ML062210301

Gil Johnson Notes/Comments on the Interview

ML062210301
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	03/02/2004
From:	Johnson G Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
To:
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0194
Download: ML062210301 (3)

Text

Gil Johnson noteslcomments on the /ll interview (03-02-04)

The following are my observations/questions ofth ja.. ... interview held on 03 04. This transcript review was completed on 4/08704 modifi fa~on/arlficatioi bi Ted Wingfielid co pnete on 4/23/04). 7

~~Y ES/N- -> ~ A P F A I N(W Y VH N0 .T Will raise concerns and has done so before? YES I was prepared to NOT start the facility up because It was not the right thing to do (p 65) You can relieve me and have someone else start the unit up (p 66)

Raises concerns for others? YES What is it I need to do for you to feel comfortable and safe [in the "B"Diesel Generator Room] (p 37, line 10)

Believes others raise concerns without hesitation? YES AO's said "we are getting sick (from the diesel fumes) and we don't feel good" (p 36)

Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for N/A Not discussed raising concerns?

Bins for Issues:

1. 1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

• (p. 12 - 75) The following comments were made In reference to one specific senior managerI His engagement In understanding what we are doing was relatively high (p. 12) ... He can be very bl n't and he can be very asserting but that was his management style (p. 16) ... I think that his methodology ... may have caused the rest of the people more discomfort (p. 17) ... I think he wanted to understand what we were doing [after the BPV went dosed] with the asset (p. 20) ... the way he talks to people ... I see it now as potentially challenging and stifling (p. 28) ... [It never came to mind before] ... what Impact they [Senior Management] have on a safety conscious work environment (p. 48

& 49) ... his loud challenging voice and the rditat he used ... could very easily train you to keep your mouth shut (p. 49) ... I didn't think It [a meeting iamfice to discuss the decision to cool down and repair the BPV or not, caused a 3 to 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> delay In cooling c own 1h9panti]was a good m : .Ijn't tell you I wasn' sweating and challenged during that meeting. I was. (p. 49) ... that Is the kind of thirduct at the meeting] that can be stifling ... for people to speak up and Identify Issues ... I think that his%-anagement style would be counter to what we want to achieve here wlth.Dpur safety conscls work environment (p. 50) ... I dont think he directed me to do anything" (p. 71) ... The formOV2 of Operationld a management style that had a stifling effect. (p. 75)

• "... I was not in denial about the Issue [a damaged safety conscious work environment] as much as other people in the organization ... [if we were to be] branded [within] the Industry [as having a] chilling atmosphere ... those words strike fear In me that an organization would have a chilling effect on Its employees when they don't address Issues" (p. 116 -

118)

1. 2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

• "We were not going to start the unit up until we understood what the problem was with the BP valve" (p. 7)

• "... I think - the data to support [and explain the reasoning for not restarting the unit with the BPV In quesion] toW corporate (p.14) 0"[1 did not, at any time, get the impression that s pressuring for the start up] ... what surprised me was that [the discussio] ... utilized 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of ... critical m*'e" (p. 22)

• "It was dear to me .that he j-had to provide an explanation of what we were doing to the unit to corporate PSEG" (p. 23),--.

• "I don't remember where the notion of starting the plant back up came from ... but someone did [vocalize It], and it really caught me off guard" (p. 56)

• "[You can relieve me and have someone else start the unit up] ... I did say that [t (p. 66)

"[whei - canvassed the group], I dont remember anyone saying that we should start up ... everybody was aligned with that viewpoint (to shutdown) ... I don't know If that was based on the strength of my justification" (p. 68)

"... I was comfortable that the [diesel with extensive exhaust leaks] was operable and would perform its Intended function

... and I didnt think [it] had risen [to a level requiring us to] shut the facility down ... In hindsight ... [remaining at power without correcting the condition of the diesel] was not a good decision" (p. 37 & 38)

IntorDratio if!this record was deleted P Ant,exeoptio f...... , of ýnTormaff- /0 ge I of 3 Atexmptions Vi odmofnomt FOWA

Gil 3ohnson notes/commnents on th _ interview (03-02-04) -

"The two times that I remember being In challenging situations IO.e. uncomfortable with the position being advocated for the company, were] the [stuck] bypass valve. and the diesel [with the excessive exhaust leak]" (p. 44)

• There were no examples showing where senior operations managemen allenged the operators to be more conservative. (p. 46)

The previousnior operations manage~as the decision maker in the process (i.e. making day-to-day decisions on what to do with the plant) ... "that Is not the.place for [the] decision making to take place" ... the new senior management style is one that makes the Shift Managers the decision makers ... "[currentiienior operations management never tells me what to do ... he asks ;hat am I going to do ... [then] did you think about this ... did you think about that ... [I factor his questions] into my decision [and then let him know what, if any, changes I've made to my plan]" (p. 70)

S *I don'tthin.s going to make me start up [during the stuck BPV issue] ... the position I took was solidly justified ... I threw my job behind Itto support my conviction ... I was not going to start the unit up as [a] senior licensed Individual at Hope Creek" (p. 72) 0 New .enior operations management'Is operating in a more safety conscious conservative manner ... 'te current organization gives you the wherewithal to make a decision and make comparisons ... it is OK to come down 5% and take the Bravo feed pump out and then figure out [if] you have a problem ... it is easier to make the 'gray' decisions [now]

because providinoou rustification Is not a problem [any more] because you almost dont have to do it ... the plant manager's conversations are gentle but probing ... made a significant [positive] Impact within weeks of arriving (p.- 6-81)Mr

• The following relate to operating Hope Creek at off gas flows greater than 'procedurally allowed" (p. 98 - 105):

o . What we did was rationalize [that because everything was operating correctly at the moment, we were justified in giving] engineering time to tell us [that it was Indeed okay]"

o 'It took us two days to change the procedure... to operate above 75 CFM ... not the way to do business" o "... we would rationalize our decisions to provide justification that we were comfortable with ... that is not the kind of procedural use ... message [we want to send to] the operators" o "I believe solidly that we have gotten away from that behavior mode"

• The work groups that have the most Issues are those people with jobs closest to "production" (p. 120)

1. 3- SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES The following comments/issues relate to the forced outage in March 2003 requiring the "rushed" creation of an Infrequently Performed Test/Evolution (IPTE) procedure to shutdown with the stuck Bypass Valve (BPV):

o "It [justifying tdid cost me 3 or 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> in delay in doing the cool down" (p. 19) o 'The training on a finished product (the IPTE] never occurred and [I didnt find out about that] until after the fact ... the;.-ontzl room supervisor ... was very concerned that it wasnt a solidified done deal plan ... I dont think his [tner:CP$ concerns were appropriately addressed at the time of the training evolution ... It became confusing and a jumble of what they were actually trying to accomplish" (p. 87 - 89) o Bypass Valve "jack" usage was procedurally eliminated as an option any time the reactor was critical following the reactivity event Involving use of the Jack during the shutdown. "... that has been a problem for me ... I think you should be able to use the bypass Jack at low power levels to control pressure on a start up ... but not when you are shutting down" (p. 92 & 93)

• "[The] concept of following a schedule Is convoluted into production pressure in different peoples minds ... I am telling you that production pressure is sensed at every level and every job ... you have to communicate a different message to people so that it doesnt have a negative Impact on what you are trying to do" (p. 121 - 123) 1"Iwent out of my way to make sure that the field supervisors understood that their job Is not to be out there cracking the whip ... [instead] their job ... Is to be removing obstales? (p. 125)

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Gil 3ohnson notes/comments on th interview (03-02-04

1. 4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

• Information from the previous licensee Investigation Into the EDG exhaust leak Issue found that management was split on considering employee refusal to work In the diesel room as Insubordinatlion. Aith gh the interviewee did not recol _

it, the previous information documents that he had discussions w b bout 'insubordinationw w supporting It)... 'Trying to accomplish something with a hammer is never-the rigt way to do it ... telling e to do so ing because they will be Insubordinate ... Is not a win-win situation ... that dearly indicates that w 11l- had a conversation of insubordination with employees" (p. 40 - 48)

S bngage inthat type of explanation [justifying why the unit should stay shutdown and continue to cooled down

'To wit ior VP as abnormal" (p. 54)

1. 5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES The following relate to the Issue of diesel exhaust fumes in the WB" Diesel Generator Room (p. 37 - 48):

o 'What Is it I need to do for you to feel comfortable and safe?" ... in the WB" Diesel Generator Room o v... the safety department [said the atmosphere in the EDG room had] not reached any threshold that jeopardized ... health and safety ... the bargaining unit said we don't care, [the fumes are] making us ill" o "was before we utilized the safety Issues resolution process ... [which has become] a very effective way to resolve those Issues" OTHER ISSUES; Deregulation and Impact on spare parts/maintenance/improvements

• '... forced prioritization of corrective maintenance and upgrades] might be something that drives the operators Insane

... (doing so many] compensatory actions ... There Is a set amount of money for doing Improvements to the facility ...

[there is a great] number of obsolete spare parts ... [20 year old technology] is woefully behind the times now. It Is very frustrating" (p. 112)

• 'Money Is always an Issue for making Improvements ... [need to] ensure it's spent [on] equipment reliability" (p. 113)

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