ML052730347
| ML052730347 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/02/2004 |
| From: | Brenner E Office of Public Affairs |
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| FOIA/PA-2004-0369, NRC-1520 | |
| Download: ML052730347 (44) | |
Text
! Eot Brenner -NRC transcript _ Page 1 From: Eliot Brenner A To: Lisa.slow~tumer.com Date: Wed, Jun 2, 2004 5:16 PM
Subject:
NRC transcript Lisa: attached is the transcript of the Chairman's visit to an Energy Daily press breakfast, which C-Span covered. I hope that helps. there are a few references to plant security, particularly in the event of an aircraft crash, and a line on page 6 about .... "We are now a safety, security and preparedness agency.
We are no longer one-dimensional. These three areas, safety, security and preparedness are being integrated in a synergistic manner so each one reinforces each other. ... we have done significant secuirty enhancements. .... in particular.... look at the comments in the two full paragraphs on paragraph on pagel 7 of the transcript.
to get the industry perspectivel think dave suggested you reach out to steve kerekes at NEI. I'm sure he can help you.
Eliot Brenner Director of Public Affairs The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rockville, MD r el ("* 2-3 301-415-8200 Vki ert
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Energy Daily Breakfast Meeting Docket Number: (not applicable)
Location: (not provided)
Date: Thursday, May 27, 2004 Work Order No.: NRC-1 520 Pages 1-41 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 234-4433 1
1 ENERGY DAILY 2 + ++ + +
3 BREAKFAST MEETING 4
5 THURSDAY, 6 MAY 27, 2004 7
8 9
10 11 12 The meeting was held at 10:00 a.m.,
13 Llewelyn King, presiding, with guest, Nils Diaz, 14 Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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2 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 MR. KING: Good morning, ladies and 3 gentlemen. Thank you for coming. I'm Llewelyn King, 4 the publisher and founder of Energy Daily . We 5 appreciate you all coming on what is essentially a 6 holiday week, a holiday coming up. This is another 7 notorious breakfast which we've been running since 8 1974. The purpose is to provide everyone with the 9 stories of the day, with no advantage to the Energy 10 Daily. It's a pretty straightforward situation where 11 everything is on the record, and we could play it back 12 on our website from about noon on, so if you miss 13 something, you can get it off the website. We have 14 television today, C-Span, and I'd be grateful if you 15 would identify yourselves for the record.
16 Our guest today, an old friend of mine.
17 He just reminds me how long we've known each other.
18 After a while it doesn't get to be flattering.
19 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: I know that.
20 MR. KING: The Chairman of the Nuclear 21 Regulatory Commission will (inaudible), and I think we 22 have a few remarks, and then we'll move into 23 questions. And (inaudible) together to handle the 24 questions. Welcome and (inaudible)it doesn't get to 25 be flattering.
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3 1 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: It's my pleasure. Well, 2 good. I think I'll just focus your attention on a 3 series of issues. I'll go down a few bullets that I 4 have in here, and as everybody knows, this is the 5 0 th 5 anniversary of the Atomic Energy Act, and in many ways 6 for many people this is a celebration, and for other 7 people this is an area of concern.
8 And this brings out the fact that nuclear 9 power has both many benefits, but it also creates many 10 questions for humanity. And in the NRC we deal with 11 those issues day in and day out, because our job 12 really is to provide the means to protect the people 13 of this country from radiological hazards. In many 14 ways, that's what we do day in and day out. We 15 provide radiological protection from the uses of 16 nuclear energy, and for civilian materials that are 17 based in medicine and industrial issues.
18 There is no doubt that many things have 19 changed in the last 50 years. I think even Mr. King 20 and I have changed a little bit in the last 50 years.
21 The reality is -- well, a little bit.
22 MR. KING: A little bit.
23 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Yes. I'm not going to get 24 into that. Fundamentally, in the 50 years there's a 25 tremendous amount of increase of the two main uses of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 1 nuclear power and radiation, so the energy portfolio 2 has increased significantly from the standpoint of the 3 production of electricity. If you look back 50 years, 4 there's significant development which in many ways 5 stagnated during the crises that came in the 70s when 6 the prices of oil drove the prices of reactors very 7 high, but the level of safety, which is what I am 8 concerned with, has continued to increase.
9 The level of safety in reactors is a 10 continuous improvement that has really been 11 remarkable, especially the last 10 to 15 years. I 12 don't know whether you can say well, that is true 13 because of the mishaps like Three Mile Island, some 14 big mishaps like Chernobyl, but the reality is that 15 nuclear power plants in this country and abroad are 16 operated at a much higher level of safety than what 17 they were.
18 The other part of the equation that we 19 deal with is, of course, the issue of the use of 20 radioactive materials, and the increased use of 21 radioactive materials for medicine and for industrial 22 purposes have also continued to increase. In these 23 areas, safety has also increased.
24 I must note, however, that every year we 25 have several incidents, especially at hospitals with NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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5 1 misutilization and misadministrations of radioactive 2 materials. This continues to be a concern, and the 3 agency is systematically trying to come up with better 4 ways to protect the patients, and occasionally work 5 with some of the industrial uses.
6 If you look at our reports to Congress for 7 the past many, many years, the only real issues were 8 the large amounts of radiation were either given to a 9 person as an internal or external radiation event, 10 really comes from the medical and from the industrial 11 communities. Those are the two that actually in many 12 ways directly related to the project and many ways 13 more significant than any other type of issue that we 14 have ever seen.
15 If you look at the NRC, we have changed 16 too, and we believe we have changed for the better.
17 When I came to the NRC eight years ago, we were still 18 in the process of accelerating and looking at how we 19 become more focused on safety, because the NRC many 20 times is preoccupied with the issue of is the right 21 thing being done. There was a lot of little tables 22 with checkmarks put on it, and people were worried 23 whether people were complying with a procedure or not.
24 I think we have changed tremendously, and 25 changed for the better. This change is that things NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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6 1 that are important to safety rise up from where they 2 were and are given national attention, and things that 3 are not are taking a different perspective.
4 We no longer do enforcement on minor 5 safety issues. We just work with the licensees to 6 make them better, but we do take serious safety issues 7 and elevate them. And like I keep saying, you can 8 always tell when something is very serious by the 9 amount of inspectors that come into a site. The 10 numbers of inspectors are multiplied.
11 We are in a new phase. There is no doubt 12 about it, and this focus on safety goes not only from 13 the reactors, it goes all the way to the materials 14 arena. And we are trying to get to be an agency that 15 is risk-informed and performance-based, a new way of 16 doing things that allows to do things more efficiently 17 and more effectively.
18 Even now in the past year, we changed the 19 NRC even further. We used to be a safety agency. We 20 just always did public health and safety, public 21 health and safety. Well, 9/11 changed that 22 completely. We are now a safety, security, and 23 preparedness agency. We are no longer one-24 dimensional. These three areas, safety, security, and 25 preparedness are being integrated in a synergistic NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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7 1 manner so each one reinforces each other. I know that 2 you have very strong interest in security. We have 3 done significant security enhancements.
4 The agency in February of 2002, three 5 months after 9/11, in that very, very I'll almost say 6 arbitrary manner issued orders for all nuclear power 7 reactor licensees and told them flat out to go ahead 8 and increase their security in a manner that was, even 9 at the time we were not sure of all the intelligence 10 that was available but we actually went and did it.
11 We actually increased the security for access control, 12 security for protection against ground, a land-based 13 attack. We issued new water-based criteria, and we 14 required the licensees to actually be prepared to deal 15 with the potential effects of an aircraft attack. And 16 out of that came out a continuing study which is 17 called our Aircraft Vulnerability Study.
18 The studies, as you know, are classified 19 but they do confirm that the power reactor facilities 20 are the most protected civilian facilities in the 21 country. And that this criteria, this approach that 22 we have used for many years is called Defense-In-23 Depth, gives us time to deal with unexpected events no 24 matter where they come from.
25 What we have learned in the last two and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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8 1 a half years is a sophisticated set of analyses that 2 I believe have ever been done on power reactors is 3 that we have time, and time is on our side. And, 4 therefore, we have concluded that the potential 5 radiological consequences from aircraft attacks on 6 nuclear power reactors are low.
7 You can say that it's low but it's not 8 zero. Absolutely true, it is not (inaudible), and we 9 deal with that day in and day out; therefore, the next 10 phase that we did is we say what is our next step to 11 make sure that we're protecting the people of America, 12 so we have increased emergency preparedness.
13 We have taken an agency preparedness like 14 a routine. You do it every do. You check it out, you 15 do it into a vital component of our triad, safety, 16 security, and preparedness. What we have done 17 internally is created an organization, doubled the 18 number of people. We're integrating right now 19 emergency preparedness with incident response. We are 20 shaking that issue loose and making sure that it is on 21 par with the amount of attention that we always gave 22 safety, and now to security, and now to preparedness.
23 I know that I could go on for some time.
24 The other issue that I think is very important is the 25 issue of sources. We have been working in securing NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 radioactive sources with the Department of Energy. We 2 actually have worked in a very, very close manner with 3 Homeland Security, with EPA, FAA, with DOE, and with 4 all the other agencies and have created a series up 5 response plans, including things like assessing what 6 the results of any potential device is, both health 7 wise contamination and cleanup levels. We are a lot 8 better now than we were.
9 We have answers, we have action plans. We 10 believe we are capable of addressing these issues in 11 a manner that are protective of public health and 12 safety. Are we there? Do we have everything we 13 should do, no; but we certainly have come a long way.
14 15 I think I'm going to stop right there 16 because I've done enough damage.
17 MR. KING: If you've got a question, would 18 you identify yourself and give your affiliation so 19 that we'll know for the television. Questions. Go 20 ahead.
21 QUESTION: Hi. I'm Darren (inaudible) 22 Daily. There's an issue right now in the Senate where 23 there's a fight over whether to allow DOE to 24 reclassify certain high-level waste at at least one 25 site, the Savannah River site. Folks that oppose it NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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10 1 say that this would create some kind of precedent for 2 some kind of reclassification at a public site. What 3 is your feeling on that about what DOE would like to 4 do with some of that waste?
5 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Well, I do believe that 6 the issue of incidental waste, as it's called, which 7 are waste that are in the stream of the higher-level 8 waste, is an issue that DOE is trying to deal with in 9 a manner that I call it risk-informed. Can I separate 10 enough of this waste, can I handle this waste in a 11 manner that still provides protection that doesn't 12 really entail all of the processing that we have to do 13 with the other waste. And I think this is a issue for 14 the Congress of the United States to address, which is 15 where it's being addressed.
16 I do believe there are things that can be 17 done to separate waste in a manner that classifies 18 them and is easier to handle. I think DOE has a 19 series of problems with this thing, and I would like 20 to say they are not my problems.
21 QUESTION: I'm with the Las Vegas Sun.
22 The State of Nevada that I have asked the Nuclear 23 Regulatory Commission to intervene in the Department 24 of Energy's idea to move waste from Fernald to the 25 Yucca Mountain site. I don't know if you're responded NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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11 1 to them yet, or do you --
2 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: We are in the process of 3 responding. Of course, we have a series of 4 regulations that deal with what is called 1lE-2 waste.
5 And fundamentally, we've tried to classify waste that 6 has been used in the processing of Uranium and what is 7 separated, and the law allows us to do certain things 8 and does not allow us to do other things. And the 9 issue for now, what we're trying to do is make sure 10 we're responsive to whatever needs are presented, but 11 we go slow on these issues. These are the type of 12 things that we don't decide overnight, and I hate to 13 say this but my lawyers have a lot to say about the 14 kind of things that we do. It's not purely a 15 technical issue. It goes into legal issues and, 16 therefore, there is a lot of back and forth into it.
17 I don't think the issue has been totally reviewed, but 18 I do know that the commitment has been made not to 19 move them until every "I" has been dotted.
20 QUESTION: Mr. Chairman, (inaudible) of 21 Reuters. Last week before Senator Voinovich's 22 hearing, he took a little bit of heat from a GAO 23 report regarding the Davis-Besse incident. There was 24 some discussion. Part of the issue was safety culture 25 and whether NRC should be involved in the safety NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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12 1 culture. Have you considered your position or the 2 agency's position, that that really doesn't fall under 3 your jurisdiction, or do you think you're likely to?
4 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Well, any time that the 5 Congress of the United States (inaudible) issue, we 6 pay very serious attention to it. And we believe we 7 have some good answers to the issue. There is no 8 doubt that the NRC is committed to a strong safety 9 culture in our licensees, but the way we do it, rather 10 than just saying have a safety culture, we have a 11 series of indicators.
12 I referred to it in the hearing as paying 13 more attention to the management of safety, which are 14 things that we can actually probably measure, and 15 actually see in the issue of the safety culture. So 16 we require our licensees to have a strong safety 17 culture. That somebody once in a while doesn't do it, 18 there's no doubt about it, and it happens. It happens 19 here, it happens everywhere.
20 However, I'd like to say that we are very 21 much aware of the need to address the issue. And, in 22 fact, you can see a couple of little speeches I have 23 given to the industry, at INPO last year in which I 24 addressed the issue of safety culture and complacency 25 and so forth.
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13 1 I do believe that the role of the NRC is 2 definitely not to manage these plants, and I think 3 that Senator Voinovich completely agrees, that we're 4 not a manager of nuclear power plants. I think our 5 role is to make sure that the licensee does what they 6 have to do. And in this case, Davis-Besse did not do 7 what they had in their own plan regarding safety 8 culture. In other words, they violated their own 9 plans and their own standards, and that we can hold 10 them accountable for.
11 I do believe that we're learning more 12 about what are the type of things that we can measure 13 by the type of things that we can add to it. And in 14 the case of Davis-Besse, because the culture was 15 really not good, we went a step beyond what we would 16 normally do, because in the case of safety, the 17 Commission and the Atomic Energy Act, 50 years that 18 tells us we have a tremendous amount of flexibility 19 and latitude. We require it for five years provide 20 independent assessment of their culture, their 21 operations. And that's kind of unique. We have only 22 done that -- we did a little bit with Milstone when we 23 required them to provide an independent body to look 24 at their culture, and an independent assessment of 25 their safety system. So in unique cases, we do it.
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14 1 We'd rather the licensees do it, and we see what the 2 results are.
3 QUESTION: Well, the GAO report mentioned 4 the possibility for other mishaps is still out there.
5 You mentioned that First Energy's safety culture 6 obviously wasn't good. Are you concerned that there 7 are other ticking time bombs out there that could come 8 up if you don't look at it more closely.
9 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: We haven't seen any 10 ticking time bombs. Okay. I can categorically tell 11 you that there's never going to be another hole in the 12 head of a reactor vessel in this country. I mean, 13 you're never going to find one. And you can say well, 14 is that because of the strong regulator? Well, a 15 little bit, take a little bit of credit for that. But 16 fundamentally if you look at what it cost them, there 17 is no other industry in this country that's going to 18 take that risk.
19 Now we're going to make sure that there's 20 strong regulations, and we have gone that way.
21 However, I think what the GAO was saying, and they 22 might have even quoted me, is the fact that I said 23 that there might be some other things that are not as 24 obvious and as clear as the Boric Acid corrosion in 25 the plant. And that's why a year ago I started to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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15 1 push very hard and established a Materials Degradation 2 Program, a program that is not only looking at the 3 nozzles of the pressure vessel head, looks at the 4 materials in the plant and all of the systems that 5 could actually have an impact on safety.
6 At the same time then, the industry has 7 established major programs in Materials Degradation.
8 This, by the way, is not an issue only of the nuclear 9 power industry. You talk to the Presidential Science 10 Advisor, which I occasionally have the pleasure of 11 doing, that's an issue that is very big on his list.
12 This is an issue of America, do we have many, many 13 assets that have materials degradation problems, and 14 we need to come up with a new technology, a new way of 15 fixing them.
16 QUESTION: Chairman, you're a nuclear 17 engineer by training and a nuclear professor before 18 you joined the NRC. Do you feel that the need for 19 technology is evolving or is it frozen in time? We 20 haven't seen a new plant, since everybody knows in 21 more than 30 years. In everything else we see 22 technological evolution, oil (inaudible) is something 23 different after 30 years than it was before. How do 24 you feel about the evolution of the technology?
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16 1 evolved very fast. You're absolutely right, the 2 nuclear technology in this country, and really in the 3 world is kind of -- is not frozen. It has evolved 4 slowly. That doesn't mean that changes are not being 5 made even to existing reactors or to the new reactors 6 that are being built, especially in the East, in 7 Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China. But the changes 8 are evolutionary in measure, and the reason is this is 9 a very conservative industry. And by being 10 conservative, they have tried to assure themselves and 11 whoever invests in these things, and the country, that 12 what they are doing already fits the framework of 13 performance and of regulation.
14 I believe that for the nuclear power 15 industry to move forward, and I'm now talking as an 16 old nuclear engineer, they need to evolve more 17 rapidly. They need to actually have plans that run 18 more efficiently, at little higher temperatures. They 19 need to really get rid of all this whole analog 20 systems going to digital controls and 21 instrumentations. There are many, many things that 22 are state-of-the-art, and they are bringing them in 23 into the old plants. But if there are new power 24 plants, they definitely need to move into an area that 25 makes them more efficient, and at the same time, we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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17 1 will require them to be moving at a higher level of 2 safety; meaning that inherent safety becomes part of 3 the criteria, rather than something that you add on 4 later on.
5 QUESTION: (inaudible) evolution?
6 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: In a certain way, yes. I 7 think that in a certain way in this particular area 8 where conservatisms is such a big part of all that is 9 done, it inhibits it because people say I do not want 10 to have uncertainty. Uncertainty is one of the great 11 enemies of this area.
12 On the other hand, I do believe there is 13 enough known learned now that the basis is there to 14 move forward. I think we know much more now than we 15 did many years ago. There is a good, strong, 16 scientific and technological basis to move reactors 17 from where they are to a higher level of performance.
18 And I think the industry is looking seriously at that.
19 QUESTION: Do we learn enough from the 20 Nuclear Navy and the nuclear submarines, do we learn 21 enough to do. I believe there's evolution going on 22 now.
23 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Yes, we do. We, of 24 course, as you know, we do have significant programs 25 with the Nuclear Navy and there is a learning process.
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18 1 I do believe that those programs, of course, have 2 improved also in the areas of materials and controls.
3 But I think the big step in the nuclear power plants 4 comes in the area of can we increase the efficiency of 5 generation. We're stuck at the 32, 33 percent level, 6 I think, that that can only be resolved with higher 7 temperatures. And this is why the move to either gas 8 turbines. You know, it's probably a very good move 9 for the future. Nobody is going to go there, as you 10 well know, in the next 20 years. They need to be 11 assured that this fits both the expectations of 12 performance, the expectations of safety, and the 13 expectations of what the country was to be assured 14 that these things are very, very safe. So I have, by 15 the way -- I coin a phrase about a couple of years 16 ago, which is an interesting phrase. It's just that 17 we need to be conservative, but we need to be 18 realistically conservative. We need to avoid the 19 extreme levels of conservatism, because it doesn't 20 serve the American people very well.
21 QUESTION: Mr. Chairman, (inaudible).
22 There seems to be a lot of pressure and uncertainty on 23 the Hill this year, and I know the NRC has asked for 24 increases in several areas, including preparations for 25 the Yucca Mountain license application.
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19 1 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Yes.
2 QUESTION: If you don't get the budget in 3 time (inaudible) that's needed, how is that going to 4 affect the agency's goal to start up on that project?
5 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Well, it certainly will 6 impact us after a while. If there is a continuing 7 resolution, we will be essentially at the previous 8 year's level, and we have anticipated a significant 9 increase from the nuclear waste fund. And if that 10 increase doesn't come, we will be curtailed.
11 Now the agency, of course, will look to 12 right now how to accelerate other projects we already 13 have on our plate. We have the licensing of the MOX 14 facilities, we have potentially two enrichment 15 applications for fuel enrichment plants, so we can 16 juggle our things for a few months, but if it goes 17 longer than a few months, then it would curtail what 18 we can do in the high-level waste area.
19 QUESTION: If I can ask a follow-up.
20 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Sure.
21 QUESTION: If the agency has three, maybe 22 four years to get through this very complex license 23 application, even in the best of times, is this a job 24 that the NRC could get done in that period of time, or 25 do you think it's going to take longer?
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20 1 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: How long do I have to 2 answer this question? No, fundamentally three years 3 is very tough. I would say it's very, very difficult 4 for us to handle this massive adjudicatory process, 5 which is going to probably be the largest that has 6 ever been done in this country in a three year period, 7 but we're going to try. We're going to give it our 8 best try.
9 We have a one year leeway which we have to 10 justify, so given that the Department of Energy is 11 telling us they're going to deliver an application in 12 December, and given the fact that we have insisted 13 that the application be as good as it can be, if it's 14 a very good application and it's delivered on time, 15 we're going to try our best to do it in three years, 16 but we will do it in four years.
17 QUESTION: (inaudible), National Public 18 Radio. Back to the question of the (inaudible). The 19 DOE's plan is to take out it says over 99 percent of 20 the waste. That still could leave tens of thousands 21 of gallons of high level waste in the bottom of these 22 tanks. What has the NRC done to evaluate the safety 23 of that proposal? Has all the science been done, and 24 how confident are you that the rivers will be safe 25 (inaudible)?
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21 1 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Well, we have not done it, 2 because like I said, it is not on our plate, so we 3 don't provide those evaluations. It's Department of 4 Energy evaluations. The NRC does not regulate DOE's 5 abilities, so they are not on our every day plate. We 6 do have memorandums of understanding with the 7 Department of Energy, and we do conduct a series of 8 evaluations, and we have done that. We have projects 9 in Hanford support some of the departments work in the 10 Hanford area, specifically in the radiological 11 protection arena. But I think what they are trying to 12 do is handle the problem in a manner that allows them 13 to do what is more important first, and the things 14 that can be done, and then have the assessment that 15 although this waste are still radioactive, they do not 16 pose the significant hazard that the rest of the waste 17 would. I think that's a good way of doing things, 18 because if not, we might not be able to handle all of 19 it, so doing it in phases is a good approach.
20 I am not really familiar with what is the 21 total amount of radioactivity, or what it is, but I am 22 sure that a lot of people are going to be looking at 23 it. And it might end up that we might be consulted, 24 but that has not taken place.
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22 1 is that they say well, the NRC has approved our plan, 2 is one of the things they say. What (inaudible) true?
3 Have you run any computer models (inaudible)?
4 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: What we have done is look 5 at the sequence of operations, but we have not any 6 long-term effects or issues. We assume that the 7 Department of Energy is going to do that, and provide 8 it to us. That it still (inaudible) and the process 9 is being done.
10 QUESTION: Actually, do you evaluate the 11 details and models --
12 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: We don't evaluate all the 13 detail models or predictions. Now I could be wrong on 14 that, but I have not seen -- it hasn't crossed my 15 desk. It hasn't my crossed my desk, it means that 16 there is a process that has not taken place.
17 Now can we be asked to do that? The 18 answer is yes. Can the Congress turn around and say 19 we want NRC to -- the answer is yes. But has the 20 process been done and completed? The answer is no.
21 QUESTION: Jeff Beatty with Energy Daily.
22 In the past couple of years, the NRC has looked at 23 individual problems at individual plants and judged 24 them to be important enough to issue sort of a fleet-25 wide generic (inaudible) inspections or assessments NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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23 1 (inaudible). And given the discovery of the missing 2 spent fuel rod noticed at Vermont Yankee, and 3 discovered at Milstone a couple of years ago, I'm 4 wondering if the NRC is considering any sort of 5 similar fleet-wide communication (inaudible)?
6 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Well, we have already done 7 it. We pick up the phone and call all of the people 8 that have similar reactors and could have similar 9 materials and tell them to make sure they start 10 accounting for all the material, which we have already 11 done. The issue is we're now in a little more 12 demanding mode because this practice of having a pail 13 that breaks, it's okay. This is something that 14 (inaudible) fuel is doing to occasionally may be 15 damaged and come apart. The issue of putting it in a 16 pail and sitting in a place is probably ok. Most 17 plants have a pail that is locked and cannot be 18 opened, and cannot be moved. In this case it was not, 19 and obviously somebody did not really realize what 20 they were handling.
21 Now the good part of the story is that 22 that means that that fuel was no longer very, very 23 radioactive as we consider it, because if not, once 24 you take it out of there, something would have 25 alarmed, so it was probably handled underwater or put NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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24 1 in a shielded cask. It was probably, and this is all 2 conjecture, that we don't have any real data on where 3 it went. It probably is not there. It's not on a 4 part of the plant. It was probably with all the 5 radioactive waste, so it was taken to the waste 6 handling facility. It was probably mixed with 7 concrete, and so by the time it left the plant, it met 8 all of the criteria for shipping fuel because they 9 checked the outside of it, and there was no 10 contamination on the outside. It met the 11 transportation radiation level, and so it met what the 12 criteria that we have for moving things outside of the 13 plant.
14 How it happened, we don't know. We're 15 still trying to figure that out. Have we addressed 16 the issue? The answer is yes. Will we be able to, 17 once we get some answers, go back and make sure there 18 is proper communication that identifies what they have 19 to do? The answer is yes.
20 QUESTION: Steven (inaudible) McGraw Hill.
21 Chairman, you mentioned a moment ago that most over-22 used word in Washington, but that a paradigm of 23 realistic conservatism and at meetings I've seen the 24 staff on technical issues this is beginning to be 25 considered and brought into technical meetings on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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25 1 various issues. Can you tell us more about how you 2 hope, and how management is going to make sure that 3 this approach is brought into NRC's technical analyses 4 and decisions on a more nuts and bolts level with what 5 I think Commissioner McGaffigan referred to as several 6 layers of bounding conservatism studies, how it causes 7 the agency to look to make conservatism in its 8 technical studies more realistic without eliminating 9 important parameters in the study?
10 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Sure. The issue of 11 realistic conservatism, of course, came out very 12 clearly when we started to deal with some of the 13 vulnerability assessment and some of the consequence 14 analysis. And what happens is that we scientists, I 15 used to be a scientist. I'm no longer qualified, but 16 I used to be able to doodle in the issue, they have a 17 tendency of taking a complex issue and then saying all 18 right. I'm going to deal with it in a manner that 19 allows me to make the calculations, and so we take 20 issues that have - let's just say the word that is 21 seven dimensions, and we say I'm going to make it one 22 dimension. I'm going to be able to work with this 23 problem. And when they do that, they get to a result, 24 and that result normally could be slanted one way or 25 another. And the way that in our business we do it, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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26 1 we make it conservative.
2 Then they say all right, now I know what 3 it is in this simple one point analysis. Let me go to 4 the next level. And they go to the next level, they 5 say all right, I'm going to consider another factor.
6 And then they start saying but I want to be 7 conservative, and then they add another layer of 8 conservatism. And when they do this five times, the 9 fifth iteration has already forgotten what the first 10 one was, and so the end result is that you don't know 11 how conservative you are.
12 People used to think that conservatisms is 13 good. My point is that unnecessary conservatism is 14 paid by the American people. They pay for it. Power 15 companies don't pay for it. You, I, everybody pay for 16 the electricity. You, I, everybody pays for the 17 medical procedures, so are we having the American 18 people pay for unnecessary conservatism? And the 19 answer is yes. Okay. So what we're doing is from the 20 beginning, we want people to add just the amount of 21 conservatism that they can justify because of the end 22 use, the amount of conservatism that can be assessed.
23 It's very simple when people design a 24 bridge, you know, designers, and normally the way it 25 used to be, they'd come and say I want this bridge to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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27 1 do this, and this, and this. Then at the end they say 2 I'm going to have a safety margin of two. Well, that 3 to me is very realistic. They knew what they wanted 4 and they added a safety margin of a factor of two.
5 Well, I think we should be able to do the same thing.
6 It might be that we want to add a safety margin of 7 fire. Because we want to be more conservative. That 8 is the case, but when we don't know what the amount of 9 conservatism is, it becomes not realistic. It doesn't 10 serve anybody.
11 And what the staff is doing, and they 12 started with research, but is cooperating to the other 13 offices when we make analysis, we make technical 14 vulnerability assessments, when we made comparisons, 15 we are going to not take the worst case scenario at 16 every step. We're going to try to determine what is 17 the margin of safety because that's where our low is.
18 We are supposed to be have a margin of safety, they're 19 going to ensure that there is a very good margin of 20 safety. We're going to know what that is.
21 QUESTION: Tom (inaudible) International.
22 Am I'm not sure if (inaudible) but earlier this month, 23 Secretary Abraham said that it might be worth 24 considering federalizing some of the guard forces at 25 nuclear facilities. And I was wondering if you could NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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28 1 explain any of the considerations surrounding 2 something like that, or any progress made in that 3 direction.
4 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Sure. I believe that what 5 Secretary Abraham was saying is there are facilities 6 which have potentially higher risk profiles, and those 7 facilities he might consider having an extra level of 8 security, which would include the federalization of 9 those guards.
10 The issue, of course, the way that is 11 played out is because of the different ways that 12 people come out with the so-called design basis 13 threat, and the design basis threat is being compared 14 to the so-called postulated threat. Now there is a 15 big difference between the postulated threat and the 16 design basis threat. Postulated threat is what can 17 happen in 10 years, what if serious or circumstances 18 converge that allow terrorists to gain this, or this, 19 or that, and are really more pointed to the 20 acquisition of nuclear weapons than some of the other 21 facilities.
22 I believe Secretary Abraham was 23 specifically addressing the security of facilities who 24 have or could have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons 25 materials. It really doesn't cover the other DOE NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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29 1 facility, and is really not applicable to civilian 2 nuclear reactors, where this threat is much more 3 reduced. And it really does not compare to the 4 postulated threat.
5 QUESTION: The Commission right now is two 6 commissioners short. I know the Senate is -- that 7 there's a hold-up in the Senate on one of the 8 nominees. Have you heard the White House giving any 9 names for the second nominee, and how has it affected 10 the Commission?
11 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Well, we love good 12 company. There's no doubt about it. But the 13 Commission is working well. I haven't heard from the 14 White House what they intend to do. I believe that 15 there have been many, many times in the history of the 16 Commission where we worked with even two 17 Commissioners, which makes it even more difficult to 18 do certain things. Although, as you know, the agency 19 becomes a single agency administrative as to 20 commissioners, which is what happened when Chairman 21 Jackson came into the Commission. She was a single 22 agent administrative for a series of months.
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30 1 worked together now for many years. We communicate 2 very well, and we are addressing all the issues that 3 need to be addressed. It's not impacting the work 4 that we do. Could we have a little more help? Yes, 5 I think that's fine, but we're doing well.
6 QUESTION: Can I ask you about the sources 7 at NRC. We've had movement and talk about maybe 8 somebody building a natural uranium Canadian CANDU 9 reactor. A while back there was talk about a pebble 10 bed reactor, and you have just talked about a high 11 temperature light water reactor, I think. Do you have 12 any sources to license any new designs?
13 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: We have made preparations 14 to license what is on our plate. To go beyond that, 15 the answer is no, but we are fully manned to complete 16 the licensing for the AP1000, which final design 17 approval is expected for September. And then we're 18 going to rule making, and it should have -- the rule 19 making should be done December, '05. We have two 20 other pre-applications which includes the ESBWR and 21 the Advance CANDU 700. Those are in the pre-22 application space. We have cut back in the work on 23 the high temperature reactors, like the pebble bed or 24 the gas core reactors because we see them as being 25 further in the future, and we have enough on our NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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31 1 plate.
2 I don't think there would be a very high 3 temperature light water reactor. We need to change 4 the feel, and we need to change the medium to be able 5 to go to the high temperatures. And I think that that 6 is in the future. I believe that the materials 7 technology and the fuels technology have advanced to 8 the point that we can consider high temperature 9 reactor. Those reactors that will give a thermal 10 efficiency of conversion of 42, 43, 45 percent, and 11 that makes a big difference for the economics of those 12 plants, and with the fuels, and the fuels also makes 13 a big difference, and the safety of the plants.
14 There's much more inherent safety in the larger, 15 potentially graphite reactors than the light waters.
16 QUESTION: Jeff Beatty with Energy Daily.
17 I'm wondering if given some of the materials related 18 discoveries have been made over the past couple of 19 years again with Davis-Besse and steam dryer at 20 Vermont Yankee. And given that there's an enormous 21 number of plants lined up for either power uprated 22 systems (inaudible), do you feel that those systems 23 for judging those applications and improving uprates 24 and license extensions is catching everything that 25 needs to be caught (inaudible) this point? I mean, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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32 1 simply you approved or reclassified the State of 2 Vermont (inaudible) independent engineering assessment 3 of (inaudible) and the uprate proposal there. Is that 4 -- are you considering anything additional for other 5 similar applications?
6 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: We are reassessing the 7 power uprates because we just had a power plant that 8 was granted what we call an instrument power rate of 9 1.2 percent, I believe, and the licensee itself came 10 and said that they are not able to meet the 11 requirements of the uprate, and so they are going back 12 to their original power until we can do it.
13 These are highly technical issues. We
.14 believe we have done a very good job in assessing the 15 power rate, especially in placing them in what we call 16 our safety framework. The issue of the steam dryers 17 is really not a safety issue of concern. It is an 18 operational issue. It is only a concern if the steam 19 dryer starts breaking into pieces, and could go into 20 the core vent. Normally, most plants would be able to 21 detect that. They make noise, they have loose parts 22 monitors that should be able to tell them. Also, what 23 happens very quickly is the amount of moisture that 24 goes to the turbine increase very rapidly, and the 25 turbine you don't do that. Turbines don't like NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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33 1 moisture.
2 So to answer your question, we are, of 3 course, increasing our assessment; especially of the 4 extended uprates, making sure that they fit into our 5 safety framework. We believe they do. What we're 6 doing in Vermont Yankee is part of another role, 7 enhancements of engineering inspections that we are 8 going to do everywhere, because we realize that we 9 could do engineering inspections a little better.
10 And these engineering inspections are 11 going to be called risk-informed inspections, in which 12 we're going to go and take vertical slices of safety 13 systems, and Vermont Yankee was the perfect one to do 14 the first one, and so we're going to dedicate
'15 additional resources to it. We're going to do it, and 16 it's independent because the NRC is an independent 17 agency. It's independent because we're going to make 18 sure that everybody that works on it has no ties or 19 relationships to the licensee, or the way that things 20 were done. And it's new and it's better, because we 21 just started working on it in December and established 22 with many hours. And I have been directly involved in 23 this, by the way. Occasionally, I like to go back to 24 my engineering roots.
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34 1 Radio. You talked a bit about the possibility of a 2 plane flown into a nuclear power plant. What's the 3 worst case scenario if a plane gets a direct hit on a 4 spent fuel pool and you talked about time. How much 5 time?
6 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Well, enough time to do 7 all of the things that we need to do to protect the 8 people. Spent fuel pools are really, in our 9 assessment, have come down several levels of safety 10 assessment. Spent fuel pools are okay. We know what 11 we will have to do. There is really very low 12 probabilities of any significant hazards to the public 13 from a direct hit on the spent fuel pool. It's just 14 really not there.
15 That doesn't mean that everything is 16 honky-dory every place. We have systematically 17 analyzed all of these systems. What I can tell you is 18 that there is enough time to protect the people around 19 this plant and the people of this country. And that 20 we know.
21 QUESTION: What's the technical basis, 22 that it's just that it's hard for them to actually 23 catch fire, hard to imagine a leak of the water? What 24 is the --
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35 1 way. Nuclear power reactors don't have mechanisms for 2 quick releases of radioactivity. They're just not 3 there. Small releases of radioactivity, a little bit 4 of radioactive water in the place; yes, but those are 5 not consequential. We always worried if the core of 6 the reactor melts and the radioactivity of the core 7 goes to the environment. Okay.
8 What we have found is that the way that 9 these plants were built, operated, and what we call 10 the severe accident and mitigation strategies that 11 were put in these power plants in the late 1980s,
.12 early 1990s, are very good at mitigating whatever can 13 happen, whether it's a plane crash or somebody throws 14 a bomb. The combination of these systems are so 15 robust that even if worst case things happen, we have 16 plenty of time to protect the people of this country.
17 So what I'm saying flat out is that there 18 are no quick mechanisms for significant releases of 19 radioactivity that we have identified. Does that mean 20 that the probability is zero? No. I can't say that, 21 but it is very low. Does it mean that we know 22 everything that we need to know? It doesn't mean 23 that. It means we have analyzed every angle that is 24 most probable, every structure, every system. We have 25 looked at every type of airplane. We have looked at NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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36 1 different ways of doing it, and we are convinced 2 enough for me to stand here and to tell the Congress 3 of the United States that the probability of a 4 significant radioactive release to occur before the 5 time that we have protected the people is very low.
6 And that includes not only nuclear power plants, it 7 includes all the spent fuel pools, the independent 8 spent fuel pools at facilities, it includes dry casks 9 and it includes transportation of the spent fuel.
10 Beyond transportation, the transportation casks that 11 we have analyzed. And in those cases, there is either
.12 little release, no release, very little release, but 13 in all cases there is time to protect the American 14 people. And that's the answer that we needed, that's 15 the answer that we have. And that's what we are 16 clearly coming out and saying.
17 QUESTION: Does that mean evacuating 18 people, or just getting it under control?
19 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Both. It means eventually 20 if we have enough time to get things under control.
21 If things we have not foreseen happen, there would be 22 plenty of time for evacuating the people and having 23 our emergency plans in action. And as you heard me 24 said, and this is a reality, is that emergency 25 preparedness has been elevated to a new level. Does NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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37 1 that means we're not confident of our result? No. We 2 are confident that we're getting good results, but we 3 also realize that we cannot stop there; therefore, we 4 have taken emergency preparedness to the next level of 5 activity.
6 QUESTION: Thank you. Along the same 7 lines of emergency preparedness, we understand that 8 there's some real plan for the IP 2 Plan up in New 9 York in the next few weeks. What makes these drills 10 special in terms of their security profile, and why 11 aren't more of these drills being done at other plants 12 in the United States?
13 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Well, first you see these 14 gray hairs? That's where they come from. Yes, we 15 have an emergency preparedness exercise that will take 16 place at the Indian Point Power Plant in New York that 17 contain a terrorist scenario, and that has been the 18 subject of significant attention, both by Homeland 19 Security, the NRC, and especially the local 20 authorities, the county executives and the State of 21 New York. It is the first of a kind.
22 And Indian Point will be the first power 23 plant in this country to have all three of our 24 elements of scenarios, which includes three things.
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38 1 integrated tabletop. Integrated tabletops are at the 2 present time -- of course, they are tabletops because 3 we have not really done a complete exercise yet. If 4 the integration of the federal agencies in this 5 country get together to put all their resources to 6 address whatever can happen at a power plant, and in 7 this case, we are the lead role. We are the ones that 8 have established this. We identified the need to 9 establish the scenarios. Secretary Ridge was 10 extremely helpful in moving this issue forward. The 11 White House got involved, so we now have many players 12 involved from the different federal agencies. And 13 Indian Point was actually the second plant to have an 14 integrated response analysis. The third one was 15 Calvert Cliffs, as a matter of fact.
16 QUESTION: When is this exercise going to 17 take place?
18 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: The one on -- the federal 19 exercise I think is June the 8 th. The tabletop 20 already took place, so they have two of the three 21 legs. The third one is emergency preparedness 22 exercise with a terrorist scenario built into it, and 23 that has been the subject of a tremendous amount of 24 preparation.
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39 1 resources, and in which we're going to test all of the 2 elements of emergency preparedness, including these 3 issues that have been brought up regarding 4 communications, regarding it will happen, but I think 5 it would be a fairly tough test. I would like to say 6 that I believe that FEMA and the NRC, the licensee, 7 and the county executives, which I met with them last 8 week on this issue. I went to New York, and went into 9 the Lion's Den, and sat in there and talked with them, 10 are prepared. And we are moving very quickly to that 11 deadline.
12 QUESTION: Linda (inaudible). You seem to 13 be pretty confident about airborne attacks. How about 14 ship borne attacks. What are you doing about that 15 aspect. I'm usually around the water around Calvert 16 Cliffs. I guess that makes me really nervous to go by 17 Calvert Cliffs.
18 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Again, we have run the 19 scenarios of water-based attack since February of 20 2002. Our licensees have had to consider the 21 potential for a water-based attack. They are 22 prepared. They're ready. We also did assessments on 23 the potential vulnerabilities if something much larger 24 than what is anticipated is done. We have identified 25 what we call mitigating strategies. And I go back to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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40 1 this integration of safety, security, and 2 preparedness.
3 What happens is that the things that we 4 identified years ago that could mitigate a very large 5 reactor accident are in place, and the people are 6 being able to be drilled in how to deal with these 7 issues. This has served us very well. We've been 8 able to address every single one of these effects that 9 we have identified. There's always the one that we 10 have not identified; and, therefore, we always go a 11 little bit beyond where we should be.
12 And, in fact, some people in the industry 13 claim that I am very, very, very -- too safety 14 conscious. I'm always pushing them a little bit 15 beyond where they should be. And maybe so. But I do 16 believe that we're now at a stage where the licensees 17 have responded. They have submitted their plans. We 18 have inspected them, and we know where they are. And, 19 therefore, we're confident they're capable of handling 20 the vast majority of what could be thrown at them.
21 MR. KING: Well, before we conclude and we 22 reach the end, I want to thank our co-sponsor, BP, and 23 acknowledge Mike Ryan, who heads the Washington 24 office, and Sara Howell who is here from BP in New 25 York, and we appreciate your support for a vigorous NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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41 1 dialogue with the press on energy issues. Nils Diaz, 2 Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, thank 3 you so much for being with us.
4 CHAIRMAN DIAZ: Thank you.
5 MR. KING: Thank you all for coming. I 6 appreciate it.
7 (Adjourned.)
8 9
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