ML051090552
| ML051090552 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/2005 |
| From: | Merschoff E NRC/EDO |
| To: | Leidich G FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| Starkey D, OE | |
| References | |
| 3-2002-006, EA-03-025, EA-05-066, EA-05-067, EA-05-068, EA-05-069, EA-05-070, EA-05-071, EA-05-072, FOIA/PA-2005-0261, FOIA/PA-2007-0299, IR-02-008 | |
| Download: ML051090552 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000346/2002008
Text
April 21, 2005
EA-03-025; EA-05-066; EA-05-067; EA-05-068;
EA-05-069; EA-05-070; EA-05-071; EA-05-072
Mr. Gary Leidich, President
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
76 S. Main St.
Akron, OH 44308
SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES -
$5,450,000; (NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 3-2002-006;
NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-346/2002-08(DRS));
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
Dear Mr. Leidich:
This refers to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) inspections and investigations
relative to the significant degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head identified at the
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Companys (FENOC) Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in
February and March 2002. Based upon the discovery of the reactor pressure vessel head
degradation, the NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter Number 3-02-001 to Davis-Besse
documenting six commitments required to be accomplished prior to restarting of the reactor.
The NRC also chartered an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection of the reactor
pressure vessel degradation, the results of which were documented in Inspection Report
No. 50-346/2002-03, issued on May 3, 2002. On October 2, 2002, the NRC issued the AIT
Follow-up Special Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-08, documenting ten apparent violations
associated with the reactor pressure vessel degradation.
In a February 25, 2003, letter to FENOC, the NRC documented a performance deficiency
associated with the control rod drive penetration cracking and reactor pressure vessel head
degradation. The performance deficiency involved FENOCs failure to properly implement its
boric acid corrosion control and corrective action programs, which allowed reactor coolant
system pressure boundary leakage to occur undetected for a prolonged period of time, resulting
in reactor pressure vessel head degradation. The NRC assessed the significance of the
performance deficiency using the Significance Determination Process (SDP) and preliminarily
concluded that the significance was in the RED range. A RED finding is one with high
importance to safety that will result in increased NRC inspection and other NRC action. The
NRC offered FENOC an opportunity to request a Regulatory Conference to discuss the
preliminary significance determination. In lieu of a Regulatory Conference, FENOC submitted a
written response, dated April 24, 2003, in which FENOC acknowledged the performance
deficiency and did not contest the RED finding.
In a letter to FENOC, dated May 29, 2003, the NRC documented its conclusions that the
significance of the performance deficiency, involving the control rod drive penetration cracking
and the reactor pressure vessel head degradation, was appropriately characterized as RED.
The NRC noted that the safety signficance of the performance deficiency was one of the inputs
G. Leidich -2-
into the final characterization and resolution of the apparent violations described in the October
2002 AIT Follow-up Special Inspection Report. The NRC also noted that the results of an
ongoing Office of Investigations (OI) investigation into the cause of the apparent violations
would be a factor in the final enforcement deliberations. As a result, no Notice of Violation
(Notice) was issued concurrent with the May 2003 letter.
Based upon its investigation into the causes of the apparent violations, OI determined that the
apparent violations involved the licensees willful failure to: (1) properly implement the boric
acid control program; (2) properly implement the corrective action program; (3) adequately
remove, on several occasions, boric acid and rust deposits from the reactor pressure vessel
head; (4) maintain the plant shutdown, i.e., not startup and return the plant to power from the
Twelfth Refueling Outage (12RFO), until boric acid deposits were removed and the reactor
pressure vessel head was inspected, and; (5) maintain and submit to the NRC, complete and
accurate information. As a result, the NRC referred the OI report to the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) for its review and consideration of criminal prosecution. While the DOJs review
is still ongoing, the NRC has determined that enforcement action should now be taken relative
to the apparent violations documented in the AIT Follow-up Special Inspection and the OI
Investigation Reports. The NRC does not anticipate taking further enforcement action in this
matter, relative to FENOC, absent the DOJ developing new additional information.
Since the licensees initial discovery of the reactor pressure vessel head degradation and the
NRCs issuance of a Confirmatory Action Letter which outlined those actions necessary for the
licensee to restart the plant, the NRC has provided extensive oversight of the licensees
evaluation of and corrective actions for the conditions which contributed to the reactor pressure
vessel head degradation and the performance deficiency. In a March 8, 2004, letter, the NRC
documented its determination that the matters contained in the NRCs Confirmatory Action
Letter and Restart Checklist had been adequately resolved and that the NRC had reasonable
assurance that the Davis-Besse Station could be restarted and operated safety. Therefore, the
NRC has determined that the following results do not represent current licensee performance.
Based on information developed during the AIT Follow-up Special Inspection and OI
Investigation, the NRC has determined that nine violations of NRC requirements occurred. The
violations are cited in the enclosed Notice and are described in detail in the AIT Follow-up
Special Inspection and the OI Investigation Reports. The NRC has determined that all of the
violations were associated with the RED finding and the performance deficiency previously
communicated to FENOC in our February and May 2003 letters.
Section I of the Notice documents five violations which were considered for civil penalties in
accordance with the General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement
Action, (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. The NRC determined that these violations were
of very high safety and regulatory significance because they clearly documented a pattern of
willful violations of FENOCs boric acid corrosion control and corrective action programs over a
protracted period of time, and a pattern of willful inaccurate or incomplete documentation of
information that was required to be maintained or submitted to the NRC. As a direct result of
these violations, the NRC determined that FENOC started up and operated the plant, for at
least the last operating cycle prior to the February 16, 2002, shutdown without: (1) fully
understanding or characterizing the condition of the reactor pressure vessel head and the
G. Leidich -3-
control rod drive penetrations; (2) determining the cause of significant boric acid buildup on the
reactor pressure vessel head, the control rod drive penetrations, and several other components
in the reactor containment building; (3) properly identifying the presence of ongoing reactor
coolant system pressure boundary leakage and taking appropriate corrective actions, and;
(4) identifying the very significant ongoing degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head
which required a number of years to reach the level of material wastage observed in March
2002. Finally, the NRC determined that FENOC willfully provided incomplete and inaccurate
information associated with its responses to the NRC Bulletin 2001-01, Circumferential
Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, which contributed to
continued operation of the plant with ongoing reactor coolant system pressure boundary
leakage and the significant degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head. As a result, a civil
penalty in the amount of $5,450,000 is proposed as outlined in the following paragraphs and in
the enclosed Notice.
Violation I.A of the enclosed Notice concerns a violation of Davis-Besse Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.a which prohibits plant operation in Modes 1 through 4 with any reactor coolant system
leakage associated with the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. From at least May 18,
2000, to February 16, 2002, FENOC started up and operated the Davis-Besse Station in Modes
1 through 4 while being aware of the presence of significant boric acid deposits, on the reactor
pressure vessel head, which were indicative of reactor coolant system leakage and which could
not be justified as being caused by reactor coolant system non-pressure boundary leakage
alone. The licensee conducted limited cleaning and inspection of the reactor pressure vessel
head during the 12RFO in April-May 2000. However, the limited cleaning and inspection of the
reactor pressure vessel head were not sufficient to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant
system pressure boundary.
The NRC determined that the licensees failure to exercise adequate management oversight
and controls, in its assessment of substantial recurring boric acid deposits on the reactor
pressure vessel head during 12RFO and the build-up of boric acid deposits on other
reactor containment equipment during plant operations, significantly contributed to the length of
the Technical Specification violation and the significant reactor pressure vessel head
degradation. The licensees decision to return the unit to power on May 18, 2000, with
ongoing reactor coolant system leakage, with significant boric acid deposits on the reactor
pressure vessel head, which could not be associated with reactor coolant system non-pressure
boundary leakage, and without conducting the reactor pressure vessel head cleaning and
inspection required by the boric acid corrosion control procedure, is a serious safety and
regulatory concern.
The seriousness of this safety and regulatory concern was exacerbated by FENOCs inaccurate
and incomplete response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor
Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles. The inaccurate and incomplete information
provided by FENOC in its responses directly contributed to enabling FENOC to operate the
plant beyond the Bulletin 2001-01 recommended shutdown date of December 31, 2001. Had
the NRC known that the Davis-Besse Station was being operated with reactor coolant system
pressure boundary leakage, the NRC would have taken immediate regulatory action to shut
G. Leidich -4-
down the plant and to require the licensee to implement appropriate corrective actions. The
startup and operation of the Davis-Besse Station, with reactor coolant system pressure
boundary leakage, was a continuing violation of Davis-Besse Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.a.
This continuing Technical Specification (TS) violation is associated with a RED finding
(EA-03-025) and was evaluated using the Significance Determination Process of the NRC
Reactor Oversight Process. While a civil penalty is not usually considered for issues evaluated
under the SDP, absent actual consequences (Section VI.C of the Enforcement Policy), the NRC
considers a RED SDP finding to be of significant regulatory concern and may issue a civil
penalty, up to the statutory maximum civil penalty, for such violations (Section VII.A of the
In consultation with the Commission and because of the safety significance of the violation and
the particularly poor performance of FENOC in this matter, the NRC is proposing, in
accordance with Section VII.A of the Enforcement Policy, to issue a civil penalty for the
Technical Specification violation associated with a RED finding evaluated under the SDP. In
determining the proposed civil penalty, the NRC considered the safety significance of the
violation, FENOCs multiple opportunities to identify and take corrective action for the violation,
prior to and following restart of the plant in May 2000, and the economic benefit FENOC gained
by operating the plant with reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage between May 18,
2000, and February 16, 2002.
The statutory maximum civil penalty for the Technical Specification violation would be $110,000
per day for the period of time prior to and including November 2, 2000, and would be $120,000
per day for the period of time beginning on November 3, 2000, until the plant shut down on
February 16, 2002. If the civil penalty for the Technical Specification violation was assessed for
the entire operating cycle, the statutory maximum civil penalty would be approximately
$75,000,000. However, the NRCs approach in assessing a civil penalty is not punitive, but
focuses on deterrence to emphasize the importance of compliance with requirements and to
encourage prompt identification and comprehensive corrective actions for violations. In
determining the civil penalty, the NRC also noted that the licensee experienced substantial
adverse economic impact resulting from the extended outage to replace the reactor vessel
head and to make improvements necessary to address NRC requirements and concerns.
Therefore, on balance, the NRC determined that a proposed civil penalty of $5,000,000 was
appropriate for Violation I.A (EA-05-071).
Violation I.B of the enclosed Notice concerns FENOC willfully maintaining incomplete and
inaccurate information in documents required to be maintained by the NRC. The documents
indicated that accumulated boric acid deposits were removed from the reactor pressure vessel
head and that the entire reactor pressure vessel head was inspected. However, the licensee
did not clean or inspect the entire reactor pressure vessel head. The licensees willful failure to
accurately document the condition and cleanliness of the reactor pressure vessel head,
including the willful failure to fully describe the accumulated boric acid deposits that remained
on the head, is a significant violation that permitted uncorrected reactor coolant system
pressure boundary leakage and boric acid corrosion of the reactor pressure vessel head to
continue for an extended period of time. Had the NRC known of the reactor coolant system
G. Leidich -5-
pressure boundary leakage, the NRC would have taken a different regulatory position, including
the issuance of an Order. Therefore, this violation is categorized in accordance with the
Enforcement Policy at Severity Level I.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty of $110,000 was considered for
a Severity Level I violation at the time of occurrence. Because the violation was willful and
categorized at Severity Level I, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for the civil
penalty adjustment factors of Identification and Corrective Action. Credit was not warranted for
Identification because the NRC identified the violation. Credit was not warranted for Corrective
Action because significant intervention was required by the NRC to focus FENOC on the
evaluative and corrective action process in order that comprehensive corrective action be taken.
While credit was not warranted for the immediate corrective actions, the NRC recognized that
your corrective actions ultimately were sufficient to permit restarting the facility. Since credit for
Identification and Corrective Action was not warranted, the civil penalty assessment would
normally be twice the base civil penalty for a Severity Level I violation or $220,000. However,
Section VI.C.2.d of the Enforcement Policy limits the civil penalty to $110,000 per violation, per
day. Therefore, a civil penalty of $110,000 is proposed for Violation I.B (EA-05-068).
Violation I.C of the enclosed Notice concerns FENOC willfully failing to ensure that a significant
condition adverse to quality, associated with the presence of boric acid on the reactor pressure
vessel head, at the end of 12 RFO, on May 18, 2000, was evaluated and corrected prior to
restart of the plant. Specifically, the licensee closed at least three condition reports
documenting the presence of significant boric acid deposits on the reactor pressure vessel
head and associated components without determining the cause of each condition, i.e., the
source of the reactor coolant system leakage, without taking corrective action to address the
immediate condition adverse to quality, i.e., the presence of significant deposits of boric acid on
the reactor vessel head, and without taking corrective action to prevent recurrence.
Therefore, this willful violation is categorized at Severity Level II in accordance with the
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty of $88,000 was considered for
a Severity Level II violation at the time of occurrence. Because the violation was willful and
categorized at Severity Level II, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for either of
the civil penalty adjustment factors of Identification or Corrective Action. As discussed in
Violation I.B above, credit was not warranted for either of the civil penalty adjustment factors
because the NRC identified the violation, the licensee had multiple opportunities to identify the
violation and failed to do so, and significant intervention by the NRC was necessary to focus the
licensee on corrective actions and determining the root cause of the violation. Since credit was
not warranted for the civil penalty adjustment factors, the civil penalty assessment would
normally be twice the base civil penalty for a Severity Level II violation or $176,000.
However, the civil penalty is reduced to the statutory maximum of $110,000 per violation
(Section VI.C.2.d of the Enforcement Policy). Therefore, a civil penalty of $110,000 is
proposed for Violation I.C (EA-05-066).
G. Leidich -6-
Violation I.D of the enclosed Notice documented that FENOC, at the end of 12RFO, willfully
failed to fully implement the boric acid corrosion control procedure. Specifically, FENOC did not
conduct a complete cleaning and inspection of the reactor pressure vessel head as required by
the boric acid corrosion control procedure. In addition, FECNOC willfully deferred the
implementation of a modification which was a corrective action for previous boric acid corrosion
control program implementation non-conformances. As a result, FENOC willfully restarted the
plant on May 18, 2000, and operated until February 16, 2002, with visible boric acid deposits on
the reactor pressure vessel head and uncharacterized reactor coolant system pressure
boundary leakage. Therefore, this willful violation is categorized at Severity Level II in
accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty of $88,000 was considered for
a Severity Level II violation at the time occurrence. Because the violation was willful and
categorized at Severity Level II, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for either of
the civil penalty adjustment factors of Identification or Corrective Action. As discussed in
Violation I.B above, credit was not warranted for either of the civil penalty adjustment factors
because the NRC identified the violation, the licensee had multiple opportunities to identify the
violation and failed to do so, and significant intervention by the NRC was necessary to focus the
licensee on corrective actions and determining the root cause of the violation. Since credit was
not warranted for the civil penalty adjustment factors, the civil penalty assessment would
normally be twice the base civil penalty for a Severity Level II violation or $176,000.
However, the civil penalty is reduced to the statutory maximum of $110,000 per violation
(Section VI.C.2.d of the Enforcement Policy). Therefore, a civil penalty of $110,000 is
proposed for Violation I.D (EA-05-067).
Violation I.E of the enclosed Notice concerns FENOC willfully providing incomplete and
inaccurate information in two responses to the NRC relative to NRC Bulletin 2001-01. The
incomplete and inaccurate information was significant because the NRC relied, in part, on the
information to assess the adequacy of FENOCs previous implementation of those quality
assurance and management controls necessary to ensure a complete understanding of the
physical condition of the reactor pressure vessel head, the control rod drive penetrations, and
the absence of reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage. Had the NRC known of the
reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage, the NRC would have taken a different
regulatory position, including the issuance of an Order. Therefore, this willful violation is
categorized at Severity Level I in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty of $120,000 was considered for
a Severity Level I violation at the time occurrence. The NRC considered whether credit was
warranted for the for either of the civil penalty adjustment factors of Identification or Corrective
Action. As discussed in Violation I.B above, credit was not warranted for either of the civil
penalty adjustment factors because the NRC identified the violation, the licensee had multiple
opportunities to identify the violation and failed to do so, and significant intervention by the NRC
was necessary to focus the licensee on corrective actions and determining the root cause of the
violation. Since credit was not warranted for the civil penalty adjustment factors, the civil
penalty assessment would normally be twice the base civil penalty for a Severity Level I
G. Leidich -7-
violation or $240,000. However, the civil penalty is reduced to the statutory maximum of
$120,000 per violation (Section VI.C.2.d of the Enforcement Policy). Therefore, a civil penalty
of $120,000 is proposed for Violation I.E (EA-05-072).
Section II of the enclosed Notice describes other violations of NRC requirements that are
associated with the previously issued RED SDP finding (EA-03-025). Also described in
Section II of the enclosed Notice are two non-willful violations of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness
and Accuracy of Information (Severity Level III violation without civil penalty (EA-04-069) and a
Severity Level IV violation). The NRC is exercising discretionary authority under Section VII.B.6
of the Enforcement Policy and is not proposing a civil penalty be issued for the other violations
associated with a RED SDP finding and the Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 50.9, in part,
because of the significant civil penalty proposed in Section I of the Notice.
Therefore, to emphasize the very high safety and regulatory significance of compliance with
TSs, FENOCs willful failure to effectively implement its boric acid corrosion control and
corrective action programs, and FENOCs willful failure to maintain and provide to the NRC
complete and accurate information, and in consultation with the Commission, I am issuing the
enclosed Notice with a cumulative civil penalty of $5,450,000.
You are required to respond to this letter within 90 days and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. However, since the NRC
enforcement action is being proposed prior to any final action by the U.S. Department of
Justice, consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosures , and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from
the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your
response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so
that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary
information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed
copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted
copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such
material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have
withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the
disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the
information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential
commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an
acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
G. Leidich -8-
Questions concerning this matter should be addressed to Mr. Steven Reynolds, the NRC Senior
Manager responsible for the NRCs Manual Chapter 0350 oversight activities associated with
the Davis-Besse Station. Mr. Reynolds may be reached at (630) 829-9601.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Ellis W. Merschoff
Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs
Office of the Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation and Proposed
Imposition of Civil Penalties
2. NUREG/BR-0254 Payment Methods (Licensee Only)
Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3
cc w/encl: The Honorable Dennis Kucinich
M. Bezilla, Vice President, Davis-Besse
J. Hagan, Senior Vice President
Engineering and Services, FENOC
L. Myers, Chief Operating Officer, FENOC
Plant Manager
Manager - Regulatory Compliance
D. Jenkins, Attorney, FirstEnergy
Ohio State Liaison Officer
R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
President, Board of County Commissioners
of Lucas County
J. Papcun, President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners
-9-
DISTRIBUTION:
SECY
L. Reyes, EDO
E. Merschoff, DEDR
W. Kane, DEDA
F. Congel, OE
J. Caldwell, RIII:RA
S. Reynolds, RIII:DRP
L. Chandler, OGC
J. Moore, OGC
J. Dyer, NRR
D. Holody, Enforcement Coordinator, RI
C. Evans, Enforcement Coordinator, RII
K. OBrien, Enforcement Coordinator, RIII
G. Sanborn, Enforcement Coordinator, RIV
R. Franovich, Enforcement Coordinator, NRR
C. Nolan, OE
D. Starkey, OE
M. Burrell, OE
B. Fretz, OE
B. Clayton, OEDO
J. Grobe, OEDO
D. Nelson, OEDO
Sara Brock, OGC
Shelly Cole, OGC
Melissa Duffy, OGC
Resident Inspector
S. Gagner, OPA
H. Bell, OIG
G. Caputo, OI
J. Piccone, OSTP
D. Dandois, OCFO/DAF/LFARB
R. Paul, RIII:OI
J. Ulie, RIII:OI
J. Strasma, RIII:PA
R. Lickus, RIII
J. Lynch, RIII
OEWEB
OEMAIL
OAC3
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CST1
CAA1
DRPIII
DRSIII
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NOTICE OF VIOLATION
AND
PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Docket No. 50-346
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station License No. NPF-3
EA-03-025; EA-05-066; EA-05-067;
EA-05-068; EA-05-069; EA-05-070;
During an NRC inspection conducted from May 15 to August 9, 2002, and an NRC investigation
completed on August 22, 2003, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance
with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The
particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:
I. Violations Assessed a Civil Penalty
A. Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.a, Amendment 220, dated April 14, 1998, requires,
in part, that the licensee shall limit reactor coolant system leakage to No
PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE during Modes 1 through 4.
Contrary to the above, between May 18, 2000, and February 16, 2002, the
licensee started up and operated the plant in Modes 1 through 4 with reactor
coolant system pressure boundary leakage, i.e. control rod drive penetration
leakage. Specifically, the licensee returned the plant to operation following the
2000 refueling outages without fully characterizing and eliminating reactor coolant
system pressure boundary leakage on the reactor pressure vessel head as
evidenced by significant boric acid deposits on the reactor pressure vessel head at
the start and end of the outage and by the development of new and extensive
boric acid deposits on reactor containment equipment during the operation cycle.
This is a violation associated with a RED SDP finding.
Civil Penalty - $5,000,000 (EA-05-071)
B. 10 CFR 50.9 requires that information provided to the Commission by a licensee
or information required by statute or by the Commissions regulations, orders, or
license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate
in all material respects.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires, in part, that for significant
conditions adverse to quality, the cause of the condition and the corrective actions
taken to preclude repetition shall be documented.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, requires, in part, that the licensee shall
maintain sufficient records to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality and
that those records shall include monitoring of work performance.
-2-
Condition Report (CR) 2000-1037, closed May 1, 2000, documented corrective
actions for the presence of boric acid on the reactor pressure vessel head, a
significant condition adverse to quality, that included: Accumulated boron
deposited between the reactor head and the thermal insulation was removed
during the cleaning process performed under W.O. [Work Order] 00-001846-000.
No boric acid induced damage to the head surface was noted during the
subsequent inspection.
Work Order 00-001846-000, Clean Boron Accumulation from Top of Reactor
Head and Top of Insulation, dated April 25, 2000, required the licensee staff to
clean boron accumulation from top of reactor head and on top of insulation. The
Work Order Log, included as Page Four of the completed Work Order,
documented that the, work [was] performed without deviation and was signed by
the System Engineer on April 25, 2000.
Contrary to the above,
1. The information included in CR 2000-1037 relative to the completed
corrective actions and the subsequent inspection results were not complete
and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the licensee did not
remove the accumulated boron deposits from all areas between the reactor
head and the thermal insulation and did not conduct subsequent inspections
of the entire reactor head. Instead, the licensee removed accumulated boric
acid deposits from a portion of the reactor vessel head and conducted
subsequent inspections for those portions of the reactor vessel head where
the boric acid deposits had been removed.
2. The Work Order Log, included as Page Four of completed Work Order 00-
001846-000, a record required by Commission regulations to furnish
evidence of activities affecting quality, contained information that was not
accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the Work Order Log indicated
that boron accumulation was cleaned from the top of the reactor head and on
top of the insulation, without deviation, when, in fact, boric acid deposits were
left on the head after the cleaning was completed on April 25, 2000.
This is a Severity Level I violation (Supplement VII).
Civil Penalty $110,000 (EA-05-068)
C. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires, in part, that licensees shall
establish measures to ensure that conditions adverse to quality such as failures,
malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-
conformances are promptly identified and corrected. For significant conditions
adverse to quality, the licensee shall establish measures to ensure that the cause
of the condition is determined and that corrective actions are taken to preclude
repetition.
-3-
Plant Procedure NG-NA-00702, Corrective Action Program, Revision 3, defined a
significant condition adverse to quality to be a condition, which, if left uncorrected,
could have an undesirable effect on plant safety, personal safety, regulatory
position, financial liability, or environmental impact.
Contrary to the above, the licensee did not determine the cause of the condition
and did not implement corrective actions to preclude repetition of the condition
associated with the identification and removal of boric acid on the reactor vessel
head, a significant condition adverse to quality, prior to closing the associated
condition reports.
Specifically:
1. On April 27, 2000, the licensee closed CR 2000-0781, Leakage from CRD
[Control Rod Drive] Structure Blocked Visual Exam of Reactor Vessel Head
Studs, issued on April 6, 2000, associated with the accumulation of boric
acid deposits on the reactor vessel head studs without determining the cause
of the deposits, i.e., identifying the source of the reactor coolant system
leakage, and without taking corrective actions to preclude recurrence.
2. On April 27, 2000, the licensee closed CR 2000-0782, Inspection of Reactor
Flange Indicated Boric Acid Leakage From Weep Holes, issued on April 6,
2000, associated with the accumulation of boric acid deposits on the reactor
vessel head, without determining the cause of the boric acid deposits, i.e.,
identifying the source of the reactor coolant system leakage, without
removing all of the known boric acid deposits on the reactor pressure vessel
head, and without taking corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
3. On May 1, 2000, the licensee closed CR 2000-1037, Inspection of Reactor
Head Indicated Accumulation of Boron in Area of the CRD [Control Rod
Drive] Nozzle Penetration, issued on April 17, 2000, associated with the
accumulation of boric acid deposits on the reactor vessel head, without
determining the cause of the boric acid deposits, i.e., identifying the source
of the reactor coolant system leakage, without removing all of the known
boric acid deposits on the reactor vessel head, and without taking corrective
actions to prevent recurrence.
This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement I)
Civil Penalty - $110,000 (EA-05-066)
D. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting
quality be accomplished in accordance with written procedures.
Davis-Besse Station Procedure NG-EN-00324, Boric Acid Corrosion Control
Program, Revisions 1/C1 and 2, Step 6.3.1, required, in part, that an initial
inspection of boric acid buildup shall be performed to determine the as found
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conditions and to document the inspection results. The procedure also required, in
Attachment 3, that insulation and other hindrances to direct visual [inspection] be
removed as needed to allow detailed inspections of components suspected of
leakage.
Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) 96-0551, initiated on April 21, 1996,
documented the licensees inability to comply with some inspections of the reactor
pressure vessel head, as required by Procedure NG-EN-00324, and an inability to
accurately determine the reactor pressure vessel head as found conditions,
associated with boric acid deposits on the reactor pressure vessel head, due to the
restrictions resulting from the location and size of the inspection ports, mouse
holes. The PCAQ further documented that only 50 to 60 percent of the reactor
pressure vessel head could be inspected using the current inspection ports.
Modification 94-0025, initiated on May 27, 1994, and referenced as corrective
action for PCAQ 96-0551, directed the completion of modifications to the reactor
pressure vessel head service structure inspection ports to permit the inspection
and cleaning of 100 percent of the reactor vessel head in accordance with
Procedure NG-EN-00324.
Contrary to the above, on May 18, 2000, and at the end of Refueling Outage 12,
the licensee failed to remove obstructions, including boric acid deposit buildups,
necessary to conduct a detailed inspection of the reactor pressure vessel head
and other components that may be suspected of leakage, as required by Plant
Procedure NG-EN-00324, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program. The licensees
ability to conduct the inspections was significantly limited as a result of its
concurrent deferral of the installation of Modification 94-0025, a corrective action
for a significant condition adverse to quality documented in PCAQ 96-0551 and
associated with the licensees failure during previous outages to conduct complete
inspections and cleaning of boric acid deposits on the reactor pressure vessel
head.
This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement I)
Civil Penalty $110,000 (EA-05-067)
E. 10 CFR 50.9 requires that information provided to the Commission by a licensee
or information required by statute or by the Commissions regulations, orders, or
license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate
in all material respects.
NRC Bulletin 2001-01, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
Penetration Nozzles, required all holders of operating licenses for pressurized
water nuclear power reactors to provide information related to the structural
integrity of the reactor vessel head penetration (VHP) nozzles for their respective
facilities, including the extent of VHP nozzle leakage and cracking that has been
found to date, the inspections and repairs that have been undertaken to satisfy
applicable regulatory requirements, and the basis for concluding that their plans for
future inspections will ensure compliance with applicable regulatory requirements.
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Contrary to the above, the licensee, a holder of an operating license for a
pressurized water nuclear power reactor, the Davis-Besse Station, provided the
Commission responses to Bulletin 2001-01 which included materially inaccurate
and incomplete information as follows:
1. In a September 4, 2001, response to the Bulletin entitled, Response to
Bulletin 2001-01, Serial 2731, the licensee made the following four materially
inaccurate and incomplete statements:
(a) The licensees response to Bulletin Item 1.c, on page 2 of 19, stated: "the
minimum gap being at the dome center of the RPV [reactor pressure
vessel] head where it is approximately 2 inches, and does not impede a
qualified visual inspection."
The licensees response was materially inaccurate, in that, the statement
contradicted statements in the licensees documents identified as
PCAQR 94-0295 and 96-0551, which clearly stated that inspection
capability at the top of the reactor vessel head was limited. The limitation
was stated to be caused by the restricted access to the area through the
service structure "weep holes", the curvature of the reactor pressure
vessel head, and by the limited space to manipulate a camera due to the
insulation that creates the two inch gap.
(b) The licensees response to Bulletin Item 1.d, which requested inclusion of
a description of any limitations (insulation or other impediments) to
accessibility of the bare metal of the reactor pressure vessel head for
visual examinations, did not include a description of any limitations.
The licensees response was materially incomplete in that the response
did not mention that accessibility to the bare metal of the reactor pressure
vessel head was impeded, during the Eleventh (1998) and the Twelfth
(2000) Refueling Outages, by the presence of significant accumulations
of boric acid deposits.
(c) The licensees response to Bulletin Item 1.d, which also requested a
discussion of the findings of reactor pressure vessel head inspections,
stated that for the Twelfth Refueling Outage (2000), the inspection of the
reactor pressure vessel head/nozzles indicated some accumulation of
boric acid deposits.
The licensees response was materially incomplete and inaccurate in that
it mischaracterized the accumulation of boric acid on the reactor pressure
vessel head and did not mention the evidence of corrosion that was
evidenced by the pictures and the video examination of reactor pressure
vessel head conditions documented at the beginning and ending of the
Twelfth Refueling Outage (2000).
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(d) The licensees response to the Bulletin, on Page 3, stated: "The boric
acid deposits were located beneath the leaking flanges with clear
evidence of downward flow. No visible evidence of nozzle leakage was
detected."
The licensees response was materially inaccurate in that the boric acid
deposits were not all located under leaking flanges and the licensee
lacked clear evidence of the absence of downward flow for all nozzles.
Specifically, the presence of boric acid deposits was not limited only to
the areas beneath the flanges, as implied by that statement. The build-
up of boric acid deposits was so significant that the licensee could not
inspect all of the nozzles. As a result, the licensee also did not have a
basis for stating that no visible evidence of nozzle leakage was detected.
2. In an October 17, 2001, response to the Bulletin entitled, Supplemental
Response to Bulletin 2001-01, Serial 2735, the licensee stated: In May
1996, during a refueling outage, the RPV [reactor pressure vessel] head was
inspected. No leakage was identified, and these results have been recently
verified by a re-review of the video tapes obtained from that inspection. The
RPV head was mechanically cleaned at the end of the outage. Subsequent
inspections of the RPV head in the next two refueling outages (1998 and
2000), also did not identify any leakage in the CRDM [control rod drive
mechanism] nozzle-to-head areas that could be inspected. Video tapes
taken during these inspections have also been re-reviewed."
The licensees response was materially inaccurate, in that: (1) each reactor
pressure vessel head control rod drive penetration was not inspected in May
1996, as documented in PCAQR 96-0551, and; (2) the reactor pressure
vessel head, including the area around each control rod drive penetration,
was not completely cleaned, as noted in PCAQR 98-0649, which was
prepared at the start of the Eleventh Refueling Outage (1998), which stated
that there were old boric acid deposits on the head.
This is a Severity Level I violation (Supplement VII)
Civil Penalty $120,000 (EA-05-072)
II. Violations Not Assessed a Civil Penalty
A. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires, in part, that the licensee shall
establish measures to ensure that conditions adverse to quality such as failures,
malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-
conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Criterion XVI also requires
that for significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the
cause of the condition is determined and that corrective actions are taken to
preclude repetition.
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Plant Procedure NG-NA-00702, Corrective Action Program, Revision 3, defined a
significant condition adverse to quality to be a condition adverse to quality, which,
if left uncorrected, could have an undesirable effect on plant safety, personal
safety, regulatory position, financial liability, or environmental impact.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to determine the root cause of and take
corrective actions to preclude the repetition of:
1. Fouling of containment air cooling fins by boric acid, between June 2000
and February 16, 2002, a significant condition adverse to quality, as
documented in:
Condition Report (CR) 2000-1547, CAC [containment air cooler] Plenum
Pressure Drop Following 12 RFO, dated June 2, 2000;
CR 2000-4138, Frequency for Cleaning Boron From CAC Fins Increased to
Interval of Approximately 8 Weeks, dated December 21, 2000, and;
CR 2001-0039, CAC Plenum Pressure Experienced Step Drop, dated
January 4, 2001.
2. Fouling of the containment radiation elements by boric acid and iron oxide,
between April 2001, and February 16, 2002, a significant condition adverse
to quality, as documented in:
Condition Report (CR) 99-1300, Analysis of CTMT [containment] Radiation
Monitor Filters. dated May 13, 1999;
CR 2001-1110, Chemistry is Changing Filters on RE4597BA More
Frequently, dated April 23, 2001;
CR 2001-1822, Frequency of Filter Changes for RE4597BA is Increasing,
dated July 23, 2001;
CR 2001-2795, RE4597BA Alarmed on Saturation, dated October 22,
2001, and;
CR 2001-3411, Received Equipment Fail Alarm for Detector Saturation on
RE4597BA, dated December 18, 2001.
3. An increasing trend in unidentified reactor coolant system leakage, between
March 2001, and December 2001, a significant condition adverse to quality,
as documented in:
Condition Report (CR) 2001-0890, Unidentified RCS [reactor coolant
system] Leak Rate Varies Daily by as Much as 100 percent of the Value,
March 29, 2001;
-8-
CR 2001-1857, RCS Unidentified Leakage at .125 to .145 gpm [gallons per
minute], July 25, 2001;
CR 2001-2862, Calculated Unidentified Leakage for Reactor Coolant
System has Indicated Increasing Trend, October 22, 2001, and;
CR 2001-3025, Increase in RCS Unidentified Leakage, November 12,
2001.
This is a violation associated with a RED SDP finding (EA-03-025).
B. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting
quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings,
of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in
accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Procedure NG-EN-00324, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Revisions 0
through 2 (effective date October 1, 1999), were classified as a procedure
affecting quality under the licensees administrative system.
Contrary to the above, between October 1, 1999, and March 6, 2002, Procedure
NG-EN-00324, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Revisions 0 through 2,
were not appropriate to the circumstances and contributed to the licensees failure
to detect and address boric acid corrosion of the reactor vessel head, as follows:
1. The procedure inappropriately focused on bolted and flanged connections in
the definition of leakage (Sections 4.2 though 4.4), the definition of reactor
coolant system pressure boundary components (Section 4.9), and the
identification of investigation locations (Section 6.1) at the expense of
identifying the potential for through-wall leakage.
2. The procedure did not include adequate guidance, specifications, or
threshold levels for initiating a detailed inspection in order to ensure
consistent implementation of Section 6.3.4 of the procedure.
3. The procedure did not require the identification of and corrective actions to
preclude the repetition of boric acid leaks, a significant condition adverse to
quality, but instead only required the preparation of a repair tag or work order
to facilitate repair of the leak.
4. The procedure did not define the qualifications and training necessary to
permit engineering staff to conduct inspections and evaluations in a
consistent manner, including the use of proper inspection techniques,
observations, recording of results, and evaluations.
5. The procedure inappropriately exempted stainless steel or Inconel
components from further examination related to boric acid corrosion, unless
the examination was during an ASME Section XI test which might require a
bolting examination.
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6. The procedure inappropriately did not require the licensee staff to maintain
records necessary to demonstrate the proper completion of activities
affecting quality.
This is a violation associated with a RED SDP finding (EA-03-025).
C. 10 CFR 50.9 requires that information provided to the Commission by a licensee
or information required by statute or by the Commissions regulations, orders, or
license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate
in all material respects.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, requires, in part, that the licensee
shall maintain sufficient records to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality
and that those records shall include actions taken to correct any deficient
conditions.
Contrary to the above, the following information was not complete or accurate in all
material respects for documents required to be maintained or provided to the
Commission:
1. Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR) 98-0649, dated
April 18, 1998, contained the following closure statement: Accumulation of
boric acid on the reactor vessel caused by leaking CRDMs [control rod drive
mechanisms] has not resulted in any boric acid corrosion. This was identified
through inspections following reactor vessel head cleaning in past
outages....Additionally, B&W [Babcock & Wilcox] documentation discussing
CRDM nozzle cracking further stated that boric acid deposits on the head
caused by leaking CRDM flanges would not result in head corrosion.
However, the quoted statements were not accurate in all material respects in
that the licensee had previously not cleaned all areas of the reactor head of
boric acid deposits, had not inspected the base metal under all the deposits
to determine whether corrosion was present, and no B&W documentation
was available to support the claim that boric acid would not result in head
corrosion.
2. Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR) 98-0767, dated April
25, 1998, Section 4A, Item F, included the following closure justification, The
boric acid deposits were removed from the head. However, the quoted
statement was not accurate in all material respects in that the licensee had
not removed all of the boric acid deposits from the head as of the end of the
eleventh refueling outage.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement VII) (EA-05-069)
D. 10 CFR 50.9 requires that information provided to the Commission by a licensee
or information required by statute or by the Commissions regulations, orders, or
license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate
in all material respects.
-10-
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII, requires, in part, that the licensee
shall maintain sufficient records to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality
and that those records shall include audits and those actions taken to correct any
deficient conditions.
Contrary to the above, the following information was not complete or accurate in all
material respects for documents required to be maintained or provided to the
Commission:
1. On September 23, 1993, the licensee processed a Document Void Request
to cancel Modification 90-012 which stated, Current inspection techniques
using high-powered cameras preclude the need for inspection ports,
additionally, cleaning of the reactor vessel head during last three outages
was completed successfully without requiring access ports. However, the
quoted statement was not accurate in all material respects, in that, the
licensee left boric acid deposits on the reactor vessel head at the end of both
the seventh and eighth refueling outages, the two outages preceding this
statement.
2. Quality Assurance Audit Report AR-00-OUTAG-01, dated July 7, 2000,
stated, in part, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Checklists and Condition
Reports were initiated by inspectors when prudent to document and evaluate
boric acid accumulation and leaks. Boric acid leakage was adequately
classified and corrected when appropriate. Engineering displayed noteworthy
persistence in ensuring boric acid accumulation from the reactor head was
thoroughly cleaned. However, the audit report was not accurate in all
material respects in that the licensee did not: 1) thoroughly clean the reactor
head during the outage; 2) did not prepare a boric acid corrosion control
checklist for the boric acid left on the head after the cleaning attempt; and
3. identify, properly classify, or correct the boric acid accumulation and leaks.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement VII) (EA-05-070)
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
(Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in response to this Notice of Violation
and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) within 90 days of the date of this letter.
However, since this enforcement action is being proposed prior to any final action by the U.S.
Department of Justice, consideration may be given to extending the response time for good
cause shown. The reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation:
EA-03-025; EA-05-066; EA-05-067; EA-05-068; EA-05-069; EA-05-070; EA-05-071 and
EA-05-072" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged
violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the
corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will
be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the
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correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not
received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be
issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other
action as may be proper should not be taken. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act,
42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the
Licensee may pay the civil penalties proposed above or the cumulative amount of the civil
penalties, if more than one civil penalty is proposed, in accordance with NUREG/BR-0254 and
by submitting to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, a statement indicating when and by what method payment was made,
or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part, by a written answer
addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil
penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with
10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly
marked as an "Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this
Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this
Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to
protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or
mitigation of the penalties.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in Section VI.C.2 of
the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with
10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific
reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the
Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for
imposing civil penalties.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently has been determined in
accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the
Attorney General, and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be
collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234(c)) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c.
The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, statement as to payment of civil
penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Director, Office of
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator and Enforcement
Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, and a copy to the NRC Resident
Inspector at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), to the extent possible,
it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can
be made available to the public without redaction. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web
site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If personal privacy or proprietary information
is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your
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response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your
response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in
detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will
create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by
10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please
provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two
working days.
Dated this 21st day of April 2005
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Questions concerning this matter should be addressed to Mr. Steven Reynolds, the NRC Senior
Manager responsible for the NRCs Manual Chapter 0350 oversight activities associated with
the Davis-Besse Station. Mr. Reynolds may be reached at (630) 829-9601.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Ellis W. Merschoff
Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs
Office of the Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation and Proposed
Imposition of Civil Penalties
2. NUREG/BR-0254 Payment Methods (Licensee Only)
Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3
cc w/encl: The Honorable Dennis Kucinich
M. Bezilla, Vice President, Davis-Besse
J. Hagan, Senior Vice President
Engineering and Services, FENOC
L. Myers, Chief Operating Officer, FENOC
Plant Manager
Manager - Regulatory Compliance
D. Jenkins, Attorney, FirstEnergy
Ohio State Liaison Officer
R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
President, Board of County Commissioners
of Lucas County
J. Papcun, President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners
DISTRIBUTION:
OE r/f
ADAMS Accession#: ML051090552 *See Previous Concurrence
DOCUMENT NAME: E:\Filenet\ML051090552.wpd
OFC OE:ES OE:D DEDR EDO
NAME DStarkey* FCongel* EMerschoff LReyes (original
signed by E. Merschoff
for)
DATE 4/19/05 4/19/05 4/21/05 4/ 21/05
C-COVER E-COVER & ENCLOSURE N-NO COPY
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY