ML050690400
| ML050690400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear |
| Issue date: | 01/27/2005 |
| From: | Gody A Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Forbes J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| 50-368/05-301 50-368/05-301 | |
| Download: ML050690400 (102) | |
Text
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0451 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/4/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
IH BANK 278 Originator Coble 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.4 Type CE EPE System Reactor Trip Recovery System E02 K/A: EK2.1 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 3.7 Description Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Reactor Trip Recovery) and the following:
Components and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.
Question #1 Given the following:
- The plant has tripped from 100% Power
- RCS Pressure is 1700 psia and dropping
- Steam Generator pressures are 800 psia and dropping
- Containment pressure is 19.3 and rising.
What equipment status would the Control Room Operators expect to see when checking Containment Cooling (CC) Fan operations?
A. Chilled Water isolated by CCAS signal, all CC fans running, Service Water (SW) aligned to SW Coil, bypass dampers Closed.
B. Service Water aligned to SW coil, bypass dampers Open, all CC fans running, Chilled Water isolated by CIAS signal.
C. Chilled Water aligned to Chilled Water Coils, all CC fans operating, and bypass dampers Open, Service Water aligned to SW coils.
D. Service Water aligned to SW coil, bypass dampers Closed, Chilled Water isolated by CIAS signal, all CC fans operating.
Answer:
B. Service Water aligned to SW coil, bypass dampers Open, all CC fans running, Chilled Water isolated by CIAS signal.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because Containment Chill Water isolations are actuated closed by CIAS and the bypass dampers would be Open.
Distracter C is incorrect because Chill Water isolation would have been closed by the CIAS.
Distracter D is incorrect because the bypass dampers should be Open.
References STM 2-09, Containment Cooling and Purge Systems, Section 10.2.1 A2LP-RO-CVENT Objective 4, Describe the automatic actuations associated with the Containment Cooling Units.
A2LP-RO-CVENT Objective 18, Describe the emergency operation of the Containment Building Ventilation System.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam Bank 0027 Rev 001 Rev Date: 10/4/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: C Source:
NRC BANK Originator Coble 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type Generic APE System Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident System 008 K/A: AK2.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 2.7 Description Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and the following: Sensors and Detectors.
Question # 2 Given the following:
- The reactor has tripped and safety injection has actuated.
- The RCS has a stuck open Pressurizer Safety valve.
- The RCS has rapidly depressurized to saturation conditions.
- Pressurizer level initially dropped and then began to rise rapidly.
Which one (1) of the following characterizes the relationship between indicated pressurizer level and RCS inventory and the reason for these conditions?
A. Level is NOT an accurate indication of inventory. The cold calibrated pressurizer level channels indicate high during high temperature, low pressure conditions.
B. Level is an accurate indication of inventory. Voiding would occur first in the pressurizer steam space due to the higher temperature of the pressurizer walls.
C. Level is NOT an accurate indication of inventory. Reactor vessel voiding may result in a rapidly rising pressurizer level.
D. Level is an accurate indication of inventory. RCP flow would sweep any voids from the RCS to the pressurizer steam space and out the safety.
Answer:
C. Level is NOT an accurate indication of inventory. Reactor vessel voiding may result in a rapidly rising pressurizer level.
Notes:
"A" is true but it's contribution to a false level is not significant in this event. "B" & "D" are both incorrect.
References 2202.003, Section 3, Step 11 (Loss of Coolant Accident).
2202.010, Attachment 9, Void Elimination (Standard Attachments).
A2LP-RO-ELOCA, Obi 14. Given a LOCA event and a set of plant conditions, determine if voiding has occurred during a cooldown.
Historical Original question used on the 1998 NRC initial RO Exam. Rev. 1 Changed the word increasing to rising.
Added the word "indicated" to the stem. Added "Reactor vessel" to the answer. Changed the order of the distracters and the answer. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 10/12/2004
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0452 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/4/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator Coble 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type Generic EPE System Small Break LOCA System 009 K/A: EA1.1 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.1 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.1 Description Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a small break LOCA:
EFW/MFW.
Question # 3 Given the following conditions:
- Emergency Diesel Generator #1 is OOS for maintenance.
- The plant has tripped due to a complete loss of offsite power.
- After the trip, a 200 gpm small break LOCA develops.
- Steam generator levels have dropped to 9% and lowering
- The LOCA operating procedure 2203.003 has just been entered.
To ensure adequate RCS heat removal, the ____ Emergency Feedwater Pump should be verified running and supplying the steam generators with a total feedwater flow of greater than ______ gpm.
A. B; 485 B. A; 485 C. B; 600 D. A; 600 Answer:
B. A; 485 Notes:
Due to no offsite power and no A train EDG, the B EFW pump would not be available but the steam driven A EFW pump would still be available thus distracters A and C are incorrect..
In distracters C and D, 600 gpm is the max limit for EFW flow in a 4 inch pipe per the normal operating procedure 2106.006, Limit 5.10 but no the flow required for Decay Heat removal and thus are incorrect.
References EOP 2203.003, LOCA, Step 12 Contingency 12.D NOP 2106.006 Step 5.10.
A2LP-RO-ELOCA, OBJ. 16 Given a LOCA event and a set of plant conditions, IDENTIFY if adequate RCS Heat Removal via SGs exists.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0486 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/26/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.8 & 41.10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.1 Type GENERIC EPE System LARGE BREAK LOCA System 011 K/A: EK1.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group 1 RO Imp: 4.1 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.4 Description Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Large Break LOCA: Natural Circulation and Cooling, including reflux boiling.
Question: # 4 Given the following conditions:
- The plant has tripped due to a complete Loss of Offsite Power.
- The plant experienced a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident on the trip.
- A plant cooldown is in progress.
- RCS Thot indicates 542°F and steady.
- RCS Tcold indicates 520°F and steady.
- RCS Pressure is 1100 psia and steady.
- Steam Generator levels are 30% each and slowly rising.
- RVLMS level 7 and above are DRY Based on the above conditions, the method of RCS heat removal would be:
A. Two Phase Reflux Boiling cooling.
B. Forced flow running one RCP in each loop.
C. Single Phase Natural Circulation cooling.
D. Once through cooling with HPSI and ECCS Vents.
Answer:
A. Two Phase Reflux Boiling cooling.
Notes:
Distracter B is incorrect due to no Power to run RCPs.
Distracter C is incorrect due to CET and Thot being greater than 10 degrees F out from each other and also MTS is less than 30 degrees F.
Distracter D is incorrect, this action would only be taken if SG levels dropped to < 70 inches wide range which is well below 0% in the SGs.
References EOP 2203.003, LOCA, Section 3, Step 6 A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ 10, Given a LOCA event and a set of plant conditions, determine if Natural Circulation has been established in at least one loop.
A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ 11, Given a LOCA event and a set of plant conditions, describe the conditions required to be met if Natural Circulation conditions can not be confirmed.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/26/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0011 Rev 000 Rev Date: 6/29/1998 RO Select: Yes SRO Select:
Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NRC BANK Originator Hatman 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type Generic APE System Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions System 015 K/A: AA2.1 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.7 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions: When to secure RCPs on loss of cooling or seal injection.
Question # 5 Which one (1) of the following conditions requires the plant to be tripped and the affected Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) to be stopped as soon as the condition is met?
A. Seal Bleedoff flow greater than 3.0 gpm.
B. Motor Winding Temperature reaches 180°F and stabilizes.
C. Vapor Seal Pressure reaches 750 psia.
D. Component Cooling Water Flow is lost for over 10 minutes.
Answer:
D. Component Cooling Water Flow is lost for over 10 minutes.
Notes:
Answer "A" is incorrect because seal bleedoff temperature of 180F requires plant shutdown, not a trip.
Answer "B" is incorrect because motor winding temperature must reach 194F before action is required.
Answer "C" is incorrect because vapor seal pressure must be 1500 psia to require a trip.
References 2203.025 Attachment D (RCP Emergencies)
A2LP-RO-RCS OBJ. 28 Given a set of plant conditions and the appropriate reference material, determine what actions should be taken for any RCP emergency.
Historical Used on 1998 NRC Exam. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 10/12/2004
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0453 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/4/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator Coble 10CFR55_41: 41.8 & 41.10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type Generic APE System Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup System 022 K/A: AK1.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.4 Description Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Makeup: Relationship between charging flow and PZR level.
Question # 6 With the plant at full power steady state operation, the following occurs:
(Reference Provided)
- The "Charging Low Flow" alarm comes in
- RCS Pressure is 2200 psia
- Pressurizer Level is 60%
- All Charging Pumps are secured and Letdown is isolated.
If no operator action is taken, what would pressurizer level be 13 minutes after Letdown is isolated ?
A. 60%
B. 59%
C. 55%
D. 50%
Answer:
B. 59%
Notes:
The pressurizer is 53.5 gal/%. With Letdown isolated the RCS inventory would still be reduced by 4 gpm from the RCP controlled bleed-off. After 13 minutes, the RCS would have been reduced by 52 gallons or ~
1%.
References NOP 2305.002 Exhibit 1 AOP 2203.036 Step 3 Contingency A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ 26, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, applicable industry events, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.036, Loss Of Charging.
A2LP-RO-RCS OBJ.. 6.a, Describe the construction and operation of the Reactor Coolant Pumps including: Shaft Seals-purpose, construction and flow through the seal package NOP 2305.002 Exhibit 1 should be provided as a reference for this question.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0454 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/5/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
IH BANK 11386 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 & 41.10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL System 025 K/A: AK3.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.7 Description Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Isolation of RHR low-pressure piping prior to pressure increase above specified level.
Question # 7 Consider the following.
- Unit 2 is being cooled down in preparation for a refueling outage.
- Shutdown Cooling is in service using LPSI 2P60A through Heat Exchanger 2E35A.
- 'A' and 'D' reactor coolant pumps are running
- The upper limit for RCS pressure is 280 psia
- The lower limit for RCS pressure is 260 psia The upper RCS pressure limit is based on ________________ and the lower RCS pressure limit is based on _________________.
A. automatic closure of SDC suction isolation valves to prevent overpressure in SDC piping; loss of Reactor Coolant pump NPSH B. automatic closure of SDC suction isolation valves to prevent overpressure in SDC piping; loss of Low Pressure Safety Injection pump NPSH C. lifting the SDC suction thermal relief valve to prevent a loss of RCS inventory; loss of Reactor Coolant pump NPSH D. lifting the SDC suction thermal relief valve to prevent a loss of RCS inventory; loss of Low Pressure Safety Injection pump NPSH Answer:
A. automatic closure of SDC suction isolation valves to prevent overpressure in SDC piping; loss of Reactor Coolant pump NPSH Notes:
The limit of 280 psia includes instrument inaccuracies to prevent going above 300 psia which is the SDC suction valve closure setpoint. This closure would cause a loss of SDC.
Two SDC thermal relief's are installed in the SDC suction line that lift at 2485 psig and 440 psig respectively due to thermal expansion should the SDC suctions go closed thus distracters C and D are incorrect.
LPSI are designed to operate at low suction head but RCPs need higher RCS pressure to provide adequate NPSH thus distracters B and D are incorrect.
References NOP 2102.010, Plant Cooldown, Steps 6.1 and 8.14.3.
Form 1015.016 H, RCS Pressure verses Temperature.
AOP 2203.029, Loss of SDC, Step 2.
A2LP-RO-SDC OBJ. 2, Describe the following shutdown cooling system components as stated in STM 2-14 including purpose and design features of components, including automatic features and purpose of automatic features: SDC suction motor operated valves Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0455 Rev 0 Rev Date: 10/5/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System LOSS OF CCW System 026 K/A: AA1.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp:
3.1 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 3.1 Description Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: CCW temperature indication.
Question # 8 While at 100% power an inadvertent CIAS occurs causing a loss of CCW to RCPs.
The decision to quickly restore CCW to containment is based on a RCP controlled bleedoff temperature indication of less than ______ °F. If above this limit, then CCW should be restored slowly to cooldown the RCP seals at less than ______ °F per hour.
A. 100; 180 B. 100; 100 C. 180; 180 D. 180; 100 Answer:
D. 180; 100 Notes:
Maintaining a cooldown rate of less than 100 degrees per hour if greater than 180 degree seal temperature will prevent thermal shocking the RCP seals and prevent a potential LOCA condition.
Distracters A and B have incorrect bleedoff temperature limits.
Distracters A and C has incorrect cooldown limits.
References AOP 2203.039, Inadvertent CIAS, Step 5 and Attachment C Step 1 A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 29, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.039, Inadvertent CIAS.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0456 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/5/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 & 41.10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System PZR PRESSURE CONTROL System 027 K/A: AK3.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.0 Description Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Verification of alternate transmitter and/or plant computer prior to shifting flow chart transmitters.
Question # 9 Given the following conditions:
- The plant is at 100% power.
- PZR Pressure Control Channel Select Switch 2HS-4626 is selected to Channel 4626A
- PZR Pressure Transmitter 2PT-4626A fails high.
Which ONE of the following actions should be taken?
A. Take manual control of PZR Pressure Controller 2PIC-4626A to restore RCS pressure control manually.
B. Verify PZR Pressure Transmitter 2PT-4626B NOT failed and transfer 2HS-4626 to Channel 4626B to restore RCS pressure control automatically.
C. Take manual control of PZR heaters and spray valves to restore RSC pressure control manually.
D. Verify all PZR backup heaters energize automatically to restore RCS pressure that has been lost due to the excess amount of PZR spray flow.
Answer:
B. Verify PZR Pressure Transmitter 2PT-4626B not failed and transfer 2HS-4626 to Channel 4626B to restore RCS pressure control automatically.
Notes:
Although distracter A would work, it is a slower and more complicated method than answer B which is called for in the procedure.
Distracter C is only applicable if both the A and B PZR pressure transmitters have failed.
Distracter D is not a viable method since heater capacity cannot overcome heat losses due to spray flow.
References STM 2-03-1, PZR Pressure and Level Control, Sections 2.2.1/2/3.
AOP-2203.028, Contingency Step 5.C AOP TG 2203.028 Step 5.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 21, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.028, Pressurizer Systems Malfunction.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0158 Rev 000 Rev Date: 6/19/1998 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NRC BANK Originator Hatman 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.1 Type Generic EPE System Anticipated Transient Without Scram System 029 K/A: EK2.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.1 Description Knowledge of the interrelations between the ATWS and the following: Breakers, relays and disconnects.
Question # 10 Given the following conditions:
- A manual reactor trip is attempted and the reactor does NOT trip after depressing ALL the manual trip pushbuttons,
Which ONE of the following will accomplish this action from the control room?
A. Open 480V Load Center 2B5 and 2B6 feeder breakers (2B-512 and 2B-612).
B. Open 480V Load Center 2B7 and 2B8 feeder breakers (2B-712 and 2B-812).
C. Open 480V MCC 2B31 and 2B41 feeder breakers (2B-321 and 2B-421)
D. Open 480V MCC 2B71 and 2B81 feeder breakers (2B-732 and 2B-823).
Answer:
B. Open 480V Load Center 2B7 and 2B8 feeder breakers (2B-712 and 2B-812).
Notes:
De-energizing 2B7 and 2B8 will de-energize power to the CEDM MG Sets which will cause a loss of Power to the CEA drives which will cause them to Scram the Reactor.
Distracters A, C, and D are incorrect because they will not de-energize the CEA Drives to cause a Scram.
References OP-2202.001, Step 3.A.2, (Standard Post Trip Actions)
A2LP-RO-ESPTA, OBJ. 7 Identify the steps that require an action to be completed prior to initiating the next step.
Historical Used on 1998 NRC Exam. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 10/12/2004
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0457 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/6/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.1 Type GENERIC EPE System STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE System 038 K/A: EA1.1 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.6 Description Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a SGTR: Steam flow indicators.
Question # 11 Given the following conditions:
- Indications of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture exist at 100% Power
- The plant was tripped due to lowering PZR level with all available Charging pumps running.
- SIAS and CCAS was manually initiated.
- RCS pressure is 1400 psia and slowly dropping.
- Steam Generator "A" and "B" pressure is 950 psia each and steady.
Which of the following indications would identify the Steam Generator with a tube rupture?
A. Steam Generator "B" level rising with feedwater flow greater than steam flow.
B. Steam Generator "A" level rising with feedwater flow equal to steam flow.
C. Steam Generator "B" level lowering with feedwater flow less than steam flow.
D. Steam Generator "A" level lowering with feedwater flow equal to steam flow.
Answer:
B. Steam Generator "A" level rising with feedwater flow equal to steam flow.
Notes:
Distracters A and C are normal expected changes in level for the given condition with no SGTR.
Distracter D is an unexpected condition for a loss of mass in the SG but cannot be going into the RCS due to the difference in pressure.
References EOP-2202.004, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 13 E A2LP-RO-STEAM OBJ 1, Describe the construction and operation of the Steam Generators: The configuration of the Steam Generators during accident scenarios.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0458 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/5/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.4 Type CE EPE/APE System STEAM LINE RUPTURE-EXCESSIVE System E05 K/A: EA2.2 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.2 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand): Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.
Question # 12 Given the following plant conditions:
(Reference Provided)
- A Steam Line Break has occurred on the "B" S/G inside Containment.
- Main Steam Isolation has automatically actuated.
- The Excess Steam Demand EOP has been entered.
- S/G "B" level indicate 0 inches wide range.
- RCS Tcold has been stabilized at 400°F using the "A" S/G.
- Containment Pressure is 37 psig and rising.
- Average CET temperatures indicate 400°F.
To prevent pressurized thermal shock from causing brittle fracture of the Reactor Vessel, RCS pressure should be reduced below _________ psia using ________ spray.
A. 1800; Main B. 1800; Aux C. 1540; Main D. 1540; Aux Answer:
D. 1540; Aux Notes:
200 degrees MTS is the License basis that will ensure brittle fracture does not occur after a rapid cooldown. 400°F plus 200°F = 600°F. The saturation pressure for 600°F is 1543.2 psia. All other distracters are higher than the 200°F MTS line of the RCS PT Limits curve in 2202.010 Attachment 1 Also Main spray is not available due to no RCP because they were secured when Containment Spray Actuated in SPTAs. All of this makes distracters A, B, AND C incorrect.
The students should have a copy of steam tables and 2202.010 Attachment 1 Page 1 as a reference for this question.
References EOP 2202.005 Step 28 EOP TG 2202.005 Step 28 EOP 2202.010 Attachment 1 A2LP-RO-EESD OBJ. 8, Given Control Room reference material and a set of plant conditions during an ESD, determine the actions to take if RCS MTS is greater than 200°F.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0162 Rev 000 Rev Date: 6/22/1998 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NRC BANK Originator Hatman 10CFR55_41: 41.8 & 10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.4 Type CE Generic EPE/APE System Loss of Feedwater System E06 K/A: EK1.2 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.7 Description Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater): Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Main Feedwater).
Question # 13 Why does OP 2202.006, Loss of Feedwater require the operators to feed the Steam Generators using the EFW system flow at less than 150 gpm for five minutes when S/G narrow range level is less than 49%?
A. To minimize the amount of shrinkage to the steam generator level.
B. To minimize the possibility of water hammer in the emergency feedwater system.
C. To minimize the possibility of damage to the steam generator feed ring.
D. To ensure the most reliable source of feedwater is used to restore steam generator level.
Answer:
C. To minimize the possibility of damage to the steam generator feed ring.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because there will be some shrinkage but its is inconsequential.
Distracter B is incorrect because there may be water hammer if flow is not limited, but damage would occur to main feed line instead of EFW.
Distracter D is incorrect because EFW is the safety system for feed to SGs, and the preferred source in a Loss of all Feedwater, but the procedure also addresses AFW and MFW as feed sources.
References OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater, Step 11. C and previous caution.
EOP TG 2202.006 Step 11.C A2LP-RO-ELOSF OBJ. 4, From memory, describe the limits associated with restoring feedwater to the SGs.
Historical Used on 1998 NRC Exam. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 10/12/2004
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0460 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/6/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: C Source:
NEW Originator BLANCHARD 10CFR55_41: 41.6 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.1 Type GENERIC EPE System STATION BLACKOUT System 055 K/A: 2.2.30 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.3 Description Equipment Control : Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling such as alarms from fuel handling area, communication with fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation.
Question # 14 Given the following conditions:
- The plant is in Mode 6 with core alterations in progress.
- A complete Station Blackout occurs due to severe weather.
- Directions are given to secure core alterations.
Which of the following indications would be an available and accurate monitor to detect changes in core reactivity if core alterations are not secured properly?
A. All 4 log power meters on 2C03.
B. Refueling Bridge portable area radiation monitor.
C. Containment low range radiation monitors.
D. Startup Channels 1 and 2 on 2C09.
Answer:
D. Startup Channels 1 and 2 on 2C09.
Notes:
Distracter A would be available but not accurate to detect small changes in core reactivity due to the log scale.
Distracter B and C would not be available due to not being powered from an Vital AC inverter supplied from DC batteries.
Answer D is powered from Vital 120 VAC which is powered from the station batteries.
References STM 2-67-1, Excore Nuclear Instrumentation, Section 2.2.and 2.3 A2LP-RO-FH, Fuel Handling, OBJ 4, Given a fuel handling evolution or condition, determine the correct response.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0025 Rev 001 Rev Date: 10/26/1998 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NRC BANK Originator Hatman 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
2 Type Generic K&As System Loss of Offsite Power System 056 K/A: 2.1.2 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.0 Description Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of Operator Responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.
Question # 15 Given the following:
- The plant has tripped from 100% due to a Main Generator Reverse Power Relay Failure.
- SPTAs have been completed and the Reactor Trip Recovery Procedure entered.
- Now a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)occurs.
- Breaker 2A301, 480V ESF Bus 2B5 feeder breaker is tripped on overcurrent at the same time the EDG output breakers close.
Which one (1) of the following is the requirement for stopping 2DG1 based on the above conditions?
A. Immediately.
B. Within three (3) minutes.
C. When jacket water temperature from the engine reaches 160 degrees F.
D. When lube oil temperature from engine indicates 190 degrees F.
Answer:
B. Within three (3) minutes.
Notes:
The Service Water cooling supply to 2DG1 will not open due to the loss of 2B5. The Caution in the Loss of Offsite power EOP Above Step 8B states that with no cooling water, engine damage can occur after three minutes.
Distracter A is incorrect because the Diesels are stopped locally and can run up to three minutes loaded.
Distracters C and D are normal jacket water and oil temperatures for a fully loaded EDG so they are incorrect.
References 2202.001, SPTAs, Step 4.F directs a shutdown of an EDG without SW aligned.
2202.007 LOOP EOP Contingency Step 7.C.4 and Caution before Step 8B EOP TG 2202.007, Step 8.B A2LP-RO-EDG OBJ. 11.d, Explain the operation of the Emergency Diesel Generators for the following scenarios: A loss of off-site power while the EDG is in standby.
Historical Revision 1 updated the references and stated the time of the overcurrent trip on the 2B5 Feeder Breaker.
Used on 1998 NRC Exam. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 10/26/2004
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0461 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/6/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: C Source:
IH BANK 9739 Originator Coble 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System LOSS OF VITAL AC INSTRUMENT BUS System 057 K/A: AA2.1 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.1 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: That a loss of AC has occurred.
Question # 16 Which of the following would cause a Vital 120 VAC instrument bus to have a complete loss voltage at the time the condition occurs?
A. Any Loss Of Off-site Power and the failure of the Alternate AC Diesel Generator to start.
B. Any Loss Of Off-site Power and the failure of one of the Emergency Diesels to start.
C. The Battery Input Breaker supplying the respective inverter for the bus trips during an uncomplicated Reactor Trip from power.
D. A simultaneous loss of off-site power and the Battery Input Breaker supplying the respective inverter for the bus trips.
Answer:
D. A simultaneous loss of off-site power and the Battery Input Breaker supplying the respective inverter for the bus trips Notes:
Distracter A and B are incorrect because the vital batteries would continue to supply vital AC voltage through the inverter.
Distracter C is incorrect because the static switch on the inverter would swap to Alternate AC automatically when the DC input breaker trips and no disruption of voltage would occur.
Answer D is correct because the voltage to the vital AC bus would be lost during the time it takes for the emergency diesels to start and reload the alternate AC input buses (~ 15 seconds)
References STM 2-32-4, 120 VAC Distribution System, Section 2.2 A2LP-RO-ED120 OBJ. 4, Explain the sources of power available for a 120VAC Vital (Uninterruptable)
Bus. This would include the ability to draw a 120 VAC Vital Bus single line drawing.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0462 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/6/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
IH BANK 12791 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 &
10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System LOSS OF DC POWER System 058 K/A: AK3.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.0 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.2 Description Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Actions contained in the EOP for loss of DC power.
Question # 17 Unit 2 is operating at full power. Consider the following:
- The red battery (2D11) is disconnected from its bus (2D01) for the replacement of four (4) cells.
- Battery Charger 2D31A is supplying 2D01
- The Voltage Regulator for 2D31A now fails, and 2D31A has 0 VDC output.
- All other systems and components operate as designed
- The Loss of 125 VDC AOP 2203.037 has been entered Given these conditions, which of the following conditions would be the correct contingency action to take to prevent an inadvertent actuation?
A. Bypass all points on BOTH channel 1 (2C23-1) AND channel 2 (2C23-2).
B. Bypass all points on BOTH channel 1 (2C23-1) AND channel 3 (2C23-3.
C. Bypass all points on EITHER channel 1 (2C23-1) OR channel 2 (2C23-2).
D. Bypass all points on EITHER channel 1 (2C23-1) OR channel 3 (2C23-3).
Answer:
D. Bypass all points on EITHER channel 1 (2C23-1) OR channel 3 (2C23-3).
Notes:
Distracters A and B are incorrect because interlocks prevent bypassing the same point in two different channels.
Distracter C is incorrect because the power for channel 2 is supplied from green or B train power and is still functional so the procedure does not direct bypassing this channel.
References AOP-2203.037, Loss of 125 VDC, Section 2 Step 5.
AOP TG 2203.037, Section 2 Step 5.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 27, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, applicable industry events, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.037, Loss Of 125VDC.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0463 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/6/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System LOSS OF NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER System 062 K/A: 2.4.16 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.0 Description Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures.
Question # 18 Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is at full power operation.
- The 'A' and 'C' Service Water pumps are in service
- The ACW Pressure Low alarm comes in.
- The Service Water Header Loop II low pressure alarm now comes in.
- The Turbine Building Sump Station II high level alarm comes in.
- The AO reports that the ACW supply pipe to Stator Cooling Water has ruptured.
- The Loss of Service Water AOP 2203.022 has been entered.
Given these conditions, which of the following actions should be taken?
A. Trip the Reactor, close the SW to ACW isolations and GO TO SPTAs.
B. Close SW to ACW isolations and GO TO Loss of Turbine Load AOP.
C. Trip the Reactor, separate SW Loops 1 and 2 and REFER to SPTAs.
D. Separate SW Loops 1 and 2 and REFER to Loss of Turbine Load AOP.
Answer:
A. Trip the Reactor, close the SW to ACW isolations and GO TO SPTAs.
Notes:
Distracter B and D are incorrect because a loss of ACW will cause a loss of condenser vacuum and thus the reactor will have to be tripped.
Distracter C is incorrect because the guidance for a reactor trip, not supplemental information therefore the EOP users guide term GO TO is the correct term.
References AOP 2203.022, Loss of Service Water, Step 16 D.
AOP TG 2203.022 Step 16.
1015.021, EOP/AOP Users Guide Attachment B terms REFER and GO TO.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 17, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.022, Loss Of Service Water.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0464 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/7/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 & 41.10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System CONTINUOUS ROD WITHDRAWAL System 001 K/A: AK3.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.6 Description Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Manually driving rods into position that existed before start of casualty.
Question #19 Given the following conditions:
- Plant Power is 65% during a power ascension from a forced outage.
- Group P CEAs are being withdrawn 3 steps for ASI control.
- The CEAC 1and CEAC 2 CEA DEVIATION alarm comes in.
- CEA 24 withdrawal stops when the Mode Select Switch is taken to OFF.
- CEA 24 is currently at 130 inches withdrawn.
- All other CEAs in Group P are at 124 inches withdrawn.
- The CEA Malfunction Procedure 2202.003 has been entered.
Which of the following would be the correct action to take and the reason for taking this action?
A. Withdraw the rest of the CEAs in Group P using Manual Individual Mode to 130 inches within 15 minutes to prevent operating in an unanalyzed condition that could cause cladding damage.
B. Trip the Reactor immediately because the Reactor core has been analyzed for this condition and cladding damage has already occurred.
C. Insert Group P CEA 24 using Manual Individual Mode to 120 inches within 15 minutes to prevent operating in an unanalyzed condition that could cause cladding damage.
D. Commence a power reduction to less than 60% power within 15 minutes prior to realignment of CEA 24 to prevent cladding damage from occurring.
Answer:
C. Insert Group P CEA 24 using Manual Individual Mode to 120 inches within 15 minutes to prevent operating in an unanalyzed condition that could cause cladding damage.
Notes:
In accordance with CEA Malfunction AOP, Contingency Step 15 C, an outward deviated CEA should be inserted to within 5 inches of its associated group within 15 minutes or the plant would be tripped if >
60% power IAW Step 15 D. This is an unanalyzed condition so a conservative action to prevent cladding damage is to realign the outward deviated CEA with the rest of its group within 15 minutes.
Distracter A is not a conservative action and could cause cladding damage.
Distracter B is only required if the outward deviation is > 7 inches IAW Step 15 B.
Distracter D is the action to take for an inward deviated CEA and this is an outward deviated CEA.
References AOP 2203.003, CEA Malfunction Step 15.C and 19.
AOP TG 2203.003, Step 15.
STM 2-02, CEDM Control System, Section 9.2 Step 1.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 4, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, applicable industry events, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.003, CEA Malfunctions.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0153 Rev 000 Rev Date: 6/18/1998 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NRC BANK Originator Hatman 10CFR55_41: 41.8 & 10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type Generic APE System Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod System 005 K/A: AK1.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 4.1 Description Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod: Calculation of Minimum shutdown margin.
Question # 20 At 100% power following the determination that a CEA in Shutdown Bank "A" is misaligned by four (4) inches and mechanically bound, shutdown margin is calculated to be 4.9%.
Which one (1) of the following should be taken?
A. Continue plant operation without restriction.
B. Reduce power to less than or equal to 72% within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
C. Start a plant shutdown and be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
D. Manually trip Reactor and Initiate Emergency Boration.
Answer:
D. Manually trip Reactor and Initiate Emergency Boration.
Notes:
Emergency Boration is defined as a boration rate of > 40 gpm at > 2500 ppm boric acid solution at ANO.
This is an immediate TS action if minimum SDM is not met. The minimum COLR limit for SDM in this case is 5.0%.
Distracters B and C are actions to take for misaligned CEAs IAW TS 3.1.3.1 Action a and d; however, in this case the CEA does not meet the > 7 inch misalignment of the TS LCO.
Distracter A is incorrect because we do not meet SDM References Tech Specs 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.3.1 COLR Section IV. Step 1 OP 2103.015, Reactivity Balance Calculation, Step 5.3 A2LP-RO-TS OBJ. 4.b, From memory, discuss the LCOs and actions statements for all LCOs with action statements less than or equal to one hour.
A2LP-SRO-TS OBJ. 4, Discuss the technical specifications LCOs that have action statements of one hour or less.
Historical Used on 1998 NRC Exam. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 10/12/2004
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0465 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/7/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System EMERGENCY BORATION System 024 K/A: AK2.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 2.5 Description Knowledge of the interrelations between the Emergency Boration and the following:
Controllers and positioners.
Question # 21 Given the following conditions:
- The plant was tripped from 100% due to lowering PZR level.
- Two CEAs did not insert fully into the core.
- RCS pressure is 1600 psia and dropping slowly.
- PZR level is 9% and dropping.
- No dilution of the RCS was in progress prior to the trip.
Which of the following group of component positions would be correct to verify that the Reactivity Control Safety Function is satisfied?
A. Boric Acid Makeup Pumps Running; VCT Outlet Valve (2CV-4873-1) OPEN; BA Gravity Feed Valves (2CV-4920-1 and 2CV-4921-1) CLOSED and a charging pump providing >40 gpm flow to the RCS.
B. At least One High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Running at least One injection flow control valve OPEN supplying >100 gpm of flow to the RCS.
C. Boric Acid Makeup Pumps Running; VCT Outlet Valve (2CV-4873-1) CLOSED; Emergency Borate Valve (2CV-4916-2) OPEN and a charging pump providing
>40 gpm flow to the RCS.
D. Both High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps Running at with all associated flow control valves OPEN supplying sufficient flow to the RCS to raise PZR level.
Answer:
C. Boric Acid Makeup Pumps Running; VCT Outlet Valve (2CV-4873-1) Closed; Emergency Borate Valve (2CV-4916-2) Open and a charging pump providing
>40 gpm flow to the RCS.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because the there is no flow path from a boric acid source to the charging pump suction.
Distracters B and D are incorrect because RCS pressure is above the shutoff head of the HPSI pumps.
References AOP 2203.032, Emergency Boration AOP, Steps 3, 4, and 6.
AOP 2202.010, EOP Standard Attachments, Exhibit 1, Emergency Boration.
AOP 2202.010, EOP Standard Attachments, Exhibit 2, HPSI Flow Curve.
STM 2-04, CVCS, Figures on pages 64 and 65.
A2LP-RO-EBOR OBJ. 6, Describe the conditions as stated in OP 2203.032, Emergency Boration AOP, that indicate emergency boration is occurring.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0466 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/7/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 &
10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System Steam Generator Tube Leak System 037 K/A: AK3.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.5 Description Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: Reset and Check of Condensate air ejector exhaust monitor.
Question # 22 If a Steam Generator Tube leak were to occur on Unit 2 at 100% Power, which ONE of the following types of radiation monitors should NOT be checked to determine the specific Steam Generator that is leaking?
A. Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor.
B. Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor.
C. Steam Generator N-16 Radiation Monitor.
D. Vacuum Pump Exhaust Radiation Monitor.
Answer:
D. Vacuum Pump Exhaust Radiation Monitor.
Notes:
There are redundant radiation monitors on each SG for the Steam Line, Blowdown and N-16 Radiation Monitors but only one Vacuum Pump exhaust Radiation Monitor thus distracters A, B and C are incorrect because they can be used to determine the affected Steam Generator.
References STM 2-62, Radiation Monitoring System, Section 2.3.
AOP 2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage, Entry Conditions and Step 10.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 28, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, applicable industry events, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.038, Primary To Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0467 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/7/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System ARM SYSTEM ALARMS System 061 K/A: AK2.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.5 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 2.6 Description Knowledge of the interrelations between the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms and the following: Detectors at each ARM system location.
Question # 23 The Post Accident Containment High Range Area Monitors are gamma sensitive _________________
detectors that will cause an alarm to notify the control room of high radiation conditions in the containment at __________ R/hr.
A. Geiger-Mueller; 1000 B. Scintillation; 1000 C. Geiger-Mueller; 10 D. Scintillation; 10 Answer:
A. Geiger-Mueller; 1000 Notes:
The setpoint for high radiation alarm on the post accident monitors was recently changed from 10 R/hr to 1000 R/hr to prevent false alarms due to high containment temperature. (ER-ANO-2001-0743)
This alarm when in is a direct input to isolate containment IAW the annunciator corrective actions.
Distracters C and D have the wrong Setpoint for the Radiation Monitor.
Distracters B and D have the wrong Detector type.
References STM 2-62, Radiation Monitoring System, Section 2.1.2 AOP 2203.012J, Annunciator 2K10 Corrective Actions, Window A-6, Containment Radiation High.
A2LP-RO-RMON OBJ. 6, Describe the local monitors associated with area monitoring.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0468 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/7/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 5 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System PLANT FIRE ON SITE System 067 K/A: AA2.1 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.9 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site:
Location of vital equipment within fire zone.
Question # 24 The following plant conditions exist at power:
- Annunciator 2K11-A9, FIRE ALARM is in alarm.
- On fire protection panel, 2C-343, the fire alarm LED is lit for module 2-2-6 (B),
2B53 Room (Fire Zone 2091-BB).
Which of the following would be an operational concern associated with a fire in this zone?
A. A complete loss of operability of Remote Shutdown instrumentation.
B. An uncontrollable loss of Reactor Coolant due to a hot short.
C. A Loss of the Red Emergency Diesel Generator DC starting control power.
D. Auto Start of the "A" Boric Acid Makeup Pump due to a hot short.
Answer:
B. An uncontrollable loss of Reactor Coolant due to a hot short.
Notes:
Answer B is correct because the DC buses 2D-26 and 2D-27 that power up the ECCS Vent Valves 2CV-4698-1 AND 2CV-4740-2 are located in this room and could open on a hot short and cause a rapid uncontrolled loss of RCS pressure and inventory.
Distracter A is incorrect because this instrumentation has different and redundant power sources and is designed to be available after a fire.
Distracter C is incorrect because this DC Power source is in a different fire zone (2D-23 in Door 340 Corridor Zone 2109-U)
Distracter D is incorrect because this AC Power source is in a different fire zone (2B-63 Room Zone 2096-M)
References AOP 2203.049, Fire in Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown, Entry Conditions and EOP Required Actions for Fire in 2B53 Room ( Zone 2091-BB).
AOP TG 2203.049 Pages 20 Component 2D01-21 and 2D02-21 AND Page 27 Basis last bullet.
STM 2-03, RCS. Section 2.2.4 and figure on page 51.
STM 2-32-5, 125 VDC Electrical Distribution, Section 2.2.4 STM 2-04, CVCS, Section 2.3.4.
A2LP-RO-EAOP, OBJ. 25, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.034, Fire or Explosion.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0469 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/7/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
IH BANK 7 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.8 &
10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY System 069 K/A: AA2.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 4.4 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity: Verification of automatic and manual means of restoring integrity.
Question # 25 Given the following:
- The plant is operating at 100% power with all systems aligned for normal full power operation.
- You discover the Containment Purge Inside Isolation Valve (2CV-8291-1) indicates intermediate position.
The Licensed Operator should:
A. Verify purge system flow rate greater than 39700 cfm and discharging through a charcoal filter and HEPA filter.
B. Verify that both outside penetration isolation valves are fully closed to satisfy Tech Spec requirements for the penetration.
C. Obtain key and attempt to close valve within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
D. Note actual valve position on the surveillance test and forward the test sheets to the system engineer.
Answer:
C. Obtain key and attempt to close valve within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Notes:
Technical Specification 3.6.1.6 requires all three Containment Purge Isolations in the supply and exhaust ducts to remain closed and keys removed during modes 1-4. These valve are only opened in Modes 5 and below to ensure Containment Integrity is maintain in Modes 1-4 Distracter A is incorrect because the Purge system should not be running in Modes 1-4.
Distracter B is incorrect because all three valves are required to be closed to satisfy the TS.
Distracter D is incorrect because the TS has a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action to restore so prompt action must be taken to restore containment Integrity.
References Technical Specification 3.6.1.6, Containment Ventilation System.
A2LP-RO-CVENT, Containment Ventilation Systems, OBJ. 15, Describe the conditions required to satisfy the TS LCOs and TRM TROs associated with the Containment Ventilation System including the basis for each LCO/TRO.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0470 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/7/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
IH BANK 11383 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.1 Type GENERIC EPE System INADEQUATE CORE COOLING System 074 K/A: EA1.0 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 4.4 Description Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to an Inadequate Core Cooling: RCS water inventory.
Question # 26 Consider the following.
- Unit 2 has tripped due to a LOCA
- Core CET's indicate 610 deg F and rising
- T-hot indicates 605 deg F and rising
- Pressurizer pressure indicates 1200 psia and lowering
- RVLMS Level 7 and below indicates wet
- SG levels are 300" and 400" respectively Given these conditions what is the potential for core damage?
A. There is no indication of potential for core damage as long as RCS pressure is maintained less than 2500 psia.
B. There is no indication of potential for core damage as long as negative reactivity is maintained.
C. There is potential for core damage due to inadequate RCS inventory causing superheat.
D. There is potential for core damage due to inadequate Steam Generator inventory Answer:
C. There is potential for core damage due to inadequate RCS inventory causing superheat Notes:
The LOCA EOP, uses TH and CET temperature less than superheated as the limit to ensure that the recovery strategy is effective in core heat removal. The EOP uses additional criteria which allow temperature to be as much as 10°F superheated as long as RVLMS indicates that the core is covered (Level 6 or higher). The EOP contains a final acceptance criteria in the event that temperature is superheated, but by not more than 10°F, and the RVLMS is inoperable. In this case, temperature is required to not be rising and less than 700°F.
Distracter A is not correct because RCS pressure should be lowered to minimize break flow and 2500 psia would challenge the rest of the RCS boundary.
Distracter B is incorrect because negative reactivity does not ensure all decay heat is removed from the core.
Distracter D is incorrect because Steam Generator level greater than 70 inches ensures RCS heat removal due to decay heat.
References EOP 2203.003, LOCA EOP, Safety Function Status Check for Core Heat Removal.
EOP TG 2203.003, LOCA SFSC Step 5.
A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ. 17, Given a LOCA event and a set of plant conditions, describe the steps taken to verify adequate core heat removal if single phase Natural Circulation can not be maintained.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0471 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/12/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
4.4 Type CE EPE/APE System EXCESS RCS LEAKAGE System A1 K/A: 2.2.2 RO Tier: 1 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.0 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.5 Description Equipment Control: Ability to manipulate the console as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.
Question # 27 Given the following conditions.
- The plant is at full power.
- RCS leakrate indicates a 5 gpm unidentified leakrate and steady.
- The Leak has been verified to be in containment and NOT in Letdown or CCW.
- No indications of Primary to Secondary leakage exist.
- The Quench Tank and RDT levels are stable.
Which of the following actions would be correct?
A. RCS leakage exceeds TS limits and a plant shutdown should be commenced using normal RCS boration at power.
B. RCS leakage does NOT exceed TS limits and plant should remain at power unless RCS leakage exceeds 10 gpm.
C. RCS leakage exceeds TS limits and a rapid shutdown should be commenced using RCS boration from the RWT.
D. RCS leakage does NOT exceed TS limits; however, plant power should be reduced to 60%
using normal RCS boration at power.
Answer:
A. RCS leakage exceeds TS limits and a plant shutdown should be commenced using normal RCS boration at power.
Notes:
Distracters B and D are incorrect because unidentified RCS leakage in excess 1 gpm exceeds TS limits.
Also distracter B remains at power and the 10 gpm TS limit is for Identified leakage.
Distracter C is incorrect because the procedure calls for a normal plant shutdown if leakage exceeds TS limits and is less than 10 gpm.
References Technical Specification 3.4.6.2, RCS Leakage AOP 2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage, Contingency Step 9.D A2LP-RO-EAOP, OBJ 11, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, applicable industry events, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.016, Excess RCS Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0280 Rev 01 Rev Date: 10/12/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NRC BANK Originator Coble 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.4 Type RCS Heat Removal System Reactor Coolant Pump System System 003 K/A: K5.05 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.8 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.0 Description Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCPS: The dependency of RCS flow rates upon the number of operating RCPs.
Question # 28 Given the following plant conditions:
- 70% Reactor Power.
- 2P32A Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) shaft shear occurs.
Which of the following would occur for the given conditions?
A. Low Pressurizer Pressure SIAS actuation due to loss of RCP discharge head.
B. High Pressurizer Pressure Reactor trip due to loss of normal spray flow.
C. RCS low flow alarms come in but no actuation's or trips occur at this power level.
D. Asymmetric Steam Generator Differential temperature will trip the Reactor.
Answer:
D. Asymmetric Steam Generator Differential temperature will trip the reactor.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because RCS pressure is maintained by the PZR water temperature and not RCP discharge head.
Distracter B is incorrect because normal spray flow can also be supplied by RCP 2P32B.
Distracter C is incorrect because the plant will trip on ASGT Delta Temp at this power level.
References 2105.001, CPC/CEAC Operations, Step 6.1.8.
STM 2-65-1, CPC System, Section 2.4.6.1 A2LP-RO-CPC, OBJ. 19, List the Aux trips associated with each CPC and the conditions they protect Historical Used on 2000 NRC Exam. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 10/12/2004. Revised stem and answer/distracters to determine operational implications of this event. BNC 10/12/2004
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0472 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/12/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator Coble 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.2 Type RCS INVENTORY System Chemical and Volume Control System System 004 K/A: K4.05 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Knowledge of CVCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Interrelationships and design basis, including fluid flow splits in branching network (e.g.
charging and seal injection flow).
Question # 29 Which of the following would cause the Controlled Bleedoff flow from the RCP seals to be diverted from the Volume Control Tank (VCT) to the Quench Tank?
A. High Containment Pressure B. High RCS pressure C. Low Steam Generator Pressure D. Low RWT level Answer:
A. High Containment Pressure Notes:
RCP Controlled Bleedoff valves to the VCT Isolate on a SIAS (Low RCS pressure or High Containment Pressure) or CIAS (High Containment Pressure). An installed relief in the return line is designed to lift and direct flow to the quench tank to prevent RCP seal damage.
Distracter B is incorrect because this is a reactor trip and no ESFAS actuation.
Distracter C is incorrect because this causes a MSIS actuation which does not close the RCP controlled bleedoff line isolations.
Distracter D is incorrect because this causes a RAS actuation which does not close the RCP controlled bleedoff line isolations.
References STM 2-04, CVCS, Section 2.1.21.3 and Figure on Page 64.
A2LP-RO-CVCS OBJ. 4.K Describe the following components of the CVCS. Include component functions, normal operations, abnormal operation, interlocks, and power supplies as applicable: Reactor Coolant pump Control Bleed-off Isolation Valves (2CV-4847-2 and 2CV-4846-1)
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0473 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/12/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.4 Type RCS HEAT REMOVAL System RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM System 005 K/A: k2.03 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 2.8 Description Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: RCS Pressure boundary motor operated valves.
Question # 30 The Shutdown Cooling Motor Operated Suction Isolation Valves, 2CV-5084-1 and 2CV-5086-2, are powered from:
A. Vital 480 Volt Load Centers 2B5 and 2B6.
B. Non Vital 480 Volt Load Centers 2B7 and 2B8.
C. Vital 480 Volt MCCs 2B51and 2B62.
D. Non Vital 480 Volt MCCs 2B31 and 2B41.
Answer:
C. Vital 480 Volt MCCs 2B51and 2B62.
Notes:
These valves are powered from 2B52 and 2B62 so the other distracters are incorrect.
Load centers are where the big 480 volt loads such as large 480 volt motors come from not MOVs.
2B31 and 41 are the Aux Building non vital MCC busses and these valves are safety related vital References STM 2-14, Shutdown Cooling System, Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 A2LP-RO-SDC OBJ. 2, Describe the following shutdown cooling system components as stated in STM 2-14 including purpose and design features of components, including automatic features and purpose of automatic features: SDC suction motor operated valves.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0474 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/12/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: C Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.2 Type RCS INVENTORY System EMERGENCY CORE COOLING System 006 K/A: K2.02 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.5 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 2.9 Description Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Valve Operators for accumulators.
Question # 31 Given the following conditions:
- The plant is being cooled down for a refueling outage.
- RCS pressure is being maintained at 670 psia with Auxiliary Spray in preparation for closing SIT MOVs.
- Safety Injection Tank Outlet Isolation MOV Breakers have been closed.
- Now, a complete Loss of Offsite Power occurs.
- All automatic actions occur as designed.
At this point the Safety Injection Tank motor operated outlet valves _________ be operated from the Control Room because ___________________________________________________________.
A. cannot; they are non vital AC powered MOVs and this power supply has been lost B. can; they are Vital DC powered MOVs supplied from the Vital Battery banks C. cannot; they receive emergency AC power from the Alternate AC Diesel which is secured D. can; they receive emergency AC power from the Emergency Diesels which are running Answer:
D. can; they receive emergency AC power from the Emergency Diesels which are running.
Notes:
The SIT outlet isolation are powered from AC busses 2B51 and 2B61 which are vital AC MCC buses that would tie to the Emergency Diesels automatically on a loss of offsite power.
Distracter A is incorrect because these valves do not come off of non vital buses.
Distracter B is incorrect because these MOVs are not DC powered.
Distracter C is incorrect because only automatic actions have occurred and the start of the alternate AC diesel requires manual action to supply the vital busses.
References NOP 2102.010, Plant Cooldown, Steps 7.39 and 7.42.
STM 2-05 ECCS, Section 2.1.2 A2LP-RO-ECCS OBJ. 6, Describe the function, construction, and operation of ECCS system components including tanks, pumps, and valves; pump capacities and ratings; tank capacities; and associated area cooling systems.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0475 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/12/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.2 Type RCS INVENTORY System EMERGENCY CORE COOLING System 006 K/A: 2.1.28 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.3 Description Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.
Question # 32 Given the following conditions:
- An unisolable Large Break LOCA has occurred.
- RCS pressure is 750 psia and lowering.
- RWT level is 5.8% on all indicators.
- All components are actuated and operate as designed.
Which of the following components is maintaining the RCS inventory safety function?
A. High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps through their open injection MOVs.
B. Safety Injection Tanks through their associated outlet isolations.
C. Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps through their open injection MOVs.
D. Containment Spray Pumps through their associated outlet isolations.
Answer:
A. High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps through their open injection MOVs.
Notes:
Distracter B is incorrect because RCS Pressure is above SIT pressure.
Distracter C is incorrect because LPSI pumps trip on RAS caused by Low RWT level <6%.
Distracter D is incorrect because Spray Pumps do not inject into the RCS.
References EOP 2202.003, LOCA EOP, Safety Function Status Check Step 3, RCS Inventory Control.
A2LP-RO-ECCS OBJ. 3, State the functions of the HPSI system.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/12/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0476 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/13/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.5 Type CONTAINMENT System Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank System 007 K/A: K5.02 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.4 Description Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR.
Question # 33 Given the following:
- A refueling outage has been competed.
- The PZR has been filled to 85% in preparation of forming a steam bubble.
- All PZR heaters have been energized and the temperature of the PZR is rising.
- The PZR is being vented to the Quench Tank to remove non-condensable gases.
- The Quench Tank is being vented and purged when it reaches 30 psig.
Which of the following Quench Tank and Pressurizer parameter changes would indicate that all of the non condensable gases have been removed from the Pressurizer?
A. Quench Tank pressure rising continuously with Quench Tank level stable.
B. Pressurizer pressure rising with PZR water temperature below saturation.
C. Quench Tank pressure rising slightly with Quench Tank level rising slightly.
D. Pressurizer pressure lowering with PZR water temperature at saturation.
Answer:
C. Quench Tank pressure rising slightly with Quench Tank level rising slightly.
Notes:
The PZR high point vents enter the QT through the PZR Safety Valve line and are discharged below the water line so when all non-condensable gases are vented from PZR, then QT pressure will rise only slightly. This is due to only steam being vented into QT that is condensed causing level and pressure to rise only slightly.
Distracter A is incorrect because this is what you would expect to see with non-condensable gases being vented to the Quench Tank.
Distracter B is incorrect because the only way PZR pressure cold rise below saturation temperature is with non-condensable gases present in the PZR.
Distracter D is incorrect because PZR pressure would remain constant at saturation temperature or rise as saturation temperature went up.
References NOP 2103.002, Filling and Venting of the RCS, Section 9 and note before step 9.19.
NOP 2103.007, QT and RDT Operations, Section 3.0 STM 2-03, RCS, Section 2.4 and figure on page 58.
A2LP-RO-RCS OBJ. 26, Describe the Control Room Instrumentation associated with the Quench Tank and what they would be used for.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/13/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0477 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/13/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 43.2 Section:
3.5 Type CONTAINMENT System Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank System 007 K/A: 2.2.22 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.1 Description Equipment Control: Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Question # 34 Given the following:
- The plant has just completed a refueling outage.
- The plant is in Mode 2 ready to raise power above the Point of Added Heat (POAH).
- The Control Room receives a CR stating that the pressure setpoint test results from one of the PZR Code Safety Valves is out of tolerance high and should be declared inoperable.
Which of the following is the correct action to take?
A. Restore the inoperable Code Safety to operable status within 15 minutes or return to Hot Standby and be in Hot Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
B. Maintain Reactor Power constant while the Code Safety setpoint is corrected under ambient (hot) conditions for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> then if not corrected go to Hot Standby in 15 minutes.
C. Restore the inoperable Code Safety to operable status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or return to Hot Standby and be in Hot Shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
D. Maintain Reactor Power constant while the Code Safety setpoint is corrected under ambient (hot) conditions for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> then if not corrected go to Hot Standby in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Answer:
A. Restore the inoperable Code Safety to operable status within 15 minutes or return to Hot Standby and be in Hot Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Notes:
Distracter B is incorrect because the plant is in Mode 2 and Action b. of TS 3.4.3 allows 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> to set the Code Safety setpoint under ambient (hot) condition only during entry into or operation in Mode 3.
Distracter C is incorrect because the time limit to restore to operable status is not 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and time to Hot Shutdown is not 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Distracter D is incorrect because of the same reasons in Distracter B but the times are different.
References T.S 3.4.3, Safety Valves Operating, Action a.
A2LP-RO-TS OBJ 4.b, From memory, discuss the LCOs and actions statements for all LCOs with action statements less than or equal to one hour.
A2LP-RO-RCS OBJ 16, Given a set of plant conditions and appropriate reference material, determine if any Code Safety Tech Spec LCOs are impacted and what actions, if any, are required to be taken.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/13/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0478 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/13/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: C Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.8 Type PLANT SERVICE System COMPONENT COOLING WATER System 008 K/A: K3.02 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.1 Description Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following:
CRDS.
Question # 35 Given the following conditions:
- An inadvertent CIAS has caused this Loss of CCW to Containment.
What effect, if any, will the above conditions have on the CEA Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) temperatures?
A. No effect on temperature since CCW does not supply cooling to the CRDMs.
B. Temperatures will rise due to the loss of Chilled Water cooling to the CRDMs.
C. No effect since Service Water will automatically supply cooling to the CRDMs.
D. Temperatures will rise due to the loss of CCW cooling supply to the CRDMs.
Answer:
B. Temperatures will rise due to the loss of Chilled Water cooling to the CRDMs.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because while it is true that CCW does not supply cooling to the CRDMs, the CIAS signal also isolates Chill Water to Containment which will cause CRDM temperatures to rise.
Distracter C is incorrect because Service Water can only supply the Containment Fan Coolers not CRDM coolers and will automatically supply them on a CCAS not an CIAS.
Distracter D is incorrect because CCW does not supply the CRDM coolers.
References AOP 2203.039, Inadvertent CIAS, NOTE before Step 7.
STM 2-02, CEDM System, Section 3.10 STM 2-45, Main Chill Water System, Section 2.4.5.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/13/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0479 Rev 1
Rev Date: 11/3/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.3 Type RCS PRESSURE System PZR PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM System 010 K/A: K6.04 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS:
PRT (Pressurizer Relief Tank).
Question # 36 Given the following:
- The plant was tripped from full power due to a small beak LOCA
- Quench Tank (QT) Vent Solenoid Valve From the Reactor Head and PZR 2SV-4669-1 on 2C336-1 has lost power.
- Charging Header to RCP Loop B Isolation 2CV-4827-2 on 2C09 will NOT Close.
- Pressurizer level is 15% and slowly dropping.
- RCS pressure is 1550 psia and slowly rising.
- RCS Margin to Saturation is reading 55°F and rising Which of the following actions would be the correct action to take lower RCS pressure to minimize break flow and restore Pressurizer level?
A. Align and throttle Main Spray Valves 2CV-4651 and 2CV-4652 as necessary.
B. Align and throttle Auxiliary Spray Valve from CVCS 2CV-4824-2 as necessary.
C. Align and cycle ECCS Vents Valves 2CV-4740-2 and 2CV-4698-1 to the QT.
D. Align and cycle PZR Vent Valves 2SV-4636-2 and 2SV-4670-2 to Atmosphere.
Answer:
D. Align and cycle PZR Vent Valves 2SV-4636-2 and 2SV-4670-2 to Atmosphere.
Notes:
The candidate must analyze this situation and realize several things. Main Spray is not available because RCPs are secured. Aux spray will not get to the PZR because the Charging Path to the RCS cannot be isolated thus flow will go to the path of least resistance. ECCS vents would compound the Pressure control problem and are not needed. The Quench Tank is not available as a vent path because Solenoid Vent Valve 2SV-4669-1 has no power. Thus the only available means of pressure control is venting the PZR to the Containment Atmosphere.
Distracter A is incorrect because the RCPs are secured.
Distracter B is incorrect because the flowpath of CVCS would go into the RCS instead of the PZR.
Distracter C is incorrect because this is too large of a vent path and would cause a massive drop in RCS Pressure.
References STM 2-03, RCS, Section 2.4 and Figure on page 51.
EOP-2202.003, LOCA EOP, Section 2 Step 22.C.
EOP 2202.010, EOP Standard Attachments, Attachment 27, PZR Spray Operation, Step 2 E.
A2LP-RO-RCS OBJ. 21, Describe the purpose and operation of the RCS High Point Vent System.
A2LP-RO-ELOCA, OBJ 6, Given a set of plant conditions during a LOCA, demonstrate understanding of the LOCA EOP and ability to use the LOCA EOP to control the plant Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/03/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0480 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/13/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.7 Type INSTRUMENTATION System REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM System 012 K/A: K3.02 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.3 Description Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following: T/G.
Question #37 Which of the following combinations of Trip Circuit Breakers (TCBs) coming OPEN would cause a Turbine trip?
A. TCBs 1, 2, 5, and 6.
B. TCBs 5, 6, 7, and 8.
C. TCBs 3, 4, 7, and 8.
D. TCBs 1, 3, 5, and 7.
Answer:
D. TCBs 1, 3, 5, and 7 Notes:
The Answer D is the only combination of TCBs that will cause a loss of voltage to both CRDM buses 2C70 and 2C71. The turbine has to see an undervoltage relay pick up on each CRDM bus to actuate a turbine trip. (UN-1 and UV-2 for 2C-70 and UV-3 and UV-4 for 2C71)
All the other distracters are incorrect due to power still available to the CRDM buses with this combination of breakers open.
References STM 2-02, CEDM Control System, Section 5.8 and figure on page 83 A2LP-RO-TURBC OBJ 26, Describe the signals that will cause a Main Turbine trip including trip name, instrumentation used, coincidences and setpoints if applicable.
A2LP-RO-CEDM OBJ 8, From memory draw a one-line diagram of the CEDMCS electrical Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/13/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0481 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/14/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
IH BANK 9228 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.7 Type INSTRUMENTATION System REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)
System 012 K/A: A4.02 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.4 Description Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Components for individual channels.
Question # 38 The following plant conditions exist:
- A plant heatup is in progress following a refueling outage.
- Hot leg temperature is 198 degrees F and rising.
Concerning the PPS Hi/Lo Steam Generator Level Operating Bypass, what action, if any, is required for the Operational Bypass to be removed ?
A. None, the operating bypass is automatically removed.
B. The operating bypass must be manually removed at 2C-03 (PPS Remote Control Module).
C. The operating bypass must be manually removed at 2C-23 (Plant Protective System Cabinet).
D. The operating bypass must be manually removed at 2C-80 (Remote Shutdown Panel).
Answer:
A. None, the operating bypass is automatically removed.
Notes:
This Operating Bypass is automatically removed when T-hot goes above 195 degrees F.
Distracters B, C, and D are incorrect because they are manual actions and manual action is NOT required to remove this Operating Bypass in "Bypass" at this temperature.
References STM 2-63, RPS, Section 6.2.2.3 A2LP-RO-RPS OBJ. 10, Describe the following Reactor Protection System Bypasses:
Hi/Lo Steam Generator Level Bypass Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/14/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0482 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/14/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: AP Source:
IH BANK 9385 Originator Coble 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.2 Type RCS INVENTORY System ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES System 013 K/A: K6.01 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.1 Description Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ESFAS:
Sensors and detectors.
Question # 39 The plant is at full power with the following conditions :
- Pressurizer Pressure Wide Range Pressure Transmitter 2PT-4624-3 has failed low.
- Bistable #6 for Low Pressurizer Pressure has been placed in Trip Channel Bypass on Channel C.
Which Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) function's Logic Matrixes are now operating in "2 out of 3" logic for the Low Pressurizer Pressure function?
A. Containment Cooling Actuation Signal (CCAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS).
B. Containment Cooling Actuation Signal (CCAS) and Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS).
C. Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS).
D. Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS).
Answer:
B. Containment Cooling Actuation Signal (CCAS) and Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS).
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because CIAS is only affected by Containment Pressure Transmitters which have not failed.
Distracter C is incorrect because CIAS is only affected by Containment Pressure Transmitters which have not failed.
Distracter D is incorrect because CSAS is only affected by Containment Pressure Transmitters which have not failed.
References STM 2-70, ESFAS, Section 3.1.1 A2LP-RO-ESFAS, OBJ. 7, Describe a typical flowpath from a measurement channel through the ESFAS system to component actuation.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/14/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0483 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/14/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
3.5 Type CONTAINMENT System CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM System 022 K/A: A2.03 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.0 Description Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Fan motor thermal overload/high-speed operation.
Question # 40 Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is at normal full power operation in the middle of a summer afternoon.
- Outside ambient air temperature is 98 degrees F.
- The CTMT BLDG CLG FANS C/D TROUBLE alarm comes in and locks in solid when acknowledged.
- All indicating lights on the 2VSF-1D are extinguished.
- The Inside AO reports that the thermal overloads on the 2VSF-1D Supply Breaker 2B63 J2 appear to be tripped and will not reset.
With no operator action, what would be the impact of this failure and what action, if any, is required to correct this condition?
A. Containment Cooling Fan 2VSF-1C automatically starts and Containment temperature and pressure would remain stable; Enter TS LCO 3.6.2.3 for Containment Fan Cooling Groups and Restore 2VSF-1D to operable status in 7 days or go to Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
B. Containment pressure and temperature would rise outside the TS Region of Acceptable Operation; Manually start Containment Cooling Fan 2VSF-1C and restore Containment temperature and pressure to within the TS Region of Acceptable Operation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
C. Containment Cooling Fan 2VSF-1A and 2VSF-1B are sufficient to maintain Containment temperature and pressure stable; Enter TS LCO 3.6.2.3 for Containment Fan Cooling Groups and Restore 2VSF-1D to operable status in 6 days or be in Hot Standby within the next 7 hrs.
D. Containment pressure and temperature would go below the TS Region of Acceptable Operation; Manually start Containment Cooling Fan 2VSF-1C and restore Containment temperature and pressure to within the TS Region of Acceptable Operation within 1hour.
Answer:
B. Containment pressure and temperature would rise outside the TS Region of Acceptable Operation; Manually start Containment Cooling Fan 2VSF-1C and restore Containment temperature and pressure to within the TS Region of Acceptable Operation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because the Containment Cooling Fans only get an auto start signal on a operation.
Containment Cooling Actuation signal; the rest of the distracter is true.
Distracter C is incorrect because two fan coolers cannot maintain Containment Internal temperatures and pressures at this high ambient temperature.
Distracter D is incorrect because the temperature and pressure inside Containment would definitely not References STM 2-09, Containment Cooling and Purge Systems, Sections 2.8, and 2.10.1.
TS 3.6.1.4, Containment Internal Pressure and Temperature with Figure 3.6-1
TS 3.6.2.3, Containment Cooling System.
A2LP-RO-CVENT OBJ. 3, Describe the construction and operation of the Containment Cooling Units and OBJ. 15, Describe the conditions required to satisfy the TS LCOs and TRM TROs associated with the Containment Ventilation System including the basis for each LCO/TRO.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/14/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0484 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/14/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.5 Type CONTAINMENT System CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM (CSS)
System 026 K/A: A3.01 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.3 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.5 Description Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CSS, including: Pump starts and correct MOV positioning.
Question # 41 Given the following:
- A Large Break LOCA is in Progress.
- Containment Pressure is 39 psig and rising.
- RWT level is 45% and dropping.
- All actuation's occur as designed.
The Containment Spray Pumps should be running and providing at least _________ gpm flow to each header and if the RWT drops to less than 6% level, the Containment Spray Pump should provide at least
________ gpm flow to each header.
A. 1875; 1875 B. 1875; 2000 C. 2000; 2000 D. 2000; 1875 Answer:
B. 1875; 2000 Notes:
On a Recirc Actuation Signal (RAS at less than 6% in the RWT), the minimum flow recirc isolation for both Spray pumps close to stop flow back to the RWT and this will provide additional flow to the Containment.
Distracter A is incorrect because flow will be higher after the RAS.
Distracter C is incorrect because Spray flow is not required to be greater than 2000 gpm before the RAS.
Distracter D is incorrect because Spray flow is not required to be greater than 2000 gpm before the RAS and flow will be higher after the RAS.
References STM 2-08, Containment Spray System, Section 1.3.
EOP 2203.003, LOCA EOP, Entry Section Step 17. E and Section 3 Step 20. B.
A2LP-RO-SPRAY OBJ. 6, Describe the operation of the CSS during the following modes of operation:
Injection Mode (CSAS) and Recirculation Mode (RAS)
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/14/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0220 Rev 000 Rev Date: 2/6/2000 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: C Source:
NRC BANK Originator Hatman 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.4 Type RCS Heat Removal System Main and Reheat Steam System System 039 K/A: K5.08 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.6 Description Knowledge of the operational implications and effects of steam removal on reactivity as it applies to the Main and Reheat Steam System.
Question # 42 The plant is operating at 100% when the CBOR notices Tcold dropping and Reactor Power rising. Which of the following would give these indications?
A. Atmospheric Dump Valve 2CV-1001 failed open.
B. EH supply to the Main Turbine #4 control valve is blocked.
C. Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P-7A tripped on overspeed.
D. Atmospheric Dump Valve 2CV-0305 failed open.
Answer:
D. Atmospheric Dump Valve 2CV-0305 failed open.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because 2CV-1001 has a normally closed MOV isolation so a failure of this valve would have no consequences.
Distracter B is incorrect because Electro Hydraulic (EH) fluid loss to #4 Control Valve would cause this valve to close lowering steam flow and power to drop.
Distracter C is incorrect because 2P7A tripping would lower steam flow from the SG which would cause Tc to rise References STM 2-15, Steam Generators & Main Steam System, Section 3.2.8 and figure on page 59 STM 2-23, SDBCS, Section 4.0 ASLP-RO-RXT14 OBJ. 21, Explain the relationship between steam flow and reactor power given specific conditions.
Historical Used on 2000 NRC Exam. This question was not used on the previous two NRC Exams. BNC
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0485 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/1/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.2 to 41.9 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.4 Type RCS HEAT REMOVAL System MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM System 059 K/A: K1.07 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MFW System and the following systems: ICS (FWCS).
Question # 43 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power.
- The A Main Feed Water Master Controller is in manual due to Engineering Work Station (EWS) maintenance on the steam flow inputs to the A Steam Generator.
- The A Steam Generator Main and Bypass FW Regulating Valve Controllers are in Automatic.
- A transient causes A Steam Generator level to rise to 83%.
Based on these conditions, what would be status of the A Steam Generator Main and Bypass Feedwater Regulating Valves?
A. The Main and Bypass Regulating Valves would remain at the same position as before the transient.
B. The Main Regulating Valve would Close and the Bypass Regulating Valve would throttle Open.
C. The Main Regulating Valve would Close and the Bypass Regulating Valve would remain Closed.
D. The Main and Bypass Regulating Valves would throttle themselves as necessary to restore SG level.
Answer:
C. The Main Regulating Valve would Close and the Bypass Regulating Valve would remain Closed.
Notes:
A High Level Override signal is sent directly to the Valve controllers downstream of the master controller at a SG level of 82% to close both the Main and Bypass Feedwater Regulating Valves when their individual controller is in Automatic. The Bypass valve would have been closed prior to the transient should remain this way based on high level override and no input from the Master Controller.
Distracter A, B and D are incorrect because both Valves would close.
References STM 2-69, FWCS, Section 3.4 and Figure on Page 49.
A2LP-RO-FWCS OBJ. 11, Explain Reactor Trip Override.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/01/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0487 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/26/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.4 Type RCS HEAT REMOVAL System AUXILIARY/EMERGENCY System 061 K/A: K3.01 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.4 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.6 Description Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the AFW System will have on the following: RCS.
Question # 44 Consider the following:
- The plant is at full power with severe weather in the area.
- The plant experienced a complete loss of Green Vital 125 VDC.
- Now a complete loss of offsite power occurs causing a plant trip.
- Steam Generator (SG) levels drop to 21% right after the trip.
- All actuation's occur as designed.
Which of the following would be the correct feedwater alignment to remove heat from the RCS?
A. EFW Pump 2P-7A would automatically start and feed only the 'A' SG.
B. EFW Pump 2P-7B would automatically start and feed only the 'B' SG.
C. EFW Pump 2P-7A would automatically start and feed both SG's.
D. EFW Pump 2P-7B would automatically start and feed both SG's.
Answer:
D. EFW Pump 2P-7B would automatically start and feed both SG's Notes:
The 2P-7A Steam Driven EFW pump is designed to operate with a complete loss of AC but its supply valve is powered from Green Vital DC along with its closed discharge isolation valves. The Red AC driven 2P-7B is designed to operate with a loss of Green DC due to its discharge valves being Red AC powered. In this case the 2P-7B would auto start and feed both Steam Generators.
Distracter A and C are incorrect because 2P-7A could not start without Green DC Power.
Distracter B is incorrect because the 2P-7B would feed both Steam Generators.
References EFW STM 2-19-2, Sections 2.1.1.3 and 2.3.3.2; AND Figure on page 38.
A2LP-RO-EFW OBJ. 10, Describe the operation of the EFW system during a:
loss of Green DC event Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/26/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0488 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/26/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.6 Type ELECTRICAL System AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION System 062 K/A: K4.05 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Knowledge of A.C. Distribution System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Paralleling of ac sources.
Question # 45 Which of the following design feature on the Emergency Diesel Generators allows them to be paralleled with offsite AC sources during normal surveillances?
A. The electrical speed governor is operated in the Isochronous speed control mode.
B. The mechanical speed governor is operated in the Isochronous speed control mode.
C. The electrical speed governor is operated in the Droop speed control mode.
D. The mechanical speed governor is operated in the Droop speed control mode.
Answer:
C. The electrical speed governor is operated in the Droop speed control mode.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because the electrical governor only operates in the Isochronous mode when there is no offsite power or a SIAS has occurred.
Distracters B is incorrect because the mechanical governor is the backup governor and does not control the EDG speed when paralleled to offsite.
Distracter D is incorrect because the mechanical governor droop speed control is set to zero (0) so there is always a constant isochronous speed on the EDG when the backup Mechanical governor take over should the electrical governor fail.
References STM 2-31, EDGs, Section 2.4.7.
A2LP-RO-EDG OBJ. 5, Explain the operation of the engine governor.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/26/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0489 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/27/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: C Source: IH BANK 11992 MOD Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.6 Type ELECTRICAL System DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION System 063 K/A: A1.01 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.5 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.3 Description Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the D.C. Electrical System controls including: Battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate.
Question # 46 Consider the following.
- Unit 2 is at full power.
- 2DG1 is out of service for maintenance.
- The Main Turbine trips.
- #3 SU Transformer locks out.
- #2 SU Transformer voltage regulator locks out.
- 2DG2 did not start and has no more starting air.
- The AAC Diesel will not start.
- These conditions are expected to last more than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Which of the following combination of loads would cause the greatest load reduction on the Red Battery (2D11)?
A. Securing the Plant Monitoring Computer and 2RS4 B. Securing the Plant Monitoring Computer and 2RS3 C. Securing the SPDS Inverter 2Y26 and 2RS4 D. Securing the SPDS Inverter 2Y26 and 2RS3 Answer:
B. Securing the Plant Monitoring Computer and 2RS3 Notes:
The plant computer and vital instrument bus 2RS3 both are powered from 2D11 and the plant computer is the largest load on the DC system.
Distracter A is incorrect because 2RS4 is Green Powered Inverter so the load reduction would be less than the Answer B.
Distracter C is incorrect because 2Y26 is powered from the Black Battery, 2D13 and 2RS4 is Green Powered.
Distracter D is incorrect because 2Y26 is powered from the Black Battery so the load reduction would be less than the Answer A.
References 125 VDC STM 2-32-5, Figure on page 22 EOP 2202.008, Station Blackout, Section 1 Step 15 A and B.
EOP 2202.010, Standard Attachment 25, Step 3.
EOP 2202.008, Station Blackout, Section 1 Step 16 C A2LP-RO-ESBO OBJ. 11, Explain the mitigating actions required by the Station Blackout EOP when a vital 4160V bus can not be energized from a diesel generator: Load Shedding of Vital Station Battery.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/27/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0490 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/27/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION System 063 K/A: 2.4.29 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.0 Description Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of the emergency plan.
Question # 47 Given the following:
(Reference Provided)
- A Station Blackout condition has occurred from full power.
In accordance with the Emergency Plan, this condition would place us in a(n) _________ Emergency Action Level (EAL) and if this condition lasted for greater than 15, minutes, a(n) _________ Emergency Action Level (EAL) should be declared.
A. NUE; ALERT B. ALERT; SAE C. NUE; SAE D. SAE; GE Answer:
B. ALERT; SAE Notes:
Distracter A and C are incorrect because an ALERT is the minimum classification for a station blackout.
Distracter D is incorrect because a GE is never declared on a station blackout.
The students should have a copy of 1903.010, Attachment 4 as a reference. They are not required to memorize EAL entry conditions.
References OP 1903.010 Attachment 4 EAL 4.2 and 4.4.
ASLP-RO-EPLAN OBJ. 3, Given plant conditions, determine if any criteria for which an Emergency Action Level may apply are met.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/27/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0214 Rev 000 Rev Date: 2/4/20004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NRC BANK Originator Hatman 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.6 Type ELECTRICAL System Emergency Diesel Generator System System 064 K/A: K4.02 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 4.2 Description Knowledge of EDG system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide trips for EDG while operating (normal or emergency).
Question # 48 Plant conditions are as follows:
- A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred.
- Pressurizer pressure is 1430 psia.
- #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (#1EDG) has just tripped.
Which of the following trips caused the Loss of #1EDG?
A. High crankcase pressure.
B. High jacket water cooling temperature.
C. Loss of field excitation.
D. Generator phase differential current.
Answer:
D. Generator phase differential current.
Notes:
SIAS actuates at 1650 psia.
Distracter C is incorrect because this trip is bypassed by an SIAS signal.
Distracter A and B are incorrect because these conditions are alarm functions only.
References EDG STM 2-31, Section 3.2 and 4.0 A2LP-RO-EDG OBJ. 8, Explain the operation of the Generator Lockout.
Historical Used on 2000 NRC Exam. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 10/27/2004
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0491 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/27/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.6 Type ELECTRICAL System EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR System 064 K/A: A4.07 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.4 Description Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Transfer ED/G (with load) to grid.
Question # 49 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power
- A monthly surveillance on Emergency Diesel Generator 2DG1 is in progress.
- Electrical load is being transferred back to the grid (unloaded) in preparation for securing 2DG1.
The 2DG1 Output Breaker, 2A-308) should be opened when electrical load has dropped to _______ to prevent a _________________ trip:
A. 50 kW; Anti-Motoring B. 100 kW; Loss of Field C. 50 kW; Loss of Field D. 100 kW; Anti-Motoring Answer:
D. 100 kW; Anti-Motoring Notes:
The Caution in Operating Procedure States: "EDG may trip due to anti-motoring if opening 2A-308 is delayed at 100 kW load" and this trip has been experienced on this unit.
Distracters A is incorrect because it is less than the 100kW guidance in the procedure.
Distracter B is incorrect because this condition will not cause a loss of field trip.
Distracter D is incorrect because it is less than the procedure guidance and the EDG will not trip on Loss of Field under these conditions.
References NOP 2104.036, EDG Operations, Step 13.4.2 and Caution above this step.
A2LP-RO-EDG OBJ. 9, Explain the Limits and Precautions associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/27/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0277 Rev 000 Rev Date: 2/7/2000 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: C Source:
NRC BANK Originator Hatman 10CFR55_41: 41.2 to 41.9 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.7 Type INSTRUMENTATION System Process Radiation Monitoring System System 073 K/A: A1.01 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.5 Description Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: Radiation levels.
Question # 50 Given the following plant conditions:
- Plant is returning to full power after a transient.
- LETDOWN RADIATION HI/LO annunciator (2K12-A1) alarm comes in.
- Letdown Gross Activity Monitor (2RITS-4806-A) reads 2E+5 CPM and rising.
- Letdown I-131 Activity Monitor (2RITS-4806-B) reads 1E+5 CPM and rising.
Which of the following events occurred for the given indications?
A. Failed Fuel.
B. RCS chemical shock.
C. RCS crud burst.
D. Letdown Demineralizer exhausted.
Answer:
A. Failed Fuel.
Notes:
Rising activity on both the Gross and Iodine 131 monitors indicate Fuel Failure.
Distracters B and C are incorrect because only Gross activity would rise in these cases.
Distracter D is incorrect because this case would cause a change in RCS chemistry but not activity.
References STM 2-62, Radiation Monitoring System, Section 2.2.1.
2203.020, RCS High Activity AOP, Entry Conditions and Step 6.
A2LP-RO-RMON OBJ. 11, Describe the use of the Radiation Monitoring System in the Abnormal Operating Procedures.
Historical Used on 2000 NRC Exam. This question was not used on the previous two NRC Exams. BNC
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0492 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/28/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator BLANCHARD 10CFR55_41: 41.2 to 41.9 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.4 Type RCS HEAT REMOVAL System SERVICE WATER SYSTEM System 074 K/A: K1.15 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.5 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 2.6 Description Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems: FPS (Fire Protection System).
Question # 51 Given the following plant conditions:
- ACW aligned to loop 2 Service Water (SW).
- 2P4A and 2P4C SW pumps are running.
- 2P4B SW pump is aligned to Green train.
The following valid alarms occur simultaneously (no other alarms are present in the control room):
- Fire Alarm (Smoke and Flame in Unit 2 intake structure)
- Fire Water Flow
- Fire System Trouble
- 2P4C Breaker Trip
- Low SW Loop 1 Pressure (52psig)
- Low SW Loop 2 Pressure (48 psig)
The Outside AO reports that the fire was due to 2P4C SW pump motor connection on the pump motor and the fire is out.
Which of the following actions should be taken?
A. Open all four SW loop cross-tie valves.
B. Close the SW to CCW isolation valve from loop 1.
C. Manually start 2P4B SW pump from the control room.
D. Secure 2P4A SW pump due to fire water actuation in the Intake Structure.
Answer:
C. Manually start 2P4B SW pump from the control room.
Notes:
The candidate should understand the SW System lineup and the fire protection boundaries between the SW pumps to understand that all that is need to restore the cooling to safety related components is to start the swing SW pump since it is already aligned.
Distracter A is incorrect because this action would not restore SW Pressure.
Distracter B is a logical action to take to restore pressure to Loop 1 pressure but would not help Loop 2 pressure and is not the action called for in the AOP on Loss of a SW pump.
Distracter D is incorrect because this would result in a complete loss of SW.
References AOP 2203.022, Loss of SW AOP, Step 9.
AOP 2203.012E, Annunciator Corrective Action B-5, 2P4C Breaker Trip.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ.17, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.022, Loss Of Service Water.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/28/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0493 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/28/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: C Source:
NEW Originator Mayfield 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.8 Type PLANT SERVICE System INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM System 078 K/A: A3.01 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Ability to monitor automatic operation of the IAS, including: Air pressure.
Question # 52 An instrument air line break in Unit 2 has resulted in the following:
- Unit 2 instrument air pressure 50 psig
- Unit 1 instrument air pressure 58 psig
- 2C-27B, the LAG air compressor, is running loaded
- The Loss of IA AOP 2203.021 has been implemented Within 20 minutes of receiving the Instrument Air Low Pressure alarm, the line break has been isolated and instrument air pressure is now 87 psig and rising. (The only Operator Actions taken are those in the Loss of IA AOP)
What is the instrument air system status at the current time?
A. Unit 1 and 2 Instrument air systems are cross connected Breathing Air is aligned to Unit 2 2C-27A is running loaded 2C-27B is running loaded.
B. Unit 1 and 2 Instrument air systems are isolated from each other 2C-27A is running loaded 2C-27B is running loaded.
C. Unit 1 and 2 Instrument air systems are cross connected 2C-27A is running loaded 2C-27B is running unloaded.
D. Unit 1 and 2 Instrument air systems are isolated from each other Breathing Air is aligned to Unit 2 2C-27A is running loaded 2C-27B is running unloaded.
Answer:
B. Unit 1 and 2 Instrument air systems are isolated from each other 2C-27A is running loaded 2C-27B is running loaded.
Notes:
A is incorrect because the initial conditions require splitting out the Unit 1 and Unit 2 IA systems and the breathing air compressor are normally secured and require 30 to 40 minutes start up time.
C is incorrect because the initial conditions require splitting out the Unit 1 and Unit 2 IA systems and the LAG compressor will not unload until 105 psig.
D is incorrect because the breathing air compressor are normally secured and require 30 to 40 minutes start up time and Unit 2 IA systems and the LAG compressor will not unload until 105 psig..
References AOP 2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air, Step 4 and Note above Step 15.B STM 2-48, Instrument Air, Section 2.7.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 16, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.021, Loss Of Instrument Air.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/28/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0494 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/28/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source: IH BANK 4558 MOD Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.8 Type PLANT SERVICE System INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM System 078 K/A: A4.01 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.1 Description Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Pressure gages Question # 53 During a Loss of Instrument Air on Unit 2, the abnormal operating procedure requires verifying cross connect isolation valves with Unit 1 Instrument Air systems Open if Unit 2 Instrument Air header pressure lowers to _____ psig, and requires tripping of the Unit 2 Reactor if Instrument Air header pressure drops to _____ psig.
A. 80, 35 B. 60, 35 C. 80, 60 D. 60, 50 Answer:
A. 80, 35 Notes:
The Loss of IA AOP is entered at IA Header pressure 80 psig and lowering. Step 2 of the AOP verifies the cross connect valves open. Step 5 provides Reactor Trip criteria if pressure goes below 35 psig Distracter B, C, and D are incorrect because the 60 psig is criteria to close the cross tie valves.
References AOP 2203.021, Loss of IA AOP, Entry Condition 1 and Steps 2 and 5.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 16, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.021, Loss Of Instrument Air.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/28/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0495 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/29/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 41.3 Section:
3.5 Type CONTAINMENT System CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS System 103 K/A: A2.05 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.9 Description Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Containment System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Emergency Containment Entry.
Question # 54 Given the following:
- Annunciator 2K11-A9 "Fire Alarm" has come in.
- On 2C343-1 Detector 1-4-4-T, the South Containment Cable Spreading Areas is in Alarm
- The Shift Manager has determined that an immediate emergency Containment entry is required to access the potential fire in Containment.
Entry into the Containment Building would be considered an entry into a ________________________,
and the access key to the Personnel hatch would be obtained directly from the A. Locked High Radiation Area; Shift Manager B. Locked High Contamination Area; Plant Manager or designee C. Locked High Radiation Area; Plant Manager or designee D. Locked High Contamination Area; Shift Manager Answer:
A. Locked High Radiation Area; Shift Manager Notes:
The Containment is a Locked High Radiation Area so distracters B and D are incorrect. Also although the Plant Manager or designee has to approve the entry, the shift manager controls the issue of the emergency Containment access key in a breakable glass box in the Shift Manager's Office so this makes distracters B and C incorrect.
References OP 1601.300, Job Coverage, Steps 5.1.2, 5.4.1.B, 5.4.3, 1015.005, Operations Key Control, Step 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.B ASLP-ROP-RADP OBJ. 7, Define the posting/control and entry requirements for radiological hazard areas: Radiation Areas (RA, HRA, LHRA, VHRA)
ASLP-RO-OPSPR OBJ, 4.b.1, For procedure 1015.001, Conduct of Operations:
With respect to Shift Organization and Responsibilities: Describe the specific responsibilities and authorities of the Shift Manager Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/29/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0496 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/29/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
3.5 Type CONTAINMENT System CONTAINMENT SYSTEM System 103 K/A: A2.04 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
1 SRO Imp: 3.6 Description Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Containment System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm).
Question # 55 The following plant conditions exist.
- Mode 6 with refueling shuffle complete.
- The Containment Purge system is in service.
- The running SDC Pump becomes air bound and flow goes to 200 gpm.
- All attempts to restore flow have failed.
- The Lower Mode Functional Recovery procedure is entered.
Which of the following actions should be performed for the given conditions?
A. Sound the Plant Evacuation alarm on 2C14, evacuate the Site, set Containment closure within 30 minutes and start all Containment cooling fans.
B. Sound the Containment Evacuation alarm on 2C22, evacuate the Containment, set Containment closure within 30 minutes and secure the Containment Purge system.
C. Sound the Plant Evacuation alarm on 2C14, evacuate the Site, set Containment closure within 60 minutes and secure the Containment Purge system.
D. Sound the Containment Evacuation alarm on 2C22, evacuate the Containment, set Containment closure within 60 minutes and start all Containment Cooling fans.
Answer:
B. Sound the Containment Evacuation alarm on 2C22, evacuate the Containment, set Containment closure within 30 minutes and secure the Containment Purge system.
Notes:
The Evacuation Alarm Control switch has different positions for plant and containment evacuation located on 2C22.
Distracter A is incorrect because the wrong evacuation alarm is activated on the wrong panel and the Purge System should be secured.
Distracter C is incorrect because the wrong evacuation alarm is activated on the wrong panel and containment closure should be set in 30 minutes.
Distracter D is incorrect because containment closure should be set in 30 minutes and the Purge System should be secured.
References AOP 2203.029, Loss of SDC, Contingency Step 8.C.
EOP 2202.011, Lower Mode Functional Recovery, Step 3.A EOP 2202.010, EOP Standard Attachment 32, Steps 2.A and Step 5. B, E, and F.
OP 1015.008, Unit 2 SDC Control, Attachment F, Step 1.0 and the note before step 4.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 22, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, applicable industry events, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.029, Loss Of Shutdown Cooling.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/29/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0497 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/29/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source: IH BANK 3324 MOD Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.2 Type RCS INVENTORY System REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM System 002 K/A: K4.03 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Knowledge of RCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Venting the RCS.
Question # 56 In Mode 3, which of the following RCS vent paths provide the HIGHEST volumetric flow rate capability?
A. Pressurizer Hi Point Vent valves to the atmosphere.
B. Reactor Vessel Hi Point Vent valves to the Quench Tank.
C. Emergency Core Cooling Vent valves to the Quench Tank.
D. LTOP relief valves to the Quench Tank and atmosphere.
Answer:
C. Emergency Core Cooling Vent valves to the Quench Tank.
Notes:
Distracter A and B are incorrect because both Hi point vents go through an orifice to limit inventory loss and they are 1 inch lines.
Distracter D is incorrect because the LTOP relief's are isolated in Mode 3.
References STM 2-03, RCS, Sections 2.2.3.1, 2.2.4, 2.4, and Figure on page 51.
A2LP-RO-RCS OBJECTIVES 18, 20 & 21, Describe the purpose of the LTOP System to include when the system is used. Describe the purpose of the ECCS Vent System and when the system would be used.
Describe the purpose and operation of the RCS High Point Vent System.)
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/29/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0498 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/29/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.2 Type RCS INVENTORY System PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL System 011 K/A: K2.02 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: PZR Heaters.
Question # 57 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power when a loss of offsite power causes a plant trip
- Electrical Bus 2A1 has a LOCKOUT alarm in.
- Both EDGs start and tie onto their respective ESF buses Which of the following pressurizer heater banks would be available for RCS pressure control?
A. Both Proportional heater banks.
B. All Backup heater banks.
C. Both Backup heater banks #3 and #4.
D. All Proportional and Backup heater banks.
Answer:
A. Both Proportional heater banks Notes:
Distracter B is incorrect because BU heaters banks are 480 non vital powered and there is no power to their bus.
Distracter C is incorrect because all BU heater banks are non vital powered.
References STM 2-03, RCS, Section 2.2.2 A2LP-RO-RCS OBJ 10.c, Describe the following, concerning the RCS pressurizer: Heaters Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/29/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0499 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/29/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: C Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.2 to 41.9 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.7 Type INSTRUMENTATION System NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION System 015 K/A: K1.04 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.5 Description Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems: ESF (Engineered safety Feature).
Question # 58 Given the following:
- The plant has tripped from full power.
- A small break LOCA is in progress.
- Containment Pressure is 27 psig and rising.
- RCS Pressure is 1400 psia and steady.
- All action in SPTAs have been taken.
Which of the following Excore Startup Channel indications would indicate that RCS inventory makeup from the ESF Safety Injection system is NOT adequate?
A. Count rate will start rising rapidly when the core is completely uncovered.
B. Count rate will drop rapidly as if a bubble is formed in the Reactor Vessel head.
C. Count rate will start rising slowly as soon as the core starts to uncover.
D. Count rate will remain stable or lower even with inadequate RCS inventory.
Answer:
C. Count rate will start rising slowly as soon as the core starts to uncover.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because the count rate should have been going up the whole time the core water level was dropping due to less shielding in the vessel downcomer.
Distracter B is incorrect because the excores are well below the head area and will not be affected by a bubble there.
Distracter D is incorrect because of the greater leakage of neutrons from the core as the inventory drops will cause the count rate to rise.
References STM 2-67-1 Excore Nuclear Instrumentation, Section 4.4 and figure on page 37.
ASLP-RO-MCD04 OBJ. 6, Describe the normal post-trip SRM trace and the expected deviations in degraded core conditions.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/29/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0500 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/29/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.7 Type INSTRUMENTATION System IN CORE TEMPERATURE System 017 K/A: K6.01 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.0 Description Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ITM System components: Sensors and detectors.
Question # 59 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power
- The Data Acquisition System (DAS) 2C388-1 for Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) Channel 1 has failed.
Which of the following describes the effect (if any) on the Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) indications on the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)?
A. Half the CET indications on SPDS will indicate BAD but CET indication is still operable since there are more than 2 CET indications coming from each core quadrant.
B. All the CET indications on SPDS will indicate BAD and the CET System is inoperable.
C. Half the CET indications on SPDS will be GOOD but CET indication is NOT operable since the CETs in each core quadrant require independent power sources.
D. All CET indication will still be indicating GOOD and the CET System is still operable.
Answer:
C. Half the CET indications on SPDS will be GOOD but CET indication is NOT operable since the CETs in each core quadrant require independent power sources.
Notes:
The CET indication is routed through the RVLMS DAS before it goes to SPDS, half go though channel 1 and half go through channel 2.
Distracter A is incorrect because the CETs require independent power sources through RVLMS to be operable.
Distracter B and D are incorrect because half the CETs will be BAD and Half will be GOOD.
References STM 2-67-2, Incore Flux Monitoring System, Section 2.1 STM 2-75, RVLMS, Section 2.2, 2.2.1, AND Table on page 17.
TS 3.3.3.6 Table 3.3-10 Item 13 and the Bases for TS 3.3.3.6.
OPS-B18 Log, Post Accident Channel Checks, Step 6 on Page 3 of 4.
A2LP-RO-ICI OBJ. 2, Discuss the detector outputs of the incore instrument strings which comprise the Incore Flux Monitoring System as described in STM-2-67-2.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/29/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0204 Rev 000 Rev Date: 2/4/2000 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NRC BANK Originator Hatman 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System Hydrogen Recombiner & Purge Control System 028 K/A: 2.4.20 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 4.0 Description Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions and notes.
Question # 60 The following plant conditions exist:
- A large break LOCA has occurred on Unit 2.
- EOP 2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident is being implemented.
- Hydrogen Analyzers initially indicate 0.7%.
- Hydrogen concentration has risen to 2.2% since the initial reading.
- No equipment is out of service.
Which of the following actions are required to satisfy the Containment Combustible Gas Control safety function?
A. Ensure both Hydrogen Recombiners are in service.
B. Ensure the Hydrogen Purge System in service.
C. Ensure both Hydrogen Recombiners and Hydrogen Purge System in service.
D. Ensure both Penetration Ventilation Exhaust fans are in service.
Answer:
A. Ensure both Hydrogen Recombiners in service.
Notes:
The answer is a step in the EOP to ensure compliance with the operating procedure limit and precaution.
Distracters B and C are incorrect because the hydrogen purge system has been abandoned in place.
Distracter D is incorrect because the penetration ventilation is designed to remove radioactivity and not hydrogen.
References OP 2104.044, Containment Hydrogen Control Operations, Limit and Precaution 5.2.
OP 2202.003, LOCA EOP, Section 1, Step 20 and Safety Function Status Check #9.A.2 TG 2202.003, LOCA Technical Guidelines, Section 1, Step 20.
A2LP-RO-CONH2 OBJ.15, From memory, describe the limitations and precautions associated with operation of the hydrogen recombiner system, including the reason for each.
Historical Used on 2000 NRC Exam. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 11/01/2004
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0501 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/1/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
3.8 Type PLANT SERVICE System FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT System 034 K/A: A2.03 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 4.0 Description Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fuel Handling System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Mispositioned fuel element.
Question # 61 Given the following:
(Reference Provided)
- The plant is in Mode 6 with core alterations in progress.
- Reactor Engineering reports to the Control Room that a fuel assembly has been placed in an incorrect location in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) outside of T.S. 3.9.12.b Figure 3.9.2, Allowable Pattern Interfaces.
Which of the following actions is required to be taken?
A. Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in the SFP immediately. Move the assembly to its correct location before resumption of any other fuel movement.
B. Commence borating the SFP and have Chemistry take SFP samples. Secure Boration when SFP boron concentration has been verified greater than 2001 ppm.
C. Immediately pull the inserted fuel assembly out of its storage location. Place the fuel assembly into the Fuel Handling Upender and return the assembly to Containment.
D. Suspend all core alterations, place all fuel assemblies in a safe location. Have the Refueling Team standown and debrief this error prior to any more fuel movement.
Answer:
A. Suspend all actions involving the movement of fuel in the SFP immediately. Move the assembly to its correct location before resumption of any other fuel movement.
Notes:
Distracter B is incorrect because this action will only be done if boron was less than 2001 ppm and it must be verified greater than 2500 ppm prior to fuel movement.
Distracter C is incorrect because this action is not directed by any procedure and is not conservative.
Distracter D is incorrect because this is not a required action but could be directed by plant management but not until the fuel assembly is placed in the correct location.
Need to Provide Figure 3.9.2 of TS 3.9.12.b as a reference.
References Technical Specification 3.9.12.b, first action.
A2LP-RO-FH OBJ. 5.0, Given a set of plant conditions associated with fuel handling, evaluate Technical Specification and Technical Requirement entry conditions and describe any LCO actions that may be required.
A2LP-RO-TS OBJ. 4.b, From memory, discuss the LCOs and actions statements for all LCOs with action statements less than or equal to one hour.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/01/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0135 Rev 000 Rev Date: 6/17/1998 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source: NRC BANK MOD Originator Coble 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.4 Type Plant Systems System Steam Dump System and Turbine Bypass System 041 K/A: K3.04 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.4 Description Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SDS will have on the following:
Reactor Power.
Question # 62 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power.
- A Condenser tube leak occurs in the outer pass waterbox.
- Plant power is reduced to 90% to isolate the outer pass waterbox.
- Steam Dump and Bypass Control System (SDBCS) Valves 2CV-303 and 2CV-306 are defeated from opening by placing their permissive switches in OFF.
- All other SDBCS components are in their normal positions.
Based on the above conditions and with no operator action, what is the remaining total steam flow capacity of the Steam Dump and Bypass Control System should the Main Turbine trip?
A. ~ 25%
B. ~ 30%
C. ~ 35%
D. ~ 55%
Answer:
C. ~ 35%
Notes:
There are 4 SDBCS ADV at 11.5% capacity each and three steam dumps to the condenser, two at 11.5%
each and one at 5%. Two of the ADVs upstream of the MSIVs are normally isolated by an electric MOV because they fail open on a loss of IA and have to be placed in service manually.
2CV-303 is the 5% Steam dump and 2CV-306 has a capacity of 11.5%. With these conditions, there are two ADVs and one steam dump left to automatically control steam flow and Reactor Power should the turbine trip. All three have a capacity of 11.5% so the total capacity left is approximately 35%
Distracter A is incorrect but would be the answer if the trainee thought there were only two ADVs left for steam flow control and all Steam dumps were defeated.
Distracter B is incorrect but would be the answer if the trainee incorrectly calculated that 2CV-303 had a capacity of 11.5% instead of 5%.
Distracter D is incorrect but would be the answer if the trainee did not remember the upstream ADVs were manually actuated only and added the capacity of these valves.
References 2105.008, SDBCS Operations, Section 3.0 STM 2.23, SDBCS Section 1.2 OP 2104.008, CW System Operations, Section 16 Step 16.3.
A2LP-RO-CWS OBJ. 6, Describe the major evolutions performed on the CWS A2LP-RO-SDBCS OBJ. 20, Describe the normal SDBCS system line-up during power operation, heatups, and cooldowns.
Historical Used on 1998 NRC Exam. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 11/01/2004
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0502 Rev 0
Rev Date: 10/14/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.4 Type RCS HEAT REMOVAL System MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR System 045 K/A: A1.06 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.7 Description Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MT/G System controls including: Expected response of secondary plant parameters following T/G trip.
Question # 63 Consider the following:
- The Unit 2 Reactor and Turbine tripped from full power 2 minutes ago.
- 'A' SG Narrow Range Level is 45% and slowly recovering
- 'B' SG Narrow Range Level is 50% and slowly recovering
- RCS Tave is 554 °F and stabilizing
- All Feed Water Control System controllers are in Automatic Based on the above conditions, what would be the status of the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves and the Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves?
A. Both Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves Closed and Both Main Feed Regulating Valves at 50% Open.
B. Both Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves at 50% Open and Both Main Feed Regulating Valves Closed.
C. Both Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves Closed and Both Main Feed Regulating Valves at 19% Open.
D. Both Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves at 19% Open and Both Main Feed Regulating Valves Closed.
Answer:
B. Both Main Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves at 50% Open and Both Main Feed Regulating Valves Closed.
Notes:
On A Reactor Trip The FWCS will place the Main Feedwater Bypass Control Valves at a preset position based on Tave until SG levels are restored above 55% and 60 seconds have elapsed from the trip signal.
The Main Feedwater Regulating Valves will go closed. The Bypass valve has a minimum set position of ~
19% at Tave of 548.24 degrees and a maximum position of 50.7% at 552 degrees to prevent overfeeding and overcooling the RCS. The parameters are verified by the RO after each Reactor/Turbine Trip Distracter A and D are incorrect because the bypass valves go to a preset position, not the main regulating position Distracter C is incorrect because the current Tave is calling for the 50.7% position setting for the bypass valves.
References STM 2-69, Feedwater Control System, Section 3.3 A2LP-RO-FWCS OBJ. 11, Explain Reactor Trip Override.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 10/14/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0503 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/1/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
IH BANK 102 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.9 Type RADIOACTIVITY System WASTE GAS DISPOSAL SYSTEM System 071 K/A: A4.25 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Setting of process radiation monitor alarms, automatic functions, and adjustments of set points.
Question # 64 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power
- A gaseous radwaste release from Gas Decay Tank 2T18A is in progress.
- An inadvertent electrical signal causes both Radwaste Exhaust Fans (2VEF8A/B) to stop.
After restarting a Radwaste Exhaust Fan, what action is required, if any, to continue the release?
A. No action required, release flow restarts when a radwaste exhaust fan starts.
B. Reopen Waste Gas Decay Tanks Discharge to Vent Plenum Valve 2CV-2428.
C. Have Chemistry recalculate the release permit prior to restarting the release.
D. Reset Waste Gas Decay Tank Vent Line Radiation Monitor 2RITS-2429.
Answer:
B. Reopen Waste Gas Decay Tanks Discharge to Vent Plenum Valve 2CV-2428.
Notes:
2CV-2428 is the release path isolation and is interlocked to close if there are no exhaust ventilation fans operating to prevent a buildup of gas in the Aux Building since the release path goes to the suction of these fans.
Distracter A is incorrect because 2CV-2428 has to be re-opened.
Distracter C is incorrect because these fans tripping do not affect the release permit.
Distracter D is incorrect because the Rad Monitor is not affected by these fans tripping.
References STM 2-54, Gaseous Radwaste System, Section 2.8 A2LP-RO-RWST, OBJ 4.c.8, Describe the following Radwaste System Components and Instrumentation:
Gaseous Rad Waste System: Waste Gas Discharge Flowpath Isolation 2CV-2428 Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/01/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0504 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/1/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
INPO BANK Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
3.7 Type INSTRUMENTATION System AREA RADIATION MONITORING System 072 K/A: K5.01 RO Tier: 2 RO Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group:
2 SRO Imp: 3.0 Description Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ARM system: Radiation theory, including sources, types, units, and effect.
Question # 65 Given the following:
Which of the following radiation sources contribute the most dose to the operator's TEDE?
A. Gamma radiation from a crud trap located 4 feet away.
B. Neutron radiation from the fuel in the Reactor Vessel.
C. Alpha radiation emitters coating the inside of the RCS piping.
D. Beta radiation on the step off pad on the SG manway access platforms.
Answer:
A. Gamma radiation from a crud trap located 4 feet away.
Notes:
The gamma radiation is the only source that is not being attenuated by the present conditions.
Distracter B is incorrect because the fuel is in the reactor vessel under water, the Reactor is not critical producing a large number of neutrons, and the primary and secondary biological shields are between this source and the operator so all neutrons would be attenuated.
Distracters C and D are incorrect because Alpha and Beta radiation can not travel the distance to reach the operator due to their charge interaction with air and other types of shielding.
References General Employee Lesson Plan ELP-GET-RWT01, Types of Radiation Section.
ELP-GET-RWT01 OBJ. RWT04, State the four types of radiation found in a commercial nuclear power plant. And RWT05. Characterize the four types of radiation by the following: a. penetrating ability b.
methods of shielding c. exposure hazard (for example, whole body, skin, eyes) d. where found Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams at ANO Unit 2. BNC 11/01/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0505 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/2/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source: INPO BANK MOD Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS System 2.1 K/A: 2.1.9 RO Tier: 3 RO Group: NA RO Imp: 2.5 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 4.0 Description Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room.
Question # 66 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power.
- A CEA exercise surveillance is in progress.
- An off shift SRO is directly supervising all CEA movement Which of the following individuals can manipulate the CEA controls during this surveillance?
A. An on shift non-licensed Shift Engineer assisting with the surveillance.
B. An on shift NLO that is scheduled to attend an initial license class next year.
C. A non-licensed individual enrolled in the current initial license class.
D. Any person in the Operations department as long as a SRO is supervising.
Answer:
C. A non-licensed individual enrolled in the current initial license class.
Notes:
Distracter A, B and D are incorrect due to not being enrolled in a current licensed training program References OP 1015.001, Conduct of Operations, Step 7.9.2 ASLP-RO-OPSPR OBJ. 4.b.7, For procedure 1015.001, Conduct of Operations: With respect to Shift Organization and Responsibilities: Describe the responsibilities of Trainees.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams at ANO Unit 2. BNC 11/02/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0506 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/2/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 &
10CFR55_43: NA Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS System 2.1 K/A: 2.1.17 RO Tier: 3 RO Group: NA RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.6 Description Ability to make accurate, clear and concise verbal reports.
Question # 67 Given the following:
- The plant has tripped due to a Loss of Offsite Power
- Both emergency diesels have started and energized their respective ESF bus.
- Steam Generator levels are 45% and slowly dropping
- The CRS states to the CBOT " Start the Red Train EFW Pump and restore Alpha and Bravo Steam Generator Levels to 60%".
Which of the following functional repeat backs to the CRS would be correct?
A. Start an EFW pump and restore both Steam Generators to 60%.
B. Start the Alpha EFW Pump and restore both Steam Generators to 60%.
C. Start the Bravo EFW Pump and restore both Steam Generators to 60%
D. Start both EFW pumps and restore both Steam Generators to 60%
Answer:
C. Start the Bravo EFW Pump and restore both Steam Generators to 60%
Notes:
Distracter A is wrong because the CRS has called for a specific EFW pump.
Distracter B is wrong because the Alpha EFW pump is the green train EFW pump.
Distracter D is wrong because the CRS only called for one EFW pump.
References Common Operations Directives, COPD001, Operations Expectations and Standards, Sections 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3.
A2LP-RO-TEMWK, OBJ. 6, Describe the communications process and OBJ. 7, Describe what constitutes Effective Communications.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/02/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0507 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/2/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.7 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS System 2.1 K/A: 2.1.28 RO Tier: 3 RO Group: NA RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.3 Description Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.
Question # 68 Given the following:
- The plant has experienced a Large Break LOCA
- Containment pressure is 25 psig and rising What is/are the reason(s) for starting the Containment Spray pumps?
A. To rapidly reduce Containment temperature and pressure POST LOCA.
B. To remove any iodine from the Containment atmosphere POST LOCA.
C. To provide Reactor Core AND Containment Sump cooling prior to a RAS.
D. To remove iodine AND reduce temperature and pressure in Containment.
Answer:
D. To remove iodine AND reduce temperature and pressure in Containment.
Notes:
Distracters A is incorrect because it list only one function of the system.
Distracters B is incorrect because it list only one function of the system.
Distracters C is incorrect because HPSI provides core cooling before a RAS and the CS system provides sump cooling after a RAS.
References STM 2-08, Containment Spray System, Section 1.1 A2LP-RO-SPRAY OBJ. 1, Describe the functions and design bases of the Containment Spray system.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/02/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0508 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/2/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.2 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System EQUIPMENT CONTROL System 2.2 K/A: 2.2.24 RO Tier: 3 RO Group: NA RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.8 Description Ability to analyze the affect of maintenance activities on LCO status.
Question # 69 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power
- Stone and Webster contractors are removing overgrown vegetation from the Emergency Cooling Pond (ECP) Spillway with a backhoe.
- The backhoe scoop causes a breach in the Spillway.
- The ECP level drops to 4.8 feet and stabilizes.
Which of the following actions should be taken?
A. Commence emergency repairs to the Spillway; restore level to > 5 feet in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
B. Restore ECP level to > 5 feet in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
C. Be in at least HOT STANDBY in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN in the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
D. Shift Service Water Returns to the ECP and maintain full power until repairs are made.
Answer:
C. Be in at least HOT STANDBY in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN in the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
Notes:
Distracters A, B and D are incorrect because they don't comply with the LCO action for the given References Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 STM 2-42, Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling Water Systems, Section 2.8, ECP A2LP-RO-SWACW OBJ. 12, Given a set of plant conditions and appropriate reference material, determine which Tech Spec Actions Statements, if any, are required to be performed.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/02/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0509 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/2/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source: IH BANK 6687 MOD Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.2 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System EQUIPMENT CONTROL System 2.2 K/A: 2.2.25 RO Tier: 3 RO Group: NA RO Imp: 2.5 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.7 Description Knowledge of bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Question # 70 The TS basis for the minimum temperature for criticality of 525°F includes all of the following EXCEPT:
A. Ensures moderator temperature coefficient is WITHIN its analyzed temperature range.
B. Ensures protective instrumentation is WITHIN its normal operating range.
C. Ensures PZR is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble.
D. Ensures reactor pressure vessel is BELOW its minimum RT Nil Ductility Temperature.
Answer:
D. Ensures Reactor pressure vessel is BELOW its minimum RT Nil Ductility Temperature.
Notes:
Distracters A, B, and C are incorrect because they are three of the correct basis for minimum temperature for criticality. Answer D is not a correct basis because this temperature ensures the RX vessel is ABOVE the minimum RTndt to prevent brittle fracture.
References Technical Specification 3.1.1.5 and the Basis for 3.1.1.5.
A2LP-RO-TS OBJ. 7, Discuss the Technical Specification basis for Minimum Temperature for criticality.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/02/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0297 Rev 000 Rev Date: 3/12/2000 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NRC BANK Originator Woolf 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.4 Section:
2 Type Generic K/A System Radiation Control System 2.3 K/A: 2.3.4 RO Tier: 3RO Group: NA RO Imp: 2.5 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.1 Description Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and contamination control, including permissible levels in excess of those authorized.
Question # 71 Plant conditions are:
- A LOCA has occurred.
- Whole body dose rates are 3 Rem/hr in the "B" SDC Heat Exchanger Room.
- An "ALERT" Emergency Classification has been declared.
A female WCO who is NOT declared pregnant with complete exposure records is assigned to align the "B" SDC train for decay heat removal. This job is expected to take 30 minutes. The WCO has a radiation history of 1000 mrem exposure for this year.
Which of the following statements is correct for the additional dose that would be received by performing this system alignment with the above conditions?
A. WCO will NOT exceed routine annual ANO Admin whole body (TEDE) limits for radiation workers.
B. WCO will NOT exceed routine annual ANO Admin whole body (TEDE) limits for female radiation workers.
C. WCO will exceed annual Federal whole body (TEDE) limits for female radiation workers.
D. WCO will exceed routine annual ANO Admin whole body (TEDE) limits for radiation workers.
Answer:
D. WCO will exceed routine annual ANO Admin whole body (TEDE) limits for radiation workers.
Notes:
Radiation history of 1000 mrem shows that WCO is a radiation worker with limits the same as males.
A is incorrect because the TEDE ANO Routine Admin limit is 2 Rem/yr for rad workers. Total exposure after this job would be 2.5 Rem.
B is incorrect because the ANO Routine Admin limits are the same for Female rad worker who is not pregnant and rad worker.
C is incorrect because Federal limits are 5 Rem/yr..
D is correct because the additional dose is 1500 mrem which is added to 1000 mrem to make 2500 mrem which exceeds the admin limit of 2.0 Rem/yr.
References RP-201, Dosimetry Administration, Step 5.2.3.
A2LP-RO-RADP, Radiation Protection, OBJ. 14, Define the ANO Administrative Exposure Limits.
Historical 03/12/00 - Rev 000 - Developed for 2000 RO/SRO Exam to replace QID0236. Has not been used on the last two NRC exams BNC 11/03/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0510 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/3/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.4 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System RADIATION CONTROL System 2.3 K/A: 2.3.10 RO Tier: 3 RO Group: NA RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.3 Description Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure.
Question # 72 Given the following:
(Reference Provided)
- The plant is at full power.
- A small primary to secondary leak has slowly developed in Steam Generator A.
- Chemistry analysis has estimates that the leak is sustained at 0.07 gpm
- One hour later Chemistry reports that the leak has risen to 1.5 gpm.
Which of the following actions should be taken to reduce radiation exposure to the public?
A. Be in Mode 3 in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
B. Be in Mode 3 in less than or equal to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
C. Reduce Power to 50% in < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and be in Mode 3 in < 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
D. Declare an ALERT Emergency Action Level and evacuate the site.
Answer:
C. Reduce Power to 50% in < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and be in Mode 3 in < 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Notes:
This question is based on 2203.008, Primary to Secondary Leakage, The answer is the most restrictive limit of the given examples and indicates continuing degradation of the SG tube and the plant should be expeditiously taken off line.
Distracter A is incorrect because the leak did not spike up but slowly developed.
Distracter B is incorrect because the leak did not initially spike up to > 150 gpd.
Distracter D is incorrect because we only meet the criteria for an NUE not an Alert.
Attachment C which will be provided as a reference.
References OP 2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage, Attachment C (Provided as a Reference) 1903.010, EPLAN EALs, Attachment 4, EAL 3.2 and 3.3.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 28, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, applicable industry events, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.038, Primary To Secondary Leakage.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/03/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0511 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/3/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System RADIATION CONTROL System 2.3 K/A: 2.3.11 RO Tier: 3 RO Group: NA RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Ability to control radiation releases.
Question # 73 Given the following plant conditions:
- Plant is operating at 100% power.
- On 01/19/2005 at 0200, Chemistry reports that RCS activity has risen to 1.4 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUVALENT I-131.
- On 01/21/2005 at 0300, Chemistry reports that RCS activity has lowered to 1.2 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUVALENT I-131.
Which one of the following states the required action(s) for this condition?
A. Be in at least HOT STANDBY with T-ave less than 500°F within six (6) hours to limit offsite dose in case of a SGTR.
B. Restore RCS activity to within limits in the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or go to HOT STANDBY to limit offsite dose in case of a SGTR.
C. Trip the Reactor, reduce RCS Thot to less then 535°F and isolate Steam Generators due to indications of a SGTR.
D. Perform sampling of RCS activity for Iodine activity every two (2) to six (6) hours to determine the number of leaking of fuel assemblies.
Answer:
A. Be in at least HOT STANDBY with T-ave less than 500°F within six (6) hours to limit offsite dose in case of a SGTR.
Notes:
Distracter B is incorrect because activity has been above 1 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUVALENT I-131 for > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and the TS action call for a shutdown to HOT STANDBY Distracter C is incorrect because there is no Tube Rupture but this is the action to take if there was; however only one generator would be isolated.
Distracter D is incorrect because this is the action to take if Power has been changed over 15% in one hour.
References AOP 2203.020, High RCS Activity, Step 4.
Technical Specification 3.4.8, LCO a. and Action a.
A2LP-RO-TS OBJ.4, From memory, discuss the LCOs and actions statements for all LCOs with action statements less than or equal to one hour.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/03/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0512 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/4/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: NA Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN System 2.4 K/A: 2.4.15 RO Tier: 3 RO Group: NA RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.5 Description Knowledge of communications procedures associated with EOP implementation.
Question # 74 During Implementation of an Emergency Operating Procedure, the CRS communicates to the CBOT to "CHECK" a valve Open.
Which of the following would be the correct method to comply with this direction?
A. Observe that the valve is Open but does not permit Opening of the valve.
B. Regulate system flow by incremental positioning of the valve to the Open position.
C. Take the valve in the Closed direction then go to Open on the handswitch.
D. Observe that the valve is Open and if NOT, then take the valve handswitch to Open.
Answer:
A. Observe that the valve is Open but does not permit Opening of the valve.
Notes:
Distracter B is incorrect because this is the definition of the Action Verb "Throttle" Distracter C is incorrect because this is the definition of the Action Verb "Override" Distracter D is incorrect because this is the definition of the Action Verb "Verify" References OP 1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User's Guide, Attachment B, EOP/AOP Action Verbs, Definitions for CHECK, OVERRIDE, THROTTLE AND VERIFY.
A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ. 3, Define the terms that are used in the EOP's as per 1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP Users Guide.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/04/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 RO/SRO Exam BANK 0513 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/4/2004 RO Select: Yes SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
RS Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN System 2.4 K/A: 2.4.26 RO Tier: 3 RO Group: NA RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.3 Description Knowledge of facility protection requirements including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment usage.
Question # 75 Given the following:
- The plant is at 100% Power
- A fire in the 2B9/2B10 Room is reported to the control room Which of the following describes the makeup of the Fire Brigade and the individual who will coordinate the Fire and Explosion AOP 2203.034 after the Reactor is tripped?
A. The WCO from Unit 2 as the Fire Brigade Leader, two Fire Brigade Members from Unit 1, one Fire Brigade member from Unit 2, and the Shift Manager from Unit 2.
B. The WCO from Unit 2 as the Fire Brigade Leader, three Fire Brigade Members from Unit 1, and the Shift Manager from Unit 1.
C. The WCO from Unit 1 as the Fire Brigade Leader, three Fire Brigade Members from Unit 2, and the Shift Manager from Unit 2.
D. The WCO from Unit 1 as the Fire Brigade Leader, two Fire Brigade Members from Unit 2, one Fire Brigade member from Unit 1 and the Shift Manager from Unit 1.
Answer:
B. The WCO from Unit 2 as the Fire Brigade Leader, three Fire Brigade Members from Unit 1, and the Shift Manager from Unit 1.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because the Unit 2 SM is involved in E-Plan assessment and Oversight, and no Fire Brigade members are supplied from Unit 2, just the leader.
Distracter C is incorrect because the Unit 2 SM is involved in E-Plan assessment and Oversight, and no Fire Brigade members are supplied from Unit 2, just the leader.
Distracter D is incorrect because no Fire Brigade members are supplied from Unit 2, just the leader.
References OP 1015.007, Fire Brigade Organization and Responsibilities, Section 6.1 and 6.2.
AOP 2203.034, Fire or Explosion, Step 10.
ASLP-RO-OPSPR OBJ., 4.a and b. Describe the responsibilities of the SM/CRS as they pertain to the Fire Brigade organization. Describe the actions taken upon the report of a fire to the Control Room (include the composition of the initial fire fighting force).
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/04/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0514 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
IH BANK 4648 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.1 Type GENERIC EPE System LARGE BREAK LOCA System 011 K/A: EA2.0 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 3.9 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA:
Consequences of managing LOCA with loss of CCW.
Question # 76 The following conditions exist after a Reactor trip during performance of SPTAs:
- RCS pressure 1650 psia (lowering slowly)
- RCS Thot 552 degrees F (lowering slowly)
- RCS Tcold 551 degrees F (lowering slowly)
- PZR level 5% (lowering slowly)
- Containment pressure19.1 psia (rising slowly)
- Containment Radiation Monitors are trending up
- SIAS, CCAS, CIAS Actuated
A. Leave the RCPs running and restore CCW flow.
B. Leave the RCPs running and restore controlled bleedoff.
C. Stop all RCPs due to LOCA condition and loss of CCW.
D. Stop all RCPs due to containment spray actuation.
Answer:
A. Leave the RCPs running and restore CCW flow.
Notes:
The goal in the EOPs is to maintain forced circulation as long as possible to assist in the subsequent cooldown after a mass loss event such as LOCA. Therefore as CCW is lost due to the CIAS, the SPTA Step 7.B contingency is to restore RCP cooling to keep forced circulation as long as possible.
Distracter B is incorrect because RCP controlled bleedoff cannot be restored to a normal lineup until the SIAS is reset and the conditions to reset SIAS are not met.
Distracter C is incorrect because the RCPs are only secured on low NPSH or a CSAS which has not happened yet.
Distracter D is incorrect because a CSAS does not occur until 23.3 psia in Containment.
References EOP 2202.001, SPTA, STEP 7.B CONTINGENCY TG 2202.001, TG FOR SPTAs, STEP 7.
A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ. 9, Describe what is being accomplished by performance of the Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTA's).
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/08/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0515 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System STEAM LINE RUPTURE System 040 K/A: AA2.0 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 4.5 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture:
When ESFAS systems may be secured.
Question # 77 The plant has experienced an Excess Steam Demand (ESD) event inside containment on the "A" Steam Generator (SG), and the following conditions exist after 18 minutes:
- Containment Temperature is 245°F and slowly dropping.
- Containment Pressure is 34 psia and slowly dropping
- RVLMS Level 1 and below indicates WET
- PZR Level is 42% and rising
- Steam Generator levels are 54% each and being restored with EFW Which of the following is TRUE concerning the HPSI system?
A. HPSI termination criteria IS satisfied and all running HPSI pump handswitches should be placed in PTL.
B. HPSI termination criteria IS NOT satisfied due to low Pressurizer level and should be left in service.
C. HPSI termination criteria IS satisfied and HPSI injection MOVs should be throttled as needed to control RCS inventory.
D. HPSI termination criteria IS NOT satisfied due to high Containment Pressure and should be left in service.
Answer:
B. HPSI termination criteria IS NOT satisfied due to low Pressurizer level and should be left in service.
Notes:
The containment temperature being > 200 degrees F is considered a harsh environment to containment instrumentation and there are more conservative numbers in the EOP in this case in brackets [50%] for PZR level before HPSI termination criteria is met.
Distracters A and C are incorrect because HPSI termination criteria is not met with harsh containment environment conditions.
Distracter D is incorrect because Containment Pressure is not part of HPSI termination criteria.
References EOP 2202.005, EXCESS STEAM DEMAND, Note above Step 1 and Step 19 TG, 2202.005, Steps 1 and 19 A2LP-RO-EESD OBJ. 5, From memory and given a set of plant conditions during an ESD, determine if HPSI termination criteria is satisfied.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/08/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0516 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER System 054 K/A: 2.4.36 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 2.8 Description Emergency plan/ Procedures: Knowledge of chemistry/health physics tasks during emergency operations.
Question # 78 Given the following conditions:
- A complete loss of offsite power has caused a Reactor trip from 100% power.
- ESF Bus "2A3 Lockout Relay Trip" alarm is locked in and the bus has no voltage.
- EFW Pump 2P7A Overspeed Trip comes in when EFAS is actuated during SPTAs.
- The WCO reports that the 2P7A Overspeed Trip reset linkage cannot be reset.
- Steam Generator Levels are 34% each and dropping.
Which procedure should the crew transition to after SPTAs and what action should Chemistry perform during the implementation of this procedure?
A. Loss of Feedwater EOP; sample the RCS for iodine 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> post Reactor Trip.
B. Loss of Offsite Power EOP; sample both Steam Generators for activity.
C. Loss of Feedwater EOP; sample both Steam Generators for activity.
D. Loss of Offsite Power EOP; sample the RCS for iodine 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> post Reactor Trip.
Answer:
A. Loss of Feedwater EOP; sample the RCS for iodine 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> post Reactor Trip.
Notes:
No Feedwater source is available under these conditions and the Loss of Feedwater EOP will provide direction to get a power source to the B EFW Pump so this is the procedure to transition to. The sampling of the RCS is a TS requirement to assess fuel damage due tot he event.
Distracter B is incorrect because the wrong EOP is implemented and the SGs should not be sampled because cooling water to the sample coolers is lost therefore this direction is not given in the appropriate EOP. The EOP actually directs closure of the SG sample valves to conserve FW inventory.
Distracter C is incorrect because the EOP actually directs closure of the SG sample valves to conserve FW inventory.
Distracter D is incorrect because the wrong EOP is implemented.
References OP 1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP Users Guide, Step 5.1.7 EOP 2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP, Entry Conditions EOP 2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP, Step 29.
EOP 2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP, Step 6.B.
A2LP-RO-ELOSF OBJ. 1, From memory, determine if the required entry conditions exist to enter the Loss of Feedwater EOP.
A2LP-RO-TS OBJ. 4, Given a set of plant conditions, evaluate any TS LCO applicability and associated action.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/08/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0517 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER System 056 K/A: AA2.1 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 4.2 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:
T-cold and T-hot indicators (wide range).
Question # 79 Given the following:
- The Plant has tripped due to a loss of Offsite Power 15 minutes ago.
- SPTAs are complete and the Loss Of Offsite EOP 2202.007 has been entered.
- RCS hot leg temperature 567°F and lowering.
- RCS cold leg temperature 515°F and constant.
- PZR pressure 1600 psia and steady.
What is the status of natural circulation conditions?
A. Natural Circulation IS established due to RCS margin to saturation greater than 30°F.
B. Natural Circulation IS established due to CET temperature greater than T-hot.
C. Natural Circulation IS NOT established due to cold leg temperature constant.
D. Natural Circulation IS NOT established due to loop delta T greater than 50°F.
Answer:
D. Natural Circulation IS NOT established due to loop delta T greater than 50°F.
Notes:
Natural Circulation is verified met by looking at the parameters listed in the Loss of Offsite Power EOP step 23. All of the 4 criteria must be met to ensure single phase natural circulation.
Distracter A is incorrect because it does meet one of the criteria for the given conditions but ALL of the 4 criteria in the EOP step must be met.
Distracter B is incorrect because the criteria is CET and T-hot delta T less than 10 degrees F not CETs hotter than T-hot.
Distracter C is incorrect because one of the criteria is T-cold constant or lowering which is the case in the distracter but the distracter says "Natural Circulation is NOT established".
References EOP-2202.007, Loss of Offsite EOP, Section 1 Step 23 TG-2202.007, Loss of Offsite Power TG, Section 1 Step 23 A2LP-RO-ELOOP OBJ. 5, Given a set of plant conditions determine if the conditions for Natural Circulation are being met during the Loss Of Offsite Power optimal recovery EOP.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/09/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0518 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: C Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System LOSS OF DC POWER System 058 K/A: 2.4.9 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 3.9 Description Emergency plan/ Procedures: Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.
Question # 80 Given the following conditions:
- The plant is shutdown to replace a failed RCP seal.
- OP 1015.008 Attachment B, Unit 2 SDC Control is complete.
- SDC Pump 2P-60A is in service through SDC HX 2E-35A with the same flows established during completion of OP 1015.008 Attachment B.
- The RCS is currently at 42 inches on both level indicators on 2C04.
- RCS Temperature is 115°F and steady.
- Now a loss of 125 VDC power to the SDC Temperature Control Valve solenoid causes 2CV-5093 to go to its failed position.
- All other components in the SDC system remain the same as before the failure.
Which of the following would be the effect on RCS Temperature?
A. RCS temperature would rise slowly due to approximately 25% loss of flow through 2E-35A.
B. RCS temperature would rise rapidly without cooling due to 2CV-5093 failing closed.
C. RCS temperature would drop slowly due to approximately 25% more flow through 2E-35A.
D. RCS temperature would drop rapidly with a lot more cooling due to 2CV-5093 failing open.
Answer:
A. RCS temperature would rise slowly due to approximately 25% loss of flow from 2E-35A.
Notes:
2CV-5093 will lose IA on a loss of power to its DC solenoid causing the valve to fail closed. However, OP 1015.008 Attachment B Step 6.2 throttles the SDC Temperature Control Valve 2CV-5091 Bypass Valve 2SI-5093-3 to ensue at least 75% of the flow from the SDC HX is available as a mitigation strategy should 2CV-5091 fail Closed. This makes answer A correct.
Distracter B is incorrect because there is still 75% of the flow going through the bypass so the temperature would not go up rapidly.
Distracter C is incorrect because cooling flow is lowered not raised.
Distracter D is incorrect because cooling flow is lowered not raised.
References STM 2-14, SDC System, Section 2.6 and 2.6.2.
OP 1015.008, SDC Control, Attachment B, Steps 6.1. and 6.2 AOP 2203.029, Loss of SDC, Step 9 TG 2203.029, Loss of SDC TG, Step 9 A2LP-RO-SDCC OBJ. 4, Discuss our approach to reducing the severity of Loss of Shutdown Cooling event.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/09/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0519 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR System 065 K/A: AA2.0 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 2.7 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:
Typical conditions which could cause a compressor trip (e.g., high temperature).
Question # 81 The Inside AO reports that the cooling fan for the LEAD air compressor, 2C-27A is not running.
If this condition were allowed to continue, how would this impact the operation of the Instrument Air System?
A. The air dryer desiccant would break down due to excessive air temperature and allow moisture to carryover into the system.
B. The air dryer heating element will automatically shut off due to high temperature and allow moisture to carryover into the system.
C. The compressor will trip on high lube oil temperature.
D. The compressor will trip on high inner cooler outlet temperature.
Answer:
D. The compressor will trip on high inner cooler outlet temperature.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because the compressor would have already tripped on either high inner cooler outlet temperature, high after cooler inlet temperature or high after cooler outlet temperature.
Distracter B is incorrect because the air dryer heater is only energized on the tower that is regenerating, not the tower that is in service.
Distracter C is incorrect because the low lube oil trip is based upon pressure not temperature.
Distracters, B, C, and D are incorrect because these are trips.
References ACA 2203.012L, ACA for 2K12, Widow B-8, Instrument Air System trouble.
STM 2-48, IA, Sections 2.1, 2.3 and 2.8.1.
A2LP-AO-IA OBJ. 7, State the automatic trips associated with the Instrument Air compressors.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/10/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0520 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source: IH BANK 10994 MOD Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System FUEL HANDLING INCIDENTS System 036 K/A: AA2.0 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 2 SRO Imp: 4.1 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: Occurrence of a fuel handling incident.
Question # 82 The following plant conditions exist.
- Mode 6 with Refueling in progress.
- A NEW fuel assembly is dropped from the spent fuel handling machine and falls to the bottom of the fuel tilt pit between the upender and the tilt pit gate valve.
- NO bubbles are emerging from the dropped fuel assembly.
- The readings on the spent fuel handling area ventilation exhaust (SPING 7) are stable and have not changed in the last hour.
- There has been no change in area radiation in the Spent Fuel Pool Which of the following actions should be performed for the given conditions?
A. Sound the plant evacuation alarm, evacuate the Unit 2 SFP area due to the refueling accident, and suspend all core alterations in containment.
B. Prevent all personnel access to the SFP Area floor on both units to minimize dose from the dropped fuel assembly and evacuate the Auxiliary Building.
C. Secure the SFP area ventilation exhaust fans to prevent a release of airborne activity to the atmosphere and evacuate the SFP 4 04 elevation on both units.
D. Develop a recovery plan after the fuel handler on the spent fuel handling machine notifies the control room by the most expedient means possible.
Answer:
D. Develop a recovery plan after the fuel handler on the spent fuel handling machine notifies the control room by the most expedient means possible.
Notes:
By the description and symptoms listed in Attachment M Steps 2.0 and 4.0, this incident does not classify as a Refueling Accident since it is not a spent fuel assembly and there are no signs of airborne activity therefore the assembly need to be recovered and inspected before use. Step 4.2.1 of Attachment M is the correct response.
Distracter A is incorrect because this is not a refueling accident.
Distracter B is incorrect because there should be no significant dose from a new fuel assembly.
Distracter C is incorrect because there is no airborne activity in the area and if there were the ventilation fans should be ran to filter this activity.
References NOP 2502.001, Refueling Shuffle, Attachment M Section 4, Refueling Accident.
A2LP-RO-FH OBJ. 4, Given a fuel handling evolution or condition, determine the correct response.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/10/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0521 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source: IH BANK 5118 MOD Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.2 Type GENERIC APE System ACCIDENTAL LIQUID RADWASTE System 059 K/A: AA2.0 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 2 SRO Imp: 3.9 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: The occurrence of automatic safety actions as a result of a high PRM system signal.
Question # 83 Given the following:
- Unit 2 is at normal full power operation.
- Local Hand Switch 2HS-2331 on 2C112 is in BOTH.
- Local Hand Switch 2HS-2330 on 2C112 is in Position 1.
- The setpoint of BMS/LRW Radiation Element 2RE-2330 is exceeded.
What of the following describes the resulting lineup configuration?
A. The 2T-69A Discharge Pump 2P-47A will trip and its associated discharge valve 2CV-2318 will Close terminating the liquid radwaste release.
B. BMS/LRW to Circulating Water Discharge Control Valves, 2CV-2330A and 2CV-2330B Close and 2P47A will continue to run on short-path recirculation.
C. The 2T-69A Discharge Pump 2P-47A will continue to run on short-path recirc but its discharge valve 2CV-2318 will Close terminating the liquid radwaste release.
D. BMS/LRW to Circulating Water Discharge Control Valves, 2CV-2330A and 2CV-2330B Close and the 2T-69A Discharge Pump 2P-47A will trip.
Answer:
B. BMS/LRW to Circulating Water Discharge Control Valves, 2CV-2330A and 2CV-2330B Close and 2P47A will continue to run on short-path recirculation.
Notes:
The Recirculation Valves on the selected discharge pump is throttled during the release to prevent dead heading the pumps should the release be terminated due to high activity in the liquid. These pumps do not trip on high PRM signal.
Distracter A is incorrect because the pumps will not trip and the associated discharge valve will not close.
Distracter C is incorrect because the discharge valve will not close.
Distracter D is incorrect because the pump will not trip.
References STM 2-52, LRW/BMS, Sections 3.4.1, 3.5 and figure on page 41.
OP 2104.014, LRW/BMS Operations, Supplement 1 Step 7.3.1 and Supplement 3 Step 10 and Note above step 10.
A2LP-RO-RWST OBJ. 6.b.3, Describe the following tasks associated with the radioactive waste operating procedures. b. Boron Management System 2104.014 3. Perform a BACT 2T-69A/B Release.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/10/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0522 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
IH BANK 12589 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.4 Type CE EPE/APE System RCS OVERCOOLING System A1 K/A: 2.4.5 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 2 SRO Imp: 3.6 Description Emergency Plan/Procedures: Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.
Question # 84 Given the following:
- The plant has tripped due to a failed Main Generator Reverse Power Relay.
- During the performance of SPTAs, the following conditions are noted:
- PZR level is continuing to lower slowly
- RCS Tave is continuing to lower slowly
- PZR pressure is continuing to lower slowly
- "A" and "B" S/G pressures are 940 psia and lowering slowly Which of the following procedures should be enter to mitigate these positions?
A. AOP 2203.028, PZR Systems Malfunction B. AOP 2203.011, RCS Overcooling C. EOP 2202.005, Excess Steam Demand D. EOP 2202.002, Reactor Trip Recovery Answer:
B. AOP 2203.011, RCS Overcooling Notes:
EOP 2202.010, Standard Attachment 3, Diagnostics will direct entry into RCS Overcooling AOP unless the overcooling is excessive causing a Main Steam Isolation signal, then the Excess Steam demand EOP would be entered.
Distracter A is incorrect because the PZR parameters are actual condition due to the overcooling and there is no malfunction in the PZR.
Distracter C is incorrect because the overcooling is not excessive enough to cause a MSIS.
Distracter D is incorrect because there are abnormal conditions other than normal post trip condition present.
References EOP 2202.010, Standard Attachment 3, Diagnostics AOP 2203.011, RCS Overcooling, Entry Conditions.
TG 2203.011, TG for RCS Overcooling, Entry Conditions.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 8, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.011, RCS Overcooling.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/10/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0523 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
4.4 Type CE EPE/APE System FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY System E09 K/A: EA2.2 SRO Tier: 1 SRO Group: 2 SRO Imp: 4.0 Description Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Functional Recover):
Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.
Question # 85 The following conditions occur at full power:
- The plant is at 100% power.
- "A" EDG is out of service for maintenance.
- An inadvertent CSAS comes in and can't be reset.
- Non Vital 4160 Volt Bus 2A1 lockout alarm comes in.
- The 'A' Emergency Feedwater Pump Overspeed Trip alarm comes in.
- Containment Pressure is now 19.3 psia and rising.
- PZR level is 12% and dropping rapidly.
- Containment Low Range Radiation monitors are trending up.
Following SPTA's, which of the following procedures would be diagnosed?
A. EOP 2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident B. EOP 2202.006, Loss of Feedwater C. EOP 2202.007, Loss of Offsite Power D. EOP 2202.010, Functional Recovery Answer:
D. EOP 2202.010, Functional Recovery Notes:
The inadvertent Containment Spray will trip all Condensate and Feedwater pumps causing a loss of feedwater low level trip of the plant. With no A EDG and a Bus 2A1 lock out, there is no voltage on the 4160 Vital RED train bus which supplies power to the motor driven EFW pump. Non Vital 4160 Bus 2A1 also supplies the backup Auxiliary Feedwater pump. Now with the over speed trip on the A EFW pump, we are left with no source of feedwater. Now with indications of a large RCS leak/LOCA and with conditions meeting a SIAS, we have two EOP event in progress which will diagnose us into the function recovery procedure.
Distracter A is incorrect because we also have a loss of feed event in progress.
Distracter B is incorrect because we also have a LOCA event in progress.
Distracter C is incorrect because we can handle a LOOP with other Optimum EOP Recovery Procedures.
References EOP 2202.010, Standard Attachment 3, Diagnostics.
OP 1015.021, AOP/EOP Users Guide, Step 5.1.8 A2LP-RO-EFRP OBJ.1, Describe the purpose of the FRP and when it should be used.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/10/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0524 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: C Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
3.2 Type RCS INVENTORY System CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL System 004 K/A: A2.16 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 3.6 Description Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: T-ave. and T-ref. deviations.
Question # 86 Given the following:
(Reference Provided)
- The plant is at 100% power at 375 EFPD in the current cycle.
- Plant power is reduced to 80% power over the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to maintain vacuum in the condenser within acceptable limits.
- CEA Group 6 was inserted to 121 inches withdrawn for ASI control
- All other CEAs are at the Upper Electrical Limit (UEL)
- The plan now is to stabilize plant power and troubleshoot the CW Pump trip.
- T-ref currently indicates 573°F
- T-ave currently is 572°F and dropping If Group 6 and Group P CEAs are inserted to 114 inches and 141 inches withdrawn respectively over the next 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> for ASI control, how much water should be to be added to the RCS to prevent T-ave from deviating from T-ref any more?
A. Approximately 650 gallons.
B. Approximately 900 gallons C. Approximately 1150 gallons D. Approximately 1800 gallons Answer:
C. Approximately 1150 gallons Notes:
This amount of water should be calculated from the Reactivity Management Contingency Plan for these conditions. Starting at 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> during the stabilization period. - (23x15) + (22x15) + (17x15) + (15x15) =
1155 gallons or ~ 1150 gallons.
Distracter A is incorrect but the approximate amount of water to be added in the next 1/2 hour.
Distracter B is incorrect but is half the total approximate 1814 gallons over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Distracter D is incorrect but is the approximate amount to maintain power/temperature constant over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
The ANO-2 Cycle 17: 375 EFPD Contingency Plan to 80% should be provided as a reference for this question.
References AOP 2203.019, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, Steps 5 and 6 and Attachment A, Backpressure Limits.
NOP 2102.004, Power Operations, Exhibit 1 T-ave Verses T-ref.
Reactivity Management Plan -ANO-2 Cycle 17: 375 EFPD Contingency Plan to 80%.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/11/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0525 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
3.4 Type RCS HEAT REMOVAL System RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL System 005 K/A: A2.02 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 3.7 Description Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RHRS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Pressure transient protection during cold shutdown.
Question # 87 Given the following:
- The unit is shutdown for a refueling outage
- RCS pressure is 260 psia
- RCS temperature is 215°F
- One train of shutdown cooling is in service.
- 2PT-4623-1 (pressurizer low range pressure transmitter) fails high.
Which of the following Operator actions should be taken?
A. Override all SIT outlet valves due to automatically opening.
B. Stop the running SDC pump due to a loss of suction from the RCS.
C. Place all HPSI and LPSI pumps in PTL due to initiation of a SIAS.
D. Place all Normal Spray Valves to manual and closed due to opening.
Answer:
B. Stop the running SDC pump due to a loss of suction from the RCS.
Notes:
The pressure transmitter failing high will cause SDC suction isolation 2CV-5084-1 to go closed and the AOP for loss of SDC directs securing the running SDC pump.
Distracter A is incorrect because the SIT outlet valve MOV breakers are de-energized after they are closed at ~650 psia during a cooldown.
Distracter C is incorrect because an SIAS is actuated on the Wide Range PZR Pressure Transmitters and the SIAS Low PZR Pressure actuation's have been bypassed on the PPS ROMs.
Distracter D is incorrect because the normal spray valves open on Control Channel PZR Pressure Transmitters which have not failed.
References STM 2-03, RCS, Section 2.2.5.1, PZR Pressure Instrumentation and Figure on page 55.
STM 2-14, SDC, Section 2.1.1 and Figure on Page 50 AOP 2203.029, Loss of SDC, Step 3.
NOP 2102.010, Plant Cooldown, Step 7.42.3.
A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ. 22, Discuss the Mitigation strategy, Entry Conditions, applicable industry events, Instructions and Exit Conditions (as per AOP and Tech Guide) of OP 2203.029, Loss Of Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/11/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0526 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
3.5 Type CONTAINMENT System CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM System 022 K/A: A2.06 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of CCS Pump.
Question # 88 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power.
- Outside ambient air temperature is 92°F.
- Lake temperature is 64°F.
- The running Main Chiller and Main Chilled Water Pump trips.
- All attempts to start the tripped and standby Main Chill Water pumps have failed.
- Containment Temperature and Pressure have gone high outside of the Region of Acceptable Operation per TS 3.6.1.4 Which of the following actions should be completed to mitigate the high temperature/pressure in containment?
A. Start all CEDM Cooling Fans and Containment Recirculation Fans; Commence a plant shutdown and be in Hot Standby in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> due to the high Containment temperature.
B. Start three (3) Containment Cooling Fans and align Service Water to them; Commence a plant shutdown and be in Hot Standby in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> due to the high Containment temperature.
C. Start all Containment Cooling Fans and align Service Water to them; Restore Containment Temperature and Pressure to within the Region of Acceptable Operation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
D. Start all CEDM Cooling Fans and Containment Recirculation Fans; Restore Containment Temperature and Pressure to within the Region of Acceptable Operation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Answer:
C. Start all Containment Fan Coolers and align Service Water to them; Restore Containment Temperature and Pressure to within the Region of Acceptable Operation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Notes:
Starting and aligning SW to all 4 CFCs will provide adequate cooling at the current lake temperature to restore containment parameters within acceptable limits. This is due to the much larger surface area on the SW cooling HX compared to the Chilled Water HX in the CFCs and a lot more flow.
Distracter A is incorrect because Chill Water also cools the CEDM coolers and Chilled Water is lost and TS allows a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> restoration limit before shutdown.
Distracter B is incorrect because the procedure directs starting all 4 and TS allows 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to restore parameters prior to the shutdown.
Distracter D is incorrect because the CEDM coolers have no cooling medium and would not affect Containment Parameters.
References STM 2-09, Containment Cooling and Purge Systems, Sections 2.2 and 2.7.
TS 3.6.1.4 and Figure 3.6-1.
AOP 2203.039, Inadvertent CIAS, Step 10.
A2LP-RO-CVENT, OBJ. 3, Describe the construction and operation of the Containment Cooling Units and Objective 15, Describe the conditions required to satisfy the TS LCOs and TRM TROs associated with the Containment Ventilation System including the basis for each LCO/TRO.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/11/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0527 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
3.4 Type RCS HEAT REMOVAL System MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM System 039 K/A: 2.2.19 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 3.1 Description Equipment Control: Knowledge of Maintenance Work Order Requirements.
Question # 89 Given the following:
- The plant is at 100% power.
- This leak is downstream of the IA drain line isolation valve.
- A work request is generated and a work order/tagout issued to repair the leak.
- During day shift the SM tours the Main Steam Isolation Valve area.
- No workers are in the area.
There would be a concern about this tool box if it was located within ______ feet of the Main Steam Isolation Valves and their actuators because __________________________________________.
A. 2; potential seismic interaction could cause damage.
B. 3; this is a sensitive area and no one is allowed here.
C. 2; this is a sensitive area and no one is allowed here.
D. 3; potential seismic interaction could cause damage.
Answer:
A. 2; potential seismic interaction could cause damage.
Notes:
Any toolbox or other heavy object that is not tied down is not allowed within 2 feet of safety related equipment due to seismic interaction concerns.
Distracter B is incorrect because it is 2 feet/not 3 and the sensitive area entry is allowed with SM/CRS permission.
Distracter C is incorrect because the sensitive area entry is allowed with SM/CRS permission.
Distracter D is incorrect because it is 2 feet/not 3.
References Control Of Maintenance Procedure 1000.024, Note above Step 6.5 and Step 6.5.1.A ASLP-RO-MNTC OBJ. 10, Describe the guidelines for the placement of items around safety related equipment.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/11/2004.
Questions For 2005 SRO Exam BANK 0528 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.3 Section:
3.4 Type RCS HEAT REMOVAL System SERVICE WATER System 076 K/A: 2.2.5 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group: 1 SRO Imp: 2.7 Description Equipment Control: Knowledge of the process for making changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report.
Question # 90 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power.
- The MOV that supplies Service Water to the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) has a faulty limit switch and will NOT stroke electrically.
- Weather in the area has degraded and a Tornado Watch is in effect.
- The grid has also become unstable due to a Tornado strike in the Fort Smith area.
- Maintenance has determined that they can install a jumper around the faulty limit switch on the Service Water supply to the "A" EDG to allow the valve to Open automatically.
- The Shift Manager decides to install this jumper now and complete the controlling documentation later due to the severe weather affecting the grid.
This jumper would be considered a(n) ____________________ temporary alteration and the Shift Manager must obtain the concurrence of the _________________ prior to installation. Generation of the controlling documentation must be completed and approved by the Onsite Safety Review Committee (OSRC) within _________ of installation.
A. Work Order Controlled; Shift Engineer; 30 days B. Emergency; Operation's Manager; 14 days C. Work Order Controlled; Operation's Manager; 30 days D. Emergency; Shift Engineer; 14 days Answer:
D. Emergency; Shift Engineer; 14 days Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because this is considered an emergency T-alt and the approvals must be completed by the OSRC within 14 days.
Distracter B is incorrect because the Shift Engineer must concur with the SM to install the T-alt.
Distracter C is incorrect because the Shift Engineer must concur with the SM to install the T-alt, the approvals must be completed by the OSRC within 14 days and this is not a procedurally installed T-alt.
References OP 1000.028, Control of Temporary Alterations, Steps 6.1.1 and 6.6.1.
ASLP-RO-MNTC OBJ 12, Describe the process of emergency temporary alteration implementation Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/17/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0529 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.2 Section:
3.5 Type CONTAINMENT System CONTAINMENT IODINE REMOVAL System 027 K/A: 2.4.4 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group: 2 SRO Imp: 4.3 Description Emergency Procedures/Plan Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
Question # 91 Given the following:
- The plant was tripped due to a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
- All four Containment Fan Coolers are running in the Emergency Mode.
- RWT level is 71% and slowly dropping.
- A plant cooldown has been commenced.
- Containment pressure peaked at 28 psia and has lowered to 21.5 psia.
- Containment temperature peaked at 165°F and has lowered to 121°F.
Which of the following is TRUE concerning the Containment Spray system?
A. Containment Spray termination criteria IS satisfied and the CSAS should be RESET and Spray pumps secured.
B. Containment Spray termination criteria IS NOT satisfied until the TSC determines the system is not required for Containment Iodine Removal.
C. Containment Spray termination criteria IS satisfied but one train should be left in service for Core Heat removal after a RAS.
D. Containment Spray termination criteria IS NOT satisfied until Containment Pressure and Temperature are back within Mode 3 TS limits.
Answer:
B. Containment Spray termination criteria IS NOT satisfied until the TSC determines the system is not required for Containment Iodine Removal.
Notes:
Continued CNTMT Spray operation may be desirable to reduce offsite doses from airborne iodine activity in Containment. The TSC will perform dose assessment around the site and give the control room notice when Containment Spray is no longer needed for Iodine removal.
Distracter A is incorrect because all of the termination criteria is not met.
Distracter C is incorrect because all of the termination criteria is not met.
Distracter D is incorrect because the termination criteria for Containment temperature and pressure are met in the LOCA EOP well above the TS LCO limits.
References EOP 2202.003, LOCA, Step 18 and the note above step 18.
TG 2202.003, LOCA TG, Step 18.
A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ 6, Given a set of plant conditions during a LOCA, demonstrate understanding of the LOCA EOP and ability to use the LOCA EOP to control the plant.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/17/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0530 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
3.8 Type PLANT SERVICE System CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM System 029 K/A: A2.01 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group: 2 SRO Imp: 3.6 Description Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Containment Purge System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Maintenance or other activity taking place inside containment.
Question # 92 Given the following:
- The plant is in Mode 6 with Core Alterations in progress
- The Containment Purge system is in operation
- The Equipment and Personnel Hatches are Open but capable of being Closed
- I&C is performing maintenance on the Auxiliary Building 2VEF8A/B Exhaust Radiation Monitor 2RE-8245 when they inadvertently de-energize the Containment Purge Exhaust Radiation Monitor 2RE-8233
- All attempts to restore power to 2RE-8233 have failed.
- Containment Purge Exhaust SPING 5 is Operable and in service.
Which one of the following actions should be taken for these conditions?
A. Secure Containment Purge, Close the Isolation Valves, Close the Equipment and Personnel Hatches, Core Alterations can continue without interruption as long as SPING 5 is Operable.
B. Continue with Containment Purge and Core Alterations since the Containment Purge Isolations will automatically close on a High Activity signal from SPING 5.
C. Immediately Suspend Core Alterations since the automatic closure function of the Containment Purge Isolation Valves is inoperable. Core Alterations may be restarted after Purge has been secured.
D. Restore the Containment Purge Exhaust Radiation Monitor 2RE-8233 to Operable status within one hour or Suspend Core Alterations in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Answer:
C. Immediately Suspend Core Alterations since the automatic closure function of the Containment Purge Isolation Valves is inoperable. Core Alterations may be restarted after Purge has been secured.
Notes:
Distracter A is incorrect because core alteration should be suspended until the purge containment isolations are verified closed.
Distracter B is incorrect because the SPING does not provide auto closure of the containment isolation valves.
Distracter D is incorrect because the TS action is to immediately suspend core alteration if a References T.S. 3.9.4, Containment Building Penetrations, LCO c.1 and ACTION.
T.S. 3.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, Table 3.3-6, Action 16.a STM 2-09, Containment Cooling and Purge Systems, Sections 7.3.1, 7.5.1, 7.6, 7.7, and 9.2.
A2LP-RO-CVENT OBJ. 15, Describe the conditions required to satisfy the TS LCOs and TRM TROs associated with the Containment Ventilation System including the basis for each LCO/TRO.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/17/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0531 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
IH BANK 6922 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.5 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
3.4 Type RCS HEAT REMOVAL System STEAM GENERATOR System 035 K/A: A2.02 SRO Tier: 2 SRO Group: 2 SRO Imp: 4.4 Description Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the S/GS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Reactor trip/turbine trip.
Question # 93 Given the following plant conditions:
- The plant trips from full power due to a COMPLETE loss of offsite power.
- #1 EDG has failed to start.
- #2 EDG has started and tied onto 2A4.
- SPTAs are in progress.
- Both MSIVs have been closed.
- Steam Generator pressures are 1070 psia each controlling on Main Steam Safeties.
Which ONE of the following actions could be taken from the control room to restore Steam Generator pressure control to the normal shutdown operating band of 950 to 1050 psia?
A. Control the A SG pressure using the A SG Upstream Atmospheric Dump Valve, 2CV-1001.
B. Control the B SG pressure using the B SG Upstream Atmospheric Dump Valve, 2CV-1051.
C. Control the A SG pressure using the A SG Upstream Atmospheric Dump Valve Isolation Valve, 2CV-1002.
D. Control the B SG pressure using the B SG Upstream Atmospheric Dump Valve Isolation Valve, 2CV-1052.
Answer:
C. Control the A SG pressure using the A SG Upstream Atmospheric Dump Valve Isolation Valve, 2CV-1002.
Notes:
The power supply to the A SG upstream ADV MOV isolation is powered from the Green or B train of vital power so it is available to modulate open and closed from the control room handswitch.
Distracters A and B are incorrect because both SG upstream Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) fail open on loss of instrument air so they would not be available for pressure control.
Distracter D is incorrect because the power supply to the B SG upstream ADV MOV isolation is powered from the Red or A train of vital power so it is not available.
References STM 2-23, SDBCS, Section 2.12 STM 2-15, Main Steam and SG System, Section 3.2.3 and figure on page 59 EOP 2202.007, LOOP EOP, Step 22 A2LP-RO-ELOOP OBJ. 3, Given a set of plant conditions determine which floating steps should be implemented for the Loss Of Offsite Power optimal recovery EOP.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/17/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0532 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.10 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS System 2.1 K/A: 2.1.13 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 2.9 Description Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital / controlled access.
Question # 94 The Shift Manager has left the Control Room to perform an OJT Instructor Evaluation and has taken the key to the Shift Manager's Key Cabinet with him.
If an emergency requires access behind a locked security gate where else could the CRS get a key to unlock the Shift Manager's Key Cabinet and issue the proper security key?
A. The Control Board Operator (Reactor) key ring.
B. The Control Board Operator (Turbine) key ring.
C. The Shift Engineer key ring.
D. The EOP watch key ring.
Answer:
A. The Control Board Operator (Reactor) key ring.
Notes:
The Control Board Operator (Reactor) key ring has a spare key to the key cabinet on it.
Distracters B, C, and D are incorrect because no one else beside the Shift Manager and the CBOR has this References OP 1015.005, Operations Key Control, Step 6.1 and Note above step 6.1.2.
ASLP-RO-SEC OBJ. 9, Describe the control requirements associated with the different types of keys maintained by Operations.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/17/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0533 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS System 2.1 K/A: 2.1.14 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.3 Description Knowledge of system status criteria which require the notification of plant personnel.
Question # 95 Given the following:
- The plant is at 100% power
- A RCP shaft shears but the plant does not trip.
- The plant is manually tripped after the shaft shear is identified.
- Reactor Engineering reports that DNBR dropped to 1.20 during this event.
Which of the following notifications should be completed?
A. Notify the Arkansas Public Service Commission within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of this condition.
B. Notify the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management within the next 15 minutes.
C. Notify all plant personnel by using the Emergency Response Notification System.
D. Notify the Vice President of ANO and Safety Review Committee within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Answer:
D. Notify the Vice President of ANO and Safety Review Committee within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Notes:
Exceeding a Safety limit requires notification of the Vice President at ANO and the SRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per TS 2.1.1 and 6.7.1.
Distracter A is incorrect because the Public Service Commission doe not need to be notified.
Distracter B is incorrect because ADEM is not notified in this case.
Distracter C is incorrect because plant personnel are not required to be notified in this case.
References T.S 2.1.1 TS 6.7.1, Safety Limit Violation A2LP-SRO-TS OBJ. 8, State the Technical Specification actions required when a safety limit is violated.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/17/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0534 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
IH BANK 10886 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System EQUIPMENT CONTROL System 2.2 K/A: 2.2.26 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.7 Description Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.
Question # 96 Given the following conditions:
- The plant is shutdown for refueling with the following conditions:
- Both Source Range neutron flux monitor are in service.
- The first three studs on the Reactor Vessel head have undergone initial detensioning.
- RCS temperature is 108°F.
- Reactor Engineer has calculated Keff and it is currently.91 Which of the following statements is correct based on the above conditions?
A. The plant is in MODE 5 and boron concentration is NOT adequate.
B. The plant is in MODE 6 and boron concentration is NOT adequate.
C. The plant is in MODE 5 and all Tech Spec concerns are satisfied.
D. The plant is in MODE 6 and all Tech Spec concerns are satisfied.
Answer:
B. The plant is in MODE 6 and boron concentration is NOT adequate.
Notes:
During Mode 6, RCS boron concentration has to be the more restrictive of <.95 Keff or 2500 ppm boron per TS 3.9.1. Detensioning the first pass of head bolts place the plant in Mode 6.
Distracter A is incorrect because the plant has shifted to Mode 6.
Distracter C is incorrect because the plant has shifted to Mode 6 and T.S. 3.9.1 is not satisfied.
Distracter D is incorrect because T.S 3.9.1 is not satisfied.
References T.S. 3.9.1, Boron Concentration for Mode 6.
NOP 2502.001, Refueling Shuffle, Step 6.35.
NOP2504.007, Stud Detensioning, Step 6.3.
A2LP-RO-FH OBJ. 5.0, Given a set of plant conditions associated with fuel handling, evaluate Technical Specification and Technical Requirement entry conditions and describe any LCO actions that may be required.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/18/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0535 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: K Source: INPO EXAM BANK Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: 41.12 10CFR55_43: 43.4 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System RADIATION CONTROL System 2.3 K/A: 2.3.1 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.0 Description Knowledge of 10 CFR 20 and related facility radiation control requirements.
Question # 97 The following plant conditions exist:
- A Site Area Emergency has been declared.
- You are the Shift Manager and still have Emergency Direction and Control.
- You have waived a plant worker's Federal 10CFR20 TEDE dose limit and directed him to perform a life saving activity in an emergency situation.
Which one of the following is the maximum emergency TEDE dose you can authorize the plant worker to receive in accordance with OP 1903.033, Protective Action Guidelines for Rescue/Repair and Damage Control Teams, if he is directed to perform this life saving activity?
A. 5 Rem B. 10 Rem C. 25 Rem D. 50 Rem Answer:
C. 25 Rem Notes:
25 Rem is the maximum limit for lifesaving if the individual does not volunteer and has to be directed to perform the activity.
Distracter A is incorrect because this is the limit that can be authorized to perform all activities.
Distracter B is incorrect because this is the limit that can be authorized to protect valuable property.
Distracter D is incorrect because it is more than the maximum limit.
References OP 1903.033, Protective Action Guidelines for Rescue/Repair and Damage Control Teams, Section 6.1.3 and Attachment 2.
ASLP-EP-A0025 OBJ. 25.5, Identify the 10CFR20 emergency dose limit requirements for emergency Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/18/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0536 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
NEW Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.4 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System RADIATION CONTROL System 2.3 K/A: 2.3.8 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.2 Description Knowledge of the process for performing a planned gaseous radioactive release.
Question # 98 Given the following:
- The plant is at full power at the end of a cycle preparing to shutdown in 1 week.
- A Unit 2 Gaseous Release Permit has been issued for Gas Decay Tank (GDT) 2T-18A
- The source check on the GDT Vent Line Radiation Monitor 2RITS-2429 has failed.
- The radiation monitor will not come off of the low end of the scale.
- The Shift Manager has declared 2RITS-2429 inoperable Which of the following statements is TRUE concerning the release of 2T-18A?
A. The release CAN proceed as long as an independent verification of the discharge path valve lineup and an independent sample of 2T-18A activity is analyzed first.
B. The release CAN proceed as planned as long as the Auxiliary Building Exhaust Dose Assessment SPING 6 is operable to monitor the activity being released.
C. The release CANNOT proceed until 2RITS-2429 has been returned to Operable status in accordance with ODCM L2.2.1 requirements.
D. The release CANNOT proceed because the discharge flow path cannot be aligned with 2RITS-2429 failed off scale Low.
Answer:
A. The release CAN proceed as long as an independent verification of the discharge path valve lineup and an independent sample of 2T-18A activity is analyzed first.
Notes:
Distracter B is incorrect because the SPING does not automatically shutoff the release on high activity and this is not allowed without independent samples and lineup.
Distracter C is incorrect because the release can still be completed with independent samples and lineup.
Distracter D is incorrect because the interlock to isolate the discharge flowpath will only occur on a high radiation signal or the rad monitor failing high.
References NOP 2104.022, Supplement 1, Unit 2 Gaseous Release Permit, Step 3.16 STM 2-54, Section 4.0, TS/TRM/ODCM L.2.2.1 A2LP-RO-RWST, OBJ. 9, Describe the Technical Specifications and Offsite Does Calculation Manual Requirements associated with the following Radwaste Systems. Gaseous Rad Waste System Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/18/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0537 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: K Source: INPO EXAM BANK Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN System 2.4 K/A: 2.4.30 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 3.6 Description Knowledge of which events related to system operations/status should be reported to outside agencies.
Question # 99 Given the following conditions:
(Reference Provided)
- Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- Air in leakage to the condenser has resulted in steadily degrading condenser vacuum.
- A load reduction is in progress in order to maintain vacuum.
- With the unit at approximately 85% power, vacuum degrades rapidly causing a Turbine Trip and the Reactor Trips on high RCS pressure.
- All systems function as designed.
Which of the following is TRUE concerning the notification requirements for this event?
A. The NRC must be notified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> due to the Reactor Trip at power.
B. The State/County agencies must be notified within 15 minutes of the trip due to a NUE.
C. ENTERGY Dispatcher must be notified within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in order to ensure grid stability.
D. No notifications to any outside agencies are required for these conditions.
Answer:
A. The NRC must be notified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> due to actuation of the Reactor Protection System.
Notes:
Distracter B is incorrect because this is not a NUE Emergency Action Level Classification.
Distracter C is incorrect because the dispatcher can see the loss of electrical supply and respond immediately.
Distracter D is incorrect because the NRC must be notified with in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> IAW 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2).
This question will require the trainee to have a copy of the REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET-1015.047-ATT-A as a reference.
References OP-1015.047-ATT-A, REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET ASLP-RO-REPRT OBJ. 11, For a given condition, using appropriate procedures, documents and/or Reportability Evaluation Assistance Program (REAP), determine the immediate Reportability.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/18/2004.
Questions For 2005 ANO UNIT 2 SRO Exam BANK 0538 Rev 0
Rev Date: 11/7/2004 RO Select: No SRO Select: Yes Points: 1.00 Lic Level:
S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: AP Source:
IH BANK 12749 Originator COBLE 10CFR55_41: NA 10CFR55_43: 43.5 Section:
2 Type GENERIC K&As System EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN System 2.4 K/A: 2.4.41 SRO Tier: 3 SRO Group: NA SRO Imp: 4.1 Description Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.
Question # 100 Consider the following:
(Reference Provided)
- A fire occurs in the Unit 2 Control Room causing severe damage to 2C16 and 2C17.
- The SM determines that an Alternate Shutdown is necessary.
- Actions are taken in accordance 2203.014, Alternate Shutdown Procedure
- 20 minutes later there is no EFW flow to either steam generator.
Given the above plant conditions, determine the appropriate Emergency Action Level Classification:
A. Notification of Unusual Event.
B. Alert.
C. Site Area Emergency.
D. General Emergency.
Answer:
C. Site Area Emergency.
Notes:
Since the Control Room has to be evacuated due to the fire and local control of EFW which is a shutdown system, then a SAE should be declared. Main feedwater Pumps are tripped per 2203.014.
Distracter A is incorrect because the Control room is evacuated which is an ALERT as a minimum.
Distracter B is incorrect because local control of a shutdown system has not been established in 15 minutes.
Distracter D is incorrect because there is no release in progress that would warrant an upgrade to a General Emergency.
References AOP 2203.014, Alternate Shutdown, Entry Conditions and Steps 3.C and 13.
OP 1903.010, Emergency Action Level Classification (EAL) Attachment 4, EAL 6.6 and 6.7.
A2LP-RO-EPLAN OBJ. 6, Using references and given various plant conditions, determine the appropriate Emergency Action Level and Emergency Class.
Historical This question has not been used on any previous NRC exams. BNC 11/18/2004.