ML040290124

ISFSI - Revision 47 to the Emergency Plan

ML040290124
Person / Time
Site:	Surry, 07200002
Issue date:	01/21/2004
From:	Grecheck E Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
04-013
Download: ML040290124 (174)

Text

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 January 21, 2004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.04-013 Attention: Document Control Desk NEPrjbc/mm RO Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket Nos. 50-280, 281 72-2 License Nos. DPR-32, 37 SNM-2501 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY (DOMINION)

SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 SURRY INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REVISION TO SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 72.44(f), attached is a revision to the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan. This revision does not implement actions that decrease the effectiveness of our Emergency Plan. The Emergency Plan continues to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Please update your manual by performing the actions described in Attachment 1, Tabulation of Changes.

Your attention is also directed to Attachment 2, Surry Emergency Plan Revision 47 Summary. This information is provided to facilitate your review of the enclosed Emergency Plan revision.

No commitments are made by this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. David Sommers at (804) 273-2823.

Very truly yours, Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Attachments 494

SN 04-013 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 72-2 Letter- Page 2 cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2 copies)

Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303-8931 Mr. Martin J. Virgilio, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mail Stop T 8A23 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Mr. C. Gratton (Letter only)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 8G9 Rockville, MD 20852 Ms. Mary Jane Ross-Lee (Letter only)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 13D13 Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. G. J. McCoy NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station

Serial No.04-013 Docket Nos.: 50-280/281 72-2 Page 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT I TABULATION OF CHANGES VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY (DOMINION)

REVISION TO SURRY EMERGENCY PLAN Enclosed is a recent revision'to the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan. Please take the following actions in order to keep your manual updated with the most recent revision.

REMOVE AND DESTROY EFFECTIVE INSERT EFFECTIVE DATE DATE SPS Emergency Plan, 1/13/2003 SPS Emergency Plan, 1/7/2004 Rev. 46 Rev. 47 Emergency Plan Privacy and Proprietary Material has been removed. Reference Generic Letter No. 81-27.

Serial No.04-013 Docket Nos.: 50-280/281 72-2 Page 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT 2 SURRY EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION 47

SUMMARY

Added Hurricane Warning in effect for Surry County as additional indication and deleted reference to duration of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> prior to when winds expected to arrive.

(Table 4.1, Initiating Conditions: Notification of Unusual Event #19, and Appendix 10.8, Emergency Classification / Initiating Conditions #19) 2 Deleted formal classroom or classroom with respect to training, written with regard to test, replaced Nuclear Power Station General Employee Training with Nuclear Employee Training, and updated passing percentage from 70% to 80%. These revisions update descriptions to reflect current practices, e.g., computer-based training and testing. (Sections 6.3.3.1, Respiratory Protection, 6.3.3.2, Protective Clothing, 8.3.4, Cognitive Evaluations, and 8.3.5, Task Performance Evaluations) 3 Added reference to visual indicator in areas where noise levels might exceed the volume of the loudspeakers to description of public address and intercom system.

(Section 7.2.1.1, Public Address and Intercom System) 4 Updated titles vhere appropriate, i.e., Vice President - Nuclear Operations changed to Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations, Shift Supervisor changed to Shift Manager, and Assistant Shift Supervisor changed to Unit Supervisor.

(Sections 5.0, Organizational Control of Emergencies, 5.2, Onsite Emergency Organization, 6.1, Activation of the Emergency Plan, 7.1.2, Operational Support Center, and 8.1, Responsibilities for Maintaining Emergency Preparedness, Table 5.1, Minimum Shift Manning Requirements, Figures 5.1, Station Emergency Organization Prior to Augmentation, and 5.2, Station Emergency Organization Following Augmentation, and Appendix 10.1 1, Notification of Unusual Events #13

& #21, Alerts #18 & #28, Site Area Emergencies #15 & #23, and General Emergencies #10 & #11).

5 Added percentage fuel damage represented by High Range Letdown Radiation Monitor classification thresholds for clarification/information in Appendix 10.8, Emergency Classification / Initiating Conditions Notification of Unusual Event #6 and Alert #8.

Serial No.04-013 Docket Nos.: 50-280/281 72-2 Page 2 of 2 6 Miscellaneous administrative revisions:

• Figure 7.2, Surry Power Station, Monitoring Location Listing: Updated reference to source document: VPAP-21 03S, Rev. 4, Attachment 8, Environmental Sampling Locations, updated to refer to Rev 5. There were no changes to the information in this figure.

• References to the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) updated to reference the Joint Information Center (JIC) per Corporate Emergency Response Plan Revision 10. (Section 1.1, Acronyms and Abbreviations, Section 5.3.1.5, Release of Information to News Media, Section 7, Table of Contents, Section 7.0, Emergency Facilities and Equipment, Section 7.1.6, Joint [Public]

Information Center and Local Media Center, Table 7.1, ERF Communications, and Figure 7.3, Communications Links)

• Updated Appendix 10.5, EPIP Emergency Plan Cross Reference, to reflect replacement of EPIPs 4.22, Post Accident Sampling of Containment Air, 4.23, Post Accident Sampling of Reactor Coolant, and 4.25, Liquid Effluent Sampling During an Emergency, with new EPIP-4.35, Chemistry Sampling.

Dominion- Emergency Plan

Title:

Surry Power Station Emergency Plan Revision Number: Effective Date:

47 - V-&AO -7 zoo-° Revision Summary:

Revision 47 updates this entire document. Revised material includes, but is not limited to:

• Clarification of emergency action level condition addressing projection of hurricane force

- winds onsite and its associated indications and addition of note identifying percentage fuel failure associated with classification thresholds.

• Clarification of plant public address system description to reflect compensatory measures in

- high-noise areas.

• Clarification of terms describing training to reflect current practices.

• Update list of implementing procedures and titles to reflect organizational changes.

Approvals on File

SEP Page i.1 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION SUBJECT PAGE NO.

i Table of Contents 1.1 1 Definitions 1.1 1.0 Definitions 1.2 1.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations 1.4 2 Scone and Applicability 2.1 2.0 Site Specifics 2.2 2.1 Emergency Plan 2.2.

3 Summary of Emeraencv Plan 3.1 3.0 Summary of Emergency Plan 3.2 4 Emergency Conditions 4.1 4.0 Emergency Conditions 4.2 4.1 Spectrum of Postulated Accidents 4.2 4.2 Emergency Classification System 4.3 4.3 State and Local Government Classification System 4.8 4.4 Requirements for Written Summaries of Emergency Events 4.8 5 Organizational Control of Emergencies 5.1 5.0 Organizational Control of Emergencies 5.3 5.1 Normal Station Organization 5.3 5.2 Onsite Emergency Organization 5.4 5.3 Augmentation of Onsite Emergency Organization 5.10 5.4 Coordination with Participating Government Agencies 5.13

-l SEP Page i.2 Revision 47 SECTION SUBJECT PAGE NO.

6 Emergency Measures 6.1 6.0 Emergency Measures 6.2 6.1 Activation of the Emergency Plan 6.2 6.2 Assessment Actions 6.2 6.3 Protective Actions 6.3 6.4 Aid to Affected Personnel 6.6 6.5 Offsite Support 6.8 7 Emergencv Facilities and Eguipment 7.1 7.0 Emergency Facilities and Equipment 7.3 7.1 Emergency Response Facilities 7.3 7.2 Communications System 7.4 7.3 Assessment Facilities Available Onsite 7.8 7.4 Facilities and Equipment for Offsite Monitoring 7.10 7.5 Damage Control Equipment and Supplies 7.10 7.6 Early Waming System 7.11 8 Maintaining Emer.gency Prearedness 8.1 8.0 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness 8.3 8.1 Responsibilities for Maintaining Emergency Preparedness 8.3 8.2 Maintenance of the Emergency Plan, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, and Emergency Personnel Notification List 8.3 8.3 Training of Station Personnel 8.4 8.4 Training of Offsite Support Personnel 8.7 8.5 Emergency Drills 8.7 8.6 Emergency Exercises 8.9 8.7 Testing and Maintenance of Emergency Equipment 8.11 8.8 Informing the Public 8.12 8.9 Independent Review of the Emergency Preparedness Program 8.13 9 Recovery 9.1 9.0 Recovery 9.2 9.1 Recovery Methodology 9.2 9.2 Population Exposure 9.2

SEP Page .3 Revision 47 SECTION SUBJECT 10 Appendices Appendix 10.1 Agreement Letters Appendix 10.2 Radiation Emergency Plan MCVHNCU - Virginia Power

-Appendix 10.3 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)

Operations Plan Appendix 10.4 Evacuation Time Study Appendix 10.5 EPIP Emergency Plan Cross Reference Appendix 10.6 NUREG-0654/Emergency Plan Cross Reference Appendix 10.7 Emergency Kits Contents Appendix 10.8 Emergency Classification/Initiating Conditions Matrix

SEP Page 1.1 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION 1 DEFINITIONS Part Subiect Page No.

1.0 Definitions 1.2 1.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations 1.4

SEP Page 1.2 Revision 47 1.0 Definitions

• Annually - 12 months +/- 3 months.

- Biennial - Occurring every two years.

Buffer Sectors - Two 22 1/20 sectors flanking each side of the 22 1/20 primary sector.

. Commonwealth of Virginia Radiological Emergency Response Plan (OVRERP) - Annex to Volume II of the Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Operations Plan - Peacetime Disasters.

• Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE) - Measure of direct external radiation exposure to the body (e.g.,

cloud shine, contamination or direct radiation). DDE is assumed equivalent to Effective (external)

Dose Equivalent (EDE) with respect to uniform exposure.

• Drill - A supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills.

• Effective Date - Date of change; implementation date assigned by approval authority; date from which 30-day NRC submittals are required in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.V.

• Emergency - Any situation that may result in undue risk to the health and safety of the public and/or site personnel, or significant damage to property or equipment.

• Emergency Action Levels (EALs) - Events, such as equipment malfunctions, natural phenomena, radiological dose rates, et cetera, that may be used as thresholds for initiating such specific emergency measures as designating a particular class of emergency, initiating a notification procedure, or initiating a particular protective action.

• Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) - Emergency response procedures that implement the Emergency Plan.

• Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs)

• Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ - An area delineated by an approximate ten-mile radius circle around the Surry Power Station.

• Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ - An area delineated by an approximate fifty-mile radius circle around the Surry Power Station with the potential of internal exposure from the ingestion of radioactive material through the food pathway.

• Exclusion Area - The company-owned area within 1650 feet of Surry Unit 1 containment.

• Exercise - A test of the response capabilities of the emergency organization that permits the evaluation of training and response to a given situation. Exercises are conducted in accordance with pre-planned scenarios with defined objectives.

• Interim - A temporary or provisional emergency response position or facility which is augmented or transferred as resources become available.

• Local Communities - This term shall be used to denote the counties of Surry, Isle of Wight, York and James City and the cities of Williamsburg and Newport News located in the approximate ten (10) mile Emergency Planning Zone.

• Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF) - A near site facility where the Recovery Manager controls overall emergency response efforts.

SEP Page 1.3 Revision 47

• Local Media Center (LMC) - This facility provides a near site location for official media releases.

The LMC is inthe Surry Nuclear Information Center.

• Nearsite - Within the Exclusion Area, but beyond Protected Area.

• Offsite - Beyond the Exclusion Area.

• Onsite - The Protected Area (area surrounded by security fence) and Switchyard.

• Operational Support Center (OSC) - An assembly area that serves as the staging location for Damage Control Teams, the Fire Team, the First Aid Team, and the Search and Rescue Team.

• Primary Sector - The 22Y20 sector which bounds the existing wind direction.

• Proiected Dose - An estimated radioactive dose which affected population groups could potentially receive if no protective actions are taken.

• Protected Area - An area encompassed by physical barriers and to which access is controlled. For the purposes of this plan, the Protected Area refers to the designated security area around the reactor and turbine buildings.

• Protective Action Guides (PAGs) - The projected dose to individuals in the general population which warrants taking protective actions.

• Protective Actions - Those emergency measures taken before or after an uncontrolled release of radioactive material has occurred for the purpose of preventing or minimizing radiological exposures.

• Recovery Actions - Those actions taken after the emergency to restore the station as nearly as possible to its pre-emergency condition.

• Rem (Roentgen Equivalent Man) - A unit of radiation dose that relates exposure to the biological effects of the exposure (absorbed exposure or dose). A unit related to the rem is the millirem (mrem). 1 mrem -1/1000 rem.

• Restricted Area - Any area where access is controlled for the purpose of radiation protection.

• Semi-annual - Occurring once during each of the first and last six months of the calendar year.

• Station Emergency Manager (SEM) - Designated onsite individual having the responsibility and authority for implementing the Emergency Plan.

. Technical Support Center (TSC) - A facility located adjacent to the Unit 1 Control Room which will be the central control center for the onsite emergency response organization after shift augmentation.

• Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) - Radiation exposure to the thyroid through inhalation or ingestion of radioactive material assuming a 50 year exposure period from uptake.

• Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) - The sum of external and internal dose.

SEP Page 1.4 Revision 47 1.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations NE - Architect/Engineer AC - Alternating Current APs - Abnormal Procedures Appx. - Appendix ARD - Automatic Ringdown Line ATWT - Anticipated Transient Without Trip BTL - Bottle BX - Box cc - Cubic Centimeter CDE - Committed Dose Equivaient Ce - Cerium CEDE - Committed Effective Dose Equivalent CEOF - Central Emergency Operations Facility CERC - Corporate Emergency Response Center CERP - Corporate Emergency Response Plan CERT - Corporate Emergency Response Team CFR - Code of Federal Regulations CH - Charging System cm - Centimeter COVRERP - Commonwealth of Virginia Radiological Emergency Response Plan cpm - counts per minute Cs - Cesium CSD - Cold Shutdown CVCS - Chemical and Volume Control System CW - Circulation (Circ.) Water DAD - Digital Alarming Dosimeter DBE - Design Basis Earthquake DC - Direct Current DDE - Deep Dose Equivalent DECON - Decontaminate DEM - Department of Emergency Management (State)

DEPT. - Department DOE - Department of Energy dpm - disintegrations per minute EAD - Emergency Administrative Director EALs - Emergency Action Levels EAS - Emergency Alert System

SEP Page 1.5 Revision 47 ECC - Emergency Control Center ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System EDE - Effective Dose Equivalent e.g. - For example [From Latin exempli gratia]

EMD - Emergency Maintenance Director ENS - Emergency Notification System (NRC Communications System)

EOC - Emergency Operations Center EOD - Emergency Operations Director EOF - Emergency Operations Facility EPA - Environmental Protection Agency EPC - Emergency Procedures Coordinator EPIP(s) - Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures EPZs - Emergency Planning Zones ERDS - Emergency Response Data System ERF - Emergency Response Facility ERFCS - Emergency Response Facility Computer System ERGs - Emergency Response Guidelines etc. - et cetera ETD - Emergency Technical Director EWS - Early Warning System F - Fahrenheit FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency FRMAC - Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center Ft - Feet GM - Geiger-Mueller GOVT. - Government GPM (gpm) - Gallons per minute HP - Health Physics HPN - Health Physics Network (NRC Communications System) hrs. - Hours HRSS - High Radiation Sampling System HSD - Hot Shutdown I - Iodine i.e. - That is [From Latin id est]

IAW - In accordance with IEIN - Inspection and Enforcement Information Notice (NRC)

Int'l - Intemational 1/0 - Input/Output

SEP Page 1.6 Revision 47 JDG - Job Demonstration Guide JIC - Joint Information Center (formerly the Joint Public Information Center, JPIC)

KI - Potassium Iodide Kr - Krypton LAN - Local Area Network LCO - License Condition of Operation LEOF - Local Emergency Operations Facility LFA - Lead Federal Agency LMC - Local Media Center LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident LW - Liquid Waste MCL - Management Counterpart Link MCV/MCVH - Medical College of Virginia/Medical College of Virginia Hospital MIDAS - Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System ml - milliliter mph - miles per hour mR/hr - Millirem per hour MSL - Mean Sea Level MWe - Megawatt electric MWt - Megawatt thermal NA - Not applicable NEP - Nuclear Emergency Preparedness NPSEPT - Nuclear Power Station Emergency Preparedness Training NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS - Nuclear Steam Supply System OBE - Operating Basis Earthquake ODCM - Offsite Dose Calculation Manual OPS - Operations OPX - Off-Premises exchange (Communications System)

OSC - Operational Support Center PAGs - Protective Action Guides PBX - Private Branch exchange (Communications System)

Pk. - Package PMCL - Protective Measures Counterpart Link PORV - Power Operated Relief Valve Pr - Pair PSIA - Pounds per square inch absolute PSIG - Pounds per square inch gauge

SEP Page 1.7 Revision 47 RAA - Remote Assembly Area RAC - Radiological Assessment Coordinator RAD/Radfrad - Radiological Assessment Director, radiation or radiological depending on context RCP - Reactor Coolant Pump RCS - Reactor Coolant System Rem - Roentgen Equivalent Man R/hr - Roentgen per hour RHR - Residual Heat Removal RERP - Radiological Emergency Response Plan RERT - Radiological Emergency Response Team RIC - Richmond Intemational Concourse (Airport)

RM, RMS - Radiation Monitoring System RO - Reactor Operator RPS - Radiation Protection Supervisor RSCL - Reactor Safety Counterpart Link RSD - Refueling Shutdown RTM - Response Technical Manual Ru - Ruthenium RVLIS - Reactor Vessel Level Indication System Rx - Reactor SCBA - Self contained breathing apparatus SEM - Station Emergency Manager SEP - Surry Emergency Plan Si - Safety Injection SNIC - Surry Nuclear Information Center SNSOC - Station Nuclear Safety & Operating Committee SPDS - Safety Parameter Display System SPS - Surry Power Station SRD - Self Reading Dosimeter SRO - Senior Reactor Operator STA - Shift Technical Advisor SW - Service Water system Te - Tellurium T.S. - Technical Specification TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent TLD - Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TSC - Technical Support Center 11ci - Micro () Curie

SEP Page 1.8 Revision 47 UFSAR - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report UHF - Ultrahigh frequency (radio)

U.S. - United States VCU - Virginia Commonwealth University VG - Vents - Gaseous VPAP - Virginia Power Administrative Procedure Xe - Xenon X/Q - ChVQ; Dilution and dispersion factor, sec/m3

SEP Page 2.1 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION 2 SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY Part .Sublect Page No.

2.0 Site Specifics 2.2 2.1 Emergency Plan 2.2

SEP Page 2.2 Revision 47 2.0 Site Specifics The Surry Power Station consists of two units, each of which include a three loop pressurized light water reactor nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) and turbine generator furnished by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The balance of the station was designed and constructed by the Company with the assistance of its Architect/Engineer (E), Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation. Each reactor unit is designed for a core power output of 2546 MWt, which results in a gross electrical output of approximately 852 MWe. The units are located in Surry County, Virginia, on a point of land called Gravel Neck, which juts out into the James River from the South. The 840 acre site is located approximately 25 miles NW of Hampton, Virginia; and, approximately 7.0 miles south of Williamsburg, Virginia. Cooling water is obtained from the James River. An Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) is located on the plant she.

The city of Williamsburg, as well as portions of Surry, Isle of Wight, James City and York counties and the city of Newport News, lie within 10 miles of the station. Newport News, Williamsburg and the counties of James City and York are dominated by growing population centers and large transient tourist trade. The counties of Surry and Isle of Wight, which surround the site on the south side of the James River, are predominately rural and characterized by farmland, wooded land and marshy wet lands. Surry County has the largest agricultural area within the 10 mile zone, covering over 9000 acres of major cropland.

Peanuts, corn and soybeans are the principal crops of the area. Two (2) dairy farms are in this zone, located close to Bacon's Castle.

2.1 Emergency Plan The Surry Power Station Emergency Plan describes the organization, facilities, emergency response measures, and functional interfaces with offsite agencies which can be used to respond to a broad range of defined emergencies. The organization has well defined responsibilities and specific authorities which provide for effective control and coordination of the emergency response, both onsite and offsite.

The organization is augmented, as required, to address situations with the most serious potential consequences.

The Plan is formulated for compatibility with existing Local, State, and Federal organizations which have responsibilities to render assistance should the need exist. Coordinating the response effort between the company and offsite agencies supports mutual goals of protecting public health and safety and of minimizing damage to both public and private properties.

The basic purposes of the Plan are as follows:

1) To define potential types of emergencies;

2) To establish an organization for managing an emergency,

3) To provide measures for coping with an emergency,

4) To provide facilities from which to perform selected measures;

5) To provide for a recovery program following an emergency-, and,

6) To provide methods for maintaining the Plan active and current.

SEP Page 2.3 Revision 47 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) provide instructions for accomplishing the provisions established in the Plan. The procedures guide the classification of the emergency, provide for offsite notifications, and activation of the full response organization. They also provide techniques for estimating the consequences of offsite releases and making recommended Protective Action Recommendations.

The Plan satisfies the emergency plan requirements for the Surry ISFSI under provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72, Subpart B, Section 32, Subsection (c).

SEP Page 3.1 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION 3

SUMMARY

OF EMERGENCY PLAN Part Subiect Page No.

3.0 Summary of Emergency Plan 3.2

SEP Page 3.2 Revision 47 3.0 Summary of Emergency Plan Types of emergencies are divided into four classifications which cover a broad spectrum of potential occurrences. These classifications range from a "Notification of Unusual Event," in which offsite officials are notified of an unusual condition, through a "General Emergency," in which onsite and offsite evacuation may be required and a major state of emergency exists. This classification scheme is compatible with existing State and local emergency response plans.

An emergency response organization is established with specific duties and responsibilities defined, and points of contact between onsite and offsite supporting agencies designated. Augmentation of the emergency organization will occur at the Alert" level, which includes activation of both station and corporate emergency response teams. Provisions for prompt notification of the State, Local and Federal agencies are established and include transmittal of pre-planned information which may be required for offsite agency response.

Methods and procedures provide corrective and protective actions including evaluation of the operability of the unaffected unit. The use of protective equipment, protective action guides and exposure limits are pre-specified. The facilities available for assessment and management of the emergency consist of onsite and offsite emergency response facilities, communication systems, and portable or fixed equipment for detection and measurement of those parameters causing or resulting from the emergency. Medical facilities are also available.

A recovery program describes the organization and procedural approach required to re-start the affected unit. The recovery program provides guidance for relaxing protective measures that have been instituted and requires the periodic estimation of total population exposure.

The Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures are reviewed annually. The Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNSOC) evaluates the review and may provide additional recommendations as necessary. Periodic drills and exercises involving communications, fire fighting, radiological monitoring and Health Physics activities are routinely conducted. A joint exercise involving Federal, State and local response agencies will be held on odd-numbered years at Surry (the even-numbered years being held at North Anna) to ensure all major elements of the Plan are tested within a six year period.

Critiques of each implementation of the Plan allow for critical reviews of technique, methods, and shortcomings. Improvements will be factored into the plan and/or implementing procedures, through revisions.

SEP Page 4.1 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION 4 EMERGENCY CONDITIONS Part Subiect Page No.

4.0 Emergency Conditions 4.2 4.1 Spectrum of Postulated Accidents 4.2 4.2 Emergency Classification System 4.3 4.3 State and Local Government Classification System 4.8 4.4 Requirements for Written Summaries of Emergency Events 4.8

SEP Page 4.2 Revision 47 4.0 Emergency Conditions The following guidelines describe the criteria used by station personnel in classifying or determining the type of an emergency. The types of potential accidents or emergencies are numerous and vary in magnitude. Accordingly, the classification system is wide-range, although flexible and straight forward. The four classifications are defined in accordance with Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654IFEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants". The classification system is not intended to include minor deviations during normal operation. Furthermore, it may be discovered that an event or condition, which met the classification criteria, had existed, but that and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of discovery. For example, the event may have rapidly concluded or been discovered during a post-event review. As discussed in NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines: 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73" (Revision 1), actual declaration of an emergency class is not necessary in these circumstances, although notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Virginia Department of Emergency Management is warranted.

4.1 Sectrum of Postulated Accidents The spectrum of emergencies peculiar to nuclear power stations range from accidents with minor implications on health and safety to the postulation of major occurrences resulting in the release of significant quantities of radioactive material. Examples of minor accidents that may occur include small spills of radioactive liquid, unplanned or uncontrolled releases of small amounts of radioactive material, or equipment malfunctions.

Major occurrences, though not expected to take place, have been postulated for planning and design purposes. These events, further described in Surry Power Station UFSAR, Section 14, are as follows:

a. Major reactor coolant pipe ruptures (LOCA).

b. Major secondary system pipe rupture (steam line break).

c. Steam generator tube rupture.

d. Fuel handling accidents.

e. Rupture of a control rod drive mechanism housing (rod cluster control assembly ejection).

Of the accidents listed above and analyzed in the UFSAR, three are considered to release significant amounts of radioactivity. These are the loss of coolant accident, the steam generator tube rupture and the fuel handling accident. The nature of these three accidents is such that a radiological safety analysis can produce results that vary in terms of consequences. This analysis depends on assumptions used concerning such items as the status of primary coolant radioactivity content, meteorological conditions, or performance of station safety systems. The Emergency Plan and implementing procedures are written in anticipation of having to contend with these worst case consequences.

SEP Page 4.3 Revision 47 4.2 Emergency Classification System Emergency conditions which may develop will be categorized as one of the following emergency classifications:

1. Notification of Unusual Event.

2. Alert.

3. Site Area Emergency.

4. General Emergency.

The Notification of Unusual Event classification requires notification of appropriate offsite support groups and station management personnel that an abnormal condition exists at the station. The purpose of this notification is to increase the awareness of key offsite support organizations and station management of a condition which can currently be managed by the onsite resources, but which could escalate to a more serious condition. The on-shift operations personnel are assigned response tasks in accordance with the pre-augmentation organization responsibilities defined in Section 5 of this plan.

The Alert classification is indicative of a more serious condition which has the potential for radioactive release. As a result, the emergency response organization is notified to augment onsite resources and activate corporate emergency response facilities.

The Site Area Emergency classification reflects conditions where some significant radiation releases are likely or are occurring, but where a core melt situation is not currently indicated. In this situation, there would be full mobilization in the nearsite environs of monitoring teams and associated communications. A Site Area Emergency can be declared for reasons other than radiological releases.

The General Emergency classification is indicative of actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containment, or non-radiological events which could endanger public health and/or safety. Within fifteen minutes of declaring a General Emergency, predetermined protective action recommendations will be made to the State based on plant and meteorological conditions.

Tables 4.1 - 4.4 list initiating conditions for each emergency classification. Appendix 10.8 provides the specific plant parameters for the classification of events. In Attachment 1 to EPIP-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure", these conditions are grouped by event category for easy reference and identification. For each condition, specific indications available from instruments and unit operating response are defined in EPIP-1.01 to confirm that the proper thresholds have been met for declaring a given classification.

SEP Page 4.4 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT - TABLE 4.1 NOTE: The alpha-numeric designator, [A.N], preceding each condition below, indicates the Emergency Action Level designator used in EPIP-1.01, Attachment 1.

1. [A.1] Inability to reach required unit operating condition within T.S. time limits

2. [A.4] Failure of a safety or relief valve to close after pressure reduction

3. [A.71 Loss of plant communications capability

4. [A.1 0] Unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciators for greater than 15 minutes

5. [B.3] Leak rate or leakage requiring plant shutdown IAW T.S.

6. [C.3] Fuel clad damage indication

7. [C.12] Spent Fuel Storage Facility accident

8. [E.5] Effluent release GREATER THAN ODCM allowable limit

9. [G.3] Major Secondary line break

10. [H.3] Loss of offsite power or onsite AC power capability

11. [1.3] Fire lasting GREATER THAN 10 minutes

12. [J.4] Security threat, unauthorized attempted entry, or attempted sabotage

13. [K-3] Aircraft crash or unusual aircraft activity

14. [K.6] Onsite explosion

15. [K.9] Onsite or nearsite release of toxic or flammable liquids or gases

16. [K.13] Turbine rotating component failure with no casing penetration

17. [L-3] Earthquake detected

18. [L-5] Tornado within Protected area or Switchyard

19. [L.8] Hurricane force winds projected onsite

20. [L1 1] Flood or low water level

21. [M.4] Station conditions which warrant increased awareness of state and/or local authorities

SEP Page 4.5 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT -TABLE 4.2

1. [A.3] Loss of cooling function needed for Cold Shutdown and Refueling Condition

2. [A.6] Trip following ATWT that takes the reactor subcritical

3. [A.9] Unplanned loss of safety system annunciators with compensatory indicators unavailable or a transient in progress

4. [A.12] Evacuation of Main Control Room required

5. [B.2] RCS leak rate limit - EXCEEDED

6. [B.5] Excessive Primary to Secondary leakage with loss of offsite power

7. [B.6] Gross Primary to Secondary leakage

8. [C.2] Severe Fuel Clad Damage

9. [C.10] Fuel damage accident with release of radioactivity to containment or fuel buildings

10. [C.11] Loss of cask/fuel containment barriers or accidental criticality

11. [D.3] High Containment radiation, pressure and temperature

12. [E.3] High radiation or airborne contamination levels indicate a severe degradation in control of radioactive material

13. [E.4] Effluent release GREATER THAN 10 times ODCM allowable limit

14. [G.2] Major Secondary line break with Primary to Secondary leakage GREATER THAN 10 gpm

15. [H.2] Loss of all offsite and onste AC power

\I,,- ~ .16. [H.5] Loss of all onsite DC power

17. [1.2] Fire potentially affecting station safety systems

18. [J.3] Ongoing Security compromise or bomb potentially affecting station safety systems

19. [K.2] Aircraft crash on the facility

20. [K.5] Explosion damage to facility.

21. [K.8] Entry of toxic or flammable gases or liquids into plant facility

22. [K.11] Missile damage to safety related equipment or structures

23. [K.12] Turbine failure with penetration

24. [L2] Earthquake GREATER THAN OBE levels

25. [L4] Tornado striking facility

26. [L71 Hurricane winds near design basis level experienced or projected

27. [L.1 0] Flood or low water level near design levels

28. [M.3] Station conditions which have the potential to degrade or are actually degrading the level of safety of the station

SEP Page 4.6 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - TABLE 4.3

1. [A.2] Loss of Function needed for unit HSD condition

2. [A.5] Failure of the reactor to trip (ATWT)

3. [A.8] Inability to monitor a significant transient in progress

4. [A.1 1] Evacuation of Main Control Room with control NOT established within 15 minutes

5. [B.1] RCS leak rate exceeds makeup capacity

6. [B.4] Steam generator tube rupture with loss of offsite power

7. [C.1] Core damage with possible loss of coolable geometry

8. [C.9] Major fuel damage accident with radioactive release to containment or fuel buildings

9. [D.2] High Containment radiation, pressure and temperature

10. [E.2] Release imminent or in progress and site boundary doses projected to exceed 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE

11. [G.1] Major Secondary line break with Primary to Secondary leakage GREATER THAN 50 gpm and fuel damage indicated

12. [H.1] Loss of offsite and onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes

13. [H.4] Loss of all onsite DC power for GREATER THAN 15 minutes

14. [1.1] Fire resulting in degradation of safety systems

15. [J.2] Imminent loss of physical Station control

16. [K.1] Aircraft damage to vital plant systems

17. [K.4] Severe explosive damage

18. [K.7] Entry of toxic or flammable gases or liquids into plant vital areas other than the Control Room

19. [K.1 0] Severe missile damage to safety systems

20. [L1ii Earthquake GREATER THAN DBE levels

21. [L.6] Sustained winds in excess of design levels experienced or projected

22. [L.9] Flood or low water level above design levels

23. [M.2] Station conditions which may warrant notification of the public near the site

SEP Page 4.7 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: GENERAL EMERGENCY - TABLE 4.4

1. [B.7] Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with potential loss of 3rd barrier

2. [B.8] Fuel failure with steam generator tube rupture

3. [C.4] Probable large radioactivity release initiated by LOCA with ECCS failure leading to core degradation

4. [C.5] Probable large radioactivity release initiated by loss of heat sink leading to core degradation

5. [C.6] Probable large radioactivity release initiated by failure of protection system to bring reactor subcritical and causing core degradation

6. [C.7] Probable large radioactivity release initiated by loss of AC and all feedwater

7. [C.8] Probable large radioactivity release initiated by LOCA with loss of ECCS and containment cooling

8. [D.1] Extremely high Containment radiation, pressure and temperature

9. [E.1] Release imminent or in progress and site boundary doses projected to exceed 1.0 Rem TEDE or 5.0 Rem Thyroid CDE

10. [J.1] Loss of Station physical control

11. [M.1] Any major internal or external event which singly or in combination cause massive damage to station facilities or may warrant evacuation of the public

SEP Page 4.8 Revision 47 4.3 State and Local Government Classification System The Commonwealth of Virginia Radiological Emergency Response Plan (COVRERP) emergency classification system defines two levels of projected radiological doses resulting from the release of radioactive materials from a fixed nuclear facility. The company will provide projected radiological doses based on plant parameters. Provisions are in COVRERP for dose assessments within 50 miles of the station for the ingestion of radioactive material via the food pathway.

The projected radiation doses and response levels are:

Projected Radiation Dose Radiological Response Level Exceeds 1.0 Rem TEDE exposure GENERAL EMERGENCY or exceeds 5.0 Rem Thyroid CDE.

0.1 Rem to 1.0 Rem TEDE exposure SITE AREA EMERGENCY or 0.5 Rem to 5.0 Rem Thyroid CDE.

A Site Area Emergency or General Emergency can also be declared for reasons other than radiological releases.

COVRERP's and local govemment's protective actions are based on projected doses recommended in Table 2.1 of EPA-400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents.

4.4 Requirements for Written Summaries of Emergency Events A written summary is provided to the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Emergency Management following activation of the Surry Emergency Plan. The schedule for submitting the written summary of a Notification of Unusual Event is within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of its declaration; for any other classification, the schedule for submitting the written summary is within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of its termination. This schedule was established with the concurrence of the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Emergency Management.

(Reference Letter Serial No.84-302 dated 5-31-84.)

SEP Page 5.1 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION 5 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL OF EMERGENCIES Part Subiect Paae No.

5.0 Organizational Control of Emergencies 5.3 5.1 Normal Station Organization 5.3 5.2 Onsite Emergency Organization 5.4 5.2.1 Station Emergency Position and Team Descriptions 5.4 5.2.1.1 Station Emergency Manager 5.5 5.2.1.2 Emergency Communicators 5.5 5.2.1.3 Emergency Procedures Coordinator 5.6 5.2.1.4 Emergency Operations Director 5.6 5.2.1.5 Emergency Maintenance Director 5.6 5.2.1.6 Emergency Technical Director 5.6 5.2.1.7 Shift Technical Advisor 5.6 5.2.1.8 Emergency Administrative Director 5.6 5.2.1.9 Radiological Assessment Director 5.7 5.2.1.10 Radiation Protection Supervisor 5.7 5.2.1.11 Operational Support Center Director (OSC Director) 5.7 5.2.1.12 OSC Support Team 5.7 5.2.1.13 Technical Support Team 5.8 5.2.1.14 Chemistry Team 5.8 5.2.1.15 Administrative Support Team 5.8 5.2.1.16 Security Team 5.8 5.2.1.17 Dose Assessment Team 5.8 5.2.1.18 Offshe Monitoring Team. 5.9 5.2.1.19 Evacuation Monitoring Team 5.9 5.2.1.20 In-Plant Monitoring Team 5.9 5.2.1.21 Sample Analysis Team 5.9 5.2.1.22 Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination Team 5.9 5.2.1.23 Onsite (Out of Plant) Monitoring Team 5.9 5.2.1.24 Fire Team 5.9

SEP Page 5.2 Revision 47 Part Sublect Page No.

5.2.1.25 First Aid Team 5.9 5.2.1.26 Damage Control Team 5.10 5.2.1.27 Search and Rescue Team 5.10 5.2.2 LEOF Emergency Positions and Team Descriptions 5.10 5.3 Augmentation of Onsite Emergency Organization 5.10 5.3.1 CERT Notification and Response 5.11 5.3.1.1 Environmental Monitoring 5.11 5.3.1.2 Logistics Support for Emergency Personnel 5.11 5.3.1.3 Technical Support for Planning and Re-entry/Recovery Operations 5.11 5.3.1.4 Interface with Governmental Authorities 5.11 5.3.1.5 Release of Information to News Media 5.11 5.3.2 Vendor and Contractor Support 5.12 5.3.3 Local Services 5.12 5.4 Coordination with Participating Government Agencies 5.13 5.4.1 Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Emergency Management (DEM) 5.14 5.4.2 Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health 5.14 5.4.3 Additional State Agency Support 5.14 5.4.4 Surry County 5.15 5.4.5 James City, Isle of Wight and York Counties, and the Cities of Williamsburg and Newport News 5.15 5.4.6 Counties and Cities Within the Fifty Mile Ingestion Pathway Zone 5.16 5.4.7 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)

Operations Plan 5.16 Table 5.1 Minimum Shift Manning Requirements 5.17 Table 5.2 Emergency and Recovery Corporate Response Required for Nuclear Station Emergencies Alert (or Higher) Emergency Classification 5.20 Figure 5.1 Station Emergency Organization Prior to Augmentation 5.21 Figure 5.2 Station Emergency Organization Following Augmentation 5.22 Figure 5.3 Station to Support Group Interface Prior to Augmentation of the Onsite Emergency Organization 5.23 Figure 5.4 Station to Support Group Interface Following LEOF Activation 5.24 Figure 5.5.a Surry Power Station Cities and Counties within the 50 Mile Emergency Planning Zone 5.25 Figure 5.5.b Surry Power Station Fifty Mile Emergency Planning Zone 5.26

SEP Page 5.3 Revision 47 5.0 Organizational Control of Emergencies An integral part of this Emergency Plan is to assure that classifications of Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency are consistently made in a timely manner. All employees are instructed to contact the Shift Manager to report any emergency. This notification and information is available to the Shift Manager in the Control Room to enable a timely classification of the emergency and subsequent actions.

The Shift Manager or Unit Supervisor initially acts in the capacity of the Station Emergency Manager and takes actions as outlined in the EPIPs. If required by the emergency classification, or if deemed appropriate by the Station Emergency Manager, emergency response personnel will be notified and instructed to report to their emergency response locations. The Shift Manager is relieved as Station Emergency Manager when the Site Vice President or his designated alternate reports to the station (normally to the Control Room) and is updated as to the status of the emergency. Following this relief, the Station Emergency Manager may relocate to the onsite Technical Support Center (TSC).

The Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF) is activated simultaneously with, but independent of, the TSC. The LEOF is staffed by station and corporate personnel, including the Recovery Manager, who directs the activities of this facility. Once the LEOF is staffed, the Recovery Manager becomes the liaison between the inplant emergency response effort headed by the Station Emergency Manager and the Corporate Emergency Response Team (CERT). Responsibilities of the Recovery Manager, once the LEOF has been activated, include communicating emergency status to the State and local govemments, directing the efforts of the offsite monitoring teams, making radiological assessments, recommending offsite protective measures to the State, and arranging for the dispatch of any special assistance or services requested by the station. Specific information relating to the staffing and reporting structure of the LEOF organization is provided in the Corporate Emergency Response Plan (CERP). The Recovery Manager reports to the Corporate Response Manager who directs the activities of the CERT at the Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC). The CERC will be activated at an Alert or higher emergency classification. The Corporate Response Manager is a senior level company executive who is responsible to the President of the Company for the total execution of the company's emergency response effort He has the ultimate authority to commit company resources and set policy as part of managing the long term recovery effort. More detailed information on the composition of the CERT and their responsibilities is provided in the CERP.

5.1 Normal Station Organization The Site Vice President is ultimately responsible for the operation of the Station. The minimum staff required to conduct Station operation is maintained at the station at all times. For purposes of the Emergency Plan, the onshift manning is assumed to be on back-shift because the normal Station complement of personnel is only present during regular duty hours on scheduled work days.

The basic shift (back-shift) complement of personnel is comprised of Operations, Health Physics, Chemistry, and Security personnel with coverage by Maintenance on designated shifts. In addition, technicaVengineering support is available on all shifts from the Shift Technical Advisor (STA). Administrative procedures provide the details of the normal station organization including reporting relationships.

SEP Page 5.4 Revision 47 5.2 Onsite Emergency Organization The first line of control in an emergency at Surry Power Station lies with the onshift personnel. The shift complement is staffed with personnel qualified to take the initial actions necessary to respond to an emergency. The organizational relationship of the on-shift emergency organization prior to augmentation is shown in Figure 5.1. Also, personnel assigned to the Search and Rescue Team, the First Aid Team, and the Fire Team may be assigned other functions until their services are required. The capabilities of the assigned onshift personnel are adequate to assess the condition of the affected unit(s), take initial mitigative actions in accordance with emergency operating procedures, make notifications to off-site authorities, and initiate a callout of supplementary emergency response personnel as required. The EPIPs are used procedurally to control these actions.

Should the Station Emergency Manager deem that additional emergency response personnel are needed or the emergency classification is upgraded to Alert or higher, Station Security will commence callout of supplementary emergency response personnel. Table 5.1 represents the minimum number of personnel that are required to augment emergency operations and the estimated response times of these personnel.

The composition of the emergency response personnel assigned on shift and those who make up the augmentation crews are consistent with the staffing level goals promulgated by Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737. Sufficient training has been provided for the on-shift personnel to ensure that the response actions needed to bring the affected unit(s) to a stable condition in preparation for the longer term recovery will be taken.

If an emergency occurs on one of the two units, the Shift Manager or Unit Supervisor assumes the operational responsibility for the unaffected unit. This allows the other to assume the position of Station Emergency Manager until relieved. Figure 5.2 shows the station emergency organization after full augmentation.

5.2.1 Station Emergency Position and Team Descriptions The Station Emergency Organization, when fully implemented, will consist of at least the positions discussed below. Reporting relationships are as depicted in Figure 5.2. Additional personnel may be designated by Station Management as emergency responders providing special expertise deemed beneficial, but not mandatory, to the planned response. The individuals assigned as interim, primary and atemate responders for the emergency positions will be designated by Station Management based on the technical requirements of the position. Guidance for selection of emergency responders is provided in administrative procedures, and designated individuals will receive training for their emergency response duties.

SEP Page 5.5 Revision 47 5.2.1.1 Station Emergency Manager The Station Emergency Manager (SEM) has the responsibility of managing and directing emergency operations during the course of the emergency. The SEM initially operates from the Control Room and then transitions to the Technical Support Center. The SEM ultimately reports to the Recovery Manager, once augmented. SEM responsibilities shall include, but not be limited to:

1) Classifying the emergency,

2) Authorizing notifications to the NRC, State and local agencies of the emergency status,

3) Recommending protective actions,

4) Authorizing emergency exposure limits,

5) Activating emergency personnel and facilities,

6) Reducing power or shutting down both reactors,

7) Committing company funds as necessary,

8) Acquiring emergency equipment or supplies,

9) Ordering site evacuation,

10) Restricting access to the site,

11) Notifying company management,

12) Implementing work schedules, and

13) Directing onsite emergency activities.

Items 1 through 4 above may not be delegated. Upon activation of the Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF), the Recovery Manager will be responsible for notifying the State and local agencies of the emergency status. In addition, the Recovery Manager will be responsible for recommending offsite protective measures to the State.

5.2.1.2 Emergency Communicators The Emergency Communicators report to the SEM in the Control Room prior to activation of the TSC, and to the TSC after its activation. The primary duties of the Emergency Communicators are to initially notify and periodically update the Emergency Operations Centers of the communities within the 10-mile Emergency. Planning Zone, the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Emergency Management (DEM),

and the NRC. Upon activation of the LEOF, the LEOF staff becomes responsible for notification of State and local govemments. The minimum information to be conveyed is specified in the EPIPs.

SEP Page 5.6 Revision 47 52.1.3 Emergency Procedures Coordinator The Emergency Procedures Coordinator (EPC) reports to the SEM in the TSC as part of the augmentation of the onshift emergency organization. The responsibilities of the EPC include:

1) Assisting the SEM in assuring all appropriate procedures and responses are initiated,

2) Monitoring emergency action level entry conditions,

3) Assisting the SEM in maintaining a working document of the controlling EPIPs and other appropriate procedures,

4) Assisting the SEM in obtaining all procedures generated as a results of the emergency,

5) Reviewing procedures for accuracy and completeness; and,

6) Assisting in the preparation of these documents for review by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

5.2.1.4 Emergency Operatlons Director The Emergency Operations Director (EOD) reports to the SEM in the TSC as part of the augmentation of the onshift emergency organization. His duties include directing the activities of Operations personnel, advising the SEM on emergency operations, and directing the development of procedures necessary for conducting emergency operations.

5.2.1.5 Emergency Maintenance Director The Emergency Maintenance Director (EMD) reports to the SEM in the TSC as part of the augmentation of the onshift emergency organization' The EMD is responsible for advising the SEM on emergency maintenance activities including prioritization, status and providing interface with the Operational Support Center (OSC) Director (when necessary).

5.2.1.6 Emergency Technical Director The Emergency Technical Director (ETD) reports to the SEM in the TSC as part of the augmentation of the on-shift emergency organization. He directs the activities of the Technical Support Team.

The ETD will analyze mechanical, electrical, instrumentation and control, hydraulic, thermodynamic, and reactor physics problems, and develop solutions to the problems. He shall provide technical support to the SEM and assist in developing procedures necessary for conducting emergency operations and maintenance.

5.2.1.7 Shift Technical Advisor The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) will remain in the Control Room to advise the Shift Supervisor or Assistant Shift Supervisor on engineering and accident assessment matters. STA coverage is provided on a 24-hour per day, 7-days per week on-shift basis to enable timely assistance in the Control Room.

5.2.1.8 Emergency Administrative Director The Emergency Administrative Director (EAD) reports to the SEM in the TSC as part of the augmentation of the on-shift emergency organization. The EAD directs activities of the Administrative Support Team and advises the SEM on emergency first aid, fire protection, security, administrative and logistical support activities. He coordinates the acquisition of equipment, supplies, personnel, and other

SEP Page 5.7 Revision 47 assistance needed to cope with the emergency. He ensures that the TSC log keeper maintains a chronological record of key events.

5.2.1.9 Radiological Assessment Director The Radiological Assessment Director (RAD) reports to the SEM in the Technical Support Center after relieving the interim director who was the Senior Health Physics representative onsite at the initiation of the emergency. He directs the activities of the Radiation Protection Supervisor in maintaining the Radiation Protection Program onsite during an emergency. He also directs the activities of the Dose Assessment Team and Offsite Monitoring Teams in determining offsite consequences of radiological releases until control is assumed by the Radiological Assessment Coordinator (RAC) at the LEOF.

Other duties of the RAD are to provide status of offsite releases to the SEM, to direct activities of the Chemistry Team following augmentation, to evaluate radiological conditions and recommend onsite and offsite protective actions to the SEM, to provide recommendations and Health Physics coverage for onsite corrective actions, to direct decontamination efforts, and to provide HP coverage for evacuation of onsite personnel.

5.2.1.10 Radiation Protection Supervisor The position of Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) will be filled upon augmentation of the on-shift emergency organization. The RPS normally operates from the Station HP Office and reports to the RAD.

The RPS directs the activities of the In Plant Monitoring Team, the Sample Analysis Team, the Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination Team, the Onsite (Out of Plant) Monitoring Team, and the Evacuation Monitoring Team. The RPS will also provide radiological support, as needed, to the Fire Team, First Aid Team, and the Search and Rescue Team. Additional duties include evaluating onsite radiological conditions, ensuring that appropriate monitoring and sampling are performed, verifying the appropriate personnel monitoring is performed and personnel exposures are evaluated, and maintaining dose records. The RPS shall also recommend onsite protective measures to the RAD and provide him with survey results and sample analysis results needed for offsite dose assessment.

5.2.1.11 Operational Support Center Director (OSC Director)

The position of OSC Director will be filled upon augmentation of the on-shift emergency organization.

The OSC Director operates from the Operational Support Center and reports to .the SEM, normally through the EMD. The duties and responsibilities of the OSC Director include planning, scheduling and material requisitioning in support of damage control tasks. The OSC Director is also responsible for accountability, dispatch and control of the Fire Team, First Aid Team, Search and Rescue Team (until these teams are activated, at which time control may shift to the TSC), and the pool of personnel who compose damage control teams, including mechanics, electricians, instrument technicians and standby operations personnel.

5.2.1.12 OSC Support Team The OSC Support Team operates out of the OSC under the direction of the OSC Director after augmentation of the on-shift emergency organization. The OSC Support Team plans required maintenance evolutions, develops emergency maintenance procedures, arranges for material acquisition, coordinates the

SEP Page 5.8 Revision 47 efforts of the Damage Control Teams (if activated) and provides logistical and communications support, as necessary.

5.2.1.13 Technical Support Team The Technical Support Team operates out of the TSC under the direction of the ETD after augmentation of the on-shift emergency organization. The Team members include a Reactor Engineer, a Mechanical Engineer, an Electrical Engineer and Operational Advisor. The on duty Shift Technical Advisor has the required training to provide technical support until the Team is fully staffed.

The Team shall assist the ETD in analyzing electrical, mechanical, instrumentation and control, reactor physics, hydraulic and thermodynamic problems and in developing solutions to the problems. The Team shall also assist in developing procedures necessary to deal with the emergency condition.

5.2.1.14 Chemistry Team The Chemistry Team, after augmentation, reports to the RAD and operates from the designated Chemistry Team staging area. The Chemistry Team will conduct liquid and gaseous sampling, and sample analysis, as directed.

5.2.1.15 Administrative Support Team The Administrative Support Team will assist the EAD on emergency fire protection, security, administrative and logistical support activities. The Team will also provide clerical and records support.

If the emergency is Security related, the Administrative Support Team Leader may report directly to the SEM. In a fire or first aid emergency, the Safety/Loss Prevention representative may report directly to the SEM.

5.2.1.16 Security Team The Security Team reports to the EAD. This Team will maintain personnel accountability, control search activities for unaccounted for personnel, provide site access control, provide station security, and activate the LEOF. The Team will also maintain liaison and communications with local law enforcement agencies in accordance with procedural guidelines or when directed to do so by the SEM.

5.2.1.17 Dose Assessment Team This Team will operate under the direction of the RAD. The Dose Assessment Team maintains contact with and transmits instructions to Offsite Monitoring Teams, performs offsite dose assessment calculations, and provides the RAD with offsite release calculations and dose projections. The Team will also assign an individual to transmit Health Physics and environmental information to the NRC using the Health Physics Network (HPN) phone.

Once the LEOF is activated, the Dose Assessment Team Leader will report results of offsite releases and dose projections to date to the RAC in the LEOF. The Dose Assessment Team Leader will also inform the RAC of the locations of Offsite Monitoring Teams and of the current data received from these Teams.

Control of Offsite Monitoring Teams and responsibility for making HPN notifications will transfer to the LEOF. The Dose Assessment Team will then provide support to the RAD regarding onsite response and interface with the LEOF.

SEP Page 5.9 Revision 47 5.2.1.18 Offsite Monitoring Teams These Teams will report to the Dose Assessment Team in the TSC or the LEOF, once activated.

These Teams will provide offsite monitoring and sample collection as directed by the Dose Assessment Team.

5.2.1.19 Evacuation Monitoring Team This Team is under the direction of the RPS and is activated at the Remote Assembly Area only if a site evacuation is ordered.

The duties of this Team include monitoring station personnel at the Remote Assembly Area following a site evacuation, collecting evacuated personnel dosimetry, and decontaminating personnel as necessary.

5.2.1.20 In-Plant Monitoring Team The In-Plant Monitoring Team reports to the RPS in the Station HP Office. This Team will perform monitoring and sample collection inside the protected area. The team will also provide monitoring services to the Search and Rescue Team, the Damage Control Team, the Fire Team, and the First Aid Team, if required.

5.2.1.21 Sample Analysis Team The Sample Analysis Team reports to the RPS in the Station HP Office. The team shall analyze samples collected offsite as well as post accident liquid and gaseous samples.

5.2.1.22 Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination Team This Team reports to the RPS in the Station HP Office. The Team will monitor personnel, decontaminate personnel and provide monitoring services to the Search and Rescue Team, the Damage Control Team, the Fire Team, and the First Aid Team, if required.

5.2.1.23 Onsite (Out of Plant) Monitoring Team This Team reports to the RPS and operates out of the Station HP Office. The team will perform monitoring and sample collection within the owner controlled area but outside the protected area.

5.2.1.24 Fire Team The Fire Team members arriving at the Station to augment the on-shift Fire Team will report to the OSC Director in the OSC and remain there until their services are needed. Upon activation, the Team will report to the Administrative Support Team Safety/Loss Prevention Representative, the SEM, or the responsible Emergency Director as needed.

The Fire Team will combat fires in accordance with the Station Fire Protection Program. The on-shift Fire Team members with other duties will not report to the OSC, but will remain in their normal duties unless called out to combat a fire.

5.2.1.25 First Aid Team The First Aid Team members reporting to the Station to augment the on-shift First Aid Team will report to the OSC Director in the Operational Support Center until their services are needed. Upon activation, the Team will report to the Administrative Support Team Safety/Loss Prevention representative, the SEM or a designated Emergency Director as needed.

SEP Page 5.10 Revision 47 The Team will respond to first aid emergencies in accordance with the Station Administrative Procedures and in accordance with standard first aid practices.

The on-shift First Aid Team members with other duties will not report to the OSC, but will remain in their normal duties unless activated to respond to a first aid emergency.

5.2.1.26 Damage Control Team The Damage Control Team reports to the OSC Director. When support is required, designated personnel may report to the EMD or the responsible emergency director.

The Damage Control Team is a pool of mechanics, electricians, instrument technicians and operators from which Damage Control Task Teams are formed to conduct emergency assessment and repairs.. Damage Control supervisors may be designated to assist in the selection of personnel for Damage Control Task Teams and monitoring of emergency maintenance activities.

5.2.1.27 Search and Rescue Team This Team will report to the OSC Director in the OSC until circumstances require their function to be performed. Upon activation, the Team will report to the SEM, the Administrative Support Team Safety/Loss Prevention representative, or the designated Emergency Director as needed.

The Search and Rescue Team will search for and rescue personnel following an explosion, a fire, or any other hazardous event.

5.2.2 LEOF Emergency Position and Team Descriptions The LEOF Emergency Organization, when fully implemented, will consist of the positions and teams as described in the Corporate Emergency Response Plan. Guidance for selection of emergency responders is provided in administrative procedures.

5.3 Augmentation of Onsite Emergency Organization The SEM has the authority to request assistance from any organization which he deems necessary to mitigate the conditions causing the emergency. In addition, the SEM may request offsite assistance in fire fighting, rescue services, law enforcement, and medical support prior to augmentation of the onsite emergency organization (see Figure 5.3).

The participating agencies and support services with whom emergency support services have been negotiated are listed, by letters of agreement, in Appendix 10.1 of this Plan.

If conditions at the Station require an Alert or higher classification, the CERC, LEOF, TSC and OSC shall be activated. The facility activation goal for the LEOF is approximately 90 minutes, while the activation goal for the TSC and the OSC is approximately 60 minutes. The SEM would normally forward information or request additional support through the Recovery Manager located in the LEOF (See Figure 5.4). Upon completion of the notification, the Recovery Manager would notify the Corporate Response Manager and provide recommendations concerning additional manpower, equipment, services, and the overall participation of the Corporate Emergency Response Team (CERT). Additional resources shall be obtained through personnel assigned to the CERT. Those additional personnel directed to report to the site during the emergency shall report to either the SEM or Recovery Manager for assignment, as appropriate.

SEP Page 5.11 Revision 47 The Corporate Response Manager has the ultimate responsibility for directing the corporate emergency response. Corporate support would be coordinated between the SEM and the Recovery Manager at the LEOF. The Recovery Manager and his staff will serve as control point of contact between the Station, corporate emergency response in Richmond, and governmental authorities. In the event that the LEOF becomes uninhabitable, the functions of the LEOF will be transferred to the Central Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF) located in Glen Allen, Virginia.

5.3.1 CERT Notification and Response The EPIPs provide for notification of Corporate Security to activate the Corporate Emergency Response Team (CERT) in the event of an Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. This will also activate the Corporate Emergency Response Plan as the team members report to the Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC) in Glen Allen, Virginia. Upon activation of the LEOF, the Recovery Manager will become the liaison between the Station and the CERC. He will provide recommendations concerning the corporate response based on the emergency classification. The Corporate Emergency Response Plan establishes the necessary guidelines for both the CERC and the LEOF to assist the station staff in managing the emergency. These include the following functions which may be necessary for emergency mitigation and recovery.

5.3.1.1 Environmental Monitoring Provisions for obtaining additional environmental monitoring personnel shall be the responsibility of the CERT.

5.3.1.2 Logistics Support for Emergency Personnel CERT Administrative Services will be responsible for all administration and logistics including accommodations, corporate communications, purchasing, finance, commissary, sanitary, transportation, and security services.

5.3.1.3 Technical Support for Planning and Re-entrv/Recoverv Operations Technical support for recovery and subsequent re-entry would be directed by the Recovery Manager.

Trained technical personnel are available in the areas of nuclear fuel management, water quality, air quality, Engineering, Health Physics, and Chemistry. Additional technical support would be obtained from North Anna Power Station, A/E, and NSSS vendor. Consulting services would be obtained as necessary.

5.3.1.4 Interface with Governmental Authorities CERT management is responsible for contacting governmental agencies when coordinating mobilization of resources or requesting additional support. The LEOF, once activated, serves as principal point of interaction between the Station and governmental authorities once they are mobilized.

5.3.1.5 Release of Information to News Media News releases shall be coordinated with the External Affairs Department or Public Affairs representative in the Joint Information Center. The Chief Technical Spokesperson is responsible for meeting with the news media. Releases will be coordinated with the appropriate governmental authorities. Briefings can be conducted at the Joint Information Center in the Corporate offices and, when activated, at the Local

SEP Page 5.12 Revision 47 Media Center in the Surry Nuclear Information Center (SNIC). The process for preparing, reviewing and distributing information to the public during emergencies is detailed in the CERP.

5.3.2 Vendor and Contractor Support Support will be obtained from Stone & Webster (the A/E) and Westinghouse (the NSSS vendor) as needed for emergency and recovery operations. Experienced personnel with in-depth expertise in station design, engineering and construction will be obtained to aid in solving critical technical problems.

This support is normally solicited by the Corporate Response Manager or his representative. In the event of an emergency, Westinghouse will be informed of the plant status. In addition, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations can be contacted to provide sources of additional support, if necessary.

In addition, radiological count laboratory resources are available through the Commonwealth to respond to an emergency at the station. These resources include those facilities listed below. Estimated travel times to the station are provided parenthetically:

1) University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />)

2) Virginia Commonwealth Laboratories, Richmond, VA (75 minutes)

3) Medical College of Virginia, Richmond, VA (75 minutes)

4) Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock, Newport News, VA (45 minutes)

5) Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, VA (60 minutes)

6) Virginia Department of Health Radiological Health Program Mobile Laboratory (75 minutes)

7) College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA (75 minutes)

If required at the time of the event, additional resources can be obtained through purchase agreements with private institutions. These agreements would not be prepared in advance, but would be negotiated on an as needed basis.

5.3.3 Local Services Support Agreements have been arranged to provide fire fighting, rescue squad, medical and hospital services. Procedures for obtaining offsite services are provided in Abnormal Procedures and EPIPs.

Responding rescue squads are trained in the handling, treatment, and transportation of injured personnel.

The Medical College of Virginia (MCV), Virginia Commonwealth University, has developed an emergency plan designed to provide medical care in the case of a radiation emergency. The MCV Radiation Emergency Plan supports the company's nuclear power stations in the case of occupational and/or major accidents, including contaminated personnel. In the event of a need for their support, a call ahead to MCV will be made to alert them to activate their emergency plan. A copy of the MCV Radiation Emergency Plan is maintained on file by the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness department.

Letters of Agreement in support of the Surry Emergency Plan will be renegotiated once every 2 years. These agreements and any new agreements will be included in Appendix 10.1 upon the next plan revision. Negotiation responsibility lies with the Director Nuclear Protection Services and Emergency Preparedness. Letters of Agreement are limited to Federal, State, local and volunteer organizations.

SEP Page 5.13 Revision 47 5.4 Coordination with Participating Government Agencies The State organization for response to radiological emergencies is based on normal governmental structures and channels of communication. The Governor, in his role as Director of Emergency Management, directs the response through the State Coordinator of Emergency Management. The State Coordinator of Emergency Management coordinates the overall response and the Department of Health provides technical advice and assistance on radiological accident assessment, protective action, radiological control, and radiological monitoring.

Responsibility for radiological emergency response rests primarily with the elected officials of local governments. As time is a major factor in realizing the benefits of protective action in the event of a radiological emergency, certain of these actions are predetermined and agreed upon by the local governing body and are implemented without delay upon notification of a radiological emergency. An instaphone (dedicated hot-loop system), continuously monitored by the Operations shift in the Control Room, with extensions available in the TSC and LEOF, is used for normal transmission of emergency notifications to these authorities (See Section 7.2.2.5). Procedures for authentication of an emergency via the use of restricted, unpublished call-back telephone numbers are maintained in State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans should verification be desired. When this notification is received, the Commonwealth of Virginia Radiological Emergency Response Plan is also implemented and the State Department of Health initiates action to assess and evaluate the radiological situation in order to provide guidance and assistance to local governments. After the initial immediate action, subsequent protective actions are made based on the results of the State evaluation of the radiological situation and the company's recommendations. State and Federal agencies provide assistance, as required. Response operations at the State level are coordinated by the Department of Emergency Management.

The State will also provide police support in the event of the activation of this plan. In the event of an emergency, the dispatcher at the State Police Headquarters in Richmond, Virginia may be called. First response would be from police units normally based in the local areas. These would soon be supplemented by additional units dispatched from other parts of the state. The State Police would provide traffic control and additional security.

The local Sheriffs departments of Sbrry and Isle of Wight counties also respond to this plan. They perform essentially the same functions as the State Police and coordinate their efforts with that organization.

The Company also maintains liaison and agreement with local Fire Departments and Rescue Squads that will provide assistance, if requested, by the SEM.

In the event of an emergency, the Station will be in communication with the Directors of Emergency Services in the local communities who have the capability of activating their Emergency Operations Centers.

The Station relies upon Surry and Isle of Wight Counties to provide assistance in the event an evacuation from the site requires a remote assembly point or any services the counties are capable of providing to mitigate any results of the emergency.

The Station will also maintain close contact with NRC Headquarters and the Region II Offices in Atlanta. This is an important function to ensure that accurate information and assessment of the emergency

SEP

' Page 5.14 Revision 47 are available to the Federal Government. As a results of these communications the NRC can best appraise their response to the emergency. In a like manner, the U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, will provide radiological assistance to the Station in the event of an emergency. The Station will provide the necessary assembly point and information of the emergency. This agency will coordinate all its efforts with the participating Federal, State and local agencies responding to the emergency.

The Station has the responsibility to provide to supporting agencies involved in the recovery of the facility or participating in controlling the emergency the necessary information to permit them to use their resources. In the case of the local communities the Company provides communication, and when needed, training. This training takes the form of participation in drills and exercises by the county and radiological training for members of local volunteer rescue squads and fire departments. Local Police are trained by State agencies. The Company will also arrange drills and exercises on a routine basis to ensure the plan is workable and to gain experience in Rs implementation. The total effort of all parties involved shall be directed toward minimizing the results of an emergency and working toward the recovery of the facility with the least impact on the population at large.

5.4.1 Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Emergency Management (DEM)

The State Coordinator of Emergency Management coordinates the overall response operations at the State level and performs specific duties as defined in the COVRERP.

The State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is located in Richmond, Virginia. There are local EOCs in each of the local communities. Additionally, the DEM will send appropriate liaison personnel to the LEOF upon activation.

5.4.2 Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Health Department of Health personnel, in coordination with the DEM, provide technical advice and assistance on radiological accident assessment, protective actions, radiological exposure control, and radiological monitoring. (Reference COVRERP for more specific information). Upon either an Alert or higher classification, the Department of Emergency Management will notify the Virginia State Department of Health (Radiological Health Program). The Department of Health will implement its response procedures. The local county health department is the primary health response agency, with the State Department of Health providing assistance to them, as required, with emphasis on the special requirements for those individuals who are contaminated with radioactivity. Accident assessment personnel, as part of the Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT), will operate from the State EOC.

5.4.3 Additional State Agency Support Additional State organizations having possible responsibilities in a radiological emergency are listed in COVRERP, Annex I-V to Volume II, Appendix 2, Organization. Requests for support services from these organizations will be coordinated through DEM by the SEM or the Recovery Manager.

SEP Page 5.15 Revision 47 5.4.4 Surry County The authority and responsibilities of Surry County presented in the Surry County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) applies to radiological emergencies within the county caused by events at the Surry Power Station. The plan:

a. Assigns responsibilities to county offices and organizations in radiological emergency response and preparedness.

b. Sets forth procedures for disseminating warning of radiological emergencies to the citizens of the county.

c. Specifies response actions for specific emergency classifications.

d. Delineates the policies and concepts under which the county government will operate in radiological emergency response.

Upon notification from the SEM, the County Sheriff's Office will notify the County Coordinator of Emergency Services, or their representative, who shall:

a. Verify the notification from Surry Power Station

b. Initiate the key county official's alert system

c. Initiate public warning procedures, as ordered by appropriate State authority

d. Commence evacuation of people from the affected area when directed by the appropriate State authority.

The County Coordinator of Emergency Services or their representative will activate and ensure that ihe EOC is manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day.

Once initial notifications are complete, the SEM or Recovery Manager provides periodic status reports to the County Coordinator of Emergency Services. These reports include any changes in status or emergency classification. The County Sheriff's Office will serve as the local point for communications prior to the establishment of the County EOC.

The County Office of Emergency Services with its EOC is located in the Surry County Government Center. The Surry County Radiological Emergency Response Functional Organization is shown in the Surry County RERP.

5.4.5 James City, Isle of Wight and York Counties, and the Cities of Williamsburg and Newport News The authority and responsibilities of the above counties and cities during a radiological emergency are presented in their respective RERP. The RERPs apply to the radiological emergencies within these locations caused by events at the Surry Power Station. The James Citytilliamsburg, Isle of Wight, York and Newport News RERPs are similar to the Surry RERP (as described in Section 5.4.4 above) except for information that is specific to Surry County.

In the event of an emergency of any classification, the SEM will notify all local jurisdictions (Surry County, York County, James City County, Isle of Wight County, Williamsburg City, and Newport News City) and the DEM by using the Insta-phone loop. If the Insta-phone is out of service, commercial telephone lines will be used to make the notifications. The above localities have a system to call back to the power station and verify the message.

SEP Page 5.16 Revision 47 5.4.6 Counties and Cities Within the Fifty Mile Ingestion Pathway Zone The local communities directly involved in the emergency plan are Surry, Isle of Wight, James City, Williamsburg, York and Newport News. They have emergency response functions as previously stated in this section.

• The communities within the fifty mile EPZ are listed in Figure 5.5a and depicted in Figure 5.5b. In the event of an emergency, notification of and interaction with these entities is a function of the DEM.

5.4.7 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Operations Plan The FRMAC Operations Plan provides for the coordinated management of Federal technical response activities related to a radiological emergency. Its primary goals include:

• Assisting the State and Lead Federal Agency (LFA) with personnel, equipment, and technical resources, as needed;

• Collecting offsite environmental radiological data; and,

• Providing the data and related assessments to involved State agencies and to the LFA.

The Department of Energy (DOE), because of its history and capabilities in radiological monitoring and assessment, was assigned the responsibility to prepare for, establish, and manage the FRMAC. The FRMAC may be activated when a major radiological emergency exists, and the Federal government will respond when a State, other governmental entity with jurisdiction, or a regulated entity requests federal support.

The SEM, Recovery Manager or Corporate Response Manager may request FRMAC assistance directly or through the NRC (LFA). The Company will provide designated facilities for the NRC (LFA) in the LEOF. There are three commercial air terminals in close proximity (i.e., within 75 minutes driving time) to Surry Power Station: Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport in Newport News, Virginia; Richmond International Airport (RIC) in Richmond, Virginia; and Norfolk International Airport in Norfolk, Virginia. It is estimated that a FRMAC Advance Party could be expected at the site within 6 to 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> following the order to deploy.

Further information concerning objectives and organization is provided in the FRMAC Operations Plan (See Appendix 10.3).

SEP Page 5.17 Revision 47 MINIMUM SHIFT MANNING REQUIREMENTS TABLE 5.1 Maior Functional Major Tasks Position Title Additional within aDproximatelv Area Shift 45 Min. 60 Min.

Plant Operations Plant Operations Shift ManagerUnit Supervisor and Assessment of Operational (SRO)

Control Room Operator (RO) 2*

3*

I Aspects Control Room Operator (AO) 4 Emergency Direction and Station Emergency Manager 1**'

• Direction and Control of onsite Control Emergency Activities Notification! Notify station, Emergency Communicator 2** 2 Communication local, State, and Federal personnel and maintain communication Radiological Local Recovery Manager (Refer to Table 5.2)

Accident Emergency Assessment and Operations Support of Facility (LEOF)

Operational Accident Assessment TSC Offsite Radiological Assessment 1*** 1 Dose Director Assessment LEOF Offsite Radiological Assessment (Refer to Table 5.2)

Dose Coordinator Assessment Offsite Surveys Offsite Monitoring Team Leader 2 Offsite Monitoring Team Member 2 Onsite (out of Onsite Monitoring Team plant) Surveys Leader 1 Onsite Monitoring Team Member 1 Inplant Surveys/ Inplant Monitoring Team Radiochemistry Leader 1 1 Inplant Monitoring Team Member 1 1 Chemistry Chemistry Team Leader 1 Chemistry Team Member 1 1

SEP Page 5.18 Revision 47

• Maior Functional Maior Tasks Position Title Additional within approximatehr:

Area Shift 45 Min. 60 Min.

Plant System Technical Shift Technical Advisor (STA) 1*

Engineering, Support Operational - Technical Repair and Support Team Member Corrective Action (Operational Advisor) 1 (1)

Core - Technical Support Team Member 12)

Electrical - Technical Support Team Member 1 Mechanical - Technical Support Team Member 1 Repair and Mechanical Maintenance -

Corrective Action Damage Control Team Member 1 ** 1 1 Rad Waste Operator -

Damage Control Team Member 1***

Electrical Maintenance -

Damage Control Team Member 1 ** 2 Instrument and Control -

Damage Control Team Member 2 Protective Radiation Personnel Monitoring Team Actions Protection: Leader 1*** 2

a. Access Personnel Monitoring Team Control Leader 1*** 2

b. HP Coverage for repair, corrective actions, search and rescue, first aid, and firefighting.

c. Personnel monitoring

d. Dosimetry

SEP

- Page 5.19 Revision 47 Maior Functional Maior Tasks Position Title Additional within approximately Area Shift 45 Min. 60 Min.

Firefighting and Firefighting Fire Team Members 5*^* 5*** plus local Rescue support Operations First Aid and First Aid and First Aid Team Members 2*** plus local Rescue Rescue support Operations Site Access Security and Security Personnel (Proprietary)

Control and Personnel Personnel Accountability Accountability 1 26 NOTES:

• Station Technical Specifications allowances for reduced staffing with both units in cold shutdown condition apply.

Mechanical and electrical maintenance personnel are normally onsite on a 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> per day, 7 day per week basis. This coverage may be provided by personnel who are assigned to other functions during the period that mechanical and electrical maintenance personnel are not onsite.

This coverage is provided by personnel who may be assigned other functions.

(1) The candidates for this position are limited to qualified STAs, SROs, former STAs, or former SROs.

Concurrence for change to position title and resource pool used to staff position provided by NRC via letter dated July 22, 1993.

(2) This coverage previously required within approximately 30 minutes. Change Approved per NRC Region II letter,

Subject:

Surry and North Anna Proposed Emergency Plan Changes, May 18, 1990.

The on-duty Shift Technical Advisor performs the responsibilities of this position prior to augmentation. Approval was based on factors outlined in the referenced letter remaining constant.

SEP Page 5.20 Revision 47 EMERGENCY AND RECOVERY CORPORATE RESPONSE REQUIRED FOR NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCIES ALERT (OR HIGHER) EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE 5.2 Major Functional Area (Emergency Position Title) Maior Task Available in:

Management of Local To coordinate the Company's response to 1Y2 hrs.

Emergency Operations Facility emergency with Federal, State and local (Recovery Manager) authorities 1Y2 hrs.

Health Physics & Chemistry Report to Recovery Manager to conduct (Radiological Assessment radiological assessment Coordinator)

Technical Support Reports to the Corporate Response Manager to 1Y2 hrs.

(Technical Support Manager) provide technical and evaluation support.

lY2hrs.

Plan/Design/Construction Reports to the Corporate Response Manager to (Plan/Design/Construction provide engineering, technical and vendor support Manager) in areas dealing with construction or design changes.

1Y2hrs.

News Center Interface Reports to the Corporate Response Manager to (Chief Technical become the Company Spokesperson for Spokesperson) statements to the news media.

SEP Page 5.21 Revision 47 STATION EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION PRIOR TO AUGMENTATION*

FIGURE 5.1 STATION EMERGENCY MANAGER H_ EMERGENCY COMMUNICATOR I

SHIFT MANAGER RADIOLOGICAL OR ASSESSMENT UNIT SUPERVISOR DIRECTOR ON-DUTY lCHEMISTRY I STA d TEAM l ON-DUTY IN-PLANT OPERATIONS MONITORING PERSONNEL TEAM H

i DAMAGE SECURITY CONTROL TEAM TEAM #

FIRE IRST AID I TEAM ** -_ TEAM ** g i

SEARCH AND RESCUE TEAM **

• Augmented for Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency.

• • This coverage is provided by personnel who may be assigned other functions.

This coverage may not be provided on a full time basis.

SEP Page 5 22 Revision 47 STATION EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION FOLLOWING AUGMENTATION

• FIGURE 5.2 STATION EMERGENCY MANAGER l EMERGENCY PROCEDURES COORDINATOR -A EMERGENCY COMMUNICATOR

]

I EMERGENCY OPERATIONS I EMERGENCY MAINTENANCE EMERGENCY I

TECHNICAL EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR

]

SHIFT TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGER SUPPORT SUPPORT OR TEAM TEAM UNIT

]I SUPERVISOR I SECURITY ON-DUTY RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT DIRECTOR OSC DIRECTOR I TEAM OPERATIONS PERSONNEL DOSE ASSESSMENT 1

RADIATION PROTECTION I OSC SUPPORT I

ON-DUTY TEAM SUPERVISOR TEAM STA ##

I OFFSITE MONITORING IN-PLANT MONITORING FIRE TEAM TEAMS (2)*** TEAM **, #

F I

CHEMISTRY SAMPLE l FIRST AID TEAM

] ANALYSIS TEAM ##

TEAM ON-SITE (OUT OF PLANT) DAMAGE MONITORING EVACUATION PERSONNEL MONITORING AND DECON TEAM CONTROL TEAM **,#

SEARCH AND

]

MONITORING .

RESCUE TEAM TEAMS **, ## **, # l

• Augmented for Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency.

• • This team will be activated only if circumstances require this function to be performed.

• • • '~' Transferred to LEOF when facility activated.

Normal reporting structure is shown. If the team is activated, control of the team will transfer to the SEM or appropriate Emergency Director.

1. 1. These teams may consist of only one individual.

SEP Page 5.23 Revision 47 STATION TO SUPPORT GROUP INTERFACE PRIOR TO AUGMENTATION OF THE ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION FIGURE 5.3 STATION EMERGENCY MANAGER CORPORATE STATION OFFICE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION SEE FIGURE 5.1 NEWS MEDI LOCAL FIRE LOCAL FIGHTING 4- RESCUE SERVICES SERVICES MEDICAL COLLEGE LOCAL LAW OF ENFORCEMENT VIRGINIA AGENCIES OTHER SERVICES

SEP Page 524 Revision 47 STATION TO SUPPORT GROUP NTERFACE FOLLOWING LEOF ACIVATION FIGURE 5.4 CORPORATE CORPORATE U. S. DEPT.

EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

ORGANIZATION

RESPONSE

MANAGER l OF ENERGY (DOE) ]

INDUSTRY RECOVERY I--

MANAGER { SUPPORT

]

II II UNAFFECTED STATION NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY REGULATORY STATION MANAGER COMMISSION I

STATION* LOCAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS (SEE FIG. 5.2) FACILITY r------------- ---- ______I I I I I I I STATE DEPT. DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SERVICES (LOCAL GOV'T)

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH OFFICE OF (RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH PROGRAM)

[ EMERGENCY SERVICES DEPT. OF VIRGINIA SHERIFF OR I STATE POLICE [ POLICE SOCIAL SERVICES FIRE _ DEPT.OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENTS PUBLIC COLLEGE OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT K RESCUE SQUADS _

I HEALTH I OF GAME AND INLAND SYMBOLS: FISHERIES MANAGEMENT CONTROL COORDINATED ASSISTANCE --------------

SEP Page 5.25 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION CITIES AND COUNTIES WITHIN THE 50 MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE FIGURE 5.5.a VIRGINIA COUNTIES VIRGINIA CITIES

1. Surry 24. Suffolk

2. Isle of Wight 25. Williamsburg

3. Southhampton 26. Chesapeake

4. James City 27. Newport News

5. York 28. Hampton

6. Charles City 29. Portsmouth

• ^7. Henrico 30. Norfolk

• • 8. Chesterfield **31. Richmond

9. Northhampton 32. Virginia Beach

10. Northumberland 33. Colonial Heights

11. Lancaster 34. Hopewell

12. Richmond 35. Petersburg

• • 13. Essex 36. Franklin

14. Middlesex 37. Poquoson

15. Mathews

16. Gloucester

• • 17. King & Queen

• • 18. King William

• • 19. Hanover

20. New Kent

21. Prince George

22. Dinwiddie

23. Sussex

• That portion of the State of North Carolina lying within the 50 Mile Zone has been excluded (reference NRC letter, January 13, 1981, Serial Number 39).

Within 50 miles of North Anna Power Station and Surry Power Station.

Reference Figure 5.5b.

SEP Page 5.26 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION FIFTY MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE FIGURE 5.5.b 5 t4N humberland \

Thar, C c 5a so miles Owls" W..SB)flS

SEP Page 6.1 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION 6 EMERGENCY MEASURES Part Subiect Paae No.

6.0 Emergency Measures 6.2 6.1 Activation of the Emergency Plan 6.2 6.2 Assessment Actions 6.2 6.3 Protective Actions 6.3 6.3.1 Offsite Criteria for the 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) 6.3 6.3.2 Onsite Criteria for the Exclusion Area 6.4 6.3.3 Use of Onsite Protective Equipment and Supplies 6.5 6.3.3.1 Respiratory Protection 6.5 6.3.3.2 Protective Clothing 6.6 6.3.3.3 Thyroid Blocking Agent 6.6 6.4 Aid to Affected Personnel 6.6 6.4.1 Emergency Exposure Limits 6.6 6.4.2 First Aid and Decontamination 6.7 6.4.3 Medical Transportation 6.8 6.4.4 Medical Treatment 6.8 6.5 Offsite Support 6.8 Figure 6.1 Surry Power Station Remote Assembly Areas 6.9 Figure 6.2 Surry Power Station 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) 6.10 Table 6.1 Radionuclides with Significant Contribution to Dominant Exposure Modes 6.11 Table 6.2 Surry Population Distribution and Evacuation Time Estimates 6.12 Table 6.3 Surry Power Station Population Data by Sector 6.13

SEP Page 6.2 Revision 47 6.0 Emergency Measures Emergency measures provide pre-planned actions, methods, and criteria which guide personnel during the course of an emergency.

The initial response to any emergency condition will be the activation of the Emergency Plan. After activation, the emergency organization that is formulated by activation of the Emergency Plan performs the necessary assessment activities to classify the type of emergency. If the emergency is radiological in nature, the potential consequences of the emergency will be evaluated for the necessary offsite and onsite protective actions to guard the health and safety of the population. If additional assistance is required, offsite support will be requested as provided for in Letters of Agreement established with a variety of government agencies and volunteer organizations.

6.1 Activation of the Emergency Plan Each full-time employee of the station is required to be familiar with the provisions of the Emergency Plan. Any employee, upon becoming aware of an emergency condition, shall immediately notify the Shift Supervisor on duty unless it is apparent that notification has already taken place. Upon such notification or other indication, the Shift Manager or Unit Supervisor assumes the responsibilities of the Station Emergency Manager (SEM). The SEM classifies the emergency and proceeds to take appropriate actions and make specific recommendations to offsite agencies as stated in the EPIPs. Notifications will be made to state and local community officials within 15 minutes after declaration of an emergency, and to the NRC as soon as possible, but within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Dedicated communicators will be available to maintain a continuous channel of communications with the NRC and to provide regular updates to state and local officials approximately every 60 minutes, when conditions change or as otherwise agreed. Initial information provided to the NRC and state and local governments is defined by specific report forms which are included in the EPIPs. Message content was established in coordination with state and local govemments, and includes the class of emergency, whether a release is in progress, and any recommended protective measures. Additional information will be provided as it becomes available.

6.2 Assessment Actions EPIP-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure, is the controlling procedure for categorizing the event and classifying the emergency, while EPIP-4.01, Radiological Assessment Director Controlling Procedure, provides guidance for conducting dose assessment, source term determination, atmospheric diffusion factor determination, monitoring team activities, personnel monitoring and decontamination, monitoring of onsite facilities, evacuation, respiratory protection, sampling and sample analysis, and use of the Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS) computer model.

Once the emergency classification has been determined, the appropriate EPIPs are initiated to direct the activation of the required emergency response facilities and call out of designated emergency response personnel. The design of the facilities and data retrieval and monitoring capabilities provide the information needed to make timely assessments and formulate appropriate protective actions.

SEP Page 6.3 Revision 47 6.3 Protective Actions The Recovery Manager or the SEM (if the LEOF is not yet activated) is responsible for recommending offsite protective actions to the State. The State and local governments are responsible for notification of the public and implementation of the appropriate protective measures.

6.3.1 Offsite Criteria for the 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)

Dose contribution from key isotopes such as those listed in Table 6.1 are used to calculate offsite doses for comparison to protective action recommendation thresholds specified in EPIPs.

Protective action recommendations are required to be made to the State within 15 minutes of declaring a General Emergency. Specific initial protective action recommendations tied to plant conditions have been included in an EPIP in order to comply with this time requirement. These recommendations are based on Supplement 3 (Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents) to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." (This supplement was issued for interim use and comment on August 26, 1996.)

The initial protective action recommendation for any event classified as a General Emergency will be to evacuate in all directions out to 5 miles. Follow-up protective action recommendations that the station may make to the state will be based upon current meteorological data such as wind direction, wind speed and stability class, and dose projections.

A Site Area Emergency will be declared when offsite doses are projected to exceed 0.1 Rem TEDE or 0.5 Rem Thyroid CDE. A General Emergency will be declared when offsite Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of 1.0 Rem TEDE or 5.0 Rem Thyroid CDE are likely to be exceeded due to a direct radiation or inhalation hazard, or when non-radiological conditions exceed General Emergency EALs.

Warnings to the public within the 10-mile EPZ (Figure 6.2) will be the responsibility of State and local officials who will be assisted by the State Department of Police upon request. The primary method of warning the public is by the use of the Early Warning System sirens. Other warning methods may include telephone communications, television and radio Emergency Alert System stations, public address systems, bull horns from patrol cars and personal contact. Special facilities are notified by the DEM.

It is estimated that the primary sector and the two buffer sectors (spanning 67 1/20) can be alerted of the emergency within 15 minutes using the Early Warning System.

Evacuation zones, routes, and relocation centers have been established in the event that an evacuation is recommended. This information is published in brochures and distributed by the State.

Population distribution and evacuation time estimates are maintained on file by the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Department and are summarized in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. The existing evacuation time estimate studies will be provided to the State Department of Emergency Management following the 10-year census. At that time, the State will make the determination whether or not a new study is required for the EPZ.

Written preplanned messages intended for transmittal to the public via radio and television stations will be consistent with the classification scheme. They will be released to the media by the State Coordinator

SEP Page 6.4 Revision 47 of Emergency Management or Local Coordinator of Emergency Services representative (or designee). The messages will give instruction with regard to specific actions to be taken by the occupants of the inhabited area. The messages will, as appropriate, give instruction on the aspects of sheltering, thyroid blocking, evacuation, the nature of the emergency, and recommended protective actions. The local governments are charged by COVRERP with the responsibility to conduct information programs to educate their citizens on:

1. Radiological hazards,

2. Procedures for notification of a radiological emergency;

3. Evacuation routes and assembly points; and,

4. Other protective measures.

The COVRERP identifies the methods to be utilized in preventing or minimizing direct or subsequent ingestion exposure to radioactive materials deposited on the ground or other surfaces.

Upon notification of a radiological emergency within the state which may affect livestock, crops, or farmlands, the State Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services will institute a program to assess the impact upon the agriculture community. Members of the department will take samples of milk from dairy cattle in the affected area for analysis and will monitor soil, crops and farm equipment for contamination.

Samples will be taken at localities where radiation levels exceed 0.05 mR/hr at one inch. The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services will supply uncontaminated feed for dairy cattle and livestock removed from contaminated farmland. The ingestion pathway is monitored within an approximate 50-mile radius of the station.

Follow-up action Includes the disposition of radiologically contaminated materials. The local govemment(s) has the prime responsibility of affected area ingress and egress. Assistance from the State Police shall be supplied as requested by local officials.

Waller Mill, Harwood Mill, Bethel and Newport News Reservoirs supply water for the Williamsburg, Newport News and Hampton areas. The respective local public health departments are the primary health response agencies for monitoring water supplies, with assistance given by the State Department of Health.

There are no withdrawals of James River water for public or private water supplies within Surry, James City, Isle of Wight, and York counties and the cities of Williamsburg and Newport News. Most of Surry County and Isle of Wight County water supplies come from wells.

Criteria for determining an exposure value that would allow relaxation of protective actions within any or all of the 10-mile EPZ falls under the provisions of the COVRERP. Assistance will be provided as required in this regard.

6.3.2 Onsite Criteria for the Exclusion Area The area within 1650 feet of Surry Unit 1 is defined as the Exclusion Area for the purposes of this Plan. Company employees, contractor personnel, and occasional visitors at the site may be in the Exclusion Area. The immediate area surrounding the units which has been enclosed by a security fence is defined as the Protected Area. The Station Emergency Manager is responsible for making the decision to evacuate the Protected Area, and will take appropriate measures in cooperation with state and local agencies for evacuation of persons in the Exclusion Area and those members of the public who may be passing through

SEP Page 6.5 Revision 47 the site or within Company property. The company will also commit Company personnel and appropriate equipment (search lights, power amplified loudspeakers) to clear the Exclusion Area when required.

Visitors to the Protected Area of the station are under continuous escort by personnel knowledgeable in emergency personnel accountability procedures. Contractor personnel are also trained in personnel accountability procedures.

Onsite personnel will be immediately notified of an emergency that is initially classified as an Alert or higher event, unless doing so poses a threat to personnel safety. For example, hurricane force winds, a tomado, or a security breach may dictate suspension or deferral of assembly, accountability and/or initiation of facility staffing. However, these activities would be implemented as quickly as achievable given the specific situation. The Central Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF) may be activated in lieu of the LEOF upon a management decision to do so or Hthe readiness of the LEOF is impaired. Normally, alarms will be sounded and announcements will be made to conduct personnel accountability or, if necessary, a site evacuation of non-essential workers. Those individuals within the Exclusion Area will be alerted by station personnel and Security. In the event of an evacuation, radiation monitoring teams will be dispatched to the appropriate Remote Assembly Area.

The Station has the capability to conduct personnel accountability for individuals inside the Protected Area within approximately 30 minutes using an EPIP established for this purpose. After accountability is completed, an evaluation is made and search teams may be dispatched to locate any individual noted as missing or unaccounted. Additionally, Emergency Assembly Areas have been established outside the Protected Area to facilitate the dissemination of information to personnel.

If onsite evacuation is to occur, Security collects only the security badges, not the dosimetry, of all personnel leaving the Protected Area. Continuous accountability of personnel in the Protected Area not evacuating the site shall be maintained throughout the emergency. Evacuees, who may use personal vehicles, proceed to either the primary or secondary remote assembly area (See Figure 6.1). Station evacuees will be surveyed for contamination following events involving a radiological release, and decontaminated, if necessary, prior to being released from the remote assembly area. Decontamination agents and supplies are available at the station which can be transported to the remote assembly areas to provide decontamination capabilities.

6.3.3 Use of Onsite Protective Equipment and Supplies 6.3.3.1 Respiratory Protection The company has a comprehensive respiratory protection program at its nuclear stations. VPAP 2101, "Radiation Protection Plan", establishes the Respiratory Protection Program which is implemented by HP procedures. Those individuals likely to wear respirators are given a pulmonary examination and training on respiratory protection including a practical examination. A "fit test' is given before an individual is allowed to enter an area requiring respiratory protection.

SEP Page 6.6 Revision 47 6.3.3.2 Protective Clothinq The station maintains an adequate inventory of protective clothing in the Clean Change Room.

Contaminated clothing is washed at the station and reissued provided contamination is below established radiation criteria. A Radiation Work Permit system is utilized whereby HP establishes personnel protective clothing and equipment criteria. Such clothing may consist of cotton coveralls, hoods, cotton glove inserts, rubber gloves, plastic shoe covers, rubber shoe covers and rubber boots. Station personnel are given training on how to don and remove protective clothing so as to minimize personal contamination or introduction of contamination into adjacent areas.

6.3.3.3 Thyroid Blocking Agent EPIP-5.07, Administration of Radioprotective Drugs, governs the process for approving administration of a thyroid blocking agent for a potential radioiodine inhalation situation. This process was authorized by the company's employee health services staff in consultation with its medical support staff.

6.4 Aid to Affected Personnel The Company has made arrangements with the Medical College of Virginia (MCV), Virginia Commonwealth University, to provide medical assistance to personnel injured or exposed to radiation and/or radioactive material. MCV has developed its own plan for responding to the emergency. MCV's plan establishes a specialized area of the hospital for treatment with appropriate Health Physics functions, and implements a coded system to alert hospital team members. Radiation monitoring equipment, dosimetry, and protective clothing are available at MCV.

The station will provide and distribute self-reading and cumulative type dosimeters to all personnel involved in emergency onsite response, regardless of their affiliation with the Company, in accordance with procedures established for this purpose. The station shall have this capability on a 24-hour basis. Dose records shall be maintained and checked throughout the emergency.

6.4.1 Emergency Exposure Limits Emergency response personnel may, because of necessity, receive once-in-a-lifetime exposure to contamination and radiation up to the 10CFR20 annual limits, not including accumulated occupational exposure. Approval from the Station Emergency Manager is necessary for planned exposures greater than the 10CFR20 annual limits. Under limited circumstances, exposure levels greater than 5 times the 10CFR20 annual limits are allowed, but only on a voluntary basis to persons fully aware of the risks involved. Selection criteria for volunteer emergency workers includes consideration of those who are in good physical health, are familiar with the consequences of emergency exposure, and are not declared pregnant adults. It is preferable, though not mandatory, that volunteers be older than 45 years of age and not be a female capable of reproduction.

Emergency exposure may be authorized for such needs as removal of injured personnel, undertaking corrective actions, performing assessment actions, providing first-aid, performing personnel decontamination, providing ambulance service, providing medical treatment, etc. Guidelines for emergency exposure limits, including life saving actions, are specified in the EPIPs. These guidelines are consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Life Saving Activity Protective Action Guides.

SEP Page 6.7 Revision 47 6.4.2 First Aid and Decontamination The station has a First Aid Facility that contains the normal complement of first aid supplies and equipment necessary to treat those injuries not involving hospitalization or professional medical services.

At least two First Aid Team members are trained, certified, and available to respond to personnel injuries onsite.

Inaddition, the following Medical facilities and services are available:

1. Company nurse available on a part-time basis

2. Company Ambulance

3. Company designated physicians in the area

4. Local Rescue Squads

5. Medical College of Virginia Station Health Physics Procedures and EPIPs specify levels of permissible radioactive contamination for workers and equipment. Actions are required to be taken when levels for equipment or areas exceed the limits established in the Health Physics Procedures. Any detected personnel contamination will initiate appropriate evaluation and decontamination in accordance with these procedures.

The Station has onsite contamination control procedures that provide for access control. These procedures state the criteria for permitting the return of the areas and their contents to normal use.

No food supplies are grown on the site and the water supplies come from deep wells. However, there are procedures to monitor contamination in areas designated permissible for employees to eat and drink during the emergency and recovery phases of operation.

If onsite personnel are required to relocate or routinely leave the site during an emergency, the station will provide adequate supplies for personnel decontamination, clothing and means to provide for decontamination of the clothing. If contamination of the skin is determined, provisions will be made to provide for decontamination as specified in Health Physics Procedures.

An EPIP has been developed to provide for the monitoring of vehicles and personnel at the Remote Assembly Areas (RAA). Should decontamination of vehicles or personnel be warranted, Health Physics personnel can perform the task at the station, the RAA, or if necessary, at Surry County High School.

Security personnel may patrol the land area to ensure eviction of unauthorized personnel. Since the station's drinking water supply is from deep wells, there is no agricultural production in this area, and there are no milk cows in this area, contamination control methods affecting these are unnecessary. The area may be returned to a status not requiring evacuation when projected doses to the majority of non-essential workers is expected to be less than 1 Rem TEDE, less than 5 Rem Thyroid CDE, and less than 1000 dpm/100 cm2 Beta-Gamma contamination.

SEP Page 6.8 Revision 47 6.4.3 Medical Transportation A Station ambulance is available to transport contaminated injured personnel. Contaminated injured personnel will be suitably clothed or prepared to prevent the spread of contamination in the transporting vehicle. Communication can be maintained with MCV from the station. The station can also communicate with the ambulance by use of a UHF radio, and the ambulance can communicate with MCV by way of the HEAR system. In addition arrangements have been made with local volunteer rescue squads to transport injured contaminated personnel to MCV. Response team members have received training concerning transportation of contaminated injured individuals. A Health Physics technician, with appropriate instrumentation, would normally accompany contaminated injured personnel to MCV. The approximate time to transport a patient to MCV is 75 minutes. The estimated time local rescue squads to arrive at the station is 30 minutes.

6.4.4 Medical Treatment The MCVHNCU-Virginia Power Radiation Emergency Plan, maintained on file by the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness department, provides guidance for the treatment of contaminated injured personnel by qualified individuals. The Radiation Emergency Plan includes provisions to request assistance from other facilities having the capability to receive and treat injured and/or contaminated individuals. In the event that facilities at MCV Hospital become over-extended, MCV may coordinate further assistance with these facilities directly or through the State Department of Health.

6.5 Offsite Support In addition to the offsite agencies listed above, volunteer fire departments in the counties of Surry and Isle of Wight have agreed to assist in fighting fires. A list of services and equipment is included in the Letters of Agreement in Appendix 10.1.

The time of response of volunteer fire departments from Surry and Smithfield, Virginia varies from 30 minutes to 45 minutes, unless adverse weather conditions prevail.

Police support for an emergency is provided by state and local govemments, as detailed in the respective Emergency Plans.

SEP Page 6.9 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION REMOTE ASSEMBLY AREAS FIGURE 6.1 James Rive r

64 Surry Power Stat Ion IN 31 PoerI Lines I Surry.

~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ IPimr 68 Assembly

~~ ~

31110 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Ae arahs No.SB]216

SEP Page 6.10 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION 10 - MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (EPZ)

FIGURE 6.2 Willamsburg A R 3B James Cy %t County 1tch X York County 10 1 m8R~e Cubn o. SBU17

SEP Page 6.11 Revision 47 RADIONUCLIDES WITH SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO DOMINANT EXPOSURE MODES(')

TABLE 6.1 Radionuclides with Significant Contribution to Lung Exposure (Lung only controlling when thyroid dose is reduced by Radionuclides with Significant Radionuclides with Significant iodine blocking or there is Contribution to Thyroid Exposure Contribution to TEDE Exposure a long delay prior to release)

Radionuclide Half Life Radionuclide Half Life Radionuclide Half Life (days) (days) (days) 1-131 8.05 1-131 8.05 1-131 8.05 1-132 0.0958 Te-132 3.25 1-132 0.0958 1-133 0.875 Xe-1 33 5.28 1-133 0.875 1-134 0.0366 1-133 0.875 1-134 0.0366 1-135 0.280 Xe-135 0.384 1-135 0.280 Te-132 3.25 1-135 0.280 Cs-134 750 Cs-134 750 Kr-88 0.117 Kr-88 0.117 Cs-137 11,000 Cs-1 37 11,000 Ru-106 365 Te-132 3.25 Ce-1 44 284 (1) Derived from NUREG 0654.

SEP Page 6.12 Revision 47 SURRY POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES TABLE 6.2 Total Population Evacuation Time Estimate (in minutes)

Evacuated Normal Conditions Adverse Conditions 10-mile radius - North of James River 172565 491 572 10-mile radius - South of James River 3533 61 61 5-mile radius 62370 568 622 2-mile radius 1354 49 55 Quadrant I 135943 534 568 Quadrant II 104939 650 770 Quadrant III 3533 61 61 Quadrant IV 65293 190 241 Information summarized above derived from Innovative Emergency Managements Evacuation Time Estimates for the Surry Power Station and Surrounding Jurisdictions dated November 28, 2001 (Table 13, Summary of Results of Evacuation Time Estimates).

Total population evacuated represents the total population loaded onto the network during the 8 simulations listed and evacuation time estimates were calculated based on when approximately 90% of that population has exited the 10-mile radius.

The four quadrants represent 900 arcs of the area surrounding the station. The total population for each quadrant was determined by adding the population of the protective action zones included within each 90° arc. The protective action zones are irregular-shaped areas are bounded by prominent physical features which facilitate selection and notification of protective actions for the public.

SEP Page 6.13 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION POPULATION DATA BY SECTOR TABLE 6.3 Direction/Sector Population 2-Mile Ring 5-Mile Ring 10-Mile Ring Direction: North Permanent Resident 0 597 14251 Sector A Transient 0 129 0 Direction: North Northeast Permanent Resident 0 1164 9082 Sector B Transient 0 1363 0 Direction: Northeast Permanent Resident 3 268 1853 Sector C Transient 0 0 0 Direction: East Northeast Permanent Resident 3 0 5418 Sector: D Transient 0 0 0 Direction: East Permanent Resident 0 0 24582 Sector E Transient 0 0 0 Direction: East Southeast Permanent Resident 0 98 26260 Sector: F Transient 0 0 0 Direction: Southeast Permanent Resident 0 19 939 Sector G Transient 0 0 0 Direction: South Southeast Permanent Resident 5 162 348 Sector H Transient 963 17 13 Direction: South Permanent Resident 8 262 1088 Sector: J Transient 14 0 28 Direction: South Southwest Permanent Resident 1 146 211 Sector K Transient 0 19 6 Direction: Southwest Permanent Resident 0 162 380 Sector: L Transient 0 152 44 Direction: West Southwest Permanent Resident 0 190 767 Sector. M Transient 0 48 322 Direction: West Permanent Resident 0 169 545 Sector: N Transient 0 27 7 Direction: West Northwest Permanent Resident 0 66 138 Sector P Transient 0 76 11 Direction: Northwest Permanent Resident 0 147 6459 Sector: 0 Transient 0 1704 3303 Direction: North Northwest Permanent Resident 0 561 12579 Sector R Transient 0 26 0 22.50 conical sectors are designated by compass direction point outward from the plant on the centerline of the sector, e.g., sector from 348.750 to 11.250 is designated as Direction: North. Sectors are designated by letter beginning with A for North and where the remaining 15 sectors are designated in a clockwise direction by the subsequent letter, excluding I and 0.

Rings are defined as the area between circles of radius 0 and 2 miles, 2 and 5 miles, and 5 and 10 miles.

Information summarized above derived from Innovative Emergency Managemente Evacuation Time Estimates for the Surry Power Station and Surrounding Jurisdictions dated November 28, 2001 (Table 1, Permanent Resident Population Distribution Based on 2000 Census Data by Sector and Ring, and Table 5, Transient Population by Sector and Ring). Special facility population included within transient population counts.

SEP Page 7.1 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION 7 EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Part Subiect Page No.

7.0 Emergency Facilities and Equipment 7.3 7.1 Emergency Response Facilities 7.3 7.1.1 Control Room 7.3 7.1.2 Operational Support Center 7.3 7.1.3 Technical Support Center 7.3 7.1.4 Local Emergency Operations Facility 7.4 7.1.5 Corporate Emergency Response Center and Central Emergency Operations Facility 7.4 7.1.6 Joint Information Center and Local Media Center 7.4 7.2 Communications Systems 7.4 7.2.1 Communications Systems Within the Station 7.5 7.2.1.1 Public Address and Intercom System 7.5 7.2.1.2 Radio Communications System (Onsite) 7.5 7.2.1.3 Private Branch Telephone Exchange (PBX) 7.5 7.2.1.4 Sound Powered Telephone System 7.5 7.2.2 Offsite Communications Systems 7.5 7.2.2.1 Commercial Telephone 7.5 7.2.2.2 Microwave System (OPX) 7.6 7.2.2.3 Radio Communications System (Offsite) 7.6 7.2.2.4 Dedicated NRC Communications 7.6 7.2.2.5 Instaphone Loop 7.7 7.2.3 Communication System Reliability 7.7 7.2.4 Emergency Response Facility Communications 7.7 7.2.5 Communications Responsibilities 7.7 7.2.5.1 Station Emergency Manager 7.7 7.2.5.2 State And Local Entities Contiguous to the 10 Mile EPZ 7.7 7.2.5.3 Federal Response 7.7 7.2.5.4 Local Emergency Facilities 7.8

SEP Page 7.2 Revision 47 Part Subiect Page No.

7.2.5.5 Emergency Personnel 7.8 7.2.5.6 Communications with Local Emergency Operations Facility 7.8 7.3 Assessment Facilities Available Onsite 7.8 7.3.1 Seismic Monitoring 7.8 7.3.2 Radiological Monitoring 7.8 7.3.3 Meteorological Monitoring 7.9 7.3.4 Plant Process Parameter Monitoring 7.9 7.3.5 Fire Detection 7.10 7.3.6 Post Accident Sampling 7.10 7.4 Facilities and Equipment for Offsite Monitoring 7.10 7.5 Damage Control Equipment and Supplies 7.10 7.6 Early Warning System 7.11 Table 7.1 ERF Communications 7.12 Table 7.2 Meteorological Monitoring System Parameters 7.14 Figure 7.1 Surry Power Station Environmental Monitoring Locations Map 7.15 Figure 7.2 Surry Power Station Environmental Monitoring Locations Listing 7.16 Figure 7.3 Communications Links 7.17 Figure 7.4 Communications Links - NRC 7.18

SEP Page 7.3 Revision 47 7.0 Emergency Facilities and Equipment The facilities required in the implementation of the Emergency Plan consist of the Control Room (shared for both Unit 1 and 2), the Operational Support Center (OSC), the Technical Support Center (TSC),

the Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF), the Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC) and the Central Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF), and the Joint Information Center (JIC) and the Local Media Center (LMC). These facilities were designed to meet the intent of the guidance in NUREG-0696 and the clarification in NUREG-0737 Supplement 1. A description of each is given below.

7.1 Emergency Response Facilities 7.1.1 Control Room The Control Room of the affected unit(s) shall be the initial location for command and control of the emergency response effort. Controls and instrumentation needed to diagnose plant conditions and to take immediate actions to place the affected unit(s) in a safe condition are available in the Control Room. Within the Control Room, the Station Emergency Manager has access to the information needed to classify the emergency. Redundant communications systems are also available in the Control Room to make the required onsite and offsite notifications. The Control Room has the required shielding and ventilation system to remain habitable during the emergency. Access to the Control Room shall be limited to these individuals responsible for carrying out assigned emergency response tasks plus other technical advisors, as necessary.

7.1.2 Operational Support Center The Operational Support Center (OSC), located in the Maintenance Building, is the designated reporting location for the pool of workers who compose Damage Control Teams, the Fire Team, the First Aid Team, and the Search and Rescue Team. Station Operations personnel not required for Control Room operation may also assemble at the OSC unless already performing an emergency function outside the Control Room (or otherwise instructed by the Shift Manager/SEM). A separate area has been designated for use as an Alternate OSC in the event that the primary facility is unavailable.

7.1.3 Technical Support Center The TSC is located adjacent to Unit 1 Control Room, and its alternate location is the Control Room.

Emergency response personnel will assemble at the primary TSC unless otherwise instructed by the SEM.

The primary location contains controlled copies of selected manuals, procedures, drawings, and other documents as designated by Nuclear Records Department directives. Information about plant conditions is available via real time data displays from the Emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS).

Dedicated phone line communications have also been established with the Control Room to keep TSC personnel knowledgeable on current operating evolutions and to provide consultation and recommendations to the Control Room staff.

The construction of the facility walls and design of the ventilation system are such that the whole body and thyroid doses received by occupants of the TSC are below General Design Criteria limits.

Radiation monitoring equipment for making airborne particulate and direct radiation measurements is installed in the TSC. The TSC houses the ERFCS Data Communications Processors (redundant units).

SEP Page 7.4 Revision 47 Inputs from plant sensors are processed by these units and the information is transmitted to facilities including the Control Room, LEOF, CERC, and CEOF for display on video terminals.

7.1.4 Local Emergency Operations Facilit The station's LEOF is adjacent to the Surry Training Facility. The facility provides work stations for Corporate, Federal and State officials who may be assembled at this location. This facility is the designated central collection point for the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data and the coordination of sample media. Plant data is available via an independent VO unit of the ERFCS which drives the terminals in the LEOF. The ERFCS provides information, through a data link, to the MIDAS computer which is used primarily by the Radiological Assessment Coordinator to estimate offsite doses.

The LEOF was designed to provide a specified protection factor from gamma radiation. The facility also has a specially designed ventilation system to limit the exposure of Rs occupants and further assure its availability during an emergency. Radiation monitoring equipment for making airbome particulate and direct radiation measurements is installed in the LEOF. Should the LEOF become unavailable during an emergency the responsibilities assigned to the LEOF will be transferred to the backup facility known as the Central Emergency Operations Facility. Situations with the potential to affect both Surry and North Anna may warrant transfer of the responsibilities assigned to the LEOF to the CEOF.

7.1.5 Corporate Emergency Response Center and Central Emergency Operations Facility Space is designated for the Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC) and the Central Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF) at the nnsbrook Technical Center in Glen Allen, Virginia. The facility will be manned by members of the Corporate Emergency Response Team as defined in the Corporate Emergency Response Plan. The CERC has access to plant data from the ERFCS via an independent VO processor.

7.1.6 Joint Information Center and Local Media Center The Joint Information Center (JIC) is located on the ground floor of the Innsbrook Technical Center' in Glen Allen, Virginia. It is a branch of the CERC. The facility will be manned by members of the Corporate Emergency Response Team as defined in the Corporate Emergency Response Plan. Official company statements to the media will be made from this facility, by the Chief Technical Spokesman.

A Local Media Center (LMC) may be activated as an adjunct to the JIC. The LMC for Surry Power Station is located on Route 650 on company property. The facility is designated as the Surry Nuclear Information Center in normal operation. There are dedicated rooms for Dominion, NRC, FEMA, State, and media representatives as well as an auditorium that will accommodate 200 people.

Provisions have been made to accommodate TV cameras, copying machines, typewriters, and other equipment needed for press conferences. Should the LMC become uninhabitable, small groups of the media, no more than 20, can be accommodated in the LEOF with the approval of the Recovery Manager.

7.2 Communications Svstems The station communications system is designed to provide redundant means to communicate with all essential areas of the station associated with Surry Units 1 and 2 and to essential locations remote from the station during normal operation and under accident conditions. Communication systems vital to Units 1

SEP Page 7.5 Revision 47 and 2 operation and safety are designed so that failure of one component would not impair the reliability of the total communications system. The EPIPs and the State and local emergency response plans define the responsibilities of designated personnel for use of the communication systems.

7.2.1 Communications Systems Within the Station The systems which provide for communications within the station are discussed below.

7.2.1.1 Public Address and Intercom System A five channel public address and intercom system (Gai-Tronics System) is installed in the station.

The system power is supplied from a power supply which will maintain the system in an operational condition in the event of a normal station service power failure. Zones are provided within the station to ensure operability of a major portion of the system should equipment in a zone become inoperative. Loudspeaker and paging phone stations are located throughout the station. The coverage of the loudspeakers permits broadcasts to be heard throughout the station. A visual indicator has been installed in those areas where evaluation of NRC Bulletin 79-18, Audibility Problems Encountered on Evacuation of Personnel from High-Noise Areas, identified noise levels which might exceed the volume of the loudspeakers. In the event of an emergency, the system is used to alert station personnel of any emergency situation and to direct emergency response actions required of on-site personnel.

7.2.1.2 Radio Communications System (Onsite)

An Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) two-way radio trunking system is provided at the Station consisting of base stations/repeaters, mobile units installed in emergency vehicles, and hand-held portable radios. The radio trunking system provides system redundancy and independent emergency backup equipment for designated station functions.

7.2.1.3 Private Branch Telephone Exchange (PBX)

The PBX system provides switched local and trunked telephone service. The PBX switching equipment is physically located within the Protected Area and is connected to a commercial telephone exchange in Smithfield, Virginia.

7.2.1.4 Sound Powered Telephone System A sound powered telephone communications system is installed which serves Surry Units 1 and 2.

This system is a multiple channel system connecting selected operating areas of the plant. Headsets consisting of an earphone and microphone are connected to a two wire channel for direct communication between persons in different areas. Operation of this system is not dependent on the availability of the electrical power system. During an emergency, the system would provide an aternate means of relaying messages.

7.2.2 Offsite Communications Systems Those systems provided for communication between the Station and offsite are described below and depicted in Figures 7.3 and 7.4.

7.2.2.1 Commercial Telephone Commercial telephone lines are provided between the Station and a commercial telephone exchange in Smithfield, Virginia. These lines are connected into the Station PBX. In addition, lines are

SEP Page 7.6 Revision 47 provided for communications between the Station and the commercial telephone network independent of the PBX system.

7.2.2.2 Microwave System (OPX)

A microwave system is provided for communication between the Station and the General Office Phone Network and the Systems Operator's Office in Richmond, Virginia. The system provides Automatic Ringdown Phone (ARD) communication from station emergency response facilities to the State Department of Emergency Management (DEM), to the counties of Surry and James City, and to the CERC. It also supports ARD communications between the LEOF and the TSC. In addition, the microwave system provides the communication link to the Early Warning System (EWS) transmitter located at Surry. The system is battery operated at all locations to provide continuous operation upon loss of AC power.

7.2.2.3 Radio Communications System (Offsite)

The same UHF two-way radio trunking system that provides onsite communications also provides for communications within a ten mile radius of the Station. During an emergency, this system will allow direct

• contact with Radiation Monitoring Teams, Security vehicles, and a separate channel (Talk Group) between the Security Central Alarm Station and the Surry County Sheriff's Department.

7.2.2.4 Dedicated NRC Communications Separate commercial telephone lines are dedicated to the NRC and include the following:

• Emergency Notification System (ENS): The ENS is the system on which initial notifications, as well as ongoing information about plant systems, status and parameters, are provided to the NRC.

ENS lines are located in the Control Room, TSC and LEOF.

• Health Physics Network (HPN): Provides for communications regarding radiological and meteorological conditions, assessments, trends, and protective measures. HPN lines are located in the TSC and LEOF.

• Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL): Allows for internal NRC discussions regarding plant and equipment conditions. RSCL lines are located in the TSC and LEOF.

• Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL): Allows for the conduct of internal NRC discussions on radiological releases, meteorological conditions, and protective measures. PMCL lines are located in the TSC and LEOF.

• Emergency Response Data System (ERDS): Allows for transmittal of reactor parametric data from the site to the NRC. ERDS data is transmitted from the ERFCS computer, via modem, to the NRC Operations Center.

• Management Counterpart Link (MCL): This system has been established for internal discussions between the NRC Executive Team Director/members and the NRC Director of Site Operations or licensee management. MCL lines are located in the TSC and LEOF.

• Local Area Network (LAN) Access: Provides access to the NRC local area network. Telephone jacks are provided in the TSC and LEOF for NRC LAN access.

SEP Page 7.7 Revision 47 7.2.2.5 Instaphone LooD An Instaphone Loop permits simultaneous telephone-speaker communications from the station to the counties of Surry, Isle of Wight, James City and York; cities of Williamsburg and Newport News, and the State DEM on a 24-hour per day basis. This loop can be activated at the station from the Control Room, TSC, or LEOF.

7.2.3 Communication System Reliability A failure of one communication system will not affect the operation of other communication systems at the Station. The communication systems within the Station have diverse power supplies. The public address system has an emergency backup, and the sound powered phone system does not rely on any Station power system. Since the onsite communication systems normally will be in use, or periodically tested, equipment failure will not go unnoticed. The multiplicity of onsite communications networks ensures the availability of adequate communications. Equipment for these systems is located in different areas of the Station thus ensuring that an accident in one area of the Station would not incapacitate all communication systems. Failure of normal power supplies will not deprive the station of offsite communication capability since, in most cases, backup power is provided. Dedicated telephone lines are checked according to specified schedules.

7.2.4 Emergency Response Facility Communications The communication systems discussed above are used extensively in the emergency response.

facilities. A summary of the types of communications is provided in Table 7.1.

7.2.5 Communications Responsibilities 7.2.5.1 Station Emergency Manager The SEM has the responsibility for communicating with the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Emergency Management; Surry, Isle of Wight, York and James City counties; and the cities of Williamsburg and Newport News. All of these agencies/jurisdictions provide 24-hour dispatcher coverage. Upon activation of the LEOF, the Recovery Manager is responsible for notifying State and local governments of emergency status.

7.2.5.2 State and Local Entities Contiguous to the 10-Mile EPZ While the licensee is responsible for notifying political entities within the 10-mile EPZ, the Commonwealth of Virginia DEM notifies those political jurisdictions outside the 10-mile EPZ but within the 50-mile zone.

7.2.5.3 Federal Response The SEM or Recovery Manager is responsible for communications with Federal emergency response organizations. Initial NRC notification is made to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center in accordance with approved procedures designed for this purpose. The Recovery Manager may also contact DOE, either directly or through the NRC (LFA), and request FRMAC activation. Other Federal agencies are normally contacted by the State DEM.

SEP Page 7.8 Revision 47 7.2.5.4 Local Emergency Facilities The SEM is responsible for ensuring communications are established from the TSC to the OSC and LEOF, as appropriate. Communications shall also be maintained by field monitoring teams using two-way radios or alternative methods such as cellular telephones. This Information will be provided to the TSC and/or LEOF, depending on that facility responsible for team command and control at the time.

7.2.5.5 Emergency Personnel The SEM shall implement EPIP-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure, which will ensure activation of the CERP and the rapid activation of station personnel to deal with the emergency if the station requires such action.

7.2.5.6 Communications with Local Emergency Operations Facility In the event that the severity of the emergency requires LEOF activation, the Recovery Manager is responsible for ensuring availability and operability of communications between the LEOF and the TSC.

7.3 Assessment Facilities Available Onsite A number of instrumentation and monitoring systems are available onsite for emergency assessments. These systems are described below.

7.3.1 Seismic Monitoring The Seismic Monitoring System is designed to detect the occurrence of an earthquake at the Surry site, to alert the Control Room via panel indications and annunciation, and to provide records of the intensity, duration, and frequency of the earthquake. Active sensors provide indication and recording of seismic activity in the Control Room, while passive sensors record seismic activity by etching marks on metal plates which are later retrieved and evaluated.

7.3.2 Radiological Monitoring The installed Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) consists of process monitors and area monitors which read out and record in the Control Room. The process system continuously monitors selected lines for radioactive effluents. The system's function is to warn personnel of increasing radiation levels, to give early warning of a system malfunction, and to record and control discharges of radioactive liquids and gases to the environment.

High range process monitors are installed to provide accurate indication of plant releases during and following an accident. The flow paths monitored include the ventilation vents, the process vent (part of the Gaseous Waste System), the main steam lines, and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump exhaust.

High range area monitors, located inside the containments, are installed to provide additional information on core integrity during and after a design basis accident.

In addition to the fixed radiation monitoring equipment, portable radiation monitoring equipment would be used to perform dose assessments. The equipment consists of low and high range instruments to measure gamma, alpha, beta, and neutron radiation. This equipment is maintained by the Radiological Protection Department and is used on a routine basis. Portable gamma detection instruments are also dedicated for emergency kit use (See Appendix 10.7). The kits are set aside solely for emergency use and are inventoried and checked for calibration and operability on a quarterly basis.

SEP Page 7.9 Revision 47 Portable equipment is also available to take low or high volume air samples. Battery operated air samplers can be used to collect low volume samples either onsite or offsite. Silver Zeolite cartridges would be used for sampling radioiodine with a minimum detectable activity capability of 5X1 04 microcuries per cc.

Silver Zeolite has a low retention efficiency for Xenon and therefore, interference should be minimal. Plastic bags and bottles are available to collect water, soil, foodstuffs or other samples.

EPIPs provide the methodology for determining the magnitude of a release by three separate and independent methods: (1) using data or samples continuously obtained by the onsite Radiation Monitoring System, (2) using known inventory data for the system(s) affected, and (3) obtaining offsite data from air samplers or dosimeters which are continuously in place, or taking radiation surveys and appropriate samples, and using this data to calculate releases.

Equipment designated for use in environmental surveillance such as air samplers and theromoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) is used to obtain offste data. The radiological monitoring instrumentation and sampling devices used by the station meet the minimum requirements of the NRC Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position for Environmental Radiological Monitoring Programs.

Two TLDs have been placed in each of the accessible sectors within an approximate 5 mile radius of the station for environmental monitoring. Further details can be found in VPAP-21 03S, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (Surry)m. The State also has TLD monitoring points located around the Station used for verification purposes. Dosimetry and air sampler locations within the 10 mile EPZ are shown on Figures 7.1 and 7.2.

Surry maintains fixed laboratory equipment to support sampling analysis and monitoring. The equipment includes Multichannel Analyzers and whole body counters; arrangements are maintained for reading TLDs.

7.3.3 Meteorological Monitoring The station's Meteorological Monitoring System provides the capability for predicting atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion. The system consists of a primary and a backup tower, the locations of which were chosen so as to be representative of regional conditions. Instruments located at these towers provide data that is input to the ERFCS for use in Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS) operations. The data is also transmitted to the Control Room and to the company's Weather Center at Innsbrook. Table 7.2 provides a listing of the parameters measured.

The meteorological equipment was designed to meet the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.23, On Site Meteorological Programs', dated February 1972.

7.3.4 Plant Process Parameter Monitoring Installed in the Control Room are the necessary instrumentation readouts to assess station status under all conditions. Information is available from meter displays, chart recorders, annunciators, and the plant process computers to assist the operator in contending with accident conditions.

In order to support the data acquisitions need of the emergency response facilities, the ERFCS has been installed. The ERFCS provides plant monitoring, data acquisition, and critical plant data in the form of real-time status displays for the purpose of making a rapid evaluation of the reactor plants safety status.

ERFCS monitors are strategically located in areas including the Control Room, TSC, LEOF, CERC and

SEP Page 7.10 Revision 47 CEOF. The ERFCS includes the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGs), process and instrument displays, and pressure-temperature plant displays. Monitor displays are continuously updated by the computer system as they collect and process parametric data from the various plant sensors.

7.3.5 Fire Detection The Station's Fire Protection System is designed to furnish water and other extinguishing agents with the capability of extinguishing any single or probable combination of simultaneous fires that might occur.

Smoke and heat detectors are utilized for fire detection resulting in automatic fire suppression initiation and/or alarming. These systems are designed in accordance with the standards of the National Fire Protection Association.

7.3.6 Post Accident Sampling A contingency plan, controlled by normal Chemistry procedures, has been developed for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, containment sump, and containment atmosphere. (Reference NRC Letter,

Subject:

Surry Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Re:

Elimination of Post-Accident Sampling System Requirements, dated December 18, 2001, Serial No.01-761) 7.4 Facilities and Equipment for Offsite Monitoring The facilities and equipment located at the North Anna Power Station may be utilized, as applicable, during emergency conditions at the Surry Station. Such equipment may include meteorological and/or seismic data, respiratory protection equipment, portable radiation detection instrumentation and count room facilities. Seismic data may be obtained from the National Earthquake Information Service. Meteorological data can be obtained from the following:

LOCATION ORGANIZATION DISTANCE FROM SURRY (MILES)

Chesterfield Dominion 55 Yorktown Dominion 13 Wakefield National Weather Service 21 Newport News/

Williamsburg Int'l Airport Federal Aviation Administration 11 Norfolk Naval Air Station US Navy 32 Fort Eustis US Army 06 Langley Air Force Base US Air Force 22 Milford Haren US Coast Guard 35 South Island US Coast Guard 40 7.5 Damage Control Equipment and Supplies The station maintains an adequate supply of damage control equipment and supplies, and could rely on additional equipment and supplies from the North Anna Power Station. The station maintains a normal supply of mechanical tools and equipment which are used in the day to day maintenance of the station. The Warehouse maintains an inventory of supplies required for the normal operation of the station. These supplies are in various tool cribs in the station and at the Warehouse. Other equipment and supplies include full face respirators with proper filters or canisters, SCBA respirators, air supplied respirators, protective clothing, radioactive waste containers, ion-exchange resin (liquid waste processing), portable radios, pagers,

SEP Page 7.11 Revision 47 various communication devices, portable lighting equipment, and Company-owned vehicles. Where appropriate, calibration and inventory are conducted in accordance with station procedures. Equipment and supplies will be transferred to the OSC as needed.

7.6 Early Warning System Prompt alerting and notification of the population within the 10-Mile EPZ is accomplished using the Early Warning System (EWS). The EWS consists of sirens installed and maintained by the Company, route alerting utilizing State and local emergency vehicles, institutional alerting initiated by State and local governments, the Emergency Alert System (EAS), and personal notifications. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has determined that the alert and notification system installed around the Surry Power Station satisfies the requirements of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, and FEMA-REP-1 0.

The purposes of the system are: 1) to allow initial notification to the residents of 10-Mile EPZ within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent actions,

2) to ensure that essentially 100% of population within 5 miles from the site can be alerted within this time, and 3) to ensure that essentially 100% of the population from 5 to 10 miles from the site can be alerted within 45 minutes from this time.

The State and local governments bear the ultimate responsibility for warning the public. Should it be necessary, State and local authorities will alert the public within the 10-Mile EPZ using alternative methods (reference COVRERP, Appx. 3). Members of the public within the 10-Mile EPZ shall be informed of what actions to take following activation of the EWS sirens. Upon hearing the sirens, they have been instructed to turn on their radios or television sets to EAS stations to receive further instructions. Surry and James City counties and the State have 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> capability to activate the EWS sirens. Messages sent out over the EAS are initiated by the State DEM.

SEP Page 7.12 Revision 47 ERF COMMUNICATIONS TABLE 7.1 Control Room

1. Automatic Ring Downs (ARDs) to the System Operator, TSC, OSC, Security Shift Supervisor, DEM, Control Room Annex, Emergency Switchgear Room, and Condensate Polishing Building

2. Instaphone

3. Station PBX phones

4. OPX phones

5. Radio System

6. NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)

7. Commercial Phone

8. Public Address Intercom and Sound Powered Phone System

9. Emergency Response Data System (ERDS)

Technical SuDort Center

1. ARDs to the Control Room, OSC, LEOF, CERC, DEM, Primary Remote Assembly Area, Security Shift Supervisor and Radiation Protection Supervisor.

2. Instaphone

3. Station PBX Phones

4. OPX Phones

5. Commercial Phones

6. NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)

7. Public Address Intercom

8. Radio System

9. NRC Health Physics Network (HPN)

10. NRC Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL)

11. NRC Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL)

12. NRC Emergency Response Data System (ERDS)

13. NRC Management Counterpart Link (MCL)

14. NRC Local Area Network (LAN) Access

SEP Page 7.13 Revision 47 ERF COMMUNICATIONS TABLE 7.1 Operational Support Center (OSC)

1. Public Address Intercom

2. ARDs to Control Room and TSC

3. Radio System

4. Station PBX phone Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)

1. ARDs to TSC, CERC, JIC, LMC, DEM, Surry County and James City County

2. Instaphone

3. Commercial Phones

4. Radio System

5. Station PBX Phones

6. OPX Phones

7. NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)

8. NRC Health Physics Network (HPN)

9. NRC Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL)

10. NRC Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL)

11. NRC Management Counterpart Link (MCL)

12. NRC Local Area Network (LAN) Access Local Media Center (LMC)

1. Commercial Lines

2. ARDs to LEOF and JIC Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)

1. OPX Phones

2. ARDs to LEOF and TSC

3. Instaphone monitor

SEP

• Page 7.14 Revision 47 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM PARAMETERS '

TABLE 7.2 F'rimary Tower Backup Tower Control Rm.

Measurement 150.0 feet 34.0 feet Ground 30.3 feet Readout Wind Speed x x x x Wind Direction x x x x Sigma-theta x x x X°2 147.4 feet 31.5 feet Temperature x x Differential Temperature x x x Dew Point Temperature x Precipitation x (1) All data available via dial-up link at Meteorological Operations in Richmond.

(2) Signal from Backup Tower only.

Reference Document: SPS UFSAR, Rev. 29, 2/98.

SEP Page 7.15 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING LOCATIONS MAP FIGURE 7.1 Go JV*.SSI2A

SEP Page 7.16 Revision 47

• SURRY POWER STATION ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING LOCATIONS LISTING FIGURE 7.2 Sample Media Location Station # Distance Direction Remarks (miles)

Environmental Control 00 Onsite (TLDs) West North West 02 0.17 WNW Site Boundary Surry Station Discharge 03 0.6 NW Site Boundary North North West 04 0.4 NNW Site Boundary North 05 0.29 N Site Boundary North North East 06 0.28 NNE Site Boundary North East 07 0.31 NE Site Boundary East North East 08 0.43 ENE Site Boundary East (Exclusion) 09 0.31 E Exclusion Area Boundary West 10 0.40 W Site Boundary West South West 11 0.45 WSW Site Boundary South West 12 0.30 SW Site Boundary South South West 13 0.43 SSW Site Boundary South 14 0.48 S Site Boundary South South East 15 0.74 SSE Site Boundary South East 16 1.00 SE Site Boundary East 17 0.57 E Site Boundary Station Intake 18 1.23 ESE Site Boundary Hog Island Reserve 19 1.94 NNE Near Resident Bacons Caste 20 4.45- SSW Approximately 5 miles Route 633 21 5.0 SW Approximately 5 miles Alliance 22 5.1 WSW Approximately 5 miles Surry 23 8.0 WSW Population Center Route 636 and 637 24 4.0 *W Approximately 5 miles Scotland Wharf 25 5.0 WNW Approximately 5 miles Jamestown 26 6.3 NW Approximately 5 miles Colonial Parkway 27 3.7 NNW Approximately 5 miles Route 617 and 618 28 4.7 NNW Approximately 5 miles Kingsmill 29 4.8 N Approximately 5 miles Williamsburg 30 7.8 N Population Center Kingsmill North 31 5.6 NNE Approximately 5 miles Budweiser 32 5.7 NNE Population Center Water Plant 33 4.8 NE Approximately 5 miles Dow 34 5.1 ENE Approximately 5 miles Lee Hall 35 7.1 ENE Population Center Goose Island 36 5.0 E Approximately 5 miles Fort Eustis 37 4.8 ESE Approximately 5 miles Newport News 38 16.5 ESE Population Center James River Bridge 39 14.8 SSE Control Benn's Church 40 14.5 S Control Smithfield 41 11.5 S Control Rushmere 42 5.2 SSE Approximately 5 miles Route 628 43 5.0 S Approximately 5 miles Air Charcoal Surry Station SS 0.37

• NNE and Particulate Hog Island Reserve HIR 2.0 NNE Bacons Castle BC 4.5 SSW Alliance ALL 5.1 WSW Colonial Parkway CP 3.7 NNW BASF BASF 5.1 ENE Fort Eustis FE 4.8 ESE Newport News NN 16.5 ESE Control Location Reference document VPAP-2103S, Revision 5, Attachment 8, Environmental Sampling Locations. I

SEP Page 7.17 Revision 47 COMMUNICATIONS LINKS FIGURE 7.3 I. 7-r DEPARTMENT OF - - - - SYSTEM OPERATOR EMERGENCY II MANAGEMENT CONTROL ROOM I .

-- -: CONTROL ROOM ANNEX l II (SHIFT SUPERVISOR)

II (SEM)

- -- -: CONDENSATE POLISHING]

I -- I -

I II I I

OPERATIONAL I II SUPPORT I I

CENTER I I

LOCAL CITIES AND I ALTERNATE I COUNTIES WITHIN OSC I II IO MILES: I I I

I I I I

I I SURRY I I II ISLE OF WIGHT I I II JAMES CITY HP OFFICE I YORK II WILLIAMSBURG TECHNICAL NEWPORT NEWS PRIMARY SUPPORT

_ _ _ - REMOTE.

CENTER ASSEMBLY II AREA r, - (SEM) --. 1 I I II__

I_ I_

, CORPORATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTER I SURRY COUNTY ----- LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY JOINT l JAMES CITY COUNTY - ----- INFORMATION (RECOVERY MANAGER) CENTER

.____________________ . I _ _

_I LOCAL MEDIA LEGEND: ARD- AUTOMATIC RINGDOWN CENTER INSTA-PHONE (HOT-LOOP)

NOTES: 1.. PUBLIC ADDRESS INTERCOM SYSTEM AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT THE STATION.

2. BASE, PORTABLE AND MOBILE RADIOS ARE USED TO COMMUNICATE BETWEEN FACILITIES, MONITORING AND DAMAGE CONTROL TEAMS, ETC.

3. PBX, OPX AND COMMEDCIAL TELEPHONE LINES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE.

SEP Page 7.18 Revision 47 COMMUNICATIONS LINKS - NRC FIGURE 7.4

- ERDS CONTROL ROOM

- ENS (SHIFT SUPERVISOR I STATION EMERGENCY MANAGER)

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (STATION EMERGENCY MANAGER)

LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (RECOVERY MANAGER)

LEGEND:

ERDS - Emergency Response Data System ENS - Emergency Notification System HPN - Health Physics Network RSCL - Reactor Safety Counterpart Link PMCL - Protective Measures Counterpart Link MCL - Management Counterpart Link LAN - Local Area Network

SEP Page 8.1 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION 8 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Part Sublect Paae No.

8.0 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness 8.3 8.1 Responsibilities for Maintaining Emergency Preparedness 8.3 8.2 Maintenance of the Emergency Plan, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, and Emergency Personnel Notification List 8.3 8.2.1 Review of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures 8.4 8.2.2 Review of the Emergency Personnel Notification List 8.4 8.2.3 Distribution of Emergency Plans and Implementing Procedures 8.4 8.3 Training of Station Personnel 8.4 8.3.1 Responsibilities for Maintaining Emergency Preparedness Training 8.5 8.3.2 Nuclear Employee and Visitor Training 8.5 8.3.3 Emergency Response Personnel Training 8.6 8.3.4 Cognitive Evaluations 8.6 8.3.5 Task Performance Evaluations 8.6 8.3.6 Training Records 8.6 8.4 Training of Offsite Support Personnel 8.7 8.5 Emergency Drills 8.7 8.5.1 Communications Drills 8.8 8.5.2 Fire Drills 8.8 8.5.3 Medical Emergency Drills 8.9 8.5.4 Environmental Monitoring 8.9 8.5.5 Radiological Monitoring Drills 8.9 8.5.6 Combined Functional Drills 8.9

SEP Page 8.2 Revision 47 Part Subiect Page No.

8.6 Emergency Exercises 8.9 8.6.1 Scheduling of Emergency Exercises 8.10 8.6.2 Emergency Exercise Content 8.10 8.6.3 Emergency Exercise Scenarios 8.10 8.6.4 Conduct of Emergency Exercises 8.11 8.6.5 Emergency Exercise Evaluation and Corrective Action 8.11 8.6.6 Records of Emergency Exercises 8.11 8.7 Testing and Maintenance of Emergency 8.11 8.8 Informing the Public 8.12 8.9 Independent Review of the Emergency Preparedness Program 8.13 Table 8.1 Emergency Preparedness Training 8.14

SEP Page 8.3 Revision 47 8.0 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness Dominion has instituted an emergency preparedness program to support development, maintenance and coordination of the company's emergency response capability. The Emergency Plan and associated Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, which provide specific guidance to emergency response personnel, are revised as required and reviewed at least annually in accordance with this program.

Personnel who may be required to fill emergency response positions receive initial and annual training in their functional responsibilities. Training is also provided to various offsite groups that have agreed to support the station response to an emergency. Dedicated emergency response equipment is kept operational through testing in accordance with an established periodic surveillance program. Periodic drills and a biennial exercise are conducted for training and to identify program strengths and weaknesses.

Additionally, the emergency preparedness program provides for the issuance of public information material.

This material provides the public with a description of the emergency notification process and guidelines used to protect public health and safety in an emergency. Independent reviews of the emergency preparedness program are also conducted.

8.1 Responsibilities for Maintaining Emergency Preparedness The Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations and Chief Nuclear Officer, assigned the overall authority for maintaining emergency preparedness, has delegated the responsibility for program maintenance to the Vice President - Nuclear Support Services, and program implementation to the Senior Vice President -

Nuclear Operations. The Vice President - Nuclear Support Services has delegated the responsibility for maintaining emergency preparedness to the Director Nuclear Protection Services and Emergency Preparedness. The Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations has delegated the responsibility for station emergency preparedness to the Site Vice President. The hierarchy for program maintenance is further outlined in VPAP-2601, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness."

8.2 Maintenance of the Emergency Plan, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, and Emergency Personnel Notification List Station documents that are required to ensure emergency preparedness include: (1) the Surry Emergency Plan (SEP) and (2) the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). Nuclear Emergency Preparedness personnel shall review design changes and initiate appropriate revisions to the SEP and EPIPs when appropriate.

SEP Page 8.4 Revision 47 8.2.1 Review of the Emergency Plan and EmergencV Plan Implementing Procedures Nuclear Emergency Preparedness personnel shall review the SEP and its implementing procedures at least annually, certifying that they are adequate and current. Nuclear Emergency Preparedness personnel shall also review the results of independent assessments of the emergency preparedness program and critiques of exercises and drills to evaluate their impact on station emergency preparedness documents. The results of these reviews shall be reported to the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNSOC) and the documentation filed by Records Management. The SNSOC shall review proposed revisions to these documents and recommend action to the Site Vice President who is responsible for their approval. If a proposed revision is judged to decrease the effectiveness of these documents with respect to 10CFR50.47(b) or 1DCFR50, Appendix E, it shall be submitted to the NRC for approval in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.54(q) prior to implementation. Revisions to these documents shall be dated and marks will be placed on the affected pages to indicate where changes have been made.

8.2.2 Review of the Emergency Personnel Notification List Nuclear Emergency Preparedness personnel shall ensure a review of the Emergency Personnel Notification List is performed at least quarterly, and shall ensure that required revisions are made.

Documentation of this review shall be filed by Records Management.

8.2.3 Distribution of Emergency Plans and Implementing Procedures.

In accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix E, revisions to the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures shall be submitted to the NRC within 30 days following the assigned effective date. Revisions to the SEP will also be distributed to those offsite agencies requiring copies in order to perform their emergency response functions.

8.3 Training of Station Personnel The effectiveness of a response to a station emergency relates directly to the level of emergency preparedness maintained by station personnel. Emergency preparedness of station personnel is maintained through an integrated program that includes general orientation for all persons badged at the station and additional detailed training for persons assigned specific emergency response functions to supplement the general orientation and normal job related training.

The primary objectives of this emergency preparedness training program are to:

a) Ensure emergency response personnel maintain familiarity with the Surry Emergency Plan, its implementing procedures and their functional responsibilities during an emergency b) Inform emergency response personnel of their functional role and responsibilities during an emergency c) Familiarize emergency response personnel with significant changes to the Surry Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures

SEP Page 8.5 Revision 47 8.3.1 Responsibilities for Maintaining Emergency Preparedness Training To ensure that regulatory requirements and guidance for conducting emergency preparedness training are met, a Nuclear Power Station Emergency Preparedness Training (NPSEPT) Program Guide has been developed. Responsibilities for ensuring adequate emergency preparedness training are provided as follows:

a. The Site Vice President is responsible for ensuring station personnel are adequately trained in accordance with the NPSEPT Program Guide.

b. Department directors, managers and supervisors are responsible for ensuring their personnel receive training. This includes designating individuals who may serve as primary, interim or alternate emergency response personnel and ensuring they successfully complete the training specified by the NPSEPT Program Guide.

c. The Director Nuclear Protection Services and Emergency Preparedness is responsible for developing and scheduling training programs that meet the requirements of this plan, and for maintaining records to document the training.

d. Nuclear Emergency Preparedness personnel other than those designated to develop training programs will independently verify that the training required by the NPSEPT Program Guide and this plan is accomplished.

8.3.2 Nuclear Employee and Visitor Training All persons badged to enter the Protected Area unescorted receive, as part of Nuclear Employee Training, initial classroom training and annual retraining in the following subjects:

a) Station Policies and Procedures including, in part:

1) Reporting abnormal conditions (e.g., fire, first aid event, etc.)

2) Fire and First Aid alarms and announcements

3) Response to Fire and First Aid emergencies b) Radiation Protection Training including basic principles of radiological safety c) Emergency Preparedness Training Overview including:

1) General scope and overview of the Emergency Plan

2) Station Emergency Alarm and announcements

3) Response to Station Emergency Alarm

4) Personnel accountability

5) Visitor control during an emergency

6) Site evacuation

7) Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures

8) Emergency Organization

9) Emergency Control Centers (Emergency Response Facilities)

As appropriate, certain station visitors receive training in some or all of the above subjects in accordance with station administrative procedures.

SEP Page 8.6 Revision 47 8.3.3 Emergency Response Personnel Training Personnel designated to fill interim, primary or alternate emergency response positions will receive training in accordance with the NPSEPT Program Guide. Emergency preparedness training not conducted by the NEP staff is conducted pursuant to supporting department training program guidance. NEP will verify that this training is consistent with the provisions of the NPSEPT Program Guide. These training programs taken collectively establish the initial training and retraining requirements for all emergency response positions. Table 8.1 provides a listing of select emergency response positions along with an overview of the training provided. Revisions to the NPSEPT Program Guide that affect those descriptions referenced in Table 8.1 will be reflected in the next scheduled revision of this Plan. Equivalency credit for required training sessions may be awarded based on an individual's knowledge of the subject matter. Such credit requires the approval of the Director Nuclear Protection Services and Emergency Preparedness and the Site Vice President.

8.3.4 Cognitive Evaluations Cognitive evaluations may include self critiques, group discussions, and/or tests administered following completion of NPSEPT training. Evaluations are normally administered by the course instructor and may be scheduled at the end of a work shop, learning activity, instructional unit, or a number of related units.

A minimum score of 80% is considered passing on NPSEPT tests. For NPSEPT training incorporated into regularly scheduled continuing training programs, the passing criteria for that training program applies.

Individuals failing to successfully complete the required training within the required time frame will be relieved of their emergency response assignments.

8.3.5 Task Performance Evaluations Task performance evaluations are prescribed for individuals who must perform tasks as responders which are outside of their normal day-to-day responsibilities and may be satisfied through completion of a Job Demonstration Guide (JDG), participation in an appropriate drill or Simulator Exercise, facility training activity or included in classroom learning activities as part of the training requirement. JDG evaluations are conducted by the applicable primary responder, team leader or instructor and are scored on a pass/fail basis.

8.3.6 Training Records Nuclear Emergency Preparedness is responsible for ensuring that required emergency preparedness training records are maintained. These records are maintained by Records Management.

The required emergency preparedness training records include:

a) Program Records: Attendance sheets, master copies of Job Demonstration Guides, master copies of tests and answer keys, copies of instructor guides, NPSEPT Training Rosters and NPSEPT extensions.

b) Trainee Records: Completed tests and responder training records.

SEP Page 8.7 Revision 47 8.4 Training of Offsite Support Personnel The various offsite organizations which support the station during an emergency receive training as part of their own emergency preparedness programs. For example, corporate personnel receive emergency preparedness training as part of the Corporate Emergency Response Plan, and the State and local governments conduct training for their personnel as part of their Radiological Emergency Response Plan program. However, in order to promote effective emergency response capability, the station offers site specific emergency response training on an annual basis to local offsite emergency support organizations which have agreed to provide assistance. The organizations include the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of State Police and local county sheriffs department, volunteer fire companies, and rescue squads.

The annual training shall address the following:

a) The basic scope of the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan b) Emergency classifications c) Notification methods d) Basic radiation protection e) Station access procedures f) The individual, by title, in the station emergency response organization who will direct their activities onsite g) Definition of their support roles Training offered to local offsite support organizations will be coordinated with Station Safety and Loss Prevention or Station Security, as appropriate. Station Safety and Loss Prevention, Security and/or Nuclear Training may assist in the conduct of offsite training. Records of the training shall be maintained and filed by Records Management, and shall include letters of invitation (or record of telephone invitation), attendance sheets, and the curriculum outline.

8.5 Emercencv Drills As a part of maintaining emergency preparedness, periodic drills shall be conducted. The primary objectives of drills are to:

a) Verify that facilities, equipment, and communication systems function as required b) Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures used during an emergency response c) Familiarize station emergency response personnel with planned emergency response actions d) Disclose deficiencies which may require corrective action Drills may be conducted independently, in conjunction with another drill, or as part of an exercise.

The individual responsible for the drill shall ensure that all necessary documentation is maintained.

A scenario will be developed to support the conduct of each drill. The scenario should be designed to allow for open decision-making (free-play). If a drill is conducted in conjunction with another drill or as part of an exercise, the drill scenario, objectives and narrative shall be incorporated into the overall drill/exercise package. Drill packages shall include:

SEP Page 8.8 Revision 47 a) Objectives of the drill b) Evaluation criteria for the drill c) Date and time period of the drill d) Participating personnel or organizat ions e) A narrative summary describing the overall integration of scenario events (e.g., simulated casualties, offsite assistance, rescue of personnel, simulated activity levels, and deployment of monitoring teams) f) A time schedule of the real and simulated events It is not required that all emergency response personnel assigned a particular emergency function participate in a drill covering that function. State and local governments will be allowed to participate in drills at their request. Participation by offsite organizations may be simulated.

Drills shall be controlled and observed by individuals qualified to conduct and evaluate the drill.

Critiques will be used to document the evaluation of the drill. Deficiencies identified as a result of the drill evaluation will be presented to Station Management, and corrective actions will be coordinated through NEP.

Records of each drill will be maintained by Records Management and include the drill scenario package and the post-drill critique. Records of specific drills held in conjunction with an exercise may be integrated into the emergency exercise package (i.e., scope, objectives, critique, etc.).

The types and frequencies of drills conducted at the station are designated below.

Provisions for conducting post accident sampling drills, previously addressed herein, became obsolete upon implementation of contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, containment sump, and containment atmosphere. Although these contingency plans must be available during an accident; they do not have to be carried out in emergency plan drills or exercises.

(Reference NRC Letter,

Subject:

Surry Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Re: Elimination of Post-Accident Sampling System Requirements, dated December 18, 2001, Serial No.01-761) 8.5.1 Communications Drills Communications drills shall be conducted at least once per calendar year and shall include:

a) Use of emergency communications systems between the Control Room, the TSC, the LEOF, the OSC, the NRC Operations Center, the State EOC, the county EOCs, and the Onsite and Offsite Monitoring Teams b) Sending, receiving, and verification of message content 8.5.2 Fire Drills Fire drills shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Surry Fire Protection Program.

SEP Page 8.9 Revision 47 8.5.3 Medical Emergency Drills Medical Emergency drills shall be conducted at least once per calendar year and shall include:

a) A simulated contaminated injured individual b) Participation by a local rescue squad c) Transport to an offsite medical facility d) Participation by the offsite medical facility 8.5.4 Environmental Monitoring Drills Environmental Monitoring drills shall be conducted at least once per calendar year and shall include:

a) Collection of water, vegetation, soil, and air samples both onsite and offsite, as appropriate b) Analysis of the above samples c) Use of communications with the monitoring teams d) Use of the appropriate procedures for collecting and analyzing samples and recording results 8.5.5 Radiological Monitoring Drills Radiological Monitoring drills shall be conducted semi-annually with a maximum allowable grace period not to exceed 25%, and shall include:

a) Response to simulated elevated airborne and/or liquid activity levels, as appropriate b) Response to simulated elevated area radiation levels c) Analysis of the simulated radiological situation using the appropriate procedures 8.5.6 Combined Functional Drills Combined Functional drills shall be conducted at least once during the interval between biennial exercises and involve a combination of some of the principal functional areas of onsite emergency response capabilities, such as:

a) Management and coordination of emergency response b) Accident assessment c) Protective action decisionmaking d) Plant system repair and corrective action 8.6 Emergency Exercises An emergency exercise shall be conducted with a stated scope and objectives. The primary objectives of an emergency exercise are to:

a) Verify the integrated capability of the various emergency response organizations to respond to an emergency b) Test a major portion of the basic elements existing within the emergency response plans and organizations c) Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures used during an emergency d) Provide an opportunity for emergency response personnel to demonstrate their ability to perform planned emergency response actions e) Disclose deficiencies which may require corrective action

SEP Page 8.10 Revision 47 8.6.1 Scheduling of Emergency Exercises An emergency exercise shall be conducted at Surry Power Station at least once per biennium, normally on odd numbered years. Emergency exercises will be scheduled to start at different times of the day with advance knowledge of the time to be held confidentially. At least once every 6 years, the specific exercise date should be unannounced. Additionally and at least once every 6 years, an exercise should be initiated during off-hours (between 6pm and 4am on a weekday, or during a weekend). The unannounced and/or off-hours demonstration may be conducted during or independent of the biennial exercise.

8.6.2 Emergency Exercise Content The content of exercises shall be varied from year to year, so that all major elements of the State, local, and station plans are tested within a 6 year period.

Exercises shall include:

a) an emergency classification of at least Site Area Emergency b) a mobilization of as many elements of the State, local, and station plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation; and c) invitation for involvement of federal emergency response agencies at least once every 5 years.

8.6.3 Emergency Exercise Scenarios Each emergency exercise shall be based on a preplanned written scenario. The overall exercise package shall address, but not be limited to:

a) Basic performance objectives of the exercise b) Evaluation criteria used to verify demonstration of performance objectives c) Date, initiation time, and exercise duration d) Participating organizations e) Simulated events f) Time schedule of the real and simulated events g) A narrative summary describing the overall integration of scenario events such as simulated casualties, offsite assistance, rescue of personnel, use of protective equipment, simulated activity and radiation levels, and deployment of monitoring teams h) a description of the number, locations, and duties of the exercise facilitators; and i) a description of the arrangements made for and advance materials to be provided to the facilitators.

Advance knowledge of the scenario shall be minimized to ensure realistic participation by those involved.

SEP Page 8.11 Revision 47 8.6.4 Conduct of Emergency Exercises The emergency exercise will be initiated and supervised by facilitators. These facilitators shall -

ensure that:

a) the information supplied to the participants is of sufficient detail to allow realistic analysis of the simulated events and to provide a basis for rational decision making; b) the information is supplied on a real time basis; and c) the exercise is not so structured as to prevent free play and independent decision making on the part of the participants.

8.6.5 Emergency Exercise Evaluation and Corrective Action Emergency exercises shall be evaluated by qualified facilitators. Facilitators shall be selected based on expertise, knowledge of the areas to be evaluated, and familiarity with emergency response requirements.

Observers may include personnel from federal, state, or local governments. The specific areas to be evaluated by the facilitators will be defined in the form of pre-printed critique sheets.

Critiques will be held as soon as practicable after the exercise. Critiques should be attended by exercise facilitators and key participants. Notes of critique comments shall be recorded.

Facilitators shall complete critique sheets documenting their observations. Critique sheets shall be submitted in accordance with the schedule established for the exercise.

Within 60 days of the exercise, a Post-Exercise Critique Report shall be issued. Identified corrective actions will then be assigned for implementation.

8.6.6 Records of Emergency Exercises The exercise scenario package and Post-Exercise Critique are filed by Records Management.

8.7 Testing and Maintenance of Emergency Equipment Emergency equipment shall be periodically tested to identify and correct deficiencies in accordance with administrative procedures. For inventory purposes, an item-by-item count is not required if a mechanism is in place to assure the container has not been compromised since the previous satisfactory check. Inventories and tests shall be documented and forwarded to Records Management.

The testing shall include:

a) The contents of the emergency kits dedicated for emergency use shall be inventoried quarterly and following each use. The Manager Radiological Protection shall ensure these tests are conducted and documented.

b) Dedicated emergency survey instrumentation shall be inventoried and operationally checked quarterly and following each use. They shall be calibrated in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations. The Manager Radiological Protection shall ensure these tests are conducted and documented.

c) Self-contained breathing apparatus shall be inspected and operationally checked monthly and following use during an emergency. The Manager Radiological Protection shall ensure these tests are conducted and documented.

SEP Page 8.12 Revision 47 d) State and local ring down loop (nsta-phone) extensions and the ringdown phone to the State EOC located at the station and LEOF shall be operationally checked on a monthly basis. In addition, NRC Emergency Notification System extensions and NRC Health Physics Network extensions located at the station and LEOF shall be operationally checked monthly. Nuclear Emergency Preparedness personnel shall ensure these tests are conducted and documented.

8.8 Informinc the Public Information describing the emergency notification process as well as actions that should be taken in the event of an emergency shall be provided to the public on an annual basis. Information provided to the public shall include:

a) Educational information on radiation b) Contact points for additional information c) Special needs of the handicapped d) Initial actions following Early Warning System activation e) Protective actions, such as sheltering or evacuation f) Evacuation routes The company will coordinate its efforts with State and local authorities to ensure the public is informed by using the best means available. These means may include:

a) Information in telephone books b) Utility bill inserts c) Newspaper ads d) Postings in public areas e) Information in calendars distributed to residents The information will be distributed to ensure coverage within the 10 mile emergency planning zone.

The company shall also establish a telephone system for dealing with rumors. The telephone numbers will be announced over the Emergency Alert System and individuals within the 10 mile emergency planning zone will be invited to call collect.

The Director Nuclear Protection Services and Emergency Preparedness shall ensure that a program to acquaint the news media with the following information is offered on an annual basis:

a) Emergency plans b) Information concerning radiation c) Points of contact for release of public information in an emergency.

SEP Page 8.13 Revision 47 8.9 Independent Review of the Emergency Preparedness Program An independent review of the emergency preparedness program shall be conducted either.

a) at intervals not to exceed 12 months or b) as necessary, based on an assessment against performance indicators, and as soon as reasonably practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could affect emergency preparedness, but no longer than 12 months after the change. In any case, all elements of the emergency preparedness program shall be reviewed every 24 months.

This review shall be conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54 (t). This review shall include:

a) The Surry Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures b) Emergency Plan training c) Emergency drills d) Emergency exercises e) Emergency equipment f) Interfaces with State and local governments g) Required records and documentation This review shall be conducted by an internal company organization or outside consultant which has no direct responsibility for emergency preparedness.

The results of the review and recommendations for improvements shall be documented and reported to company management. The results regarding adequacy of interface between Dominion and State and local governments shall be made available to the cognizant offsite authority. Recommendations for improvement shall be evaluated and, when appropriate, assigned for corrective action.

The following records shall be filed by Records Management and maintained for 5 years:

a) The review results and recommended improvements b) The answers to the recommended improvements c) A description of the corrective actions taken

SEP Page 8.14 Revision 47 TABLE 8.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TRAINING EMERGENCY RESPONSE POSITION SCOPE OF TRAINING (See Footnotes)

Station Emergency Manager 1,2,7,13,15 Shift Technical Advisor 1,2,13,15 Emergency Communicator 1,3,13 Emergency Procedures Coordinator 1,2,13 Emergency Operations Director 1,2,13,15 Emergency Maintenance Director 1,4,6,13 Emergency Technical Director 1,6,13,15 Emergency Administrative Director 1,6,7,13 Radiological Assessment Director 1,9,10,11,13,15 Radiation Protection Supervisor 1,10,11,13 Operational Support Center Director 1,4,5,13 OSC Support Team 1,4,5,13 Technical Support Team 1,6,13,15 Chemistry Team 1,12,13 Administrative Support Team

- Team Leader 1,6,8,13

- Clerical Personnel 1,6,13

- Loss Prevention/Safety Personnel 1,13,14 Security Team 1,8,13 Dose Assessment Team 1,9,13 Sample Analysis and Monitoring Teams 1,11,13 Fire Team 1,13,14 First Aid Team 1,13,14 Damage Control Team 1,4,13 Search and Rescue Team 1,13,14

SEP Page 8.15 Revision 47 SCOPE OF TRAINING FOOTNOTES:

1. Training provided to all emergency response personnel emphasizes an overview of: Emergency organization, emergency classification system, personnel accountability, emergency exposure limits, emergency response facilities, security access control and site evacuation process, and exposure control techniques. Station badged responders will receive this training as part of Nuclear Employee Training.

2. Training provided emphasizes: Assessing emergencies, classifying emergencies, notification systems, contaminated injured personnel actions, site evacuation, emergency radiation exposure authorization, offsite support group capabilities, and recovery.

3. Training provided emphasizes: Notifications and reports to offsite authorities and communication systems as appropriate for individual position assignments.

4. Training provided emphasizes: Emergency Plan and Damage Control Team organization, communication systems, and planning and coordination of damage control tasks.

5. Training provided emphasizes: Activation and administration of the Operational Support Center.

6. Training provided emphasizes: The activation and administration of the Technical Support Center.

7. Training provided emphasizes: Site evacuation procedures.

8. Training provided emphasizes: Notification of station personnel, LEOF activation, personnel accountability/evacuation, and station access control during an emergency. The Security Department is responsible for the conduct of this training and ensuring that documentation is properly maintained for Security Department personnel.

9. Training provided emphasizes: Dose assessment.

10. Training provided emphasizes: Control of emergency Health Physics organization, emergency exposure evaluation and protective measures.

SEP Page 8.16 Revision 47

11. Training provided emphasizes: Respiratory protection, personnel decontamination, inplant monitoring, offsite monitoring, monitoring of emergency centers and remote assembly areas, contaminated injuries, and radio communications as appropriate for individual position assignments.

12. Training provided emphasizes: Chemistry sampling and high level activity sample analysis under emergency conditions.

13. Training provided emphasizes: Organizational interfaces and responsibilities appropriate for individual position assignments.

14. Training provided emphasizes: Emergency organizational interfaces, search and rescue procedures, and communications systems. Fire Team members shall also receive Fire Brigade training as required by the Surry Power Station Fire Protection Program. First Aid Team members shall also receive training as required by station administrative procedures which meet the requirements of the Accident Prevention Manual.

15. Training provided emphasizes: Use of the Emergency Response Facility Computer System appropriate for individual position assignments.

SEP Page 9.1 Revision 47 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION 9 RECOVERY Part Subiect Page No.

9.0 Recovery 9.2 9.1 Recovery Methodology 9.2 9.2 Population Exposure 9.2

SEP Page 9.2 Revision 47 9.0 Recovery The recovery process will be managed by a special, designated organization composed of Dominion personnel. The recovery organization is described in the Corporate Emergency Response Plan and further outlined in an EPIP specifically designed for administration of the recovery process. The basic organization may be modified as required to address the needs of the given situation. The Recovery Manager assumes control and direction of the recovery operation with the authority and responsibilities set forth in the Corporate Emergency Response Plan and EPIPs.

The recovery process is implemented when the Recovery Manager and the Station Emergency Manager, with concurrence of State and Federal agencies, have determined the station to be in a stable and controlled condition. Upon the determination, the Recovery Manager shall notify the NRC Operations Center, the State Emergency Operations Center, and the Local County Emergency Operations Centers that the emergency has been terminated and any required recovery has commenced.

9.1 Recovery Methodologv The recovery organization will develop plans and procedures designed to address both immediate and long-term actions. The necessity to maintain protective measures implemented during the emergency will be evaluated and, if deemed appropriate, the recovery organization will recommend relaxation of the protective measures.

The following conditions shall be considered appropriate for the recommendation to relax protection measures:

a. Station parameters of operation no longer indicate a potential or actual emergency exists.

b. The release of radioactivity from the Station is controllable, no longer exceeds permissible levels and does not present a credible danger to the public.

c. The Station is capable of sustaining itself in a long term shutdown condition.

Because it is not possible to foresee all of the consequences of an event, specific recovery procedures may need to be written to address specialized requirements. Where possible, existing station procedures will be utilized in the areas of operations, maintenance and radiological controls. Any special recovery procedures will require the same review and approval process accorded other station procedures and, as such, will require the approval of the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNSOC).

9.2 Population Exposure Total population doses shall be periodically estimated in the affected sectors and zones utilizing population distribution data from within the emergency planning zones.

Station personnel initially determine Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) due to external exposure from airborne material, external exposure from ground deposition, and internal exposure due to inhalation. Initial calculations are also performed for determination of Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) resulting from inhalation of radioiodines. The methodology used is consistent with that presented in EPA-400-R-92-001, MANUAL OF PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDES AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR NUCLEAR INCIDENTS.

SEP Page 9.3 Revision 47 Determination of total population doses will be performed utilizing the Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS) computer code or equivalent, and will include assessments of exposure received from (but not necessarily limited to) immersion, inhalation, ground shine, and ingestion of radioactive materials.

SEP Appendix 10 Page 10.1 Revision 46 SURRY POWER STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION 10 APPENDICES Part Subiect 10.1 Agreement Letters 10.2 Radiation Emergency Plan, MCVHNCU - Virginia Power 10.3 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Operations Plan 10.4 Evacuation Time Study 10.5 EPIP Emergency Plan Cross Reference 10.6 NUREG-0654/Emergency Plan Cross Reference 10.7 Emergency Kt Contents 10.8 Emergency Classification/Initiating Conditions Matrix

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.1 Revision 47 AGREEMENT LETTERS Federal Agencies: U.S. Department of Energy - Field Office, Oak Ridge U.S. Department of Transportation - Fifth Coast Guard District State Agencies: State Department of Emergency Management State Department of Health State Police - Fifth Division Chesapeake State Department of Game and Inland Fisheries Medical College of Virginia/Virginia Commonwealth University Local Agencies: Surry - Chairman, Board of Supervisors Surry - Sheriff Surry - Volunteer Rescue Squad Surry - Volunteer Fire Department Isle of Wight - County Administrator Isle of Wight - Sheriff Isle of Wight - Volunteer Rescue Squad Smithfield - Volunteer Fire Department Rushmere Volunteer Fire Department Newport News - City Manager York - County Administrator York - Sheriff Williamsburg - City Manager James City - County Administrator

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.2 Revision 47 Department of Energy Oak Ridge Operations Office P.O. Box 2001 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-January 18,2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President, Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Blvd.

Glen Allen, Virginia 23060

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

US. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE AVAILABILITY FOR NORTH ANNA AND SURRY POWER STATIONS This letter is in response to your January 10, 2002 letter requesting an updated Letter of Agreement regarding the availability of DOE Radiological Assistance. This letter supercedes all previous such letters between your organization and the DOE Oak Ridge Operations Office (ORO).

The current version of the DOE Radiological Assistance Program, Region 2, Regional Plan is dated October 1997, and should be on file at your office. This plan sets forth the procedures for obtaining radiological assistance and conditions pertaining to the scope of radiological assistance that DOE will provide in support fyour facility. Prior to dispatch of radiological assistance, we will consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the appropriate state authorities to ensure that there will not be any duplication of efforts. The type and duration of radiological assistance provided will depend on the severity of the incident and will be limited to advice and emergency actions essential for the control of immediate hazards to health and safety.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at (865) 576-9740.

Sincerely, e o Regional Response Coordinator U. S. DOE RAP, Region 2

SEP Appendix 1 0.1 Page 10.1.3 Revision 47 U.S. Department / Commander 431 CraWord Street of Transportatlon FfhCoastGuawdDisbict Pnsmouth.VA. 23704 I,~~~~~~~J~~~~w~~~Staff Symbol: Dm United States /______

Coast Guard 5050 February 20, 2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060

Dear Mr. Grecheck,

In reference to your letter dated January 10, 2002, the Fifth Coast Guard District has resources available that can respond to an emergency at the Surry Power Station. Coast Guard assistance during an emergency will primarily consist of controlling vessel traffic on the James River in the vicinity of the power station, broadcasting notice to mariners regarding the emergency, and rendering other traditional humanitarian aid.

The initial emergency report and request for Coast Guard assistance should be directed to the Marine Safety Office Hampton Roads, Norfolk, Virginia, 24-hour telephone number 757-484-8192. The alternate unit to whom the report can be made is the Coast Guard Fifth District/Atlantic Area Command center, 24-hour telephone number 757-398-6231.

The commitment of the Coast Guard resources in any particular instance is always conditional upon the availability and limitations of such resources including consideration of other competing demands. Ofparamount concern to me is the safetyofCoast Guard personnel while assisting in these instances. Coast Guard response personnel do nothave radiological monitoring capabilities.

Each of our organizational elements involved has a copy of your emergency plan. To remain current and effective, it is important that four copies of all subsequent revisions be forwarded to the above address for distribution within our organization.

Sincerely, D. T. ORMES By direction Copy: MSO Hampton Roads Group Hampton Roads Atlantic Area (Ap)

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.4 Revision 47 COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA MICHAEL M. CLINE Department of Emergency Management 10501 lrade Court State Coordinator Rlchmomf. VirgWa 23236-3713 GEORGE W. FORESMAN (804) 897-6500 DeputyDeuyClzrirzator Cor Januaryy 17,2002 FAX(TOD) 674-24 17 804t)8976506 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President -Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

Reference is made to your letter of January 10. 2002, regarding the need to update our Letter of Agreement in compliance with the federal criteria prescribed by NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1.

We have reviewed the North Anna and Surry Power Stations' emergency plans and are assured that they properly interface with the state Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) as well as with the local RERPs, site-specific to either power station. Upon receiving notification of a radiological accident at a Virginia Power nuclear power station, state agencies and local governments will implement their Radiological Emergency Response Plans in accordance with state and local government procedures. Specifically, the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) agrees to implement all or parts of the following actions in the event of a radiological emergency at either plant site:

1. Operate Virginia Emergency Operations Center (VEOC).

2. Provide VDEM on-scene coordinator(s) to the EOF.

3. Provide warning in coordination with other state and local government agencies and the nuclear facility operator.

4. Provide emergency communications.

5. Coordinate emergency response actions of federal and state agencies.

6. Notify the following federal agencies ofa radiological emergency:

a. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) when the emergency action level at the power facility is classed as an Alert. Also provide updated information and request assistance, if required, when the emergency action level is classed as a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.

b. Federal Aviation Administration air controllers at Richmond International Airport of a radiological emergency and request that aircraft be instructed to avoid affected airspace until notified otherwise.

c. Commander. Fifth U.S. Coast Guard District of a radiological emergency at the Surry Power Station and request establishment of traffic control of boats and ships on the James River in the vicinity of the power station.

"Working to ProtectPeople, Propertyand Our Communities,

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.5 Revision 47 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Page 2 January 16,2002

d. Fort Eustis in the event of an incident at the Surry Power Station that could affect the health and safety of personnel stationed at hs military installation.

7. Notify CSX Transportation of a radiological emergency at the North Anna or Surry Power Station and request that rail service in the affected area be discontinued temporarily.

8. Notify the State Bureau of Radiological Health, Department of Health immediately of all classes of accidents and incidents reported by operators of nuclear facilities.

9. Notify the Virginia Department of Transportation to establish roadblocks and to temporarily terminate ferry service between James City County and Surry County, when appropriate.

10. Notify other state agencies that have emergency task assignments identified in the State RERP.

11. Notify the state of Maryland EOC of radiological accidents at the North Anna Power Station resulting in either a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.

Notify the state of North Carolina EOC of radiological accidents at the Surry Power Station resulting in either a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.

12. Provide public information based on information furnished by the Department of Health and the nuclear facility operator.

13. Request assistance from the federal government in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) and the Federal Response Plan (FRPX In support of the emergency response actions stated above, we will, on an annual basis, perform the following missions:

I. Assist state agencies and political subdivisions in the development, promotion, and maintenance of plans, procedures, and preparedness programs.

2. Coordinate radiological emergency response training and conduct annual training programs.

3. Maintain a list of media representatives, including names and telephone numbers; as necessary, issue news releases respective to emergency operations involving the North Anna and Surry Power Stations.

These actions are authorized by the Governor of Virginia (Executive Order Number Nineteen (90) and are consonant with the Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Law of 1973 (Code of Virginia. Chapter 3.2, Title 44) as amended.

Michael M. Cline MMC/ASW/sb

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.6 Revision 47 COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA Department of Health P 0 BOX 2448 RICHMOND, VA 23218 TDD 1-80828-1120 January 16,2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President -Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, Virgmia 23060

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

Thank you for your letter of January 10, 2002, regarding the Letter of Agreement for emergency response at North Anna and Surry Power Stations.

By this letter, we are renewing our commitment to respond to any radiological emergency at North Anna and Surry Power Stations. The Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) is the lead agency for the Commonwealth in providing emergency responses. The State Coordinator of Emergency Management at VDEM coordinates such responses with other state agencies and local governments under the framework of the Commonwealth of Virginia Radiological Emergency Response Plan (COVRERP).. The Virginia Department of Health (VDH) is committed to providing its support to the State Coordinator of Emergency Management in the implementation of COVRERP.

Should you have any questions, please call Khizar Wasti, Ph.D., Director, Division of Health Hazards Control, VDH at (804) 786-1763.

Sincerely, Robert B. Stroube, M.D., M.P.H.

Acting State Health Commissioner vDHV CrNIA

_D H *..EPARTM.NT OiHEALTH DXh

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.7 Revision 47 Col. W.Gerald Masscngill COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA Superintendent DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE (804) 674-2000 Post Office Box 1067, Chesapeake, VA 23327-1067 January 15,2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

We have reviewed the Surry Emergency Plans and we will provide all possible assistance in the event of an emergency.

We agree to provide the following support to any emergency that nay occur at the Surry Power Station upon the direction of the Department of Emergency Management.

I. Assist local officials in disseminating warning.

2. Assist in evacuation in coordination with local officials.

3. Enforce access/egress provision in controlled areas, when established in coordination with local officials.

4. Provide traffic control.

5. Assist to the extent possible in radiological monitoring of vehicles and personnel at traffic control points.

Sincerely, Captain George L. Daniels Jr Fifth Division Commander (757-424-6820)

GLDjr/fs A NATIONALLY ACCREDITED LAWENFORCEMENT-AGENCY TOD 1-800-553-3144

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.8 Revision 47 COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINJA Mark R. Warner Governor Departmentof Game and InlandFisheries Willian L. Woodfin, Jr.

W. Tayloe Murphy, Jr. . Dirctlor Secretary of Natural Resources January 17,2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President -Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 500 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

The Department of Game and Inland Fisheries remains in agreement with emergency response plans for the Surry and North Anna Power Stations. This agency will continue to assist you in any future emergency situations as outlined in your plan to the greatest extent possible at the time any emergency might evolve, just as we have previously agreed.

We agree to provide the support listed in appendix I, Task Assignments, Virginia Radiological EmergencyResponse Plan. These services, of course, will be furnished at the Surry orNorth Anna Power Station as directed by Emergency Management.

Sincerely, William L.

Director WLW,Jrrjkc 4010 WEST.BROAD STREF, P.O. BOX 11104, RICMOND, VA 23230-1104 (804) 367.1000 (VITDD) Equal Opportuny Employment, Programs ant Facilities TAX (804) 367-9147

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.9 Revision 47 MCV Campus System Semn X~~~~~~~~~~~~~vc~fat Healh Sv.-Istem MCV Hospitals and Physicians Adins4ratiSn 401NaOI0t Sue23M Pa BOXMl

'iimc. Veria 2az~esi0 February 19,2002 E1t4Znm3n s ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Fac rW4 E16b7 T~ft 1828 112O Mr. Eugene S Grecheck 5_ M P d MSPfR Vice President - Nuclear Support Servies Seni Eve Viches 3000 Dominion Boulevard andeierfa Oegtargf Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 PW Heath Systm

• unGutmm~

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

Otte Maer vWtHeattysm LETIER OF AGREEMENT Adnibn NORTH ANNA AND SURRY POWER STATIONS TbeMedical College of Virginia Hospitals/Vrginia Conmonwealth University agrees to participate in the implementation of the Radiation Emergency Plans for the North Anna and Surry Power Stations and to support the plans within the limits of our organizational capabilities.

TheMedical College of VirginialVirgnia Commonwealth University agrees to participate in any planning, training and drilling necessary to insure preparedness. We agree that upon verification of an emergency at either station the following services will be provided.

1. Facilities to treat up to four seriously injured and radioactively contaminated patients in the emergency department.

2. Facilities to treat up to ten non-seriously radioactively contaminated patients in the Sanger Hall morgue area.

3. Hospital transportation (stretchers) to move patients from the morgue area to the emergency department.

4. Campus Police to support iraffic control and maintain security around the treatment areas.

S. Central services supplies (oxygen, deflibrillators, etc.) to support treatment in the morgue area.

6. Monitoring and counting equipment for the detection and analysis of radioactivity or radiation.

7. Decontamination and other supplies necessary for the isolation and treatment of radioactively contaminated patients.

These services will be available 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day and are outlined in greater detail in the Radiation Emergency Plan. The Radiation Safety Section of the Office of Environmental Health and Safety is responsible for supplying the radiological support services necessary for the implementation of this plan.

Sincerely, donM. Retch M.D., M.S.P.H.

Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer VCU Health System SMR.bg

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1 .10 Revision 47.

surre Countp ERNESTL BLOUNT

.Countp bminitratorox ffe JOSHUA B.SHEARS R . BO 65 REGINALD 0. HARRISON N--~1 45 §OtOD trtt JUDY S LYMTE The Couriek setle. I must JONIN SEWARD cwIge!Z3%eeasatb4 currp, Virgnia 23883 OcI TERRY D. LE1MS aind rileisoyle. .. February 7, 2002 TERRYD. Lw Samuel Awl, ca. 1609 Tdeo-e (757) 294-62271 04 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Fac (757)294-52 Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, Virginia 23060

Dear M. Grecheck:

We have received your letter of January 10, 2002 indicating a need to revise our agreement with you for your Surry Emergency Plan.

This letter is to inform you that we are willing to participate in the Emergency Plan by providing the following:

1. Operate the County Emergency Operations Center.

2. Coordinate the overall emergency response of all county departments and organizations.

3. Serve as the County point-of-contact with State/Federal agencies.

4. With mechanical equipment provided by Dominion Energy, give early warning to the public.

5. Coordinate radiological emergency response training.

6. Initiate the key county official alert system and notify assisting agencies and departments to evacuate the public from affected areas.

Very truly yours, Ernest L Blount Chairman, Surry County Board of Supervisors ELB/gs "Surry is Something Special"

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.11 Revision 47 Ornomwonweait of Virginia MEMBER COUNTY OF SURRY SHERIFFS OFFICE RD. BROWN SHERIFF SURRY, VIRGINIA 23883 (757) 294.5264 January 14, 2002 Virginia Power Nuclear Emergency Preparedness 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 ATT: Eugene S Grecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Domion Energy

Dear Mr. Grecheck,

In reference to your letter of January 10, 2002, the Surry County Sheriff's Office agrees to respond to any emergency at the Surry Power Station in accordance with the urry Emergency Plan.

The Sheriff's Office is capable of providing the following services:

1. Receive the notification of the radiological emergency and notify the County Coordinator or his designated representatives.

2, Warn key County officials and agencies assigned a radiological emergency responsibility.

3. Warn the public.

4. Evacuate the public from the area affected upon notification from the County Coordinator or Emergency Services.

5. Establish traffic control.

6. Conduct initial radiological monitoring in accordance to Appendix 6 of the Surry County ERP.

7. Enforce access/egress control provisions, when established, in coordination with the state olice.

8. Operate the Emergency Comunications Center.

Respectfully, H. D. Brown Sheriff.

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.12 Revision 47 SURRY VOLUNTEER RESCUE SQUAD INC.

11 627 Rolfe Hwy.

RO. Box 188 Surry, Virginia 23883 January 14,2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President -Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

I have received your letter dated January 10, 2002 regarding 'Letters of Agreement" supporting the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan.

This is to inform you that we are in agreement with the Surry Emergency Plan and are willing to support it should the occasion arise.

Accordingly, I hereby submit the following agreement:

We are in agreement with the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan and will respond to it within the capabilities of our organization, should our services be requested.

Respectfully, Thomas A. Gwaltney, Captain Surry Volunteer Rescue Squad SERVICES: Emergency Medical Care and Transportation EQUIPMENT: Three ALS Ambulances - Capacity 6 persons One Light DutyRescue Truck, One Rescue Boat Twenty-eight Members RESPONSE TIME: Fifteen Minutes

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.13 Revision 47 Suy Yofunteer Fire Department Inc.

25fBnks trt

• P.0. Ba26 Surnp Vwginia23883 January 17, 2001 Mr . Eugene S. Crecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Domonion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 Dear Mr. Grecheck This letter is to inform you that we are in agreement with the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan and are willing t support it should the occasion arise Accordingly , I hereby submit the following AGREEMENT Weare in agreement with Surry Power Station Emergency Plan and will respond to it within the capabilities of our organization should our services be requested Services, Fre Protection and Emergency Assistance Equipment; One (i) 1,000 Gpm Pumper, 1,450 gallons water and 50 gallons foam One (1) 1,000 CPR Pumper, 1,000 gallons water One (1) 750 GPM Pumper, 750 gallons water One (1) 500 GPI Pumper, 500 gallons water One (1) 500 GPM PUmper, 1,500 gallons water Two (2) 'Brush truck, 250 GPH with 250 gallons water One (1) equiptment supply van Personal: 27 members Response time: 15 minutes from SVFD to SUrry Power Station Sincerely, J.Earl Stewart Fire Chief Surry Vol.Fire Dept P.O. Box 260 Surry, Va 23883

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.14 Revision 47 COUNTY of ISLE OF WIGHT THE COURTHOUSE January 15, 2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 Dear Mr. Grecheck' Please be advised that this letter serves to update our previous letter of agreement that Isle of Wight County is willing to participate in the emergency plan, if required, and we are capable of providing the following services:

Operate the County Emergency Operations Center Coordinate the overall emergency responses of the County Serve as the County point of contact with State and Federal agencies Provide public information Coordinate radiological emergency response training Provide secondary fire responses Provide staging for radiological monitoring within the ten (10) mile radius Please contact me if any additional information is required.

Yours ery tru W. Dougla County Ad or WDC:chmn Cc: Mr. Richard 0, Childress Major Riddle Hines Mr. Donald T. Robertson, Assistant to the County AdministratorlDirector of Human Resources.

P.O. BOX 80

• ISLE OF WIGHT

• VIRGINIA 23397 * (757) 357-3191

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1 .15 Revision 47 SHERIFI'S OFFICE COUNTY OF ISLE OF WIGHT COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA C W PHELPS SHEIFF SERVING ISLE OF WIGHT WITH PRIDE January 14, 2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Section Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Dear Mr. Grechecic I am happy to comply with your request to update our Letter of Agreement withyour emergency plan. We are In agreement with said plan and willing to participate In this, if required, and are capable of providing the following services:

• Receive and verify the notification of the radiological emergency.

• Warn key county officials and other agencies assigned to radiological emergency responsibility.

• Warn the public.

• Evacuate the public from affected area(s).

• Maintain traffic control.

• Conduct Initial radiological monitoring.

. Access/egress control In coordination with the State Police.

Operate the Emergency Communications Center.

Sincerely, C. W. Phe Sheriff CWP:ebs Cc: Major Riddle Hines, Emergency Services Coordinator Mr. W. Douglas Caskey, Emergency Services Director for Isle of Wight P.O. BOX 75

• ISLE OF WIGHT, VIRGINIA 23397 urn:lnvC7.oi r:cur

• WCOWRI24tAU11&

• FRANIJN 562-3275

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.16 Revision 47 Isle of Wight Volunteer Rescue Squad I! / /POST OFFICE BOX 97 SMI-IHFLD, VIRGINIA 23431 January 28, 2002 Mn Eugene S Grecheck Vice Presdent-Nucear Support Serices Dominion Energy 5000 DominiBoula Glen Allen,VA 23060 -,

Dear Mc Grecheck:

Punsuant to you letter dated January 10, 2002, regarding a need to update our agreement with your emergency Pla lhis letter is to inform you that our organization is In agreement with Surry Ernergency Plan and ate willing to support it, should the need arise.

Accordingly, I hereby submit te following agreement We are In agrermentwiththa Surrg Puweta n's emerency plan anstdilllrespontltvLhln the capabilities of our organization, should our services be requested.

Services: Emergency medical care and transport with Advanced Life Support, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day.

Equipment 5 Medic units, I heavy duty rescue vehide. I ALS non-transport response unit Sincerely, Teri Reeder Captain

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.17 Revision 47 Smithfield Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.

P.O. Box 117 Smithfield, Va. 23431 Phone 357-3231 January 24, 2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen,'Virginia 23060

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

Per Federal Regulations prescribed inNUREG-0654, Rev 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants", please let this letter serve as our agreement to send one engine carrying 1,000 gallons of water, with a 1,000 g.p.m. pump, one officer, and three firefighters in the event of an emergency at Surry Power Station. If requested this will be followed by a second engine and additional firefighters.

These responses all depend on daytime availability of firemen, as this is a volunteer fire department Sincerely, Isaac N. Jones, 111 Chief

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.18 Revision 47 Rushmere Volunteer Fire'Department P.O. Box 361 Smithfield, Virginia 23430 Office: (757) 357-3207 Fax: (757) 357-2184 e-mail: RUSHS30@aoI.com Jfer" ?rs Pa n Bowie Romg. seadzry Rudopb cfferso. AWL hie Hervimi n rm Toasurp Wd-itecwwnjr.cw=

January 22,2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 Dear Mr. Grecheck This letter is to inform you that we are in agreement with the Station Emergency Plan and will respond to it within the capabilities of our organization should our services be requested.

Services: Fire Protection and Emergency Assistance Equipment:

One 1500 GPM Pumper/Tanker, 2000 gallon water One 1250 GPM Pumper, 1000 gallon water One 300 GPM Pumper/Tanker, 1200 gallon water One 750 GPM Pumper, 300,gallon water One Equipment Vehicle One Support Unit Personnel: 25 Firefighters Sincerey, Fire Chief

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.19 Revision 47 itp t f eport KebX T rainfa 23607 2400 Wagoington fibnut (757) 926-411 efite Of Atb Citr filanagtr August 20,2002 fax (757) 926-3503 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck, Vice President Dominion Energy -Nuclear Support Services 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 Re: Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Surry Power Station

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

The City of Newport News is aware that an operating license granted for the purpose of generating nuclear power requires the licensee to prepare and maintain a radiological eergency response plan, and the concept of contiguous jurisdictions emergency planning zones requires supportive emergencyplanning andpreparednessbyjurisdictions within thoseplanning zones. Based upon the City's Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the City will provide the following support services in the event it is called upon to assist or respond to a radiological emergency at the Surry Power Station:

o Operate the City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

o Receive and verify notification of a radiological emergency.

0 Coordinate the overall emergency response by the City.

O Serve as the City's point-of-contact with state and federal agencies.

O Disseminate public information to Newport News residents.

O Provide traffic control in Newport News.

o Evacuate the public from affected areas in Newport News.

o Operate the City's Mobile Communications Command Post if necessary.

o Provide staging for and conduct radiological monitoring in Newport News.

O Provide personnel to staff radiological teams in Newport News.

o Provide on-site assistance at the Surry Nuclear Power Station ifrequested and if available.

This letter updates and supercedes all previous radiological emergency response letter agreements.

Veyt ly

• ~~City Managet./

cc: City Attorney, Fire Chief, Police Chief, Coordinator of Emergency Services 1er123

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.20 Revision 47 COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR James 0. McReyolds aYork r,-t BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Walter Wal C-DistC Zaremba tI Sheila S. Noll District2 Donald E. Wiggins District 3 James S. Burgett Pistrict4 January 17, 2002 1homas G.Shqeppcrd Jr.

District S Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 Dear Mr. Grecheck In response to your letter of January 10, 2002, we have an established Emergency Operation Center EOC) in the meeting room of the Public Safety Building, located at 301 Goodwin Neck Road. We continue to update our Radiological Emergency Response Plan Standard Operating Procedures and can:

• operate the County EOC;

• serve as County point-of-contact with state and federal agencies as required;

• coordinate the overall emergency response plan of the County,

• disseminate public information as outlined by the State Department of Emergency Man-agement in our updated Radiological Emergency Response Plan;

• receive and verify the notification of the radiological emergency;

• warn key County officials and other agencies assigned a radiological emergency responsi-bility,

• operate the Emergency Communications Center; and

• have available well-trained radiological response personnel and continually add to this group through general refresher courses.

If you have any questions, please contact Stephen P. Kopczynsli, Fire Chief, at (757) 890-3600.

Sin ely James 0. McReynolds County Administrator 224 Ballard Street

• P.O. Box 532

• Yorktown, Virginia 23690-032 * (757) 890-3320 Fax: (757) 890-4000 *TDD (757) 890-3300

• Email: ctyadmsyorkcounty.gov A Hiampton Roads Community

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.21 Revision 47 York County Sheriff's Office Serving the Citizens of York County & Poquoson "Whern Independence Was Won in 1781" Phone: 757-890-3630 P.O. Box 99 Fax: 757-890-3649 . D. DIGGS, SEERZFF.P YmnuvvinargZ390M9 oml: shicdff(yorkcounty.gov www.yorkcounty.gov/sheriff January 28,2000 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President - .Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard GlenAlien, VA 23060

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

As you have requested in your letter d January1 0,20O2, liis letter is to update our agreement with your e-. cy plan.and our prt ion ith Surry Energency plan if rquested. ~ d.o ;a ,>Co We will be capable of providing the following services ifrequed:

1. Receive and verify the notification of tlibadiological emergency.

2. Warn Key County officials anewd ergcies assigned a radiological emergency responsibility.

3. Assist in warningtle public.

4. Assist in evacuating the public from the area affected.

5. Assist in traffic control.

6. Accesslegress control, in coordination with the State Police.

7. Operate the Emergency Communication center.

Sincerxel yours, J. D. Diggs, Sheriff County of York and City of Poquoson JDD:cj 301 Goodwin Neck Road

• Yorktown, Virginia 23692

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.22 Revision 47

• @ SCITY OF WILLIAMSBURG Office of the City Manager

• }[ 1 i 401 Lafayette Street, Williamsburg, Virginia 23185.3617 (757) 220-6100 Fax (757) 220-6107 citymgr~ci.willianisburg.va.uv January 15, 2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck Vice President - Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 RE: Letter of Agreement Surry Power Station

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

This is in reply to your letter dated January 10, 2002, requesting an update of our Letter of Agreement concerning the Surry Plan.

This is to inform you that we agree to participate i6 the Surry Emergency Plan by exchange of information with all agencies responding to an iirneidh at the Surry Power Station.

The city will perform the following functions, as necessary:

1. Operate the City Emergency Operating Center.

2. Coordinate the overall emergency response of the city.

3. Designate a city point of contact when Interfacing with other jurisdictions.

4. Issue Public Information releases.

5. Coordinate radiological emergency response training.

6. Receive and verify notification of the radiological emergency.

7. Initiate the key city official alert system.

8. Warn the public.

9. Evacuate the public from the areas affected.

10. Control traffic.

11. Coordinate with the County Office of Emergency Services.

Sincerely,

- :ackso Tuttle City Managet  :

cc: T.K. Weiler, Fire Chief

SEP Appendix 10.1 Page 10.1.23 Revision 47 COUNTY ADmINISTRATION 101 -MomBB Ro.w, P.O. Box 8784, WmuASmw, VGu 23187-8784 S.MAa cadmajams-dty.vaus (757) 253-605 F- (757) 253-6833 January 23, 2002 Mr. Eugene S. Grecheck VicePrsident, Nuclear Support Services Dominion Energy 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060

Dear Mr. Grecheck:

Please accept this letter as James City County's intent to comply with NUREG-0654, Rev. 1. James City County has developed a response plan to encompass any emergency that should arise at the Surry Nuclear Plant and will cooperate with the Plant, the State of Virginia, and surrounding jurisdictions should an incident occur.

James City County is prepared to carry out the following activities:

I. Operate the County Emergency Operations Center.

2. Coordinate the overall emergency response of the County.

3. Serve as the County point-of-contact with State and Federal agencies.

4. Disseminate public information.

5. Coordinate radiological emergency response training.

6. Receive and verify notification of the radiological emergency.

7. Alert key County officials and other agencies assigned a radiological emergency response responsibility.

8. Alert the public 'activate sirens."

9. Evacuate the public from the area affected.

10. Traffic control

11. Conduct initial radiological monitoring

12. Acecsslegress control, in coordination with the Police Department.

13. Increase staff in Central Dispatch while incident is in progress.

Sincerely Sanford . Wanner County Administrator SBW/gs grechekltr

SEP Appendix 10.2 Page 10.2.1 Revision 47 APPENDIX 10.2 RADIATION EMERGENCY PLAN MCVHNCU - VIRGINIA POWER (Maintained under separate cover by Corporate Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. Available upon request)

SEP Appendix 10.3 Page 10.3.1 Revision 47 APPENDIX 10.3 FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT CENTER (FRMACQ OPERATIONS PLAN (Maintained under separate cover by Corporate Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. Available upon request.)

SEP Appendix 10.4 Page 10.4.1 Revision 47 APPENDIX 10.4 EVACUATION TIME STUDY (Maintained under separate cover by Corporate Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. Available upon request.)

SEP Appendix 10.5 Page 10.5.1 Revision 47 APPENDIX 10.5 EPIP EMERGENCY PLAN CROSS REFERENCE

SEP Appendix 10.5 Page 10.5.2 Revision 47 EMERGENCY PLAN EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES SECTION IMPLEMENTED

1. Emergency Control Procedures 1.01 Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure 4.2, 5.0, 6.1 1.02 Response to Notification of Unusual Event 4.2,6.1 1.03 Response to Alert 4.2,6.1 1.04 Response to Site Area Emergency 4.2,6.1,6.3 1.05 Response to General Emergency 4.2, 6.1,6.3 1.06 Protective Action Recommendations 6.3

2. Notification Procedures 2.01 Notification of State and Local Governments 5.4,6.1 2.02 Notification of NRC 6.1

3. Augmentation Procedures 3.02 Activation of Technical Support Center 5.0, 5.2.1 3.03 Activation of Operational Support Center 5.0, 5.2.1 3.04 Activation of Local Emergency Operations Facility 5.0,5.2.2 3.05 Augmentation of Emergency Response Organization 5.0,6.1

4. Radiological Monitoring and Dose Assessment Procedures 4.01 Radiological Assessment Director Controlling Procedure 5.2.1.9 4.02 Radiation Protection Supervisor Controlling Procedure 5.2.1.10 4.03 Dose Assessment Team Controlling Procedure 6.2 4.04 Emergency Personnel Radiation Exposure 6.4.1 4.05 Respiratory Protection 6.3.3.1 4.07 Protective Measures 6.3 4.08 Initial Offsite Release Assessment 6.2 4.09 Source Term Assessment 6.2 4.10 Determination of X/Q 6.2 4.13 Offsite Release Assessment with Environmental Data 6.2 4.14 In-Plant Monitoring 5.2.1.20, 6.4.2 4.15 Onsite Monitoring 5.2.1.23, 6.4.2 4.16 Offsite Monitoring 5.2.1.18

SEP Appendix 10.5 Page 10.5.3 Revision 47 EMERGENCY PLAN EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES SECTION IMPLEMENTED 4.17 Monitoring of Emergency Response Facilities 5.2.1.20 4.18 Monitoring of LEOF 5.2.1.20 4.21 Evacuation and Remote Assembly Area Monitoring 5.2.1.19, 6.4.2 4.24 Gaseous Effluent Sampling During an Emergency 6.2 I I

4.26 High Activity Sample Analysis 6.2 4.27 Exposure Control Emergency Response 6.4 4.29 TSC/LEOF Radiation Monitoring System 5.2.1.20 4.30 Use of MIDAS Class A Model 6.2 4.31 Use of MIDAS Class B Model 6.2 4.33 Health Physics Network Communications 5.2.1.17 4.34 Field Team Radio Operator Instructions 6.2 4.35 Chemistry Sampling 6;2, 7.3.6 I

5. Protective Action Procedures 5.01 Transportation of Contaminated Injured Personnel 6.4.3 5.03 Personnel Accountability 5.2.1.27,6.3.2 5.04 Access Control 6.3.2 5.05 Site Evacuation 6.3.2 5.07 Administration of Radioprotective Drugs 6.3.3.3 5.08 Damage Control Guideline 5.2.1.5, 5.2.1.26 5.09 Security Team Leader Controlling Procedure 5.0,5.2.1.16, 6.2

6. Recovery and Restoration Procedures.

6.01 Re-entry/Recovery Guideline 9.1

SEP Appendix 10.6 Page 10.6.1 Revision 47 APPENDIX 10.6 NUREG-0654/EMERGENCY PLAN CROSS REFERENCE

SEP Appendix 10.6 Page 10.6.2 Revision 47 NUREG-0654 CROSS REFERENCE INDEX SURRY EMERGENCY PLAN NUREG-0654 SEP NUREG-0654 SEP REF. SECTION SECTION NO. REF. SECTION SECTION NO.

A.1.a 5.3 F.1.a 5.2,5.4,7.2 A.1.b 5.4 F.1.b 7.2 A.1.c Fig.5.4 F.1.c 7.2 A.1.d 5.0 F.1.d 7.2 A.1.e 5.2,5.4 F.1.e 5.2 A.2.a N/A F.1 .f 7.2 A.2.b N/A F.2 6.4.3 A.3 5.3, APP. 10.1 F.3 8.7 A.4 5.2,5.3 G.1 8.8 B.1 5.1 G.2 8.8 B.2 5.0,5.2 G.3.a 8.8,7.1.5, CERP B.3 5.0 G.3.b 7.1 B.4 5.2.1.1 G.4.a 5.3.1, Table 5.2 B.5 5.2.1, Tables 5.1 & 5.2 G.4.b 5.3.1 B.6 Fig. 5.4 G.4.c 8.8 B.7.a thru d 5.3.1, Table 5.2 G.5 8.8 B.8 5.3.2 B.9 5.3.3, 5.4, APP. 10.1 H.1 7.1 H.2 7.1 C.1.a 5.3,5.4 H.3 N/A C.1.b 5.4.7 H.4 5.2 C.1.c 5.4.7 H.5 7.3 C.2.a N/A H.5.a 7.3.1, 7.3.3 C.2.b CERP, 5.3 H.5.b 7.3.2 C.3 5.3 H.5.c 7.3.4 C.4 5.3 H.5.d 7.3.5 H.6.a thru c 7.3,7.4 D.1 4.2 H.7 7.3.2 D.2 4.2 H.8 7.3.3 D.3 N/A H.9 7.1,7.5 D.4 N/A* H.1 0 7.5,8.7 H.1 1 APP. 10.7 E.1 5.4,6.1 H.12 7.1 E.2 6.1 E.3 6.1 1.1 4.2 E.4.a thru n 6.1 1.2 7.3 E.5 N/A 1.3.a thru b 6.2 E.6 6.3.1,7.6 1.4 6.2 E.7 6.3.1 1.5 7.3.3,7.3.4 1.6 7.3.2 1.7 7.3.2 1.8 5.2,7.3.2 1.9 7.3.2 1.10 6.3.1 1.11 N/A

SEP Appendix 10.6 Page 10.6.3 Revision 47 NUREG-0654 SEP NUREG-0654 SEP REF. SECTION SECTION NO. REF. SECTION SECTION NO.

J.1.a thru d 6.3.2 N.1.a 8.6 J.2 6.3.2 N.1.b 8.6 J.3 6.3.2 N.2.a 8.5.1 J.4 6.3.2 N.2.b 8.5.2 J.5 6.3.2 N.2.c 8.5.3 J.6.a thru c 6.3.3 N.2.d 8.5.4 J.7 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 N.2.e.1 8.5.6 J.8 6.3, APP.1 0.4 N.2.e.2 8.5.5 J.9 N/A N.3.a thru f 8.5, 8.6 J.1 0.a Fig 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, APP.1 0.4 N.4 8.6.5 J.1 0.b APP.1 0.4 N.5 8.6.5 J.1 0.c 6.3.1 J.10.d thru I N/A 0.1 8.3 J.10.m 6.3.1 0.1.a 8.4 J.1 1 N/A 0.1.b N/A J.12 N/A 0.2 8.3 0.3 6.4, Table 8.1 K.1.a thru g 6.4 0.4.a thru f 8.3 K.2 6.4 0.4g 8.4 K.3.a-b 5.2, 6.4 0.4h 8.3, 8.4, APP.1 0.2 K.4 N/A 0.4i 8.3 K.5.a thru b 6.4.2 0.4j 8.3 K.6.a thru c 6.4.2 0.5 8.3 K.7 6.4.2 L.1 6.4 P.1 8.3 L.2 6.4 P.2 8.1 L.3 N/A P.3 8.1 L.4 6.4 P.4 8.2 P.5 8.2.3 M.1 9.1 P.6 APP. 10.1-10.3 M.2 9.0 P.7 APP. 10.5 M.3 9.0 P.8 APP. 10.6 M.4 9.2 P.9 8.9 P.10 8.2.2

SEP Appendix 10.7 Page 10.7.1 Revision 47 APPENDIX 10.7 EMERGENCY KIT CONTENTS The contents of the nine (9) emergency kits established for use by emergency response personnel at Surry Power Station are specified in this appendix.

COMMUNICATIONS No specific communications equipment is contained in any kit, but the following radios are available for emergency communication:

Portable - Health Physics Office Mobile - Selected management and station vehicles PROCEDURES Selected EPIPs are positioned in various emergency response locations.

Distribution is specified by Records Management.

EMERGENCY KITS Contents are specified on the following pages.

SEP Appendix 10.7 Page 10.7.2 Revision 47 EMERGENCY KITS HP AREA, LEOF, CONTROL ROOM. OS, TSC QUANTITY DESCRIPTION HP AREA LEOF CRIOSC (1 ea.) TSC 1 1 1 -- First Aid Kit 2 2 2 -- Flashlight 10 10 10 -- D cell Batteries 24 -- C cell Batteries 1 1 1 -- Adjustable Wrench 1 1 1 - Flat Head Screwdriver 1 I 1 - Phillips Head Screwdriver 1 2 1 - Channel locks 1 1 1 -- Pliers 1 1 1 - Pocket knife 2 2 2 - Mechanical pencils 2 2 2 - China markers 1 1 1 -- Notebook 10 10 10 - 12'x20" Bag 10 10 -- 36"x48" Bag 20 20 20 -- Ziplock bag (small) 1 1 1 - Hemostats 1 1 1 - 10 Mile EPZJSite Boundary Map 1 -- Safeguards roof ladder key 2pr 2pr 2pr 2pr Coveralls 6pr 6pr 6pr 6pr Rubber gloves 6pr 6pr 6pr 6pr Cotton Inserts 2pr 2pr 2pr 2pr Rubber Boots 2 2 2 2 Hoods (e.g., cotton) 4pr 4pr 4pr 4pr Booties (e.g., plastic) 2 2 2 2 Full-face respirators 2 2 2 2 Iodine canister 1btl 1btl 1 bI 1btl Anti-fog 50ft 5Oft 5Oft 5Oft Barricade rope

SEP Appendix 10.7 Page 10.7.3 Revision 47 EMERGENCY KITS HP AREA. LEOF. CONTROL ROOM, OSC. TSC QUANTITY DESCRIPTION HP AREA LEOF CR/OSC (1 ea.) TSC 4 4. 4 4 Radiation signs 4 4 4 4 Contamination signs 1 -- High Range Ion Chamber Survey Meter 3 1 -- Medium Range Ion Chamber Survey Meter 7 1 -- Low Range GM Survey Meter 7 1 -- Frisker with probe 6 1 - Air sampler (with battery cables, if appropriate) 1 -- Battery powered air sampler 3 1 1 -- Air sampler head 50 -- TLD 50 -- SRD 0 -1.5R or DAD 1 -- SRD charger (N/A if DADs used) 100 100 100 -- Smears 10 10 10 - 100 ml Bottle 1 bx 1 bx 1 bx - Gelman filters 10 10 10 -- Silver Zeolites 1 1 -- Gas chamber NOTE: The HP Area Emergency Kit includes supplies (e.g., monitoring instrumentation) dedicated for use in other areas.

SEP Appendix 10.7 Page 10.7.4 Revision 47 EMERGENCY KITS FOR OFFSITE AND REMOTE ASSEMBLY AREA (RAM) MONITORING TEAMS QUANTITY DESCRIPTION OFFSITE (3) RAA 1 1 First Aid Kit 2 2 Flashlight 10 10 D cell batteries 1 Adjustable wrench 1 Flat head screwdriver 1 Phillips head screwdriver 1 Channel locks 1 Pliers 1 Pocket knife 2 2 Mechanical pencil 2 2 China markers 1 1 Notebook 1 Hand shovel 20 Ziplock bag (large) 10 10 12"x20" bag 10 36"x48' bag 20 Ziplock bag (small) 1 1 Hemostats 1 10-Mile EPZ/Site Boundary Map 1 Switchyard gate keys 1 RAA phone cabinet key 2pr 2pr Coveralls 6pr 6pr Rubber gloves 6pr 6pr Cotton inserts 2pr 2pr Rubber boots 2 2 Hoods 4pr 30pr Booties 2 Full-face respirators 2 Iodine canister 1 btl Anti-fog 25 Paper suit

SEP Appendix 10.7 Page 10.7.5 Revision 47 EMERGENCY KITS FOR OFFSITE AND REMOTE ASSEMBLY AREA (RAA) MONITORING TEAMS QUANTITY DESCRIPTION OFFSITE (3) RAA soft Barricade rope 4 Radiation signs 4 Contamination signs 1 Air sampler head 100 100 Smears 10 100 ml bottles 1 bx Gelman filters 10 Silver zeolite cartridges 1 Gas chambers 2 btls KI tablets

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.1 Revision 47 APPENDIX 10.8 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONANITIATING CONDITIONS MATRIX

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.2 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION NOTE: The alpha-numeric designator, [A.N], preceding each condition/applicability below, indicates the Emergency Action Level designator used in EPIP-1.01, Attachment 1, for that particular item.

1. [A.1] Inability to reach required unit

• Intentional reduction in power, load or temperature operating condition within T.S. time IAW T.S. Action Statement - HAS COMMENCED limits AND I ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• T.S. Action Statement time limit for condition change

- CANNOT BE MET

2. [A.4] Failure of a safety or relief valve

• RCS to close after pressure reduction

. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 2000 psig ALL CONDITIONS OR Overpressure Mitigation System - ENABLED AND

• Any indication after lift or actuation that Pressurizer Safety or PORV - REMAINS OPEN AND a Flow - NON-ISOLABLE

• Main Steam

. Excessive flow through Steam Generator Safety or' PORV as indicated by rapid RCS cooldown rate GREATER THAN 500 F per hour

3. [A.7] Loss of plant communications

• Station PBX Phone System - FAILED capability AND ALL CONDITIONS

• Station Gai-Tronics System - FAILED AND

• Station UHF Radio System - FAILED

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.3 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

4. [A.10] Unplanned loss of most or all Unplanned loss of most (>75%) or all visual safety system annunciators for annunciator alarms on panels A' to Kw for GREATER greater than 15 minutes THAN 15 minutes ABOVE CSD CONDITION

5. [B.3] Leak rate or leakage requiring Intentional reduction in power, load or temperature IAW plant shutdown IAW T.S. T.S. 3.1 .C leakage limit Action Statement - HAS COMMENCED ABOVE CSD CONDITION

6. JC.3] Fuel clad damage indication

• Intentional reduction in power, load or temperature IAW T.S. 3.1 .D reactor coolant activity limit Action ABOVE CSD CONDITION Statement - HAS COMMENCED OR High Range Letdown Radiation Monitor:

Either of the following indications occur within 30 minutes and remain for at least 15 minutes:

1-CH-RM-118, 2-CH-RM-218:

GREATER THAN 5.8 x 103 cpm (indicating 0.1% fuel failure) I

7. 1C.12] Spent Fuel Storage Facility

• Verified Spent Fuel Storage Cask seal leakage accident OR ALL CONDITIONS Spent Fuel Storage Cask dropped or mishandled

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.4 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

8. [E.5] Effluent release GREATER a) Any of the following monitors indicate valid readings THAN ODCM allowable limit above the specified value for GREATER THAN one.

hour ALL CONDITIONS

• Vent Vent Kaman, RM-VG-131, GREATER THAN 2.84 x 10 4 Cisec eProcess Vent Kaman, RM-GW-1 30, GREATER THAN 4.59 x 106 iCsec

• Discharge Tunnel, RM-SW-1 20 or -220, GREATER THAN 3.3 x 10 4 cpm OR b) HP assessment (sample results or dose projections) indicates GREATER THAN 100% ODCM allowable limit OR c) Surry Radwaste Facility Monitor GREATER THAN 100% ODCM allowable limit as determined by HP:

• RRM-1 01: Ventilation Stack Noble Gas Monitor OR

• RRM-1 31: Uquid Effluent Monitor

9. [G.3] Major Secondary line break Uncontrolled loss of secondary coolant - IN PROGRESS ABOVE CSD CONDITION

10. [H.3] Loss of offsite power or onsite

• Offsite power to unit specific Transfer Buses (Unit 1:

AC power capability D & F; Unit 2: E & F) - NOT AVAILABLE ALL CONDITIONS OR Unit Main Generator and both Emergency Diesel Generators - OUT OF SERVICE

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.5 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

11. [1.3] Fire lasting GREATER THAN 10 Fire in the Protected Area or Switchyard which is not minutes under control within 10 minutes after Fire Brigade -

DISPATCHED ALL CONDITIONS 12 P.4] Security threat, unauthorized Any of the following when determined to have attempted entry, or attempted potential for degrading the level of safety of the plant sabotage or ISFSI:

• Receipt of a credible site-specific threat from ALL CONDITIONS Security, NRC or FBI

• Confirmed hostage situation

• Civil disturbance

• Discovery of a bomb device (other-than on or near a safety related system which represents an on-going security compromise)

• Confirmed attempted intrusion (Protected Area or ISFSI)

• Attempted sabotage

13. [K.3] Aircraft crash or unusual aircraft

• Confirmed notification of aircraft crash within the site activity boundary ALL CONDITIONS OR Unusual aircraft activity in the vicinity of the site as determined by the Shift Manager/Station Emergency Manager or Supervisor Security Shift I

14. [K.6] Onsite explosion Confirmed report of unplanned explosion within Protected Area or Switchyard ALL CONDITIONS

15. [K.9] Onsite or nearsite release of Unplanned release of toxic or flammable agents which toxic or flammable liquids or gases may affect safety of station personnel or equipment ALL CONDITIONS

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.6 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

16. [K.1 3] Turbine rotating component Failure of turbine/generator rotating component failure with no casing penetration resulting in unit trip POWER AND STARTUP

17. [L3] Earthquake detected Confirmed earthquake which activates the Event Indicator on the Strong Motion Accelerograph ALL CONDITIONS

18. [L5] Tornado within Protected area Tornado visually detected within Protected Area or or Switchyard Switchyard ALL CONDITIONS

19. [L8] Hurricane force winds projected a) Either of the following National Weather Service onsite declarations in effect for Surry County ALL CONDITIONS * "Hurricane Warning" (tidal flooding along with hurricane force winds are possible)

• "inland High Wind Warning for Hurricane Force Winds" (hurricane force winds may be experienced but no storm surge or tidal flooding is expected)

OR b) Sustained hurricane force winds (GREATER THAN 73 mph) projected onsite within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

20. [L.11] Flood or low water level

• Flood in the James River GREATER THAN +12 FEET MSL (CW pump motors and entrance to the ALL CONDITIONS CW pump pits are at + 12 1/2 feet MSL) but LESS THAN +21 feet MSL (Alert criteria)

OR Water level in the Surry Power Station Intake Canal (CW-LI-1 01, -201) - LESS THAN +23 1/2 feet and NOT increasing

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.7 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

21. [M.4] Station conditions which Shift Manager/Station Emergency Manager judgement I warrant increased awareness of state that any of the following exist:

and/or local authorities

• Unit shutdown is other than a controlled shutdown ALL CONDITIONS OR Unit is in an uncontrolled condition during operation OR A condition exists that has the potential for escalation and, therefore, warrants notification

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.8 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

• Secondary System cooling capability -

1. [A.3] Loss of cooling function needed

• Secondary System cooling capability-for Cold Shutdown and Refueling UNAVAILABLE Condition AND CSD & RSD

• Loss of any of the following systems:

• Service Water

• Component Cooling

• Residual Heat Removal AND

• RCS temperature greater than 1400 F

2. [A.6] Trip following ATWT that takes

• Reactor trip setpoint and coincidences - EXCEEDED the reactor subcritical AND POWER OPS & HSD

• Automatic reactor trip from RPS - FAILED AND

• Manual reactor trip - REQUIRED AND

• Manual reactor trip from Control Room -

SUCCESSFUL

3. [A.9] Unplanned loss of safety system

• Unplanned loss of most (>75%) or all visual annunciators with compensatory annunciator alarms on panels "A"to "K" for indicators unavailable or a transient in GREATER THAN 15 minutes progress AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• All computer monitoring capability (e.g., plant computer, ERFCS) - NOT AVAILABLE OR Significant transient - INITIATED OR IN PROGRESS (e.g., reactor trip, Si, turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, thermal power oscillations >10%)

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.9 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

4. [A.12] Evacuation of Main Control Evacuation of the Control Room with stable shutdown Room required control established within 15 minutes ALL CONDITIONS

5. [B.2] RCS leak rate limit -

• Primary system leak determined to be - GREATER EXCEEDED THAN 50 gpm ABOVE CSD CONDITION AND

• Pressurizer level can be - RESTORED AND MAINTAINED

6. [B.5] Excessive Primary to Secondary

• Intentional reduction in power, load or temperature leakage with loss of offsite power IAW T.S. 3.1.C.6 leakage limit Action Statement -

HAS COMMENCED ABOVE CSD CONDITION AND

• Offsite power to unit specific Transfer Buses (Unit 1:

D & F; Unit 2: E & F) - NOT AVAILABLE

7. [B.6] Gross Primary to Secondary

• Steam Generator tube rupture - IN PROGRESS leakage AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• Safety Injection - REQUIRED

8. [C.2] Severe Fuel Clad Damage

• RCS specific activity GREATER THAN 300 LiC/gram dose equivalent 1-131

- ABOVE CSD CONDITION OR High Range Letdown Radiation Monitor Either of the following indications occur within 30 minutes and remain for at least 15 minutes:

1-CH-RM-1 18, 2-CH-RM-218:

GREATER THAN 5.8 x 104 cpm (indicating 1%fuel failure)

I

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.10 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT CONDrrION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

9. [C.10] Fuel damage accident with

• Verified accident involving damage to irradiated fuel release of radioactivity to containment or fuel buildings AND ALL CONDITIONS

• HP confirms fission product release from fuel OR Readings on the Ventilation Vent Kaman Monitor (RM-VG-1 31) - GREATER THAN 2.8x105 iiCisec

10. [C.11] Loss of cask/fuel containment

• Verified loss of all cask/fuel containment barriers barriers or accidental criticality AND ALL CONDITIONS

• HP confirms fission product release from fuel

11. [D.3] High Containment radiation,

• Outside Containment High Range Radiation Monitor:

pressure and temperature (RM-RMS-1 61, -261) GREATER THAN 24 mR/hr ABOVE CSD CONDITION OR CHRRMS (Inside) Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (RM-RMS-1 27, -128, -227, -228) -

GREATER THAN 1.54 R/hr AND

• Containment pressure GREATER THAN 17.7 psia OR Containment temperature GREATER THAN 150OF

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.11 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

12. [E.3] High radiation or airborne a) Valid unexpected readings on any of the following contamination levels indicate a monitors have increased by a factor of 1000:

severe degradation in control of radioactive material *Control Room Area (RM-RMS-157)

ALL CONDITIONS

• Auxiliary Building Control Area (RM-RMS-1 54)

• Auxiliary Building Drumming Area (RM-RMS-1 55)

• Decontamination Building Area (RM-RMS-151)

• Fuel Pit Bridge Area (RM-RMS-153)

• New Fuel Storage Area (RM-RMS-152)

• Laboratory Area (RM-RMS-158)

• Sample Room Area (RM-RMS-156)

OR b) Surry Radwaste Facility reports valid unexpected readings on any of the following monitors have increased by a factor of 1000:

• Control Room (RRM-121)

• Chemistry Laboratory (RRM-1 22)

• Local Control Panel (RRM-129)

• Bitumen Control Room (RRM-1 30)

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.12*

Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT CON DITION/APPLI CAB ILITY INDICATION

13. [E.4] Effluent release GREATER a) Any of the following monitors indicate valid readings THAN 10 times ODCM allowable limrit above the specified value for GREATER THAN 15 minutes:

ALL CONDITIONS

• Vent Vent Kaman, RM-VG-131, GREATER THAN 2.84 x 105 pCi/sec

• Process Vent Kaman, RM-GW-1 30, GREATER THAN 4.59 x 107 C i/sec

• Discharge Tunnel, RM-SW-1 20 or RM-SW-220, GREATER THAN 3.3 x 10 5 cpm OR b) HP assessment (sample results or dose projections) indicates GREATER THAN 10 times ODCM allowable limit OR c) Surry Radwaste Facility Monitor GREATER THAN 10 times ODCM allowable limit as determined by HP:

.*RRM-101: Ventilation Stack Noble Gas Monitor OR

• RRM-131: Liquid Effluent Monitor

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.13 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

14. [G.2] Major Secondary line break with

• Uncontrolled loss of secondary coolant - IN Primary to Secondary leakage PROGRESS GREATER THAN 10 gpm AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• Condenser Air Ejector Monitor 1-SV-RM-1 11, 2-SV-RM-21 1:

GREATER THAN 1 x 107 cpm OR Vent Vent Kaman Monitor (RM-VG-1 31)

GREATER THAN 2.84 x 105 gCisec OR Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor on affected pathway 1-SS-RM-1 12 or -113, 2-SS-RM-212 or-213 GREATER THAN 1x 107 cpm

15. [H.2] Loss of all offsite and onsite AC . Offsite power to unit specific Transfer Buses power (Unit 1: D & F; Unit 2: E & F) - NOT AVAILABLE ALL CONDITIONS AND

• Station Service Buses A, B, & C -

DE-ENERGIZED AND

• Emergency Buses H & J - DE-ENERGIZED

16. [H.5] Loss of all onsite DC power

• All Station Battery voltmeters- ZERO (0) VOLTS ALL CONDITIONS AND

• No light indication available to Reserve Station Service Breakers 15D1, 15E1 and 15F1

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.14 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

17. [12] Fire potentially affecting station Fire which has potential for causing a safety system safety systems NOT to be operable as defined by T.S.1.0.D and 3.0.2 ABOVE CSD CONDITION

18. [J.3] Ongoing Security compromise Supervisor Security Shift has notified the Shift or bomb potentially affecting station Manager/Station Emergency Manager of a confirmed . I safety systems un-neutralized intrusion into the Protected Area or ISFSI ALL CONDITIONS OR Shift Manager/Station Emergency Manager notified of a verified bomb discovered on or near a safety related system I

19. [K.2] Aircraft crash on the facility Aircraft crash within the Protected Area or Switchyard ALL CONDITIONS

20. [K.5] Explosion damage to facility Unplanned explosion resulting in damage to plant structure or equipment that affects plant operations ALL CONDITIONS

21. [K.8] Entry of toxic or flammable Uncontrolled release of toxic or flammable agent which gases or liquids into plant facility causes:

ALL CONDITIONS

• Evacuation of personnel from plant areas AND

. Safety related equipment to be rendered inoperable

22. [K.1 1] Missile damage to safety Notification of missile impact causing damage to safety related equipment or structures related equipment or structures ABOVE CSD CONDITION

23. [K.1 2] Turbine failure with penetration Failure of turbine/generator rotating equipment resulting in casing penetration POWER

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.15 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

24. [L2] Earthquake GREATER THAN

• Confirmed earthquake which activates Event OBE levels Indicator on the Strong Motion Accelerograph ALL CONDITIONS AND

• Safety related equipment is rendered inoperable by earthquake OR AP-37.00, SEISMIC EVENT, calculations indicate horizontal motion of 0.07g or GREATER

25. [L.4] Tornado striking facility Tornado visually detected striking structures within the Protected Area or Switchyard ALL CONDITIONS

26. [L7] Hurricane winds near design Hurricane winds 120 mph OR GREATER experienced basis level experienced or projected or projected ALL CONDITIONS

27. [L.1 0] Flood or low water level near

• Flood in the James River - GREATER THAN +21 design levels feet MSL (Emergency Service Water Pump House entrance is at +21 1/6 feet) but LESS THAN +27 feet ALL CONDITIONS MSL (Site Area Emergency criteria)

OR Water level in the Surry Power Station Intake Canal -

LESS THAN +23 1/2 feet AND decreasing

28. [M.3] Station conditions which have Shift Manager/Station Emergency Manager judgement the potential to degrade or are I actually degrading the level of safety of the station ALL CONDITIONS

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.16 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

1. [A.2] Loss of Function needed for unit a) Inability to attain the minimum required heat sink as HSD condition indicated by loss of the following:

ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• Main Feedwater System AND

• Auxiliary Feedwater AND -.

• Auxiliary Feedwater Crosstie OR b) Loss of High Head flowpath as indicated by loss of the following:

• Normal Charging System AND

• High Head SI System

2. [A.5] Failure of the reactor to trip

• Reactor trip setpoint and coincidences - EXCEEDED (ATWT)

AND POWER OPS & HSD

• Automatic reactor trip from RPS - FAILED AND

• Manual reactor trip from Control Room - FAILED.

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.17 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

3. [A.8] Inability to monitor a significant . Most (>75%) or all visual annunciator alarms on transient in progress panels 'A' to SKY - NOT AVAILABLE ABOVE CSD CONDITION AND

• All computer monitoring capability (e.g., plant computer, ERFCS) - NOT AVAILABLE AND

• Significant transient - IN PROGRESS (e.g., reactor trip, SI, turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, thermal power oscillations >10%)

AND

• Inability to directly monitor any one of the following using Control Room indications:

• Subcriticality

• Core Cooling

• Heat Sink

• Vessel Integrity

• Containment Integrity

4. [A.1 1] Evacuation of Main Control Evacuation of the Control Room with stable shutdown Room with control NOT established control NOT established within 15 minutes within 15 minutes ALL CONDITIONS

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.1 8 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONDITIONIAPPLICABILITY INDICATION

5. [B.1] RCS leak rate exceeds makeup . Primary system leak (LOCA) - IN PROGRESS capacity AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• Safety Injection - REQUIRED AND

• RCS subcooling based on Core Exit Themiocouples

- LESS THAN 300 F OR RCS inventory cannot be maintained based on pressurizer level or RVLIS indication

6. [B.4] Steam generator tube rupture

• Steam generator tube rupture - IN PROGRESS with loss of offsie power AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• Offsite power to unit specific Transfer Buses (Unit 1: D & F; Unit 2: E & F) - NOT AVAILABLE AND

• Atmospheric steam release from ruptured Steam Generator - OCCURRING OR REQUIRED

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.1 9 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

7. [C.1] Core damage with possible loss a) Fuel clad failure as indicated by any of the following:

of coolable geometry

• RCS Specific activity - GREATER THAN 60 ABOVE CSD CONDITION piCVgram dose equivalent 1-131 OR

. High Range Letdown Radiation Monitor 1-CH-RM-1 18, 2-CH-RM218:

GREATER THAN 1.4 x 10 6 cpm AND b) Loss of cooling as indicated by any of the following:

• 5 confirmed core exit thermocouples - GREATER THAN 12000 F OR Core delta T - ZERO OR Core delta T - RAPIDLY DIVERGING

8. [C.9] Major fuel damage accident

• Water level in reactor vessel during refueling -

with radioactive release to BELOW TOP OF CORE containment or fuel buildings OR ALL CONDITIONS Water level in Spent Fuel Pit verified - BELOW TOP OF SPENT FUEL AND

• Verified damage to irradiated fuel resulting in readings on Ventilation Vent Kaman Monitor (RM-VG-1 31) - GREATER THAN 4.2x10 7 i/CVsec

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.20 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONDITIONIAPPLICABILITY INDICATION

9. [D.2] High Containment radiation,

• Outside Containment High Range Radiation Monitor pressure, and temperature (RM-RMS-1 61, -261) - GREATER THAN 6.3x10 2 mR/hr ABOVE CSD CONDITION OR CHRRMS (Inside) Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (RM-RMS-127, -128, -227, -228) -

GREATER THAN 2x103 Rl/hr AND

• Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 23 psia and NOT decreasing OR Containment temperature - GREATER THAN 200OF

10. [E.2] Release imminent or in HP assessment indicates actual or projected doses at progress and site boundary doses or beyond Site Boundary- GREATER THAN 100 projected to exceed 100 mrem TEDE mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE ALL CONDITIONS

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.21 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONDITIONIAPPLICABILITY INDICATION

11. [G.1] Major Secondary line break with

• Uncontrolled loss of secondary coolant - IN Primary to Secondary leakage PROGRESS GREATER THAN 50 gpm and fuel damage indicated AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• RCS specific activity GREATER THAN 300 pi/Cgram D.E. 1-131 OR High Range Letdown Radiation Monitor on affected pathway 1-CH-RM-1 18, 2-CH-RM-218:

GREATER THAN 7.0 x 106 cpm AND

• Condenser Air Ejector Radiation Monitor 1-SV-RM-1 11, 2-SV-RM-21 1:

GREATER THAN 1x1 7 cpm OR Vent Vent Kaman Monitor (RM-VG-1 31) GREATER THAN 1.1 x 17 CVsec OR Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor on affected pathway 1-SS-RM-112 or -113, 2-SS-RM-212 or -213: GREATER THAN 1x107 cpm OR Main Steam Line High Range Radiation Monitor on affected pathway (RM-RI-MS-124, -125, -126, -224, -

225, -226) GREATER THAN 1.94 mR/hr

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.22 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

12. [H.1] Loss of offsite and onsite AC The following conditions exist for GREATER THAN 15 power for more than 15 minutes minutes:

ALL CONDITIONS

• Offsite power 1o unit specific Transfer Buses (Unit 1: D & F; Unit 2: E & F) - NOT AVAILABLE AND

• Station Service Buses A, B, & C -

DE-ENERGIZED AND

• Emergency Buses H & J - DE-ENERGIZED

13. [H.4] Loss of all onsite DC power for The following conditions exist for GREATER THAN 15 GREATER THAN 15 minutes minutes:

ALL CONDITIONS . All station Battery voltmeters - ZERO (0) VOLTS AND

. No light indication available to Reserve Station Service Breakers 15D1, 15E1 and 15F1

14. [1.1 ] Fire resulting in degradation of

• Fire which causes major degradation of a safety safety systems system function required for protection of the public ABOVE CSD CONDITION AND

• Affected systems are caused NOT to be operable as defined by T.S.1.0.D and 3.0.2

15. [J.2] Imminent loss of physical Station Supervisor Security Shift has notified the Shift l control Manager/Station Emergency Manager of imminent intrusion into a Vital Area ALL CONDITIONS

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.823 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

16. [K.1] Aircraft damage to vital plant Aircraft crash adversely affects vital structures by systems impact or fire ABOVE CSD CONDITION

17. [K.4] Severe explosive damage Explosion which results in severe degradation of any systems required for safe shutdown ABOVE CSD CONDITION

18. [K.7] Entry of toxic or flammable

• Uncontrolled release of toxic or flammable agents gases or liquids into plant vital areas into Vital Areas other than the Control Room AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• Evacuation of Vital Area other than Control Room -

REQUIRED OR Loss of a safety system function required for protection of the public

19. [K.10] Severe missile damage to Missile impact causing severe degradation of safety safety systems systems required for unit shutdown ABOVE CSD CONDITION

20. [L.1] Earthquake GREATER THAN

• Earthquake which activates the Event Indicator on DBE levels the Strong Motion Accelerograph ABOVE CSD CONDITION AND

• Safety related systems are significantly degraded by earthquake OR AP-37.00, SEISMIC EVENT, calculations indicate horizontal motion of 0.1 5g or GREATER

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.24 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE AREA EMERGENCY CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

21. [L.6] Sustained winds in excess of Sustained winds 150 mph OR GREATER experienced design levels experienced or or projected projected ABOVE CSD CONDITION

22. 1L9] Flood or low water level above

• Flood in the James River - GREATER THAN +27 design levels feet MSL (Station operating level)

ALL CONDITIONS OR Water level in the James River LESS THAN -9 feet MSL as indicated by loss of Emergency SW Pump suction

23. [M.2] Station conditions which may Shift Manager/Station Emergency Manager judgement I warrant notification of the public near the site ALL CONDITIONS

SEP Appendix 10.8

• Page 10.8.25 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITION: GENERAL EMERGENCY CONDITIONIAPPLICABILITY INDICATION

1. [B.7] Loss of 2 of 3 fission product Any two of a), b) or c) exist and the third is imminent:

barriers with potential loss of 3rd barrier a) Fuel clad integrity failure as indicated by any of the following:

ALL CONDITIONS

.* RCS specific activity - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 300 pCigram dose equivalent 1-131 OR 5 or more core exit thermocouples reading -

GREATER THAN 1200OF OR CHRRMS (Inside) Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (RM-RMS-127, -128, -227, -

228): GREATER THAN 2x103 R/hr OR Outside Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (RM-RMS-161, -261): GREATER THAN 6.3x102 mR/hr b) Loss of RCS integrity as indicated by any of the following:

• PORV failed open OR Loss of reactor coolant c) Loss of containment integrity as indicated by any of the following:

• Containment pressure GREATER THAN 60 psia and NOT decreasing OR Release path to environment - EXISTS

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.26 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITION: GENERAL EMERGENCY CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

2. [B.8] Fuel failure with steam Any two of a), b) or c) exists and the third is imminent:

generator tube rupture a) Fuel clad integrity failure as indicated by any of the ALL CONDITIONS following:

RCS specific activity GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 300 pCVgram dose equivalent 1-131 OR 5 or more core exit thermocouples reading -

GREATER THAN 1200OF OR High Range Letdown Radiation Monitor:

1-CH-RM-1 18, 2-CH-RM-21 8:

GREATER THAN 7.0x 10 cpm b) S/G tube rupture as indicated by both of the following:

• Safety Injection - REQUIRED AND

• Steam generator tube rupture- IN PROGRESS c) Loss of Secondary integrity associated with ruptured S/G pathway as indicated by.

• Steam discharge to atmosphere OR Loss of secondary coolant outside containment -

IN PROGRESS

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.27 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITION: GENERAL EMERGENCY CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

3. [C.4] Probable large radioactivity

• Loss of reactor or secondary coolant - IN release initiated by LOCA with ECCS PROGRESS failure leading to core degradation AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• RCS specific activity - GREATER THAN 300 pCi/gram dose equivalent 1-131 OR CHRRMS (Inside) Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (RM-RMS-127, -128, -227, -228)

GREATER THAN 2x103 R/hr AND

• High or Low Head ECCS flow - NOT being delivered to the core (if expected plant conditions)

4. [C.5] Probable large radioactivity . Loss of Main Feedwater System and Condensate release initiated by loss of heat sink System leading to core degradation AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• Loss of Auxiliary Feedwater System AND

• RHR System - NOT OPERABLE

5. [C.6] Probable large radioactivity

• Reactor nuclear power after trip remains - GREATER release initiated by failure of THAN 5%

protection system to bring reactor subcritical and causing core AND degradation

• RCS pressure GREATER THAN 2485 psig and NOT ABOVE CSD CONDITION decreasing OR Containment pressure and temperature - RAPIDLY INCREASING

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.28 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITION: GENERAL EMERGENCY CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

6. [C.7] Probable large radioactivity

• Loss of all onsite and offsite AC power release initiated by loss of AC and all feedwater AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION . Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - NOT OPERABLE AND

• Restoration of either the above NOT LIKELY within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />

7. [C.8] Probable large radioactivity

• Loss of reactor or secondary coolant - IN release initiated by LOCA with loss of PROGRESS ECCS and containment cooling AND ABOVE CSD CONDITION

• High or Low Head ECCS flow NOT being delivered to the core (if expected by plant conditions)

AND

• Containment RS sump temperature GREATER THAN 190OF and NOT decreasing OR All Containment Spray and Recirculation Spray Systems - NOT OPERABLE

SEP Appendix 10.8 Page 10.8.29 Revision 47 INITIATING CONDITION: GENERAL EMERGENCY CONDITION/APPLICABILITY INDICATION

8. [D.1 ] Extremely high Containment

• Outside Containment High Range Radiation Monitor radiation, pressure and temperature (RM-RMS-1 61, -261) - GREATER THAN 3x10 3 mR/hr ABOVE CSD CONDITION OR CHRRMS (Inside) Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (RM-RMS-1 27, -128, -227, -228)

GREATER THAN 9x103 R/hr AND

• Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 45 psia AND is NOT decreasing OR Containment temperature - GREATER THAN 280° F

9. [E.1] Release imminent or in HP assessment indicates actual or projected doses at progress and site boundary doses or beyond Site Boundary - GREATER THAN 1.0 Rem projected to exceed 1.0 Rem TEDE TEDE or 5.0 Rem Thyroid CDE or 5.0 Rem Thyroid CDE ALL CONDITIONS

10. [J.1] Loss of Station physical control

• Shift Manager/Station Emergency Manager has been informed that the Security force has been neutralized I

ALL CONDITIONS by attack, resulting in loss of physical control of station OR Shift Manager/Station Emergency Manager has been informed of intrusion into one or more Vital Areas I which are occupied or controlled by an aggressor

11. [M.1] Any major internal or external Shift Manager/Station Emergency Manager judgement event which singly or in combination I

cause massive damage to station facilities or may warrant evacuation of the public ALL CONDITIONS