ML042960549

PVNGS Updated FSAR, Ldcr 02-F023, Revision 12

ML042960549
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	06/30/2003
From:	Arizona Public Service Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0307
Download: ML042960549 (13)

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PVNGS UPDATED FSAR 8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.

2.1 DESCRIPTION

The offsite power system consists of six physically independent circuits from the Arizona-New Mexico-California-Southern Nevada power grid to the PVNGS switchyard.

Offsite power from the switchyard through three startup transformers and six intermediate buses is provided to supply two physically independent preferred power circuits to the ac power distribution system of each unit.

The offsite power system is described in this section and is depicted in figures 8.1-1 and 8.2-1.

8.2.1.1 Transmission Network The transmission system associated with PVNGS supplies offsite ac power at 525 kV for startup, normal operation, and safe shutdown of Units 1, 2, and 3. The six 525 kV lines of this system, PVNGS to RUDD, PVNGS to Westwing I, PVNGS to Westwing II, PVNGS to Kyrene, PVNGS to North Gila, and PVNGS to Devers, cover distances of approximately 37, 44, 44, 74, 114, and 235 miles, respectively.

All six transmission lines associated with PVNGS traverse relatively flat terrain and their design meets grade B requirements specified by the National Electrical Safety Code, sixth edition.

The Code specifies loading areas, wind loads for towers and conductors, and safety factors to be used.

The conductors and the overhead ground wires are dampened to maintain acceptable levels of vibration.

None of the 525 kV lines associated with PVNGS cross one another.

There is a crossing of the Westwing I and Westwing II lines by 525 kV line not associated with PVNGS, approximately 43 miles from PVNGS.

June 2003 8.2-1 Revision 12 LDCR 02-F023

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM The six transmission lines associated with the PVNGS switch-yard, and their rights-of-way, are designed so as to minimize line proximities that could result in simultaneous failure of

• more than one circuit. Based oh-historical transmission system data, the frequency of occurrence for breakage of the span of line that crosses the two Westwing and Westwing lines is 1.1 x 105 per year.

In the highly unlikely event of grid instability resulting from simultaneous short-circuiting of both Westwing lines, a loss of all nonemergency AC power event could result.

This design basis event is evaluated in chapter 15.

8.2.1.2 Switchyard and Connections to the Onsite Power System Prior to the construction of PVNGS there were no transmission lines to, or transmission switchyards in the vicinity of, the site.

Construction of PVNGS includes construction of a 525 kV switchyard of the breaker-and-a-half design in which three breakers are provided for every two terminations, either line or transformers. The switchyard is connected to the six 525 kV transmission lines associated with PVNGS, the 525/24 kV tuibine-generator main transformers, and the 525/13.8 kV startup transformers, as shown in figure 8.2-2.

These figures reflect the development of the switchyard as each unit is added.

Each turbine-generator connects to the switchyard through a main transformer, a 525 kV tie line, and two 525 kV switchyard breakers, as shown in figure 8.2-2.

Physical connections between the units and the 525 kV switchyard are shown in figure 8.2-1.

June 2003 8.2-2 Revision 12 LDCR 02-F023

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM The three startup transformers connect to the switchyard through two 525 kV switchyard breakers each, and feed six 13.8 kV intermediate buses.

These buses are arranged in three pairs, each pair feeding only ode unit.

The intermediate buses for Units 1, 2,

and 3 are inter-connected to the startup transformers so that each unit's buses can access all three startup transformers when all startup transformers are connected to the switchyard.

The intermediate buses are connected to the onsite power system by one 13.8 kV transmission line per bus (two per unit).

These lines are physically separated to minimize the possibility of simultaneous failure of the lines.

8.2.1.2.1 Switchyard and Offsite Power System Development Figure 8.2-2 depicts the switchyard and 13.8 kV bus arrangements.

Necessary 525 kV breaker installation is accomplished during refueling, if possible, or during operation. All operating 525 kV positions are transferred to the opposite bus: thus, continuity of offsite power is maintained.

8.2.1.2.2 Water Reclamation Facility Load Shedding The Water Reclamation Facility loads are load shed from the Unit 1 intermediate buses upon a Unit 1 BOP ESFAS Mode 1 signal concurrent with switchyard voltage at or below a value which could result in a trip of offsite power in the event of a safe shutdown or emergency event.

June 2003 8.2-3 Revision 12

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.2.1.3 Compliance with Design Criteria and Standards The following analysis demonstrates compliance with General Design Criteria 17 and 18 of 10CFR50, Appendix A, and Regulatory Guide 1.32.

8.2.1.3.1 Criterion 17 --

Electric Power Systems In addition to the features detailed in paragraphs 8.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.2, compliance with Criterion 17 is further demonstrated by the following:

A.

If one of the two 13.8 kV startup transmission lines per unit is interrupted, the remaining line can supply offsite power to both engineered safety features (ESF) buses, as shown in engineering drawing 01, 02, 03-E-MAA-002.

B.

The two 13.8 kV transmission lines, supported on independent structures, are separated so as to avoid the possibility that the structural collapse of one will cause an outage of the other 13.8 kV line.

C.

The. 13.8 kV system is protected from lightning and switching surges by lightning protective equipment and by overhead static lines.

D.

Design of the 125 V-dc system-for the switchyards con-sists of two independent dc.systems. Each of the two systems consist of a separate 125 V-dc battery, battery charger, and distribution system.

Cable separation is maintained between the two systems. A-single failure caused by a malfunction of either of the two 125 V-dc systems does not affect the performance of the other system.

The ability of the switchyards to supply off-site power to the plant is not affected by the loss of one of the two 125 V-dc systems.

June 2003 8 :2-4 Revision 12

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM E.

Two isolated 13.8 kV supplies from the intermediate 13.8 kV buses are provided to the switchyards.

The ac load is divided between two power panels and loss of one feeder from the.plant does not jeopardize con-tinued operation of the switchyard equipment.

F.

For reliability and operating flexibility, the switch-.

yard design includes a breaker-and-a-half arrangement for each circuit along with breaker failure backup protection.

Each breaker has two trip coils on separate, -isolated dc control circuits. These pro-visions permit the following:

1.

Any transmission line can be cleared under normal or fault conditions without affecting any other transmission line.

2.

Any circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance without interrupting the power or protection to any circuit (subject to'limitations of power system development paragraph 8.2.1.2.1).

3.

Short circuits on a section of bus can be isolated without interrupting service to any circuit other than that connected to the faulty bus section.

G.

The offsite sources from the 525 kV switchyards to the startup transformers are separate and independent.

The failure or structural collapse of one system or structure does not affect other offsite sources.

H.

The offsite sources from the startup transformers to the 13.8 kV switchgear located at the units are independently and separately routed.

I.

Two physically independent circuits are provided for offsite power to the onsite distribution system for June 2003

.8.

2-5 Revision 12

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM each unit.

The offsite source normally connected to each ESF bus is immediately available to supply components important to safety following a postulated loss-of-coolant acciderit.

Either of the two offsite sources to each ESF bus, if available, can be connected by control switch operation in the control room.

(subject to the limitations of power system development paragraph 8.2.1.2.1).

8.2.1.3.2 Criterion 18 --

Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems The 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV circuit breakers can be inspected, maintained, and tested on a routine basis.

This can be accomplished without removing the generators, transformers, or transmission lines from service (subject to limitations of power system development paragraph 8.2.1.2.1).

Transmission line protective relays can be tested on a routine basis.

This can be accomplished without removing the transmission lines from service.

Generator, main transformer, and service transformer relays are tested on a routine basis when the generator is offline.

Onsite power components will be periodically inspected and maintained as required.

This can be accomplished without removing the transmission lines, generators, or transformers from service.

8.2.1.3.3 Regulatory Guide 1.32 As described in paragraph 8.2.1.3.1, listing I, an independent immediate access circuit is provided to each Class lE bus for each unit.

June 2003

8. 2-6 Revision 12

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.2.1.3.4 Industry Standards The design complies with applicable standards and recommendations of:

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

(IEEE) National Electrical Manufacturer's Association (NtMA)

National Electrical Code (NEC)

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)

Underwriters' Laboratory, Inc. (UL)

American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) 8.2.2 ANALYSIS TIfe transmission system associated with PVNGS is planned so that the loss-of a single transmission element (i.e., line or transformer) does not result in loss of load, transmission overload, undervoltage condition, or loss of system stability to the Arizona-New Mexico-California-Southern Nevada extra high voltage (EHV) grid.

Offsite power supply reliability is determined by the performance of the six 525 kV supply circuits associated with PVNGS.

The source stations for these circuits (RUDD Westwing, Kyrene, Miguel, and Devers) all have three or more connected circuits of 230 kV and above, which provide the appropriate reliability.

Power flow studies conducted for the described system indicate that the system can reliably deliver power to all project par-ticipants using the above planning criteria.

Dynamic stability studies.have shown that the system can withstand the following disturbances without loss of system stability or loss of load:

June 2003 8.2-7 Revision 12 LDCR 02-F023

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM A.

A permanent 3-phase fault on the switchyard 525 kV bus with subsequent loss of the critical 525 kV line.

B.

A sudden loss of one of the three PVNGS units with no underfrequency load shedding measures in effect.

C.

The sudden loss of the largest single load on the Arizona-New Mexico-California-Southern Nevada system.

In-withstanding these-disturbances, which are used as design criteria, the system exhibits a very stable response, with significant positive damping achieved and with system frequency deviation held within acceptable limits.

(Salt River Project letter to APS # SALT RIVER PROJECT 20020206, "Final Report for the 2002 Palo Verde / Hassayampa Operating Study",

2/6/2002).

These results represent the response of the system associated with PVNGS with 7t generation stability margin.

Although these studies conclude that a PVNGS unit trip would not cause grid instability, certain chapter 15 accident analyses conservatively assume that offsite power is lost as a consequence of a PVNGS turbine trip.

Refer to section 8.3.4 and table 15.0-0.

Grid availability data on EHV systems in the area indicate an outage rate of 2.08 total outages per year per 100 line miles.

Of these, 1.08 are due to.planned outages and 1.00 are due to forced outages.

Due to all causes, the outage ratio for 500 kV lines in the area is 0.00180.

On 230 kV systems in the area, similar data indicate outage rates of 6.59 total outages per year per 100 line miles.

Of these, 2.97 are due to planned outages and 3.61 are due to forced outages.

Due to all causes, the outage ratio for 230 kV lines in the area is 0.0394.

June 2003 8.2-8 Revision 12

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM These outages are most commonly attributable to lightning.

Other causes are fog, contamination, flooding, other aspects of weather, falling objects, equipment failure, emergency maintenance, employee error, arid, hypothetically, dust contamination.

The chief constituents of dust storms are nonconducting clay dust (usually quartz) and conducting gypsum (calcium sulphate) which can contaminate the insulators.

This contamination increases the probability of flashover, especially with fog or dew, by disclosing the salts to form an electrolyte.

However, dust buildup is reduced by the self-clearing action of the" "VI"' string insulator configuration used in EHV line construction and by the abrasive action of the dust and sand.

Also, any adverse conditions resulting from insulator contamination within the switchyard can be corrected by washing the insulators.

APS has never experienced a flashover in any of its EHV switchyards due strictly to dust on insulators and has found that dust storms contribute little to the outage frequency of EHV transmission lines.

Likewise, APS has not experienced any known dust-caused insulation failures at the 15 kV or 4 kV voltage levels in ei'ther'open substation facilities or enclosed switchgear.-

Therefore, it is felt that dust loading on the 13.8 kV system will not be a problem.

The system is designed such that, with rare exceptions, forced outages do not result in.loss of load..

Other forms of contamination that increase the probability of flashover in certain areas, especially near the Pacific coast, are sea-salt deposits and industrial contaminations.

The insulators can become contaminated by the salt deposits and June 2003

8. 2-9 Revision 12

PVNGS UPDATED FSAR OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM when fogging conditions exist, flashovers are more likely to occur.

To minimize the effect of both salt and industrial contamination, the insulators are washed with demineralized water.

The frequency of washing depends on the area.

Some areas near the Pacific Coast require washing once a month while areas farther inland require washing every 90 days.

The use of semi-conducting glazed insulators also reduces the flashover rates in areas' of high contamination. No washing of insulators is anticipated in the desert regions.

June 2003 8.2-10 Revision 12

10 CFR Ch. i(i-19

,r..

kdaory Commission Pt. 50, App. A Anticipated OPerional cecu ated operational 0 TTnes'.

onditions Of normalOcrene l

ected to occur one or inc fe of the nuclear Power ure timesdn

-enot lImited to loss ofnpt and lnc'ed latlon pumps, tripping of the to al k

• ator set, isolation of the main turie id loss of all otf slte pow er malnden C~rrERUI

1. Overall Requfreents zognied cdes nd 8 e andr

'rlsehlOn i--Qualify Standrad are e

ructures. systems, and components cat to safety shall be d POefa o

)ctedf and tested to quaity, qanCtidt lt standaids Coy.

Induti with the ImPortance of the at Ictouns to be performed Where set

nonizYed prodecin 8tutres renerii agnied codnens and standard, ar ased, Jy shall be Identified and evaluated to de-mine their applicability adequacy.ant nciency and shall bt supplemented Or difled as necessary toeassur oa duct in keeping with the required sfty action A quality assurance PrOgrn t.

establisbed and Implemented In order to vide adequate assurance that these struc_

5n, systems. and components will satinrac.

JlY Perform their safety-functiOns-Appro ite records Of the design, fabrication, Wton. and testing of structures sstm components important tp saey shaiem ntind bry or under the control of the lerpwer unit licensee throughout the-Of the unit.

iterion 2-Desig, bases for protectio nst natural Phenomena. Structures, Sys-

3. and component imnportant to safety I be designed to withstand the effects of ral Phenomena such as earthquakes. tor.

,es. hurricanes, floods, tun1ami, and' 1eea without lossof`Capability to perform

• safety functions. The design bases for 3 structures. systems, and components reflect: (1) Appropriate consideration of Most severe of the natural phenomena have been historically reported for the and surrounding a rea, with sufficient In for the limited accuracy, quantity.

?eriod of time In which the historical have been accumulated. (2) appropriate inatiObs of the effects of normal and ac-t conditions with the effects of the flat-phenomena and (3) the importance of J.ety functions to be performed.

,omn 3 -Fire Protection. Structures, sys-and components important to safety tentwit othr sfetyreqireents, Noncmbusibleand eat esitant lalsshall beuse wheeverpratical ered in designing the system against a failure are under development.

-out the unit, particularly in loca-cd as the containment and control jre detection and fighting systems of A-ate capacity and capability shall be eand designed to milhinize the ad-Beifects of fires on structures, systems, mponents important to safety. Fire-l~r systems shall be designed to assure l

l rupture or Inadvertent operation o

significantly impair the safety ca-t of these structures, systems, and

' IPoflen i-Environmental and dynamic ef-gdesign bases-Structures, systems, and Qpponents important to safety shall be de-

. Pged to accommodate the effects of and to ompatible with the environmental condl-Pons associated with, normal operation, Vsintenance. testing, and postulated acci-

-dents. including loss-of-coolant accidents.

these structures, systems, and components hpill be appropriately protected against iy-lamic effects, including the effects of mis-siles. pipe whipping, and discharging fluids, that may result from equipment failures and from events and conditions outside the nu-elear power unit. However, dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures In puclear power units may be excluded from the design basis when analyses reviewed and approved by the Commission demonstrate that the probability of fluid system piping rapture is extremely low under conditions consistent with the design basis for the pip-Ing.

Criterion 5-Sharing of structures, systems.

and components. Structures, systems, and components Important to safety shall not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not sMg-nlficantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions, including, in the event of an accident in one unit, an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining units.

rations which can result in conditions ex-ceeding specified acceptable fuel design lim-its are not possible or can be reliably and readily detected and suppressed.

Criterion 13-Instrumentatfon and control. In-strumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences. and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fisslon process, the Integ-rity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems. Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.

Criterion 14-Reactor coolant pressure bound-ary. The reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested so as to have an extremely low prob:

ability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly prop-agating failure, and of gross rupture.

Criterion 15-Reactor coolant system design.

The reactor coolant system and associated auxiliary, control, and protection systems shall be designed with sufficient margin to assure that the design conditions of the reac-tor coolant pressure boundary are not ex-ceeded during any condition of normal oper-ation, Including anticipated operational oc-currences.

Criterion 16-Containment design. Reactor containment and associated systems shall be provided to establish an essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled re-lease of radioactivity to the environment and to assure that the containment design conditions Important to safety are not ex-ceeded for as long as postulated accident conditions require.

Criterion 17-Electric power systems. An on-site electric power system and an offslte electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the re-actor coolant pressure boundary are not ex-ceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other.vital func-tions are maintained In the event of postu-lated accidents.

The onsite electric power supplies, includ-ing the batteries, and the onsite electric dis-tributlon system, shall have sufficient inde-pendence, redundancy, and testability to per-form their safety functions assuming a sin-gle failure.

11. Protection by Multiple Fission Product Barriers Criterion 10-Reactor design. The reactor core and associated coolant, control. and protection systems shall be designed with appropriate margin to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceed-ed during any condition of normal operation, including the effects of anticipated oper-ational occurrences.

Criterion 1i-Reactor inherent protection.

The reactor core and associated coolant sys-tems shall be designed so that in the, power Operating range the net effect of the prompt Inherent nuclear feedback characteristics tends to compensate for a rapid Increase In reactivity.

Criterion 12-Suppression of reactor power os-cillaffons. The reactor core and associated coolant, control. and protection systems shall be designed to assure that power oscil-819

Pt. 50, App. A Electric power from the transmission net-work to the onsite electric distribution sys-tem shall be supplied by two physically inde-pendent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likell-hood of their simultaneous failure under o,-

erating and postulated accident and environs mental conditions. A switchyard common to both circuits Is acceptable. Each of these cir-cuits shall be designed to be available in suf-flcient time following a loss of all onsite al-ternating current power supplies and the other offsite electric power circuit, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. One of these circuits shall be designed to be avail-able within a few seconds following a loss-of-coolant accident to assure that core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safe-ty functions are maintained.

Provisions shall be Included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of power gen-erated by the nuclear power unit. the loss of power from the transmission network. or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies.

Criterion 18-Inspection and testing of electric power systems. Electric power systems impor-tant to safety shall be designed to permit ap-propriate periodic Inspection and testing of Important areas and features, such as wiring, Insulation, connections, and switchboards, to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their components. The systems shall be designed with a capability to test periodically (1) the operability and func-.

tional performance of the components of the systems. such as onsite power sources, re-lays, switches, and buses, and (2) the oper-ability of the systems as a whole and. under conditions as close to design as practical, the full operation sequence that brings the sys-tems into operation, Including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, and the transfer of power among the nuclear power unit. the offsite power system. and the onsite power system.

Criterion 191-Control rooan. A control room shall be provided from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear power unit safe-ly under normal conditions and to maintain It In a safe condition under accident condi-tions, Including loss-of-coolant accidents.

Adequate radiation protection shall be pro-vided to permit access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions without personnel receiving radiation expo-sures in excess of 5 rem whole body, or its equivalent to any part of the body, for the duration of the accident. Equipment at ap-propriate locations outside the control room shall be provided (1) with a design capability for prompt hot shutdown of the reactor, in-10 CFR Ch. 1 (1-103 Edi cluding necessary instrumentati trols to maintain the unit in a s during hot shutdown, and (2) with capability for subsequent cold the reactor through the use of suitabe cedures.

Applicants for and holders of constructl i permits and operating licenses undert',J4 part.who apply on or after January 10, igt applicants for design certifications weir part 52 of this chapter who apply On Or ij January 10, 1997, applicants for and boljA of combined licenses under part 52 orU4s chapter who do not reference a standar by, sign certification, or holders of operati.I censes using an alternative source tio under 150.67, shall meet the requiremelati'b this criterion, except that with regarde16 control room access and occupancy ;s&

quate radiation protection shall be profidid to ensure that radiation exposures shail exceed 0.05 Ev (5 rem) total effectiveioW, equivalent (TEDE) as defined In S50.2 for X.

duration of the accident.

i.

111. Protection and Reactivity Control Sysleng Criterion 20-Protection system funcho@.

The protection system shall be designedi) to initiate automatically the operation'o appropriate systems Including the renichid control systems, to assure that specids 6d'-

ceptable fuel design limits are not exceM.

as a result of anticipated operational occii.

rences and (2) to sense accident conditfion and to initiate the operation of systemnsiA components important to safety.

Criterion 21-Protection system rellabilifla testability. The protection system shall bde signed for high functional reliability Sa service testability commensurate with*.

safety functions to be performed. Go:-'

dancy and Independence designed Inty'1h protection system shall be sufficient a

sure that (1) no single failure results l of the protection function and (2) rem0$f from service of any component or ch does not result in loss of the requke.

Imum redundancy unless the acceptable ability of operation of the protection BYE can be otherwise demonstrated. The PrS~j tion system shall be designed to petni~h odic testing of its functioning when th&a tor is In operation, Including a capabi test channels Independently to de failures and losses of redundancy have occurred.

Criterion 22-ProtectiOn system The protection system shall be desiib assure that the effects of Mat r nomena. and of normal operating Go nance, testing, and postulated acci i ditions on redundant channels do n in loss of the protection function, o demonstrated to be acceptable on d

Zt defined basis. Design techniQues functional diversity or diversitY nent design and principles Of operaf i lear Regulatory Coff e used to the extent prac

• ts of the protection functic i cxite 1inon 23-Protection syst Ibe protection system shat Ztil into a safe state or In

-Cstrated to be acceptable 0:

ined basis if conditions suc Mtion of the system, loss of e

• tric power. instrument air), £ verse environments (e.g., e cold. rare, pressure, steam, ition) are experienced.

. Criterion 24-Separation oj control systems..

The protecti be separated from control sy

,tent that failure of any sin

• tem component or channel,

.noval from service of any s system component or chann, aon to the control and pro leaves intact a system sat ability, redundancy, and ir quirerments of the protectio2 connection of the protection tes shall be limited so a.

safety is not significantly Im CNterion 25-Protection sys

.for reactivity control malfunct Stfon system shall be designe specified acceptable fuel de mot exceeded for any single the reactivity control syster Aental withdrawal (not eject Let control rods.

, Critexion 26-Reactivity cont

dancy and capability. Two In MVty control systems of principles shall be provided.

tens shall use control rod.

eluding a positive means fc rods, and shall be capable of:

hog reactivity changes to al

qndtlons of normal opera iaticipated operational oc Mith appropriate margin fc Arch as stuck rods, specified

1. 41sgn limits are not excee(

itactivity control system sh.

?eliably controlling the rat

• anges resulting from p er changes (including xe.

Asre acceptable fuel desigi tZceeded. One Of the system Ale of holding the reactor Paler cold conditions.

~Cfleriteon 27-Corbined react MPS Capability. The reactive shall be designed to h gPability in conjunction w by the emergency core E reliabiS controlling reacti Ure that under postulated.

Ls and with appropriate n g the capability to cool tI gC~lerlon 25-Reactidity hin systems shall I r

, ^

820