Inadequate Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Setpoints and Performance Issues Associated with Long MSSV Inlet PipingML031050370 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
03/12/1997 |
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From: |
Martin T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-97-009, NUDOCS 9703140143 |
Download: ML031050370 (9) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 12, 1997 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-09: INADEQUATE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE
(MSSV) SETPOINTS AND PERFORMANCE ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH LONG MSSV INLET PIPING
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert
licensees to the recent staff findings related to improper main steam safeLy valve (MSSV)
setpoints and MSSV performance issues associated with long inlet piping. It is expected that
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information
notice are not NRC requirements, therefore, no specific action or written response is
required.
Description of Circumstances
The licensee for Millstone Unit 2, a Combustion Engineering pressurized-water reactor
(PWR), reviewed the calculations used to determine MSSV setpoints to assure that peak
main steamline pressure did not exceed the allowable pressure. The licensee determined
that the calculations may be inadequate because the dynamic pressure loss between the
main steamline and the MSSVs was not modeled. This stretch of piping is not modeled in
the licensee's design-basis event transient analysis. The consideration of the dynamic
pressure drop in the piping would reduce the relieving capacity of the MSSVs. Therefore, the
omission resulted in an underprediction of the peak main steamline pressure by a relatively
significant amount and also resulted in the potential for the calculated peak pressure to
exceed 110 percent of the design pressure for the main steam system. In addition, significant dynamic pressure drops resulting from long inlet piping could cause unstable
MSSV performance.
970314014Z 3 PDe G E HOr/cE 9 o7-009 %7o3zX
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IN 97-09 March 12, 1997 Discussion
The peak main steam pressure for PWRs generally occurs when a main steam isolation
valve closure or a turbine trip is postulated. Typically, as much as 100 percent of the full
main steam flow can be relieved through the MSSVs following one of these events. These
high flowrates can create significant dynamic (i.e., frictional and acoustic) pressure drops.
At Millstone Unit 2, 8 individual code safety relief valves are attached to each of the 2 main
steamlines with approximately 6.1 m [20 feet] of 15.24-cm [6-inch] piping. The full-flow
pressure drop through this 6.1 m [20 ft] of piping could be as high as 689 kPa [100 psi]. As
a result of not modeling the stretch of piping for each MSSV, the actual discharge capacity of
the MSSVs was overpredicted and the peak main steamline pressure was underpredicted.
The relatively long stretch (approximately 6.1 m [20 feet]) of relatively small (15.24-cm
(6-inch]) piping between the main steamlines and the MSSVs contributed to the magnitude of
the underprediction of the peak pressure; however, the dynamic pressure loss from all
stretches of piping should be accounted for in the analysis. For plants that do not have long
stretches of narrow piping or have a large manifold, the MSSVs will not have as large a
pressure drop, however, the calculations may still be affected significantly depending on the
actual piping configuration in the plant.
In addition, long MSSV inlet piping may also affect the stability of the MSSVs. If dynamic
pressure drops are great enough, the valve disks may chatter because (after the valves
open) the valve inlet pressures will immediately drop below the valve reseating pressures.
Because significant excess system pressure has not been relieved,.the valves reopen and
the chattering cycle would continue.
Depending on the specific plant, this analysis can be performed by the architect engineer, the
nuclear steam supply system vendor, the fuel vendor, or the licensee. For example, the fuel
vendor may supply the transient analysis; however, the system pressure losses that are
inputs to the transient analysis are frequently provided by the architect engineer. As a result, it is important that controls are in place such that data communication across organizational
interfaces include all pressure losses in the transient analysis.
IN 97-09 March 12,1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Christopher P. Jackson, NRR Charles G. Hammer, NRR
(301) 415-2947 (301) 415-2791 E-mail: cpjenrc.gov E-mail: cghenrc.gov
Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 415-1171 E-mail: ejblnrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
K>
Attachment
IN 97-09 March 12, 1997 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
97-08 Potential Failures 03/12/97 All holders of OLs
for General Electric or CPs for nuclear
Magne-Blast Circuit power reactors
Breaker Subcomponents
97-07 Problems Identified 03/06/97 All holders of OLs
During Generic Letter or CPs for nuclear
89-10 Closeout power reactors
inspections
97-06 Weaknesses in Plant- 03/04/97 All holders of OLs
Specific Emergency or CPs for nuclear
Operating Procedures power reactors with
for Refilling the with once-through
Secondary Side of Dry steam generators
Once-Through Steam
Generators
91-85, Potential Failures of 02/27/97 All holders of OLs
Rev. 1 Thermostatic Control or CPs for nuclear
Valves or Diesel power reactors
Generator Jacket
Cooling Water
97-05 Offsite Notification 02/27/97 All holders of OLs
Capabilities or CPs for nuclear
power reactors and
test and research
reactors
97-04 Implementation of a New 02/24/97 All materials, fuel
Constraint on Radioactive cycle, and non-power
Air Effluents reactor licensees
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 97-09 March 12, 1997 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
original signed by M.M. Slosson
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Christopher P. Jackson, NRR Charles G. Hammer, NRR
(301) 415-2947 (301) 415-2791 E-mail: cpj@nrc.gov E-mail: cghenrc.gov
Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 415-1171 E-mail: ejbl@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:IEJB1\SRV.IN *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
Tech Editor has concurred on 12/3/96 To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: C"' u Copy without enclosures "E"- Copy with enclosures "N" u No copy
OFFICE
CONTACT
S I AC:C/SRXB C:PECB I D:DRPM I
NAME . CJackson* TCollins* AChaffee* TMartin
GHammer*~fC I
EBenner* _
DATE 12/9/10/11/96 12/12/96 01/16/97 103/t7/97 OFFICIA7L RECORD COPY
IN 97-XX
January , 1997 At Millstone Unit 2, 8 individual code safety relief valves are attached to each of the 2 main
steamlines with approximately 6.1 m [20 feet] of 15.24-cm [6-inch] piping. The full-flow
pressure drop through this 6.1 m [20 ft] of piping could be as high as 689 kPa [100 psi]. As
a result of not modeling the stretch of piping for each MSSV, the actual discharge capacity of
the MSSVs was overpredicted and the peak main steamline pressure was underpredicted.
The relatively long stretch (approximately 6.1 m [20 feet]) of relatively small (15.24-cm
[6-inch]) piping between the main steamlines and the MSSVs contributed to the magnitude of
the underprediction of the peak pressure; however, the dynamic pressure loss from all
stretches of piping should be accounted for in the analysis. For plants that do not have long
stretches of narrow piping or have a large manifold, the MSSVs will not have as large a
pressure drop, however, the calculations may still be affected significantly depending on the
actual piping configuration in the plant.
In addition, long MSSV inlet piping may also affect the stability of the MSSVs. If dynamic
pressure drops are great enough, the valve disks may chatter because (after the valves
open) the valve inlet pressures will immediately drop below the valve reseating pressures.
Because significant excess system pressure has not been relieved, the valves reopen and
the chattering cycle would continue.
Depending on the specific plant, this analysis can be performed by the architect engineer, the
nuclear steam supply system vendor, the fuel vendor, or the licensee. For example, the fuel
vendor may supply the transient analysis; however, the system pressure losses that are
inputs to the transient analysis are frequently provided by the architect engineer. As a result, it is important that controls are in place such that data communication across organizational
interfaces include all pressure losses in the transient analysis.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Christopher P. Jackson, NRR Charles G. Hammer, NRR
(301) 415-2947 (301) 415-2791 E-mail: cpjpnrc.gov E-mail: cgh@nrc.gov
Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 415-1171 E-mail: ejbl@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\EJB1\SRV.IN *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: "Vc- Copy without enclosures "E - Copy with enclosures "N" u No copy
OFFICE
CONTACT
S :CSRXB T:PECB D:DRPM AA
NAME CJackson* TCollins* AChaffee* TMart
Gl-ammer*\ I
EBenner* _ _97 _
DATE 12/9/10/11/96 12/12/96 01/16/97 XI/ /97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
M4WI :1/if
IN 97-XX
January , 1997 At Millstone Unit 2, 8 individual code safety relief valves are attached to each of the 2 main
steamlines with approximately 20 feet of 6-inch piping. The full-flow pressure drop
through this 20 feet of piping could be as high as 100 psi. As a result of not modeling the
stretch of piping for each MSSV, the actual discharge capacity of the MSSVs was
overpredicted and the peak main steamline pressure was underpredicted. The relatively long
stretch (approximately 20 feet) of relatively small (6-inch) piping between the main steamlines
and the MSSVs contributed to the magnitude of the underprediction of the peak pressure;
however, the dynamic pressure loss from all stretches of piping should be accounted for in
the analysis. For plants that do not have long stretches of narrow piping or have a large
manifold, the MSSVs will not have as large a pressure drop, however, the calculations rnay
still be affected significantly depending on the actual piping configuration in the plant.
In addition, long MSSV inlet piping may also affect the stability of the MSSVs. If dynamic
pressure drops are great enough, the valve disks may chatter because (after the valves
open) the valve inlet pressures will immediately drop below the valve reseating pressures.
Because significant excess system pressure has not been relieved, the valves reopen and
the chattering cycle would continue.
At Millstone Unit 2, the transient analysis is currently performed by Siemens. Depending on
the specific plant, this analysis can be performed by the architect engineer, the nuclear steam
supply system vendor, the fuel vendor, or the licensee. For example, the fuel vendor may
supply the transient analysis; however, the system pressure losses that are inputs to the
transient analysis are frequently provided by the architect engineer. As a result, i is
important that controls are in place such that data communication across organizational
interfaces include all pressure losses in the transient analysis.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Christopher P. Jackson, NRR Charles G. Hammer, NRR
(301) 415-2947 (301) 415-2791 E-mail: cpj@nrc.gov E-mail: cgh@nrc.gov
Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 415-1171 E-mail: ejbl@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:XEJBISRV.IN *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: *C u Copy without enclosures "E" a Copy with enclosures "N"
OFFICE
CONTACT
S AC:C/SRXB I
C:PECBll Z D: DRPM
FI
NAME Cackson* TCollins* AChaff~e TMartin
GHammer*
EBenner* l _ _ _
DATE 12/9/10/11/96 12/12/96 /7 /96 12/ /96 OFFICIAL RECORD C / / 1
IN 96-XX
December XX, 1996 through this 20 feet of piping could be as high as 100 psi. As a result of not modeling the
stretch of piping for each MSSV, the actual discharge capacity of the MSSVs was
overpredicted and the peak main steamline pressure was underpredicted. The relatively long
stretch (approximately 20 feet) of relatively small (6-inch) piping between the main steamlines
and the MSSVs contributed to the magnitude of the underprediction of the peak pressure;
however, the dynamic pressure loss from all stretches of piping should be accounted for in
the analysis. For plants that do not have long stretches of narrow piping or have a large
manifold, the MSSVs will not have as large a pressure drop, however, the calculations may
still be affected significantly depending on the actual piping configuration in the plant.
In addition, long MSSV inlet piping may also affect the stability of the MSSVs. If dynamic
pressure drops are great enough, the valve disks may chatter because (after the valves
open) the valve inlet pressures will immediately drop below the valve reseating pressures.
Because significant excess system pressure has not been relieved, the valves reopen and
the chattering cycle would continue.
At Millstone Unit 2, the transient analysis is currently performed by Siemens. Depending on
the specific plant, this analysis can be performed by the architect engineer, the nuclear steam
supply system vendor, the fuel vendor, or the licensee. For example, the fuel vendor may
supply the transient analysis; however, the system pressure losses that are inputs to the
transient analysis are frequently provided by the architect engineer. As a result, it is
important that controls are in place such that data communication across organizational
interfaces include all pressure losses in the transient analysis.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any
questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts
listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Christopher P. Jackson, NRR Charles G. Hammer, NRR
(301) 415-2947 (301) 415-2791 E-mail: cpj@nrc.gov E-mail: cgh@nrc.gov
Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 415-1171 E-mail: ejbl@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\EJB1\SRV.IN *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'I' = Copy without enclosures "E" a Copy with enclosures "N" - No copy
OFFICE
CONTACT
S I AC:C/SRXB lC Z:PECB D:DRPM
NAME CJackson* TCollins* AChaffee TMartin
GHallmmer*
EBenner* _
DATE 12/9/10/11/96 12/12/96 112 /96 O /12/ /96 UVtMAL KtLUKU LUFT 'I\:
N
K..-' < IN 96-XX
December XX, 1996 each MSSV, the actual discharge capacity of the MSSVs was overpredicted and
the peak main steamline pressure was underpredicted. The relatively long
stretch (approximately 20 feet) of relatively small (less than 6-inch) piping
between the main steamlines and the MSSVs contributed to the magnitude of th
underprediction of the peak pressure, however, the dynamic pressure loss om
all stretches of piping should be accounted for in the analysis. For p nts
that do not have long stretches of narrow piping or have a large mani ld, the
MSSVs will not have as large a pressure drop, however, the calculatons may
still be affected significantly depending on the actual piping co iguration
in the plant.
In addition, long MSSV inlet piping may also affect the sta ity of the
MSSVs. If dynamic pressure drops are great enough, the v ye disk may chatter
because after the valves open, the valve pressure will i ediately drop below
the valve reseating pressures. Because significant ex ss system pressure has
not been relieved, the valves reopen and the chatteri g cycle would continue.
At Millstone Unit 2, the transient analysis is cur ntly performed by Siemens;
however, the responsibility for this type of ana sis is not always clearly
defined. Depending on the specific plant, this analysis can be performed by
the architect engineer, the nuclear steam sup y system vendor, the fuel
vendor, or the licensee. For example, the f el vendor may supply the
transient analysis; however, the system pr sure losses that are inputs to the
transient analysis are frequently provide by the architect engineer. As a
result, it is important to include all essure losses in the transient
analysis.
This information notice requires no pecific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the i formation in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts lised below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR project manager.
Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: C istopher P. Jackson. NRR Charles G. Hammer, NRR
01) 415-2947 (301) 415-2791 Internet: cpj@nrc.gov Internet: cgh@nrc.gov
Eric J. Benner, NRR
(301) 415-1171 Internet: ejbl@nrc.gov
Attachment: ist of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\ JB1\SRV.IN Q5 lul Ayz
To recelve a copy of th document, Indicate In the box: "C' - Copy without enclosures "E" - Copy with enclosures "N"u No copy
OFFICE CONT T AC:C/SRXB I C:PECB lI D:DRPM
NAME CJa son (e i TCollinn AChaffee TMartin
Rudessin GHminer t 4 ..kt/
-(-t )
lDATE r 12//961//
JLPATE'121 /96v - ' 12/t&/96 1121 /96 1121 /96 1121 /96 t A4k I' UFFICIAL KLLUKRLUPY
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list | - Information Notice 1997-01, Improper Electrical Grounding Results in Simultaneous Fires in the Control Room and the Safe-Shutdown Equipment Room (8 January 1997, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Emergency Lighting)
- Information Notice 1997-02, Cracks Found in Jet Pump Riser Assembly Elbows at Boiling Water Reactors (6 February 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-03, Defacing of Labels to Comply with 10 CFR 20.1904(b) (20 February 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-04, Implementation of a New Constraint on Radioactive Air Effluents (24 February 1997, Topic: Backfit)
- Information Notice 1997-05, Offsite Notification Capabilities (27 February 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-06, Weaknesses in Plant-Specific Emergency Operating Procedures for Refilling the Secondary Side of Dry Once-Through Steam Generators (4 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-07, Problems Identified During Generic Letter 89-10 Closeout Inspections (6 March 1997, Topic: Hot Short, Safe Shutdown, Weak link)
- Information Notice 1997-08, Potential Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Subcomponents (12 March 1997, Topic: Coatings, Weak link)
- Information Notice 1997-09, Inadequate Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Setpoints and Performance Issues Associated with Long MSSV Inlet Piping (12 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-10, Liner Plate Corrosion in Concrete Containments (13 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-11, Cement Erosion from Containment Subfoundations at Nuclear Power Plants (21 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-12, Potential Armature Binding in General Electric Type Hga Relays (24 March 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-13, Deficient Conditions Associated with Protective Coatings at Nuclear Power Plants (24 March 1997, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-14, Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (28 March 1997, Topic: Time to boil, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-15, Reporting of Errors and Changes in Large-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Models of Fuel Vendors and Compliance with 10 CFR 50. 46(a)(3) (4 April 1997, Topic: Coatings, Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1997-16, Preconditioning of Plant Structures, Systems, and Components Before ASME Code Inservice Testing or Technical Specification Surveillance Testing (4 April 1997, Topic: Stroke time, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-17, Cracking of Vertical Welds in the Core Shroud and Degraded Repair (4 April 1997, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1997-18, Problems Identified During Maintenance Rule Baseline Inspections (14 April 1997, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Coatings, Emergency Lighting)
- Information Notice 1997-19, Safety Injection System Weld Flaw at Sequcyah Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 (18 April 1997, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1997-20, Identification of Certain Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinders That Do Not Comply with ANSI N14.1 Fabrication Standards (17 April 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-21, Availability of Alternate AC Power Source Designed for Station Blackout Event (18 April 1997, Topic: Main transformer failure)
- Information Notice 1997-22, Failure of Welded-Steel Moment Resisting Frames During Northridge Earthquake (25 April 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-23, Evaluation and Reporting of Fires and Unplanned Chemical Reaction Events at Fuel Cycle Facilities (7 May 1997, Topic: Earthquake, Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-24, Failure of Packing Nuts on One-Inch Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinder Valves (8 May 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-25, Dynamic Range Uncertainties in the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation (9 May 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-26, Degradation in Small-Radius U-Bend Regions of Steam Generator Tubes (19 May 1997, Topic: Eddy Current Testing, Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-27, Effect of Incorrect Strainer Pressure Drop on Available Net Positive Suction Head (16 May 1997, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1997-28, Elimination of Instrument Response Time Testing Under the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 (30 May 1997, Topic: Enforcement Discretion)
- Information Notice 1997-29, Containment Inspection Rule (30 May 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-30, Control of Licensed Material During Reorganizations, Employee-Management Disagreements, and Financial Crises (3 June 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-31, Failures of Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barriers and Check Valves in Foreign Plants (3 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-32, Defective Worm Shaft Clutch Gears in Limitorque Motor-Operated Valve Actuators (10 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-33, Unanticipated Effect of Ventilation System on Tank Level Indications and Engineering Safety Features Actuation System Setpoint (11 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-34, Deficiencies in Licensee Submittals Regarding Terminology for Radiological Emergency Action Levels in Accordance with the New Part 20 (12 June 1997, Topic: Deep Dose Equivalent)
- Information Notice 1997-34, Deficiencies in Licensee Submittals Regarding Terminology for Radiological Emergency Action Levels In Accordance with the New Part 20 (12 June 1997, Topic: Deep Dose Equivalent)
- Information Notice 1997-35, Retrofit to Industrial Nuclear Company (Inc) IR100 Radiography Camera to Correct Inconsistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility (18 June 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-35, Retrofit to Industrial Nuclear Company (INC) Ir100 Radiography Camera to Correct Inconsistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility (18 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-36, Unplanned Intakes by Worker of Transuranic Airborne Radioactive Materials and External Exposure Due to Inadequate Control of Work (20 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-37, Main Transformer Fault with Ensuing Oil Spill Into Turbine Building (20 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-38, Level-Sensing System Initiates Common-Mode Faulure of High-Pressure-Injection Pumps (24 June 1997, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1997-39, Inadequate 10 CFR 72.48 Safety Evaluations of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (26 June 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-40, Potential Nitrogen Accumulation Resulting from Backleakage from Safety Injection Tanks (26 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-41, Revised - Potentially Undersized Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Oil Coolers (27 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-42, Management Weaknesses Resulting in Failure to Comply with Shipping Requirements for Special Nuclear Material (27 June 1997, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1997-43, License Condition Compliance (1 July 1997, Topic: Ultimate heat sink)
- Information Notice 1997-44, Failures of Gamma Metrics Wide-Range Linear Neutron Flux Channels (1 July 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-45, Environmental Qualification Deficiency for Cables & Containment Penetration Pigtails (2 July 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-46, Unisolable Crack in High-Pressure Injection Piping (9 July 1997, Topic: Flow Induced Vibration)
- Information Notice 1997-47, Inadequate Puncture Tests for Type B Packages Under 10 CFR 71.73(c)(3) (27 June 1997)
- Information Notice 1997-48, Inadequate or Inappropriate Interim Fire Protection Compensatory Measures (9 July 1997, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Unanalyzed Condition, Fire Barrier, Emergency Lighting, Continuous fire watch, Fire Protection Program, Fire Watch)
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