ML043500309

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Technical Specification (TS) Bases Change
ML043500309
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, McGuire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/06/2004
From: Gordon Peterson
Duke Power Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML043500309 (38)
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Text

Duke GARY R. PETERSON MrPowere Vice President A Duke Energy Company McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Power MG0I VP / 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-9340 704 875 5333 December 6, 2004 704 875 4809 fax grpeters@duke-energy.com U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Duke Energy Corporation McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Technical Specification (TS) Bases Change Attached is a revision to McGuire Technical Specification Bases Manual Sections 3.1.7 "Rod Position Indication, 3.6.10 "Annulus Ventilation System", and 3.7.9 "Control Room Area Ventilation System".

Revisions were incorporated into TS Bases 3.1.7 to provide clarification regarding the accuracy of the Rod Position Indication System.

TS Bases 3.6.10 and 3.7.9 were revised to further clarify the operability requirements associated with the heaters of the Annulus Ventilation System and the Control Room Area Ventilation.

System.

Attachment 1 contains the revised TS Bases List of Effective Sections. Attachment 2 contains revised TS Bases.

Please contact Mike Wilder at (704) 875-5362 if you have any questions.

Very truly yours,

/6I G. R. Peterson Attachments www. duke-energy. corn

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 6, 2004 Page 2 Xc w/attachments:

W. D. Travers U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 J. J. Shea (addressee only)

NRC Senior Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mail Stop O-8H12 Washington, D.C. 20555 Xc wo/attachments:

J. B. Brady Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Station

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 6, 2004 Page 3 Bc w/attachments:

ELL (ECO50)

Kay Crane McGuire Master File 1.3.2.12

ATTACHMENT 1 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION / BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS

McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specifications List of Affected Pages / Sections Page Number Amendment Revision Date i 184/166 9/30/98 ii 184/166 9/30/98 iii 184/166 9/30/98 iv 184/166 9/30/98 1.1-1 184/166 9/30/98 1.1-2 184/166 9/30/98 1.1-3 206/187 8/23/02 1.1-4 194/175 9/18/00 1.1-5 206/187 8/23/02 1.1-6 206/187 8/23/02 1.1-7 194/175 9/18/00 1.2-1 184/166 9/30/98 1.2-2 184/166 9/30/98 1.2-3 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-1 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-2 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-3 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-4 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-5 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-6 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-7 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-8 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-9 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-10 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-11 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-12 184/166 9/30/98 1.3-13 184/166 9/30/98 1.4-1 184/166 9/30/98 1.4-2 184/166 9/30/98 1.4-3 184/166 9/30/98 1.4-4 184/166 9/30/98 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page I Revision 57

Page Number Amendment Revision Date 2.0-1 219/201 1/14/04 3.0-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.0-2 221/203 4/29/04 3.0-3 221/203 4/29/04 3.0-4 205/186 8/12/02 3.0-5 221/203 4/29/04 3.1.1-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.2-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.2-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.3-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.3-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.3-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.4-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.4-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.4-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.4-4 186/167 9/8/99 3.1.5-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.5-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.6-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.6-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.6-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.7-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.7-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.8-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.1.8-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.2.1-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.2.1-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.2.1-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.2.1-4 188/169 9/22/99 3.2.1-5 188/169 9/22/99 3.2.2-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.2.2-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.2.2-3 184/166 9/30/98 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 2 Revision 57

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Page Number Amendment Revision Date 3.2.2-4 188/169 9/22/99 3.2.3-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.2.4-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.2.4-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.2.4-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.2.4-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-3 216/197 7/29/03 3.3.1-4 216/197 7/29103 3.3.1-5 184/166 9/30198 3.3.1-6 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-7 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-8 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-9 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-10 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-11 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-12 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-13 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.1-14 194/175 9118/00 3.3.1-15 222/204 6/21/04 3.3.1-16 194/175 9/18/00 3.3.1-17 194/175 9/18/00 3.3.1-18 219/201 1/14/04 3.3.1-19 219/201 1/14/04 3.3.1-20 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.2-1 1841166 9/30/98 3.3.2-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.2-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.2-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.2-5 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.2-6 198/179 4/12/01 3.3.2-7 198/179 4/12/01 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 3 Revision 57

Page Number Amendment Revision Date 3.3.2-8 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.2-9 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.2-10 220/202 3/18/04 3.3.2-11 220/202 3/18/04 3.3.2-12 220/202 3/18/04 3.3.2-13 220/202 3/18/04 3.3.2-14 220/202 3/18/04 3.3.3-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.3.3-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.3-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.3-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.4-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.3.4-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.4-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.5-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.5-2 194/175 9/18/00 3.3.6-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.6-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.3.6-3 194/175 9/18/00 3.4.1-1 219/201 1/14/04 3.4.1-2 219/201 1/14/04 3.4.1-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.1-4 219/201 1/14/04 3.4.2-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.3-1 214/195 7/3/03 3.4.3-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.3-3 214/195 7/3/03 3.4.3-4 214/195 7/3/03 3.4.3-5 214/195 7/3/03 3.4.3-6 214/195 7/3/03 3.4.3-7 214/195 7/3/03 3.4.3-8 214/195 7/3/03 3.4.4-1 184/166 9/30/98 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 4 Revision 57

Page Number Amendment Revision Date 3.4.5-1 216/197 7/29/03 3.4.5-2 216/197 7/29/03 3.4.5-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.6-1 216/197 7/29/03 3.4.6-2 216/197 7/29/03 3.4.7-1 216/197 7/29/03 3.4.7-2 216/197 7/29/03 3.4.7-3 216/197 7/29/03 3.4.8-1 216/197 7/29/03 3.4.8-2 216/197 7/29/03 3.4.9-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.9-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.10-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.10-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.4-11-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.4.11-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.4-11-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.11-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.12-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.12-2 221/203 4/29/04 3.4.12-3 214/195 7/3/03 3.4.12-4 214/195 7/3/03 3.4.12-5 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.12-6 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.13-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.13-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.14-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.14-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.14-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.14-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.15-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.4.15-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.15-3 184/166 9/30/98 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 5 Revision 57

Page Number Amendment Revision Date 3.4.16-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.4.16-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.16-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.16-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.4.17-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.5.1-1 218/200 12/23/03 3.5.1-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.5.2-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.5.2-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.5.2-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.5.3-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.5.3-2 184/166 9/30198 3.5.4-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.5.4-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.5.5-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.5.5-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.1-1 207/188 9/4/02 3.6.1-2 207/188 9/4/02 3.6.2-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.2-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.2-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.2-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.2-5 207/188 9/4/02 3.6.3-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.3-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.3-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.3-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.3-5 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.3-6 207/188 9/4/02 3.6.3-7 207/188 9/4/02 3.6.4-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.5-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.5-2 184/166 9/30/98 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 6 Revision 57

0-Page Number Amendment Revision Date 3.6.6-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.6-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.7-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.6.7-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.8-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.6.8-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.9-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.9-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.10-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.10-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.11-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.11-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.12-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.12-2 217/199 9/29/03 3.6.12-3 217/199 9/29/03 3.6.13-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.13-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.13-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.14-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.14-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.14-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.15-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.15-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.6.16-1 212/193 5/8/03 3.6.16-2 212/193 5/8/03 3.7.1-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.1-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.1-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.2-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.2-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.3-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.3-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.4-1 221/203 4/29/04 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 7 Revision 57

Page Number Amendment Revision Date 3.7.4-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.5-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.7.5-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.5-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.5-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.6-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.6-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.7-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.7-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.8-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.8-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.9-1 187/168 9/22/99 3.7.9-2 187/168 9/22/99 3.7.9-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.10-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.10-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.11-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.11-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.12-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.12-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.13-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.14-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.7.15-1 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-2 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-3 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-4 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-5 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-6 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-7 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-8 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-9 210/191 2/4/03 3.7.15-10 210/191 2/4/03 3.7.15-11 210/191 2/4/03 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 8 Revision 57

Page Number Amendment Revision Date 3.7.15-12 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-13 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-14 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-15 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-16 210/191 2/4/03 3.7.15-17 210/191 2/4/03 3.7.15-18 210/191 2/4/03 3.7.15-19 210/191 2/4/03 3.7.15-20 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.15-21 197/178 11/27/00 3.7.16-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-1 221/203 4/29/04 3.8.1-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-5 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-6 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-7 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-8 192/173 3/15/00 3.8.1-9 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-10 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-11 192/173 3/15/00 3.8.1-12 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-13 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-14 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.1-15 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.2-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.2-2 216/197 7/29/03 3.8.2-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.3-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.3-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.3-3 215/196 8/4/03 3.8.4-1 184/166 9/30/98 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 9 Revision 57

Page Number Amendment Revision Date 3.8.4-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.4-3 209/190 12/17/02 3.8.5-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.5-2 216/197 7/29/03 3.8.6-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.6-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.6-3 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.6-4 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.7-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.8-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.8-2 216/197 7/29/03 3.8.9-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.9-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.8.10-1 216/197 7/29/03 3.8.10-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.9.1-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.9.2-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.9.3-1 216/197 7/29/03 3.9.3-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.9.4-1 184/166 9/30/98 3.9.4-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.9.5-1 216/197 7/29/03 3.9.5-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.9.6-1 216/197 7/29/03 3.9.6-2 184/166 9/30/98 3.9.7-1 184/166 9/30/98 4.0.1 222/204 6/21/04 4.0.2 197/178 11/27/00 5.1-1 213/194 6/6/03 5.2-1 184/166 9/30/98 5.2-2 184/166 9/30/98 5.2-3 213/194 6/6/03 5.3-1 213/194 6/6/03 McGuire Units I and 2 Page 10 Revision 57

Page Number Amendment Revision Date 5.4-1 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-1 212/193 5/8/03 5.5-2 212/193 5/8/03 5.5-3 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-4 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-5 223/205 8/5/04 5.5-6 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-7 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-8 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-9 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-10 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-11 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-12 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-13 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-14 196/177 11/2/00 5.5-15 184/166 9/30/98 5.5-16 215/196 8/4/03 5.5-17 215/196 8/4/03 5.5-18 184/166 9/30/98 5.6-1 184/166 9/30/98 5.6-2 219/201 1/14/04 5.6-3 219/201 1/14/04 5.6-4 . 203/184 7/10/02 5.6-5 184/166 9/30/98 5.7-1 213/194 6/6/03 5.7-2 184/166 9/30/98 BASES (Revised per section) i Revision 0 9/30/98 ii Revision 0 9/30/98 iii Revision 0 9/30/98 B 2.1.1 Revision 51 1/14/04 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page I 1 Revision 57

Page Number Amendment Revision Date B 2.1.2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.0 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.1.1 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.1.2 Revision 10 9/22/00 B 3.1.3 Revision 10 9/22/00 B 3.1.4 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.1.5 Revision 19 1/10/02 B 3.1.6 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.1.7 Revision 58 06/23/04 B 3.1.8 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.2.1 Revision 34 10/1/02 B 3.2.2 Revision 10 9/22/00 B 3.2.3 Revision 34 10/1/02 B 3.2.4 Revision 10 9/22/00 B 3.3.1 Revision 53 2/17/04 B 3.3.2 Revision 55 3/18/04 B 3.3.3 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.3.4 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.3.5 Revision 11 9/18/00 B 3.3.6 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.1 Revision 51 1/14/04 B 3.4.2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.3 Revision 44 7/3/03 B 3.4.4 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.5 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.4.6 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.4.7 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.4.8 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.4.9 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.10 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.11 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.4.12 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.4.13 Revision 53 2/17/04 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 12 Revision 57

Page Number Amendment Revision Date B 3.4.14 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.15 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.4.16 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.4.17 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.5.1 Revision 48 12/23/03 B 3.5.2 Revision 45 8/20/03 B 3.5.3 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.5.4 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.5.5 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.1 Revision 53 2/17/04 B 3.6.2 Revision 32 10/4/02 B 3.6.3 Revision 32 10/4/02 B 3.6.4 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.5 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.6 Revision 0 9130/98 B 3.6.7 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.6.8 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.6.9 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.10 Revision 43 5/28/03 B 3.6.11 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.12 Revision 53 2/17/04 B 3.6.13 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.14 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.15 Revision 0 9/30198 B 3.6.16 Revision 40 5/8103 B 3.7.1 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.3 Revision 0 9/30198 B 3.7.4 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.7.5 Revision 60 10/12/04 B 3.7.6 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.7 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.8 Revision 0 9/30/98 McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 13 Revision 57

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Page Number Amendment Revision Date B 3.7.9 Revision 43 5/28/03 B 3.7.10 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.11 Revision 39 3/19/03 B 3.7.12 Revision 28 5/17/02 B 3.7.13 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.14 Revision 52 1/7/04 B 3.7.15 Revision 52 1/7/04 B 3.7.16 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.8.1 Revision 57 4/29/04 B 3.8.2 Revision 49 10/22/03 B 3.8.3 Revision 53 2/17/04 B 3.8.4 Revision 36 12/17/02 B 3.8.5 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.8.6 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.8.7 Revision 20 1/10/02 B 3.8.8 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.8.9 Revision 24 2/4/02 B 3.8.10 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.9.1 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.9.2 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.9.3 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.9.4 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.9.5 Revision 59 7/29/04 B 3.9.6 Revision 41 7/29/03 B 3.9.7 Revision 0 9/30/98 McGuire Units I and 2 Page 14 Revision 57

ATTACHMENT 2 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES 3.1.7, 3.6.10, 3.7.9

V -

Rod Position Indication B 3.1.7 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM B 3.1.7 Rod Position Indication BASES BACKGROUND According to GDC 13 (Ref. 1), instrumentation to monitor variables and systems over their operating ranges during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident conditions must be OPERABLE.

LCO 3.1.7 is required to ensure OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The OPERABILITY, including position indication, of the shutdown and control rods is an initial assumption in all safety analyses that assume rod insertion upon reactor trip. Maximum rod misalignment is an initial assumption in the safety analysis that directly affects core power distributions and assumptions of available SDM. Rod position indication is required to assess OPERABILITY and misalignment.

Mechanical or electrical failures may cause a control rod to become inoperable or to become misaligned from its group. Control rod inoperability or misalignment may cause increased power peaking, due to the asymmetric reactivity distribution and a reduction in the total available rod worth for reactor shutdown. Therefore, control rod alignment and OPERABILITY are related to core operation in design power peaking limits and the core design requirement of a minimum SDM.

Limits on control rod alignment and OPERABILITY are established in LCO 3.1.4, "Rod Group Alignment Limits," and all rod positions are monitored and controlled during power operation to ensure that the power distribution and reactivity limits defined by the design power peaking and SDM limits are preserved.

Rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs), or rods, are moved out of the core (up or withdrawn) or into the core (down or inserted) by their control rod drive mechanisms. The RCCAs are divided among control banks and shutdown banks. Each bank may be further subdivided into two groups to provide for precise reactivity control.

The axial position of shutdown rods and control rods are determined by two separate and independent systems: the Bank Demand Position Indication System (commonly called group step counters) and the Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) System.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.1.7-1 Revision No. 58

Rod Position Indication B 3.1.7 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

The Bank Demand Position Indication System counts the pulses from the Rod Control System that move the rods. There is one step counter for each group of rods. Individual rods in a group all receive the same signal to move and should, therefore, all be at the same position indicated by the group step counter for that group. The Bank Demand Position Indication System is considered highly precise

(+/- 1 step or +/- 5/8 inch). If a rod does not move one step for each demand pulse, the step counter will still count the pulse and incorrectly reflect the position of the rod.

The DRPI System provides a highly accurate indication of actual control rod position, but at a lower precision than the step counters.

This system is based on inductive analog signals from a series of coils spaced along a hollow tube with a center to center distance of 3.75 inches, which is 6 steps. To increase the reliability of the system, the inductive coils are connected alternately to data channel A or B. Thus creating two separate and independent channels (Data A and Data B). Also, the coils are not placed at the reflected six step increments starting at rod bottom. Because of this arrangement, the nominal accuracy of the system is +/- 3 steps indicated versus true rod position. Due to mechanical positioning of the coils on the rod position detector and expansion in containment atmosphere, another +/- 1 step is added to system accuracy making it

+/- 4 steps.

If one channel fails, the DRPI will go to half accuracy. The accuracy will be - 10, + 4 steps when either channel fails. Therefore, the maximum deviation between the group demand counters and DRPI could be 10 steps, or 6.25 inches.

Gray code (A & B data from the data cabinets in containment) is sent to the DRPI equipment in the control room. The gray code is processed by the DRPI equipment and the rod position is displayed on the control board. The gray code is also sent from the DRPI equipment to the Operator Aid Computer (OAC), where it is processed by the OAC and the rod position is displayed on the OAC.

The processing of the gray code by the DRPI equipment and the OAC are completely independent. Therefore, both the DRPI display and the OAC DRPI indication are considered valid indications of control rod position.

APPLICABLE Control and shutdown rod position accuracy is essential during SAFETY ANALYSES power operation. Power peaking, ejected rod worth, or SDM limits may be violated in the event of a Design Basis Accident (Ref. 2), with control or shutdown rods operating outside their limits undetected.

Therefore, the acceptance criteria for rod position indication is that rod positions must be known with sufficient accuracy in order to verify McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.1.7-2 Revision No. 58

Rod Position Indication B 3.1.7 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) the core is operating within the group sequence, overlap, design peaking limits, ejected rod worth, and with at least minimum SDM (LCO 3.1.5, "Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits,' and LCO 3.1.6, mControl Bank Insertion Limits"). The rod positions must also be known in order to verify the alignment limits are preserved (LCO 3.1.4, "Rod Group Alignment Limits"). Control rod positions are continuously monitored to provide operators with information that ensures the plant is operating within the bounds of the accident analysis assumptions.

The control rod position indicator channels satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3). The control rod position indicators monitor control rod position, which is an initial condition of the accident.

LCO LCO 3.1.7 specifies that one DRPI System (either A or B Channel) and one Bank Demand Position Indication System be OPERABLE for each control rod. For the control rod position indicators to be OPERABLE requires meeting the SR of the LCO and the following:

a. The DRPI System indicates within 12 steps of the group step counter demand position as required by LCO 3.1.4, 'Rod Group Alignment Limits";
b. For the DRPI System either Data A or Data B is operable for each rod; and
c. The Bank Demand Indication System has been calibrated either in the fully inserted position or to the DRPI System.

The 12 step agreement limit between the Bank Demand Position Indication System and the DRPI System indicates that the Bank Demand Position Indication System is adequately calibrated, and can be used for indication of the measurement of control rod bank position.

A deviation of less than the allowable limit, given in LCO 3.1.4, in position indication for a single control rod, ensures high confidence that the position uncertainty of the corresponding control rod group is within the assumed values used in the analysis (that specified control rod group insertion limits).

These requirements ensure that control rod position indication during power operation and PHYSICS TESTS is accurate, and that design assumptions are not challenged.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.1.7-3 Revision No. 58

Rod Position Indication B 3.1.7 BASES LCO (continued)

OPERABILITY of the position indicator systems ensures that inoperable, misaligned, or mispositioned control rods can be detected. Therefore, power peaking, ejected rod worth, and SDM can be controlled within acceptable limits.

APPLICABILITY The requirements on the DRPI and step counters are only applicable in MODES 1 and 2 (consistent with LCO 3.1.4, LCO 3.1.5, and LCO 3.1.6), because these are the only MODES in which power is generated, and the OPERABILITY and alignment of rods have the potential to affect the safety of the plant. In the shutdown MODES, the OPERABILITY of the shutdown and control banks has the potential to affect the required SDM, but this effect can be compensated for by an increase in the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable rod position indicator per group and each demand position indicator per bank. This is acceptable because the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable position indicator.

A.1 When the DRPI channels (Data A and Data B) for one rod per group, for one or more groups fails, the position of the rods can still be determined by use of the incore movable detectors. Based on experience, normal power operation does not require excessive movement of banks. If a bank has been significantly moved, the Required Action of B.1 or B.2 below is required. Therefore, verification of RCCA position within the Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is adequate for allowing continued full power operation, since the probability of simultaneously having a rod significantly out of position and an event sensitive to that rod position is small.

A.2 Reduction of THERMAL POWER to

  • 50% RTP puts the core into a condition where rod position is not significantly affecting core peaking factors (Ref. 4).

The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reducing power to < 50% RTP from full power conditions without challenging plant systems and allowing for rod position determination by Required Action A.1 above.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.1.7-4 Revision No. 58

Rod Position Indication B 3.1.7 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2 These Required Actions clarify that when one or more rods with inoperable position indicators have been moved in excess of 24 steps in one direction, since the position was last determined, the Required Actions of A.1 and A.2 are still appropriate but must be initiated promptly under Required Action B.1 to begin verifying that these rods are still properly positioned, relative to their group positions.

If, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, the rod positions have not been determined, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 50% RTP within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to avoid undesirable power distributions that could result from continued operation at > 50% RTP, if one or more rods are misaligned by more than 24 steps. The allowed Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> provides an acceptable period of time to verify the rod positions.

C.1.1 and C.1.2 With one demand position indicator per bank inoperable, the rod positions can be determined by the DRPI System. Since normal power operation does not require excessive movement of rods, verification by administrative means that the rod position indicators are OPERABLE and the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod are

  • 12 steps apart within the allowed Completion Time of once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is adequate. Since DRPI is the only operable rod position indication, administrative means are actions taken by the control room SRO to assure that the DRPI for the affected bank remains operable at all times. These administrative means would prevent any maintenance or testing of the operable DRPI for the affected bank until the inoperable demand position indicator is returned to operable status.

C.2 Reduction of THERMAL POWER to < 50% RTP puts the core into a condition where rod position is not significantly affecting core peaking factor limits (Ref. 4). The allowed Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> provides an acceptable period of time to verify the rod positions per Required Actions C.1.1 and C.1.2 or reduce power to < 50% RTP.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.1.7-5 Revision No. 58

Rod Position Indication B 3.1.7 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

D.1 If the Required Actions cannot be completed within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.7.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that the DRPI agrees with the demand position within 12 steps ensures that the DRPI is operating correctly.

This Surveillance is performed prior to reactor criticality after each removal of the reactor head as there is the potential for unnecessary plant transients if the SR were performed with the reactor at power.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 13.

2. UFSAR, Section 15.0.
3. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
4. UFSAR, Section 15.4 McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.1.7-6 Revision No. 58

AVS B 3.6.10 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.10 Annulus Ventilation System (AVS)

BASES BACKGROUND The AVS is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref. 1), to ensure that radioactive materials that leak from the primary containment into the reactor building (secondary containment) following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) are filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to the environment.

The containment has a secondary containment called the reactor building, which is a concrete structure that surrounds the steel primary containment vessel. Between the containment vessel and the reactor building inner wall is an annulus that collects any containment leakage that may occur following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or rod ejection accident. This space also allows for periodic inspection of the outer surface of the steel containment vessel.

The AVS establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the reactor building and the steel containment vessel. Filters in the system then control the release of radioactive contaminants to the environment.

Reactor building OPERABILITY is required to ensure retention of primary containment leakage and proper operation of the AVS.

The AVS consists of two separate and redundant trains. Each train includes a heater, mechanical demister, a prefilter/ moisture separator, upstream and downstream high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of radioiodines, and a fan. Ductwork, valves and/or dampers, and instrumentation also form part of the system. The heaters and mechanical demisters function to reduce the moisture content of the airstream to less than 70% relative humidity. A second bank of HEPA filters follows the adsorber section to collect carbon fines and provide backup in case of failure of the main HEPA filter bank. Only the upstream HEPA filter and the charcoal adsorber section are credited in the analysis. The system initiates and maintains a negative air pressure in the reactor building annulus by means of filtered exhaust ventilation of the reactor building annulus following receipt of a Phase B isolation signal. The system is described in Reference 2.

The prefilters remove large particles in the air, and the moisture separators remove entrained water droplets present, to prevent excessive loading of the HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers. Heaters are included Revision No. 43 McGuire Units 1 and 2 1 and 2 B 3.6.10-1 B 3.6.1 0-1 Revision No. 43

AVS B 3.6.10 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) to reduce the relative humidity of the airstream. Continuous operation of each train, for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> per month, with heaters on, reduces moisture buildup on their HEPA filters and adsorbers. The mechanical demisters cool the air to keep the charcoal beds from becoming too hot due to absorption of fission product.

The AVS reduces the radioactive content in the annulus atmosphere following a DBA. Loss of the AVS could cause site boundary doses, in the event of a DBA, to exceed the values given in the licensing basis.

APPLICABLE The AVS design basis is established by the consequences of the limiting SAFETY ANALYSES DBA, which is a LOCA. The accident analysis (Ref. 3) assumes that only one train of the AVS is functional due to a single failure that disables the other train. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction in airborne radioactive material provided by the remaining one train of this filtration system. The amount of fission products available for release from containment is determined for a LOCA.

The modeled AVS actuation in the safety analyses is based upon a worst case response time following a Phase B isolation signal initiated at the limiting setpoint. The total response time, from exceeding the signal setpoint to attaining the negative pressure of 0.5 inch water gauge in the reactor building annulus, is 22 seconds. The pressure then goes to -3.5 inches water within 48 seconds after the start signal is initiated. At this point the system switches into its recirculation mode of operation and pressure may increase to -0.5 inches water within 278 seconds but will not go above -0.5 inches water. This response time is composed of signal delay, diesel generator startup and sequencing time, system startup time, and time for the system to attain the required pressure after starting.

The AVS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 4).

LCO In the event of a DBA, one AVS train is required to provide the minimum particulate iodine removal assumed in the safety analysis. Two trains of the AVS must be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one train will operate, assuming that the other train is disabled by a single active failure.

Revision No. 43 and 22 Units 11 and McGuire Units B 3.6.10-2 B 3.6.1 0-2 Revision No. 43

AVS B 3.6.1 0 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could lead to fission product release to containment that leaks to the reactor building. The large break LOCA, on which this system's design is based, is a full power event. Less severe LOCAs and leakage still require the system to be OPERABLE throughout these MODES. The probability and severity of a LOCA decrease as core power and Reactor Coolant System pressure decrease. With the reactor shut down, the probability of release of radioactivity resulting from such an accident is low.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a DBA are low due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Under these conditions, the AVS is not required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS A.1 With one AVS train inoperable, the inoperable train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant AVS train and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The Completion Time is adequate to make most repairs.

B.1 and B.2 With one or more AVS heaters inoperable, the heater must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Alternatively, a report must be initiated within 7 days in accordance with Specification 5.6.6, which details the reason for the heater's inoperability and the corrective action required to return the heater to OPERABLE status.

The heaters do not affect OPERABILITY of the AVS filter train because charcoal adsorber efficiency testing is performed at 30'C and 95%

relative humidity. The accident analysis shows that site boundary radiation doses are within 10 CFR 100 limits during a DBA LOCA under these conditions.

C.1 and C.2 If the AVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.6.10-3 Revision No. 43

AVS B 3.6.10 BASES ACTIONS (continued) 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each AVS train from the control room with flow through the HEPA filters and activated carbon adsorbers ensures that all trains are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation with the heaters on for 2 10 continuous hours eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. Experience from filter testing at operating units indicates that the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> period is adequate for moisture elimination on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. Inoperable heaters are addressed by Required Actions B.1 and B.2. The inoperability of heaters between required performances of this surveillance does not affect OPERABILITY of each AVS train. The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls, the two train redundancy available, and the iodine removal capability of the Containment Spray System and Ice Condenser.

SR 3.6.1 0.2 This SR verifies that the required AVS filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The AVS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5) with exceptions as noted in the UFSAR. The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.6.1 0.3 The automatic startup on a Containment Phase B Isolation signal ensures that each AVS train responds properly. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.6.10-4 Revision No. 43

AVS B 3.6.10 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Therefore the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. Furthermore, the SR interval was developed considering that the AVS equipment OPERABILITY is demonstrated at a 31 day Frequency by SR 3.6.10.1.

SR 3.6.10.4 The AVS filter cooling electric motor-operated bypass valves are tested to verify OPERABILITY. The valves are normally closed and may need to be opened to initiate miniflow cooling through a filter unit that has been shutdown following a DBA LOCA. Miniflow cooling may be necessary to limit temperature increase in the idle filter train due to decay heat from captured fission products. The 18 month Frequency is considered to be acceptable based on valve reliability and design, and the fact that operating experience has shown that the valves usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.6.10.5 The proper functioning of the fans, dampers, filters, adsorbers, etc., as a system is verified by the ability of each train to produce the required system flow rate. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5) guidance for functional testing.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.

2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
4. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
5. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.

and 22 B 3.6.10-5 Revision No. 43 McGuire Units I1 and McGuire Units B 3.6.10-5 Revision No. 43

. ft ;

IT  ;

CRAVS B 3.7.9 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.9 Control Room Area Ventilation System (CRAVS)

BASES BACKGROUND The CRAVS provides a protected environment from which operators can control the unit following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

The CRAVS consists of two independent, redundant trains that draw in filtered outside air and mix this air with conditioned air recirculating through the Control Room area. Each outside air pressure filter train consists of a prefilter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal absorber section for removal of gaseous activity (principally iodines), and a fan. Ductwork, valves or dampers, and instrumentation also form part of the system, as well as prefilters to remove water droplets from the air stream. A second bank of HEPA filters follows the absorber section to collect carbon fines and provide backup in case of failure of the main HEPA filter bank.

The CRAVS is an emergency system. During normal operation the Control Room is provided with 100% recirculated air and the outside air pressure filter train is in the standby mode. Upon receipt of the actuating signal(s), the Control Room is provided with fresh air through outside air intakes and is circulated through the system filter trains. The prefilters remove any large particles in the air, and any entrained water droplets present, to prevent excessive loading of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Continuous operation of each train for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> per month, with the heaters on, reduces moisture buildup on the HEPA filters and adsorbers. The heater is important to the effectiveness of the charcoal adsorbers.

Actuation of the CRAVS places the system in the emergency mode of operation, depending on the initiation signal. The emergency radiation state initiates pressurization and filtered ventilation of the air supply to the control room. Pressurization of the control room prevents infiltration of unfiltered air from the surrounding areas of the building.

The air entering the outside air intakes is continuously monitored by radiation detectors. The detector output above the setpoint will cause actuation of the emergency radiation state.

A single train will pressurize the control room to 2 0.125 inches water gauge. The CRAVS operation in maintaining the control room habitable is discussed in the UFSAR, Section 6.4 (Ref. 1).

McGuire Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.9-1 Revision No. 43

CRAVS B 3.7.9 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

Redundant supply and recirculation trains provide the required filtration should an excessive pr6ssure drop develop across the other filter train.

Normally open outside air intake isolation dampers are arranged in series pairs so that the failure of one damper to shut will not result in a breach of isolation. The CRAVS is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements.

The CRAVS is designed to maintain the control room environment for 30 days of continuous occupancy after a Design Basis Accident (DBA) without exceeding a 5 rem whole body dose or its equivalent to any part of the body.

There are components that have nomenclature associated with the CRAVS but do not perform any function that impacts the control room.

These components include the Control Room Area Air Handling units, the Switchgear Air Handling units, the Battery Room Exhaust Fans and the associated ductwork, dampers, and instrumentation. These components share the CRACWS with the CRAVS but are not governed by LCO 3.7.9.

APPLICABLE The CRAVS components are arranged in redundant, safety related SAFETY ANALYSES ventilation trains. The CRAVS provides airborne radiological protection for the control room operators, as demonstrated by the control room accident dose analyses for the most limiting design basis loss of coolant accident, fission product release presented in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2).

The worst case single active failure of a component of the CRAVS, assuming a loss of offsite power, does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function.

The CRAVS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3).

LCO Two independent and redundant CRAVS trains are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available assuming a single failure disables the other train. Total system failure could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem to the control room operator in the event of a large radioactive release.

The CRAVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to limit operator exposure are OPERABLE in both trains. A CRAVS train is OPERABLE when the associated:

McGuire Units I and 2 B 3.7.9-2 Revision No. 43

I, I CRAVS B 3.7.9 BASES LCO (continued)

a. An Outside Air Pressure Filter Train fan and a Control Room Air Handling unit are OPERABLE;
b. HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and
c. Ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.

The CRAVS is shared between the two units. The system must be OPERABLE for each unit when that unit is in the MODE of Applicability.

Additionally, both normal and emergency power must also be OPERABLE because the system is shared. If a CRAVS component becomes inoperable, or normal or emergency power to a CRAVS component becomes inoperable, then the Required Actions of this LCO must be entered independently for each unit that is in the MODE of applicability of the LCO.

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the control room boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for control room area isolation is indicated.*

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2,3, 4, 5, and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and during CORE ALTERATIONS, CRAVS must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and CORE ALTERATIONS, the CRAVS must be OPERABLE to cope with the release from a fuel handling accident.

Revision No. 43 Units 1 McGuire Units and 22 1 and BB 3.7.9-3 3.7.9-3 Revision No. 43

CRAVS B 3.7.9 BASES ACTIONS A.1 When one CRAVS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CRAVS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CRAVS train could result in loss of CRAVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CRAVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.1. C.2.1. and C.2.2 In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, if the inoperable CRAVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be taken to immediately place the OPERABLE CRAVS train in the emergency mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure would be readily detected. An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

D.1 and D.2 In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, with two CRAVS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might enter the control room. This places the B3.7.9-4 Revision No. 43 McGuire Units and 22 Units I1 and B 3.7.9-4 Revision No. 43

CRAVS B 3.7.9 BASES ACTIONS (Continued) unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

E.1 If both CRAVS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than Condition G, the CRAVS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

F.1 and F.2 Action F.1 allows one or more CRAVS heater inoperable, with the heater restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Alternatively, Action F.2 requires if the heater is not returned to OPERABLE within the 7 days, a report to be initiated per Specification 5.6.6, which details the reason for the heater's inoperability and the corrective action required to return the heater to OPERABLE status.

The heaters do not affect OPERABILITY of the CRAVS filter train because charcoal absorber efficiency testing is performed at 300C and 90

% relative humidity. The accident analysis shows that control room radiation doses are within 10 CFR 100 limits during a DBA LOCA under these conditions.

G. 1 If the control room boundary is inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4 such that the CRAVS trains can not establish or maintain the required pressure, action must be taken to restore an OPERABLE control room boundary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, the availability of the CRAVS to provide a filtered environment (albeit with potential control room inleakage), and compensatory measures available to the operator to minimize doses (e.g. self contained breathing apparatus and alternate control room air intakes).

Revision No. 43 Units 11 and McGuire Units 2 and 2 B 3.7.9-5 B 3.7.9-5 Revision No. 43

CRAVS B 3.7.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.9.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check of this system. Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. Systems with heaters must be operated from the control room for 2 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized and flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Inoperable heaters are addressed by Required Actions F.1 and F.2. The inoperability of heaters between required performances of this surveillance does not affect OPERABILITY of each CRAVS train. The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy availability.

SR 3.7.9.2 This SR verifies that the required CRAVS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CRAVS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 4).

The VFTP includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.9.3 This SR verifies that each CRAVS train starts and operates with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 18 months is specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 4).

SR 3.7.9.4 This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure, and the assumed inleakage rates of the potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the CRAVS.

During the emergency mode of operation, the CRAVS is designed to pressurize the control room 2 0.125 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to atmospheric pressure in order to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The CRAVS is designed to maintain this positive pressure with one train at a makeup flow rate of < 2200 cfm. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800 (Ref. 5).

Revision No. 43 McGuire Units and 2 Units 11 and 2 B 3.7.9-6 B 3.7.9-6 Revision No. 43

CRAVS B 3.7.9 BASES REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
3. 10 CFR 50.37, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.
5. NUREG-0800, Section 6.4, Rev. 2, July 1981.

U 1 a .uire B 2

McGuire Units I and 2 B_ 3I_.97 3.7.9-7 Revision NO. 4o

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