ML061980254

OI Notes

ML061980254
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	07/07/2006
From:	NRC/OI
To:
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0194
Download: ML061980254 (71)

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The Region I Office of Investigations (01) initiated an Assist to Staff on October 2, 2003, at the request of regional management, to evaluate information developed and/or reported to the Region indicating that the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) at the Public Service Electric & Gas (PSEG) nuclear generating stations, Salem and Hope Creek, was poor. Based upon the information known to the region in October 2003, the inquiry was planned to focus on the Operations aspects at both sites, and would include representatives from the operator levels, operations management and senior managers. Both former and current employees were interviewed at the management levels. The results of these interviews, arranged by station and working level, are outlined below.

Salem Operators By interviewing the operators at Salem, 01 and the staff sought to identify any SCWE related concerns they had, particularly involving a production over safety climate, and if so, what the basis for the concern was. In that the subject matter-was broad, these interviews tended to develop a variety of issues, obviously dependinE D e interviewee's view of its effect on the SCWE. As delineated, some common themes developed throughout the interviews involving negative perceptions and some positive points emerged.

The positive impressions Included: most believed that they and the majority of their co-workers had no problem in raising concerns and would not hesitate to do so, specifically in regard to nuclear safety issues. Further, mos

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operators interviewed did not believe that anyone suffered retaliation for having raistcnerns. Some operators had no concerns regarding nuclear safety and reported that the company took the appropriate action when necessary; and did not report any instances that left th pression of a production over safety atmosphere.

The arrival as noted as a positive change and anticipated improvements in union/management relations, conservative decision, g, and equipment repairs were cited based upon the prior association between, Ind the Salem operators.

Though not explored specifically, mixed reports were received about the effectiveness of the Employee Concerns Program. SCWE surveys were noted as negative in terms of distrust of the results published, the lack of corrective actions taken, and the burden due to the frequency of the surveys.

The negative impressions reported by the operators at Salem outweighed the positive both in number and in nature. Some Indicated that the company does well when operating decisions are clear cut, but delays exist in the "greyer" areas. Said another way, this was described as they do not pose a safety threat to people or the environment, but come close to it by accepting risks. Numerous operators expressed concerns and frustrations regarding the way particular incidents were handled, as either an industrial or nuclear safety issue, and offered the incidents as evidence of the effect of decisions driven by production over safety, "megawatt mentality",

non-conservative approaches and/or schedule presspure. The key examples leaving this impression are: 1he Septemb.er 200, Salem L.*nit 2-MS-42 valve steam leak involving the intervention by'J--_*

the October 2003 stuck 14 BF-19 feed regulator v-ave at Salem Unit 1; the grassing issues aToth units in Spring 2003; a concern regarding the potential catastrophic failure of the SS-661 sampling valve (numerous notifications written related to repeated leaking) at Salem 2 in August 2003; the push to build scaffolding by flashlight and fix the leaking SS-661 valve by flashlight in the same incident

(notification written); and the practice of starting complicated surveillance testing immediately prior to the end of the shift in order to gain credit for the work.

A significant area of concern involved PSEG's Corrective Action Program (CAP)and the amount of equipment that did not get repaired or repaired correctly. Additionally, parts availability was cited as a known "joke" on the island to the effect that if something was needed, it was being held as surplus by the warehouse to be sold at a sale. Also, the idea that the warehouse kept no spare parts in order to avoid paying taxes was conveyed. The work-week scheduling and constant re-prioritization of issues, coupled with the lack of appropriate resources, were seen as the primary precipitants for the problems with equipment repairs. The SAP software programs used to track notifications and for equipment tagging were seen as difficult and troublesome since initiated (around 2000) and challenging to use for trending and research purposes. The weaknesses in corrective actions were perceived as having an apathetic effect on some who would question the point of raising an issue. (This was a concern noted with respect to less significant issues.) Some operators feel they are only "white noise.'

The problems with equipment repairs and parts availability has the additional adverse effect of leading to criticism of workers by management for "low wrench time," which adds to the anger, frustration and bad attitude on both sides. The union/management relationship is viewed as damaged in a manner that causes both the Shift Managers (SMs) and the Control Room Supervisors (CRSs) to be seen as in the middle and aggravated because morale is poor and the relationship has become "tit for tat over piddly stuff."

With respect to raising concerns, it was reported that some people prefer not to have their name associated with issues for differing reasons, including personality type, and some new workers would not raise a concern for fear of losing their job. The union stewards were viewed as compensating in this area and the impression became that issues would get'e raised, particularly nuclear safety conce rns, but possibly not by the initial observer. Others discussed their personal comfort level with raising concerns in relation to how valid it would be seen by management. Several interviewees reported their perception that union stewards who regularly front issues are viewed as a "hindrance" or "troublemaker" and treated adversely by the company. This was also the opinion of some in regard to a shift manager who pushed operator concerns to upper management in the 2002-2003 time frame.

Salem Operations Management Positive Mmlsees no weaknesses in the safety culture, no concern over operations he has been

'asked to perform, no unusual pressure recently, people can and do raise nuclear safety concerns and do so w/o fear of retaliation-includes self, some reluctance on the part of some due to an introverted personality issbe, no personal experience in having operability decisions questioned by sr. mgt (however, offered only one Instance as possibly feeding into rift 01 heard about between SM and sr mgt that i e Q003.*ajteqdthat in regard to grassing and circulators on Unit 2, sr managementthad Initially given one direction,nd after things did not improve-re grassing, they changed their philosophy-000-anted 5 In accordance w/original criteria anc aid 4 OK), believes culture is far more conservative now than 6 or7 years ago and believes that's the case across the industry

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'no issues with people raising issues or ability to do so, offered an incident inVoIvi;ng' d' lung at operators (re isolating condensity) for being unsafe shut.down the job-ne1er savia "just do it anyway" attitude (re industrial safety issues

.*ple always able to raise concerns without repercussions, sees a change in senio tfro and MOM; 2

C I current as positive in that people believe their concerns are more lisf~hed to and properly dealt with-there's more emphasis and a more engaged safety committee, never saw a hesitation to bring a nuclear concern up-both operators and peer level, under new management believes nuclear safety concerns will be discussed without AOM or OM trying to talk him out of it or minimize the concern, offered that the environment now is that sr mgt asks what's the conservative and right thing to do to give operators a comfort level (example given of # of circulators for startup spring 2002 or 2003) without the chance. of down powers., erturbations or abnormal procedures. Added that was displayed betwee declined to start upheat up using MS-1 Os (coming out of 2R13 inovem er 2003) feels more comfortable now raising concerns-less comfortable w--P 4Ne aate 6A none apart from one incident described above, lot more issues withhe plant are brought up now because they suffer from maintenance and the prioritization by work management-believes maybe the money is not being spent where it should be to see improved performance indicators, outage times, etc.-if it were up to him, he would only accept the plant at 100% in every issue, Salem Unit 2 spring 2003 grassing recalled issues but'he was on h and he was not pressured-not even though he was a SM for only several weeks when

,pushed for minimum numberie thought they could have waited a little bit longer to get e circulators back, then re-evaluated because they had a tide change and thought the screens could handle it-th ouht t.'e.

ould continue w/power ascensionmfesome pressure from above to start the plant never directed to do so b !lome equipment operators feel treated wrongly for bringing up industrial safety issues, in spit*eof safety operator designation and the fact that the issues raised are resolved "all the time", believes union/management issues get emotional and create.a lack of communication and animosity-some union members that send the feeling that management disagrees with their issues purely for production purposes-(not true), sms feel just as frustrated at times, especially w/ the amount of repeat work-sees part of problem with maintenance in that they do not have operational experience In supervision-schedule compliance not good, planning is questionable, mentioned parts availability problem, W the discovery hase was taking too long-wanted t wait longer on operability calls-sins ha a meeting underj 411i 1&nd pushed back-took the position that he wanted more people to weigh in before the call was made, Sms wanted to look at what they had at hand and make the call conservatively and follow the tech spec (meaning shut down), example 6coming into CR to push into start up without proper surveillance of reactor head vefnindicators, pressure to stay wt in the rules but work through and around issues like reactor head vent indicators, the number of telephone calls to the CR by, in which Sins "defended" their position-taking a.

conservative approach-led to discomfort in operating the plant for sms, example given of and circulators (2003) position that procedure says you can move forward-do so in spite of SM comfort level-"hav.e a certain amount of risk" try to avoidtalking W1 across the board w/SMs,.aer" forthe

,believe left ecause he was micromanage ad similar problembelieves K. Harvin had a negative affect on m

ealing with Sis-improved afterve egime over, explained that there are some personalities on the crew that observed the&

handling of 22

MS42 leak that don't like nd made this incident into the uproar it became because it was actions, management process for repairing equipment is not effective and leads to use of temporary logs for excessive periods-this leads to operator mistakes (ex. Re rad monitors 12103 time frame)-need to dedicate the resources; saw BF-19 incident delay caused by failure to get "right people in the room and finally coming up with solutions-eventually they found they had something stuck in the internals of the valve, but the process of ruling everything else out and getting the info from the "smart people" takes time", described the Sms as in the position to "buffer" the CRSs and operators from sr management in the "push" they would exhibitby calling into the CR "not uncommonly" to move a start up along U.....i,_

y.callin example of this as salting in switchyard in September 2003-SiM idescribed hirm'self as feeling "uncomfortable" because he needed to shut down both units bas.ed upon what he vi wed in the switchyard-arcing, presented facts to including the *from th plant who had "word for word" experienced the same rd. lem 10 years earlie-"disbelief' that's what w s occurring, had to convinc t hat plant needed to b6 srut down-had to walk*"to switchyard to show him (explained should have been a no brainer to shut down when arcing viewed) and still wasn't convinced until 500 KV breaker opened the!psaid, that's it I'm shutting down-the financial influences of who's going to make up'for the lost generation, pay for switchyard repairs and who is accountable for this should not enter the control room decision making$1il. NOOid not come from proper perspective and it added "at least an hour*

unti 4 decision-o shut down, offered as example of what he would experience with.

in.pas.-resistance to shut down/offered that his confidence level currently is higheA r that hewon't be in the same position again-believes won't have that problem witt-environment under -. _-

as such that you didn M t

wwork in it because of the constant coaching and ridicu-Te-not conducive to,

i best effort, just doing what you had to to avoid coaching-nobody wanted to work tfu and now improved as-far as dealing with management-SMs had to figh no become "si e managers" because of the issues that Salem would have regular y-needed to be in CR to be backup for CRS due to emerging issues-described as happening more than in other plants-became Po viqs t a id not understand what was going on in control-this affected their rapport; union/management relationship detero a i and worsened in last 6-8 months specifically between-Eos and mgt (cited firingh/_then returning him to duty as "incendiary device"), cited animosity over perception by some in management that safety is7 being used, as a weapon by operators-sees the "real organizational risk" as a supervisor mayj i tt r-make a decision with that factored In-saying you're just beating me over the head w/safety ahd the supv. Makes the wrong choice-has not seen it happen, believes there's potential to happen O~e and keeps on top of his supv to prevent it-offered examples of union using safety erroneously (over 3 yrs ago, hydrazone laden water 11 issue, left bad taste for him as SM; operators returned to shift from training-did not like-started raising confined space issues-summer 2003; re conservative decision making-spring 20Q2.wanted 4 circulators to bring the plant-orward without the fear of having to back down,"

ushed for minimum of 3'WN

,0111 fence" and could go either way from the start-wanted defense in depth in spiteo*o persuasive argument that they were still in conservative space with the # (3) they had-did n6t' -..

like operating philosophy o hat sets the unit at a place that did not allow defense in depth- -

pointed out thati i

comfort zone.was wider than his own with using 3 right from start, V1rA.

but believes he was persuaded b

ýIjanother example late 2001 of his disagreement in conservative decisi n re SJ injection valve w'lsignificant leakage and needed to test to determine which one-he and fo greed and went to meeting to discus' w

' lmade decision not going to test for leakaae, they would-engineer it away" (issue being paneled t tV" ARB), when decision made to goiway, ade conscious decision not to "defy" Vin A e l d '<

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public setting:l t went along and met w~fter to discuss Offered engineering issue, f his bosses, believe ust as taken back by reversal ofV

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steam leak situation raised as non-conservative decision making by elt he could safely get to the valve-no indication that sr. mgt had part i decision to-lsolate the leak summarized as did not think anybody was telling

__oa get up there and close leak, in spite of his differences w/mgt he would not believe that happened-had not seen that kind of behavior r 5;/vt z2-$,1 k-(r91;- /6 L

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Negative (see remainder in Positive) perceived restart pressure resulted in p ush ofix a valve by flashlight rather than Waiting to fix lights (resolved wltemp Iighting);(

perception that co. takes easlest/cheapest way out examples qiven: chronic problems with boron leakage and charging pump cooler cleaning during grassing season, perception of surveys Is management does them to a bers to justify whatever they want, no corrections come from the surveys;"Nll identified industrial safety concerns of scaffolding by flashlight, failure of SS-661 valve, no one from management or union wants to be the one to say they held a job up; 0: ECP ineffective, perception that it takes too long to fix some things that unionbe ieves should be done immediately, expressed concerns of self and others that tagging is complicated and not well enough known to the people hanging them, surveys are not useful because they get too many to pay attention to, results not well published, regularly hear about missing parts because the warehouse sold them, known as a

.,j*a.al joke" that a needed part was In the warehouse as surplus to be sold at a sale;

)somest do not have the personality to raise an issue no matter where they work; believes the environment intentionally cumbersome to discourage.

or has effect o -isouraging-complaints,, surveys can be Interpreted any way and did not believe management listened to what was said, Industrial safety issues overlooked to get the job done, first line supervisors push production over safety because their pay structure rewards that-could not attach any nuclear safety Issues to this though, industrial safety; corrective actions are less than adequate and that's because they do not conduct post job briefs for the lessons learned (1 in 100 would be a-lot); company and union battle to.ý much Where they should not have to, hopes U 1" will help this, expects so; industrial safety Issues (equipment and personnel safety related n..ed some work re backlog of notifications in CAP,'perception that EDG at HC wasN*

concerned wltech specs, not OSHA requirements-caused a problem for operators by term insubordinate, ECP thorough, but did not roll out findings clearly

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does not see production over safety yet, but does not like the trend that be sees as sitting and waiting before making a call-believes the push to not be the person to bring a unit down could affect decisions-offered BF 19 controls vs. mechanically stuck issue and it took too long to call it mechanically stuck, perception that declaring the BFI 9 valve mechanically stuck avoided because It would have led to a 1-hour shutdown (production push-error), sees production push in Issues like BFI9, and the handling of two issues

developed under hurricane startup in Sept 03-, re main steam isolation valves and steam dump valves-seen as examples of pushing the envelop ofco ervative decision making to keep units on line, id'd three incidents involving that sent a message to operators indicating no regard for personal safety and believes it sent message okto take short cuts because it happened w/ another supervisor, different situation;-

stuck BF19 troubleshooting allowed them to generate more megawatts, then continued-wlshutdown, cites problem with work week scheduling and bumping of one issue as another one becomes immediate or next priority-effect is to just keep postponing an Issue-example given CR indicators-keep sliding and don't get addressed, seemed Negative (continued) resources and or time not applied, this works the same way wICAP, notification system cumbersome to use, sees difference In CR staff In deregulated environment in a swing In emphasis on production, maintain fine line between what Is acceptable risk and what is ot ncerned re push to move to four man crews (from five) and potential effect on safe ops;

,concern is that people are not heard when they raise concerns-most NEOs feel t ey are "white noise" and some people (but not pervasive through group) don't want their names tied to a concern so the union stewards raise it for them, CRSs are caught between battle of union and management and are aggravated by both parties, it's become "tit for tat on piddly stuff", work management process Is "horrendous" and the workers have been telling management that since 2000 with nothing done about it-in part does not work because they don't have the parts to complete the work with-leads to criticism of workers for "low wrench time" and gets everybody pissed off causing bad attitudes, can't seem to get a handle on the SAP work clearance modules for tags and work clearance documents, why aren't we fixing more stuff in the primary plant?-raises issue that it seems that only goal is to.

we had a 28 day outage as opposed to 38.or 42 and really get things fixed, saw act at MS42 valve as production over safety, unsafe and exhibiting megawatt mentality, Salem 2 bolting Issue (summer 2001 or 02) deferred repair because he.did-not want to extend the refuel outage, grassing issues did the right thing but 0oofortable having to take unit off line-ever, did receive "attaboy" rom tofatnd crew for having done so;

" SAP difficult to research previous defic nincles, broken equipment tends to go on forever-cited long term plant deficiencies as primary Issue, believes "new guys" would not raise a concern of a nuclear safety nature for fear of losing job, gave five examples of schedule pressure, production over safety issues including a stuck fed reg valve where the unit should have tripped, criticized the Oss for starting surveillances just before the end of the shift to get credit, grading by "beans"-led to stress on individuals working the surveillance and those taking over from oncoming shift;Asaa starting in late 2001a major problem with culture that allows equipme t needs repair to languish-don't want to spend the money, raised same issue as.e turbine header testing not handled properly and equipment released, people may not report smaller Issues out of the belief that nothing would be done (like small oil eIas 14 BF 19 Issue as example of non conservative approach to operation, MS 42 and

--- %ssue seen as sr mgt preaching conservatism not taken to heart, indicative o1faoonservative and megawatt mentality, very weak in carrying out corrective actions gmoperators.

will say why should I bring that up if they're not going to do anything about it? People will

raise concerns if issue is major, examples of production over safety:

$42, BF19 valve-mentality was to stall and not shut down, ms28S BYPASS VALVE'on main steam line stuck, so struck wlhammers to grassing issues-guys who keep it running on one circulator get pats on the back, management picks "low hanging fruit" to fix, things that don't cost a lot of money-overall they don't pose a safety threat to people or environme t, but we try to see how close we can come to that-meant accepting risks, believesi ando have been beaten down -not the same as when they started their positions, after trying to do the r things (taking time and money) and they have changed, no cooperation from level up with union which leads to morale problem, SAP is "piece of crap" because concerns cannot be located/researched and screens are Negative (continued) difficult to work with, he believes the practice of starting surveillances at the close of shift are error traps to avoid but the push is to get "the bean" to make the shift look better, example of diesel maintenance -starting complicated procedures at shift change can be detriment to nuc safety others: no retal known believes "labeled" for trying to do the right thing, seen as a problem, believes Fqrd received poorratin. for voicin concerns

• believes nr harassed for their positions-do it by the book

'believes two outspoke ke re adversely treated because they raise issues-has not stopped them from raising concerns:

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elleves made.an example of re comments repeated to him by Harvln re'UW perception that pulled off shift for a cou le of weeks and "reprogra rnmed"for backing his people up-go 'him in trouble, see as come down on hard for raising

concerns, seen as a hindrance, knows the procedures and holds mgt "to the letter" f~psitive no problem raising concerns, good.relationship as' far as radiological safety, did not see push for production over nuclear sfe sees more support and enforcement of the industrial safety culture under.

_.no nuclear safety Issues, will raise concerns and limits dealings to ifmf'edlate supervisor, believes responsibility taken away from supervision and lower managers;i#O.

will raise concerns and others will too; raises concerns and does for others, experience to support retaliation raise conce-nJAM*uclear safety issues would be addressed,

!does a ood, thorough job and people have confidence In him to not use their name, seen as having strong operatorobackground and pushing for conservative decision making and nuclear safetyA influence has changed the way issues are addressed, they won't languish any longer; -,Ieturn "great", thinks will help return to olwa after 1996 startup of getting it management worked together; J

no Issues wlnuclear safety; o retaliation seen for raising concerns (discussion around his own termination did not evoke discrim. complaint others will raise concerns and confident that nuclear safety Issues are raised,1 I

concerns are raised, people jump over mgt If they have to to get something addressed

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and has never seen an issue where he questioned the co attitude toward nuclear safety, offered that operator decisions to trip unit have been backed up by ops mgt and offered two example 4hinks co does good job of protecting health and safety of public, big safety issues and primary plant issues are looked at in depth, everyone would report a concern of importance, sees improvement recently in procedures that required a fix either get a notification or more resources applied in the procedure group have resulted In more refined procedures w/not many major errors or problems any longer, typically only sees small issues now with procedures, majority will raise issues if they have a concern, for self, is comfortablein raising concerns that mgt believes are valid-a SCU-551 gný ssues (neg), impressed b ii lexpects p-6sitive changes

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