc~~. concern is that people are not heard when they raise concerns-most NEOs feel they are wh noise" and some people (but not pervasive through group) don't want their names tied to a concern so the union stewards raise it for them, CRSs are caught between battle of union and management and are aggravated by both parties, it's become "tit for tat on piddly stuff," work management process is "horrendous" and the workers have been telling management that since 2000 with nothing done about it-in part does not work because they don't have the parts to complete the work with-leads to criticism of workers for "low wrench time" and gets everybody pissed off causing bad attitudes, can't seem to get a handle on the SAP work clearance modules for tags and work clearance documents, why aren't we fixing more stuff in the primary plant?-

raises issue that it seems that o oa

-so say we had a 28 day outage as opposed to 38 or 42 and really get things fixed; saw ct at MS42 valve as production over safety, unsafe and exhibiting megawatt mentality; Salem 2 bolting issue (summer 2001 or 02) deferred repair because they did not want to extend the refuel outage, grassing issues did the right thing butt o ked uncomfortable having to take unit off line-however, did receive "attaboy" from toMWand crew for having done so.

SAP difficult to research previous deficiencies, broken equipment tends to go on 0orever-eited long term plant deficiencies as primary issue, believes "new guys" would not raise a concern of a nuclear safety nature for fear of losing job; gave five examples of schedule pressure, production over safety issues including a stuck feed reg valve where the unit should have tripped, criticized the OSs for starting surveillances just before the end of the shift to get credit, grading by "beans"-led to stress on individuals working the surveillance and those taking over from oncoming shift.

saw as starting in late 2001 a major problem with culture that allow

.e ulent that needs repair to languish-don't want to spend the money, raised same issue re turbine header testing not handled properly and equipment released; people may not report smaller issues out of the belief that nothing would be done (like small o eaks),.14 BF 19 issue as example of non conservative approach to operation, MS 42 anduJMMMIissue seen as sr mgt preaching conservatism not taken to heart, indicative of non conservative and megawatt mentality, very weak in carrying out corrective actions; A

operators will say why should I bring that up if they're not going to do anything about i? People will raise concerns if issue is major, examples of production over safety:_

mS42, BFI 9 valve-mentality was'to stall and not shut down, ms28S Bypass Valve on main steam line stuck, so struck w/hammers to grassing issues-guys who keep it running on one circulator get pats on the back, management picks "low hanging fruit" to fix, things that don't cost a lot of money-overall they don't pose a safety threat to peopl]

rnvi onmepnt, but we try to see how close we can come to that-meant accepting risks, believesl*and ave been beaten down -not the same as when they started their positions, after h t do the right things (taking time and money) and they have changed, no cooperation from evel up with union which leads to morale problem, SAP is "piece of crap" because concerns cannot be located/researched and screens are difficult to work with; he believes the practice of starting Case No. 1-2003-051F 9

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surveillances at the close of shift are error traps to avoid but the push is to get "the bean" to make the shift look better, example of diesel maintenance -starting complicated procedures at shift change can be detriment to nuc safety.

Others: no specific retaliation known.

believes "labeled" for trying to do the right thing, seen as a problem, believes_.,.

received poor rating for voicing concerns.

belieyes anoarassed for their positions-do it by the book believes two outspoken re adversely treated because they raise issues-has not stopped them from raising concerns.

believes made an example of re comments repeated to him b

-arviti re

,443 M.! perception that pulled off shift fo

.,coupq of weeks and "reprogrammed" for backing his people up-got Im in trouble, see as come down on hard for raising concerns.

. een as a hindrance, knows the procedures and holds mgt "to the letter."

Positive:

f no problem raising concerns, good relationship as far as radiological safety, did not see push for production o0

,Cir lear safety, sees more support and enforcement of the industrial safety culture under no nuclear safety issues, will raise concerns and limits dealings to immediate supervisor; believes responsibility taken away from supervision and lower managers.

will raise concerns and others will too.

raises concerns and does for others; experience to support retaliation raise concern.

nuclear safety issues would be addressed; does a good, thorough job and people have confidence in him to not use their name.

een as having stron q era r background and pushing for conservative decision making and nuclear safety, influence has changed the way issues are addressed, they won't languish any longer.

X retu "great," thinks will help return to old way (after 1996 startup of getting itdone) where union/management worked together.

Case No. 1-2003-051F 10

no issues w/nuclear safety.

no retaliation seen for raising concerns (discussion around hi io~wn-t'eriniatioiadi'd not evoke discrim complaint; others will raise concerns and confient t Pa "niuuclear safety issues are raised.

concerns are raised, people jump over mgt if they have to to get something addressed and hbas never seen an issue where he questioned the company attitude toward nuclear safety; offered that operator'decisions to trip unit have been backed up by ops mgt and offered two examples.

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thinks co does good job of protecting health and safety of public, big safety issues and primary plant issues are looked at in depth, everyone would report a concern of importance, sees improvement recently in procedures that required a fix either get a notification or more resources applied in the procedure group have resulted in more refined procedures w/not many major errors or problems any longer; typically only sees small issues now with procedures, majority will raise issues if they have a concern, for se f is copfortable in raising concerns that mgt believes are valid-made distinction in discussing issues (neg); impressed b andFUMMW (I~

new-expects positive chan"ges.

Case No. 1-2003-051F 11

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