ML101930382
| ML101930382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/13/2010 |
| From: | Pickett D Plant Licensing Branch 1 |
| To: | |
| Pickett D | |
| References | |
| 2.206, G20100388, NRC-329, OEDO-2010-0497 | |
| Download: ML101930382 (41) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
2.206 Petition Review Board RE Michael Mulligan and Vermont Yankee Docket Number:
050-00271 Location:
Rockville, MD Date:
Tuesday, June 29, 2010 Work Order No.:
NRC-329 Pages 1-40 Transcript edited by Douglas Pickett, NRC NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
+ + + + +
3 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 4 CONFERENCE CALL RE 5
VERMONT YANKEE - VERNON HYDROELECTRIC STATION 6
+ + + + +
7 TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 2010 8
+ + + + +
9 The conference call was held, Ted Quay, 10 Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, presiding.
11 12 PETITIONER: MICHAEL MULLIGAN 13 14 PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS 15 TED QUAY, Chairman, PRB 16 DOUG PICKETT, Petition Manager, NRR 17 NRC STAFF 18 TANYA MENSAH, NRR, DPR 19 NANCY SALGADO, NRR, DORL, LPL1-1 20 DUC NGUYEN, NRR, DLR 21 KENN MILLER, NRR, DE 22 DOUG DODSON, REGION 1, PROJECTS BRANCH 5 23 TOM SETZER, REGION 1, DRP 24 RAJ AULUCK, NRR, DLR 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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RESIDENT INSPECTORS OFFICE 1
DAVE SPINDLER, SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR 2
HEATHER JONES, RESIDENT INSPECTOR 3
FOR THE LICENSEE 4
JEFF MEYER, VERMONT YANKEE 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 1
10:02 a.m.
2 MR. PICKETT: Good morning. I'd like to 3
thank everybody for attending this meeting.
4 My name is Doug Pickett. We are here 5
today to allow the Petitioner, Mr. Michael Mulligan, 6
the opportunity to address the Petitioner Review 7
Board, which will be referred to as the PRB, regarding 8
his 2.206 petition dated June 15, 2010, on the 9
adequacy of the Vernon Hydroelectric Station tie-in to 10 the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, located in 11 Vernon, Vermont.
12 I
am the Petition Manager for the 13 petition. The PRB Chairman is Ted Quay.
14 As part of PRB's review of this petition, 15 Mr. Mulligan has requested this opportunity to address 16 the PRB.
17 This meeting is scheduled to conclude by, 18 approximately, 11:00 a.m., this morning. The meeting 19 is being recorded by the NRC Operations Center, and 20 will be transcribed by a court reporter. The 21 transcript will become a supplement to the petition.
22 The transcript will also be made publicly available.
23 I'd like to open this meeting with 24 introductions. As we go around the room, please be 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 4
sure to clearly state your name, your position, and 1
the office that you work for within the NRC for the 2
record. I will start off.
3 I am Doug Pickett. I work in the Office 4
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. I am the Petition 5
Manager.
6 CHAIRMAN QUAY: I'm Ted Quay. I work in 7
the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and I'm the 8
Board Chairman.
9 MR. MILLER: Kenn Miller. I'm also in the 10 Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation, I'm the 11 Electrical Engineering Branch representative.
12 MR. SETZER: Tom Setzer, Nuclear Reactor 13 Regulation with the License Renewal Division.
14 MR. NGUYEN: Duc Nguyen, Nuclear Reactor 15 Regulation. I work for the License Renewal Division.
16 MR. JOLICOEUR: John Jolicoeur, work for 17 the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation, I'm Chief 18 of the License Processing Branch.
19 MS. MENSAH: Tanya Mensah. I'm the 2.206 20 Coordinator, I work in the Office of Nuclear Reactor 21 Regulation.
22 MR. AULUCK: I'm Raj Auluck, I am with 23 Nuclear Regulatory Regulation, I'm Branch Chief in the 24 Division of License Renewal.
25
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MS. SALGADO: Nancy Salgado, I'm also from 1
the Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and I work for the 2
Division of Operator Reactor Licensing. I'm a Branch 3
Chief.
4 MR.
PICKETT:
We've completed the 5
introductions from this conference room. At this 6
time, are there any other NRC participants from NRC 7
Headquarters on the phone? Is there any NRC staff 8
from the Regional Office on the phone?
9 MR. DODSON: Doug Dodson, NRC Region 1, 10 Projects Branch 5, Project Engineer.
11 MR.
PICKETT:
- And, the Resident 12 Inspector's Office?
13 MR. SPINDLER: Yes, Dave Spindler, Senior 14 Resident Inspector and Heather
- Jones, Resident 15 Inspector.
16 MR.
PICKETT:
Are there any 17 representatives for the Licensee on the phone?
18 MR. MEYER: Yes, Jeff Meyer from the 19 Licensing Department at Vermont Yankee.
20 MR. PICKETT: Mr. Mulligan, would you 21 please introduce yourself for the record?
22 MR. MULLIGAN: Mike Mulligan, I'm the 23 Petitioner, and I live probably about two miles away 24 from the plant.
25
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MR. PICKETT: Are there any others, such 1
as members of the public, on the phone?
2 I'd like to emphasize that we each need to 3
speak clearly and loudly, to make sure that the court 4
reporter can accurately transcribe this meeting.
5 If you do have something that you would 6
like to say, please first state your name for the 7
record. For those dialing in to the meeting, please 8
remember to mute your phones to minimize any 9
background noise or distractions. If you do not have 10 a mute button, this can be done by pressing the key 11
- 6, to unmute press *6 again.
12 Thank you.
13 At this time, I'll turn it over to the PRB 14 Chairman, Ted Quay.
15 CHAIRMAN QUAY: Good morning. Welcome to 16 this meeting regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by 17 Mr. Mulligan.
18 I'd like to first share some background on 19 our process. Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of 20 Federal Regulations, describes the petition process, 21 the primary mechanism for the public to request 22 enforcement action by the NRC in a public process.
23 This process permits anyone to petition the NRC to 24 take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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or license activities.
1 Depending on the results of this 2
evaluation, the NRC could modify, suspend, or revoke 3
an NRC-issued license, or take any other appropriate 4
enforcement action to resolve a problem.
5 The NRC staff guidance for the disposition 6
of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 7
8.11, which is publicly available.
8 The purpose of today's meeting is to give 9
the Petitioner an opportunity to provide any 10 additional explanation or support for the petition 11 before the Petition Review Board makes an initial 12 recommendation on whether or not to accept this 13 petition for review.
14 This meeting is not a hearing, nor is it 15 an opportunity for the Petitioner to question or 16 examine the Petition Review Board on the merits or 17 issues presented in the petition request.
18 No decisions regarding the merits of this 19 petition will be made at this meeting.
20 Following the meeting, the Petition Review 21 Board will conduct its internal deliberations. The 22 outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed 23 with the Petitioner.
24 The Petition Review Board, typically, 25
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consists of a Chairman, usually, a manager at the 1
Senior Executive Service level at the NRC, and has a 2
Petition
- Manager, and a
Petition Review Board 3
Coordinator.
Other members of the Board are 4
determined by the staff, based on the content of the 5
information in the petition request.
6 At this time, I would like to introduce 7
the Board. I am Ted Quay, the Petition Review Board 8
Chairman. Doug Pickett is the Petition Manager for 9
the petition under discussion today. Tanya Mensah is 10 the Office's Petition Review Board Coordinator.
11 Our technical staff includes Duc Nguyen 12 from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations, Aging 13 Management of Structures, Electrical and Systems 14 Branch. Ken Miller from the Office of Nuclear Reactor 15 Regulation, Electrical Engineering Branch. Nancy 16 Salgado from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 17 Plant Licensing Branch 1-1, and Doug Dodson from the 18 NRC's Region 1, Division of Reactor Projects.
19 As described in our process, the staff may 20 ask clarifying questions in order to better understand 21 the Petitioner's presentation, and to reach a recent 22 decision whether to accept or reject the Petitioner's 23 request for review under the 2.206 process.
24 I would like to summarize the scope of the 25
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petition under consideration, and the NRC activities 1
to date.
2 On June 15th, Mr. Mulligan submitted to 3
the NRC a petition under 2.206 regarding the Vernon 4
Hydroelectric Station's power supply to the Vernon --
5 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.
6 In this petition request, Mr. Mulligan 7
requests the following:
8
- 1.
The immediate shutdown of the Vermont 9
Yankee facility.
10
- 2.
An independent investigation, outside of 11 NRC and Entergy, to determine whether fraud and/or 12 falsification issues were involved in the licensee's 13 renewal efforts for Vermont Yankee.
14
- 3.
An investigation on what the Petitioner 15 describes as a subtle shift from reliance on diesel 16 generators to the Vernon Hydroelectric Station by 17 Vermont Yankee licensee, without the appropriate 18 quality of a nuclear-grade electrical power supply.
19
- 4.
An inspection by NRC, or other responsible 20 organization, of the Vernon Hydroelectric Station dam 21 and switchyard.
22 Allow me to discuss the NRC activities to 23 date.
24 On June 21, 2010, the PRB met and 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 10 considered the Petitioner's request for the NRC to 1
immediately order the shutdown of Vermont Yankee 2
Nuclear Power Station.
3 As the PRB did not identify any immediate 4
safety concerns, the PRB denied the request for 5
immediate shutdown.
6 Mr. Mulligan was informed on June 25th of 7
the PRB's decision. Mr. Mulligan previously requested 8
to address the PRB on his petition, which led to this 9
teleconference.
10 As a reminder for our fellow participants, 11 please identify yourself if you make any remarks, as 12 this will help us in the preparation of the meeting 13 transcript that will be made publicly available.
14 Thank you.
15 Mr. Mulligan, I'll turn it over to you, 16 turn it over to you to provide any information you 17 believe the PRB should consider as part of this 18 petition. You have, approximately, 35 minutes, as Mr.
19 Pickett previously informed
- you, to make your 20 presentation to the PRB.
21 Thank you, and you can go ahead, Mr.
22 Mulligan.
23 MR. MULLIGAN: Yes, I'm Mike Mulligan, and 24 I'm a technologist. I've had a few discussions with 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 11 Mr. Pickett and also with the resident inspector, so 1
as far as past 2.206s I seem to have -- I've gotten 2
some more attention to me as far as discussions and 3
stuff like that.
I think that's a
positive 4
development.
5 If I am not speaking clearly, somebody 6
please cue me in to speaking up, please.
7 I think the only question at the end of 8
the day is, like the Safety Evaluation Report, 9
Relicensing Safety Evaluation Report in 2008, puts it, 10 will that Vernon Dam survive the next 26 years? You 11 know, the pictures are worth a thousand words, 12 actually, and stuff.
13 As the general theme, I think priorities, 14 and budget restraints, resource limitations for human 15 needs, or safety, I think they are immoral. I think 16 most are institutional problems from Columbia, and 17 Challenger, PMI, most of our institutional accidents, 18 Deep Water Horizon, you know, you can just go on and 19 on, and all of them revolve around budget priorities, 20 resource limitations, and priorities.
21 I'll give you an example, you know, most 22 people, I'm sure the inspectors, the project manager, 23 the senior project managers, everybody generally has a 24 list of three things, usually, ten things at the most.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 12 You know, these are on my top ten list, and these are 1
things that keep boggling in my head, or I can bring 2
to attention to people and stuff, and who knows how 3
many other issues are thrown in the wayside because of 4
these kind -- because of our priorities.
5 So, when you sit in a
hierarchal 6
organization, right, you know, you start going up the 7
hierarchy, you know, everybody has got their top ten 8
list, right? And, you go up, you know, six, seven, 9
eight steps, you know, everybody has got their ten --
10 top ten list and stuff like that.
11 When you finally get up to the top guy, 12 you have to say to yourself, well, what is the 13 magnitude of all the stuff that we haven't paid 14 attention -- what is the magnitude of the stuff that 15 hasn't made the top ten list of the top guys? You 16 know, all of the individuals, the department heads, 17 the regional people, and all that sort of stuff, when 18 it all -- I guess I could say it's a humongous 19 filtering thing that goes on here. And, you wonder if 20 the top guy ever really knows what's going on in an 21 organization.
22 So, I mean, I say budget priorities, and 23 budgets, and priorities, this causes so much trouble.
24 We have such a hard time managing them, and they, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 13 generally, lead to all our big accidents.
1 I worked at Vermont Yankee in 1992, and I 2
had -- we had equipment problems. I didn't know what 3
was the problem, I felt something was wrong and stuff.
4 I wrote a letter to the Governor, and I got some 5
response out of her and stuff. Within a year of that, 6
we had a loss of all off-site power accident, the 7
worst accident Vermont Yankee ever had. Basically, we 8
were on the diesel generators. I was up in Corporate 9
being tested for my requal, which they failed me, but 10 I wasn't at the plant, but I heard rumors of what went 11 on during this thing and stuff.
12 So, we, basically, sat there with our 13 diesel generators for an inconceivable -- I don't 14 know, it was 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, before we got 15 everything back on the -- we were back attached to the 16 grid, so we had diesel generator troubles and stuff 17 during it, that shook everybody up and stuff.
18 So, we say these are probable accidents, 19 what are the chances of you having them and stuff.
20 During that time, I ended up being a 21 whistle blower, and I want you to know how destructive 22 whistle blowing, especially, the kind of whistle 23 blowing I did. I mean, it's for a group of people and 24 stuff, it's tremendously destructive, and attention 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 14 getting, and I aimed -- that was what I -- that's the 1
only tool I have, I aimed to create as much noise as I 2
could, and the outcome, of course, I got fired.
3 Within a few years of leaving Vermont 4
Yankee, within a year, within a few years, when I was 5
at Vermont Yankee, when I first started this, the NRC 6
opinion of Vermont Yankee was steadily rising.
7 As the 1990s began, the stock prices of 8
Central Vermont Public Service was continually 9
increasing. We were reaching historic highs.
10 Two years after I left, see, you never 11 know what's going to go on, two years after I left 12 Vermont Yankee, from historic highs, to bouncing 13 around -- CVPS bouncing around bankruptcy, and for the 14 next ten years, basically, and stuff, these guys, they 15 had terrible financial problems, and, of course, they 16 were the lead owner of Vermont Yankee.
17 So, I just -- you know, we don't know what 18 the future holds for us, as far as budgets, and stock 19 prices, and stuff.
20 You know, a question I'd have is, does the 21 hydro dam, I mean, I don't -- does the hydro dam have 22 the ability to regulate voltage and frequency? You 23 know, especially, during a blackout procedure, or 24 blackout at the point of the hydro station? I don't 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 15 know if they have the capability. I don't know if 1
Vermont Yankee even tested that, you know, I mean, 2
that's the gold standard of nuclear power, is you test 3
something, actually, and stuff like that.
4 I mean, it boggles the mind to think that, 5
okay, this is a standby, standby, standby system. I 6
understand that. You know, risk perspectives, the 7
chances of ever using this are seemingly slim and 8
stuff. So, you can make a cost/risk benefit, right?
9 You know, we are going to get very little benefit out 10 of this, because it's not going to happen.
11 My opinion is, the NRC is not a safety 12 regulator, it's a financial regulator. Everything to 13 do with the NRC, risk perspectives, and a whole bunch 14 of other stuff, you are trying to save pennies for the 15 utilities, is what it comes down to. That's what the 16 end game of this whole thing is. So, that's what I 17 think a lot of the problems of this dam business is.
18 So, the risk is low, but on the other hand 19 what we know is that, if you use the dam Vermont 20 Yankee is extraordinarily naked. I mean, everything 21 has been stripped away from it all. I mean, if you 22 take -- if you operate a HPCI today, if you are doing 23 a -- doing a monthly thing with the HPCI and it fails, 24 there's very little public mitigation consequences 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 16 that could occur, none, actually, even if you use HPCI 1
as it fails. If it fails, then when it was needed at 2
demand, you know, the risk increases, but it's not 3
that big of a deal because you've got a whole bunch of 4
other safety systems below it that would, you know, 5
protect us.
6 But, you end up using the dam and stuff as 7
a tie. You've stripped away all the safety system, 8
all the safety systems. You probably only depended 9
upon one switch. So, you know, I don't know, you 10 know, should the quality be more higher for when you 11 use it to tie? Should the quality be more higher when 12 you use the tie, or should it be less when you use the 13 tie? I mean, I can make a case that it should be 14 more, because the worth of the component when you are 15 using it is extremely high. Like I said, you know, if 16 the HPCI failed it's got a little bit of mitigation 17 work, because you've got so much stuff underneath it 18 that would protect the plant.
19 During a tie, if you are using a tie, 20 everything is stripped away, and one misstep or 21 equipment breakdown and everybody pays a humongous 22 price.
23 I say that, the only thing that matters is 24 if the dam -- the switchyard survives another 20 -- I 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 17 mean, 26 years, actually, it's 20 years, but when the 1
2008 SCR was written up that was a quote in there.
2 As we know, there's good rules and bad 3
rules. There's good regulations and bad regulations.
4 There's good codes and bad codes. And, I'll tell you 5
a good code is, or a good regulation, is one that 6
allows you to see more, to -- it asks you to look and 7
check out what's going on, and to be inquisitive. A 8
bad code or rule is one that, you know, you have these 9
barriers, limitations, that ask you to shut your eyes, 10 shut one eye, Mike, you know, don't look any further.
11 The code says don't look any further, don't go beyond 12 this point. I think that's a bad rule or bad code. I 13 think, ultimately, what we should be saying is, should 14 that tie service as a back-up emergency apply to 15 Vermont Yankee for the next 26 years, and I think the 16 pictures prove my point of view that it's highly 17 questionable.
18 I go by models a lot, you know, I kind of 19 make mental models, and my model says that if, you 20 know, the NRC should have at least questioned it. I 21 mean, if I was an NRC inspector, I'd say my first job 22 is to protect the agency, and that would have been, I 23 know what I got to do, I got to explain what I see at 24 that hydro station, the conditions of the rust, and I 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 18 got to expose it as best I can. We have to have an 1
open discussion about it, and we have to decide what 2
the question is, and that place lasts another 26 3
years.
4 And, the assumption I would make is that, 5
you know, its quality standards brought us to this day 6
of all that rust and stuff, and that hole that's below 7
that stanchion. And, I think you can make the case 8
that if they provide no maintenance that dam isn't 9
going to -- that switchyard isn't going to provide its 10 function for Vermont Yankee.
11 I think Deep Water Horizon, a lot of the 12 things we are looking at now is some aspects of safety 13 indivisible. Can you contract out some aspects of 14 safety? You know, the nuclear industry has a lot of 15 experience with that, with plant security. I mean, 16 that was the issue with what we discovered out of all 17 the troubles with the subcontract in security.
18 There's a fiduciary conflict there, you know, one 19 company has profit needs, and the other company has 20 conflicting or competitive profit needs. There's 21 barriers.
22 The nuclear industry, when they -- when it 23 was first came into being, they said they recognized 24 that, and they said, we've got to have our own power 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 19 supply. We've got to own the equipment. We've got to 1
own the property it's on. We've got to own all our 2
codes and regulations, and we own it, and we maintain 3
it, and we've got the good behind us, but if worse 4
comes to worse, we can depend upon our diesel 5
generators who we -- what we test on a daily basis.
6 Well, on a monthly basis or whatever -- however you do 7
it. We, actually, do it on a daily basis, with the 8
operators going in and out of there, they eyeball it 9
and stuff. So, I mean, that's the gold standard of 10 safety, is you own it, you test it, and you fix it, 11 and nobody else is involved. There's no barrier in 12 front of us. We are in charge. We are in control, 13 that's how we define safety, we don't depend upon 14 outside people because this stuff is too important.
15 You know, that's what we learned in a lot 16 of these problems with the contracting security, 17 that's -- I'm telling you, that's what Deep Water 18
- Horizon, that's going to be the Presidential 19 Commission talking about, when is safety indivisible.
20 You know, you have -- I'd go into the alternate 21 shutdown scenarios and all
- that, but I
don't 22 understand how Vermont Yankee ended up using -- I'll 23 just say it plain out, I think what -- depending more 24 on the tie says, is that the components for the 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 20 alternate shutdown are designed poorly, and they are 1
bulky, and they are too time consuming, and there's 2
not enough people at Vermont Yankee, and so for the 3
convenience we want to just flip a switch, we want to 4
get the guys out there and flip a switch, or flip a 5
breaker and close their eyes and hope it all works out 6
and stuff like that. I think that's what this says 7
and stuff.
8 You test diesel generators once a month.
9 You test them for an hour at the rated load. I don't 10 know what you do. There was a lot of controversy for 11 years about that tie, not testing it, and then finally 12 I guess you test it once every outage, or once every 13 six years, or something like that. So, you traded a 14 diesel for a tie during the alternate shutdown 15 procedure, and there's a fire in the switch gear room 16 or the control room and stuff like that. You know, 17 it's just not right how that went to that. It's penny 18 pinching.
19 There's people saying, you know what, our 20 profits are more important, it's we are sitting there 21 with a bunch of codes and regulations that ask us to 22 be blind, ask us to not ask the hard questions, make 23 the hard decisions and choices, and you end up some 24 day, you know, it's just taking a huge risk and stuff.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 21 I don't know what the answer is, another diesel 1
generator on site, or, I mean, I'll just say that, you 2
know, we've got enough safety as it is, we don't need 3
to tie and stuff like that.
4 I don't like the idea of thee kind of 5
exaggerations and these kind of distortions, and 6
contortions, of saying we are going to depend upon 7
standby, standby back-up systems, wink, wink, wink, we 8
know they are really not going to work, because that 9
gets down to, you end up damaging the safety codes for 10 the plant. People have to kind of lie, and distort, 11 and deceive, and all that sort of stuff, you know.
12 We know what -- the operators know what 13 the real story is, would you really depend upon that 14 tie? You know, really, do you think it's really going 15 to work, with all that stuff going on down there?
16 No, but, you know, we've got to play the 17 game. That kind of stuff I think is terribly 18 destructive to a safety culture of the NRC and a site 19 in general. It would just be better, less riskful, if 20 you would just say that we don't need a tie. It was a 21 stupid thing anyways, and everybody just, you know, 22 wanting to create these super, super safety illusion 23 type of thing, and you end up, you end up having to, 24 you know, close one eye and deceive in the other eye.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 22 I don't like that idea.
1 Back in the old days, the dictatorial AEC 2
would come, and the utilities would come down and say, 3
you know, we are going to do this because we can do 4
this. We have the power to do this, and we are just 5
going to do it our way. We really don't care what the 6
public says. That's the old way. That's the old way 7
the NRC -- the AEC worked and the utilities.
8 The new way they do it nowadays is, you 9
have a set of conflicting codes and regulations. You 10 have five or six of them all intertwining and inter --
11 and very few people can understand, and you have an 12 outcome in mind, and you twist these codes and 13 regulations around until you get the outcome you want.
14 I mean, at least in the old days they were 15 direct and they told you what they were going to do.
16 Nowadays, we play games, we twist around regulations, 17 and we make believe that the regulations, you know, 18 are going to tell us the ultimate truth, if we obey 19 the regulations, it's going to tell us the ultimate 20 truth, and the perfect outcome. If we just follow the 21 rules, there's going to be a perfect outcome. We know 22 that's not true, there's a lot of higher intellectual 23 thinking that's supposed to -- supposed to support 24 following rules and stuff. You always have to have a 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 23 guy on your shoulder, you know, saying, should I --
1 you know, do these rules make sense? There's always, 2
you know, you are challenging yourself, there's a 3
little angel on the side of your shoulder saying, does 4
this rule make sense? Do we follow the rules? Are 5
they clear and stuff? There's always got to be a part 6
of you independent of the rules, you just can't sit 7
there and militantly follow the rules. I'm telling 8
you that's a sure way of ending of doing a lot of 9
damage to the community, is following the rules.
10 We all know it as operators and stuff like 11 that, if you follow -- if you just follow the rules, 12 you are going to end up tripping the plant and 13 destroying equipment. You have to have kind of a 14 knowledge base. You have to have an intelligence 15 behind following the rules. It's very -- it's very 16 interactive between human intelligence, the brain 17 function, and following rules.
18 If you get into this mechanical thing 19 about following rules, you are very dangerous.
20 So, you know, like I said, nowadays you do 21 what you want anyway at the NRC or Entergy, you have a 22 set of complicated rules, you have an outcome in mind.
23 You flip these rules around to get an outcome. You 24 are doing the same thing you did in the AEC days, but 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 24 you have fancied it up a bit with rules and codes that 1
nobody understands.
2 You know, I know the inspector's on the 3
phone line here, but I found it hard getting -- when I 4
was talking to him getting design basis 5
information, you know. Okay, during the alternate 6
shutdown, instead of depending upon it going to a 7
diesel, high-quality diesel, we default to shut the 8
tie.
9 Well, you know, why do you do that?
10 What's happening -- and I really couldn't get any 11 information. You know, he says, well, it's design-12 basis accidents, it's in the historic -- I don't have 13 that information on me, and I don't blame him, I'm not 14 faulting him, that's just the way the system is, and 15 it's unfair to him and it's unfair to me, because i 16 can't figure out, you know, why there's that --
17 because of the convenience of, you know, a demanding 18 time line, we are going to default to using an 19 unqualified tie. It doesn't make sense to me.
20 That's all -- you know, I want to know 21 what -- you know, how close to the timeline do we get?
22 Did the operator cause the -- decrease the timeline?
23 The operator actions, what's going on? How come --
24 how come -- how come for the convenience? I mean, you 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 25 know, they say, well, Mike, we'll test the tie, and if 1
it doesn't work then we'll go and line up the diesel 2
generators. It's a complicated valve line-up and all 3
that, with the baloney that goes with it and stuff 4
like that.
5 You know, I mean, how do you know that 6
doing a tie you are going to get one burp from the 7
tie, and you are going to abandon it and go to diesel 8
generator, or you are going to get a couple of 9
different subtle intermittent trips, or indications, 10 you are going to wonder about it, and you are going to 11 keep going deeper into it trying to line up the tie, 12 because you know that's important and stuff like that.
13 You are going to waste -- you are going to eat up a 14 ton of time playing with the tie, finally realizing 15 that the tie is not going to work. Then you are going 16 to start the diesel generators, that you have issues 17 with the timeline on? I mean, it seems -- it seems --
18 it seems reckless, you know.
19 I've gotten words that well, you know, 20 Mike, you'll try anything, right? We'll try anything 21 if we are so hard up, we'll try any system. You know, 22 try and cool the core. You know, on the human side of 23 that, that's fine, and I don't blame you, and we know 24 that they will do that and stuff.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 26 On the side of it where we sit back, we 1
are not in an accident or anything like that, we are 2
back here thinking about what the tie means, or what 3
safety systems mean, and stuff like that. We have a 4
responsibility to have a quality -- to have the 5
operators have a set of limited choices, and have 6
high-quality choices, extremely high-quality choices, 7
that they make, and we don't divert to a bunch of 8
procedures that nobody has ever tested before. That's 9
asking for trouble.
10 And, as time goes on, we are doing that, 11 we are flipping away from these quality-tested, 12 monthly-tested, we get the people's fingers dirty 13 operating valves and switches and stuff. We are 14 getting away from that, because of penny pinching, 15 because that's what the philosophy of risk-informed 16 regulation gives you, you know, it gives you that, 17 okay, that's all right, we can -- we can slide away 18 from quality, and we can -- because, you know, it's 19 not going to happen very often. It's not going to 20 happen at all. It won't happen. We'll never have a 21 blow out of a well in the Gulf of Mexico, you know.
22 I mean, that's where we are kind of -- you 23 know, what do they call that, frog boiling, or frog, 24 you put a frog in a pot of cold water, and you put it 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 27 on the stove, and the frog has -- as the water heats 1
up the frog has no idea that he's on his way to being 2
cooked and stuff. I think that's what this is all 3
about, these little incremental steps of reorganizing 4
the dam ownership, and all this sort of stuff, and 5
fragmenting the grid for this Vermont Yankee being one 6
owner, the dam being one owner, to regulation is kind 7
of all mixed up and stuff with the grid and stuff, 8
vulcanized and stuff, I think that's what this is --
9 all these little incremental steps have gotten us to 10 the point where we are increasingly taking --
11 increasingly doing riskful things.
We are 12 increasingly dependent upon less safe systems.
13 We are increasingly depending upon 14 untested systems, you know, you know, procedures that 15 really aren't really tested. They are just -- they 16 are there, but w conceptualize them, but they don't 17 have a high standard of quality because we haven't 18 tested them. We haven't got the operator's hands 19 dirty, and flip the switches around, and bang the 20 plant around, you know, that's how you -- that's how 21 you know quality of electrical systems or components, 22 you bang the system around. I'm sorry, that's the way 23 it is, you know, the utilities are afraid of doing 24 that, but that's what -- that's what -- that's what 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 28 the quality of electrical systems is about, banging 1
around equipment and making sure that, you know, a 2
month test, if they can't take the burden of monthly 3
tests, then something is wrong and you've got to make 4
it more durable, and you've got to fix it.
5 And, if you put stress on a system, the 6
defects shows up quickly, and you get to fix them and 7
stuff like that. That's the benefit of testing a 8
system, testing the diesels once a month.
9 Utilities will say, well, you wreck -- you 10 over test them, and you cause a lot of damaged 11 components. Well, that's the price you pay, you know, 12 that's the price you pay for quality of electricity to 13 a power plant, is you have to -- you have to -- you 14 know, you have to keep -- what you are really doing 15 is, you are trying to keep -- how you know a system is 16 safe is, you know all the components in the system.
17 You have a model in your head of how all the 18 components, do they all work, do I have a vision of 19 how their defects are going to play out, or what 20 defects are in there, and stuff like that.
21 If you've got a barrier in front of you, 22 you know, then you get surprises, and nobody wants 23 surprises with the safety system.
24 So, I've got a picture of that -- I've got 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 29 a picture of that -- I think in my head of that, what 1
does that hole mean that's on that station, stanchion?
2 Is it a woodchuck hole, or is it a --
3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Please identify 4
yourself before you speak.
5 MR. PICKETT: Yes, this is Doug Pickett.
6 I believe Mr. Mulligan is still speaking.
7 MR. MULLIGAN: Can I continue?
8 MR. PICKETT: Yes, please do.
9 MR. MULLIGAN: So, what does that -- you 10 know, I talk a lot about certainty and uncertainty 11 gaming, you know. You can flip around these codes, 12 and regulations, and rules, and you can choose areas 13 to your advantage that are -- you can maximize certain 14
-- you can amplify certainty in your evaluations, or 15 you can amplify uncertainty if you want to -- if you 16 want a certain route to not work and stuff like that.
17 So, it's gaming certainty and uncertainty.
18 It's a favorite tool of the NRC and the 19 utilities, and stuff, is they play around with 20 certainty and uncertainty, as far as in their 21 evaluations and stuff. They choose what is to their 22 benefit and stuff.
23 You know, that hole you see in there, I 24 mean, what is the meaning of that? I mean, a lot of 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 30 times the NRC will say, Mike, well, we don't see any 1
damage, we don't see any component damage looking in 2
that hole and stuff. We can only see a little cave in 3
there, and, you know, the stanchion looks like it's 4
sturdy, and stuff like that.
5 And, I mean, you know, you have no 6
evidence that anything will fail and stuff, and then 7
I'll come back and say, well, my world is about 8
models, you know, models I can see and stuff, and I'll 9
start sitting there and giving you examples of why I 10 think what that hole means, even though I can't see 11 it, you know, woodchucks are an example, that might be 12 a woodchuck hole, I don't know, but it might be.
13 I know, historically, woodchucks are a 14 threat to dams throughout the United States. They 15 burrow in holes. They burrow down. Their holes end 16 up carrying -- water goes in them, and debris, and the 17 dirt gets carried
- away, and who knows what's 18 underneath that hole. I mean, we don't even know, it 19 might not even be -- it might be a construction 20 defect, you know, they are sloppy filling in the hole, 21 or who knows what's underneath there. So, that's what 22 I'm saying, you know, certainty, uncertainty, you 23 know.
24 If you look at the certainty of what you 25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 31
-- absolutely what you can prove certainty, what you 1
see in that hole, you say that there's no evidence 2
that anything is wrong at that stanchion, that 3
stanchion won't fall over.
4 But, if I sit there and look at it, and 5
imagine all the different models that could get you to 6
thinking that, you know, there's a lot of, you know, 7
there's a lot of uncertainty here, as I start talking 8
about what could be the problems, what that hole could 9
indicate, and what you have to investigate, you have 10 to know what is the mechanism underneath that hole 11 that's causing this. You have to, you know, however 12 you want to term it, X-ray vision, or you have to dig 13 out the hole, you have to -- I mean, safety, safety 14 for the public, you have to, you know, not make an 15 assumption that there's nothing going on, it's just a 16 hole, there's nothing there. You have to make an 17 assumption, what is the worst case you can think of?
18 And, you have to test, you know, you have 19 to test. You have to either dig it out, or figure out 20 what's underneath. You know, the only thing I can 21 think of is digging it out and figuring out what the 22 mechanism is going on and stuff like that, you know.
23 You know, I can think of that stanchion 24 falling over, they are all connected by wires, right, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 32 the high-tension wires and stuff like that, that thing 1
falling over, or rusted power falling over, the high-2 tension wires all being bolted and connected together 3
pull down another wire, and then where are we, and 4
stuff like that.
5 So, that's the stuff I see, what that hole 6
represents to me, that I'm not looking for certainty, 7
I'm looking for uncertainty. I'm looking for how 8
uncertain that makes me feel about what I see with 9
that stanchion. What kind of things can I imagine 10 could go wrong underneath the dirt down there. I 11 mean, I see a defect, something -- an anomaly and 12 stuff like that. It doesn't -- it's not right, I sit 13 there and say, you know, these guys are supposed to 14 have inspection standards and stuff like that, this 15 stuff is not supposed to go on. That's supposed to be 16 a high-quality switchyard for a number of reasons, 17 it's supposed to look pretty decent, I'm not saying 18 perfect, but that's supposed to look pretty decent.
19 What's going on there? What's going on?
20 How come nobody picked up on that -- how come nobody 21 picked up on that -- on that hole? Can I see the 22 paperwork that somebody wrote up making a concern 23 about that hole, how they handled it and stuff like 24 that? Those are the things that give me an idea of 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 33 what -- does that organization, do they have a 1
competency, do they understand failure mechanisms, and 2
do they understand what it takes to take a deep dive 3
into these problems, and to finally evaporate the 4
uncertainty?
5 So, you sit there and you say, oh, I know 6
what's going on underneath, you know, or it's a big 7
cave under there, and it was about ready to tip over, 8
or, you know, it's a just a hole a couple inches under 9
the dirt. You know, I feel good because I know what's 10 under there.
11 The idea that people aren't asking 12 questions about this raises the back of my hair 13 especially when part of this stuff could be powering a 14 nuclear plant.
15 Like I said, you know, this whole thing of 16
-- I mean, that's the way I look at problems, how you 17
-- how you -- how you criticize everything, and you 18 try and come up with models, and, ultimately, you are 19 trying to limit uncertainty. You are trying to, you 20 know, get an idea of all the material conditions 21 around you, and you keep testing it, and banging your 22 head against the wall, and, you know, they used to say 23 to me, Mike, a lot of times in school you got Cs, you 24 know, or Ds, a couple Es, and stuff like that, you 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 34 know, four out of ten things I got right. What's the 1
big deal if I get -- what's the big deal if I get --
2 if everybody -- if I make ten assertions, and one is 3
right, how is somebody -- nine are wrong and one is 4
right, I'm right one time that nobody else can see. I 5
mean, isn't there a value in that, or am I a D 6
student, or minus D student, and stuff like that.
7 I mean, this whole idea of, what do you 8
got to be to be a chief excellence, you've got to 9
have, you know, As, you've got to get every assertion 10 right and stuff like that. Well, you know what, my 11 assertion's value when they get one out of 50 right, I 12 see one thing that nobody else has seen, and 13 questioned it, and I was right, and I made the 14 organization see something they didn't see before.
15 But, I'm a D student, or an E student, in the eyes of 16 everybody else. I'm not -- I'm not, you know, I have 17 a problem with that. I always had a problem with 18 that.
19 The whole idea of As and Bs and stuff like 20 that I think are ridiculous. I think as long as you 21 have a pattern, maybe once in a while you get 22 something right that nobody else can see, that nobody 23 else sees or questions, I think you are doing your 24 job. I think you are decent guy.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 35 CHAIRMAN QUAY: Mr. Mulligan?
1 MR. MULLIGAN: Yes, sir.
2 CHAIRMAN QUAY: Provide the Board here, 3
and people in Headquarters and the region, a couple 4
minutes to ask if they have any questions for you.
5 MR. MULLIGAN: All right, you know, 6
actually, I'm getting close to that right now.
7 CHAIRMAN QUAY: Okay.
8 MR. MULLIGAN: I mean, yes, I mean, we can 9
do that now, and I'll be done.
10 CHAIRMAN QUAY: I would like to do that 11 now, so at this time does any staff member here at 12 Headquarters have any questions for Mr. Mulligan?
13 MR. PICKETT: This is Doug Pickett.
14 I had a question, maybe someone on the 15 phone can help us with, Mr. Mulligan has made a number 16 of statements about the Vernon Hydro Station tie in 17 would not work as designed. He talked about how 18 procedures are never tested.
19 I know people in this room here at 20 Headquarters, we are not familiar with any tests of 21 the Vernon tie in, and I was wondering if someone on 22 the phone might be able to educate the PRB members 23 here, what is required? What do we do as far as 24 testing that physical tie in from the Vernon Hydro 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 36 Station?
1 MR. SPINDLER: Hi, this is Dave Spindler, 2
resident at Vermont Yankee.
3 The answer to that question is, right now 4
they do insulation resistance checks periodically. I 5
think it's
- annually, on the line between the 6
substation transformer and the Vernon 13.2 KV 7
subsystem.
8 As far as any other testing, I'm not sure, 9
but I do know they do the annual insulation resistance 10 check, to ensure that the system is -- at least the 11 tie line is still in tact.
12 MR. MULLIGAN: So, that's not equivalent 13 to testing of a diesel generator, you know, if you 14 ever did -- if you ever had that kind of testing 15 regime on Vermont Yankee diesel generators. I mean, 16 you would not -- you wouldn't allow nuclear power.
17 MR. SPINDLER: I'm not sure that an 18 insulation resistance check does not, necessarily, I 19 think it tells you that the line is in tact, I believe 20 that.
21 And the other testing, I'd have to do some 22 more research.
23 MR. PICKETT: One more, again, Doug 24 Pickett.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 37 Mr. Mulligan, you were making a number of 1
statements about the codes and regulations are twisted 2
by regulators to get the desired results.
3 Are you aware of any particular regulation 4
or code that is not being met?
5 MR. MULLIGAN: Well, a code. Well, you 6
see, the problem is I've got a big barrier in front of 7
me, everybody knows that, you know? This is what this 8
is about, is to keep me -- keep a barrier in front of 9
me, and not be able to get the hard questions asked 10 and stuff like that.
11 You know, I -- you know, one day, you 12 know, I envision a different 2.206 process, where, you 13 know, you are my government, I don't own the 14 government, but I do in a way, but you work for me and 15 stuff, and there's an issue of, you know, I have 16 access to NRC people, we get into a group where 17 there's an assertion like this, and people are on my 18 side, you know.
19 I don't have these techno barriers, and 20 these legalistic barriers, and these kind of evidence, 21 super-duper evidence barriers and all that sort of 22 stuff that people play games, like, you know, to put a 23 barrier in front of me and stuff like that.
24 I have a thing where a group of people, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 38 NRC people, would get together with me before 2.206, 1
we talk about all the different issues, and you would 2
bring up the information, we'd share it freely and 3
stuff like that, and would go into a 2.206 process a 4
lot different way than we do now.
5 You know, that's how I would make my 6
government work for me. As of now, this process works 7
for the utilities and the NRC. It's designed to be a 8
barrier for me, as far as legalistic stuff, you know, 9
Congress and stuff.
10 So, that's my envision of a government 11 that works for me.
12 CHAIRMAN QUAY: All right, Mr. Mulligan, 13 at this time I'd like to ask the region if they have 14 any questions for you.
15 MR. DODSON: No questions in the region.
16 CHAIRMAN QUAY: Okay. Does the Licensee 17 have any questions?
18 MR.
MEYER:
No questions from the 19 Licensee.
20 CHAIRMAN QUAY: Okay. Has any member of 21 the public joined this phone call, while we've been 22 on?
23 Okay, not hearing any, Mr. Mulligan, I'd 24 like to thank you for taking time to provide the NRC 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 39 staff with clarifying information on the petition 1
you've submitted.
2 Before we close, does the court reporter 3
need any additional information for the meeting 4
transcript?
5 MR. MULLIGAN: Can I say one more thing 6
before we close? It's just to be a couple seconds.
7 CHAIRMAN QUAY: Okay.
8 MR. MULLIGAN: Is that -- are those -- is 9
that rusting deterioration we see on the towers? I 10 mean, is that -- I mean, I don't know what the codes 11 are. Does the codes accept that kind of rusting 12 deterioration?
13 CHAIRMAN QUAY: Mr. Mulligan, what we are 14 trying to do is get information from you, so we can 15 understand this petition, not for you to question the 16 staff on this. We'll provide you with the result of 17 our Board deliberations.
18 MR. MULLIGAN: Okay.
19 CHAIRMAN QUAY: Okay. Does the court 20 reporter need any additional information?
21 COURT REPORTER: If I can just, I have one 22 spelling question, and then if I can just get a list 23 of the people who were present for this, that would be 24 great. I think I got everyone, but I just want to 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 40 make sure.
1 My first question was, I thought I heard 2
something about a Monakee (phonetic) disaster or 3
incident?
4 MR. MULLIGAN: That must have been me.
5 COURT REPORTER: Yes.
6 MR. MULLIGAN: Does anybody know what I 7
was talking about?
8 COURT REPORTER: I can go back and listen 9
to it, it was a little hard to tell. I'll just try to 10 look it up.
11 And, the other one is, HPCI.
12 MR. MULLIGAN: High Pressure Coolant 13 Injection.
14 COURT REPORTER:
Pressure Coolant 15 Injection, so it's HPCI?
16 MR. MULLIGAN: HPCI, High Pressure Coolant 17 Injection.
18 COURT REPORTER: Okay. So, yes, that will 19 be it.
20 CHAIRMAN QUAY: Okay. Thank you.
21 (Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the above-22 entitled matter was concluded.)
23 24 25