ML061980104
| ML061980104 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/2006 |
| From: | Neff E NRC/OI/RGN-I/FO |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2005-0194 | |
| Download: ML061980104 (3) | |
Text
-1.
"REPORT OF INTERVIEW OF GILBERT JOHNSON On January 7, 2004, Gilbert JOHNSON, Operation Engineer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Region I, was interviewed by the Reporting Agent (RA), NRC, Office of Investigations (01), Region I. JOHNSON was contacted in regard to his reported conversation (see attached email dated January 5, 2004) with Hope Creek Station (H1 11 J11__...-
egarding the reactivity event at HC iniMarch 2003. The following information, in substance, was reported by JOHNSON:
He was assigned during the first week of April 2003 to administer Limited Senior Reactor Operator (LSRO) examinations for fel handling at HC. JOHNSON assisted in the administration of examinations forIM.
I He was aware.that HC had recently experienced a reactivity event and he was interested in hoW-that would affect the requalification training for the licensed personnel.
HNSON that he was on shift when the reactivity transient occurred. The issue involved the shif's wanting to change the turbine pressure controller while the reactor was critical.
shift was given a procedure the day before the evolution was to occur.
They did a single "dry run" in the simulator and identified changes needed in the procedure. The procedure was sent back;,
did not identify specifically who developed and addressed the changero sscedilre. The procedure was returned to Operations with the requested changes. !IMthought there should have been another dry run conducted, but indicated that time and schedule pressure did not allow it and they had to "get on with it" JOHNSON inferred from this discussion that the pressure was to return to full power. They ran the procedure and had problems because the procedure did not address all the issues that occurred when it was implemented.
did not identify by name any of the other individuals associated with this event.
JOHNSON did not believe that regulatory requirements required a second dry run in this instance, but described it as an Infrequently Performed Evolution (IPE), and explained that it required heightened management oversight.
told him that he was reprimanded for his failure to recognize the reactivity event and h ad no issues with that reprimand. JOHNSON believed the reprimands would have primarily been focused on the shift and control room supervisors for their reported failure to recognize the reactivity event.
JOHNSON thought further about,
.comments and discussed them with NRC Allegation Coordinator Dave VITO the next day. Based upon their discussion, JOHNSON telephone
ý.on the same day to ask if he had approached him (JOHNSON) as a regulator in discussing the event.
advised that he was simply answering JOHNSON's questi6ns and not submitting anallegation. JOHNSON explained that after he recently became involved in reviewing interviews for the ongoing inspection at Salem/HC Information in this record was deleted
' accordance with theLFreedom of Intformafiop
. ct, exemptions
,",.A.-
regarding the safety culture, this incident came to mind.
Reported by:
J Eileen Neff, §p~cial Agent Office of Investigations Field Office, Region I CAs C-as"-e-fNo. 1-2002-042
e From:
Gilbert Johnson To:.
Exnl Date:
1/5/04 6:57AM
Subject:
Person I spoke to at HC relative to management pressure Although I am not 100% sure, both Alan Blarney and I recall tha was the most likely person that related to lat they had pressure to "get on with It' the day they had the reactivity issue. He would have been theJW n that shift.
Anything more I can do?