ML030690172
| ML030690172 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/2003 |
| From: | Meserve R NRC/Chairman, NRC/OCM |
| To: | Tschiltz M Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0143 | |
| Download: ML030690172 (7) | |
Text
rlcas itz:jResponsl t Page From: Richard Meserve To: Tschiltz, Michael Date: 1/7/03 7:17PM
Subject:
Response to IG I attach my draft. I will probably work on this some more tonight. RAM
SMihae Tshilz -Dais Bse IG r.eport.wpd, MichaelTschUtz-Davis reporLwpd BesseIS Page Draft January 7, 2003 P:\Davis Besse IG report.wpd MEMORANDUM TO: Hubert T. Bell Inspector General From: Richard A. Meserve Chairman
Subject:
Event Inquiry into NRC Regulation of Davis-Besse (Case No.02-03S)
I am responding on behalf of the Commission to your report of December 30, 2002, regarding the staff's decision not to issue a shutdown order for Davis-Besse in connection with the inspections of possible cracks in the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzles. The report includes a five specific findings with regard to the staff's action. I conclude that one of these findings is correct in part, but that the others are unjustified or are misleading.
There are several failings in the report. First, and perhaps most important, the report incorrectly indicates that the decision to allow the brief period of continued operation was driven in large part by the interest in reducing the financial impact on the licensee. Report, 23.
Assuring the public health and safety is the highest priority of the NRC. In this case, the underlying inspections of all pressurized water reactors were undertaken as a result of staff safety concerns about circumferential nozzle cracking. And, as your report has found, the NRC staff allowed the Davis-Besse reactor to continue to operate only after the relevant expert staff reached unanimous agreement that there was no significant safety concern relating to nozzle cracks that would preclude the brief period of extended operation. Report, 13. It is a significant failing that the report does not acknowledge this fact in its findings.
Second, the report is deficient in failing in failing to represent accurately the context for the staff's action. The report seems premised on the notion that December 31 -- the target date for completion of inspections -- was an inflexible deadline. As the report acknowledges, that date was articulated in Bulletin 2001-01. Report, xx. But the report fails to acknowledge that the Bulletin explicitly stated that if licensees at highly susceptible plants (like Davis-Besse) did not intend to perform inspections by that date, those licensees should provide their basis for concluding that the regulatory requirements discussed in the Bulletin would continue to be met until the inspections were performed. Bulletin 2001-01, 8. The licensee for Davis-Besse provided information that, in conjunction with the independent analysis conducted by the staff, was seen to justify an alternative, slightly delayed, inspection. I note that your inquiry did not question, or in any way evaluate, the licensee information that was provided to the staff. In any event, the staff's action in this case was fully consistent with the Bulletin.
Third, the report fails to acknowledge that the technical judgment of the staff concerning the extent of axial and circumferential cracking of the CRDM nozzles was determined to be correct. Specifically, the size and type of cracking in the CRDM nozzles that were found during the plant inspections were within the range predicted by the staff and none posed an immediate safety hazard. The inspection served to validate the staff's conclusion that the likelihood of a CRDM nozzle ejection due to circumferential cracking during the period of operation from December 31, 2001, to February 16, 2002, was acceptably small. The report is deficient because it fails even to mention the fact that the staff's technical judgment was right.
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Fourth, the report's distortions are particularly unfortunate because it should have been anticipated that the report would be read in the context of the unexpected head corrosion at the Davis-Besse plant. As you know, the NRC has itself been highly self-critical in connection with the programmatic shortcomings in connection with the head corrosion. The NRC has prepared an extensive lessons-learned report to examine that matter and to ensure that all issues relating to the head-corrosion matter are forthrightly addressed and corrected.' But, in my view, it is unfair to criticize the staff for its decision to allow a brief period of extended operation before inspection of the nozzles. The staff did not know about the head corrosion at the time of that decision and, quite frankly, it is Monday-morning quarterbacking to examine that decision in the false light of subsequent knowledge.
Finally, the report makes much of the fact that the staff prepared a draft shutdown order for Davis-Besse. At various points, the report cites the draft order as ifit reflected the staff's final analysis. Report, 18, 19, 24. Infact, during the relevant period, the staff maintained a continuing dialog with senior NRC officials, the Commissioners and their staff, on all aspects of the situation in connection with the Davis-Besse plant. As stated in the transmittal memorandum of November 21, 2001, that forwarded the draft shutdown order, and as was made clear in discussions with myself and my colleagues on the Commission, the staff was continuing to engage the licensee in discussions and was open to reviewing new and relevant information that might justify operation beyond December 31, just as the Bulletin 2001-01 contemplated. Inshort, the staff was preparing an order in the event that one proved to be necessary. Although the licensee initially planned operation until March 31, 2002, it ultimately agreed to shutdown by February 16, subject to certain compensatory measures. The staff's acceptance of this proposal was fully consistent with the Bulletin and made the issuance of the order unnecessary. It is unfair to use the staff's preparations for a situation that did not occur as evidence that the staff's actions were somehow improper.
In sum, I believe that the report is seriously misleading and unfair. My response to the five specific findings is provided in the attachment.
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Response to IG Findings IG Finding 1.
During its review of the potential hazardous condition at Davis-Besse, the NRC staff considered the financial impact to the licensee of an unscheduled plant shutdown. This is in keeping with one of NRC's performance goals established to support agency strategic goals - which is the reduction of unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees. However, the goal of NRC Bulletin 2001-01 was, in the interest of public health and safety, to have plants that were identified as being highly susceptible to vessel head penetration nozzle cracking perform inspections by December 31, 2001, to confirm the structural integrity of the nozzles with the intent to avoid a possible control rod drive mechanism nozzle ejection and possible loss-of-coolant accident. The fact that FENOC sought and staff allowed Davis-Besse to operate past December 31, 2001, without performing these inspections was driven in large part by a desire to lessen the financial impact on FENOC that would result from an early shutdown. Consequently, while the decision by the staff to allow Davis-Besse to continue to operate was in keeping with the NRC performance goal to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, it was contrary to the goal of NRC Bulletin 2001-01 to have at-risk plants conduct timely inspections to ensure NRC regulatory requirements related to reactor coolant leakage were met.
Response to Finding 1.
This finding is incorrect. The NRC's primary obligation is to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Only if this goal is satisfied, is there consideration of other goals, such as the goal to avoid undue regulatory burden.
The finding indicates that the NRC staff's decision to allow operation through February 1 6 th was driven in large part by economic concerns. But this is not what happened. The report elsewhere states that "NRR staff reached unanimous agreement.., that there was no significant safety concern that would preclude continued operation until [February 16]." Report,
- 13. Guided by this unanimous conclusion that safety was not compromised, the staff agreed to allow continued operation. Because safety considerations did not require an immediate shutdown, it was appropriate for the staff to consider other policy goals in making a decision as to whether to allow a brief extension. The implication in the finding that there was a clash of conflicting goals and that safety was subordinated to economic considerations is unfair.
Finding 2.
NRC Bulletin 2001-01, dated August 3, 2001, advised that inspections by Deceml~er 31, 2001, would be an appropriate way to handle plants identified as having experienced or being highly susceptible to vessel head penetration nozzle cracking. This date was not rooted in scientific analysis but was viewed by the staff as practical in that it would allow a 5-month window for plants to either perform the inspections during already-scheduled outages or to plan for and conduct an unscheduled outage. However, when questioned about the importance of that particular date, NRC staff were called to justify why December 31, 2001, was any more safety significant than any other date, e.g., January 1,
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- Page 2002. As a result, NRR staff found themselves unsuccessfully trying to defend the December 31, 2001, date even though the NRR Director stated that adequate protection of the public health and safety could not be assured without performing the inspections at Davis-Besse.
Response to Finding 2.
This finding is misleading. The finding criticizes the staff for addressing the issue that was presented to it. The issue was not whether inspections would be performed at Davis-Besse; by order or by agreement, the inspections were going to be performed. Rather, the issue was whether December 31 should be required as a deadline or whether instead some later date would be acceptable. Although the report fails to acknowledge the fact, Bulletin 2001-01 included allowance for licensees to provide a safety justification for operation beyond December 31, 2001. In this case, the licensee provided such a safety justification and the expert staff reached a unanimous agreement that there was no significant safety concern that would preclude continued operation until February 16. The staff should not be criticized for exercising reasonable judgment consistent with the Bulletin -- judgment that subsequent inspection showed to be correct.
Finding 3.
NRC appears to have informally established an unreasonably high burden of requiring absolute proof of a safety problem, versus lack of reasonable assurance of maintaining public health and safety, before it will act to shut down a power plant. The staff articulated this standard to OIG as a rationale for allowing Davis-Besse to operate until February 16, 2002, even in light of information that strongly indicated Davis-Besse was not in compliance with NRC regulations and plant technical specifications and may have operated with reduced safety margins.
Response to Finding 3.
The report does not provide a basis for this finding and, in any event, the finding is incorrect.
The NRC staff's actions in issuing Bulletin 2001-01, in crafting the draft order, and in considering the licensee's safety arguments for operation beyond December 31, 2001, were clearly and appropriately focused on maintaining reasonable assurance of public health and safety. I have no doubt that the order would have been issued on this basis if the licensee had not provided sufficient safety justification for an alternate inspection date. , The issuance of an order on this basis does not require absolute proof. Indeed, it would be completely nonsensical to require absolute proof of the existence of a problem as the predicate for an inspection to assess the possible existence of a problem.
The finding may be result of OIG confusion about the basis for the order. The staff acknowledges it could not construct the shutdown order based on a violation of technical specification unless there was known leakage from the primary reactor coolant system boundary. But this was not the basis on which the staff contemplated proceeding.
In any event, the likelihood that minor CRDM cracking was present should not be
Michael Tschiltz - Davis Besse IG reporwpd . Pg confused with the conclusion that the Davis-Besse was unsafe to operate for an additional short period. The staff's safety evaluation concluded that the likelihood of an accident due to CRDM nozzle ejection during the period of operation from December 31, 2001, to February 16, 2002, was acceptably small, assuming predicted types and sizes of CRDM cracking. These predictions were determined to be correct, as shown by the inspections conducted during the shutdown of Davis Besse in early 2002.
Finding 4.
On November 21, 2001, the NRR Director forwarded a draft shutdown order for Davis-Besse through the EDO to the NRC Commission for its information.
However, contrary to the strong justification presented in the order, the NRR Director told OIG he never intended to actually issue the order because he lacked a regulatory basis. OIG learned that the order was concurred in by all cognizant NRC staff to include the EDO and the Office of General Counsel, and OIG learned of no concerns by the staff that the NRC lacked a basis to issue the order.
Response to Finding 4.
The finding appears to based in large part on the assertion that the NRR Director told OIG that "from a legal point of view, there was an issue about constructing an order without knowing with certainty that there were cracks." Report, 19. I am informed that no senior member of the staff recalls that the NRR Director raised the doubts that are attributed to him in the report. In fact, all of the relevant senior agency management (as well as the Commission) understood that, if the licensee could not justify an alternate inspection date, a regulatory foundation for ordering the plat to shutdown clearly existed, and that such an order would have issued.
Finding 5.
NRC staff developed a well-documented technical basis for preparing an order to shut down Davis-Besse, and on November 21, 2001, the EDO informed the NRC Commission of the intent of the NRR Director to shut down the plant on or before December 31, 2001. However, contrary to the strong justification presented in the order, the NRR Director did not force a shutdown. Instead, on November 29, 2001, the NRR Director concluded that FENOC could safely operate Davis-Besse until February 16, 2002, provided the licensee implemented several compensatory measures it had developed. OIG found that, in reaching this decision in November 2001, NRR lacked a full understanding of those compensatory measure, and the NRR staff did not document its analytical bases and conclusions that supported its decision.
Response to Finding 5.
1agree with this finding, but only in part.
I agree that the staff should have documented the basis for the decision at an earlier stage and should have assured that there was mutual, detailed understanding of the '
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compensatory measures. I have asked the EDO to ensure that these oversights do not arise again.
Nonetheless, the finding is still somewhat misleading. First, as noted above, the finding fails to recognize that Bulletin 2001-01 provided that an alternate inspection schedule would be considered by the staff if an adequate safety rationale could be provided. At every stage, the order was understood to reflect an action that would be taken if an adequate rationale for an alternative date was not provided. Second, the finding fails to mention that the staff did publish the details of its safety evaluation and did document the basis on which the staff accepted an alternative inspection schedule (albeit belatedly). 2 The finding thus conflicts with the facts, as acknowledged elsewhere in the report. Report, xx. Third, while there was an initial misunderstanding with regard to one of the compensatory measures proposed by the licensee (the use of an additional dedicated control room operator), this issue was quickly resolved and the control room coverage that was anticipated by the staff was in fact promptly implemented.
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