ML023090415
| ML023090415 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/2002 |
| From: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML023090415 (194) | |
Text
PROCEDURE AND INSTRUCTION CONTROL TRANSMITTAL/RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT (TRA)
PAGE 01 OF 01 TO:
- SMITH, J.D.
HOLDER #:
001741 DCRM SQNP ADDRESS: OPS 4C-SQN TRANSMITTAL NO: 020005420 TRANSMITTAL DATE: 06/24/02 SEE ATTACHED FILING INSTRUCTIONS INFORMATION ONLY DCRM (D)
MANUAL SQNP STATUS:
FPR ACTIVE DOCUMENT NUMBER FPR IC#COVERSHEET CORRECTION COPY #
001 REV REV DATE LEVEL 061902 12 AS THE ASSIGNED DOCUMENT HOLDER FOR THE ABOVE CONTROLLED COPY NUMBER, YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR FILING AND FOR MAINTAINING THESE DOCUMENTS.
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS NOT REQUIRED.
TVA 40183CNP 5/90) 11lii1i II1 II H l1111 111111l1I 111111111111111 III SQNPO200 05420 ONP DDSBPO1l
TVAN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT APPROVAL PAGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Revision No.
12 Effective Date:
06/19/2002 Revision Sponsor:
SE-M/N Brenda Simril urganlzakJon ame Change Approval Action Type of Impacts Action Complete REF Organization Needed?
Action (see note 1)
(Name / Signature)
Date I
SE - M/N N/A Change Initiator N/A 8 F. SIMRIL SEEAUDIT 3/12/2002 TRAIL SE - M/N Program YS Yes [
BRENDA SIMRIL SEEAUDIT 312112002 2
OwnerYes T & I Review TRAIL SE - EE Program Yes Reviews 2 Yes E]
R. L. TRAVIS SEE AUDIT 3119/2002 Owner No 0
TRAIL 2
Yes El D. PORTER SEE AUDIT 3/13/2002 OPS Procedures Yes T & I Reviews No 0 TRAIL PrOPSte Yes T & I Reviews2 Yes E-- D.C. JOHNSON -SEEAUDIT 3/19/2002 5_Protection
-No TRAIL 6
OPS FP System Yes T & I Reviews 2 Yes_-[V R. C. EGU SEEAUDIT __3120/2002 Engineer No Z..
TRAIL OPS FP System Note 4 T & I Reviews 2 Yes Z S FRAZIER SEEAUDIT 3114/2002 Engineer No
[]-
TRAIL 8
N/A Note 3 Impact Review Yes NI___-----A N/A No El N.A N/
PORC Chairman E.E. FREEMAN SEE AUDIT 6/13X2002 (Meeting #6052)
Yes Approval N/A TRAIL Plant Manager E.E. FREEMAN
- SEE AUDIT 6/21/02 10 PlantManagerYes Approval N/A FOR D. KOEHL TRAIL Record any impacts of the FPR change on form FPDP-3-2, TVAN FPR Revision Impacts Technical review of the FPR change and also impact review if change is outside the design change process.
Additional impact reviews - as determined needed by sponsor or technical reviewers. N/A rows not needed.
If more than one system/system engineer is affected by the change.
FPDP-3-1 [07-25-2001]
1o.
- 2.
- 3.
4.
TVA 40706 [07-20011]
Page I of 1
STATUS:
ACTIVE IC#COVERSHEET CORRECTION COPY #
001 AS THE ASSIGNED DOCUMENT HOLDER FOR THE ABOVE CONTROLLED COPY NUMBER, YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR FILING AND FOR MAINTAINING THESE DOCUMENTS.
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS NOT REQUIRED.
TVA 40183(NP 5/90) liii 11111111111 1llJ SQNP020005559 ONP PROCEDURE AND INSTRUCTION CONTROL DDSBP11 TRANSMITTAL/RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT (TRA)
PAGE 01 OF 01 TO: SMITH, J.D.
HOLDER #:
00174i DCRM SQNP ADDRESS:
OPS 4C-SQN TRANSMITTAL NO: 020005559 TRANSMITTAL DATE: 06/27/02 SEE ATTACHED FILING INSTRUCTIONS INFORMATION ONLY DCRM DOCUMENT REV REV CD)
MANUAL NUMBER DATE LEVEL SQNP FPR FPR 062102 12
TVAN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT APPROVAL PAGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Revision No.
12 Effective Date:
06/21/2002 Revision Sponsor:
SE-M/N Brenda Simril u*garnzatnioIn -
am79 e
Change Approval Action Type of Impacts Action Complete Organization Needed?
Action (see note 1)
(Name I Signature)
Date 1
SE - M/N N/A Change Initiator N/A B.F. SIMRIL SEEAUDIT 3/12/2002 TRAIL SE - M/N Program ws3 Yes 5 BRENDA SIMRIL SEEAUDIT 3/21/2002 2
OwnerYes T & I Revie TRAIL SE - EE Program Yes T & 'Reviews 2 Yes 5 R. L TRAVIS SEEAUDIT 3/19/2002 Owner No
[
TRAIL Yes T & I 2
Yes D
D. PORTER SEEAUDIT 3113/2002 Procedures Reviews No
[
TRAIL OPS Fire ws2 Yes 5 D. C. JOHNSON SEEAUDIT 3119/2002 Protection Yes T & I Revie No
[
TRAIL 6
OPS FP System Yes T & I Reviews2 Yes 5 R. C. EGU SEE AUDIT 3/20/2002 Engineer Yes No
[
& I Reviews2 Yes [
S. FRAZIER SEEAUDIT 3114/2002 Engineer Note_4_T__I_____
No
[
TRAIL 8
N/A Note 3 Impact Review YesN NIA No E
N/A N/A PORC Chairman E.E. FREEMAN SEE AUDIT 6113/2002 9
(Meeting #6052)
Approval N/A TRAIL 10 Plant Manager Yes Approval N/A E.E FREEMAN SEE AUDIT 6/21/02 10 _PantManager YesApproval NA_
FOR D. KOEHL TRAIL
- 2.
- 3.
4.
Record any impacts of the FPR change on form FPDP-3-2, TVAN FPR Revision Impacts Technical review of the FPR change and also impact review if change is outside the design change process.
Additional impact reviews - as determined needed by sponsor or technical reviewers. N/A rows not needed.
If more than one system/system engineer is affected by the change.
FPDP-3-1 [07-25-2001]
TVA 40706 [07-20011 Page 1 of I
PROCEDURE AND INSTRUCTION CONTROL TRANSMITTAL/RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT (TRA)
PAGE 01 OF 01 TO: SMITH, J.D.
HOLDER #:
001741 DCRM SQNP ADDRESS: OPS 4C-SQN TRANSMITTAL NO: 020005054 TRANSMITTAL DATE: 06/19/02 SEE ATTACHED FILING INSTRUCTIONS INFORMATION ONLY DCRM (D)
MANUAL SQNP FPR STATUS:
ACTIVE DOCUMENT NUMBER FPR IC#COVERSHEET, R12 06/19/02 IC#PART-IV, R2 06/19/02 IC#REV LOG, R12 06/19/02 COPY #
001 REV REV DATE LEVEL 061902 12 IC#PART-III, RlI 06/19/02 IC#PART-V, RII 06/19/02 IC#TOC, R12 06/19/02 AS THE ASSIGNED DOCUMENT HOLDER FOR THE ABOVE CONTROLLED COPY NUMBER, YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR FILING AND FOR MAINTAINING THESE DOCUMENTS.
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS NOT REQUIRED.
TVA 40183(NP 5/90)
I 1111111H111 IIIIII I 1 II 11111111 l]
II iii II IIIIIIIII {I iii SQNP0200005054 ONP DDSBPO11
FILING INSTRUCTIONS PROCEDURE NUMBER FIRE PROTECTION REPORT REVISION 12 REMOVE INSERT COVER SHEET REV 11 COVER SHEET REV 12 REV LOG REV 11 REV LOG REV 12 TOC REV 11 TOC REV 12 PART-Ill REV 10 PART-IlI REV 11 PART-IV REV I PART-IV REV 2 PART-V REV 10 PART-V REV 11
TVAN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT APPROVAL PAGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Revision No.
12 Effective Date:
06/19/2002 Revision Sponsor:
SE-MIN Brenda Simril Organhzation Name Change Approval Action Type of Impacts Action Complete REF Organization Needed?
Action (see note 1)
(Name I Signature)
Date 1
SE - MIN N/A Change Initiator NIA J.J. Pierce 9.9. ;P4,,.
3/1212002 2
SE - M/N Program Yes T & I Reviews 3 Yes El Owner No 3
SE - EE Program Yes T & I Reviews 2 Yesfl Owner No 0_
4 OPS Procedures Yes T & I Reviews 2 Yes 0l No 0]
5 OPS Fire Yes T & I Reviews 2 Yes Ii Protection NoYIe 6
OPS FP System Yes T & I Reviews 2 Yes El Engineer No 0 7
OPS FP System Note 4 T & I Reviews 2 YesO Engineer NoN&R 8
N/A Note 3 Impact Review Yes 0N Nofl N/A N/A N/A 9
PORC Chairman Yes Approval N/A 10 Plant Manager Yes Approval N/A
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
4.
Record any impacts of the FPR change on form FPDP-3-2, TVAN FPR Revision Impacts Technical review of the FPR change and also impact review if change is outside the design change process.
Additional impact reviews - as determined needed by sponsor or technical reviewers. N/A rows not needed.
If more than one system/system engineer is affected by the change TVA 40706 [07-20011 Page 1 of I FPDP-3-1 [07-25-2001]
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT REVISION LOGT K1) Revision No.
DESCRIPTION OF REVISION 0
Initial Issue 8/23/96 Revision 1 to the Fire Protection Report (FPR) is a complete revision of the 11/19/98 document. The previously issued change packages (FPR-01-1 thru -13) have all been incorporated and interfiled with this revision. These change packages have been approved by PORC independently. Besides minor editorial changes (e.g.,
correction of typographical errors, clarification of wording, etc.), the only new change to the FPR is to Part II, Section 14, in which the surveillance requirements (SR) for hose station inspections and valve position verification of valves in the Reactor Buildings have been revised. Also, a new SR has been added for valve actuation of hose station standpipe valves.
All significant changes made by Revision 1 (e.g., change package revisions, the above mentioned surveillance requirements, etc.) are designated by revision bars.
2 Revision 2 to the FPR is to incorporate Fire Detection Zones 547 and 548 into 12/17/98 Part II, Table 3.3-11. These zones are being added by DCN M-14226-A, which is installing automatic fire suppression and detection into the general area of Elevation 690.0, above the Boric Acid Tanks.
Pages Changed: Coversheet, i, ii, iii, 11-48 Pages Added: 11-67 Pages Deleted: None Note: Sections with page(s) affected by this change are being included in their entirety and issued with this change package. Therefore, the entire sections will be issued as Rev. 2, with the specific changes denoted by revision bars.
i Rev. 12 Date Approved I
I REVISION I,(3G I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT REVISION LOG Rev. 12 Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 3
Revision 3 to the FPR affects Part VII and Part II, Sections 5.0 and 14.0. For 2/11/99 continuity and consistency in pagination, the sections are being issued in their entirety as Rev. 3, with the actual changes denoted by revision bars.
The changes to Part VII of the FPR were made as part of the corrective action plan for resolution of CAQ SQ962075PER. The PER was originally initiated due to a discrepancy between actual plant configuration and the justification for an NRC approved deviation to IOCFR50 Appendix R. The changes made in Rev. 3 of the FPR include resolution of documentation discrepancies involving combustible loading values, updates of cable rerouting, raceway barrier installations, procedure changes, etc. The nature of the discrepancies were all documentation only, and did not represent any unanalyzed configurations in the plant. Also, minor changes to existing evaluations in Part VII were done as enhancements.
Changes to Part II of the FPR included the addition of the definition of "in-situ Combustible Loading," and the allowance for exceeding the compensatory measure time requirements, as specified by the Fire Operating Requirements (FORs), for fire suppression/detection equipment and fire barriers taken out of service during outages. The compensatory measures (i.e., backup fire suppression and/or fire watches) will remain in place until the equipment is placed back in service after the necessary outage-related work is completed.
4 Revision 4 to the FPR is in support of DCN D-20152. The change to the FPR involves deleting the discussion on the smoke detection in the ventilation intake ducts in the Main Control Room from Part VIII, pages 53 and 54. The DCN abandons the detectors in place, and disconnects the annunciation circuits to the MCR.
Pages Changed: Coversheet, i, ii, iii, v, VIII-53, VIII-54 Pages Added: None Pages Deleted: None Note: Section VIII is being included in its entirety in the R4 change package, with the specific changes denoted by revision bars.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 12 REVISION LOG ReiinDSRPINO EIINDt Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 4
Minor format change to support electronic filing (Curator) conversion.
8/19/99 5
Revision 5 to the Fire Protection Report (FPR) was performed to incorporate the following changes:
Added Part II, Section 14.7 to incorporate new Fire Operating Requirement (FOR) 3.7.14 and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.14 for Emergency Battery Lighting (EBL) units, including compensatory actions and testing frequencies. Also revised Part V "Emergency Lighting and Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection" to address new FOR and SR; Revised Part II, Section 14.5 (FOR/SR 3/4.7.11.4) for Fire Hose Stations to allow use of portable hose packs and removal of fire hoses from the hose stations inside the Reactor Buildings; Clarified definitions for continuous and roving fire watches in Part I1, Section 13.0; Clarified compliance with NFPA-72D regarding exception to G-73 for bypassing the audible annunciation system in the Main Control Room (MCR),
Panel 0-M-29, under the direct supervision of a dedicated operator at the console.
Revised Section 3.31 of Part VII to replace summary of superseded calculation MDQ0026-980017, 'Fire Barrier Rating Evaluation for Hollow Block and Partially Filled 8" Concrete Block Walls" with calculation SCG1 S591, "Fire Ratings of Hollow Core Masonry Walls."
Corrected minor documentation discrepancy in Part II, Table 3.3-11, in which the number of ionization fire detectors for Zone 230 was listed as 9, instead of the correct number of 10 detectors in the zone.
Revised Part II, Section 14.0 to reference Calculation SQN-SQS2-203, which addresses processes for restoring inoperable Appendix R equipment that is not currently bounded by existing Tech Specs to operable status.
Minor administrative change to Revision 4 Rev Log description to delete statement regarding MCR HVAC duct smoke detector abandonment in response to a recommendation from QA audit SSA0001. The recommendation was to remove the statement, "The duct detectors have been determined unnecessary based on the absence of industry in the vicinity that could be capable of producing significant enough smoke to affect the habitability in the MCR, and the detectors in the El. 732.0' Mechanical Equipment Room which will detect smoke entering the MCR ventilation system intake and subsequently alarm in the MCR," because it provided unnecessary detail that was not discussed in the FPR.
/1 iii I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 12 REVISION LOG Revision No.
I DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date Approved Changed required testing frequency for inaccessible detectors from "each COLD 6
SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unless performed in the previous 6 month" to 10/18/00 every 18 months during cold shutdowns (page 11-42). Related editorial changes to this page, FPR cover sheet, and the table of contents.
Changed the compensatory actions for LCO 3.3.3.8 to delete fire watches and 7
temperature monitoring inside primary containment upon failure of a detector 1/29/01 inside primary containment (page 11-42). The bases for the LCO compensatory (effective actions for inoperable detectors inside primary containment were also changed.
2/1/01)
(pages 11-65 and 66).
This revision incorporates the following changes to part I1:
8 Changes the testing frequency for detectors which require removing plant 2/26/01 equipment from service from 6 to 18 months and deletes the requirement to perform the 18 month detector tests during cold shutdowns from Surveillance Requirement 4.3.3.8.1 on page 11-42.
Adds a fire detection basis on page 11-66 for the above change in test frequency which gives examples of the equipment which must be removed from service for detector testing (EGTS, ABGTS, CREVS and containment purge). They two above changes are corrective action for PER-00-006637 000.
Adds a definition for "accessible" on page 11-5.
Adds an existing heat detector to zone 466 in Table 3.3-11 on page 11-49.
Adds a end-of-quarter "grace period" to the annual fire brigade medical examination requirement on page 11-20.
Deletes three references to raw service water flow diagrams and adds five references to fire protection flow diagrams on page 11-73 (added diagrams are for the fire pumps/tanks, yard piping, the ERCW Bldg. and two cable tray water spray systems).
Related editorial changes were made to this Rev. Log, the FPR cover sheet, and the table of contents.
9 This revision incorporates the following changes to the FPR Parts III and V, due to the Vital Inverter System modification per DCN D20071A/P20872A as applicable:
Added references to DCN D20071A/P20872A, see section 11.2.13 of Part III and section 4.1.5 of Part V.
"* Revised the description of the 120VAC Vital Instrument and 250Vdc Power System, see section 4.10.3 and 4.10.5 respectively, of Part Ill.
"* Added Components to the illuminated list of Part V, see Table V-I, pages V 4 and V-7.
Related editorial changes were made to this revision log, the FPR cover sheet and the table of contents.
The Nuclear Safety Assessment for the above changes is in the "Fire protection (Appendix R)" section of Block 15 in DCN D20071A 10/12/2001 L
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I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev,. 12 REVISION LOG Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 10 Changed Part II, Section 14.1 (page 11-42) as follows:
9/25/01 Extended the frequency for fire detector testing required by Surveillance (effective Requirement (SR) 4.3.3.8.1 from 6 to 12 months.
11/28/01)
Added a requirement to test required fire detection zones each 6 months to existing SR 4.3.3.8.3.
Changed SR 4.3.3.8.2 by limiting supervision testing to the wiring between required local alarm panels and the alarm receiving console. The previously required testing of zone supervision was deleted.
Changed LCO action 3.3.3.8c by providing actions to take in the event the supervision tested via revised SR 4.3.3.8.2 fails or a loop failure trouble is annunciated. Previously, this action required a corrective action/reportability review if inoperable detectors are not restored to operation within 14 days.
This action is no longer needed since it is already included in actions 3.3.3.8a and b.
Changed LCO action 3.3.3.8b to make it explicit that it is the loss of automatic suppression system actuation which requires implementation of the action.
Changed Part II, fire detection bases (page 11-66), by adding bases for the fire suppression system actuation testing, the new zone testing and for the revised supervision testing. The later includes a discussion of the application of the LCO actions in the event of a supervision test failure or a failure of the circuits between required panels and the alarm receiving console.
Changed Part VI as follows:
Section 1.0 (page VI-1)- added a requirement that future significant deviations from NFPA testing, inspection, maintenance and testing requirements will be addressed in Part VI.
Section 3.3.11 (page VI-13)- added a detector testing deviation (12 vs. 6 month frequency).
Related editorial changes were made to this Revision Log, the Cover Sheet, and the Table of Contents.
11 PART II Changes 3/05/2002 Page 1, section 2.0: Deleted words "plans for". Sentence now reads -.___ and outlines the fire protection, fire detection and suppression capability Page 2, section 4.1 - Added reference 4.1.12. Section 4.2 - Changed 4.2.2 from NP STD 12.15, "Fire Protection" to FPDP-1, "Conduct of Fire Protection".
Page 3 - Added sections 4.2.11 FPDP-3, "Management of the Fire Protection Report"; 4.2.12 SPP 10.9, "Control of Fire Protection Impairments"; 4.2.13 SPP 10.10, "Control of Transient Combustibles"; and 4.2.14 SPP 10.11, "Control of Ignition Sources".
Page 5, section 5.0: Clarified definition of Accessible to now read "Paths to and L
from areas that contain equipment___.
Page 6 - changed fire to Fire V
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 12 REVISION LOG UDESC(IR
! ION OF REVISION I
II (continued)
- 1.
1 RevisNon
/ No.
I1 Date Approved Page 7, Fire Severity: Revised 17 edition to 17u edition Page 14, section 7.4 - added to Operations Manager responsibilities "fire safe shutdown implementing procedures" Page 20, section 9.1: Delete number 2 from second sentence. Sentence now reads: "The fire brigade shall not include the Shift Manager and other members of the minimum shift crew--." Added table for minimum operator staffing Page 23, section 9.5: Corrected typo error by replacing Ns with -. Revised last sentence to now read: "Safe shutdown procedures are available in the event a fire occurs in areas of the plant containing FSSD equipment."
Page 25, section 11.0: Change word systems to requirements. Sentence now reads: "Fire watch requirements are established ___"
Page 26, section 12.1: Moved first sentence to later in the paragraph and deleted "when the fire pumps are not running" from second sentence.
Page 28, section 12.3: Revised last sentence by replacing prevent with address to read: "The annulus area ___ water spray on select cable concentrations and to address specific cable interactions."
Page 29, section 12.3.3: In third paragraph, replace considered with addressed.
Sentence now reads: "Personnel safety is addressed by providing Page 31, first sentence: Corrected typo error by deleting =.
Page 33, section 12.10.2: Added "spatial separation greater than 20 feet" to last sentence so it now reads: Inside the reactor building._...
a combination of spatial separation of greater than 20 feet,
Page 34, section 12.10.5: Added "in ventilation openings" to first sentence so it now reads: "Fire damper are normally provided in ventilation openings in fire barriers Deleted "a single failure" PART III Page 1, section 1.1: Clarified that evaluation of CB fire also considered offsite power available Page 2, first paragraph: Spelled out reactor coolant system before RCS Page 3, section 2.4: Spelled out residual heat removal before RHR Page 5, section 3.4.1: Spelled out control rod drive mechanisms before CRDM, reactor vessel head vents before RVHV, and power operated relief valves before PORV Page 6, section 3.4.2: Spelled out centrifugal charging pump before CCP, emergency raw cooling water before ERCW, component cooling water system before CCS, volume control tank before VCT, and reactor coolant pump before RCP Page 10, section 4.3: Spelled out main feedwater isolation valve before MFIV and main feedwater before MFW Page 14, section 4.9 - Added to last paragraph :lf fans are not operable due to fire damage on fan electrical circuits, adequate ventilation can be achieved by opening the double doors to the room."
Page 21 - Deleted "performed" from middle paragraph. CASE 2) replaced "Two wire ungrounded dc power circuit cable to cable fault (125V)" with "More than one conductor to conductor hot short within one fire affected cable (125VDC/120VAC)" CASE 3) replaced "Two wire ungrounded ac control circuit cable-to-cable faults (125VDC/120VAC)" with "More than one conductor to conductor hot short between cable-to-cable faults (125VDC/120VAC). Last paragraph starts "With respect to Cases 1), 2), and 3); deleted 2) and 3).
I I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 12 Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 11 Similarly, with respect to Cases 2 and 3 added. Added to same sentence (continued)
"or ac power circuit, more than one conductor to conductor selective hot short with the proper polarity "and deleted two electrically independant cable to cable shorts".
Page 22-Added section 7.14 HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULTS Page 26, Table Il1-1 Revised Key 38 to Key 38/39 Table 111-2 and 111 Replaced with tables with information in Appendices C and D from the safe shutdown equipment calculation (SQS4-127). Tables still contain same information.
Table 111-4 was added. Copied from SQS4-127 Appendix E.
PART V changes are as follows:
Page 1, section 2.0: Added "The Turbine building lights are fed from the 6.9kv Common Board (located in the Turbine Building) and will not be lost for a fire in either the Auxiliary or Control Building that would require manual action(s) in the Turbine Building." Next to last sentence of first paragraph revised to read "The DGB has lighting provided by lighting cabinets that are separated by three hour fire barriers."
Table V-1 changes are as follows:
Page 4: For 0-LGT-247-RO01 deleted & Doors For 0-LGT-247-R011, R012, R013, R014 added & General Area For 0-LGT-247-R016 deleted CRDM MG set BKR A & B; added General Area Page 5: For O-LGT-247-R040 revised doors to door For 0-LGT-247-R044 added 'and bulkhead connections to 0-FCO-31 C Page 6: For O-LGT-247-R047, R048, R051, R052, R062, R063 and R066 added
"& General Area" Page 7: For 0-LGT-247-R075 expanded coverage to read "125VDC Vital Batt Bd 1-1 (bkrs on Pnl 2 & rear of Pnl 4) & 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-1(switch)"
For O-LGT-247-R076, expanded coverage to read "125VDC Vital Batt Bd 1-11 (bkrs on Pnl 2 & rear of Pnl 4) & 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-11(switch)"
For 0-LGT-247-R077 added "& General Area" For 0-LGT-247-R079, expanded coverage to read "125VDC Vital Batt Bd 1-111 (bkrs on Pnl 2 & rear of Pnl 4) & 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-111(switch)"
For O-LGT-247-R080, expanded coverage to read "125VDC Vital Batt Bd 1-IV (bkrs on Pil 2 & rear of Pnl 4) & 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board I-IV(switch)"
For O-LGT-247-R081 added "& Isle behind 480V Shutdown Board 2B2-B For 0-LGT-247-R089 revised doors to door Page 8: For 0-LGT-247-R090 revised doors to door For 0-LGT-247-R094, R0108, R113 and R116 added "& General Area" For 0-LGT-247-R1 09, added "2-FCV-1 -18" I
For 0-LGT-247-Rl 11, deleted "2-FCV-I -18" vii J
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT REVISION LOG Rev. 12
/Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 11 Page 9: For 0-LGT-247-R122, R125, R126 and R132 added %& General Area" (continued)
For O-LGT-247-RI 27 and Ri 29 revised doors to door Page 10: For 0-LGT-247-R152, R153, R155 and R156 added "& General Area" Page 11: For O-LGT-247-Rl 70, deleted "Sump Valve Box" and added '& General Area" For 0-LGT-247-R175 and R179, added "Sump Valve Box & General Area" For 0-LGT-247-R202, R203, R204 and R205 added "& General Area" Added 0-LGT-247-R206 and R207 (per EDC E21158A)
PART VII Page 16, section 2.10.5: Added paragraph to Deviation Update to clarify open head spray system actuated by combination of line type thermal and area smoke detectors.
Page 48, section 3.4.3.4.1.1: Added detail to clarify that separation in area is by spatial separation greater than 20 feet (IIl.G.2.d) or automatic suppression and detection (IIl.G.2.e).
PART VIII Page 33, section D.5(d): Corrected information concerning antenna associated with the plant repeater system and added clarification statement in "Remarks" column 12 PART III Page 2, section 2.2 - Added "level indication in the" to last sentence.
Page 5, section 3.4.1 - Deleted from 15t sentence "upon notification of a major fire affecting" and replace with "when operators determine that the fire affects". From last sentence, deleted "monitor shutdown reactivity" and replaced with "allow boration".
Page 6, section 3.4.2 - Deleted from 4 & 5, "or RCP thermal barrier cooling".
Page 8, section 3.4.5 - Added to end of 5t paragraph "and the available letdown path.
Page 9, section 4.1: Revised last sentence to agree with requirements as stated in the Fire Safe Shutdown calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R21.
Page 11, section 4.3 & 4: Revised 4.3 to change PORVs to ARVs. Revised 4 th paragraph in 4.4 to agree with requirements as stated in the Fire Safe Shutdown calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R21.
Page 13, section 4.6, 7 & 8: Revised 4.6 to agree with the Fire Safe Shutdown calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R21. Revised 4.7 to change Key I to Key 70 and to delete item (2) to agree with requirements as stated in the Fire Safe Shutdown calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R21. Revised 4.8 to delete Key 1 from heading.
Page 14, section 4.9: Revised to add Keys 37J, 37R and 40 to heading and change Key 1 to 37R and 40 in 3rd paragraph to agree with requirements as stated in the Fire Safe Shutdown calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R21.
Page 15, section 4.10: Added heading to 1 st paragraph and renumbered subsequent headings.
Page 22, Deleted "Excess letdown is not specifically required for safe shutdown."
Page 24, Corrected references 11.2.9 and 11.2.10 I Page 26: Added Keys 37J, 37R and 70 to the list.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT REVISION TO(
ix Rev. 12 Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 12 (cont.)
PART IV Page 3, section 3.3: Revised item 4 "Electric Fire Pumps" to "Flood Mode/Backup Electric fire pumps (1)".
Page 4, section 4.1.2 - Revised title of AOP-C.04 to "Shutdown from Auxiliary Control Room".
PART V Page 3, Revised reference 4.1.2 Page 8 - Added to light R099 "& 2-FCV-72-2 & -39" and to light R102 "& 1-FCV 72-2 & -39".
I I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 12 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page i Page Rev.
REVISION LOG i
12 TABLE OF CONTENTS i
12 PART I - INTRODUCTION I-1 1.0
Background
I-1 2.0 Purpose I-1 3.0 Scope I-1 4.0 References-Appendix A Program 1-4 5.0 References-Appendix R Progam 1-7 6.0 References-Fire Protection Improvement Program (FPIP)
I-11 PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN 11-1 11
1.0 Purpose and Scope
IH-1 2.0 Objectives of the Fire Protection Plan II-1 3.0 Basis of the Fire Protection Plan II-1 4.0 References 11-2 5.0 Definitions 11-5 6.0 Fire Protection Quality Assurance 11-13 7.0 Fire Protection Organization/Programs 11-14 8.0 Fire Protection Program Administrative 11-18 and Technical Controls 9.0 Emergency Response 11-20 10.0 Control of Combustibles 11-24 11.0 Control of Ignition Sources 11-25 12.0 Description of Fire Protection Systems and Features 11-26
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 12 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ii PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN(Continued)
PaZe Rev 13.0 Fire Protection System Impairments and Compensatory Actions 11-36 14.0 Fire Protection Systems and Features, Operating Requirements 11-39 (OR's) and Surveillance Requirements (SR's)
PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES III-1 11 1.0 Introduction III-1 2.0 Safe Shutdown Functions 111-2 3.0 Analysis of Safe Shutdown Systems 111-3 4.0 Safe Shutdown Systems 111-8 5.0 Identification of Safe Shutdown System Components 111-17 6.0 Identification of Safe Shutdown Circuits and Cables 111-18 7.0 Associated Circuits of Concern 111-18 8.0 High/Low Pressure Boundary Interfaces 111-22 9.0 Location of Safe Shutdown Equipment, Cables 111-23 and Raceways 10.0 Safe Shutdown System Separation Evaluation Methodology 111-23 11.0 References 111-24 PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IV-1 2
1.0 Introduction IV-1 2.0 Discussion IV-1 3.0 Alternate Control Room Capabilities IV-1 4.0 References IV4 I 10
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANTIV-I PUMP OIL COLLECTION 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Emergency Lighting 3.0 Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection 4.0 References PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Scope 3.0 Applicable NFPA Codes PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Deviations to 10CFR50 Appendix R 3.0 SQN 86-10 Evaluations for IOCFR50 Appendix R 4.0 Deviations to BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A 5.0 NFPA Code Deviations - Sprinkler System Criteria for Resolving Intervening Combustible Concerns PART VIII - CONFORMANCE TO APPENDIX A TO BTP 9.5 GUIDELINES PART IX - APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE MATRIX PART X - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 12 Paae iii Pane iii Rev.
11 Page V-1 V-1 V-2 V-3 VI-1 VI-1 VI-1 VI-2 VII-1 VII-1 VII-1 VII-39 VII-91 VII-99 VII-105 VIII-1 IX-1 X-1 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 12 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page iv LIST OF TABLES PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Pasz Table 5.1 Operational Modes II-12 Table 3.3-11 Minimum Fire Detector Instruments Operable 11-43 Table 3.7-5 Fire Hose Stations 11-57 PART III-SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Table III-I Safe Shutdown Systems and Subsystems by Key II-26 Table 111-2 Shutdown Logic Component List 111-27 Table 111-3 Instrumentation List For Main Control Room 111-58 PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OIL COLLECTION Table V-1 8-Hour Emergency Lighting Units V4 PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS Table 2.0-1 Process Control Requirements for Validating VII-33 Appendix R Deviation Bases Table 2.2-I Control Building Rooms Containing Redundant Safe VII-34 Shutdown Equipment, without Fire Detection and/or Automatic Suppression Table 2.12-I Auxiliary Building Rooms Containing Redundant Safe VH-35 Shutdown Equipment, without Fire Detection and/or Automatic Suppression Table 2.12-2 Auxiliary Building Rooms Containing Redundant Safe VII-38 Shutdown Equipment, with only Partial Fire Detection and/or Automatic Suppression Table VII-1 Auxiliary Building Special Purpose Doors VII-107 Table VII-2 Main Control Room Bullet Resistant Security Doors VII-108 j0
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Added Auxiliary Building Fire Rated Doors Alarmed Security Doors Certified Fire Dampers Equivalent Fire Dampers Certification/Equivalent Construction Features Added Fire Dampers in HVAC Ducts VII-108 VII-109 VII-110 VII-112 VII-1 13 VII-114 Rev. 12 Page v Table VII-3 Table VII4 Table VII-5 Table VII-6 Table VII-7 Table VII-8 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (All drawings will be current active version)
Figure II-1 Figure H1-2 Figure 11-3 Figure 11-4 Figure 11-5 Figure 1H-6 Figure 11-7 Figure 11-8 Figure 11-9 Figure II-10 Figure II-11 Figure 11-12 Figure 11-13 Figure II-14a Figure II-14b Figure II-14c Figure 11-15 Figure 11-16 Figure 11-17 1,2-47W850-1 1,2-47W850-2 1,2-47W850-3 1,2-47W850-4 1,2-47W850-5 1,2-47W850-6 1,2-47W850-7 1,2-47W850-8 1,2-47W850-9 1,2-47W850-10 1,2-47W850-11 1,2-47W850-12 1,2-47W850-20 1,2-47W850-24 1,2-47W850-26 1,2-47W850-27 1,2-47W843-1 1,2-47W843-2 1,2-47W610-26-1 Figure 11-18 1,2-47W610-26-2 Figure 11-19 Figure 11-20 1,2-47W611-26-1 1,2-47W611-26-2 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire ?otection Flow Diagram Transformer Fire Protection System Flow Diagram Transformer, Yard & MWTP IHPFP Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram CQ Storage, Fire Protection and Purging System Flow Diagram CQ Storage and Fire Protection Mechanical Control Diagram High Pressu Fire Protection System Mechanical Control Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection System Mechanical Logic Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection Mechanical Logic Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection Rev. 12 Page vi I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (Continued)
Figure 11-21 1,2-47W610-39-1 Figure 11-22 1,2-47W610-39-2 1,2-47W611-39-1 1,2-47W611-39-2 1,2-47W611-13-1 1,2-47W611-13-2 1,2-47W611-13-3 1,2-47W611-13-4 1,2-47W611-13-5 1,2-47W611-13-6 1,2-47W611-13-7 1,2-47W600-245 1,2-47W600-246 1,2-47W600-247 1,2-47W600-248 1,2-47W600-249 1,2-47W600-250 1,2-47W600-251 1,2-47W600-252 1,2-47W600-253 Mechanical Control Diagram C02 Storage Fire Protection and Purging System Mechanical Control Diagram C02 Storage Fire Protection and Purging System Logic Diagram C02 Storage, Fire Protection Purging System Logic Diagram C02 Storage, Fire Protection and Purging System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Rev. 12 Page vii Figure 11-23 Figure 11-24 Figure 11-25 Figure 11-26 Figure 11-27 Figure 11-28 Figure 11-29 Figure 11-30 Figure 11-31 Figure 11-32 Figure 11-33 Figure 11-34 Figure 11-35 Figure 11-36 Figure 11-37 Figure 11-38 Figure 11-39 Figure 11-40 I
Rev. 12 Page viii SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES PART I - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (Continued)
Figure 11-41 1,2-47W600-254 Mechanical Instrume Figure 11-42 1,2-47W600-255 Mechanical Instrume Figure 11-43 1,2-47W600-256 Mechanical Instrume Figure 11-44 1,2-47W600-257 Mechanical Instrume Figure 11-45 1,2-47W600-258 Mechanical Instrume Figure 11-46 1,2-47W600-259 Mechanical Instrume Figure 11-47 1,2-47W600-260 Mechanical Instrume Figure 11-48 1,2-47W600-270 Mechanical Instrume PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Figure III-1 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Logic Diagram PART X - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Figure X-1 1,2-47W494-1 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 653 & 669 Figure X-2 1,2-47W494-2 Auxiliary Building and Reactor Building Compartmentation EL 685 & 690 Figure X-3 1,2-47W494-3 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 706 & 714 Figure X-4 1,2-47W494-4 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 732 & 734 Figure X-5 1,2-47W494-5 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 749, 759, & 763 Figure X-6 1,2-47W494-6 Control Builling Compartmentation EL 669 & 685 Figure X-7 1,2-47W494-7 Control Building Compartmentation EL 706 & 732 Figure X-8 1,2-47W494-8 Diesel Generator Building Compartmentation EL 722 & 740.5 Figure X-9 1,2-47W494-9 ERCW Pumping Station Compartmentation EL 625 & 688 Figure X-10 1,2-47W494-10 ERCW Pumping Station Compartmentation EL 704 & 720 ents and Controls ents and Controls ents and Controls ents and Controls nts and Controls nts and Controls nts and Controls nts and Controls I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This part describes the safe shutdown analysis methodology used to identify, select, and analyze the systems, components, and cables needed to demonstrate compliance with Appendix R to I OCFR50, and the applicable NRC generic letters.
Paragraph 50.48(a) & (e) and Appendix R of 10CFR50 became effective on February 17, 1981 and requires all nuclear plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979 to comply with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R Sections II.G, m.J, and M11.O. SQN was licensed after this date and must comply with these sections of Appendix RI Additionally, by a Unit 2 license condition, SQN must comply with Sections III.G, III J, III.L, and 111.0 of Appendix R.
Section II.G.1 requires that fire protection features be provided for those systems, structures, and components important to safe shutdown. These features must be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
(1)
One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the Control Room or the Emergency Control Station(s) is free of fire damage; and, (2)
Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the Control Room or the Emergency Control Station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Where alternative shutdown capability is required (i.e., for control building fires that require shutdown from outside of the Control Room), cold shutdown must be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Alternate shutdown capability is evaluated per Appendix R Sections 1Il.G.3 and 1II.L. Plant locations that do not require alternative shutdown capability are evaluated per Section m.G.2 of Appendix Rt Generic Letter 81 12 (February 20, 1981) Enclosure 1 "Staff Position", provides additional guidance on the NRC's requirements for safe shutdown capability.
1.1 Desien Basis Evaluation The purpose of this evaluation is to demonstrate fire safe shutdown capability for postulated fires involving in situ and/or transient combustibles that could impact systems, structures, or components located in or adjacent to that area. For purposes of this evaluation, it is assumed that these fires may adversely affect these systems, structures or components essential to safe shutdown. The availability of offsite power for specific systems and/or fire scenarios has been evaluated for non-alternative shutdown locations. Loss of offsite power, as well as offsite power available, has been assumed for control building fires, for which alternative shutdown is provided. No concurrent or sequential design basis accidents or transients are assumed to occur. Failures that are a consequence of the fire are evaluated. No additional single failures are assumed (ref. 11.1.1).
1.2 Limiting Safety Consequences The limiting safety consequences used in the evaluation of fire safe shutdown are: (1) no fuel failure due to calculated cladding temperature increases; (2) no rupture of any primary coolant boundary; (3) no rupture of the containment boundary, (4) following the event, the reactor coolant system process variables shall be within those predicted for a loss of normal ac power; and (5) shutdown capability shall be able to achieve and maintain subcritical conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor coolant inventory, achieve and maintain hot standby conditions for an extended period of time, achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 I11-1 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> with equipment powered by onsite power sources if using alternative shutdown methods, and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter (ref. 11.1.1).
Generic Letter 81-12, Enclosure 1, specifies the performance goals and associated safe shutdown functions necessary to ensure the limiting safety consequences of the fire safe shutdown analysis. Other subfunctions may exist under each of these broad headings.
Examples of such subfimctions are steam generator secondary side isolation, and reactor coolant system (RCS) seal injection. Other subfunctions such as on site emergency power, environmental control, etc., are included as support functions.
The performance goals and safe shutdown functions identified in the generic letter adequately ensure that the containment pressure boundary will not be threatened. Uncontrolled mass and energy releases to the containment from the primary systems are limited by the achievement of these safe shutdown functions and will ensure that no rupture of the reactor coolant or containment pressure boundaries will occur.
2.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS This section provides a brief overview of the SQN safe shutdown fimctions. The specific safe shutdown functions necessary to satisfy the performance goals and safe shutdown fumctions of Appendix R as identified in Enclosure 1 to Generic Letter 81-12 are:
(1)
Reactivity control function (2)
Reactor coolant makeup function (3)
Reactor coolant pressure cuitrol function (4)
Decay heat removal function (5)
Process monitoring function (6)
Support function 2.1 Reactivity Control Reactor trip capability is by inserting control and shutdown rods into the reactor. After a reactor trip, the reactivity control system (boration) must be capable of achieving and maintaining adequate shutdown reactivity from zero power hot standby to cold shutdown. The function must be capable of compensating for any reactivity changes associated with xenon decay and reactor coolant temperature decrease which occur during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions.
2.2 Reactor Coolant Make-up The reactor coolant make-up systems shall be capable of assuring that sufficient make-up inventory is provided to compensate for reactor coolant system (RCS) fluid losses due to identified leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary and shrinkage of the RCS water volume during cooldown from hot standby to cold shutdown conditions. Adequate performance of this function is demonstrated by the maintenance of reactor coolant level within the level indication in thepressurizer.
2.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Reactor coolant pressure control is required to assure that the RCS is operated:
(1)
Within the technical specifications for RCS pressure-temperature requirements; 111-2 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART 11-SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 (2)
To prevent peak RCS pressure from exceeding 110% of system design pressure; and (3)
With a sufficient subcooling margin to minimize void formation within the reactor vessel 2.4 Decay Heat Removal The decay heat removal systems shall be capable of transferring fission product decay heat from the reactor core at a rate such that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. The function shall be capable of maintaining hot standby using AFW for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, achieving cold shutdown (within a 72-hour period for alternate shutdown), and maintaining cold shutdown conditions thereafter using residual heat removal (RHR).
2.5 Process Monitorin2 When information on process variables is required by operators to achieve/maintain safe shutdown system or control safe shutdown equipment, such monitoring information must be available. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing, if possible, direct readings of those plant process variables necessary for plant operators to perform and/or control the previously identified functions.
2.6 Support The systems and equipment used to perform the Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) functions may require miscellaneous support functions such as process cooling, lubrication and ac/dc power. These supporting S)functions shall be available and capable of providing the support necessary to assure acceptable performance of the FSSD functions.
3.0 ANALYSIS OF SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 3.1 Introduction Various analytical approaches ensure that sufficient plant systems are available to perform the FSSD functions. Numerous plant systems are available, alone and in combination with other systems, to provide these required functions. A minimum set of plant systems and components is identified to demonstrate that the plant can achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
In addition, for control building fires that require shutdown from outside of the main control room, the concurrent loss of off-site power is also assumed.
Providing adequate protection of this minimum system, component, and cable set from the effects of postulated fires constitutes an adequate and conservative demonstration of the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for the purpose of fire protection.
The safe shutdown systems selected are capable of:
a) achieving and maintaining subcritical conditions in the reactor, b) maintaining reactor coolant inventory, c) achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions for an extended period of time, d) performing cold shutdown repairs needed to achieve and maintain cold shutdown (or, for control building fires that require shutdown from outside of the main control room, achieving cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />), and e) maintaining cold shutdown conditions thereafter.
3.2 Initial Assumptions 111-3 J-
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART Il - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 (1) The unit is operating at 100% power upon the occurrence of a fire.
(2) For alternative shutdown locations (Control Building fires that require shutdown from outside of the Control Room), a loss of off-site power is assumed.
(3) The reactor is tripped either manually or automatically.
(4) No failures are considered other than those directly attributable to the fire.
(5) Equipment required for safe shutdown is assumed to be operable (i.e., not out of service).
3.3 Definitions Hot Standby The initial safe shutdown state with the reactor at zero power, (Mode 3) less than 0.99 and average RCS temperature Tvg greater than or equal to Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)
Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)
Subcooling Mar 3500F.
Reactor at zero power Kff less than 0.99 and average RCS temperature Tg between 350F and 200PF.
Reactor at zero power, If less than 0.99 and average RCS temperature T,, below or equal to 20(PF.
gin The difference between the saturation temperature at RCS pressure, and the maximum temperature in the hot legs.
3.4 Safe Shutdown Functions The following is a comparison of the Generic Letter 81-12 safe shutdown functions and the corresponding safety functions used in the Appendix R FSSD analysis (ref. 11.2.1):
GL 81-12 Safe Shutdown Function SQN Safety Functions Reactivity Control Initial Reactivity Control Long Term Reactivity Control Reactor Coolant Makeup Control RCS Inwentory Control RCP Seal Integrity RCS Pressure Boundary Control RCS Makeup and Letdown Reactor Coolant Pressure Control RCS Inventory Control RCS Pressure Boundary Control RCS Makeup/Letdown Decay Heat Removal SG Inventory Control 111-4 I
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART IHI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 Secondary Side Pressure Control Secondary Side Isolation Long-Term Heat Removal Process Monitoring Instrumentation (no specific correlation, in logic by system)
Support Onsite Electrical Supply Environmental Control (Process Cooling, in logic by system)
Each plant system or subsystem function relied on to accomplish the above safe shutdown functions is identified (ref. 11.2.1). A separate designator identified as a safe shutdown "Key" is assigned to each plant system or subsystem function. Figure 111-1 "Appendix R Safe Shutdown Logic Diagram" depicts the safe shutdown system and/or system function, associated Key number, and logical relationships between systems and Keys used to demonstrate compliance with Appendix R criteria. The correlation between Keys and safe shutdown systems is provided in Section 4. The following sections provide a general description of the methods and systems used in reference 11.2.1 to satisfy the safe shutdown performance goals and functions as delineated in Generic Letter 81-12.
3.4.1 Reactivity Control At least one source range neutron monitor is provided for indication of count rate to verify the reactor is subcritical.
Initial reactivity control will result from an automatic reactor protection system (RPS) trip or from operator initiation of a manual trip when operators determine that the fire affects safe unit operation. This action will deenergize the normally energized control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) to actuate a reactor trip. The RPS has a diversity of inputs, each of which "fails safe" and will actuate on an open circuit or a loss of power. As such, fire damage to the RPS will not preclude the initiation of an automatic trip or control rod insertion. There are four paths to manually trip the reactor. There is a shunt trip path for each of the two trains and an undervoltage trip path for each of the two trains. The shunt trip path trips the reactor by energizing the shunt trip coil in the reactor trip switchgear through a handswitch contact in the main control room. The undervoltage trip path trips the reactor by deenergizing the undervoltage trip coil in the reactor trip switchgear through a handswitch contact in the main control room. For an undervoltage trip path to fail, a perfect short to another power source must occur. For a shunt trip path to fail, the path must be open without shorting. It is therefore considered incredible that all four paths will fail in the specific manner to disable each representative path, particularly since the trip handswitches in the main control room utilize all four paths simultaneously when placed in the trip position.
Following rod insertion, additional negative reactivity insertion is required as xenon decays, and RCS temperature is decreased.
The addition of borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) is required to maintain the required shutdown reactivity. The chemical and volume control system (CVCS) is capable of injecting borated water into the RCS and the normal, excess, and alternate letdown paths (reactor vessel head vents (RVHV), power operated relief valves (PORVs)) are capable of sufficient letdown toaliow boration.
3.4.2 Reactor Coolant Make-up Control 111-5 J.
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 For the assumed fire scenario, reactor coolant make-up control can be achieved by the following to assure that primary side inventory (pressurizer level) is maintained:
- 1.
One centrifugal charging pump (CCP), including emergency raw cooling water (ERCW) and room cooling for appropriate CCP must be operational.
- 2.
A suction path from either the volume control tank (VCT) or the RWST to the CCPs must be available.
- 3.
Charging flow control valve or a bypass must be available (manual operation of by pass valves is acceptable) and pressurizer level indication.
- 4.
A charging path to the RCS throughthe reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection
- 5.
Cooling to the RCP seals throughthe RCP seal injection
- 6.
RCS pressure boundary isolation for normal and excess letdown, reactor head vent, RHR suction, pressurizer PORV's
- 7.
Pressurizer level instrumentation.
- 8.
RCS Letdown (NormallExcess/Altemate) 3.4.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Establishing and maintaining a sufficient subcooling margin within the RCS is required to prevent void formation in the core and to ensure the ability to maintain natural circulation (if the RCPs are not operable) through the steam generators. Overpressure protection of the RCS is provided by the pressurizer safety valves prior to a controlled cooldown and depressurization.
During cooldown from Mode 3 hot standby (above 350'F) to Mode 4 hot shutdown (below 3501F), pressure control may be by pressurizer heaters or by varying pressurizer level in combination with control of SG pressure and RCS temperature using SG PORVs. Pressure may also be reduced by normal/excess/altemate letdown paths. To ensure adequate RCS pressure and adequate subcooling margin, the operator will isolate the normal pressurizer spray valves, or trip the RCPs to limit depressurization, and isolate the pressurizer PORVs and auxiliary spray. Entering Mode 4 will permit aligning the RHR system to the RCS for decay heat removal. While on RHiR, the maximum pressures in both the RHR and RCS systems are limited by the RHR system safety valves.
RCS temperature indication is provided for the two loops used for cooldown and one RCS wide range pressure indicator is provided. Note that RCS cold leg temperature is not provided in the ACRI (See deviation in Part VII.)
3.4.4 Decay Heat Removal Following a reactor trip with loss of off-site power (either assumed or caused by the fire), decay heat is initially removed by natural circulation within the RCS, heat transfer to the main steam system via the steam generators, and operation of the steam generator PORVs or lift of the main steam system code safety valves. The secondary side of the SGs are isolated from the main turbine, main feedwater pumps, and other steam loads to prevent excessive heat removal from the RCS.
111-6 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 For decay heat removal via natural circulation a minimum of two steam generators will be available (including SG pressure and level indication). Decay heat removal requires the ability to supply sufficient auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators to make up for the inventory discharged as steam by the safety valves or steam generator PORVs. For maintenance of initial hot standby conditions, the feedwater flow required to the steam generators is supplied by the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. AFW sources are available from the condensate storage tanks, and alternatively, from the essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system. AFW may be supplied to the steam generators by the motor-driven AFW pumps and/or by the turbine-driven AFW pump. Continued heat removal is achieved by the controlled operation of the PORVs and continued operation of the AFW system. After reduction of RCS temperature to 350
'F, the RHR system is used to establish long-term core cooling by the removal of decay heat from the RCS to the environment via the RHR, CCS, and ERCW systems.
3.4.5 Process Monitoring Instrumentation The operator requires knowledge of various plant parameters to perform required system transitions and essential operator actions. A discussion by safe shutdown function of the necessary instrumentation is provided below.
For the fire scenarios assumed in this analysis, inventory make-up to the RCS will be from the refueling water storage tank through the RCP seal injection lines. Sufficient initial negative reactivity exists in the RCS after control rod insertion. The negative reactivity inserted by the control rods and borated water injected by the CVCS will maintain the core subcritical while cooling down from hot full power to cold shutdown. Core source range detectors will be available for core reactivity monitoring in the main control room. Source range channel indication is available in the auxiliary control room to provide this information for fires in control building areas requiring alternative shutdown.
Various process monitoring functions must be available to adequately achieve and maintain the reactor coolant makeup, pressure control and decay heat removal fulctions. For the assumed fire scenario, maintenance of hot standby requires that pressurizer level and RCS pressure instrumentation be available.
RCS temperature is maintained during hot standby by proper decay heat removal via steam generators using the steam generator PORVs. When the reactor coolant pumps are tripped and cooling is required in the natural circulation mode of operation, the difference between the hot-leg and cold-leg wide range temperatures (or saturation temperature for SG pressure) provides indication of the existence of a natural circulation condition.
RCS hot and cold leg temperature instrumentation is available for use given a fire that does not require MCR abandonment. For alternative shutdown, steam generator (SG) pressure instrumentation is required in order to provide a means of determining RCS cold-leg temperature from the ACR. (Refer to Part VII for the deviation request associated with using Tt in lieu of direct indication of T, in the ACR) During RCS cooldown, SG pressure will be controlled to maintain desired RCS temperature by control of the SG PORVs.
Operating personnel will maintain RCS pressure to assure that appropriate subcooling margin is achieved by monitoring of RCS pressure and hot leg temperature (Th) instrumentation. Manual control of the
<k,,
pressurizer heaters will be used if available, but is not required for safe shutdown. Pressurizer level control is maintained by monitoring pressurizer level instrumentation and manual control of CVCS charging flow 111-7
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 through the RCP sealsand the allowable letdown paths.
The above methods of controlling primary system parameters by means of the secondary system requires monitoring secondary system parameters.
Steam generator level and pressure indicators are available for the loops being used for cooldown to assure adequate and controlled decay heat removal.
The plant operators will utilize the instrumentation discussed above for monitoring natural circulation conditions, subcooling margin, and heat removal.
3.4.6 Support Functions The support functions for various safe shutdown equipment or systems are provided by the following systems:
(1)
Emergency Power Distribution System (2)
Onsite Electric Supply (3)
Essential Raw Cooling Water System (4)
Component Cooling Water System (5)
Ventilation to areas containing essential fire safe shutdown equipment (6)
Control Air System The following sections discuss the required safe shutdown systems and support systems.
4.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS The FSSD systems are identified by reference 11.2.1 and are listed by Key in Table III-1 and summarized as follows:
4.1 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) - Keys 1. 2. 4. 5. 6, 9. 34 The charging portion of the Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) accomplishes the following safe shutdown functions:
(1)
Reactivity control by injection of boron into the RCS (2)
Reactor coolant make-up control by seal injection (3)
Maintenance of reactor coolant pump seal integrity Reactivity control for safe shutdown is initially provided by the control rods, with subsequent boron injection used to compensate for the xenon decay and positive reactivity insertion due to cooldown. Insertion of the control and shutdown rod groups make the reactor adequately subcritical following trip from any credible operation condition to the hot zero power condition, even assuming the most reactive rod remains in the fully withdrawn position.
For the assumed post-fire scenario, make-up water to the RCS will be provided by the CVCS initially from the VCT and then from the RWST. When the unit is at power, the concentration of boron in the RWST exceeds that quantity required to bring the reactor from an initial hot standby condition to hot shutdown and then to cold shutdown.
111-8 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 K..>
Numerous CVCS paths are normally available for charging to the RCS (normal charging, seal injection, ECCS charging). The post-fire flow path normally qualified to provide reactor coolant make-up and boration is the charging line to the reactor coolant pump seals. This path will be available by ensuring that at least one of the charging pumps is operable and charging flow control valve remains open or is manually bypassed.
For the assumed event, charging and boration will be accomplished by operating a minimum of one centrifugal charging pump taking suction from the RWST and injecting borated water through the RCP seal injection line to the RCS. Suction to the charging pump can be delivered from the RWST by opening either one of two normally closed motor-operated valves.
Letdown from the RCS normally occurs via the seal leak-off return path and the normal and/or excess letdown paths. For the post-fire operational scenario, the normal and excess letdown paths may be isolated and an alternate letdown path using the pressurizer PORV or RVHV employed. Isolation of the normal and excess letdown lines may occur as a result of loss of instrument air or may be achieved by operator action to assure adequate inventory control. Procedural controls ensure isolation of all potentially spurious RCS letdown paths, including pressurizer PORVs and reactor head vents as necessary.
The injection path from the CCP to the RCP seals contains the charging flow control valve (normally open) which is provided with a minimum-flow stop on the controller. Thus, operation of one charging pump will ensure availability of minimum RCS charging flow.
Isolation of the VCT by closure of either one of two motor-operated valves during makeup from the RWST can be performed either remotely or by local manual operation. The VCT is isolated to prevent introduction of F-L covergas into the CCP suction in the event of VCT drainage.
Pressurizer water level is maintained by operation of one CCP using pressurizer level instrumentation.
The two high-head centrifugal charging pumps are normally available for the CVCS charging function and have a miniflow path through the seal water heat exchanger. The pumps require ERCW to the gear oil coolers and pump bearing oil coolers. The CCP room coolers require ERCW.
The capacity of the refueling water storage tank exceeds the makeup requirements during a fire safe shutdown event.
4.2 Reactor Coolant System - Keys 7. 8, 28, 48 The RCS consists of four similar heat transfer loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel. Each loop contains a RCP and a steam generator. In addition, the system includes a pressurizer with associated code safety and power-operated relief valves (PORVs). RCS instrumentation includes wide range cold-leg (except in ACR) and wide range hot-leg temperatures indication, pressure indication, and pressurizer water level indication.
The natural circulation capability of the plant provides a means of decay heat removal when the reactor coolant pumps are unavailable. Natural circulation flow rates are governed by the amount of decay heat, relative component elevations, primary to secondary heat transfer, loop flow resistance, steam generator and RCS inventories, and any RCS voiding. These conditions determine whether adequate primary to y j secondary heat transfer and subcooling during natural circulation can be maintained.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART HI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 For this analysis of safe shutdown capability, two of the four RCS loops (for which steam generator level and pressure are controlled) will be available to ensure that natural circulation is established and maintained. Additionally, RCPB isolation is provided to ensure subcooling margin is maintained. RCPB consists of isolation of normal letdown, excess letdown, pressurizer PORVs or blocks, RVHV and RHR letdown. Refer to the discussion on High/Low pressure boundary interfaces in Section 8.0 of this part.
While in natural circulation, adequate heat transfer and coolant flow are dependent on adequate inventory in both the primary and secondary systems. Maintaining water level in the secondary side of the steam generators and adequate level within the pressurizer are required for natural circulation. RCS loop temperatures confirm flow and heat transfer while in natural circulation.
RCS inventory control is based on the operation of CVCS charging paths as previously described.
Maintenance of either seal injection or thermal barrier cooling provides adequate protection of the RCP seals.
Letdown is provided to allow for a method of depressurizing the RCS and further boration of the RCS.
Letdown path options include normal letdown, excess letdown, RCP seal return, RVHV and pressurizer PORVs.
The pressurizer heaters are not required to operate for safe shutdown. Alternate means of controlling RCS pressure are available. However, should the pressurizer heaters be available, subcooling within the RCS can be maintained by controlled operation of the pressurizer heaters. The availability of pressurizer heaters will enhance the capability of controlling RCS pressure and subcooling margin.
4.3 Main Steam Systems - Keys 20. 21. 22, 23. 24. 25. 26 For the post-fire scenario, maintenance of the steam generator inventory and control of steam generator pressure are required for both hot standby and subsequent primary system cooldown to support the decay and sensible heat removal function, within the applicable operational limits, until initiation of RHR to bring the plant to cold shutdown.
The main steam (MS) system consists of four parallel flow paths, one from each steam generator to the main turbine of the unit. The MS system will be isolated either by operation of the turbine stop and control, dump, reheat, feed turbine stop and control, and gland steam valves; or by the main steam isolation valves.
The main feedwater system will be isolated by either the main feedwater isolation valve (MFIV), or regulating valves and bypasses, or trip of the main feedwater (MFW) pumps.
Inventory control of two steam generators provides the reactor heat removal function during natural circulation conditions. Maintenance of the steam generator water level during the period of AFW operation (hot standby) involves positioning of AFW valves and operation of the motor-driven and/or turbine-driven AFW pumps. Steam generator water level and pressure indication are available in the MCR and in the ACR.
The MS system also delivers motive steam to the turbine-driven AFW pump. Steam to the turbine is supplied by branch connections upstream of the main steam isolation valves on two steam lines (corresponding to steam generators No. 1 and 4). Either line is sufficient to supply steam for the AFW pump turbine.
A ARV provided on each steam line is capable of releasing the sensible and decay heat to the 111-10
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART 1II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 atmosphere. The SG ARVs are used for plant cooldown by steam discharge to the atmosphere since the steam dump system is assumed to be unavailable. The SG ARVs have a total combined capacity of approximately 10% of the maximum steam flow. For the assumed fire scenario, a minimum of two ARVs
-will be available to support controlled cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System. Controls for the steam generator ARVs are provided in the MCR and locally at the shutdown stations.
4.4 Auxiliary Feedwater System - Keys 11. 12. 14. 15. 16 17. 19 The AFW system is required during hot standby to support RCS decay heat removal. For hot standby, secondary system (steam generator) inventory control is provided by the AFW system. Two motor driven pumps and one turbine-driven pump are available to each unit.
The AFW system is designed to deliver enough water to maintain sufficient heat transfer in the steam generators in order to prevent loss of primary water through the RCS pressurizer safety or relief valves.
The turbine-driven AFW pump is designed to deliver sufficient flow to all four steam generators and maintain steam generator water levels. Steam generators No. 1 and/or 4 provide motive steam to the turbine driven AFWpump. The turbine-driven AFW pump is capable of operating down to a steam pressure of 90 psia, which is below the point at which the RIl system can be placed in service.
Each unit is supplied with two motor-driven AFW pumps.. Train A Pump supplies SGs 1 and 2 and Train B supplies SGs 3 and 4. The feedwater requirements can be met with either the turbine driven AFW pump or the two motor driven AFW pumps.
The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) contains a minimum volume of water required by the plant technical specification. As a backup, cross-ties to the ERCW are provided. Ample time is available post-fire for realignment of the normally closed valves that isolate ERCW from the suction of the AFW pumps.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART MI-SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 4.5 Residual Heat Removal System - Keys 30, 31, 40 The RHR system is designed to remove residual and sensible heat from the core by reducing the temperature of the RCS during the hot shutdown and cold shutdown modes.
The RHR system consists of two RHR heat exchangers, two RHR pumps and associated piping, valving and instrumentation necessary on each unit.
During hot shutdown and cold shutdown operations, reactor coolant flows from the RCS to the RHR pumps, through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers and back to the RCS. The heat load is transferred to CCS on the shell side of the RHR heat exchangers.
Two series motor-operated valves (FCV-74-1,-2) isolate the inlet line to the RHR system from the RCS. To avoid potential RCS boundary leakage at this high/low pressure interface, both of the motor operated valves in the RHR suction line will be kept closed (pre-fire condition) with the corresponding motor control center breaker in the open position. The return lines are isolated by two series check valves and a motor-operated valve in each return line.
A minimum-flow line from the downstream side of each RHR heat exchanger to the corresponding pump's suction line is provided to assure that the RHR pumps do not overheat under low flow conditions. A motor-operated valve located in each minimum flow line is opened if RHR pump flow falls below a low set point and will be closed when the flow increases above a high set point.
The cooldown rate of the reactor coolant is controlled by regulating the flow through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers. A bypass line, which serves both residual heat exchangers, is used to regulate the temperature of the return flow to the RCS as well as to maintain a minimum flow through the RHR system.
The RHR system can be placed in operation when the pressure and temperature of the RCS are about 380 psig and 350 0F, respectively. If one of the two RHR pumps and/or one of the two RHR heat exchangers is not operable, safe operation of the plant is not affected; however, the time for cooldown is extended.
Each RHR pump is sized to deliver sufficient reactor coolant flow through the residual heat exchangers to meet the plant cooldown requirements. A seal heat exchanger for each pump is cooled by CCS. RHR pump room cooling is provided by a room cooler and ERCW. Local handwheel operation of all RHR valves requiring realignment for cooldown is acceptable based on the time to achieve cold shutdown.
The RHR system safety valves (although not specifically listed in the shutdown logic) are available to provide RHR and RCS cold overpressure protection whenever the RHR system is in operation.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 4.6 Safety Iniection System Accumulators - Key 36 During normal plant operating conditions, the safety injection system accumulators are pressurized by nitrogen gas in order to inject borated water into the RCS when RCS pressure falls below 600 psi due to a LOCA. During a controlled depressurization, the accumulators are isolated to prevent injection of safety injection system accumulator borated water and nitrogen gas into the RCS. Injection of nitrogen into the RCS occurs when RCS pressure is less than 150 psi.
The manual isolation of the accumulators is assumed as a post-fire activity. The isolation valve at each accumulator is normally closed only when the RCS is intentionally depressurized below 1000 psig. The isolation maybe local, govemed by appropriate plant procedures (post-fire). In the event the valves are inaccessible, RCS pressure will be maintained greater than 150 psi to preclude nitrogen injection into the RCS via the accumulators.
4.7 Component Cooling Water System - Key70. 9, 31 CCS is a supporting system to other safe shutdown systems. Two redundant paths are available, each consisting of pump(s), heat exchanger(s), surge tank(s) and associated valves, piping and local instrumentation The CCS system serves as an intermediate heat transfer loop between the various safe shutdown components and the Essential Raw Cooling Water System (ultimate heat sink).
The CCS system provides cooling for the following safe shutdown equipment:
(1)
Residual Heat Removal exchangers (2)
Residual heat removal pumps mechanical-seal heat exchangers (3)
Reactor coolant pump thermal barrier heat exchanger (loaded on train A CCS only)
One pump and one or two component cooling heat exchangers fulfill the heat removal function during normal full-load operation and post fire SSD for various components located in the auxiliary and reactor buildings.
Other than the RHR heat exchangers, the essential loads are normally valved open to the supply header and discharge to the suction of the CCS pump with which they are normally associated, so that component cooling water is circulated continuously through the essential loads during normal operation.
The CCS outlet from the RHR heat exchangers have motor-operated valves which must be opened or remain open during RHR cooldown. The motor-operated valves that isolate the RCP thermal barrier coolers (Train A CCS only) are included as safe shutdown components for operational flexibility in a post-fire scenario, since the thermal barriers may be required to perform a diverse function to RCP seal injection.
4.8 Essential Raw Cooling Water System - Key 3 (additional ERCW is Keys 9, 13, 19.
37, 40)
The ERCW system provides cooling for the following safe shutdown heat transfer equipment (additional equipment in other keys):
(1)
Component cooling heat exchangers (2)
Emergency diesel generator heat exchangers (3)
Essential ventilation coolers and water chillers 11-13 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 The system also provides a back-up supply of water to the AFW pump suction in the event that the condensate storage tank is depleted.
This system consists of four traveling water screens and their wash pumps, eight pumps, four discharge strainers, four main supply headers (IA, 1 B, 2A, and 2B) and 2 discharge headers (A, B). These components, together with the associated heat exchangers, valving, piping and instrumentation, complete the ERCW system.
There are four ERCW pumps per train. Interlocks exist to preclude starting more than one ERCW pump on a single diesel generator. Two ERCW pumps are required per train and one train is required for FSSD.
4.9 Essential HVAC - Keys 37A, 37B. 37C. 37F,37J. 37K. 37N. 370,37R, 37S, 40 Essential HVAC is provided for the control, auxiliary, diesel generator, and reactor buildings.
Portions of the systems in each building that service safe shutdown equipment required for compliance with Appendix R have been analyzed to determine if HVAC is required and to ensure that at least one path of the required systems will be available for an Appendix R fire when required. The systems consist of filters, fans, ductwork, dampers, heating/cooling coils, instrumentation, and controls for general building ventilation, along with separate systems for individual rooms. The required systems, components, and cables for those subsystems relied on to protect equipment for safe shutdown have been incorporated into the Appendix R j
analysis as required equipment and cables. The location of equipment and routing of cables has been identified and evaluated as described in Sections 5 and 6 of this Part. These systems are discussed below.
The primary safety-related portions of the control room are cooled by tvo independent trains of HVAC. The two trains are separated by fire barriers and/or separation distance in accordance with Appendix R requirements to ensure that the control building HVAC system will remain functional during a fire in the auxiliary building except as provided by an approved deviation. Alternate shutdown is provided for a fire in the control building. The HVAC system in the control room is separate from the HVAC system servicing the ACR.
Portions of the auxiliary building HVAC system is required to achieve and maintain hot standby with subsequent cold shutdown. HVAC is required for the 480V transformer rooms (Key 37K). Individual room coolers are also required for the CCP and RHR pumps and are addressed in the equipment logics for their respective systems (Keys 37R and 40). Temporary ventilation may be used to replace fire damaged HVAC and heat loads may be reduced.
The TDAFW pump room is provided with a DC operated exhaust fan (Key 37N) sized to provide the required air flow in the room for the volume method of cooling. The fan is a roof ventilator type with intake and venting to the general area of the Auxiliary building. The fan will automatically start upon the start the TDAFW pump. If fans are not operable due to fire damage on fan electrical circuits, adequate ventilation can be achieved by opening the double doors to the room.
The diesel generator HVAC systems serve each combination of diesel, generator and associated batteries and electrical boards. The diesel generator building HVAC system consists of various subsystems.
The subsystems for each combination include diesel generator room HVAC subsystems, generator and electrical panel subsystems, battery hood exhaust subsystems, electric board room exhaust and heating 111-14 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 subsystems, and muffler room exhaust systems. A fire in any combination of diesel generator and associated batteries and electrical boards, which are separate fire areas, will not affect the HVAC systems servicing the adjacent combinations of diesel generator and associated batteries and electrical boards.
All other areas of the plant which contain equipment required for safe shutdown per Appendix R have been evaluated and determined that acceptable temperatures will be maintained for the required equipment to perform its intended FSSD function if HVAC is lost. Some areas require operator action to tum out normal lighting and other electrical loads to reduce the heat load. (i.e. Auxiliary Instrument Room K37B, 480V Board and Battery Rooms K37F, AFW/CCS and AFW/BAT Space Coolers K370, CCS/SFP Space Cooler K37P).
4.10 Electrical Power System - Key 38, 39 4.10.1 Emergency Power System The plant Emergency Power System (EPS) includes on-site, independent, automatically-starting emergency power sources that supply power to essential safe shutdown equipment if the normal off-site power sources are unavailable.
The emergency power sources consist of four 6.9kV diesel generators. Each consists of a single generator driven by two engines on a common shaft. Each diesel engine is equipped with its own auxiliaries.
These include batteries, starting air, fuel oil, lube oil, cooling water, intake and exhaust system, speed j
regulator (governor) and controls. Cooling water is provided from the ERCW system.
4.10.2 6.9KV Shutdown Power System Each of the four 6.9kV shutdown boards is normally fed from l6lkV/6.9kV common station service transformers (CSSTs) that receive power from offsite sources. Each of four 6.9kV shutdown boards can also be fed from the corresponding 6.9kV diesel generator. Loss of offsite power to the 6.9kV boards is sensed by undervoltage relays. Upon sensing an undervoltage, the master relay(s) automatically start the emergency generators, trip the normal feed switchgear breakers and trip all motor feeder breakers on the boards. The generators can also be manually started locally, from the MCR, or from the ACR. For shutdown scenarios that do not require MCR abandonment, a switchgear breaker on each board is automatically closed when its diesel generator is at rated speed and rated voltage and reenergizes the bus.
The essential loads are sequentially connected to the bus.
For shutdown scenarios from the ACR, breaker closure and diesel generator loading is done manually. The diesel generators will then supply all equipment which must operate under emergency conditions for the respective safeguard train.
4.103 480V AC Shutdown Power System The 480V shutdown power system distributes power for low voltage station service demands. The normal source of power is the 6.9kV shutdown boards via the 6.9kV/480V transformers.
The 480V shutdown power system consists of eight boards, two per unit per train. Each 480V board is fed from the associated unit/train 6.9kV shutdown board through the normal or spare 6.9kV/480V transformers. The 480V shutdown boards feed 480V loads and various MCCs. The MCCs in tum feed various motor operated valves and other loads required for safe shutdown. Each MCC has a normal and alternate power source that can be utilized when needed.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 4.10.4 120V AC Vital Instrument Power System The 120V AC Vital Instrument Power System consists of four separate vital boards per unit. Each 120V AC Vital Bus is supplied by an independent inverter. Each vital battery supplies two inverters (one per unit of the same channel) plus a standby spare shared between units for each channel. Each inverter is normally supplied by the 480V AC power system of the associated train, which is rectified and auctioneered using diodes with its respective 125V dc battery board. The spare inverter can be manually aligned as a replacement for either of the normal inverters. The spare inverter can be supplied 480V AC from either train via a manual transfer switch.
The output of each inverter is connected to its 120V AC vital instrument power board. The vital instrument power board can be supplied from its normal inverter or the spare inverter via a manual transfer switch located on the board. The vital instrument power boards supply all of the required normal safe shutdown instrumentation per channel.
4.10.5 125V DC Power System The 125V dc power system consists of four battery banks, four normal chargers, two spare chargers, and four main dc battery boards. The 125V dc power system supplies power for control of 6.9kV/480V shutdown boards, operation of vital inverters, pneumatic-operated solenoid controlled valves, and selected emergency lights. The battery system consists of four separately located sets of batteries powering four channels of dc boards. Each normal vital battery has its own normal charger. Each vital battery board can also be supplied from one of two spare chargers. The battery chargers are energized from normal or alternate MCCs via a manual transfer switch. A fifth vital battery may be used as an installed spare and can be placed into service in place of any of the four normal vital batteries. The fifth vital battery is maintained by its own charger until connected to one of the normal vital battery boards.
During normal operation, the 125V dc loads are fed from the battery chargers, with the batteries being supplied a "trickle" charge floating on the system. Upon loss of ac power, the entire dc load is drawn from the batteries. However, the battery chargers can be manually aligned to alternate power sources to take over the load and recharge their associated battery. All direct current loads associated with engineered safeguards equipment are fully redundant.
These loads are arranged so that each battery supplies its associated channel.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 k
J 4.10.6 250V DC Power System The 250V dc power system consists of two battery banks, two normal chargers, a spare charger, and two 250V dc battery boards. Control power for nonsafety-related power circuit breakers and associated protective relays is distributed from the 250V dc supply via circuit breakers on the turbine building dc distribution boards.
The 250V dc power system provides power for non-safety-related loads and, for Appendix R fire scenarios, is used to operate steam load trip circuits and to provide capabilities to trip the RCPs.
4.11 Operator Integrity - Key 41 Sufficient operator communication channels, emergency lighting, and security system access has been guaranteed for the FSSD.
4.12 Reactor Trin - Key 29 A fire inside or outside of the control building may require a reactor trip to bring the plant to hot standby. Reactor trip breaker A or B may be tripped by the handswitches in the MCR. Also, the reactor may be tripped using the motor-generator set breaker A and B.
The reactor trip provides sufficient initial reactivity control. Long term reactivity control is accomplished by preventing boron dilution and assuring that injected makeup water is at least the boron concentration of the RWST.
The reactor can be manually shut down from the main control room, or if the fire damages the reactor K ')
trip breakers, the reactor can be manually shut down by de-energizing the control rod drive motor-generators.
There are four paths to trip the reactor. For each of two trains, there is a shunt trip path and an undervoltage trip path. The shunt trip path trips the reactor by energizing the shunt trip coil in the reactor trip switchgear through a handswitch contact in the main control room. The undervoltage trip path trips the reactor by de energizing the undervoltage trip coil in the reactor trip switchgear through a handswitch contact in the main control room. For an undervoltage trip path to fail, a perfect short to another power source must occur. For a shunt trip path to fail, the path must open without shorting. It is, therefore, considered incredible that all four paths will fail in the specific manner to disable each respective path, particularly in light of the fact that the trip handswitches in the main control room each utilize all four paths simultaneously when placed in the TRIP position. In addition, the reactor may be tripped locally at the reactor trip switchgear and the motor-generator set supply breaker.. The reactor protection system will not be specifically protected from fire damage. The fail-safe design of the reactor protection system and diversity of input signals which can detect a given event provide additional protection should an event occur before the operator could manually insert the control rods. The input signal cables are run in conduit which makes them less susceptible to fire damage. Fires which occur in the control building which are more threatening to the reactor protection system are fires for which the operator will manually insert the rods quickly to allow evacuation of the main control room.
5.0 IDENTIFICATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM COMPONENTS For each system, plant flow diagrams (P&IDs), system descriptions and one-line diagrams were used to identify the precise primary flow paths and operational characteristics that must be established to accomplish the desired safe shutdown function. From this information, a list was compiled in reference 11.2.1 of the components which participate in the system's performance of its safe shutdown function. These components are:
(1)
Active components that need to be powered to establish, or assist in establishing, the primary flow path and/or the system's operation.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 (2)
Active components in the primary flow path that normally are in the proper position whose power loss will not result in a change of position, but may be affected by open, short, or ground faults in control or power cabling.
(3)
Power-operated components that need to change position to establish or assist in establishing the primary flow path, whose loss of electrical or air supplies result in the component adopting the required safe shutdown position but which may be affected by open, short or ground faults in control or power cabling.
(4)
Major mechanical components that support safe shutdown.
From the analysis of the safe shutdown system flow paths, those components whose spurious operation would threaten safe shutdown system operability were also identified in reference 11.2.1. This identification included those branch flow paths that must be isolated and remain isolated to assure that flow will not be substantially diverted from the primary flow path. See Section 7 for the detailed discussion of spurious operations.
A list was generated for safe shutdown devices including device identification and operating requirements for the various shutdown keys (ref. 11.2.1).
6.0 IDENTIFICATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CIRCUITS AND CABLES The equipment list developed during the SQN safe shutdown system analysis (ref. 11.2.1) was the K )
basic input for the identification of electrical circuits essential to ensure adequate equipment performance.
Essential safe shutdown electrical circuits were identified for the electrically-dependent devices (ref. 11.2.2)
However, for some equipment, either a subset of cables or no cables were identified. For example, cables were not selected for valves where local manual operation is allowed during cooldown. The circuits identified included power, control, and instrumentation. Type II associated circuits as addressed in Section 7 were also treated as required circuits.
The identification and analysis of these essential electrical circuits was based on one-line diagrams, schematics, and wiring diagrams from which the necessary circuit cables were selected for the subsequent cable routing and separation analysis. Circuit evaluation and identification considers equipment operability requirements. Circuits are identified for active and passive equipment. Circuit identification for high/low pressure boundary components considered the possibility of more conservative cable faults (e.g., 3 phase to 3 phase faults.)
For each electrical component, circuits and cables were identified which (1) are required for safe shutdown to ensure operability or (2) failure of which would be detrimental. The circuits not included per the above criteria included annunciator, computer, motor heaters and external monitoring circuits. Those circuits which are electrically isolated from the electrical circuits of concern, or where failure of these circuits would not affect operability, were not included in the separation analysis.
For each safe shutdown key, cable block diagrams were developed (ref. 11.2.2) for each safe shutdown component to identify cables required to ensure that the component can perform its safe shutdown function. Once the required cables were identified, the cable and conduit schedules were used to identify the individual cable physical routings in the plant on a raceway basis. Field routed conduit was located and evaluated where necessary. Reference 11.2.3 contains the physical routings.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 7.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS OF CONCERN 7.1 Introduction The separation and protection requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R apply not only to safe shutdown circuits but also to "associated" circuits which could prevent operation or cause maloperation of shutdown systems and equipment. The identification of these associated circuits of concern was performed in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 81-12, the Staffs clarification to Generic Letter 81-12, and Generic Letter 86-10. The generic letters defined associated circuits of concern as those which have a physical separation less than that required by Section III.G of Appendix R, and have one of the following:
Type I A common power source with the shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices; Type II A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability; Type III A common enclosure with the shutdown cables, and, (a) are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or (b) will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.
7.2 Associated Circuits by Common Power Sunply and Common Enclosures The electrical distribution system was reviewed to assure that Type I associated circuits by common power supply are addressed by providing selective protective trip coordination for all FSSD power supplies.
Type III associated circuits by common enclosures were addressed by ensuring that all existing circuits in Category 1 buildings are electrically protected with a fuse or breaker that will actuate prior to the jacket of existing faulted cables from reaching their auto-ignition temperature.
Electrical circuit fault protection was designed to provide protection for plant electric circuits via protective relaying, circuit breakers and fuses. Protective equipment was designed and applied to ensure adequate protection of electrical distribution equipment, including cables, from electric faults and overload conditions in the circuits. The selection and application of these devices was in accordance with TVA design practices (ref. 11.2.4) and is documented in engineering calculations (ref. 11.2.5). The protective equipment ensures that electrical fault and overloads will not result in any more cable degradation than would be expected when operating conditions are below the set point of the protective equipment. This will also limit cable damage and prevent cable faults from resulting in internal cable temperatures which could cause ignition of cable insulation.
An integral par of the original electric system protection was the proper coordination of these electrical protective devices. Such coordination assures that the protective device nearest (in an electrical sense) to the fault operates prior to the operation of any "upstream" protective devices, and provides interruption of electrical service to a minimum amount of equipment. The electrical protection design (ref.
11.2.4) required coordination of such electrical protective devices and is documented in engineering calculations (ref. 11.2.5).
7.3 Associated Circuits bv Snurious Oneration 111-19 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART MI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 Cables that are and are not part of safe shutdown circuits may be damaged by the effects of postulated fires. This cable damage may consequently prevent the correct operation of safe shutdown components, or result in the maloperation of equipment which would directly prevent the proper performance of the safe shutdown systems. The effects of spurious operations may be conceptually divided into two subclasses as follows:
(1)
Maloperation of safe shutdown equipment due to control circuit electrical interlocks between safe shutdown circuits and other circuits; for example, the numerous safe shutdown equipment automatic operation interlocks from process control and instrument circuits.
(2)
Maloperation of equipment that is not defined as part of the safe shutdown systems, but that could prevent the accomplishment of a safe shutdown function; for example, inadvertent depressurization of the RCS or the MS system by spurious opening of boundary valves.
The evaluation of Appendix R events ensures that any failure of associated circuits of concern by spurious operation (Type 1I) will not prevent safe shutdown (refer to Part X). Credible electrical faults considered in the analysis included open circuit, short circuit (conductor-to-conductor), short to ground, and cable-to-cable (hot-short) including 3-phase hot-shorts for high/low pressure interface valves (ref. 11.2.6).
Type II associated circuits of concern outside of containment are analyzed in accordance with Appendix R Sections III G.2a, IH.G.2b, and/or II.G.2c criteria as required circuits. Inside containment, Type II associated circuits of concern are analyzed in accordance with Appendix R Sections lII.G.2d, III.G.2e, and/or III.G.2f criteria as required circuits.
In order for cable faults that generate spurious operation to occur, the following conditions must exist synergistically at the cable fault location:
(1)
Sufficient energy must exist due to the fire to create failure of the cable jacket and insulating material.
(2)
The failure of the jacket and insulating material must occur in a way that directly exposes the cable conductors.
(3)
For each short, two or more specific conductors must come into direct contact causing low impedance conductor-to-conductor connections.
(4)
For certain types cf spurious operation, multiple electrically independent shorts must occur.
(5)
No additional conductors that would cause circuit fault currents and operation of circuit protective devices may participate in the short condition.
(6)
No ground faults that would cause operation of circuit protective devices must occur.
The spurious operation analysis (ref. 11.2.7) recognized the extremely low probability of certain types of these faulted conditions. The following cable short conditions causing spurious operation were considered of sufficiently low likelihood that they were assumed not to require additional analysis or modification (unless it involves high-low pressure boundary interfaces) :
CASE 1)
Three phase-ac power circuit cable-to-cable faults (6.9kV and 480V) 111-20 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. II CASE 2)
More than one conductor to conductor hot short within one fire affected cable K)(125VDC/120VAC)
CASE 3)
More than one conductor to conductor hot short between cable-to-cable faults (125VDC/120VAC)
With respect to Case 1no conductor-to-conductor faults within the same power cable can cause spurious powering of the associated device. Only power cable-to-cable connections between one deenergized and one energized power circuit could permit operation. For the case of the three-phase-ac circuit, three electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts must occur without grounds in order to power the associated device. Similarly, with respect to Cases 2 and 3, for the two-wire ungrounded de or ac power circuit, more than one conductor to conductor selective hot short with the proper polarity without grounds must occur.
The likelihood of such occurrences has been acknowledged by the NRC Staff to be sufficiently low to permit excluding such faulted conditions from consideration except for high/low pressure boundary components Therefore, for the above identified spurious operations caused by cable faults, only 3-phase hot-shorts for high/low pressure boundary interface valves and conductor-to-conductor (same cable), or cable to cable from the same power source have been incorporated into the analysis (ref. 11.2.7).
Concerning Case 1) - The fundamental basis of excluding the remaining shorts from consideration is based on the need for multiple cable-to-cable electrically independent faults in order for spurious operation to occur.
Concerning Case 2), in order for spurious operation to occur due to more than one conductor-to conductor selective hot short fault within a single cable, proper polarity without grounds must occur.
Concerning Case 3), all dc and ac control circuits at SQN are ungrounded. In order for spurious operation to occur due to circuit-to-circuit faults between dc circuits supplied from different sources, at a minimum, two electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts without grounds must occur.
For the ungrounded Motor Control Center (MCC) ac control circuits in Case 3), the identical consideration exists. The MCC transformer secondary 120V ac control circuits are ungrounded. Therefore, at a minimum, two cable-to-cable shorts must simultaneously occur in order for spurious operation to result for circuits supplied from different sources 7.4 HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULTS A sustained high impedance fault on a power cable is highly improbable. However, high impedance faults have been considered in the evaluation of the electrical power system's capability to provide power to the required fire safe shutdown equipment (ref. 11.2.5). To ensure that the upstream breaker supplying a board or distribution panel will not trip as a result of high impedance faults, the following criteria was used:
A. Determine the expected Appendix R board loading.
B. Identify the worst case high impedance fault (that is the non-Appendix R circuit that will be energized and has the largest differential between normal load current and protective device setting/rating). Assume this circuit is subjected to a high impedance fault such that its current rises to just below the trip setpoint of its associated circuit breaker.
C. Verify that the total current from A and B above will not trip the upstream feeder breakers and that there is margin available.
S 8.0 HIGH/LOW PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTERFACES Special considerations for high/low pressure interfaces to meet the requirements of 10CFR50 111-21 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART MI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 Appendix R are described in Generic Letters 81-12 and 86-10 and Information Notice 87-50. Per Generic Letter 81-12, the following information is required for high/low pressure boundary interfaces in order to ensure that they are adequately protected for the effects of a single fire:
- 1)
Identify each high/low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.
- 2)
Identify the essential cabling for each device
- 3)
Identify each location where the identified cables are separated by a barrier having less than a 3-hour fire rating
- 4)
For the areas identified in [3] above (if any), provide the bases and justification Per Generic Letter 86-10, the possibility of getting a hot short on all three phases of three phase ac circuits in the proper sequence to cause spurious operation of a motor is only required to be evaluated for cases involving high/low pressure interfaces. The same applies to ungrounded dc circuits regarding two hot shorts of proper polarity without grounding resulting in spurious operation of high/low pressure interfaces.
Per Information Notice 87-50, for those low pressure systems that connect to the reactor coolant system (a high pressure system) at least one isolation valve must remain closed despite any damage that may be caused by fire, because the high pressure from the reactor coolant system could result in failure of the low
- K,_
pressure piping.
Based on the above, a review of the systems credited for safe shutdown was conducted to identify potential high/low pressure interfaces. These interfaces were evaluated to identify valves that, if spuriously opened, would expose low pressure piping to high pressure resulting in potential failure of the low pressure system. The results are included in Keys 7 and 8 of reference 11.2.1.
The control system for RHR valves has been designed to prohibit opening unless the reactor coolant pressure is low enough to prevent RHR piping failure. However, if these valves opened spuriously, exposure of RHR piping to high pressure may cause failure of the RHR system piping and render the system inoperable. Therefore, the RHR/RCS isolation valves (1-FCV-74-1, 2) are considered high/low pressure interface valves.
Spurious opening of these valves could expose downstream piping to excess pressure that may cause failure resulting in the rupture of the primary coolant boundary. Therefore, the excess letdown isolation valves (I-FCV-62-55, -56) are considered high/low pressure interface valves.
Normal letdown is not specifically required for safe shutdown. However, spurious opening of these valves may cause failure to maintain RCS inventory control. Therefore, the normal letdown isolation valves are considered high/low pressure interface valves.
The pressurizer PORV and reactor head vent isolation valves are designed to function at high RCS operating pressure. They provide two safe shutdown functions: 1) to initially remain closed for RCS inventory control purposes, and; 2) to provide a means of depressurizing the RCS to the point that the RHR system can be initiated to bring the plant to a cold shutdown condition. Discharge from the RCS through these valves is directed to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). The inlet lines are sized to accommodate vent/relief discharge flow without piping or component failure.
Continuous letdown to the PRT may eventually cause spillage of excess coolant to containment through the PRT rupture disks. Therefore, the 111-22 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 pressurizer PORVs and block valve combinations, and reactor head vent isolation valves, are required for RCS inventory control (and RCS letdown) and are considered high/low interface valves.
9.0 LOCATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT. CABLES AND RACEWAYS The safe shutdown equipment list (Table IHI-2) identifies the equipment, components, and subcomponents relied on for fire safe shutdown (ref. 11.2.1). Safe shutdown cables were identified on block diagrams (ref. 11.2.2). The routing (conduits and tray nodes) of each safe shutdown cable was obtained from the cable and conduit schedules as needed. The route of each safe shutdown cable was plotted on physical drawings and used as part of the separation as needed (ref. 11.2.3).
10.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM SEPARATION EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 10.1 Overview of Evaluation Methodology The safe shutdown analysis first established the systems, components, and cables required for fire safe shutdown purposes. The locations of equipment and routing of cables were determined as described in previous sections. The separation criteria of Appendix R were evaluated on a fire area basis to meet the safe shutdown performance goals as identified in NRC generic letters and guidance documents.
The Appendix R analysis (refer to Part X) evaluated fire areas that contain systems, components, and cables required for fire safe shutdown. Plant structures that do not contain systems, components, or cables
..)
associated with FSSD capabilities were not included in the separation analysis. The adequacy of barriers separating safe shutdown-related buildings was evaluated.
The fire safe shutdown analysis was based on the evaluation of separation in the auxiliary, control, diesel generator, reactor building, and intake pumping station. The auxiliary building, diesel generator buildings, and the intake pumping station, were evaluated against the requirements of Appendix R Sections Il.G.1, lIH.G.2a, M.G.2b, and II.G.2c. For purposes of this analysis, the entire control building was evaluated as a single alternative shutdown location under the criteria of Appendix R Section Il.G.3 and nl.L.
Fire safe shutdown activities take place outside of the control building in the ACR and other manual action locations (ref. 11.2.9). The reactor building was analyzed in accordance with the criteria of Appendix R Sections llM.G.2d, MI G.2e, and III.G.2f. Detailed procedures have been developed to ensure fire safe shutdown capability in case of an Appendix R fire (ref. 11.2.10).
Interactions between redundant safe shutdown paths were identified based on the location of the components and cables of redundant safe shutdown paths. Interactions are defined as locations where components of redundant shutdown paths did not meet Appendix R separation criteria. These interactions were evaluated for their impact on the safe shutdown capability of the plant and the resolutions have been implemented. The resolutions may consist of modifications, use of radiant energy shielding, fire detection and suppression in the area, alternate equipment, manual operator actions, fire barrier installation, pre-fire actions, post-fire repairs (ref. 11.2.11), engineering evaluations prepared in accordance with the guidance of Generic Letter 86-10, or deviation requests (refer to Part VR 10.2 Fire Area Evaluation Methodology Separation analyses were initially evaluated for viability on a fire area basis. The fire area separation 111-23 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 analysis was effective where only a single room constituted a fire area, and where redundant capability
.,~,'
existed outside of the fire area. Large rooms and specific fire areas containing redundant trains of safe shutdown systems, components, or cables were further evaluated for purposes of separation. Where multiple rooms exist in the fire area, regulatory barriers with a 1-1/2-hour fire rating have been credited under Appendix R Section II.G.2c criteria. Where the 1-1/2-hour fire rated barriers have been credited, automatic detection and suppression capabilities on both sides of the barriers have been evaluated per Section lI.G.2c criteria.
Credit has been taken for a minimum of 20 feet of separation under Appendix R Section IH.G.2b criteria in those fire areas that contain multiple rooms not separated by regulatory fire barriers.
Section III.G.2b criteria has also been utilized in large rooms that contain redundant trains of safe shutdown capability.Section III.G.2c criteria has been applied where 20 feet of separation was not available. Section mI.G.2b criteria has been used in the large open areas of the auxiliary building and adjacent rooms which are not enclosed by regulatory fire barriers.
The fire area analysis is documented in Part X with deviations and evaluations documented in Part VII.
11.0 REFERENCES
11.1 Regulatory Documents 11.1.1 IOCFR50 Appendix R K) 11.1.2 Generic Letter 81-12, Enclosure 1 11.2 TVA Documents 11.2.1 SQN-SQS4-0127, "Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown per IOCFR50 Appendix R" 11.2.2 Electrical Equipment Block Diagrams Calculation Series, BD-K1 through BD-K48 11.2.3 TVA Drawing 45E890 Series 11.2.4 Electrical Design Criteria: SQN-DC-V-10.7, SQN-DC-V-1 1.2, SQN-DC-V-1 1.2.2, SQN DC-V-I11.4.1, SQN-DC-V-1 1.6, SQN-DC-V-1 1.6.1 11.2.5 Calculations: D2SDJ-P213350,SQN-APPR-1 SQN-APPR-2, SQN-APS-003, SQN-APS 015, SQN-CPS-051 11.2.6 SQN Detailed Design Criteria, SQN-DC-V-10.7, "10CFR50, Appendix R, Type I, II, & III Items" 11.2.7 Calculations: SQN-APPR-10, SQN-CSS-023, SQN-CSS-024 11.2.8 SQN-DC-V-24.0, "Design Criteria for Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability" 11.2.9 AOP-C.04, "Shutdown from the Auxiliary Control Roorni 11.2.10 AOP-N-08, "Appendix R Fire Safe Shutdowi'V 111-24 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 11.2.11 SMI-0-317-8, "Appendix R-Casualty Procedures" 11.2.12 DCN D20071A/P20872A "Vital Inverter Modification" 111-25 I
J-
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Key 1 Key 2 Key 3 Key 4 Key 5 Key 6 Key 7 Key 8 Key 9 Key 11 Key 12 Key 13 Key 14 & 15 Key 16 Key 17 Key 19 Key 20 Key 21 Key 22 Key 23 Key 24 Key 25 Key 26 Key 28 Key 29 Key 30 Key 31 Key 34 Key 36 Key 37A Key 37B Key37C Key 37F Key 37JLower Key 37K Key 37P Key 37N Key 370 Key 37R Key 3 8/39 Key 40 Key 41 Key 48 Key 70 Centrifugal Charging Pump Charging Flow Control Path Emergency Raw Cooling Water Path Volume Control Tank Suction RWST Suction ECCS Charging Path RCS Pressure Boundary Isolation Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Isolation Excess Letdown Isolation RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Steam Generator Level Control Using MDAFW Pump Control Air Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Generator Level Control using TDAFW Pump Suction From Condensate Storage Tank Suction from ERCW To AFW Pump Suction Main Steam Isolation Steam Load Isolation Feedwater Isolation Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Secondary Safety Valves Secondary Relief Valves RCS Pressure Control Reactor Trip RHR Shutdown Cooling Flow Paths RHR Pumps Key Normal Charging Path Accumulator Isolation Main Control Room HVAC Auxiliary Inst Rm HVAC Diesel Generator Building HVAC 480V Bd Rm & BatteryRm HVAC Compartment Coolers 480V Transformer Rooms HVAC CCS/SFP HVAC TDAFW PUMP ROOM HVAC CCS/AFW Pump Coolers and AFW/BAT Pump Coolers Centrifugal Charging Pump HVAC Electrical Power (includes Onsite and Offsite and Distribution)
RHR Pump Rm Coolers Operator Integrity (communications/lighting/access)
RCS Letdown Component Cooling System 111-26 10 Rev. I1 I
I I
I I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Shutdown Logic Component List Main Steam (1)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 1 &2-P-1 -2A I &2-P-1 -2B 1 &2-P-1 -2D I&2-FCV-1-4 I &2-FSV-I-4A I&2-FSV-1-4B I&2-FSV-I-4D 1 &2-FSV-i -4E I &2-FSV-i -4F 1&2-FSV-1-4G 1&2-FSV-i-4H I&2-FSV-1-4J 1 &2-P-1 -5 Q1
&2-PCV-1 -5 I &2-FCV-i -7 1 &2-P-1 -9A I&2-P-1-9B I&2-P-1-9D I&2-FCV-1-11 1&2-FSV-I-11A I &2-FSV-1-11 B I &2-FSV-i-11 D 1 &2-FSV-I-11 E I &2-FSV-I-11 F I &2-FSV-I-1l G I &2-FSV-1 -11 H I &2-FSV-I-11 J 1 &2-P-1 -12 1&2-PCV-1-12 1 &2-FCV-I -14 26,SI 26,SI 26 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 26,Sl 26 24 26,SI 26,SI 26 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 26,SI 26 24 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W801-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W610-1-1 47W610-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W801-1 47W801-2 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W801-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W801 -1 47W801-2 Loop I Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation loop Loop 1 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation loop Loop 1 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation loop Loop 1 MSIV Loop 1 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 1 Atmospheric Relief Valve Control Instrument loop Loop 1 Atmospheric Relief Valve Steam Generator 1 Blowdown Isolation Valve Loop 2 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 Main Steam Pressure - Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 Main Steam Pressure - Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 MSIV Loop 2 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 2 Atmospheric Relief Valve Control Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 Atmospheric Relief Valve Control SG 2 Blowdown Isolation Valve 111-27 If Rev. 11 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART HI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Shutdown Logic Component List Main Steam (1) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 1 &2-FCV-I-15 1 &2-FCV-1 -16 1&2-FCV-1-17 1&2-FCV-1-18 I &2-P-1 -20A I&2-P-1-20B 1 &2-P-1 -20D 1 &2-FCV-1 -22 I &2-FSV-1 -22A I &2-FSV-1 -22B I &2-FSV-1 -22D 1 &2-FSV-1 -22E 1 &2-FSV-1 -22F I &2-FSV-1 -22G I &2-FSV-1 -22H 1 &2-FSV-i -22J 1 &2-P-1 -23 1 &2-PCV-1 -23 I &2-FCV-1 -25 1 &2-P-1 -27A I &2-P-1 -27B 1 &2-P-1 -27D 1 &2-FCV-I -29 I&2-FSV-1-29A 1&2-FSV-i-29B I&2-FSV-1-29D l&2-FSV-1-29E 1&2-FSV-1-29F 1&2-FSV-1-29G I&2-FSV-1-29H I &2-FSV-1 -29J 14,15 47W803-2 14,15 47W803-2 14,15 47W803-2 14,15 47W803-2 26, SI 26,SI 26 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 26,SI 26 24 26,SI 26,SI 26 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W801-1 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W801-1 47W801-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W801-1 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 AFPT Steam Supply from SG No. I AFPT Steam Supply from SG No. 4 Steam Flow Isolation to AFPT Steam Flow Isolation to AFPT Loop 3 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 MSIV Loop 3 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 3 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 Atmospheric Relief Valve Steam Generator 3 Blowdown Isolation Valve Loop 4 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 4 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 4 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 4 MSIV Loop 4 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Test Solenoid 111-28 Rev. ll I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component 1&2-P-1-30 I&2-PCV-1-30 1 &2-FCV-1 -32 1 &2-FCV-1 -36 1&2-FCV-1-37 I&2-FCV-1-38 1&2-FCV-1-39 1 &2-FCV-1 -43 1 &2-FCV-1 -44 I&2-FCV-1-45 1&2-FCV-1-46
)
I&2-FCV-1 -51 1&2-FCV-l-52 1&2-FCV-1-61 I &2-FCV-1 -62 1 &2-FCV-1 -64 1 &2-FCV-1 -65 I &2-FCV-I -67 1 &2-FCV-I -68 I&2-FCV-1-70 I &2-FCV-1 -71 I &2-FCV-1 -75 I &2-FCV-I -77 1 &2-FCV-1 -79 I &2-FCV-1 -84 1 &2-FCV-1 -91 1 &2-FCV-i -98 APPENDIX C Shutdown Logic Component List Main Steam (1) (Continued)
Key Reference 26,SI 26 24 21,23 21,23 23 23 21,23 21,23 23 23 14,15 14,15 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 Drawincq Description 47W610-1-2 47W801-1 47W801-2 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W803-2 47W61 0-1-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 Loop 4 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 4 Atmospheric Relief Valve SG 4 Blowdown Isolation Valve High Pressure Stop Valve to MFPT A High Pressure Control Valve to MFPT A Low Pressure Control Valve to MFPT A Low Pressure Stop Valve to MFPT A High Pressure Stop Valve to MFPT B High Pressure Control Valve to MFPT B Low Pressure Control Valve to MFPT B Low Pressure Stop Valve to MFPT B AFPT Trip & Throttle Valve AFPT Governor Valve Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam to MSR A2 Main Steam to MSR B2 Main Steam to MSR C2 Main Steam to MSR Al Main Steam to MSR B1 Main Steam to MSR Cl 111-29 0
Rev. 11 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART HI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES APPENDIX C Shutdown Logic Component List Main Steam (1) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 1 &2-FCV-1-103 I&2-FCV-l-104 1 &2-FCV-1-105 1 &2-FCV-i -106 1 &2-FCV-i -107 1 &2-FCV-1 -108 I &2-FCV-1 -109 1 &2-FCV-1 -110 1 &2-FCV-1-111 I &2-FCV-1 -112 1 &2-FCV-I -113 1 &2-FCV-1-114 1 &2-FCV-1-147 1 &2-FCV-I-148 1 &2-FCV-1 -149 I &2-FCV-1 -150 1 &2-FCV-1 -181 I &2-FCV-1 -182 I&2-FCV-I-183 I&2-FCV-1-184 I&2-FCV-1-275 1 &2-FCV-1 -277 1 &2-FCV-1 -279 I &2-FCV-1 -284 1&2-FCV-1-291 1 &2-FCV-1 -298 I&2-VLV-1-512 I &2-VLV-1 -513 1 &2-VLV-1 -514 1 &2-VLV-1 -515 1 &2-VLV-1 -516 I &2-VLV-1 -517 I&2-VLV-1-518 I&2-VLV-1-519 1 &2-VLV-1-520 I &2-VLV-1 -521 I &2-VLV-1 -517 I &2-VLV-1 -518 I &2-VLV-1 -519 1 &2-VLV-1 -520 1 &2-VLV-1 -521 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 20 20 20 24 24 24 24 21 21 21 21 21 21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801 -1 47W801 -1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801 -1 47W801-2 47W801-2 47W801-2 47W801-2 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve MSIV Bypass Valve MSIV Bypass Valve MSIV Bypass Valve MSIV Bypass Valve SG 1 Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve SG 2 Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve SG 3 Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve SG 4 Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve MSR A2 Low Power Bypass Valve MSR B2 Low Power Bypass Valve MSR C2 Low Power Bypass Valve MSR Al Low Power Bypass Valve MSR B1 Low Power Bypass Valve MSR Cl Low Power Bypass Valve Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 3 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 3 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 3 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 3 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 3 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 111-30 Rev. 11 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES APPENDIX C Main Steam (1) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 1&2-VLV-1-522 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 1 1&2-VLV-1 -523 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 1 1&2-VLV-1 -524 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 1 1&2-VLV-1 -525 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 1 1&2-VLV-1 -526 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 1 1&2-VLV-1 -527 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 4 1&2-VLV-1 -528 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 4 1&2-VLV-1 -529 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 4 1&2-VLV-1-530 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 4 1&2-VLV-1-531 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 4 1&2-VLV-1-868 24 47W801-2 SG Blowdown Heat Exchanger Isolation Valve 1&2-VLV-1-869 24 47W801-2 SG Blowdown Heat Exchanger Isolation Valve Main & Auxiliary Feedwater (3)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description I&2-PMP-3-118 1&2-PMP-3-128 I &2-PMP-3-142 1 &2-FCV-3-33 1 &2-FCV-3-35 1 &2-FCV-3-35A 1 &2-L-3-39 1 &2-L-3-43 1 &2-FCV-3-47 1 &2-FCV-3-48 1 &2-FCV-3-48A 1 &2-L-3-52 I &2-L-3-56 I &2-FCV-3-87 I &2-FCV-3-90 1 &2-FCV-3-90A I &2-L-3-93 1 &2-L-3-94 K*
1 &2-L-3-98 1 &2-FCV-3-103A 1&2-L-3-1 06 1&2-L-3-107 11 11 47W803-2 47W803-2 14&15 47W803-2 22 22 22 47W803-1 47W803-1 47W610-3-1 12,16 47W610-3-1 12,16 47W610-3-1 22 22 22 47W803-1 47W803-1 47W610-3-1 12,16 47W610-3-1 12,16 47W610-3-1 22 22 22 12 12,16 12,16 22 12 12,16 47W803-1 47W803-1 47W610-3-2 47W610-3-2 47W610-3-2 47W610-3-2 47W610-3-2 47W61 0-3-2 47W61 0-3-2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B-B Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-S SG 1 Main Feedwater Isolation Valve SG 1 Main Feedwater Control Valve Feedwater Low Load Bypass to SG 1 SG 1 NR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 1 WR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 2 MFW Isolation Valve SG 2 MFW Control Valve Feedwater Low Load Bypass to SG 2 SG 2 NR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 2 WR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 3 MFW Isolation Valve SG 3 MFW Control Valve Feedwater Low Load Bypass to SG 3 SG 3 NR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 3 NR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 3 WR Level Instrumentation Loop Feedwater Low Load Bypass to SG 4 SG 4 NR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 4 NR Level Instrumentation Loop 111-31 Rev. 11 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Main & Auxiliary Feedwater (3) (continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description I &2-FCV-3-1 00 I &2-FCV-3-103 I &2-L-3-1 11 1 &2-FCV-3-116A 1 &2-FCV-3-116B 1 &2-FCV-3-126A 1 &2-FCV-3-126B 1 &2-FCV-3-136A 1 &2-FCV-3-136B 1 &2-P-3-138A 1 &2-F-3-142 I &2-L-3-148 I &2-LSV-3-148 1 &2-LCV-3-148
)
1&2-P-3-148 1 &2-L-3-156 1 &2-LCV-3-156 1 &2-LSV-3-156 1 &2-P-3-156 1 &2-L-3-164 1 &2-LSV-3-164 1 &2-LCV-3-164 1 &2-P-3-164 1 &2-L-3-171 1 &2-LCV-3-171 1 &2-LSV-3-171 I &2-P-3-171 1 &2-L-3-172 1 &2-LCV-3-172 1&2-LSV-3-172 22 22 12,16 19 19 19 19 19 19 47W803-1 47W803-1 47W610-3-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 14,15 47W610-3-3 14,15 47W610-3-3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 12 47W610-3-3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 16 16 16 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W61 0-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 SG 4 MFW Isolation Valve SG 4 MFW Isolation Valve SG 4 WR Level Instrumentation Loop ERCW Header A Isolation Valve ERCW Header A Isolation Valve ERCW Header B IsolationValve ERCW Header B Isolation Valve ERCW Header A Isolation Valve ERCW Header A Isolation Valve Turbine Driven AFW Pump Outlet Pressure Instrumentation Loop TDAFWP Flow Instrumentation Loop SG 3 Level Instrumentation Loop Solenoid for Loop 3 MDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 3 MDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 3 Level Bypass Pressure Switch Instrumentation Loop SG 2 Level Instrumentation Loop SG 2 MDAFWP Level Control Valve Solenoid for Loop 2 MDAFWP Level Control Valve SG 2 Level Bypass Switch Instrumentation Loop SG 1 Level instrumentation Loop Solenoid for Loop 1 MDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 1 MDAF WP Level Control Valve SG I Level Bypass Pressure Switch Instrumentation Loop SG 4 Level Instrumentation Loop SG 4 MDAF WP Level Control Valve Solenoid for Loop 4 MDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 4 Level Bypass Pressure Switch Instrumentation Loop SG 3 Level Instrumentation Loop SG 3 TDAF WP Level Control Valve Solenoid for Loop 3 TDAF WP Feed Reg Valve PS-3-140A, -140B, -150B, -160A, and -160B have been deleted by ECN-L5883 III-32 Rev. 11 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Main & Auxiliary Feedwater (3) ((
Key Reference Drawing 16 47W610-3-3 16 47W610-3-3 16 47W610-3-3 Component 1 &2-L-3-173 1 &2-LCV-3-173 I &2-LSV-3-173 1 &2-L-3-174 1 &2-LSV-3-174 1 &2-LCV-3-174 1&2-L-3-175 I &2-LCV-3-175 1 &2-LSV-3-175 1 &2-FCV-3-179A 1&2-FCV-3-179B 1 &2-FCV-3-400 I &2-FCV-3-401 1 &2-VLV-3-826 1 &2-VLV-3-827 1 &2-VLV-3-828 1 &2-VLV-3-829 1 &2-VLV-3-834 1 &2-VLV-3-835 1 &2-VLV-3-836 1 &2-VLV-3-837 I &2-VLV-3-867 1 &2-VLV-3-868 1 &2-VLV-3-877 1 &2-VLV-3-878 16 16 16 16 16 16 19 19 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 16 16 16 16 PS-3-165A and -165B have been deleted by ECN-L5883.
111-33 Rev. 11 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W61 0-3-3 47W61 0-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W61 0-3-3 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 Continued)
Description SG 2 Level Instrumentation Loop SG 2 TDAF WP Level Control Valve Solenoid for Loop 2 TDAF WP Level Control Valve SG I Level Instrumentation Loop Solenoid for Loop 1 TDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 1 TDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 4 Level Control Instrumentation Loop SG 4 TDAF WP Level Control Valve Solenoid for Loop 4 TDAF WP Level Control Valve ERCW Header B Isolation Valve ERCW Header B Isolation Valve Air operated Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-A Recirculation valve Air operated Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B-B Recirculation valve Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B-B to SG 3 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-A to SG 2 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-A to SG I Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B-B to SG 4 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B-B to SG 3 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-A to SG 2 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-A to SG 1 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-B to SG 4 TDAFW Pump Discharge Isolation Valve for SG 3 TDAFW Pump Discharge Isolation Valve for SG 2 TDAFW Pump Discharge Isolation Valve for SG 1 TDAFW Pump Discharge Isolation Valve for SG 4 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Ventilation (30)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description I &2-P-30-42 I &2-P-30-43 I &2-P-30-44 SI SI SI 1 &2-T-30-175 1 &2-T-30-176 1 &2-CLR-30-182 1 &2-CLR-30-183 1 &2-T-30-182 1 &2-T-30-183 2-CLR-30-184 2-CLR-30-185 1-CLR-30-190 1-CLR-30-191 1 &2-TS-30-214 1,2-HS-30-214 I-FAN-030-244A-A 1-FAN-030-244B-A I-FAN-030-244D-A 2-FAN-030-246A-B 2-FAN-030-246B-B 2-FAN-030-246D-B 1-FAN-030-248A-B 1-FAN-030-248B-B 1-FAN-030-248D-B I-FAN-030-250A-A 1-FAN-030-250B-A I-FAN-030-250D-A 47W866-1 47W866-1 47W866-1 40 47W866-8 40 47W866-8 37R 47W866-8 37R 47W866-8 37R 47W866-8 37R 47W866-8 370 47W866-8 370 47W866-8 370 47W866-8 370 47W866-8
- 37N, 14, 15 37N 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 1-FCO-30-443 2-FCO-30-444 1 -FCO-30-445 2-FCO-30-446 1 -FCO-30-447 1-HS-30-447B I-TS-30-447B 1-HS-30-447C 47W610-30-6 47W610-30-6 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 Containment Pressure Instrument Loop Containment Pressure Instrument Loop Containment Pressure Instrument Loop RHR Pump Room Coolers Temperature Switch Instrumentation Loop RHR Pump Room Coolers Temperature Switch Instrumentation Loop CCP Rm Clr Fan B-B CCP Rm Cir Fan A-A CCP Rm Cir Temp Control Instrumentation Loop CCP Rm Cir Temp Control Instrumentation Loop AFW & Boric Acid Xfer Pump Rm Cir A AFW & Boric Acid Xfer Pump Rm Clr B CCS & AFW Room Clr A CCS & AFW Room Cir B Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Vent Fan Temp Switch Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Vent Fan Handswitch 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling DG Building Intake Damper DG Building Intake Damper DG Building Intake Damper DC Building Intake Damper DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch 111-34 Rev. 11 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Ventilation (30) (Continued)
I Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 2-FCO-30-448 2-TS-30-448B 2-HS-30-448B 2-HS-30-448C 1 -FCO-30-449 2-TS-30-449B 1 -HS-30-449B 1-HS-30-449C 2-FCO-30-450 2-HS-30-450B 2-HS-30-450C 2-TS-30-450B 1 -FCO-30-451 1-TS-30-451B 1-HS-30-451B 1-HS-30-451C 2-TS-30-452B 2-FCO-30-452 2-HS-30-452B 2-HS-30-452C 1-FCO-30-453 1-TS-30-453B 1-HS-30-453B 1-HS-30-453C 2-FCO-30-454 2-HS-30-454B 2-TS-30-454B 2-HS-30-454C 1-FCO-30-459 1-HS-30-459B 1-HS-30-459C 2-FCO-30-460 2-HS-30-460B 2-HS-30-460C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 37C 37C 37C 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DC Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DC Building Exhaust Damper DC Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DC Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Damper Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Damper DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Damper DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch 111-35 Rev. 11 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Key Component 1-FCO-30-461 1-HS-30-461B 1-HS-30-461C 2-FCO-30-462 2-HS-30-462B 2-HS-30-462C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 14/15, 37N 40 40 40 40 1,37R 1,37R 1-FAN-30-459 2-FAN-30-460 1-FAN-30-461 1-FAN-30-462 1 -FAN-30-447
~
2-FAN-30-448 I-FAN-30-449 2-FAN-30-450 1-FAN-30-451 2-FAN-30-452 1-FAN-30-453 2-FAN-30-454 1-FAN-30-459 2-FAN-30-460 1-FAN-30-461 2-FAN-30-462 1 &2-FAN-30-214 1-CLR-30-175 I-CLR-30-176 2-CLR-30-175 2-CLR-30-176 I &2-CLR-30-183 1 &2-CLR-30-182 APPENDIX C Ventilation (30) (Continue Reference Drawinq 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-11 47W866-8 47W866-8 47W866-8 47W866-8 47W866-8 47W610-30-5 47W866-8 47W61 0-30-5 ed)
Description DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Damper DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Damper DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch E;ec Bd Room 1A-A Elec. Panel/Gen. Fan E;ec Bd Room 2A-A Elec. Panel/Gen. Fan E;ec Bd Room 1 B-B Elec. Panel/Gen. Fan E;ec Bd Room 28-B Elec. Panel/Gen. Fan DG Room IA-A Exhaust Fan 1 DG Room 2A-A Exhaust Fan 1 DG Room 1B-B Exhaust Fan I DG Room 2B-B Exhaust Fan 1 DG Room IA-A Exhaust Fan 2 DG Room 2A-A Exhaust Fan 2 DG Room 1B-B Exhaust Fan 2 DG Room 2B-B Exhaust Fan 2 DG Electric Board Room IA-A Exhaust DG Electric Board Room 2A-A Exhaust DG Electric Board Room 1B-B Exhaust DG Electric Board Room 2B-B Exhaust DC Powered TDAFW Pump Room Fan RHR Pump 1A Cooling Fan RHR Pump 1B Cooling Fan RHR Pump 2A Cooling Fan RHR Pump 2B Cooling Fan 1&2 CCP Room Cooler Fan A-A 1 &2 CCP Room Cooler Fan B-B 111-36 Rev. I1 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES A/C (Cooling & Heating) (31)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 0-HS-31A-20A 0-HS-31A-20B 0-FCO-31A-20 0-FSV-31A-20 0-T-31 A-22 0-FSV-31A-22A 0-FSV-31A-22B 0-FCO-31A-23 0-FSV-31A-23 0-HS-31A-23A 0-HS-31A-23B 0-T-31A-39 0-FSV-31A-39A 0-FSV-31A-39B 0-TCV-31A-47 & Loop S
O-TCV-31A-48 0-TCV-31A-49 0-TCV-31A-50 37A 37A 37A 37A 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 37A 37A 37A 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 0-T-31A-52 0-TCV-31A-65 & Loop 0-TCV-31A-66 & Loop 0-TCV-31A-67 & Loop 0-TCV-31A-68 & Loop 0-T-31A-70 O-P-31A-126 0-P-31A-127 0-T-31A-128 0-T-31 A-1 29 O-LG-31 A-1 30 0-LOOP-31A-131 0-T-31 A-1 32 0-T-31A-133 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 MCR Air Handling Unit Handswitch MCR Air Handling Unit Handswitch MCR Air Handling Unit Inlet Damper MCR Air Handling Unit Solenoid Valve MCR AHU Temperature Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Solenoid Valve MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Solenoid Valve MCR AHU Inlet Damper MCR AHU Solenoid Valve MCR Air Handling Unit Handswitch MCR Air Handling Unit Handswitch MCR AHU Temperature Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Solenoid Valve MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Solenoid Valve MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Air Controls Instrument Loop MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Air Control Instrument Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Pressure Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Pressure Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Temperature Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Temperature Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Oil Sump Level Glass MCR AHU Condensing Unit A-A MCR AHU Condensing Unit Oil Pump Motor Temperature Instrumentation Loop Oil Cooler MCR AHU Condensing Unit Control Instrumentation Loop 111-37 Rev. 11 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES A/C (Cooling & Heating) (31) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description O-LOOP-31A-134 O-ET-31A-136 O-P-31A-141 O-P-31A-142 0-T-31 A-143 0-T-31A-144 O-LG-31A-145 O-LOOP-31A-146 0-T-31A-147 0-T-31A-148 O-ET-31A-151 O-LOOP-31A-149 O-P-31 A-1 72 O-P-31A-1 73 0-FCO-31A-176 0-T-31A-176 0-FCO-31A-177 0-T-31A-177 O-CHR-311-126B-A O-CHR-311-141 B-B 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 MCR AHU Condensing Unit A-A MCR AHU Condensing Unit A-A Comp.
Motor Overload Transmitter MCR AHU Condensing Unit Liquid Pressure Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Liquid Pressure Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Temperature Controls Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Temperature Controls Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Oil Sump Level Glass MCR AHU Condensing Unit B-B MCR AHU Condensing Unit Oil Pump Motor Temperature Instrumentation Loop Oil Cooler HCR AHU Condensing Unit Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit B-B Comp.
Motor Overload Transmitter MCR AHU Condensing Unit B-B MCR AHU Condensing Unit Liquid Pressure Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Liquid Pressure Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Inlet Bypass Damper MCR AHU Inlet Damper Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Inlet Bypass Damper MCR AHU Inlet Damper Control Instrumentation Loop MCR Air Conditioning Unit A-A MCR Air Conditioning Unit B-B Control Air (32)
Key Reference flrwinri Comnonent 0-FSV-32-37 0-FSV-32-42 0-FSV-32-61 0-FSV-32-62 I-FCV-32-80 13 47W845-5 13 47W845-5 13 47W845-6 13 47W848-1 13 47W848-1 Station Air Compressor B Coolant Water Inlet Valve Station Air Compressor A Coolant Water Inlet Valve Auxiliary Air Compressor A-A Cooling Water Inlet Auxiliary Air Compressor A-A Unloader Valve Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation 111-38 0
Rev. II flsenintinn Component Descrintion I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART I - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component 2-FCV-32-81 0-FCV-32-82 0-PS-32-82 0-FCV-32-85 0-PS-32-85 O-FSV-32-87 Control Air (32) (continue Key Reference Drawinq 13 47W848-1 13 47W848-1 13 13 13 13 0-FSV-32-88 1-FCV-32-102 2-FCV-32-103 1 -FCV-32-1 10 K>,*
2-FCV-32-111 13 13 13 7,8,13 7,8,13 0-CMP-032-025 0-CMP-032-26 0-CMP-032-60 0-CMP-032-86 Control Circuit for Air Comp A Control Circuit for Air Comp B Control Circuit for Aux Air Comp A Control Circuit for Aux Air Comp B 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W846-1 47W846-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W846-1 47W846-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 Service Air (33)
Key Reference lnm nnnnn f
! I"MJJ Itlit
.. lOVV*1 ItA O-VLV-33-500 0-VLV-33-501 13 13 47W846-1 47W846-1 Description Station Air to Control Air Manual Isolation Station Air to Control Air Manual Isolation 111-39 Rev. 11
- d)
Description Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation Auxiliary Air Compressor A-A Auxiliary Building Isolation Auxiliary Air Compressor A-A Auxiliary Building Isolation Control Auxiliary Air Compressor B-B Auxiliary Building Isolation Valve Auxiliary Air Compressor B-B Auxiliary Building Isolation Control Auxiliary Air Compressor B-B Auxiliary Building Isolation Auxiliary Air Compressor B-B Unloader Valve Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation Station Air Compressor A Station Air Compressor B Aux Air Compressor A Aux Air Compressor B I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 Feedwater Control System (46)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1&2-FIC-46-57 14, 15 47W610-46-1 TDAFWP Flow Control Instrument Loop 1&2-SC-46-57 14, 15 47W610-46-1 TDAFWP Speed Control Instrument Loop Chemical and Volume Control System (62)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1&2-F-62-001A 1 &2-F-62-014A I &2-F-62-027A 1 &2-F-62-040A 1 &2-FCV-62-9 1 &2-FCV-62-22 1 &2-FCV-62-35 1 &2-FCV-62-48 1 &2-FCV-62-54 1 &2-FCV-62-55 1 &2-FCV-62-56 1 &2-FCV-62-69 1 &2-FCV-62-70 1 &2-FCV-62-72 2
2 2
2 48 48 48 48 8,48 8,48 8,48 7,48 7,48 7,48 1 &2-FCV-62-73 1 &2-FCV-62-74 I &2-FCV-62-84 1 &2-FCV-62-85 1 &2-FCV-62-86 1 &2-FCV-62-89 1 &2-FCV-62-90 1 &2-FCV-62-91 1 &2-FCV-62-93 I &2-F-62-93 I-FCV-62-98 2-FCV-62-98 1 -FCV-62-99 2-FCV-62-99 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 7,48 47W809-1 7,48 47W809-1 34 34 47W809-1 47W809-1 34 47W809-1 34 2,34 2,34 2,34 2
47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 1
47W809-1 1
47W809-1 I 1 47W809-1 47W809-1 RCP 1 Seal Water Flow Instrument Loop RCP 2 Seal Water Flow Instrument Loop RCP 3 Seal Water Flow Instrument Loop RCP 4 Seal Water Flow Instrument Loop RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve Excess Letdown Isolation Valve Excess Letdown Isolation Valve Excess Letdown Isolation Valve RCS Loop 3 Letdown Flow Valve RCS Loop 3 Letdown Flow Valve Regen Heat Exchanger Letdown Isolation Valve Regen Heat Exchanger Letdown Isolation Valve Regen Heat Exchanger Letdown Isolation Valve Auxiliary Spray Isolation Valve Alternate Charging Flow RCS CL loop 1 Isolation Valve Normal Charging Flow RCS CL Loop 4 Isolation Valve Charging Flow Control Valve Charging Flow Isolation Valve Charging Flow Isolation Valve Charging Header Flow Control Valve Charging Flow Instrumentation Loop Centrifugal Charging Pump Minimum Flow Isolation Valve Centrifugal Charging Pump Minimum Flow Isolation Valve Centrifugal Charging Pump Isolation Valve Centrifugal Charging Pump Isolation Valve 11140 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES APPENDIX C Chemical and Volume Control System (62) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 1 &2-PCV-62-119 1 &2-PCV-62-120 1 &2-FSV-62-125 1 &2-PCV-62-126 1 &2-L-62-129A I &2-L-62-130A 1 &2-LCV-62-132 1 &2-LCV-62-133 I &2-LCV-62-135 1 &2-LCV-62-136 1 &2-FCV-62-77 1 &2-PCV-62-81 1 &2-VLV-62-672 1 &2-FCV-62-59 1 &2-FCV-62-61 1 &2-FCV-62-63 1 &2-VLV-62-526 1 &2-VLV-62-527 1 &2-VLV-62-534 1 &2-VLV-62-533 1 &2-VLV-62-535 I &2-VLV-62-536 I &2-VLV-62-537 1 &2-VLV-62-539 1 &2-VLV-62-689 1 &2-VLV-62-692 I &2-VLV-62-693 I&2-PMP-62-108 1 &2-PMP-62-104 5
5 5
5 4
4 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 4,5 47W809-1 4,5 47W809-1 4,5 47W809-1 4,5 47W809-1 48 48 47W809-1 47W809-1 48 47W809-1 48 48 48 34 2
34 2
2 2
2 2
5 5
5 1
1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 VCT Isolation From Nitrogen VCT Isolation From Hydrogen VCT Vent Isolation VCT Vent Isolation VCT Level Instrumentation Loop VCT Level Instrumentation Loop VCT Outlet Isolation Valve VCT Outlet Isolation Valve Charging Pump Flow from RWST Charging Pump Flow from RWST Normal Letdown Isolation Valve VCT Letdown Pressure Control Valve PCV by-pass valve Excess Letdown Three-way Valve Excess Letdown Isolation Valve Excess Letdown Isolation Valve Charging Flow Manual Bypass Valve CCP A Manual Isolation to Charging Charging Flow Manual Bypass Valve CCP B Manual Isolation to Charging Charging Flow Manual Isolation Valve Charging Flow Manual Isolation Valve Charging Flow Manual Isolation Valve Charging Flow Manual Isolation Valve VCT Gas Sample Manual Isolation Manual VCT Isolation From Nitrogen Manual VCT Isolation From Hydrogen 1&2-Centrifugal Charging Pump A-A 1&2-Centrifugal Charging Pump B-B 11141 If Rev. 11 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART Im - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. II APPENDIX C Chemical and Volume Control System (62) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1 &2-PMP-62-247 I
47W610-62-2 CCP Aux Lube Oil Pump A-A 1 &2-PMP-62-244 1
47W610-62-2 CCP Aux Lube Oil Pump B-B 1 &2-LCV-62-118 48 47W809-1 VCT Level Control Valve 1 &2-RV-62-662 48 47W809-1 Normal Letdown to PRT 1&2-VLV-62-723 48 47W809-1 Normal Letdown Header Isolation Valve I &2-RV-62-636 48 47W809-1 Excess Letdown Relief Valve to PRT I&2-VLV-62-715 48 47W809-1 Excess Letdown Header Isolation Valve Safety Injection System (63)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1 &2-FCV-63-1 1 &2-FCV-63-5 1 &2-FCV-63-6 1 &2-FCV-63-7 1 &2-FCV-63-8 I&2-FCV-63-11 30 5
5 5
30 30 1 &2-FCV-63-25 1&2-FCV-63-26 1 &2-FCV-63-39 1 &2-FCV-63-40
"*1 &2-FCV-63-41
"*1 &2-FCV-63-42 1 &2-FCV-63-47 I &2-FCV-63-63 1 &2-FCV-63-65 1 &2-FCV-63-67 1 &2-FCV-63-72 1 &2-FCV-63-73 1 &2-FCV-63-80 1 &2-FCV-63-87 1 &2-F-63-091 1 &2-F-63-092 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6 6
6 47W811-1 47W81 1-1 47W811-1 47W811-1 47W811-1 47W811-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W811-1 5
47W811-1 36 36 36 5,
5, 36 36 30 30 47W811-1 47W830-6 47W811-1 47W811-1 47W811-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W811-1 47W81 1-1 RWST to RHR Pump Flow Control RWST To SIS Pump Flow Control SIS Pump Inlet To Cvcs Charging Pump SIS Pump Inlet To Cvcs Charging Pump RHR Pump Supply To Ccps Flow Control RHRP Outlet To Sip Inlet Isolation Valve SIS CCPIT Shutoff SIS CCPIT Shutoff SIS CCPIT Shutoff SIS CCPIT Shutoff SIS CCPIT TO CVCS Boric Acid Tank SIS CCPIT TO CVCS Boric Acid Tank SIS Pump IA-A Inlet Valve AT NO. 4 Nitrogen Isolation Valve AT NO. 4 Nitrogen Vent Valve AT NO. 4 Flow Isolation Valve Containment Sump Flow Isolation Valve Containment Sump Flow Isolation Valve AT NO. 3 Flow Isolation Valve AT NO. Nitrogen Isolation Valve RHR Flow Instrumentation Loop RHR Flow Instrumentation Loop
- THESE VALVES ARE CLOSED WITH CONTROL AIR REMOVED.
11142 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 Safety Injection System (63) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1 &2-FCV-63-93 30 47W811-1 RHR Pump A-A Discharge to Cold Leg 2 & 3 1&2-FCV-63-94 30 47W811-1 RHR Pump B-B Discharge to Cold Leg 1 & 4 1&2-FCV-63-98 36 47W811-1 AT NO. 2 Flow Isolation Valve 1&2-FCV-63-107 36 47W811-1 AT NO. 2 Nitrogen Isolation Valve 1 &2-FCV-63-118 36 47W81 1-1 AT NO. I Flow Isolation Valve I&2-FCV-63-127 36 47W811-1 AT NO. 1 Nitrogen Isolation Valve 1&2-FCV-63-172 30 47W811-1 RHR Hot Leg Injection Isolation Valve 1&2-HS-63-133A SI 47W811-2 SI ACTUATION Handswitch in MCR 1&2-HS-63-133B SI 47W811-2 SI ACTUATION Handswitch in MCR 1 &2-VLV-63-574 6
47W81 1-1 SIS CCPIT Outlet Valve to Boric Acid and CVCS Holdup Tanks ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER (67)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 0-FCV-67-12 0-FCV-67-14
- 1 -FCV-67-22
- 2-FCV-67-22
- 1-FCV-67-24
- 2-FCV-67-24 1 &2-FCV-67-66 1 -FCV-67-162 1-FCV-67-164 2-FCV-67-217 2-FCV-67-219 3
47W845-1 3
47W845-1 3
3 3
3 47W845-1 47W845-1 47W845-1 47W845-1 3
47W845-1 37-0 47W845-6 37-0 47W845-6 37-0 47W845-4 37-0 47W845-4 ERCW Header A Return Discharge Canal Shutoff Valve ERCW Header A Return Discharge Canal Shutoff Valve ERCW HDR 1A/2A Cross-Tie ERCW 2A/1A Cross-Tie ERCW HDR 1 B/2B Cross-Tie ERCW HDR 2B/1 B Cross-Tie DG Heat Exchanger Isolation Valve CCS & AFW Pump Space Cooler Isolation Valve CCS & AFW Pump Space Cooler Isolation Valve BA & AFW Pump Space Cooler Isolation Valve BA & AFW Pump Space Cooler Isolation Valve
- THESE VALVES HAVE POWER REMOVED 11143 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART 11 - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Key Component 1 &2-FCV-67-66 1 &2-FCV-67-67 1-FCV-67-81 2-FCV-67-81 1-FCV-67-82 2-FCV-67-82 1-FCV-67-123 2-FCV-67-123 1-FCV-67-124 2-FCV-67-124 1-FCV-67-125 2-FCV-67-125 I-FCV-67-126 2-FCV-67-126 1-FCV-67-127 2-FCV-67-127 1-FCV-67-128 2-FCV-67-128 1-FCV-67-146 2-FCV-67-146 APPENDIX C Essential Raw Cooling Water (67) (Continued)
Reference Drawina Description 3
3 3
3 3
3 47W845-1 47W845-1 47W845-2 47W845-2 47W845-2 47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 3,19 3,19 3,19 3,19 3,19 3,19 47W845-2 47W845-2 47W845-2 47W845-2 47W845-2 47W845-2 3,13 47W845-2 3
47W845-2 70 70 47W845-2 47W845-2 DG Hx Isolation Valve DG Hx Isolation Valve Auxiliary Building ERCW Supply Header 1A Isolation Valve Auxiliary Building ERCW Supply Header 2A Isolation Valve Auxiliary Building ERCW Supply Header 1 B Isolation Valve Auxiliary Building ERCW Supply Header 2B Isolation Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 1B Supply Control Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 2B Supply Control Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 1B Discharge Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 2B Discharge Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 1A Supply Control Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 2A Supply Control Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 1A Discharge Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 2A Discharge Valve Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to Air Conditioning Equipment 1A, and Service Air Compressor Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to Air Conditioning Equipment 2A Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to Air Conditioning Equipment 1B, and Service Air Compressor Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to Air Conditioning Equipment 2B CCS Heat Exchanger 1A1/1A2 Discharge Control Valve CCS Heat Exchanger 2A1/2A2 Discharge Control Valve 11144 Rev. 11 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART HI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component 1-FCV-67-147 2-FCV-67-147 0-FCV-67-151 0-FCV-67-152 1-FCV-67-168 2-FCV-67-168 1-FCV-67-170 2-FCV-67-170 Essential Raw Cooling Water (67)
Key Reference Drawinq 3
47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 70 70 3,37R 3,37R 3,37R 3,37R 1-FCV-67-188 2-FCV-67-188 40 40 40 40 1-FCV-67-190 2-FCV-67-190 0-TCV-67-197 0-TCV-67-201 0-FCV-67-205 37A 37A 13 0-FCV-67-208 1 &2-FCV-67-223 0-FCV-67-364 0-FCV-67-365 1-FCV-67-424 47W845-2 47W845-2 47W845-6 47W845-4 47W845-6 47W845-4 47W845-6 47W845-4 47W845-6 47W845-4 47W845-6 47W845-6 47W845-5 13 47W845-5 3
19 3
3 47W845-2 47W845-1 47W845-1 3,19 47W845-2 (Continued)
De.scription Cross Connect Valve, Main Supply Control Header 1A Cross Connect Valve, Main Supply Header 2B CCS Heat Exchanger 0B1I/0B2 Discharge Control Valve CCS Heat Exchanger 0BI/0B2 Discharge Control Valve Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to CCP Room Cooler 1A Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to CCP Room Cooler 2A Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to CCP Room Cooler 1 B Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to CCP Room Cooler 2B Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to RHR Pump Room Cooler IA Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to RHR Pump Room Cooler 2A Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to RHR Pump Room Cooler 1 B Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to RHR Pump Room Cooler 2B MCR A/C Discharge Isolation MCR A/C Discharge Isolation Station Service and Control Air Compressor Supply Header A Isolation Valve Station Service and Control Air Compressor Supply Header lB Isolation Valve Supply Header 1 B to Header 2A Isolation Valve Header A Return Discharge Canal Shutoff Valve Header A Return Discharge Canal Shutoff Valve ERCW HDR 1 B to HDR 2A Isolation Valve 111-45 Rev. 11 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Essential Raw Cooling Water (67) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 0-FCV-67-478 1-FCV-67-489 2-FCV-67-489 I &2-VLV-67-1073 I &2-VLV-67-1070 1-FCV-67-492 2-FCV-67-492 0-PMP-67-432 0-PMP-67-436 0-PMP-67-460 0-PMP-67-464 0-PMP-67-440 0-PMP-67-444 0-PMP-67-452 0-PMP-67-456 1-STN-67-491 2-STN-67-491 1-STN-67-490 2-STN-67-490 70,19 47W845-2 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 Supply Valve ERCW to Component Coolant Heat Exchanger 1A1/1A2 ERCW Strainer B1B-B Isolation Valve ERCW Strainer B2B-B Isolation Valve Strainer B Backwash Isolation Valve Strainer A Backwash Isolation Valve ERCW Strainer AlA-A Isolation Valve ERCW Strainer A2A-A Isolation Valve ERCW Pump J-A ERCW Pump K-A ERCW Pump Q-A ERCW Pump R-A ERCW Pump L-B ERCW Pump M-B ERCW Pump N-B ERCW Pump P-B ERCW Strainer AlA-A for Header 1A ERCW Strainer A2A-A for Header 2A ERCW Strainer B1AB-B for Header 1 B ERCW Strainer B2B-B for Header 2B ERCW Header 2A&1 B ERCW Header 2B&1A 0-PMP-67-470 0-PMP-67-477 0-PMP-67-482 0-PMP-67-487 0-SCN-67-471 0-SCN-67-475 0-SCN-67-480 0-SCN-67-485 3
47W845-1,5 3
47W845-1,5 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 Screen Wash Pump A-A Screen Wash Pump B-B Screen Wash Pump C-B Screen Wash Pump D-A Traveling Screen A-A Traveling Screen B-B Traveling Screen C-B Traveling Screen D-A 11146 Rev. 11 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Reactor Coolant (68)
Key Component 1 &2-T-68-1 1 &2-T-68-18 I &2-T-68-24 1 &2-T-68-41 1 &2-T-68-43 1 &2-T-68-60 I &2-T-68-65 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 I &2-P-68-66 1&2-P-68-69 1 &2-T-68-83 1 &2-L-68-320 1 &2-P-68-323 1 &2-FCV-68-332 1 &2-FCV-68-333 I &2-PCV-68-334 1 &2-P-68-334 1 &2-L-68-335 1 &2-L-68-339 1 &2-P-68-340 1 &2-PCV-68-340A I&2-PCV-68-340B 1 &2-PCV-68-340D I &2-P-68-342C 1 &2-FSV-68-394 1 &2-FSV-68-395 I &2-FSV-68-396 1 &2-FSV-68-397 28 28 28 2
2 SI 7,28,48 28 28 28 28,7,48 28,7,48 28,7,48 28,7,48 Reference Drawing 47W610-68-1 47W610-68-1 47W61 0-68-2 47W610-68-2 47W610-68-3 47W610-68-3 47W61 0-68-4 47W610-68-7 47W610-68-7 47W610-68-4 47W61 0-68-5 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W610-68-5 47W610-68-5 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W610-68-5 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 Description Loop 1 Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 1 Cold Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 Cold Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 Cold Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 4 Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop RCS Pressure Instrumentation Loop for PI-68-66A RCS Pressure Instrumentation Loop for PR-68-69 Loop 4 Cold Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Loop Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation Loop Pressurizer Relief Block Valve Pressurizer Relief Block Valve Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation Loop RCS Pressurizer Water Level RCS Pressurizer Water Level Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation Loop Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Spray Valve Pressurizer Spray Valve Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation Loop for PI-68-342A Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve Reactor Vessel Head Vent Throttle Valve Reactor Vessel Head Vent Throttle Valve 111-47 Rev. 1I I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component Cooling Water Sys Key Reference Drawinq 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 9
47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 Component 0-FCV-70-1 1 &2-FCV-70-2 1 &2-FCV-70-3 1 &2-FCV-70-4 1-FCV-70-8 1-FCV-70-9 1 -FCV-70-1 0 0-FCV-70-11 0-FCV-70-12 1-FCV-70-13 2-FCV-70-14 2-FCV-70-15 2-FCV-70-16 2-FCV-70-18 0-FCV-70-22 1-FCV-70-23 I-FCV-70-25 I-FCV-70-26 1 -FCV-70-27 2-FCV-70-28 2-FCV-70-29 0-FCV-70-34 0-FCV-70-39 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 0-FCV-70-40 0-FCV-70-41 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 11148 Rev. 11 stem (70)
Description SFPCS HX B Outlet Isolation Valve RHR HTX A Inlet Valve RHR HTX B Inlet Valve Miscellaneous Equip. Header Inlet Valve CCS HTX 1A1/1A2, Outlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 1A1/1A2 & 0B1/0B2, Outlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 1A1/1A2 & 0B1/0B2, Outlet Isolation Valve SFPCS Hx A Outlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 0B1I/0B2 Outlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 1A1/1A2 & 0BIB/02, Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 2A1/2A2 & 0B1/0B2, Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 2A1/2A2 Outlet Isolation Valve CCS Hx 2A1/2A21 Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 2A1/2A2 & 0BI/0B2, Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 0BIB/02 Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 1A1/1A2 & 0BI/0B2, Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 1AI/IA2 Inlet Valve CCS Pumps 1A-A and 1B-B to C-S Outlet Isolation Valve CCS Pumps 1A-A and 1B-B to C-S Outlet Isolation Valve CCS Pump 2A-A and 2B-B to C-S Outlet CCS Pump 2A-A and 2B-B to C-S Outlet Isolation Valve CCS Pump 1A-A to 1B-B Inlet Isolation Valve CCS Pump 2A-A to 2B-B Inlet Isolation Valve SFPCS Hx A Inlet Isolation Valve SFPCS Hx B Inlet Isolation Valve I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component Cooling Water System Key Reference Drawing 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 1 &2-FCV-70-75 2-FCV-70-76 2-FCV-70-78 1 &2-F-70-81 A 1 &2-F-70-81 B 1 &2-F-70-81 D 1 &2-F-70-81 E 1 &2-FCV-70-87 1 &2-FCV-70-90 I &2-FCV-70-133 1 &2-FCV-70-134 1 &2-FCV-70-153 I &2-FCV-70-156 0-FCV-70-193 1 &2-FCV-70-85 1 &2-FCV-70-143 I &2-TCV-70-192 0-FCV-70-194 2-FCV-70-195 2-FCV-70-196 70 47W859-1 70 70 9
9 9
9 9
9 9
9 70,31 70,31 70 48 48 48 70 70 70 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-4 47W859-4 47W859-1 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 Component 1-FCV-70-64 1-FCV-70-74 11149 Rev. ll I
(70) (Continued)
Description CCS Pumps 1A-A and 1B-B to C-S Inlet Isolation Valve CCS Pumps 1A-A and 1B-B to C-S Inlet Isolation Valve RHR Heat Exchanger B Return Header Isolation Valve CCS Pumps 2A-A and 28-B to C-S Inlet Isolation Valve CCS Pumps 2A-A and 28-B to C-S Inlet Isolation Valve CCS Containment Flow Instrumentation Loop CCS Containment Flow Instrumentation Loop CCS Containment Flow Instrumentation Loop CCS Containment Flow Instrumentation Loop Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Return Isolation Valve Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Return Isolation Valve Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Coolant Isolation Valve Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Coolant Isolation Valve RHR Heat Exchanger B Outlet Valve RHR Heat Exchanger A Outlet Valve SFPCS Heat Exchanger A & B Inlet Valve CCS to Excess Letdown HX CCS to Excess Letdown HX CCS to Letdown HX SFPCS Heat Exchanger A & B Inlet Valve CCS HTX 2A1/2A2 & 0B1/082, Outlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 2A1/2A2 & 0B1/0B2, Outlet Isolation Valve I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART HI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component 0-FCV-70-197 0-VLV-70-529A 0-VLV-70-529B 1 &2-VLV-70-531 0-FCV-70-198 1 &2-VLV-70-545A 1 &2-VLV-70-545B 1 &2-VLV-70-546A 1 &2-VLV-70-546B 1 &2-VLV-70-574 1 &2-VLV-70-587 O-VLV-70-601 0-VLV-70-636 1 &2-VLV-70-637 1 &2-VLV-70-661 1-PMP-70-046 1-PMP-70-038 2-PMP-70-059 2-PMP-70-033 O-PMP-70-051 1 &2-PMP-70-131 1&2-PMP-70-130 Component Cooling Water System Key Reference Drawinq 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 70 70 70 70 70 31 31 31 31 31 31 70 70 70 70 70 9
9 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-4 47W859-4 47W859-4 47W859-4 47W859-2&3 47W859-2 47W859-2 47W859-2 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 Component 1&2-FCV-72-2 1 &2-FCV-72-20 Ki I&2-FCV-72-21 1&2-FCV-72-22 Containment Spray (72)
Key Reference Drawing 5
47W812-1 5
47W812-1 5
47W812-1 5
47W812-1 Description Containment Spray Header B Isolation Valve Containment Sump Isolation to CSPs Containment Spray Pump RWST Isolation Containment Spray Pump RWST Isolation 111-50 Rev. 11 (70) (Continued)
Description SFPCS HTX Supply Header Valve SFPCS HTX A Outlet Manual Isolation Valve SFPCS HTX B Outlet Manual Isolation Valve SFPCS HTX Return Manual Isolation Valve SFPCS HTX Supply Header Valve RHR A Inlet Isolation Valve RHR B Inlet Isolation Valve RHR HTX A Outlet Valve RHR HTX IA-A Outlet Valve Non Regen Letdown HTX Manual Inlet Non Regen Letdown HTX Manual Outlet Aux Waste Evaporator Inlet isolation Aux Waste Evaporator Outlet isolation BAE&GS Inlet Isolation Valve BAE&GS Outlet Isolation Valve CCS Pump 1A-A CCS Pump 1B-B CCS Pump 2A-A CCS Pump 2B-B CCS Pump C-S RCP Thermal Barrier Booster Pump A A
RCP Thermal Barrier Booster Pump B B
I I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART 11 - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 1&2-FCV-72-23 5
47W812-1 Containment Sump Isolation to CSPs Containment Spray (72) (continued)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 1 &2-FCV-72-39 5
47W812-1 Containment Spray Header A Isolation Valve 1&2-FCV-72-40 5, 30 47W812-1 RHR Spray Header A Isolation Valve 1&2-FCV-72-41 5, 30 47W812-1 RHR Spray Header B Isolation Valve 1,2-PMP-72-27 5
47W812-1 Containment Spray Pump A-A 1,2-PMP-72-10 5
47W812-1 Containment Spray Pump B-B Residual Heat Removal (74)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1 &2-FCV-74-1 7,30 47W81 0-1 RHR System Isolation Valve 1&2-FCV-74-2 7,30 47W810-1 RHR System Isolation Valve 1&2-FCV-74-3 30 47W810-1 RHR Pump A-A Inlet Flow Control Valve 1&2-FCV-74-12 5,30 47W810-1 RHR Pump A-A Min Flow Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-16 30 47W810-1 RHR HTX A Outlet Flow Control Valve I&2-FCV-74-21 30 47W810-1 RHR Pump B-B Inlet Flow Control Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-24 5,30 47W81 0-1 RHR Pump B-B Mini Flow Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-28 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX B Outlet Flow Control Valve I &2-FCV-74-32 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX Bypass Flow Control Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-33 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX A Bypass Valve I &2-FCV-74-35 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX B Bypass Valve 1 &2-HCV-74-36 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX A Bypass Valve 1&2-HCV-74-37 30 47W810-1 RHR HTX B Bypass Valve I&2-PMP-74-10 31,4,5 47W810-1 RHR Pump A-A I&2-PMP-74-20 31,4,5 47W810-1 RHR Pump B-B Waste Disposal System (77)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 0-PCV-77-89 5
47W830-4 Waste Gas Compressor Isolation From VCT Vent Path 111-51 J.
I I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 Neutron Monitoring System (92) and Reactor Protection System (99)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description I&2-HS-RT-001 I &2-HS-RT-002 1&2-XI-92-5001B 1 &2-XI-92-5002B 1 &2-BCTF-99-CU/1 B-A 1 &2-BCTF-99-CU/1 C-B I&2-BCTB-85-DE/4D l&2-BCTB-85-DF/3B 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 47W611-99-1 47W611-99-1 47W611-99-2 47W611-99-2 47W611-99-1 47W611-99-1 47W611-99-1 47W611-99-1 111-52 Reactor Trip Hand Switch A Reactor Trip Hand Switch B Source Range Detector Count Rate N31 Source Range Detector Count Rate N31 Reactor Trip Breaker A Reactor Trip Breaker B Rod Drive Motor Generator Set Breaker Rod Drive Motor Generator Set Breaker I
I I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES TABLE III-3 Rev. 1I INSTRUMENTATION LIST FOR MAIN CONTROL ROOM Description Pressurizer Water Level Pressurizer Water Level Pressurizer Water Level Indicator LI-68-339A LI-68-320 LI-68-335A PI-68-342A PI-68-66A PI-68-69 SG-1 NR Level SG-1 NR Level PI-1-2A PI-1-2B PI-1-9A PI-1-9B PI-1-20A PI-1-20B PI-1-27A PI-1-27B LI-3-43A LI-3-174 LI-3-164 LI-3-38*
LI-3-39 LI-3-56A LI-3-156 LI-3-173 LI-3-51*
LI-3-52 LI-3-98A LI-3-172 LI-3-148 LI-3-93*
LI-3-94 IF One of three One of three Either one Either one Either one Either one
-Two Loops Required RCS WR Pressure RCS WR Pressure RCS WR Pressure SG-1 Steam Press SG-1 Steam Press SG-2 Steam Press SG-2 Steam Press SG-3 Steam Press SG-3 Steam Press SG-4 Steam Press SG-4 Steam Press SG-2 NR Level SG-2 NR Level SG-3 NR Level SG-3 NR Level SG-4 NR Level SG-4 NR Level LI-3-175 LI-3-171 LI-3-106*
LI-3-107
-Either one
, one one one 111-53 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 TABLE 111-3 INSTRUMENTATION LIST FOR MAIN CONTROL ROOM Indicator Description TI-68-1 RCS Loop I Hot Leg TI-68-18 RCS Loop 1 Cold Leg TI-68-24 RCS Loop 2 Hot Leg TI-68-41 RCS Loop 2 Cold Leg Two Loops TI-68-43 required RCS Loop 3 Hot Leg TI-68-60 RCS Loop 3 Cold Leg TI-68-65 RCS Loop 4 Hot Leg TI-68-83 RCS Loop 4 Cold Leg F-062-001 RCP 1 Seal Water Flow F-062-014 RCP 2 Seal Water Flow F-062-027 RCP 3 Seal Water Flow F-062-040 RCP 4 Seal Water Flow 1-T-062-004 RCP 1 Seal Temperature 1-T-062-017 RCP 2 Seal Temperature 1-T-062-030 RCP 3 Seal Temperature 1-T-062-043 RCP 4 Seal Temperature Source Range Flux Monitor XI-92-5001B Either one XI-92-5002B Condensate Storage Tank Level
- 1.
LI-2-230A Either one for Tank A (Note 1)
- 2.
LI-2-230D
- 3.
LI-2-233A Either one for Tank B (Note 1)
- 4.
LI-2-233D Chemical and Volume Control
- 1.
LI-62-129 (Tank Level-VCT)
Note 2
- 2.
FI-62-93A (Charging Flow)
Note 3 Note 1:
If MCR indication is not available, local monitoring of tank level or AFW suction pressure is acceptable Note 2:
Refer to key 4 for actions if this level indication is not available.
Note 3:
This indicator is only required if the normal charging path is chosen inkey2.
- Denotes steam generator level transmitters whose sense lines have been verified as being unaffected by a fire inside containment (Reference 11.21).
Only the sense lines are Appendix R equipment (i e., the cabling was not K>*
evaluated).
111-54 0
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES TABLE IH-4 INSTRUMENTATION LIST FOR AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM Pressurizer Pressure and Level Level
- 1.
2.
LI-68-325C Either one LI-68-326C Pressure
- 1.
PI-68-336C
- 2.
PI-68-337C One of three
- 3.
PI-68-342C Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Temperature TI-68-1C (Loop 1)
TI-68-24C (Loop 2)
TI-68-43C (Loop 3)
TI-68-65C (Loop 4)
All four loops Steam Generator Pressure and Level Pressure
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
4.
Level
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
4.
P1-1-C (Loop 1)
Pi-1-8C (Loop 2)
P1-1-19C (Loop 3)
P1-1-26C (Loop 4)
LIC-3-164 (Loop 1)
LIC-3-156 (Loop 2)
LIC-3-148 (Loop 3)
LIC-3-171 (Loop 4)
All four loops All four loops Source Range Flux Monitor
- 1.
XI-92-5 Level Indication for Tanks Volume Control Tank
- 1. LI-62-129C
- 2. LI-62-130C 111-55 Rev. 11
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
4.
I I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 11 TABLE MH-4 INSTRUMENTATION LIST FOR AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM Diagqnostic Instrumentation for Shutdown Systems Auxiliary Feedwater System
- 1.
FI-3-163C (Loop 1)
- 2.
FI-3-155C (Loop 2)
All four loops
- 3.
FI-3-147C (Loop 3)
- 4.
FI-3-170C (Loop 4)
- 5.
FI-3-142C (Aux FPT Disch)
Chemical and Volume Control Tank
- 1.
TI-62-80C (Ltdn Ht Exch Outlet)
- 2.
PI-62-92C (Chg Hdr Press)
- 3.
FI-62-93C (Chg Hdr Flow)
- 4.
FI-62-137C (Emer Boration)
Safety Iniection System
- 1.
FI-63-91 C (RHR Pmp A-A to RCS 2&3 CL)
Either one
- 2.
FI-63-92C (RHR Pmp B-B to RCS 1&4 CL)
Essential Raw Cooling Water
- 1.
FI-67-61 C (ERCW Supply Hdr A)
Either one
- 2.
FI-67-62C (ERCW Supply Hdr B)
- 1.
TI-74-38C (RHR Htx A Outlet Temp)
Either one
- 2.
TI-74-40C (RHR Htx B Outlet Temp) 111-56 0
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Rev. 2
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This part provides a description of the alternative shutdown capabilities used to achieve compliance with the requirements of Sections III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R. The plant design shall provide for control stations in locations removed from the main control room that may be used for manual control and alignment operations needed to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition, and subsequently to be able to achieve a cold shutdown of the reactor. For purposes of evaluating conformance to Appendix R, the Control Building at SQN is treated as a single fire area comprised of all rooms within the building. Fire rated barriers are used to separate specific rooms within the control building (ref. Part X). The Appendix R compliance strategy for the Control Building is based on ensuring alternative shutdown capability for those fires in the building that could result in abandonment of the Main Control Room (MCR). At least one redundant path of equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot standby shall remain free of fire damage. An overview of required manual operator actions associated with MCR abandonment and alternative shutdown capabilities is provided in Part III of the FPR.
2.0 DISCUSSION In order to address situations requiring MCR abandonment, SQN's original design provided for an auxiliary control system (ref. 4.1.1). This system is located outside of the Control Building and is physically independent of the Control Building (MCR, Auxiliary Control Instrument Rooms, Cable Spreading Room, etc.). The design provides appropriate means to isolate the necessary safe shutdown equipment and control features from the Control Building. The system is provided to satisfy General Design Criteria (GDC) 19 in Appendix Ato IOCFR50 and IOCFR50 Appendix R Section III.G.3 and III.L criteria.
In order to meet GDC 19 requirements, the auxiliary control system instrumentation and controls are physically remote from, and their circuits are electrically separated from, their counterparts in the MCR In order to meet Appendix R requirements, the auxiliary control system is both physically and electrically independent of the Control Building. Redundant auxiliary control system capability is not required to meet either GDC 19 or Appendix R requirements.
3.0 ALTERNATE CONTROL ROOM CAPABILITIES The principle feature of alternative shutdown capability at SQN is the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) complex. It is divided into five independent, dedicated rooms. Each room is separated from the others and from other Auxiliary Building rooms by 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers and from the Control Building by a 3-hour fire rated barrier. The five independent rooms consist of a Train A and a Train B Auxiliary Control Instrument (transfer switch) Room for each unit and an ACR containing multiple instrumentation and control panels.
The ACR is designed to be the central control point when operating in the auxiliary control mode (ref. 4.1.2). The ACR contains instrumentation and control switches with their associated transfer switches located in the auxiliary instrument rooms. Adjacent to the ACR on elevations 734 & 749 are the Shutdown Board Rooms and MOV Board Rooms. These electrical board rooms contain the necessary transfer switches and auxiliary control switches for operation of 6900 volt and 480 volt components. Instrumentation is provided in the ACR and at local stations (AFW for example) for monitoring the condition of the plant.
(Refer to the process monitoring functions for the ACR and reactor coolant system cold leg temperature IV-1 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Rev. 2 instrumentation deviation approvals in Part VII of the FPR.) Communication is established between the ACR, the electrical boards, and local control stations (ref. 4.1.2).
The instruments and controls located in the ACR are separated from, or can be electrically isolated from, the corresponding instrumentation and controls located in the MCR with approved exceptions (refer to Part VII and Ref 4.1.1). Typically, the instrumentation consists of loops dedicated to the ACR function (C suffix) and controls that are isolated from the MCR by "break before make" transfer switches (XS).
Operators are periodically trained in shutdown procedures from the ACR. The instrumentation and controls are sufficiently similar to those available in the MCR to permit a safe and orderly shutdown.
The reactor is tripped, MSIVs closed, and the TDAFW level control valves closed prior to evacuating the MCR. Spurious opening of the MSIV bypass valves and Reactor Vessel Head Vent (RVHV) valves is prevented by pulling fuses in their control circuit.
3.1 Instruments Required for Alternative Shutdown in the ACR The Unit 1 and Unit 2 instruments located in the ACR that are required for MCR abandonment are listed below (ref. 4.1.3):
- 1.
Either LI-68-325C LI-68-326C
- 2.
Either PI-68-337C PI-68-336C PI-68-342C
- 3.
TI-68-1C
- 4.
TI-68-24C
- 5.
TI-68-43C
- 6.
TI-68-65C
- 7.
PI-I-IC
- 8.
PI-l-8C
- 9.
PI-1-19C
- 10.
PI-1-26
- 11.
LIC-3-164
- 12.
LIC-3-156
- 13.
LIC-3-148
- 14.
LIC-3-171
- 15.
XI-92-5
- 16.
LI-62-129C
- 17.
FI-3-163C
- 18.
FI-3-155C
- 19.
FI-3-147C
- 20.
FI-3-170C
- 21.
FI-3-142C
- 22.
TI-62-80C
- 23.
PI-62-92C
- 24.
FI-62-93C Pressurizer Level or Pressurizer Level.
Pressurizer Pressure or Pressurizer Pressure or Pressurizer Pressure.
Reactor Coolant Hot Leg 1 Temperature Reactor Coolant Hot Leg 2 Temperature Reactor Coolant Hot Leg 3 Temperature Reactor Coolant Hot Leg 4 Temperature Steam Generator Pressure (Loop 1)
Steam Generator Pressure(Loop 2)
Steam Generator Pressure (Loop 3)
Steam Generator Pressure (Loop 4)
Steam Generator Level (Loop 1)
Steam Generator Level (Loop 2)
Steam Generator Level (Loop 3)
Steam Generator Level (Loop 4)
Source Range Flux Monitor Volume Control Tank Level Auxiliary Feedwater (Loop 1)
Auxiliary Feedwater (Loop 2)
Auxiliary Feedwatc- (Loop 3)
Auxiliary Feedwater (Loop 4)
Aux FPT Disch Ltdn Ht Exch Outlet Chg Hdr Press Chg Hdr Flow IV-2 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Rev. 2
- 25.
FI-62-137C Emer Boration
- 26.
FI-63-91C RHR Pmp A-A to RCS 2&3 CL or FI-63-92C RHR Pmp B-B to RCS l&4 CL.
- 27.
FI-67-61C RCW Supply Hdr A or FI-67-62C ERCW Supply Hdr B.
- 28.
TI-74-38C RHR Htx A Outlet Temp or TI-74-40C RHR Htx B Outlet Temp.
Additionally, instrumentation associated with the ACR DG panel is provided within the ACR.
3.2 Controls Available for Alternative Shutdown in the ACR Transfer switches are located on panels in the auxiliary instrument rooms for most non-6900V and non-480V controls needed for alternative shutdown capability. Controls are available in the ACR as necessary. Typical systems include main steam, SG blowdown, auxiliary feedwater, containment ventilation/vacuum relief, CVCS, SI accumulators, ERCW, RCS pressure control, CCS, RHR, and PRT/RCDT/RB sump controls.
3.3 Controls Available Outside the ACR for Alternative Shutdown Controls for the following equipment are located just outside the ACR on the 6.9kV Shutdown Boards and logic relay panels. There are four boards and logic panels labeled lA-A, lB-B, 2A-A, and 2B-B.
The number in () is the components available on each board.
I.
ERCW pump (2)
- 2.
Motor-driven AFW pump (1)
- 3.
RHR pump (1)
- 4.
Centrifugal charging pump (1)
- 5.
Pressurizer heaters (2 groups)
- 6.
SI pump (1)
- 7.
Containment spray pump (I)
- 8.
Normal and Alternate Supply Breakers (1 each)
- 9.
Emergency Diesel Generator (1)
Controls for the following equipment are located on the 480V Shutdown Boards. There are eight 480V shutdown boards labeled lAl-A, 1A2-A, 1B1-B, IB2-B, 2A1-A, 2A2-A, 2B1-B and 2B2-B. The number in () is the components available per unit.
- 1.
CRDM cooler fans (4)
- 2.
Lower compartment cooler fans (4)
- 3.
CCS pumps (2)
CCS swing pump, (1 normal feed and 1 alternate feed per plant)
- 4.
Flood Mode/ Backup Electric fire pumps 0)
- 5.
Shutdown Board Room Water Chiller Package (1)
IV-3 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Rev. 2 Controls for the 480 volt and miscellaneous loads are located in the 480V Board Room which are on elevation 749 above the ACR.
- 1.
Unit I and 2 480V Reactor MOV Boards (include CCS TBB pumps and BAT pumps)
- 2.
Unit 1 and 2 480V Reactor Vent Boards (RCDT pumps and RCP oil lift pumps)
Additional controls are also located on the following boards/locations:
- 1.
Unit I and 2 Diesel Generator Audliary Boards and control status
- 2.
Unit 1 and 2 6.9 KV Unit Boards (Reactor coolant pumps)
- 3.
Unit 1 and 2 AFW Control Stations
- 4.
Unit 1 and 2 Boric Acid Blenders
- 5.
Unit 1 and 2 Charging/Seal Flow The above instrumentation and controls are well in excess of that detailed in IE Information Notice 84-09 and well in excess of that required for safe alternate shutdown capability. The minimum set of equipment needed for alternate safe shutdown is that necessary for one path in the safe shutdown logic (ref.
4.1.3).
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 TVA Documents 4.1.1 SQN-DC-V-2.17, "Remote Shutdown Criteria From Locations Outside the Main Control Room" 4.1.2 AOP-C.04, 'Shutdown From Auxiliary Control Roon?'
4.1.3 SQN-SQS4-0127, "Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown per IOCFR50 Appendix R."
W4 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. II PUMP OIL COLLECTION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This part documents the methodology used to satisfy IOCFR50 Appendix R Section IIIJ & 111.0.
III.J requires emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto.
Section 111.0 requires the reactor coolant pump to be equipped with an oil collection system if the containment is not inerted during normal operation.
2.0 EMERGENCY LIGHTING Emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply are provided in areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.J. Emergency lighting is provided for Appendix R fire scenarios that require manual operator actions (ref. 4.1.1) within the first 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> in order to ensure safe shutdown capability. Turbine Building lighting has been reviewed to determine if 8-hour battery powered emergency lights would be required for fires in either the Auxiliary Building or the Control Building. The Turbine Building lights are fed from the 6.9kv Common Board (located in the Turbine Building) and will not be lost for a fire in either the Auxiliary or Control Building that would require manual action(s) in the Turbine Building. Portable lanterns are also available for performance of manual actions (ref. 4.1.2) and in the event access is required to remote areas of the site (e.g. yard, DGB, ERCW pumping station, Reactor Building). Additionally, although cable separation
- )
analysis has not been included in the safe shutdown analysis, permanently installed standby lighting powered by the shutdown boards (LS lighting cabinets) and emergency lighting powered by vital batteries (LD lighting cabinets) will contribute to the lighting levels in the plant. The DGB has lighting provided by lighting cabinets that are separated by three houifire barriers. The security system provides lighting for the yard areas.
Plant walkdowns have been conducted to assess the adequacy of the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> emergency lighting units in access/egress routes to manual action locations in the plant and at the manual action locations. The adequacy of this emergency lighting was evaluated by fire protection engineers and/or plant operators who would be responsible for performing the manual actions during an Appendix R event (ref. 4.1.3). Walkdown checklists for the emergency lighting units provided for manual action locations and access/egress routes were performed (ref. 4.1.4). Additional lighting units were added and existing units modified/adjusted to achieve additional lighting (ref. 4.1.5).
Functional tests are specified by the Surveillance Requirements (Part II, Section 14.7) and are detailed in approved instructions (ref. 4.1.6), which are performed on the emergency battery lighting units by simulating a loss of power. OR 3.7.14, SR 4.7.14 and the Bases for Section 14.7 of Part II of the FPR provide the operating and surveillance requirements, and the technical bases for those requirements.
Emergency lighting units with 8-hr battery supply are provided with unique identification numbers in the locations listed in Table V-1. The illuminated components and/or areas are also listed.
V-1
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. 11 PUMP OIL COLLECTION 3.0 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OIL COLLECTION The reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) are equipped with an oil collection system. The oil collection system is designed, engineered, and installed such that failure of oil containing components on the RCPs will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions. Additionally, there is reasonable assurance that the system will with-stand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake.
The oil collection system is capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil system. The oil leakage is safely collected and drained to a vented closed sump.
The drain piping located between the oil collection basins (around the pump) and the containment floor (oil drains to the auxiliary reactor building sump), is designed to category I (L) requirements so the piping will not fail during a safe shutdown earthquake and damage nuclear safety-related equipment. The drain piping has not been designed to maintain its pressure boundary integrity after the event. The RCP lubricating oil system, and the auxiliary reactor building sump are designed to seismic category I requirements so they will not fail during a safe shutdown earthquake (ref. 4.1.7). The total system provides more than reasonable assurance that a RCP lubricating oil fire will not occur as a result of a seismic event.
The RCP oil collection system does not have the capacity to hold the entire contents from all four RCP lubricating oil systems. The reactor coolant pump motors, the lubricating oil systems, and the auxiliary reactor building (pocket) sump are all designed to seismic category I requirements so they will not fail during a safe shutdown earthquake. Therefore, assuming only a single random failure, the oil collection system would only be required to hold the oil resulting from the largest spill due to such a single failure. The largest single failure is the rupture of the upper bearing oil system of one RCP, which contains 240 gallons of oil.
The auxiliary reactor building sump holds approximately 200 gallons. Additional storage capacity of 140 gallons is available in the embedded piping systems for a total of 340 gallons of capacity (ref. 4.1.8).
Annunciator response instructions require the operator to pump the auxiliary reactor building sump down in the event of a RCP high/low oil reservoir alarm in order to ensure adequate capacity is available for oil collection (4.1.9).
The sump vents do not require the installation of flame arresters because the high flashpoint characteristics of the reactor coolant pump lube oil preclude the hazard of fire flashback.
Refer to Part VII of this FPR for deviations to Section III.0.
V-2
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V-EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. 11 PUMP OIL COLLECTION
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 TVA Documents 4.1.1 SQN-SQS4-0127, "Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown per 10CFR50 Appendix R" 4.1.2 AOP-C.04, 'Shutdown from Auxiliary Control RoonY 4.1.3 Appendix R Project Documentation of Emergency Lighting: S01 85906 823, SO0 851223 916, S01 860214 805, S53 850822 916, S01 850517 892, S01 850424 819, SOI 860507 949 4.1.4 Memo from R. S. Egli to I. M. Heatherly, dated May 9, 1994, "Walkdown of Emergency Lighting Required for Appendix R Fire Safe Shutdown Manual Actions", (B38 940509 800) 4.1.5 Modifications to Add Additional Appendix R Lights: ECN L5984, ECN L6287, DCN M00558D, DCN M096 113B, DCN F10041A, DCN F11358A, DCN F12153A, DCN M12538A for the aiming and remote locating of 10 lamps, and DCN D20071A/P20872A for remote locating 2 lamps and the aiming of 6 lamps.
4.1.6 MI-1 0.56, "Emergency Lighting (Appendx R)"
4.1.7 Design Criteria, DC-V-3.0, "The Classification of Piping, Pumps, Valves, and Vessels."
4.1.8 Memo from J. H. Sullivan to Appendix R Project Files, "RCP Oil Collection System", SO1 841206 919 4.1.9 1- & 2-AR-M5-B, "Annunciator Response" V-3
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. 11 PUMP OIL COLLECTION TABLE V-1, 8 HOUR EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS COMP. ID 0-LGT-247-ROOI 0-LGT-247-R002 0-LGT-247-R003 0-LGT-247-R004 0-LGT-247-R005 0-LGT-247-R006 O-LGT-247-R007 0-LGT-247-R008 0-LGT-247-R009 0-LGT-247-R010 0-LGT-247-RO11 0-LGT-247-RO12 0-LGT-247-RO13 0-LGT-247-RO14 0-LGT-247-RO15 0-LGT-247-RO16 0-LGT-247-RO17 0-LGT-247-R018 0-LGT-247-RO19 COMP. ID 0-LGT-247-R020 0-LGT-247-R021 LOCATION 749.0, Stair #8 749.0, A3/r-s 749.0, A8/s 749.0, A8/s 749.0, A13/r-s 749.0, Stair #7 749.0, A13/s-t 749.0, A8/s-t 749.0, A8/s-t 749.0, A3/s-t 749.0, A14/q 749.0, A14/s 749.0, A14/t 749.0, A14/u 759.0, A12/v 759.0, A12/w 759.0, Stair #9 759.0, A4/v 759.0, A4/w LOCATION 732.0, C2/n 732.0, Stair Cl ILLUMINATED COMPONENTS Up/Dn Stairs RX MOV BD lB1-B, 1B2-B, Vital Battery Charger I and its Transfer switch, Inverters 0-I, 1-I and 2-I Vital Battery Charger II and its Transfer switch, Spare Charger 1-S and its Transfer switches, Inverters 0-II, I-II and 2-I1 Vital Battery Charger III and its Transfer switch, Spare Charger 2-S and its Transfer switches, Inverters 0-III, 1-III and 2-II1 RX MOV BD 2B1-B, 2B2-B, Vital Battery Charger IV and its Transfer switch, Inverters 0-IV, 1-IV and 2-IV Up/Dn Stairs & Door RX MOV BD 2A1-A, 2A2-A General Area General Area RX MOV BD 1AI-A, 1A2-A 2A-A Exh Fan Dampers & General Area 2A-A Exh Fan Dampers & General Area 2B-B Exh Fan Dampers & General Area 2B-B Exh Fan Dampers & General Area Stair S3 General Area Up/Dn Stairs & Doors CRDM MG SET BKR A & B, General Area CRDM MG SET BKR A & B, General Area ILLUMINATED COMPONENTS General Area, Chiller Package B, TCV-67-201 Up/Dn Stairs & Door V-4 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V-EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. 11 PUMP OIL COLLECTION TABLE V-I, 8 HOUR EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS 0-LGT-247-R022 0-LGT-247-R023 0-LGT-247-R024 0-LGT-247-R025 0-LGT-247-R026 0-LGT-247-R027 0-LGT-247-R028 0-LGT-247-R029 0-LGT-247-R030 0-LGT-247-R031 0-LGT-247-R032 0-LGT-247-R033 0-LGT-247-R034 0-LGT-247-R035 0-LGT-247-R036 0-LGT-247-R037 0-LGT-247-R038 0-LGT-247-R039 0-LGT-247-R040 0-LGT-247-R041 0-LGT-247-R042 0-LGT-247-R043 0-LGT-247-R044 732.0, C4/p 732.0, C5/n 732.0, C5/n 732.0, C6/n 732.0, C6/n 732.0, C7/n 732.0, C7/n 732.0, C8/n 732.0, C8/n 732.0, C8/n 732.0, C9/n 732.0, C1O/n-p 732.0, C9/q 732.0, C8/q 732.0, C7/q 732.0, C6/q 732.0, C6/q 732.0, C5/q 732.0, Stair C2 732.0, Cl 1/n-p 732.0, C13/n 732.0, C13/p 732.0, C2/p-q General Area, PNL l-M-9 Req by OPS Req By OPS, PNL l-M-3 Req By OPS, PNL-1-M-2 Req By OPS, PNL l-M-1 Up/Dn Corridor Req By OPS, PNL-0-M-12 OPS Req, MID MCR Desk Up/Dn Corridor Req by OPS, PNL 2-M-6 Req by OPS, PNL 2-M-6 Req by OPS, PNL 2-M-5 General Area, PNL 2-M-9 Req by OPS OPS Req, PNL 2-M-1 & 2 -M-2 General Area Req by OPS, PNL 2-M-1 Req by OPS, PNL l-M-6 General Area OPS Req, PNL l-M-5 & l-M-6 Up/Dn Stairs & Door Corridor, Doors C51 & C60 General Area General Area 0-FCO-3 1A-20,-23, and bulkhead connections to 0-FCO-31C -176,-177 V-5 0
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. 11 PUMP OIL COLLECTION TABLE V-I1, 8 HOUR EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS COMP. ID 0o-LGT-247-R045 0-LGT-247-R046 0-LGT-247-R047 0-LGT-247-R048 0-LGT-247-R049 0-LGT-247-R050 0-LGT-247-R051 0-LGT-247-R052 0-LGT-247-R053 0-LGT-247-R054 0-LGT-247-R055 0-LGT-247-R056 0-LGT-247-R057
.,)
0-LGT-247-R058 "O-LGT-247-R059 0-LGT-247-R060 0-LGT-247-R061 0-LGT-247-R062 0-LGT-247-R063 0-LGT-247-R064 0-LGT-247-R065 0-LGT-247-R066 0-LGT-247-R067 0-LGT-247-R068 LOCATION 732.0, C4/n 734.0, A12/q-r 734.0, Al3s 734.0, A14/q 734.0, A14/r 734.0, A14/t 734.0, A15/u 734.0, A13/s-t 734.0, A12/u 734.0, All/s 734.0, A10/s 734.0, Al l/r 734.0, A8/r 734.0, A8/q 734.0, A5/r 734.0, A6/s 734.0, A51s 734.0, A3/s 734.0, A3/q 734.0, A2/r 734.0, A2/t 734.0, A2/u 734.0, A3/s-t 734.0, A4/u ILLUMINATED COMPONENTS Corridor, DRS C56 & C39 General Area 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B, 213-B & General Area 480V SD BD 2A2-A & General Area 480V SD BD 2A1-A 480V SD BD 2131-B 2-PCV-1-5 Handwheel & General Area 480V SD BD 2B2-B & General Area General Area 6.9kV SD BD lB-B, 2B-B 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B, 2B-B General Area General Area General Area General Area 6.9kV SD BD IA-A, 2A-A 6.9kV SD BD lA-A, 2A-A 6.9kV SD BD lA-A, 2A-A & General Area 480V SD BD 1B2-B & General Area 480V SD BD IBl-B 480V SD BD 1Al-A 1-PCV-1-5 Handwheel & General Area 480V SD BD 1A2-A General Area, CCS PMP C-S Transfer switch via open door V-6 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. 11 PUMP OIL COLLECTION TABLE V-1, 8 HOUR EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS COMP. ID 0-LGT-247-R069 0-LGT-247-R070 0-LGT-247-R071 0-LGT-247-R072 0-LGT-247-R073 0-LGT-247-R074 0-LGT-247-R075 0-LGT-247-R076 0-LGT-247-R077 0-LGT-247-R078 0-LGT-247-R079 0-LGT-247-R080 0-LGT-247-R081 0-LGT-247-R082 0-LGT-247-R083 0-LGT-247-R084 0-LGT-247-R085 0-LGT-247-R086 0-LGT-247-R087 0o-LGT-247-R088 0-LGT-247-RO89 LOCATION LOCATION 734.0, A5/u-v 734.0, A4/u 734.0, A3/u-v 734.0, A8/u 734.0, Al 1/u-v 734.0, A12/v 734.0, A4/q 734.0, A5/q 734.0, A2/u 734.0, A3/q 734.0, Al lI/q 734.0, A12/q 734.0, A13/u 734.0, A6/q 734.0, A6/r 734.0, A1O/q 734.0, A1O/r 706.0, T2/k 706.0, T8/k-m 706.0, T8/m 706.0, Stair C1 ILLUMINATED COMPONENTS General Area General Area General Area General Area General Area General Area VBB Rm I - 125VDC VitalBatt Bd 1-I (bkrs on Pnd 2 & rear ofPnl 4) & 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-I (switch)
VBB Rm II - 125VDC VitalBatt Bd I-II (bkrs on Pnl 2 & rear ofPnl 4) &120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-II (switch) 1-PCV-1-30 Handwheel & General Area General Area VBB Rm III - 125VDC VitalBatt. Bd. 1-III (bkrs on Pnl 2 & rear ofPnl 4) & 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-III (switch)
VBB Rm IV - 125VDC VitalBatt. Bd. I-IV (bkrs onPnl 2 & rear ofPnl 4) & 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board I-IV (switch) 2-PCV-1-30 Handwheel & Isle behind 480V Shutdown Board 2B2-B PNL l-L-1IA PNL l-L-11B PNL 2-L-11A PNL 2-L-11B General Area General Area Up/Dn Stairwell Up/Dn Stairs &DoorCOMP. ID ILLUMINATED COMPONENTS V-7 0
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V -EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. 11 PUMP OIL COLLECTION TABLE V-I, 8 HOUR EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS O-LGT-247-R090 0-LGT-247-R091 0-LGT-247-R092 0-LGT-247-R093 0-LGT-247-R094 0-LGT-247-R095 0-LGT-247-R096 0-LGT-247-R097 0-LGT-247-R098 O-LGT-247-R099 0-LGT-247-RI 00 0-LGT-247-RI01 0-LGT-247-R102 0-LGT-247-R103 0-LGT-247-RI04 0-LGT-247-RI05 0-LGT-247-R106 0-LGT-247-R107 0-LGT-247-RI08 0-LGT-247-R109 0-LGT-247-R110 0-LGT-247-R1 11 0-LGT-247-R1 12 0-LGT-247-R1 13 0-LGT-247-R1 14 0-LGT-247-R1 15 0-LGT-247-R1 16 0-LGT-247-RI 17 0-LGT-247-RI 18 COMP. ID 706.0, Stair C2 714.0, A12/s 714.0, A8/s 714.0, A5ls 714.0, A3/t 714.0, A5/t 714.0, A12/t 714.0, Stair A13/u 714.0, A13/v 714.0, Al 1/v-w 714.0, A8fv 714.0, A7/w 714.0, A5/v-w 714.0, A3/v 714.0, Stair A3/u 706.0, A2/v 706.0, A2/u 714.0, A3/s 714.0, A13/s 706.0, A14/u-v 706.0, A14/u-v 706.0, A14/v 706.0, A2/u 714.0, A5/w 714.0, AlOt 714.0, AIO/s 714.0, A12/wv 706.0, T4/m 706.0, T12/m LOCATION UpfDn Stairs & Door General Area FCV-70-193, -194, -197, -198 General Area 1-VLV-3-827 & -828 & General Area General Area General Area Up/Dn Stairs & Doors 2-VLV-3-835,-834, 2-FCV-3-172,-173 General Area& 2-FCV-72-2 & -39 General Area General Area General Area & 1 -FCV-72-2 & -39 1-VLV-3-835,-834, 1-FCV-3-172,-173 Up/Dn Stair & Doors 1-LCV-3-175,-174, 1-FCV-1-18 General Area 1-VLV-3-826,-829 2-VLV-3-827,-828 & General Area 2-FCV-I-18 & General Area General Area 2-LCV-3-175,-174 General Area HSs on JB 3801 & General Area 1-FCV-67-146, 0-FCV-67-152 0-FCV-67-151, 2-FCV-67-146 HSs on JB 3804 & General Area Gen Area, Doors C28 & C29 Gen Area, Doors C34 & C35 ILLUMINATED COMPONENTS V-8 I
I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OIL COLLECTION TABLE V-1, 8 HOUR EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS 0-LGT-247-R1 19 0-LGT-247-RI 20 O-LGT-247-R121 0-LGT-247-RI22 0-LGT-247-R123 0-LGT-247-RI24 0-LGT-247-R125 0-LGT-247-R126 0-LGT-247-R127 0-LGT-247-R128 0-LGT-247-R129 0-LGT-247-RI30 0-LGT-247-RI31 0-LGT-247-R132 0-LGT-247-R133 0-LGT-247-R134 0-LGT-247-R135 0-LGT-247-R136 0-LGT-247-RI37 0-LGT-247-RI38 0-LGT-247-R139 0-LGT-247-R140 0-LGT-247-R141 0-LGT-247-R142 0-LGT-247-RI43 0-LGT-247-R144 706.0, C4/n 706.0, C4/p 706.0, C10/n 685.0, T5/j 685.0, T6/k 685.0, T8/k 685.0, T9/n 685.0, T12/j 685.0, Stair C2 685.0, C7/n 685.0, Stair Ci 685.0, C9/n 685.0, C5/n 685.0, T2/k 685.0, T8/j-k 690.0, Al/q 690.0, A2/s 690.0, A3/t-u 690.0, A4/s 690.0, A5/s 690.0, A8/t 690.0, A10/t 690.0, Al U/s 690.0, A13/t 690.0, A15/v 690.0, A13/u Corridor, Doors C30 & C58 Gen Area, Doors C29 & C58 Door C34 & Gen Area I-VLV-1-868 & General Area Station Air Compressor A & B General Area, 0-33-500, -501 Stairwell & General Area 2-VLV-1 -868 & General Area Up/Dn Stairs & Door Corridor, Doors C22 & C24 Up/Dn Stairs & Door General Area General Area Stairs, 685.0 to 706.0 & General Area N-S Aisle between J-K General Area General Area, 0-FCV-67-205, -208, 1-FCV-67-162 I-FCV-3-116A,-1 16B, Door A62, I-FCV-67-164, I-PI-3-117 1-FCV-3-126A,-126B, 1-PI-3-127 General Area General Area, i-FCV-70-153, -156 General Area, 2-FCV-70-153, -156 General Area, 2-PI-3-117 2-FCV-3-126A,-126B, Door A75 General Area General Area V-9 Rev. 11 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. 11 PUMP OIL COLLECTION TABLE V-I, 8 HOUR EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS COMP. ID O-LGT-247-R145 O-LGT-247-RI46 0-LGT-247-R147 0-LGT-247-R148 0-LGT-247-R149 0-LGT-247-RI 50 0-LGT-247-R151 0-LGT-247-R152 O-LGT-247-R153 0-LGT-247-R154 0-LGT-247-RI55 0-LGT-247-RI56 0-LGT-247-R157 O-LGT-247-R158 0-LGT-247-R159 0-LGT-247-R160 0-LGT-247-RI61 0-LGT-247-RI62 0-LGT-247-RI63 0-LGT-247-RI64 0-LGT-247-R165 0-LGT-247-R166 0-LGT-247-R167 0-LGT-247-R168 LOCATION 690.0, A13/v 690.0, A12/v-w 690.0, A9/v 690.0, A4/v 690.0, A3/v 690.0, A3/u 690.0, Al/v 690.0, Al 1/w 690.0, Al 1/w 690.0, A12/t 690.0, A5/w 690.0, A5/w 690.0, A4/u 690.0, A12/u 669.0, A4/s 669.0, A6/t 669.0, A12/s 669.0, A14/t 669.0, A13/t 669.0, A13-14/u-v 669.0, A12/u-v 669.0, A13/t 669.0, Al lit-u 669.0, A9/v ILLUMINATED COMPONENTS 2-LCV-62-132,-133, VCT Rm entrance General Area General Area General Area 1-LCV-62-132,-133, VCT Rm entrance General Area General Area 2-FCV-62-63 & General Area 2-FCV-62-77, 2-FCV-70-85,-143 & General Area 2-FCV-3-116A, -116B, 2-PI-3-127, 2-FCV-67-217, 219 1-FCV-62-63 & General Area 1-FCV-62-77, 1-FCV-70-85,-143 & General Area 1-VLV-62-692, -693 2-VLV-62-692, -693 General Area, I -L-I 12A General Area General Area 2-FCV-3-l36A,-136B,179A,-l79B, 2-PCV-3-183, 2-PI-3-137, -184 General Area, 2-XS-46-57 2-LCV-62-136, Sump Valve Box 2-VLV-62-537, 538, 539, Sump Valve Box 2-VLV-62-526, -527 2-VLV-62-533, -534 General Area N
V-1O I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. 11 PUMP OIL COLLECTION TABLE V-I, 8 HOUR EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS COMP. ID 0-LGT-247-R169 0-LGT-247-R170 0-LGT-247-R171 0-LGT-247-R172 0-LGT-247-R173 0-LGT-247-R174 0-LGT-247-R175 0-LGT-247-R176 O-LGT-247-R177 0-LGT-247-R178 0-LGT-247-R179 0-LGT-247-R180 0-LGT-247-RI81 0-LGT-247-RI82 0-LGT-247-RI83 0-LGT-247-R184 0-LGT-247-R185 0-LGT-247-R186 0-LGT-247-R187 0-LGT-247-R188 0-LGT-247-R189 0-LGT-247-RI90 0-LGT-247-RI 91 0-LGT-247-R192 0-LGT-247-R193 LOCATION 669.0, A4/u-v 669.0, A2-3/s-t 669.0, Al/t 669.0, A2/t-u 669.0, A4/u 669.0, A4/u 669.0, A2/u 669.0, A15/t 669.0, A14/u 669.0, Al 1s 669.0, A13/u 653.0, A7/u 653.0, A9/u-v 722.0, Stair D1 722.0, 722.0-1 722.0, 722.0-2 722.0, 722.0-9 722.0, 722.0-9 722.0, 722.0-9 722.0, 722.0-7 722.0, 722.0-7 722.0, 722.0-6 722.0, 722.0-6 722.0, 722.0-5 722.0, 722.0-5 ILLUMINATED COMPONENTS 1-VLV-62-537, -538, -539, Sump Valve Box 1-LCV-62-135,-136, &
General Area 1-FCV-3-136A,-l36B,-179A,-179B, 1-VLV-3-918,-919, 1-FCV-1-51 cntrls, 1-PCV-3-183, 1-PI-3-137,-184 PNL 1-L-381, 1-XS-46-57 1-VLV-62-526,-527 1-VLV-62-533,-534 1-LCV-62-135,-136, Sump Valve Box &
General Area PNL 2-L-381 2-FCV-1-51 Ctrls, 2-VLV-3-918, -919 PNL 2-L-1 12A, General Area 2-LCV-62-135,-136, Sump Valve Box, &
General Area General Area General Area Up/Dn Stair & Doors General Area General Area General Area General Area General Area Gen Area, PNL 2-L-1 63 General Area Gen Area, PNL 1-L-163 General Area Gen Area, PNL 2-L-272 General Area N
V-11 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT Rev. 11 PUMP OIL COLLECTION TABLE V-1, 8 HOUR EMERGENCY LIGHTING UNITS COMP. ID 0-LGT-247-RI 94 0-LGT-247-RI95 0-LGT-247-R196 0-LGT-247-RI97 0-LGT-247-RI98 O-LGT-247-RI99 0-LGT-247-R200 O-LGT-247-R201 0-LGT-247-R202 0-LGT-247-R203 0-LGT-247-R204 0-LGT-247-R205 0-LGT-247-R206 0-LGT-247-R207 LOCATION 722.0, 722.0-4 722.0, 722.0-4 740.5, 740.5-1 740.5, 740.5-4 740.5, 740.5-7 740.5, 740.5-10 740.5, 740.5-13 732.0, C 1O/n 749.0, A2/u 749.0, A2-3/s-t 759.0, A12/v 714.0, A13/t 759.0, A4Av 759.0, A1 l/w ILLUMINATED COMPONENTS Gen Area, PNL 1-L-272 General Area General Area 480V BD RM IA 480V BD RM 2A 480V BD RM lB 480V BD RM 2B Corridor, Doors C53 & C55 lA-A Exh Fan Dampers & General Area lA-A Exh Fan Dampers & General Area CRDM M-G Set Bkr A&B & General Area 2-VLV-3-826 & -829 & General Area PZR Heater Backup Group Distribution Panel &
General Area PZR Heater Backup Group Distribution Panel &
General Area V-12 I
ONP PROCEDURE AND INSTRUCTION CONTROL DDSBP011 TRANSMITTAL/RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT (TRA)
PAGE 01 OF 01 TO: SMITH, J.D.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page i Page Rev.
REVISION LOG i
13 TABLE OF CONTENTS i
13 PART I - INTRODUCTION I-1 1
1.0
Background
1-1 2.0 Purpose 1-1 3.0 Scope I-1 4.0 References-Appendix A Program 1-4 5.0 References-Appendix RProgram 1-7 6.0 References-Fire Protection Improvement Program (FPIP)
I-11 PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN II-1 11
1.0 Purpose and Scope
II-1 2.0 Objectives of the Fire Protection Plan II-1 3.0 Basis of the Fire Protection Plan 11-1 4.0 References 11-2 5.0 Definitions 11-5 6.0 Fire Protection Quality Assurance 11-13 7.0 Fire Protection Organization/Programs 11-14 8.0 Fire Protection Program Administrative 11-18 and Technical Controls 9.0 Emergency Response H1-20 10.0 Control of Combustibles 11-24 11.0 Control of Ignition Sources 11-25 12.0 Description of Fire Protection Systems and Features 11-26 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ii PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN(Continued)
Page Rev.
13.0 Fire Protection System Impairments and Compensatory Actions 11-36 14.0 Fire Protection Systems and Features, Operating Requirements 11-39 (OR's) and Surveillance Requirements (SR's)
PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES III-1 11 1.0 Introduction III-1 2.0 Safe Shutdown Functions 111-2 3.0 Analysis of Safe Shutdown Systems 111-3 4.0 Safe Shutdown Systems 111-8 5.0 Identification of Safe Shutdown System Components 111-17 6.0 Identification of Safe Shutdown Circuits and Cables 111-18 7.0 Associated Circuits of Concern 111-18 8.0 High/Low Pressure Boundary Interfaces 111-22 9.0 Location of Safe Shutdown Equipment, Cables 111-23 and Raceways 10.0 Safe Shutdown System Separation Evaluation Methodology 111-23 11.0 References 111-24 PART IV - ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IV-1 2
1.0 Introduction IV-1 2.0 Discussion IV-1 3.0 Alternate Control Room Capabilities IV-1 4.0 References IV-4
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REAC PUMP OIL COLLECTION 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Emergency Lighting 3.0 Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection 4.0 References PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Scope 3.0 Applicable NFPA Codes PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Deviations to IOCFR50 Appendix R 3.0 SQN 86-10 Evaluations for IOCFR50O 4.0 Deviations to BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A 5.0 NFPA Code Deviations TOR COOLANT Appendix R - Sprinkler System Criteria for Resolving Intervening Combustible Concerns PART VIII - CONFORMANCE TO APPENDIX A TO BTP 9.41 GUIDELINES PART IX - APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE MATRIX PART X - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 13 Page iii Page V-1 V-1 V-1 V-2 V-3 VI-1 VI-1 VI-1 VI-2 VII-1 VII-1 VII-1 VHl-39 VII-91 VII-99 VII-105 VIII-1 IX-1 X-1 Rev.
11 13 6
5 1
1 Re.._Xv.
11 13 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page iv LIST OF TABLES PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Table 5.1 Operational Modes 11-12 Table 3.3-11 Minimum Fire Detector Instruments Operable 11-43 Table 3.7-5 Fire Hose Stations 11-57 PART III-SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Table Ill-I Safe Shutdown Systems and Subsystems by Key 111-26 Table 111-2 Shutdown Logic Component List 111-27 Table 111-3 Instrumentation List For Main Control Room 111-58 K.>.
PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OIL COLLECTION Table V-1 8-Hour Emergency Lighting Units V4 PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS Table 2.0-1 Process Control Requirements for Validating VII-33 Appendix R Deviation Bases Table 2.2-1 Control Building Rooms Containing Redundant Safe VII-34 Shutdown Equipment without Fire Detection and/or Automatic Suppression Table 2.12-1 Auxiliary Building Rooms Containing Redundant Safe VII-35 Shutdown Equipment without Fire Detection and/or Automatic Suppression Table 2.12-2 Auxiliary Building Rooms Containing Redundant Safe VII-38 Shutdown Equipment, with only Partial Fire Detection and/or Automatic Suppression Table VII-1 Auxiliary Building Special Purpose Doors VII-107 Table VII-2 Main Control Room Bullet Resistant Security Doors VII-108
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Added Auxiliary Building Fire Rated Doors Alarmed Security Doors Certified Fire Dampers Equivalent Fire Dampers Certification/Equivalent Construction Features Added Fire Dampers in HVAC Ducts Rev. 13 Pane v Table VII-3 Table VII-4 Table VII-5 Table VII-6 Table VII-7 Table VII-8 VII-108 VII-109 VII-110 VII-1 12 VII-1 13 VII-1 14
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES Rev. 13 Page vi PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (All drawings wvill be current active version)
Figure II-1 Figure H1-2 Figure 11-3 Figure 114 Figure II-5 Figure 1H-6 Figure 11-7 Figure 11-8 Figure 11-9 Figure 11-10 Figure 11-11 Figure 11-12 Figure 11-13 Figure II-14a Figure 11-14b Figure II-14c Figure 11-15 Figure 11-16 Figure 11-17 Figure 11-18 1,2-47W850-1 1,2-47W850-2 1,2-47W850-3 1,2-47W850-4 1,2-47W850-5 1,2-47W850-6 1,2-47W850-7 1,2-47W850-8 1,2-47W850-9 1,247W850-10 1,2-47W850-11 1,2-47W850-12 1,2-47W850-20 1,2-47W850-24 1,2-47W850-26 1,247W850-27 1,2-47W843-1 1,2-47W843-2 1,247W610-26-1 1,2-47W610-26-2 Figure 11-19 1,2-47W611-26-1 Figure 11-20 1,2-47W611-26-2 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Transformer Fire Protection System Flow Diagram Transformer, Yard & MWTP HPFP Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram Fire Protection Flow Diagram CQ Storage, Fire Protection and Purging System Flow Diagram CQ Storage and Fire Protection Mechanical Control Diagrm High Pressure Fire Protection System Mechanical Control Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection System Mechanical Logic Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection Mechanical Logic Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (Continued)
Figure 11-21 1,2-47W610-39-1 Figure 11-22 Figure 11-23 Figure 11-24 Figure 11-25 Figure 11-26 Figure 11-27 Figure 11-28 Figure 11-29 Figure 11-30 Figure 11-31 Figure 11-32 Figure 11-33 Figure 11-34 Figure 11-35 Figure 11-36 Figure 11-37 Figure 11-38 Figure 11-39 Figure 11-40 1,2-47W610-39-2 1,2-47W611-39-1 1,2-47W611-39-2 1,2-47W611-13-1 1,2-47W611-13-2 1,2-47W61 1-13-3 1,2-47W611-13-4 1,2-47W611-13-5 1,2-47W611-13-6 1,2-47W611-13-7 1,2-47W600-245 1,2-47W600-246 1,2-47W600-247 1,2-47W600-248 1,2-47W600-249 1,2-47W600-250 1,2-47W600-251 1,2-47W600-252 1,2-47W600-253 Rev. 13 Page vii Mechanical Control Diagram C02 Storage Fire Protection and Purging System Mechanical Control Diagram C02 Storage Fire Protection' and Purging System Logic Diagram C02 Storage, Fire Protection Purging System Logic Diagram C02 Storage, Fire Protection and Purging System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls
Rev. 13 Page viii SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (Continued)
Figure 11-41 1,2-47W600-254 Mechanical Instrumc Figure 11-42 1,2-47W600-255 Mechanical Instrumc Figure 11-43 1,2-47W600-256 Mechanical Instrumc Figure 11-44 1,2-47W600-257 Mechanical Instrume Figure 11-45 1,2-47W600-258 Mechanical Instrunimc Figure 11-46 1,2-47W600-259 Mechanical Instmmc Figure 11-47 1,2-47W600-260 Mechanical Instrumc Figure 11-48 1,2-47W600-270 Mechanical Instrume PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Figure III-1 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Logic Diagram PART X - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Figure X-1 1,2-47W494-1 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 653 & 669 Figure X-2 1,2-47W494-2 Auxiliary Building and Reactor Building Compartmentation EL 685 & 690 Figure X-3 1,2-47W494-3 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 706 & 714 Figure X-4 1,2-47W494-4 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 732 & 734 Figure X-5 1,2-47W494-5 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 749, 759, & 763 Figure X-6 1,2-47W494-6 Control Building Compartmentation EL 669 & 685 Figure X-7 1,2-47W494-7 Control Building Compartmentation EL 706 & 732 Figure X-8 1,2-47W494-8 Diesel Generator Building Compartmentation EL 722 & 740.5 Figure X-9 1,2-47W494-9 ERCW Pumping Station Compartmentation EL 625 & 688 Figure X-10 1,2-47W494-10 ERCW Pumping Station Compartmentation EL 704 & 720 ents and Controls ents and Controls ents and Controls ents and Controls nts and Controls ents and Controls nts and Controls nts and Controls
PROCEDURE AND INSTRUCTION CONTROL TRANSMITTAL/RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT (TRA)
PAGE 01 OF 01 TO: SMITH, J.D.
HOLDER #:
001741 DCRM SQNP ADDRESS: OPS 4C-SQN TRANSMITTAL NO: 020005764 TRANSMITTAL DATE: 07/08/02 SEE ATTACHED FILING INSTRUCTIONS INFORMATION ONLY DCRM (D)
MANUAL DOCUMENT NUMBER REV REV DATE LEVEL SQNP FPR STATUS:
ACTIVE FPR IC#COVERSHEET, R13 07/08/02 IC#PART-VI, RIl 07/08/02 IC#TOC, R13 07/08/02 COPY #
001 070802 13 IC#PART-III, R12 07/08/02 IC#REV LOG, R13 07/08/02 AS THE ASSIGNED DOCUMENT HOLDER FOR THE ABOVE CONTROLLED COPY NUMBER, YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR FILING AND FOR MAINTAINING THESE DOCUMENTS.
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS NOT REQUIRED.
TVA 40183CNP 5/90) 1111111111111l i 11111111111 1111111 lll lil SQNP020005764 ONP DDSBPOL1
FILING INSTRUCTIONS PROCEDURE NUMBER PI::
Pfl=rTF.TIOlN RFPPRT I
J-REMOVE INSERT COVER SHEET - REV.12 COVER SHEET - REV.13 TOC - REV.12 TOC - REV.13 REV LOG - REV.12 REV LOG - REV.13 PART III - REV.11 PART III - REV.12 PART VI-REV.10 PART VI - REV.1 I 4-4-
4-4-
4-
+
4-I 4
TVAN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT APPROVAL PAGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Revision No.
13 Effective Date:
07/08/2002 Revision Sponsor:
SE-M/N Brenda Simnl urganizallon iame Change Approval Action Type of Impacts Action Complete REF Organization Needed?
Action (see note 1)
(Name / Signature)
Date 1
SE - M/N N/A Change Initiator N/A vwa Curator wa Curator 06/19/2002 (B F. Simnl) 2 SE - M/N Program N/A T & I Reviews 3 Yes NIA NIA Owner-N/A No N
SE - EE Program Yes T & Reviews 2 Yes 5 va Curator via Curator 06/20/2002 Owner I
No (R. L Travis) 4 OPS Procedures Yes T & I Reviews 2 Yes E]
via Curator via Curator 06/19/2002 No
[
(A F. Roddy)
PrOPStcion Yes T & I Reviews 2 Yes v via Curator wa Curator 06/24/2002 5_Protection No 0 (D. C. Johnson)
OPS FP System S2 Yes 5 via Curator via Curator 06/21/2002 Engineer Yes T_&_IReview No 0 (R. C. Egl) 7 OPS FP System Note 4 T & I Reviews 2 Yes No Engineer - N/A No N/A N/A N/A 8
N/A Note 3 Impact Review Yes NIA NIA NIA No 0N PORC Chairman via Curator wa Curator 06/27/2002 9
Chaing Yes Approval N/A (D.L Koeho (Meeting #6067)
Plant Manager via Curator via Curator 06/27/2002 10 Plant Manager Yes Approval N/A (D.L Koehi)
- 1.
- 2.
3 4.
Record any impacts of the FPR change on form FPDP-3-2, TVAN FPR Revision Impacts Technical review of the FPR change and also impact review if change is outside the design change process Additional impact reviews - as determined needed by sponsor or technical reviewers. N/A rows not needed If more than one system/system engineer is affected by the change TVA 40706 [07-2001]
Page 1 of 1 FPDP-3-1 [07-25-20011
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page iv LIST OF TABLES PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Page Table 5.1 Operational Modes 11-12 Table 3.3-11 Minimum Fire Detector Instruments Operable 11-43 Table 3.7-5 Fire Hose Stations 11-57 PART III-SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Table I1-1 Safe Shutdown Systems and Subsystems by Key 111-26 Table 111-2 Shutdown Logic Component List 111-27 Table 111-3 Instrumentation List For Main Control Room 111-58 PART V - EMERGENCY LIGHTING AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OIL COLLECTION Table V-I 8-Hour Emergency Lighting Units V4 PART VII - DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS Table 2.0-1 Process Control Requirements for Validating VII-33 Appendix R Deviation Bases Table 2.2-1 Control Building Rooms Containing Redundant Safe VII-34 Shutdown Equipment, without Fire Detection and/or Automatic Suppression Table 2.12-1 Auxiliary Building Rooms Containing Redundant Safe VII-35 Shutdown Equipment, without Fire Detection and/or Automatic Suppression Table 2.12-2 Auxiliary Building Rooms Containing Redundant Safe VII-38 Shutdown Equipment, with only Partial Fire Detection and/or Automatic Suppression Table VII-1 Auxiliary Building Special Purpose Doors VII-107 Table VII-2 Main Control Room Bullet Resistant Security Doors VII-108 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Added Auxiliary Building Fire Rated Doors Alarmed Security Doors Certified Fire Dampers Equivalent Fire Dampers Certification/Equivalent Construction Features Added Fire Dampers in HVAC Ducts Rev. 13 Pane v Table VII-3 Table VII-4 Table VII-5 Table VII-6 Table VII-7 Table VII-8 VII-108 VII-109 VII-110 VII-1 12 VII-113 VII-1 14 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Ni LIST OF FIGURES PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (All drawings will be current active version)
Figure II-1 1,2-47W850-1 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-2 1,2-47W850-2 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-3 1,2-47W850-3 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-4 1,2-47W850-4 Flow Diagram Transformer Fire Protection System Figure 11-5 1,2-47W850-5 Flow Diagram Transformer, Yard & MWTP LHPFP Figure 11-6 1,2-47W850-6 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-7 1,2-47W850-7 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-8 1,2-47W850-8 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-9 1,2-47W850-9 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-10 1,2-47W850-10 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-11 1,2-47W850-11 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-12 1,2-47W850-12 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-13 1,2-47W850-20 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure II-14a 1,2-47W850-24 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-14b 1,2-47W850-26 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure II-14c 1,2-47W850-27 Flow Diagram Fire Protection Figure 11-15 1,2-47W843-1 Flow Diagram CQ Storage, Fire Protection and Purging System Figure 11-16 1,2-47W843-2 Flow Diagram CQ Storage and Fire Protection Figure 11-17 1,2-47W610-26-1 Mechanical Control Diagrm High Pressure Fire Protection System Figure 11-18 1,2-47W610-26-2 Mechanical Control Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection System Figure 11-19 1,2-47W611-26-1 Mechanical Logic Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection Figure 11-20 1,2-47W611-26-2 Mechanical Logic Diagram High Pressure Fire Protection
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES PART U - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (Continued)
Figure 11-21 1,2-47W610-39-1 Figure 11-22 Figure 11-23 Figure 11-24 Figure 11-25 Figure 11-26 Figure 11-27 Figure 11-28 Figure 11-29 Figure 11-30 Figure 11-31 Figure 11-32 Figure 11-33 Figure 11-34 Figure 11-35 Figure 11-36 Figure 11-37 Figure 11-38 Figure 11-39 Figure 11-40 1,2-47W610-39-2 1,2-47W611-39-1 1,2-47W611-39-2 1,2-47W611-13-1 1,2-47W611-13-2 1,2-47W611-13-3 1,2-47W611-13-4 1,2-47W611-13-5 1,2-47W611-13-6 1,2-47W611-13-7 1,2-47W600-245 1,2-47W600-246 1,2-47W600-247 1,2-47W600-248 1,2-47W600-249 1,2-47W600-250 1,2-47W600-251 1,2-47W600-252 1,2-47W600-253 Rev. 13 Page vii Mechanical Control Diagram C02 Storage Fire Protection and Purging System Mechanical Control Diagram C02 Storage Fire Protection and Purging System Logic Diagram C02 Storage, Fire Protection Purging System Logic Diagram C02 Storage, Fire Protection and Purging System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Logic Diagram Fire Detection System Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls Mechanical Instruments and Controls I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Rev. 13 Page viii LIST OF FIGURES PART H - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (Continued)
Figure 11-41 1,2-47W600-254 Mechanical Instruments and Controls Figure 11-42 1,2-47W600-255 Mechanical Instruments and Controls Figure 11-43 1,2-47W600-256 Mechanical Instruments and Controls Figure 11-44 1,2-47W600-257 Mechanical Instruments and Controls Figure 11-45 1,2-47W600-258 Mechanical Instruments and Controls Figure 11-46 1,2-47W600-259 Mechanical Instruments and Controls Figure 11-47 1,2-47W600-260 Mechanical Instruments and Controls Figure 11-48 1,2-47W600-270 Mechanical Instruments and Controls PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Figure III-1 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Logic Diagram
<9 PART X - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Figure X-1 1,2-47W494-1 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 653 & 669 Figure X-2 1,2-47W494-2 Auxiliary Building and Reactor Building Compartmentation EL 685 & 690 Figure X-3 1,2-47W494-3 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 706 & 714 Figure X-4 1,2-47W494-4 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 732 & 734 Figure X-5 1,2-47W494-5 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 749, 759, & 763 Figure X-6 1,2-47W494-6 Control Building Compartmentation EL 669 & 685 Figure X-7 1,247W494-7 Control Building Compartmentation EL 706 & 732 Figure X-8 1,2-47W494-8 Diesel Generator Building Compartmentation EL 722 & 740.5 Figure X-9 1,2-47W494-9 ERCW Pumping Station Compartmentation EL 625 & 688 Figure X-10 1,2-47W494-10 ERCW Pumping Station Compartmentation EL 704 & 720 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 REVISION LOG Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 0
Initial Issue 8/23/96 Revision 1 to the Fire Protection Report (FPR) is a complete revision of the 11/19/98 document. The previously issued change packages (FPR-01-1 thru -13) have all been incorporated and interfiled with this revision. These change packages have been approved by PORC independently. Besides minor editorial changes (e.g.,
correction of typographical errors, clarification of wording, etc.), the only new change to the FPR is to Part II, Section 14, in which the surveillance requirements (SR) for hose station inspections and valve position verification of valves in the Reactor Buildings have been revised. Also, a new SR has been added for valve actuation of hose station standpipe valves.
All significant changes made by Revision I (e.g., change package revisions, the above mentioned surveillance requirements, etc.) are designated by revision bars.
2 Revision 2 to the FPR is to incorporate Fire Detection Zones 547 and 548 into 12/17/98 Part II, Table 3.3-11. These zones are being added by DCN M-14226-A, which is installing automatic fire suppression and detection into the general area of Elevation 690.0, above the Boric Acid Tanks.
Pages Changed: Coversheet, i, ii, iii, 11-48 Pages Added: 11-67 Pages Deleted: None Note: Sections with page(s) affected by this change are being included in their entirety and issued with this change package. Therefore, the entire sections will be issued as Rev. 2, with the specific changes denoted by revision bars.
i
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 REVISION LOG Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 3
Revision 3 to the FPR affects Part VII and Part II, Sections 5.0 and 14.0. For 2/11/99 continuity and consistency in pagination, the sections are being issued in their entirety as Rev. 3, with the actual changes denoted by revision bars.
The changes to Part VII of the FPR were made as part of the corrective action plan for resolution of CAQ SQ962075PER. The PER was originally initiated due to a discrepancy between actual plant configuration and the justification for an NRC approved deviation to 1 OCFR50 Appendix R. The changes made in Rev. 3 of the FPR include resolution of documentation discrepancies involving combustible loading values, updates of cable rerouting, raceway barrier installations, procedure changes, etc. The nature of the discrepancies were all documentation only, and did not represent any unanalyzed configurations in the plant. Also, minor changes to existing evaluations in Part VII were done as enhancements.
Changes to Part II of the FPR included the addition of the definition of 'in-situ Combustible Loading," and the allowance for exceeding the compensatory measure time requirements, as specified by the Fire Operating Requirements (FORs), for fire suppression/detection equipment and fire barriers taken out of service during outages. The compensatory measures (i.e., backup fire suppression and/or fire watches) will remain in place until the equipment is placed back in service after the necessary outage-related work is completed.
4 Revision 4 to the FPR is in support of DCN D-20152. The change to the FPR involves deleting the discussion on the smoke detection in the ventilation intake ducts in the Main Control Room from Part VIII, pages 53 and 54. The DCN abandons the detectors in place, and disconnects the annunciation circuits to the MCR.
Pages Changed: Coversheet, i, ii, iii, v, VIII-53, VIII-54 Pages Added: None Pages Deleted: None Note: Section VIII is being included in its entirety in the R4 change package, with the specific changes denoted by revision bars.
ii
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 REVISION LOG Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 4
Minor format change to support electronic filing (Curator) conversion.
8/19/99 5
Revision 5 to the Fire Protection Report (FPR) was performed to incorporate the following changes:
Added Part II, Section 14.7 to incorporate new Fire Operating Requirement (FOR) 3.7.14 and Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.7.14 for Emergency Battery Lighting (EBL) units, including compensatory actions and testing frequencies. Also revised Part V "Emergency Lighting and Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection" to address new FOR and SR; Revised Part II, Section 14.5 (FOR/SR 3/4.7.11.4) for Fire Hose Stations to allow use of portable hose packs and removal of fire hoses from the hose stations inside the Reactor Buildings; Clarified definitions for continuous and roving fire watches in Part II, Section 13.0; Clarified compliance with NFPA-72D regarding exception to G-73 for bypassing the audible annunciation system in the Main Control Room (MCR),
Panel 0-M-29, under the direct supervision of a dedicated operator at the console.
Revised Section 3.31 of Part VII to replace summary of superseded calculation MDQ0026-980017, "Fire Barrier Rating Evaluation for Hollow Block and Partially Filled 8" Concrete Block Walls" with calculation SCG1S591, "Fire Ratings of Hollow Core Masonry Walls."
Corrected minor documentation discrepancy in Part II, Table 3.3-11, in which the number of ionization fire detectors for Zone 230 was listed as 9, instead of the correct number of 10 detectors in the zone.
Revised Part II, Section 14.0 to reference Calculation SQN-SQS2-203, which addresses processes for restoring inoperable Appendix R equipment that is not currently bounded by existing Tech Specs to operable status.
Minor administrative change to Revision 4 Rev Log description to delete statement regarding MCR HVAC duct smoke detector abandonment in response to a recommendation from QA audit SSA0001. The recommendation was to remove the statement, "The duct detectors have been determined unnecessary based on the absence of industry in the vicinity that could be capable of producing significant enough smoke to affect the habitability in the MCR, and the detectors in the El. 732.0' Mechanical Equipment Room which will detect smoke entering the MCR ventilation system intake and subsequently alarm in the MCR," because it provided unnecessary detail that was not discussed in the FPR.
Him a
i.
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 REVISION LOG
( Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved Changed required testing frequency for inaccessible detectors from "each COLD 6
SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unless performed in the previous 6 month" to 10/18/00 every 18 months during cold shutdowns (page 11-42). Related editorial changes to this page, FPR cover sheet, and the table of contents.
Changed the compensatory actions for LCO 3.3.3.8 to delete fire watches and 7
temperature monitoring inside primary containment upon failure of a detector 1/29/01 inside primary containment (page 11-42). The bases for the LCO compensatory (effective actions for inoperable detectors inside primary containment were also changed.
2/1/01)
(pages 11-65 and 66).
This revision incorporates the following changes to part Ih:
8 Changes the testing frequency for detectors which require removing plant 2/26/01 equipment from service from 6 to 18 months and deletes the requirement to perform the 18 month detector tests during cold shutdowns from Surveillance Requirement 4.3.3.8.1 on page 11-42.
"* Adds a fire detection basis on page 11-66 for the above change in test frequency which gives examples of the equipment which must be removed from service for detector testing (EGTS, ABGTS, CREVS and containment purge). They two above changes are corrective action for PER-00-006637 000.
"" Adds a definition for "accessible" on page 11-5.
"* Adds an existing heat detector to zone 466 in Table 3.3-11 on page 11-49.
"* Adds a end-of-quarter "grace period" to the annual fire brigade medical examination requirement on page 11-20.
"* Deletes three references to raw service water flow diagrams and adds five references to fire protection flow diagrams on page 11-73 (added diagrams are for the fire pumps/tanks, yard piping, the ERCW Bldg. and two cable tray water spray systems).
Related editorial changes were made to this Rev. Log, the FPR cover sheet, and the table of contents.
9 This revision incorporates the following changes to the FPR Parts Ill and V, due to the Vital Inverter System modification per DCN D20071A/P20872A as applicable:
"* Added references to DCN D20071A/P20872A, see section 11.2.13 of Part III and section 4.1.5 of Part V.
"* Revised the description of the 120VAC Vital Instrument and 25OVdc Power System, see section 4.10.3 and 4.10.5 respectively, of Part Ill.
"* Added Components to the illuminated list of Part V, see Table V-I, pages V 4 and V-7.
Related editorial changes were made to this revision log, the FPR cover sheet and the table of contents.
The Nuclear Safety Assessment for the above changes is in the "Fire protection (Appendix R)" section of Block 15 in DCN D20071A 10/12/2001 iv 0
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 REVISION LOG Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 10 Changed Part II, Section 14.1 (page 11-42) as follows:
9/25/01 Extended the frequency for fire detector testing required by Surveillance (effective Requirement (SR) 4.3.3.8.1 from 6 to 12 months.
11128/01)
Added a requirement to test required fire detection zones each 6 months to existing SR 4.3.3.8.3.
Changed SR 4.3.3.8.2 by limiting supervision testing to the wiring between required local alarm panels and the alarm receiving console. The previously required testing of zone supervision was deleted.
Changed LCO action 3.3.3.8c by providing actions to take in the event the supervision tested via revised SR 4.3.3.8.2 fails or a loop failure trouble is annunciated. Previously, this action required a corrective action/reportability review if inoperable detectors are not restored to operation within 14 days.
This action is no longer needed since it is already included in actions 3.3.3.8a and b.
Changed LCO action 3.3.3.8b to make it explicit that it is the loss of automatic suppression system actuation which requires implementation of the action.
Changed Part II, fire detection bases (page 11-66), by adding bases for the fire suppression system actuation testing, the new zone testing and for the revised supervision testing. The later includes a discussion of the application of the LCO actions in the event of a supervision test failure or a failure of the circuits between required panels and the alarm receiving console.
Changed Part VI as follows:
Section 1.0 (page VI-1)- added a requirement that future significant deviations from NFPA testing, inspection, maintenance and testing requirements will be addressed in Part VI.
Section 3.3.11 (page VI-13)- added a detector testing deviation (12 vs. 6 month frequency).
Related editorial changes were made to this Revision Log, the Cover Sheet, and the Table of Contents.
11 PART II Changes 3/05/2002 Page 1, section 2.0: Deleted words "plans for". Sentence now reads and outlines the fire protection, fire detection and suppression capability ___.
Page 2, section 4.1 - Added reference 4.1.12. Section 4.2 - Changed 4.2.2 from NP STD 12.15, "Fire Protection" to FPDP-1, "Conduct of Fire Protection".
Page 3 - Added sections 4.2.11 FPDP-3, "Management of the Fire Protection Report"; 4.2.12 SPP 10.9, "Control of Fire Protection Impairments"; 4.2.13 SPP 10.10, "Control of Transient Combustibles"; and 4.2.14 SPP 10.11, "Control of Ignition Sources".
Page 5, section 5.0: Clarified definition of Accessible to now read "Paths to and from areas that contain equipment___.
Page 6 - changed fire to Fire V
0
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 REVISION LOG Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
I Approved Vi J.
I 11 Page 7, Fire Severity: Revised 17 edition to 17u edition (continued)
Page 14, section 7.4 - added to Operations Manager responsibilities "fire safe shutdown implementing procedures" Page 20, section 9.1: Delete number 2 from second sentence. Sentence now reads: OThe fire brigade shall not include the Shift Manager and other members of the minimum shift crew
." Added table for minimum operator staffing Page 23, section 9.5: Corrected typo error by replacing Ns with -. Revised last sentence to now read: "Safe shutdown procedures are available in the event a fire occurs in areas of the plant containing FSSD equipment."
Page 25, section 11.0: Change word systems to requirements. Sentence now reads: "Fire watch requirements are established ___"
Page 26, section 12.1: Moved first sentence to later in the paragraph and deleted "when the fire pumps are not running" from second sentence.
Page 28, section 12.3: Revised last sentence by replacing prevent with address to read: "The annulus area ___ water spray on select cable concentrations and to address specific cable interactions."
Page 29, section 12.3.3: In third paragraph, replace considered with addressed.
Sentence now reads: "Personnel safety is addressed by providing Page 31, first sentence: Corrected typo error by deleting =.
Page 33, section 12.10.2: Added "spatial separation greater than 20 feet" to last sentence so it now reads: Inside the reactor building.
a combination of spatial separation of greater than 20 feet, _...."
Page 34, section 12.10.5: Added "in ventilation openings" to first sentence so it now reads: "Fire damper are normally provided in ventilation openings in fire barriers ___." Deleted "a single failure" PART III Page 1, section 1.1: Clarified that evaluation of CB fire also considered offsite power available Page 2, first paragraph: Spelled out reactor coolant system before RCS Page 3, section 2.4: Spelled out residual heat removal before RHR Page 5, section 3.4.1: Spelled out control rod drive mechanisms before CRDM, reactor vessel head vents before RVHV, and power operated relief valves before PORV Page 6, section 3.4.2: Spelled out centrifugal charging pump before CCP, emergency raw cooling water before ERCW, component cooling water system before CCS, volume control tank before VCT, and reactor coolant pump before RCP Page 10, section 4.3: Spelled out main feedwater isolation valve before MFIV and main feedwater before MFW Page 14, section 4.9 - Added to last paragraph :If fans are not operable due to fire damage on fan electrical circuits, adequate ventilation can be achieved by opening the double doors to the room."
Page 21 - Deleted "performed" from middle paragraph. CASE 2) replaced "Two wire ungrounded dc power circuit cable to cable fault (125V)" with "More than one conductor to conductor hot short within one fire affected cable (125VDC/120VAC)" CASE 3) replaced "Two wire ungrounded ac control circuit cable-to-cable faults (125VDC/1 20VAC)" with "More than one conductor to conductor hot short between cable-to-cable faults (125VDC/120VAC). Last paragraph starts "With respect to Cases 1), 2), and 3); deleted 2) and 3).
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 REVISION LOG Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
I I
Approved 11 Similarly, with respect to Cases 2 and 3 added. Added to same sentence (continued)
"or ac power circuit, more than one conductor to conductor selective hot short with the proper polarity" and deleted two electrically independant cable to cable shorts".
Page 22 - Added section 7.14 HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULTS Page 26, Table Il1-1 Revised Key 38 to Key 38/39 Table 111-2 and 111 Replaced with tables with information in Appendices C and D from the safe shutdown equipment calculation (SQS4-127). Tables still contain same information.
Table 111-4 was added. Copied from SQS4-127 Appendix E.
PART V changes are as follows:
Page 1, section 2.0: Added "The Turbine building lights are fed from the 6.9kv Common Board (located in the Turbine Building) and will not be lost for a fire in either the Auxiliary or Control Building that would require manual action(s) in the Turbine Building." Next to last sentence of first paragraph revised to read "The DGB has lighting provided by lighting cabinets that are separated by three hour fire barriers."
Table V-1 changes are as follows:
Page 4: For O-LGT-247-ROO1 deleted & Doors For 0-LGT-247-ROl 1, R012, R013, R014 added & General Area For 0-LGT-247-R016 deleted CRDM MG set BKR A & B; added General Area Page 5: For 0-LGT-247-R040 revised doors to door For O-LGT-247-R044 added "and bulkhead connections to 0-FCO-31C Page 6: For 0-LGT-247-R047, R048, R051, R052, R062, R063 and R066 added
"& General Area" Page 7: For 0-LGT-247-R075 expanded coverage to read "I25VDC Vital Batt Bd 1-1 (bkrs on Pnl 2 & rear of Pnl 4) & 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-1(switch)"
For 0-LGT-247-R076, expanded coverage to read "l25VDC Vital Batt Bd 1-11 (bkrs on Pnl 2 & rear of Pnil 4) & 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-11(switch)"
For O-LGT-247-R077 added "& General Area" For O-LGT-247-R079, expanded coverage to read *125VDC Vital Batt Bd 1-111 (bkrs on Pnl 2 & rear of Pnl 4) & 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-111(switch)"
For 0-LGT-247-R080, expanded coverage to read "125VD.C Vital Batt Bd 1-IV (bkrs on Pnl 2 & rear of PnI 4) & 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board I-IV(switch)"
For 0-LGT-247-R081 added %& Isle behind 480V Shutdown Board 2B2-B For 0-LGT-247-R089 revised doors to door Page 8: For 0-LGT-247-R090 revised doors to door For 0-LGT-247-R094, R0108, R113 and R116 added "& General Area" For 0-LGT-247-R1 09, added "2-FCV-I-1 8" For 0-LGT-247-R1 11, deleted "2-FCV-1 -18" vii 0
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 REVISION LOG Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date "No.
Approved 11 Page 9: For O-LGT-247-R122, R125, R126 and R132 added "& General Area" (continued)
For 0-LGT-247-R127 and R129 revised doors to door Page 10: For 0-LGT-247-Rl 52, R1 53, Ri 55 and RI 56 added "& General Area" Page 11: For O-LGT-247-R170, deleted "Sump Valve Box" and added %& General Area" For 0-LGT-247-R175 and R179, added "Sump Valve Box & General Area" For O-LGT-247-R202, R203, R204 and R205 added %& General Area" Added 0-LGT-247-R206 and R207 (per EDC E21158A)
PART VII Page 16, section 2.10.5: Added paragraph to Deviation Update to clarify open head spray system actuated by combination of line type thermal and area smoke detectors.
Page 48, section 3.4.3.4.1.1: Added detail to clarify that separation in area is by spatial separation greater than 20 feet (III.G.2.d) or automatic suppression and detection (lIl.G.2.e).
PART VIII Page 33, section D.5(d): Corrected information concerning antenna associated with the plant repeater system and added clarification statement in "Remarks" column PART III Page 2, section 2.2 - Added "level indication in the" to last sentence.
Page 5, section 3.4.1 - Deleted from 1st sentence "upon notification of a major fire affecting" and replace with "when operators determine that the fire affects". From last sentence, deleted "monitor shutdown reactivity" and replaced with "allow boration".
Page 6, section 3.4.2 - Deleted from 4 & 5, "or RCP thermal barrier cooling".
Page 8, section 3.4.5 - Added to end of 5th paragraph "and the available letdown path.
Page 9, section 4.1: Revised last sentence to agree with requirements as stated in the Fire Safe Shutdown calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R21.
Page 11, section 4.3 & 4: Revised 4.3 to change PORVs to ARVs. Revised 4t paragraph in 4.4 to agree with requirements as stated in the Fire Safe Shutdown calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R21.
Page 13, section 4.6, 7 & 8: Revised 4.6 to agree with the Fire Safe Shutdown calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R21. Revised 4.7 to change Key I to Key 70 and to delete item (2) to agree with requirements as stated in the Fire Safe Shutdown calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R21. Revised 4.8 to delete Key I from heading.
Page 14, section 4.9: Revised to add Keys 37J, 37R and 40 to heading and change Key 1 to 37R and 40 in 3d paragraph to agree with requirements as stated in the Fire Safe Shutdown calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R21.
Page 15, section 4.10: Added heading to 1st paragraph and renumbered subsequent headings.
Page 22, Deleted "Excess letdown is not specifically required for safe shutdown.*
Page 24, Corrected references 11.2.9 and 11.2.10 Page 26: Added Keys 37J. 37R and 70 to the list.
06/21/02 "Viii J.
12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 REVISION LOG Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved 12 (cont.)
PART IV Page 3, section 3.3: Revised item 4 "Electric Fire Pumps" to "Flood Mode/Backup Electric fire pumps (1)".
Page 4, section 4.1.2 - Revised title of AOP-C.04 to "Shutdown from Auxiliary Control Room".
PART V Page 3, Revised reference 4.1.2 Page 8 - Added to light R099 "& 2-FCV-72-2 & -39" and to light R102 "& 1-FCV 72-2 & -39".
13 Revision 13 to this document resolves 2 PER actions and a TROI action as 06/27/02 follows:
effective:
07/08/02 PER 02-003930-000 The following changes have been reviewed and approved (including PORC review) and were incorporated into this document under Rev. 11, but were not listed in the revision log (Ref. PER 02-003930):
Changed Part II, (page 11-9) as follows : removed the requirement of "a normal and emergency electrical power source" from the definition of "Operable Operability".
Changed Part II, Section 7.7 (page 11-17), as follows : removed the annual, biennial and triennial audits required per SQN Fire Protection Plan, Section 8.3 and incorporated audits to be performed per the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan.
Changed Part II, Section 8.1 (page 11-18), as follows : removed requirement of a 50.59 for FPR changes in Step 8.1(a); deleted existing Step 8.1 (c) associated with PORC review of FPR and SSP-12.15 changes and inserted "changes to the FPR receive a Technical and Impact Review by qualified individuals".
Changed Part II, Section 8.3 (pages 11-18 and 11-19), as follows: removed reference to annual, biennial and triennial audits and incorporated the requirement that FPP audits will be conducted in accordance with the NQAP, in lieu of, Generic Letter No. 82-21.
Changed Part II, Section 9.3 (page 11-22), as follows : changed Step 9.3.b.2(a) to conduct a drill every calandar quarter, in lieu of, every 92 days; and deleted Step 9.3.b.2(d) associated with the 3 year unannounced drill performance.
Changed Part II, Section 14.2 (page 11-51), as follows : for Action b(1), removed the action to perform a corrective action/reportability review for no pumps or no water storage tanks operable; for Action b(2), deleted the paragraph following the unit condition modes, associated with actions taken where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the specific Action requirements.
Changed Part II, Section 14.4 (page 11-56), as follows : added 3.7.11.3.(f) to reflect the D/G Bldg. Lube Oil Storage Room as an applicable CO-2 suppression system and made Aux. Instrument Room plural.
ix 0
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Rev. 13 REVISION LOG 13 (Cont.)
Changed Part II, Section 14.6 (page 11-63), as follows deleted Note associated with compensatory measures for ERFBS while Thermolag Upgrade and Kaowool replacement work is ongoing. Compensatory measures per this Note are no longer valid with the work complete as described in the implementing DCN's.
Changed Part II, Section 14.7 (page 11-64), as follows : deleted SR 4.7.14(b) for replacement of batteries and replaced it with an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> emergency battery lighting discharge test on an 18 month frequency to verify adequate battery condition.
Changed Part II, Bases for Section 14.7 (page 11-71 and 11-72), as follows : clarified requirements for emergency battery lighting units; and removed the justification bases for performance of visual inspections, industry practice and identification of early damage detection (this is no longer the case). Also, removed bases and Table supporting periodic battery replacements and included the bases for incorporation of the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> discharge tests to prove light integrity and overall battery condition.
Changed Part VII, Section 2.10.5 (page VII-16), as follows : added information indicating that the open head water spray system protecting the Train A cables in the 480V Shutdown Board Room 1B2-B and the Train B cables in the 480V Shutdown Board Room 2A2-A are actuated by a combination of line type heat detectors and ceiling mounted smoke detectors. This was previously not addressed.
Changed Part VIII, Appendix A Guideline (C) (page VII1-13), as follows : corrected minor administrative error (typographical).
PER 02-000920-000 Per recommendations from NA Audit #SSA0201, the reference to Part VII Section 2.1 was deleted from the second paragraph of Part VI Seciton 3.3.11.
TROI Item #00-008166-000 Added Part III, Section 5.2, which summarizes the procedural requirements of placing an Appendix R valve with the power permanently removed, in the non Appendix R position for testing, maintenance, and other short-term activities.
x J.
Revision DESCRIPTION OF REVISION Date No.
Approved
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART MI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 S
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This part describes the safe shutdown analysis methodology used to identify, select, and analyze the systems, components, and cables needed to demonstrate compliance with Appendix R to 10CFR50, and the applicable NRC generic letters.
Paragraph 50.48(a) & (e) and Appendix R of IOCFR50 became effective on February 17, 1981 and requires all nuclear plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979 to comply with the requirements of IOCFR50 Appendix R Sections 11I.G, lI.J, and 11.O. SQN was licensed after this date and must comply with these sections of Appendix Rt Additionally, by a Unit 2 license condition, SQN must comply with Sections III.G, III.J, III.L, and 111.0 of Appendix R.
Section ILl.G. 1 requires that fire protection features be provided for those systems, structures, and components important to safe shutdown. These features must be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
(1)
One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the Control Room or the Emergency Control Station(s) is free of fire damage; and, (2)
Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the Control Room or the Emergency Control Station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Where alternative shutdown capability is required (i e., for control building fires that require shutdown from outside of the Control Room), cold shutdown must be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Alternate shutdown capability is evaluated per Appendix R Sections m.G.3 and 1l.L. Plant locations that do not require alternative shutdown capability are evaluated per Section llI.G.2 of Appendix R1 Generic Letter 81 12 (February 20, 1981) Enclosure 1 "Staff Position", provides additional guidance on the NRC's requirements for safe shutdown capability.
1.1 Design Basis Evaluation The purpose of this evaluation is to demonstrate fire safe shutdown capability for postulated fires involving in situ and/or transient combustibles that could impact systems, structures, or components located in or adjacent to that area. For purposes of this evaluation, it is assumed that these fires may adversely affect these systems, structures or components essential to safe shutdown. The availability of offsite power for specific systems and/or fire scenarios has been evaluated for non-alternative shutdown locations. Loss of offsite power, as well as offsite power available, has been assumed for control building fires, for which alternative shutdown is provided. No concurrent or sequential design basis accidents or transients are assumed to occur. Failures that are a consequence of the fire are evaluated. No additional single failures are assumed (ref. 11.1.1).
1.2 Limiting Safety Consequences The limiting safety consequences used in the evaluation of fire safe shutdown are: (1) no fuel failure due to calculated cladding temperature increases; (2) no rupture of any primary coolant boundary, (3) no rupture of the containment boundary-, (4) following the event, the reactor coolant system process variables shall be within those predicted for a loss of normal ac power, and (5) shutdown capability shall be able to achieve and maintain subcritical conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor coolant inventory, achieve and maintain hot standby conditions for an extended period of time, achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 111-1
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with equipment powered by onsite power sources if using alternative shutdown methods, and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter (ref. 11.1.1).
Generic Letter 81-12, Enclosure 1, specifies the performance goals and associated safe shutdown functions necessary to ensure the limiting safety consequences of the fire safe shutdown analysis. Other subfunctions may exist under each of these broad headings.
Examples of such subfunctions are steam generator secondary side isolation, and reactor coolant system (RCS) seal injection. Other snbfinctions such as on site emergency power, environmental control, etc., are included as support functions.
The performance goals and safe shutdown functions identified in the generic letter adequately ensure that the containment pressure boundary will not be threatened. Uncontrolled mass and energy releases to the containment from the primary systems are limited by the achievement of these safe shutdown functions and will ensure that no rupture of the reactor coolant or containment pressure boundaries will occur.
2.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS This section provides a brief overview of the SQN safe shutdown functions. The specific safe shutdown functions necessary to satisfy the performance goals and safe shutdown functions of Appendix R as identified in Enclosure 1 to Generic Letter 81-12 are:
(1)
Reactivity control function (2)
Reactor coolant makeup function (3)
Reactor coolant pressure cmatrol function (4)
Decay heat removal function (5)
Process monitoring function (6)
Support function 2.1 Reactivity Control Reactor trip capability is by inserting control and shutdown rods into the reactor. After a reactor trip, the reactivity control system (boration) must be capable of achieving and maintaining adequate shutdown reactivity from zero power hot standby to cold shutdown. The function must be capable of compensating for any reactivity changes associated with xenon decay and reactor coolant temperature decrease which occur during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions.
2.2 Reactor Coolant Make-up The reactor coolant make-up systems shall be capable of assuring that sufficient make-up inventory is provided to compensate for reactor coolant system (RCS) fluid losses due to identified leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary and shrinkage of the RCS water volume during cooldown from hot standby to cold shutdown conditions. Adequate performance of this function is demonstrated by the maintenance of reactor coolant level within the level indication in the pressurizer.
2.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Reactor coolant pressure control is required to assure that the RCS is operated:
(1)
Within the technical specifications for RCS pressure-temperature requirements; 111-2
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 S(2)
To prevent peak RCS pressure from exceeding 110% of system design pressure; and (3)
With a sufficient subcooling margin to minimize void formation within the reactor vessel.
2.4 Decay Heat Removal The decay heat removal systems shall be capable of transferring fission product decay heat from the reactor core at a rate such that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. The function shall be capable of maintaining hot standby using AFW for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, achieving cold shutdown (within a 72-hour period for alternate shutdown), and maintaining cold shutdown conditions thereafter using residual heat removal (RHR).
2.5 Process Monitoring When information on process variables is required by operators to achieve/maintain safe shutdown system or control safe shutdown equipment, such monitoring information must be available. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing, if possible, direct readings of those plant process variables necessary for plant operators to perform and/or control the previously identified functions.
2.6 Support The systems and equipment used to perform the Fire Safe Shutdown (FSSD) functions may require miscellaneous support functions such as process cooling, lubrication and ac/dc power. These supporting functions shall be available and capable of providing the support necessary to assure acceptable performance of the FSSD functions.
3.0 ANALYSIS OF SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 3.1 Introduction Various analytical approaches ensure that sufficient plant systems are available to perform the FSSD functions. Numerous plant systems are available, alone and in combination with other systems, to provide these required functions. A minimum set of plant systems and components is identified to demonstrate that the plant can achieve and maintain safe shutdown.
In addition, for control building fires that require shutdown from outside of the main control room, the concurrent loss of off-site power is also assumed.
Providing adequate protection of this minimum system, component, and cable set from the' effects of postulated fires constitutes an adequate and conservative demonstration of the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for the purpose of fire protection.
The safe shutdown systems selected are capable of:
a) achieving and maintaining subcritical conditions in the reactor, b) maintaining reactor coolant inventory, c) achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions for an extended period of time, d) performing cold shutdown repairs needed to achieve and maintain cold shutdown (or, for control building fires that require shutdown from outside of the main control room, achieving cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />), and e) maintaining cold shutdown conditions thereafter.
3.2 Initial Assumptions 111-3
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART m - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 (1) The unit is operating at 100% power upon the occurrence of a fire.
(2) For alternative shutdown locations (Control Building fires that require shutdown from outside of the Control Room), a loss of off-site power is assumed.
(3) The reactor is tripped either manually or automatically.
(4) No failures are considered other than those directly attributable to the fire.
(5) Equipment required for szfe shutdown is assumed to be operable (i.e., not out of service).
3.3 Definitions Hot Standby The initial safe shutdown state with the reactor at zero power, Yg (Mode 3) less than 0.99 and average RCS temperature Tv greater than or equal to Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)
Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)
Subcooling Marj 3500F.
Reactor at zero power Kfr less than 0.99 and average RCS temperature Tv between 350TF and 2000 F.
Reactor at zero power, IKr less than 0.99 and average RCS temperature T., below or equal to 200TF.
gin The difference between the saturation temperature at RCS pressure, and the maximum temperature in the hot legs.
3.4 Safe Shutdown Functions The following is a comparison of the Generic Letter 81-12 safe shutdown functions and the corresponding safety functions used in the Appendix R FSSD analysis (ref. 11.2.1):
GL 81-12 Safe Shutdown Function SQN Safety Functions Reactivity Control Initial Reactivity Control Long Term Reactivity Control Reactor Coolant Makeup Control RCS Inmentory Control RCP Seal Integrity RCS Pressure Boundary Control RCS Makeup and Letdown Reactor Coolant Pressure Control RCS Inventory Control RCS Pressure Boundary Control RCS Makeup/Letdown Decay Heat Removal SG Inventory Control 1114
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 Secondary Side Pressure Control Secondary Side Isolation Long-Term Heat Removal Process Monitoring Instrumentation (no specific correlation, in logic by system)
Support Onsite Electrical Supply Environmental Control (Process Cooling, in logic by system)
Each plant system or subsystem function relied on to accomplish the above safe shutdown functions is identified (ref. 11.2.1). A separate designator identified as a safe shutdown "Key" is assigned to each plant system or subsystem function. Figure I-1 "Appendix R Safe Shutdown Logic Diagram" depicts the safe shutdown system and/or system function, associated Key number, and logical relationships between systems and Keys used to demonstrate compliance with Appendix R criteria. The correlation between Keys and safe shutdown systems is provided in Section 4. The following sections provide a general description of the methods and systems used in reference 11.2.1 to satisfy the safe shutdown performance goals and functions as delineated in Generic Letter 81-12.
3.4.1 Reactivity Control At least one source range neutron monitor is provided for indication of count rate to verify the reactor is subcritical.
Initial reactivity control will result from an automatic reactor protection system (RPS) trip or from operator initiation of a manual trip when operators determine that the fire affects safe unit operation. This action will deenergize the normally energized control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) to actuate a reactor trip. The RPS has a diversity of inputs, each of which "fails safe" and will actuate on an open circuit or a loss of power. As such, fire damage to the RPS will not preclude the initiation of an automatic trip or control rod insertion. There are four paths to manually trip the reactor. There is a shunt trip path for each of the two trains and an undervoltage trip path for each of the two trains. The shunt trip path trips the reactor by energizing the shunt trip coil in the reactor trip switchgear through a handswitch contact in the main control room. The undervoltage trip path trips the reactor by deenergizing the undervoltage trip coil in the reactor trip switchgear through a handswitch contact in the main control room. For an undervoltage trip path to fail, a perfect short to another power source must occur. For a shunt trip path to fail, the path must be open without shorting. It is therefore considered incredible that all four paths will fail in the specific manner to disable each representative path, particularly since the trip handswitches in the main control room utilize all four paths simultaneously when placed in the trip position Following rod insertion, additional negative reactivity insertion is required as xenon decays, and RCS temperature is decreased.
The addition of borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) is required to maintain the required shutdown reactivity. The chemical and volume control system (CVCS) is capable of injecting borated water into the RCS and the normal, excess, and alternate letdown paths (reactor vessel head vents (RVHV), power operated relief valves (PORVs)) are capable of sufficient letdown toallow boration.
3.4.2 Reactor Coolant Make-up Control III-5
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 For the assumed fire scenario, reactor coolant make-up control can be achieved by the following to assure that primary side inventory (pressurizer level) is maintained:
- 1.
One centrifugal charging pump (CCP), including emergency raw cooling water (ERCW) and room cooling for appropriate CCP must be operational.
- 2.
A suction path from either the volume control tank (VCT) or the RWST to the CCPs must be available.
- 3.
Charging flow control valve or a bypass must be available (manual operation of by pass valves is acceptable) and pressurizer level indication.
- 4.
A charging path to the RCS througlthe reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection
- 5.
Cooling to the RCP seals throughthe RCP seal injection
- 6.
RCS pressure boundary isolation for normal and excess letdown, reactor head vent, RHR suction, pressurizer PORV's
- 7.
Pressurizer level instrumentation.
- 8.
RCS Letdown (Normal/Excess/Alternate) 3.4.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Establishing and maintaining a sufficient subcooling margin within the RCS is required to prevent void formation in the core and to ensure the ability to maintain natural circulation (if the RCPs are not operable) through the steam generators. Overpressure protection of the RCS is provided by the pressurizer safety valves prior to a controlled cooldown and depressurization. During cooldown from Mode 3 hot standby (above 3501F) to Mode 4 hot shutdown (below 3501F), pressure control may be by pressurizer heaters or by varying pressurizer level in combination with control of SG pressure and RCS temperature using SG PORVs. Pressure may also be reduced by normal/excess/alternate letdown paths. To ensure adequate RCS pressure and adequate subcooling margin, the operator will isolate the normal pressurizer spray valves, or trip the RCPs to limit depressurization, and isolate the pressurizer PORVs and auxiliary spray. Entering Mode 4 will permit aligning the RHR system to the RCS for decay heat removal. While on RHR, the maximum pressures in both the RHR and RCS systems are limited by the RHR system safety valves.
RCS temperature indication is provided for the two loops used for cooldown and one RCS wide range pressure indicator is provided. Note that RCS cold leg temperature is not provided in the ACRI (See deviation in Part VII.)
3.4.4 Decay Heat Removal Following a reactor trip with loss of off-site power (either assumed or caused by the fire), decay heat is initially removed by natural circulation within the RCS, heat transfer to the main steam system via the steam generators, and operation of the steam generator PORVs or lift of the main steam system code safety valves. The secondary side of the SGs are isolated from the main turbine, main feedwater pumps, and other steam loads to prevent excessive heat removal from the RCS.
111-6
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 For decay heat removal via natural circulation a minimum of two steam generators will be available (including SG pressure and level indication). Decay heat removal requires the ability to supply sufficient auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators to make up for the inventory discharged as steam by the safety valves or steam generator PORVs. For maintenance of initial hot standby conditions, the feedwater flow required to the steam generators is supplied by the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. AFW sources are available from the condensate storage tanks, and alternatively, from the essential raw cooling water (ERCW) system. AFW may be supplied to the steam generators by the motor-driven AFW pumps and/or by the turbine-driven AFW pump. Continued heat removal is achieved by the controlled operation of the PORVs and continued operation of the AFW system. After reduction of RCS temperature to 350
'F, the RHR system is used to establish long-term core cooling by the removal of decay heat from the RCS to the environment via the RHR, CCS, and ERCW systems.
3.4.5 Process Monitoring Instrumentation The operator requires knowledge of various plant parameters to perform required system transitions and essential operator actions. A discussion by safe shutdown function of the necessary instrumentation is provided below.
For the fire scenarios assumed in this analysis, inventory make-up to the RCS will be from the refueling water storage tank through the RCP seal injection lines. Sufficient initial negative reactivity exists in the RCS after control rod insertion. The negative reactivity inserted by the control rods and borated water injected by the CVCS will maintain the core subcritical while cooling down from hot full power to cold shutdown. Core source range detectors will be available for core reactivity monitoring in the main control room. Source range channel indication is available in the auxiliary control room to provide this information for fires in control building areas requiring alternative shutdown.
Various process monitoring functions must be available to adequately achieve and maintain the reactor coolant makeup, pressure control and decay heat removal functions. For the assumed fire scenario, maintenance of hot standby requires that pressurizer level and RCS pressure instrumentation be available.
RCS temperature is maintained during hot standby by proper decay heat removal via steam generators using the steam generator PORVs. When the reactor coolant pumps are tripped and cooling is required in the natural circulation mode of operation, the difference between the hot-leg and cold-leg wide range temperatures (or saturation temperature for SG pressure) provides indication of the existence of a natural circulation condition.
RCS hot and cold leg temperature instrumentation is available for use given a fire that does not require MCR abandonment. For alternative shutdown, steam generator (SG) pressure instrumentation is required in order to provide a means of determining RCS cold-leg temperature from the AC1 (Refer to Part VII for the deviation request associated with using T. in lieu of direct indication of T. in the ACR.) During RCS cooldown, SG pressure will be controlled to maintain desired RCS temperature by control of the SG PORVs.
Operating personnel will maintain RCS pressure to assure that appropriate subcooling margin is achieved by monitoring of RCS pressure and hot leg temperature (Tih) instrumentation. Manual control of the pressurizer heaters will be used if available, but is not required for safe shutdown. Pressurizer level control is maintained by monitoring pressurizer level instrumentation and manual control of CVCS charging flow Il-7
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART Im - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 through the RCP seals and the allowable letdown paths.
The above methods of controlling primary system parameters by means of the secondary system requires monitoring secondary system parameters.
Steam generator level and pressure indicators are available for the loops being used for cooldown to assure adequate and controlled decay heat removal.
The plant operators will utilize the instrumentation discussed above for monitoring natural circulation conditions, subcooling margin, and heat removal.
3.4.6 Support Functions The support functions for various safe shutdown equipment or systems are provided by the following systems:
(1)
Emergency Power Distribution System (2)
Onsite Electric Supply (3)
Essential Raw Cooling Water System (4)
Component Cooling Water System (5)
Ventilation to areas containing essential fire safe shutdown equipment (6)
Control Air System The following sections discuss the required safe shutdown systems and support systems.
4.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS The FSSD systems are identified by reference 11.2.1 and are listed by Key in Table lII-I and summarized as follows:
4.1 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) - Keys 1, 2,4, 5, 6, 9, 34 The charging portion of the Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) accomplishes the following safe shutdown functions:
(1)
Reactivity control by injection of boron into the RCS (2)
Reactor coolant make-up control by seal injection (3)
Maintenance of reactor coolant pump seal integrity Reactivity control for safe shutdown is initially provided by the control rods, with subsequent boron injection used to compensate for the xenon decay and positive reactivity insertion due to cooldown. Insertion of the control and shutdown rod groups make the reactor adequately subcritical following trip from any credible operation condition to the hot zero power condition, even assuming the most reactive rod remains in the fully withdrawn position.
For the assumed post-fire scenario, make-up water to the RCS will be provided by the CVCS initially from the VCT and then from the RWST. When the unit is at power, the concentration of boron in the RWST exceeds that quantity required to bring the reactor from an initial hot standby condition to hot shutdown and then to cold shutdown.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 "Numerous CVCS paths are normally available for charging to the RCS (normal charging, seal injection, ECCS charging). The post-fire flow path normally qualified to provide reactor coolant make-up and boration is the charging line to the reactor coolant pump seals. This path will be available by ensuring that at least one of the charging pumps is operable and charging flow control valve remains open or is manually bypassed.
For the assumed event, charging and boration will be accomplished by operating a minimum of one centrifugal charging pump taking suction from the RWST and injecting borated water through the RCP seal injection line to the RCS. Suction to the charging pump can be delivered from the RWST by opening either one of two normally closed motor-operated valves.
Letdown from the RCS normally occurs via the seal leak-off return path and the normal and/or excess letdown paths. For the post-fire operational scenario, the normal and excess letdown paths may be isolated and an alternate letdown path using the pressurizer PORV or RVHV employed. Isolation of the normal and excess letdown lines may occur as a result of loss of instrument air or may be achieved by operator action to assure adequate inventory control. Procedural controls ensure isolation of all potentially spurious RCS letdown paths, including pressurizer PORVs and reactor head vents as necessary.
The injection path from the CCP to the RCP seals contains the charging flow control valve (normally open) which is provided with a minimum-flow stop on the controller. Thus, operation of one charging pump will ensure availability of minimum RCS charging flow.
Isolation of the VCT by closure of either one of two motor-operated valves during makeup from the RWST can be performed either remotely or by local manual operation. The VCT is isolated to prevent introduction of [-l covergas into the CCP suction in the event of VCT drainage.
Pressurizer water level is maintained by operation of one CCP using pressurizer level instrumentation. The two high-head centrifugal charging pumps are normally available for the CVCS charging function and have a miniflow path through the seal water heat exchanger. The pumps require ERCW to the gear oil coolers and pump bearing oil coolers. The CCP room coolers require ERCW.
The capacity of the refueling water storage tank exceeds the makeup requirements during a fire safe shutdown event.
4.2 Reactor Coolant System - Keys 7, 8, 28, 48 The RCS consists of four similar heat transfer loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel. Each loop contains a RCP and a steam generator. In addition, the system includes a pressurizer with associated code safety and power-operated relief valves (PORVs). RCS instrumentation includes wide range cold-leg (except in ACR) and wide range hot-leg temperatures indication, pressure indication, and pressurizer water level indication.
The natural circulation capability of the plant provides a means of decay heat removal when the reactor coolant pumps are unavailable. Natural circulation flow rates are governed by the amount of decay heat, relative component elevations, primary to secondary heat transfer, loop flow resistance, steam generator and RCS inventories, and any RCS voiding. These conditions determine whether adequate primary to secondary heat transfer and subcooling during natural circulation can be maintained.
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I SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 For this analysis of safe shutdown capability, two of the four RCS loops (for which steam generator level and pressure are controlled) will be available to ensure that natural circulation is established and maintained. Additionally, RCPB isolation is provided to ensure subcooling margin is maintained. RCPB consists of isolation of normal letdown, excess letdown, pressurizer PORVs or blocks, RVHV and RHR letdown. Refer to the discussion on High/Low pressure boundary interfaces in Section 8.0 of this part.
While in natural circulation, adequate heat transfer and coolant flow are dependent on adequate inventory in both the primary and secondary systems. Maintaining water level in the secondary side of the steam generators and adequate level within the pressurizer are required for natural circulation. RCS loop temperatures confirm flow and heat transfer while in natural circulation.
RCS inventory control is based on the operation of CVCS charging paths as previously described.
Maintenance of either seal injection or thermal barrier cooling provides adequate protection of the RCP seals.
Letdown is provided to allow for a method of depressurizing the RCS and further boration of the RCS.
Letdown path options include normal letdown, excess letdown, RCP seal return, RVHV and pressurizer PORVs.
The pressurizer heaters are not required to operate for safe shutdown. Alternate means of controlling RCS pressure are available. However, should the pressurizer heaters be available, subcooling within the RCS can be maintained by controlled operation of the pressurizer heaters. The availability of pressurizer heaters will enhance the capability of controlling RCS pressure and subcooling margin.
4.3 Main Steam Systems - Keys 20, 21, 22. 23. 24, 25. 26 For the post-fire scenario, maintenance of the steam generator inventory and control of steam generator pressure are required for both hot standby and subsequent primary system cooldown to support the decay and sensible heat removal function, within the applicable operational limits, until initiation of RHR to bring the plant to cold shutdown The main steam (MS) system consists of four parallel flow paths, one from each steam generator to the main turbine of the unit. The MS system will be isolated either by operation of the turbine stop and control, dump, reheat, feed turbine stop and control, and gland steam valves; or by the main steam isolation valves.
The main feedwater system will be isolated by either the main feedwater isolation valve (MF1V), or regulating valves and bypasses, or trip of the main feedwater (MFW) pumps.
Inventory control of two steam generators provides the reactor heat removal function during natural circulation conditions. Maintenance of the steam generator water level during the period of AFW operation (hot standby) involves positioning of AFW valves and operation of the motor-driven and/or turbine-driven AFW pumps. Steam generator water level and pressure indication are available in the MCR and in the ACR.
The MS system also delivers motive steam to the turbine-driven AFW pump. Steam to the turbine is supplied by branch connections upstream of the main steam isolation valves on two steam lines (corresponding to steam generators No. 1 and 4). Either line is sufficient to supply steam for the AFW pump turbine.
A ARV provided on each steam line is capable of releasing the sensible and decay heat to the I III-10
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 atmosphere. The SG ARVs are used for plant cooldown by steam discharge to the atmosphere since the steam dump system is assumed to be unavailable.
The SG ARVs have a total combined capacity of approximately 10% of the maximum steam flow. For the assumed fire scenario, a minimum of two ARVs will be available to support controlled cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System. Controls for the steam generatorARVs are provided in the MCR and locally at the shutdown stations.
4.4 Auxiliary Feedwater System - Keys 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 17. 19 The AFW system is required during hot standby to support RCS decay heat removal. For hot standby, secondary system (steam generator) inventory control is provided by the AFW system. Two motor driven pumps and one turbine-driven pump are available to each unit.
The AFW system is designed to deliver enough water to maintain sufficient heat transfer in the steam generators in order to prevent loss of primary water through the RCS pressurizer safety or relief valves.
The turbine-driven AFW pump is designed to deliver sufficient flow to all four steam generators and maintain steam generator water levels. Steam generators No. 1 and/or 4 provide motive steam to the turbine driven AFW pump. The turbine-driven AFW pump is capable of operating down to a steam pressure of 90 psia, which is below the point at which the RHR system can be placed in service.
Each unit is supplied with two motor-driven AFW pumps.. Train A Pump supplies SGs 1 and 2 and Train B supplies SGs 3 and 4. The feedwater requirements can be met with either the turbine driven AFW pump or the two motor driven AFW pumps.
The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) contains a minimum volume of water required by the plant technical specification. As a backup, cross-ties to the ERCW are provided. Ample time is available post-fire for realignment of the normally closed valves that isolate ERCW from the suction of the AFW pumps.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART m - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 4.5 Residual Heat Removal System - Keys 30, 31 40 The RHR system is designed to remove residual and sensible heat from the core by reducing the temperature of the RCS during the hot shutdown and cold shutdown modes.
The RHR system consists of two RHR heat exchangers, two RHR pumps and associated piping, valving and instrumentation necessary on each unit.
During hot shutdown and cold shutdown operations, reactor coolant flows from the RCS to the RHR pumps, through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers and back to the RCS. The heat load is transferred to CCS on the shell side of the RHR heat exchangers.
Two series motor-operated valves (FCV-74-1,-2) isolate the inlet line to the RHR system from the RCS. To avoid potential RCS boundary leakage at this high/low pressure interface, both of the motor operated valves in the RHR suction line will be kept closed (pre-fire condition) with the corresponding motor control center breaker in the open position The return lines are isolated by two series check valves and a motor-operated valve in each return line.
A minimum-flow line from the downstream side of each RHR heat exchanger to the corresponding pump's suction line is provided to assure that the RHR pumps do not overheat under low flow conditions. A motor-operated valve located in each minimum flow line is opened if RHR pump flow falls below a low set point and will be closed when the flow increases above a high set point.
The cooldown rate of the reactor coolant is controlled by regulating the flow through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers. A bypass line, which serves both residual heat exchangers, is used to regulate the temperature of the return flow to the RCS as well as to maintain a minimum flow through the RHR system.
The RHR system can be placed in operation when the pressure and temperature of the RCS are about 380 psig and 3500F, respectively. If one of the two RHR pumps and/or one of the two RHR heat exchangers is not operable, safe operation of the plant is not affected; however, the time for cooldown is extended.
Each RHR pump is sized to deliver sufficient reactor coolant flow through the residual heat exchangers to meet the plant cooldown requirements. A seal heat exchanger for each pump is cooled by CCS. RHRpump room cooling is provided by a room cooler and ERCW. Local handwheel operation of all RHR valves requiring realignment for cooldown is acceptable based on the time to achieve cold shutdown.
The RHR system safety valves (although not specifically listed in the shutdown logic) are available to provide RHR and RCS cold overpressure protection whenever the RHR system is in operation.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART MI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 4.6 Safety Iniection System Accumulators - Key 36 During normal plant operating conditions, the safety injection system accumulators are pressurized by nitrogen gas in order to inject borated water into the RCS when RCS pressure falls below 600 psi due to a LOCA. During a controlled depressurization, the accumulators are isolated to prevent injection of safety injection system accumulator borated water and nitrogen gas into the RCS. Injection of nitrogen into the RCS occurs when RCS pressure is less than 150 psi.
The manual isolation of the accumulators is assumed as a post-fire activity. The isolation valve at each accumulator is normally closed only when the RCS is intentionally depressurized below 1000 psig. The isolation maybe local, governed by appropriate plant procedures (post-fire). In the event the valves are inaccessible, RCS pressure will be maintained greater than 150 psi to preclude nitrogen injection into the RCS via the accumulators.
4.7 Component Cooling Water System - Key70, 9, 31 CCS is a supporting system to other safe shutdown systems. Two redundant paths are available, each consisting of pump(s), heat exchanger(s), surge tank(s) and associated valves, piping and local instrumentation. The CCS system serves as an intermediate heat transfer loop between the various safe shutdown components and the Essential Raw Cooling Water System (ultimate heat sink).
The CCS system provides cooling for the following safe shutdown equipment:
(1)
Residual Heat Removal exchangers (2)
Residual heat removal pumps mechanical-seal heat exchangers (3)
Reactor coolant pump thermal barrier heat exchanger (loaded on train A CCS only)
One pump and one or two component cooling heat exchangers fulfill the heat removal function during normal full-load operation and post fire SSD for various components located in the auxiliary and reactor buildings.
Other than the RHR heat exchangers, the essential loads are normally valved open to the supply header and discharge to the suction of the CCS pump with which they are normally associated, so that component cooling water is circulated continuously through the essential loads during normal operation.
The CCS outlet from the RHR heat exchangers have motor-operated valves which must be opened or remain open during RHR cooldown. The motor-operated valves that isolate the RCP thermal barrier coolers (Train A CCS only) are included as safe shutdown components for operational flexibility in a post-fire scenario, since the thermal barriers may be required to perform a diverse function to RCP seal injection.
4.8 Essential Raw Cooling Water System - Key 3 (additional ERCW is Keys 9, 13, 19, 37,40)
The ERCW system provides cooling for the following safe shutdown heat transfer equipment (additional equipment in other keys):
(1)
Component cooling heat exchangers (2)
Emergency diesel generator heat exchangers (3)
Essential ventilation coolers and water chillers IH43
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART HI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 The system also provides a back-up supply of water to the AFW pump suction in the event that the condensate storage tank is depleted.
This system consists of four traveling water screens and their wash pumps, eight pumps, four discharge strainers, four main supply headers (1A, IB, 2A, and 2B) and 2 discharge headers (A, B). These components, together with the associated heat exchangers, valving, piping and instrumentation, complete the ERCW system.
There are four ERCW pumps per train. Interlocks exist to preclude starting more than one ERCW pump on a single diesel generator. Two ERCW pumps are required per train and one train is required for FSSD.
4.9 Essential HVAC - Keys 37A, 37B, 37C, 37F.37J, 37K, 37N, 370,37R, 37S, 40 Essential HVAC is provided for the control, auxiliary, diesel generator, and reactor buildings.
Portions of the systems in each building that service safe shutdown equipment required for compliance with Appendix R have been analyzed to determine if HVAC is required and to ensure that at least one path of the required systems will be available for an Appendix R fire when required. The systems consist of filters, fans, ductwork, dampers, heating/cooling coils, instrumentation, and controls for general building ventilation, along with separate systems for individual rooms. The required systems, components, and cables for those subsystems relied on to protect equipment for safe shutdown have been incorporated into the Appendix R analysis as required equipment and cables.
The location of equipment and routing of cables has been identified and evaluated as described in Sections 5 and 6 of this Part. These systems are discussed below.
The primary safety-related portions of the control room are cooled by two independent trains of HVAC. The two trains are separated by fire barriers and/or separation distance in accordance with Appendix R requirements to ensure that the control building HVAC system will remain functional during a fire in the auxiliary building except as provided by an approved deviation. Alternate shutdown is provided for a fire in the control building. The HVAC system in the control room is separate from the HVAC system servicing the ACR_
Portions of the auxiliary building HVAC system is required to achieve and maintain hot standby with subsequent cold shutdown. HVAC is required for the 480V transformer rooms (Key 37K). Individual room coolers are also required for the CCP and RHR pumps and are addressed in the equipment logics for their respective systems (Keys 37R and 40). Temporary ventilation may be used to replace fire damaged HVAC and heat loads may be reduced.
The TDAFW pump room is provided with a DC operated exhaust fan (Key 37N) sized to provide the required air flow in the room for the volume method of cooling. The fan is a roof ventilator type with intake and venting to the general area of the Auxiliary building. The fan will automatically start upon the start the TDAFW pump. If fans are not operable due to fire damage on fan electrical circuits, adequate ventilation can be achieved by opening the double doors to the room.
The diesel generator HVAC systems serve each combination of diesel, generator and associated batteries and electrical boards. The diesel generator building HVAC system consists of various subsystems.
The subsystems for each combination include diesel generator room HVAC subsystems, generator and electrical panel subsystems, battery hood exhaust subsystems, electric board room exhaust and heating 111-14
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 K.)J subsystems, and muffler room exhaust systems. A fire in any combination of diesel generator and associated batteries and electrical boards, which are separate fire areas, will not affect the HVAC systems servicing the adjacent combinations of diesel generator and associated batteries and electrical boards.
All other areas of the plant which contain equipment required for safe shutdown per Appendix R have been evaluated and determined that acceptable temperatures will be maintained for the required equipment to perform its intended FSSD function if HVAC is lost. Some areas require operator action to turn out normal lighting and other electrical loads to reduce the heat load. (i.e. Auxiliary Instrument Room K37B, 480V Board and Battery Rooms K37F, AFW/CCS and AFW/BAT Space Coolers K370, CCS/SFP Space Cooler K37P).
4.10 Electrical Power System - Key 38, 39 4.10.1 Emergency Power System The plant Emergency Power System (EPS) includes on-site, independent, automatically-starting emergency power sources that supply power to essential safe shutdown equipment if the normal off-site power sources are unavailable.
The emergency power sources consist of four 6.9kV diesel generators. Each consists of a single generator driven by two engines on a common shaft. Each diesel engine is equipped with its own auxiliaries.
These include batteries, starting air, fuel oil, lube oil, cooling water, intake and exhaust system, speed regulator (governor) and controls. Cooling water is provided from the ERCW system.
4.10.2 6.9KV Shutdown Power System Each of the four 6.9kV shutdown boards is normally fed from 16lkV/6.9kV common station service transformers (CSSTs) that receive power from offsite sources. Each of four 6.9kV shutdown boards can also be fed from the corresponding 6.9kV diesel generator. Loss of offsite power to the 6.9kV boards is sensed by undervoltage relays. Upon sensing an undervoltage, the master relay(s) automatically start the emergency generators, trip the normal feed switchgear breakers and trip all motor feeder breakers on the boards. The generators can also be manually started locally, from the MCR, or from the ACR1 For shutdown scenarios, that do not require MCR abandonment, a switchgear breaker on each board is automatically closed when its diesel generator is at rated speed and rated voltage and reenergizes the bus. The essential loads are sequentially connected to the bus.
For shutdown scenarios from the ACR, breaker closure and diesel generator loading is done manually. The diesel generators will then supply all equipment which must operate under emergency conditions for the respective safeguard train.
4.10.3 480V AC Shutdown Power System The 480V shutdown power system distributes power for low voltage station service demands. The normal source of power is the 6.9kV shutdown boards via the 6.9kV/480V transformers.
The 480V shutdown power system consists of eight boards, two per unit per train. Each 480V board is fed from the associated unit/train 6.9kV shutdown board through the normal or spare 6.9kV/480V transformers. The 480V shutdown boards feed 480V loads and various MCCs. The MCCs in tum feed various motor operated valves and other loads required for safe shutdown. Each MCC has a normal and alternate power source that can be utilized when needed.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART m - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 4.10.4 120V AC Vital Instrument Power System The 120V AC Vital Instrument Power System consists of four separate vital boards per unit. Each 120V AC Vital Bus is supplied by an independent inverter. Each vital battery supplies two inverters (one per unit of the same channel) plus a standby spare shared between units for each channel. Each inverter is normally supplied by the 480V AC power system of the associated train, which is rectified and auctioneered using diodes with its respective 125V dc battery board. The spare inverter can be manually aligned as a replacement for either of the normal inverters. The spare inverter can be supplied 480V AC from either train
,via a manual transfer switch.
The output of each inverter is connected to its 120V AC vital instrument power board. The vital instrument power board can be supplied from its normal inverter or the spare inverter via a manual transfer switch located on the board. The vital instrument power boards supply all of the required normal safe shutdown instrumentation per channel.
4.10.5 125V DC Power System The 125V dc power system consists of four battery banks, four normal chargers, two spare chargers, and four main dc battery boards. The 125V dc power system supplies power for control of 6.9kV/480V shutdown boards, operation of vital inverters, pneumatic-operated solenoid controlled valves, and selected emergency lights. The battery system consists of four separately located sets of batteries powering four channels of dc boards. Each normal vital battery has its own normal charger. Each vital battery board can also be supplied from one of two spare chargers. The battery chargers are energized from normal or alternate MCCs via a manual transfer switch. A fifth vital battery may be used as an installed spare and can be placed into service in place of any of the four normal vital batteries. The fifth vital battery is maintained by its own charger until connected to one of the normal vital battery boards.
During normal operation, the 125V dc loads are fed from the battery chargers, with the batteries being supplied a "trickle" charge floating on the system. Upon loss of ac power, the entire dc load is drawn from the batteries. However, the battery chargers can be manually aligned to alternate power sources to take over the load and recharge their associated battery. All direct current loads associated with engineered safeguards equipment are fully redundant. These loads are arranged so that each battery supplies its associated channel.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M1 - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIEE Rev. 12 4.10.6 250V DC Power System The 250V dc power system consists of two battery banks, two normal chargers, a spare charger, and two 250V dc battery boards. Control power for nonsafety-related power circuit breakers and associated protective relays is distributed from the 250V dc supply via circuit breakers on the turbine building dc distribution boards.
The 250V dc power system provides power for non-safety-related loads and, for Appendix R fire scenarios, is used to operate steam load trip circuits and to provide capabilities to trip the RCPs.
4.11 Operator Integrity - Key 41 Sufficient operator communication channels, emergency lighting, and security system access has been guaranteed for the FSSD.
4.12 Reactor Trip - Key 29 A fire inside or outside of the control building may require a reactor trip to bring the plant to hot standby. Reactor trip breaker A or B may be tripped by the handswitches in the MCR Also, the reactor may be tripped using the motor-generator set breaker A and B. The reactor trip provides sufficient initial reactivity control. Long term reactivity control is accomplished by preventing boron dilution and assuring that injected makeup water is at least the boron concentration of the RWST.
The reactor can be manually shut down from the main control room, or if the fire damages the reactor K >
trip breakers, the reactor can be manually shut down by de-energizing the control rod drive motor-generators.
There are four paths to trip the reactor. For each of two trains, there is a shunt trip path and an undervoltage trip path. The shunt trip path trips the reactor by energizing the shunt trip coil in the reactor trip switchgear through a handswitch contact in the main control room The undervoltage trip path trips the reactor by de energizing the undervoltage trip coil in the reactor trip switchgear through a handswitch contact in the main control room. For an undervoltage trip path to fail, a perfect short to another power source must occur. For a shunt trip path to fail, the path must open without shorting. It is, therefore, considered incredible that all four paths will fail in the specific manner to disable each respective path, particularly in light of the fact that the trip handswitches in the main control room each utilize all four paths simultaneously when placed in the TRIP position. In addition, the reactor may be tripped locally at the reactor trip switchgear and the motor-generator set supply breaker.. The reactor protection system will not be specifically protected from fire damage. The fail-safe design of the reactor protection system and diversity of input signals which can detect a given event provide additional protection should an event occur before the operator could manually insert the control rods. The input signal cables are run in conduit which makes them less susceptible to fire damage. Fires which occur in the control building which are more threatening to the reactor protection system are fires for which the operator will manually insert the rods quickly to allow evacuation of the main control room.
5.0 IDENTIFICATION AND MAINTENANCE OF SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS 5.1 Identification of Safe Shutdown Components (SSC)
For each system, plant flow diagrams (P&IDs), system descriptions and one-ine diagrams were used to identify the precise primary flow paths and operational characteristics that must be established to accomplish the desired safe shutdown function. From this information, a list was compiled in reference 11.2.1 of the components which participate in the system's performance of its safe shutdown function. These components are:
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 (1)
Active components that need to be powered to establish, or assist in establishing, the primary flow path and/or the system's operation.
(2)
Active components in the primary flow path that normally are in the proper position whose power loss will not result in a change of position, but may be affected by open, short, or ground faults in control or power cabling (3)
Power-operated components that need to change position to establish or assist in establishing the primary flow path, whose loss of electrical or air supplies result in the component adopting the required safe shutdown position but which may be affected by open, short or ground faults in control or power cabling.
(4)
Major mechanical components that support safe shutdown.
From the analysis of the safe shutdown system flow paths, those components whose spurious operation would threaten safe shutdown system operability were also identified in reference 11.2.1. This identification included those branch flow paths that must be isolated and remain isolated to assure that flow will not be substantially diverted from the primary flow path. See Section 7 for the detailed discussion of spurious operations.
A list was generated for safe shutdown devices including device identification and operating requirements for the various shutdown keys (ref. 11.2.1).
5.2 Temporary Repositioning of Appendix R Valves (e.g., Maintenance. Testing A design approach to prevent spuious operation of Appendix R valves is to position the valve in the correct FSSD position, then remove power by opening the breaker to the valve. In the course of normal operations, it is occasionally necessary to energize these valves for repositioning required for testing, maintenance, inspections, etc. These operations are considered a part of normal plant testing and maintenance programs, and are conducted with the plant in a normal mode of operation.
Special precautions are implemented by the relkant plant procedures when re-positioning is performed on an Appendix R valve that has had the power removed. These precautions involve requiring Operations to maintain an operator at the valve Motor Control Center (MCC) such that if a fire were reported to the Main Control Room (MCR), the operator can place the valve in the correct Appendix R position and then open the breaker to prevent spurious re-positioning of the valve. Also, in order to ensure the duration of the activity is minimized, procedures require operators to record the time power was placed and removed on the valve.
6.0 IDENTIFICATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CIRCUITS AND CABLES The equipment list developed during the SQN safe shutdown system analysis (ref. 11.2.1) was the basic input for the identification of electrical circuits essential to ensure adequate equipment performance.
Essential safe shutdown electrical circuits were identified for the electrically-dependent devices (ref. 11.2.2).
However, for some equipment, either a subset of cables or no cables were identified. For example, cables were not selected for valves where local manual operation is allowed during cooldown. The circuits identified included power, control, and instrumentation. Type II associated circuits as addressed in Section 7 were also treated as required circuits.
The identification and analysis of these essential electrical circuits was based on one-line diagrams, 111-18
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART [H - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 schematics, and wiring diagrams from which the necessary circuit cables were selected for the subsequent cable routing and separation analysis. Circuit evaluation and identification considers equipment operability requirements. Circuits are identified for active and passive equipment. Circuit identification for high/low pressure boundary components considered the possibility of more conservative cable faults (e.g., 3 phase to 3 phase faults.)
For each electrical component, circuits and cables were identified which (1) are required for safe shutdown to ensure operability or (2) failure of which would be detrimental. The circuits not included per the above criteria included annunciator, computer, motor heaters and external monitoring circuits. Those circuits which are electrically isolated from the electrical circuits of concern, or where failure of these circuits would not affect operability, were not included in the separation analysis.
For each safe shutdown key, cable block diagrams were developed (ref. 11.2.2) for each safe shutdown component to identify cables required to ensure that the component can perform its safe shutdown function. Once the required cables were identified, the cable and conduit schedules were used to identify the individual cable physical routings in the plant on a raceway basis. Field routed conduit was located and evaluated where necessary. Reference 11.2.3 contains the physical routings.
7.0 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS OF CONCERN 7.1 Introduction The separation and protection requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R apply not only to safe shutdown circuits but also to "associated" circuits which could prevent operation or cause maloperation of shutdown systems and equipment The identification of these associated circuits of concern was performed in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 81-12, the Staffs clarification to Generic Letter 81-12, and Generic Letter 86-10. The generic letters defined associated circuits of concern as those which have a physical separation less than that required by Section III.G of Appendix R, and have one of the following:
Type I A common power source with the shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices; Type II A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability; Type HI A common enclosure with the shutdown cables, and, (a) are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or (b) will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.
7.2 Associated Circuits by Common Power Supply and Common Enclosures The electrical distribution system was reviewed to assure that Type I associated circuits by common power supply are addressed by providing selective protective trip coordination for all FSSD power supplies.
Type 111 associated circuits by common enclosures were addressed by ensuring that all existing circuits in Category 1 buildings are electrically protected with a fuse or breaker that will actuate prior to the jacket of existing faulted cables from reaching their auto-ignition temperature.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 Electrical circuit fault protection was designed to provide protection for plant electric circuits via
)
protective relaying, circuit breakers and fuses. Protective equipment was designed and applied to ensure adequate protection of electrical distribution equipment, including cables, from electric faults and overload conditions in the circuits. The selection and application of these devices was in accordance with TVA design practices (ref. 11.2.4) and is documented in engineering calculations (ref. 11.2.5). The protective equipment ensures that electrical fault and overloads will not result in any more cable degradation than would be expected when operating conditions are below the set point of the protective equipment. This will also limit cable damage and prevent cable faults from resulting in internal cable temperatures which could cause ignition of cable insulation.
An integral part of the original electric system protection was the proper coordination of these electrical protective devices. Such coordination assures that the protective device nearest (in an electrical sense) to the fault operates prior to the operation of any "upstream" protective devices, and provides interruption of electrical service to a minimum amount of equipment. The electrical protection design (ref.
11.2.4) required coordination of such electrical protective devices and is documented in engineering calculations (ref. 11.2.5).
7.3 Associated Circuits by Spurious Operation Cables that are and are not part of safe shutdown circuits may be damaged by the effects of postulated fires.
This cable damage may consequently prevent the correct operation of safe shutdown components, or result in the maloperation of equipment which would directly prevent the proper performance of the safe shutdown systems. The effects of spurious operations may be conceptually divided into two subclasses as follows:
(1)
Maloperation of safe shutdown equipment due to control circuit electrical interlocks between safe shutdown circuits and other circuits; for example, the numerous safe shutdown equipment automatic operation interlocks from process control and instrument circuits.
(2)
Maloperation of equipment that is not defined as part of the safe shutdown systems, but that could prevent the accomplishment of a safe shutdown function; for example, inadvertent depressurization of the RCS or the MS system by spurious opening of boundary valves.
The evaluation of Appendix R events ensures that any failure of associated circuits of concern by spurious operation (Type II) will not prevent safe shutdown (refer to Part X). Credible electrical faults considered in the analysis included open circuit, short circuit (conductor-to-conductor), short to ground, and cable-to-cable (hot-short) including 3-phase hot-shorts for high/low pressure interface valves (ref. 11.2.6).
Type 11 associated circuits of concern outside of containment are analyzed in accordance with Appendix R Sections LII.G.2a, LI.G2b, and/or ll1.G.2c criteria as required circuits. Inside containment, Type H associated circuits of concern are analyzed in accordance with Appendix R Sections Il.G.2d, lII.G.2e, and/or III.G.2f criteria as required circuits.
In order for cable faults that generate spurious operation to occur, the following conditions must exist synergistically at the cable fault location:
(1)
Sufficient energy must exist due to the fire to create failure of the cable jacket and insulating material.
(2)
The failure of the jacket and insulating material must occur in a way that directly exposes the 111-20
SSQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 cable conductors.
(3)
For each short, two or more specific conductors must come into direct contact causing low impedance conductor-to-conductor connections.
(4)
For certain types of spurious operation, multiple electrically independent shorts must occur.
(5)
No additional conductors that would cause circuit fault currents and operation of circuit protective devices may participate in the short condition.
(6)
No ground faultsthat would cause operation of circuit protective devices must occur.
The spurious operation analysis (ref. 11.2.7) recognized the extremely low probability of certain types of these faulted conditions. The following cable short conditions causing spurious operation were considered of sufficiently low likelihood that they were assumed not to require additional analysis or modification (unless it involves high-low pressure boundary interfaces) :
CASE 1)
Three phase-ac power circuit cable-to-cable faults ((PkV and 480V)
CASE 2)
More than one conductor to conductor hot short within one fire affected cable (125VDC/120VAC)
CASE 3)
More than one conductor to conductor hot short between cable-to-cable faults (125VDC/120VAC)
With respect to Case lno conductor-to-conductor faults within the same power cable can cause spurious powering of the associated device. Only power cable-to-cable connections between one deenergized and one energized power circuit could permit operation. For the case of the three-phase-ac circuit, three electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts must occur without grounds in order to power the associated device. Similarly, with respect to Cases 2 and 3, for the two-wire ungrounded dc or ac power circuit, more than one conductor to conductor selective hot short with the proper polarity without grounds must occur.
The likelihood of such occurrences has been acknowledged by the NRC Staff to be sufficiently low to permit excluding such faulted conditions from consideration except for high/low pressure boundary components.
Therefore, for the above identified spurious operations caused by cable faults, only 3-phase hot-shorts for high/low pressure boundary interface valves and conductor-to-conductor (same cable), or cable to cable from the same power source have been incorporated into the analysis (ref. 11.2.7).
Concerning Case 1) - The fundamental basis of excluding the remaining shorts from consideration is based on the need for multiple cable-to-cable electrically independent faults in order for spurious operation to occur.
Concerning Case 2), in order for spurious operation to occur due to more than one conductor-to conductor selective hot short fault within a single cable, proper polarity without grounds must occur.
Concerning Case 3), all dc and ac control circuits at SQN are ungrounded. In order for spurious operation to occur due to circuit-to-circuit faults between dc circuits supplied from different sources, at a minimum, two electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts without grounds must occur.
For the ungrounded Motor Control Center (MCC) ac control circuits in Case 3), the identical consideration exists. The MCC transformer secondary 120V ac control circuits are ungrounded. Therefore, at a minimum, two cable-to-cable shorts must simultaneously occur in order for spurious operation to result 111-21
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART m - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 for circuits supplied from different sources.
7.4 HIGH IMPEDANCE FAULTS A sustained high impedance fault on a power cable is highly improbable. However, high impedance faults have been considered in the evaluation of the electrical power system's capability to provide power to the required fire safe shutdown equipment (ref. 11.2.5). To ensure that the upstream breaker supplying a board or distribution panel will not trip as a result of high impedance faults, the following criteria was used:
A. Determine the expected Appendix R board loading.
B. Identify the worst case high impedance fault (that is the non-Appendix R circuit that will be energized and has the largest differential between normal load current and protective device setting/rating). Assume this circuit is subjected to a high impedance fault such that its current rises to just below the trip setpoint of its associated circuit breaker.
C. Verify that the total current from A and B above will not trip the upstream feeder breakers and that there is margin available.
8.0 HIGH/LOW PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTERFACES Special considerations for high/low pressure interfaces to meet the requirements of IOCFR50 Appendix R are described in Generic Letters 81-12 and 86-10 and Information Notice 87-50. Per Generic Letter 81-12, the following information is required for high/low pressure boundary interfaces in order to ensure that they are adequately protected for the effects of a single fire:
- 1)
Identify each high/low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.
- 2)
Identify the essential cabling for each device
- 3)
Identify each location where the identified cables are separated by a barrier having less than a 3-hour fire rating
- 4)
For the areas identified in [3] above (if any), provide the bases and justification Per Generic Letter 86-10, the possibility of getting a hot short on all three phases of three phase ac circuits in the proper sequence to cause spurious operation of a motor is only required to be evaluated for cases involving high/low pressure interfaces. The same applies to ungrounded dc circuits regarding two hot shorts of proper polarity without grounding resulting in spurious operation of high/low pressure interfaces.
Per Information Notice 87-50, for those low pressure systems that connect to the reactor coolant system (a high pressure system) at least one isolation valve must remain closed despite any damage that may be caused by fire, because the high pressure from the reactor coolant system could result in failure of the low pressure piping.
Based on the above, a review of the systems credited for safe shutdown was conducted to identify potential high/low pressure interfaces. These interfaces were evaluated to identify valves that, if spuriously opened, would expose low pressure piping to high pressure resulting in potential failure of the low pressure system. The results are included in Keys 7 and 8 of reference 11.2.1.
111-22
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 The control system for RHR valves has been designed to prohibit opening unless the reactor coolant pressure is low enough to prevent RHR piping failure. However, if these valves opened spuriously, exposure of RHR piping to high pressure may cause failure of the RIR system piping and render the system inoperable. Therefore, the RHR/RCS isolation valves (1-FCV-74-1, 2) are considered high/low pressure interface valves.
Spurious opening of these valves could expose downstream piping to excess pressure that may cause failure resulting in the rupture of the primary coolant boundary. Therefore, the excess letdown isolation valves (1-FCV-62-55, -56) are considered high/low pressure interface valves.
Normal letdown is not specifically required for safe shutdown. However, spurious opening of these valves may cause failure to maintain RCS inventory control. Therefore, the normal letdown isolation valves are considered high/low pressure interface valves.
The pressurizer PORV and reactor head vent isolation valves are designed to function at high RCS operating pressure. They provide two safe shutdown functions: 1) to initially remain dosed for RCS inventory control purposes, and; 2) to provide a means of depressurizing the RCS to the point that the RHR system can be initiated to bring the plant to a cold shutdown condition. Discharge from the RCS through these valves is directed to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). The inlet lines are sized to accommodate vent/relief discharge flow without piping or component failure.
Continuous letdown to the PRT may eventually cause spillage of excess coolant to containment through the PRT rupture disks. Therefore, the pressurizer PORVs and block valve combinations, and reactor head vent isolation valves, are required for RCS inventory control (and RCS letdown) and are considered high/low interface valves.
9.0 LOCATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT, CABLES AND RACEWAYS The safe shutdown equipment list (Table 111-2) identifies the equipment, components, and subcomponents relied on for fire safe shutdown (ref. 11.2.1). Safe shutdown cables were identified on block diagrams (ref. 11.2.2). The routing (conduits and tray nodes) of each safe shutdowtn cable was obtained from the cable and conduit schedules as needed. The route of each safe shutdown cable was plotted on physical drawings and used as part of the separation as needed (ref. 11.2.3).
10.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM SEPARATION EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 10.1 Overview of Evaluation Methodolozy The safe shutdown analysis first established the systems, components, and cables required for fire safe shutdown purposes. The locations of equipment and routing of cables were determined as described in previous sections. The separation criteria of Appendix R were evaluated on a fire area basis to meet the safe shutdown performance goals as identified in NRC generic letters and guidance documents.
The Appendix R analysis (refer to Part X) evaluated fire areas that contain systems, components, and cables required for fire safe shutdown. Plant structures that do not contain systems, components, or cables associated with FSSD capabilities were not included in the separation analysis. The adequacy of barriers separating safe shutdown-related buildings was evaluated.
The fire safe shutdown analysis was based on the evaluation of separation in the auxiliary, control, diesel generator, reactor building, and intake pumping station. The auxiliary building, diesel generator buildings, and the intake pumping station, were evaluated against the requirements of Appendix R Sections 111-23
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 IH.G.1, II.G.2a, IIM.G.2b, and III.G.2c. For purposes of this analysis, the entire control building was evaluated as a single alternative shutdown location under the criteria of Appendix R Section II.G.3 and III.L.
Fire safe shutdown activities take place outside of the control building in the ACR and other manual action locations (ref. 11.2.9). The reactor building was analyzed in accordance with the criteria of Appendix R Sections IIl.G.2d, mII.G.2e, and lll.G.2f. Detailed procedures have been developed to ensure fire safe shutdown capability in case of an Appendix R fire (ref. 11.2.10).
Interactions between redundant safe shutdown paths were identified based on the location of the components and cables of redundant safe shutdown paths. Interactions are defined as locations where components of redundant shutdown paths did not meet Appendix R separation criteria. These interactions were evaluated for their impact on the safe shutdown capability of the plant and the resolutions have been implemented. The resolutions may consist of modifications, use of radiant energy shielding, fire detection and suppression in the area, alternate equipment, manual operator actions, fire barrier installation, pre-fire actions, post-fire repairs (ref. 11.2.11), engineering evaluations prepared in accordance with the guidance of Generic Letter 86-10, or deviation requests (refer to Part VDI 10.2 Fire Area Evaluation Methodology Separation analyses were initially evaluated for viability on a fire area basis. The fire area separation analysis was effective where only a single room constituted a fire area, and where redundant capability existed outside of the fire area. Large rooms and specific fire areas containing redundant trains of safe shutdown systems, components, or cables were further evaluated for purposes of separation. Where multiple rooms exist in the fire area, regulatory barriers with a 1-1/2-hour fire rating have been credited under Appendix R Section M.G.2c criteria. Where the 1-1/2-hour fire rated barriers have been credited, automatic detection and suppression capabilities on both sides of the barriers have been evaluated per Section Im.G.2c criteria.
Credit has been taken for a minimum of 20 feet of separation under Appendix R Section III.G.2b criteria in those fire areas that contain multiple rooms not separated by regulatory fire barriers.Section III.G.2b criteria has also been utilized in large rooms that contain redundant trains of safe shutdown capability. Section lI.G.2c criteria has been applied where 20 feet of separation was not available. Section MI.G.2b criteria has been used inthe large open areas of the auxiliary building and adjacent rooms which are not enclosed by regulatory fire barriers.
The fire area analysis is documented in Part X with deviations and evaluations documented in Part VII.
11.0 REFERENCES
11.1 Regulatory Documents 11.1.1 IOCFR50AppendixR 11.1.2 Generic Letter 81-12, Enclosure 1 11.2 TVA Documents 11.2.1 SQN-SQS4-0127, "Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown per IOCFR50 Appendix R" 111-24
1 SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART Im - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 11.2.2 Electrical Equipment BlockDiagrams Calculation Series, BD-Kl through BD-K48 11.2.3 TVA Drawing 45E890 Series 11.2.4 Electrical Design Criteria: SQN-DC-V-10.7, SQN-DC-V-11.2, SQN-DC-V-11.2.2, SQN DC-V-11.4.1, SQN-DC-V-11.6, SQN-DC-V-11.6.1 11.2.5 Calculations: D2SDJ-P213350,SQN-APPR-1, SQN-APPR-2, SQN-APS-003, SQN-APS 015, SQN-CPS-051 11.2.6 SQN Detailed Design Criteria, SQN-DC-V-10.7, "10CFR50, Appendix R, Type I, II, & III Items" 11.2.7 Calculations: SQN-APPR-10, SQN-CSS-023, SQN-CSS-024 11.2.8 SQN-DC-V-24.0, "Design Crieria for Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability" 11.2.9 AOP-C.04, "Shutdown from the Auxiliary Control Roori
/
11.2.10 AOP-N-09, "Appendix R Fire Safe Shutdowd' 11.2.11 SMI-0-317-8, "Appendix R-Casualty Procedures" 11.2.12 DCN D20071A/P20872A" Vital Inverter Modification" 111-25
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 Key 1 Centrifugal Charging Pump Key 2 Charging Flow Control Path Key 3 Emergency Raw Cooling Water Path Key 4 Volume Control Tank Suction Key 5 RWST Suction Key 6 ECCS Charging Path Key 7 RCS Pressure Boundary Isolation Key 8 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Isolation Excess Letdown Isolation Key 9 RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling Key 11 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Key 12 Steam Generator Level Control Using MDAFW Pump Key 13 Control Air Key 14 & 15 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Key 16 Steam Generator Level Control using TDAFW Pump Key 17 Suction From Condensate Storage Tank Key 19 Suction from ERCW To AFW Pump Suction Key 20 Main Steam Isolation Key 21 Steam Load Isolation Key 22 Feedwater Isolation Key 23 Feedwater Pump Turbine Key 24 Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Key 25 Secondary Safety Valves Key 26 Secondary Relief Valves Key 28 RCS Pressure Control Key 29 Reactor Trip Key 30 RHR Shutdown Cooling Flow Paths Key 31 RHR Pumps Key Key 34 Normal Charging Path Key 36 Accumulator Isolation Key 37A Main Control Room HVAC Key 37B Auxiliary Inst Rm HVAC Key 37C Diesel Generator Building HVAC Key 37F 480V Bd Rm & BatteryRm HVAC Key 37JLower Compartment Coolers Key 37K 480V Transformer Rooms HVAC Key 37P CCS/SFP HVAC Key 37N TDAFW PUMP ROOM HVAC Key 370 CCS/AFW Pump Coolers and AFW/BAT Pump Coolers Key 37R Centrifugal Charging Pump HVAC Key 38/39 Electrical Power (includes Onsite and Offsite and Distribution)
Key 40 RHR PumpRm Coolers Key 41 Operator Integrity (communications/lighting/access)
Key 48 RCS Letdown Key 70 Component Cooling System HIi-26 I
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Shutdown Logic Component List Main Steam (1)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 1 &2-P-1 -2A 1&2-P-1-2B 1&2-P-1-2D I &2-FCV-1 -4 I&2-FSV-1-4A I&2-FSV-1-4B I&2-FSV-1-4D I&2-FSV-1-4E I&2-FSV-1-4F I&2-FSV-1-4G I&2-FSV-1-4H I &2-FSV-1 -4J 1 &2-P-I -5 I &2-PCV-1 -5 1 &2-FCV-1 -7 1 &2-P-1-9A 1&2-P-1-9B 1&2-P-1-9D I &2-FCV-1 -11 1 &2-FSV-I-11A 1&2-FSV-1-11B 1&2-FSV-1-11D 1 &2-FSV-1-11 E 1&2-FSV-I-11F I&2-FSV-I-11 G 1&2-FSV-1I-11H I &2-FSV-1-11 J 1 &2-P-1 -12 1&2-PCV-I-12 1&2-FCV-1-14 26,SI 26,SI 26 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 26,SI 26 24 26,SI 26,SI 26 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 26,SI 26 24 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W610-1-1 47W801 -1 47W61 0-1-1 47W610-1-1 47W610-1-1 47W610-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W801-1 47W801-2 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W801 -1 47W610-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W61 0-1-1 47W610-1-1 47W610-1-1 47W801 -1 47W801-2 Loop 1 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation loop Loop 1 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation loop Loop I Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation loop Loop I MSIV Loop 1 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop I MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop I MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 1 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 1 Atmospheric Relief Valve Control Instrument loop Loop 1 Atmospheric Relief Valve Steam Generator 1 Blowdown Isolation Valve Loop 2 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 Main Steam Pressure - Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 Main Steam Pressure - Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 MSIV Loop 2 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 2 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 2 Atmospheric Relief Valve Control Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 Atmospheric Relief Valve Control SG 2 Blowdown Isolation Valve IlH-27 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Shutdown Logic Component List Main Steam (1) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1 &2-FCV-1 -15 1&2-FCV-1-16 I &2-FCV-1 -17 1&2-FCV-l-18 1 &2-P-1 -20A 1 &2-P-1-20B I&2-P-1-20D I &2-FCV-1 -22 1&2-FSV-1-22A 1 &2-FSV-1 -22B 1&2-FSV-1-22D I &2-FSV-1 -22E 1 &2-FSV-1 -22F 1 &2-FSV-I -22G I &2-FSV-1 -22H I &2-FSV-I -22J 1&2-P-1-23 I &2-PCV-I -23 1 &2-FCV-1 -25 1 &2-P-1 -27A I &2-P-1 -27B I&2-P-1-27D 1&2-FCV-1 -29 I &2-FSV-1 -29A 1 &2-FSV-1 -29B I &2-FSV-1 -29D 1 &2-FSV-1-29E 1 &2-FSV-1 -29F 1 &2-FSV-1 -29G 1&2-FSV-I-29H 1&2-FSV-1-29J 14,15 14,15 14,15 14,15 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 26, SI 47W610-1-2 26,SI 26 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 26,SI 26 24 26,SI 26,SI 26 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W801-1 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W801 -1 47W801-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W801-1 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 47W610-1-2 AFPT Steam Supply from SG No. I AFPT Steam Supply from SG No. 4 Steam Flow Isolation to AFPT Steam Flow Isolation to AFPT Loop 3 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 MSIV Loop 3 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 3 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 3 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 Atmospheric Relief Valve Steam Generator 3 Blowdown Isolation Valve Loop 4 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 4 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 4 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 4 MSIV Loop 4 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Air Supply Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Test Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Air Vent Solenoid Loop 4 MSIV Test Solenoid 111-28 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES APPENDIX C Shutdown Logic Component List Main Steam (1) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawinq 1 &2-P-1-30 1 &2-PCV-1-30 1 &2-FCV-1 -32 1 &2-FCV-1 -36 1 &2-FCV-1 -37 1 &2-FCV-1 -38 1 &2-FCV-1 -39 I &2-FCV-1 -43 1 &2-FCV-1 -44 1 &2-FCV-1 -45 I &2-FCV-1 -46 1 &2-FCV-1-51 1 &2-FCV-i -52 1 &2-FCV-1-61 I &2-FCV-1 -62 1 &2-FCV-1 -64 1 &2-FCV-1 -65 1 &2-FCV-1 -67 I&2-FCV-1-68 1 &2-FCV-i -70 1 &2-FCV-i -71 1 &2-FCV-1 -75 1 &2-FCV-1 -77 I&2-FCV-1-79 I&2-FCV-1-84 I &2-FCV-1 -91 I&2-FCV-1-98 26,SI 26 24 21,23 21,23 23 23 21,23 21,23 23 23 14,15 14,15 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 47W610-1-2 47W801-1 47W801-2 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W803-2 47W61 0-1-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 Description Loop 4 Main Steam Pressure Indication Instrumentation Loop Loop 4 Atmospheric Relief Valve SG 4 Blowdown Isolation Valve High Pressure Stop Valve to MFPT A High Pressure Control Valve to MFPT A Low Pressure Control Valve to MFPT A Low Pressure Stop Valve to MFPT A High Pressure Stop Valve to MFPT B High Pressure Control Valve to MFPT B Low Pressure Control Valve to MFPT B Low Pressure Stop Valve to MFPT B AFPT Trip & Throttle Valve AFPT Governor Valve Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam Stop and Control Valve to High Pressure Turbine Main Steam to MSR A2 Main Steam to MSR B2 Main Steam to MSR C2 Main Steam to MSR Al Main Steam to MSR BI Main Steam to MSR Cl 111-29 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES APPENDIX C Shutdown Logic Component List Main Steam (1) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1 &2-FCV-1 -103 1 &2-FCV-I -104 1 &2-FCV-I -105 1 &2-FCV-I -106 1 &2-FCV-I -107 I&2-FCV-I-108 1&2-FCV-I-109 I&2-FCV-i-110 I &2-FCV-I-111 I&2-FCV-I-112 1 &2-FCV-i -113 I &2-FCV-1 -114 1 &2-FCV-I -147 1 &2-FCV-I-148 1 &2-FCV-I -149 1 &2-FCV-I-150 1&2-FCV-i-181 1 &2-FCV-I -182 1 &2-FCV-I-183 I &2-FCV-I -184 1 &2-FCV-1 -275 1&2-FCV-1-277 I &2-FCV-1 -279 I &2-FCV-1 -284 I&2-FCV-1-291 I &2-FCV-I -298 1 &2-VLV-1 -512 I &2-VLV-1 -513 I &2-VLV-1 -514 I &2-VLV-1 -515 I &2-VLV-1 -516 1&2-VLV-1-517 I &2-VLV-1 -518 1 &2-VLV-1 -519 1 &2-VLV-1 -520 I &2-VLV-I -521 I &2-VLV-1 -517 1 &2-VLV-1 -518 I &2-VLV-1 -519 I&2-VLV-1-520 1 &2-VLV-1 -521 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 20 20 20 24 24 24 24 21 21 21 21 21 21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 47W801-l 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801B 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-2 47W801-2 47W801-2 47W801-2 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 47W801-1 Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve Main Steam Dump Valve MSIV Bypass Valve MSIV Bypass Valve MSIV Bypass Valve MSIV Bypass Valve SG 1 Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve SG 2 Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve SG 3 Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve SG 4 Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve MSR A2 Low Power Bypass Valve MSR B2 Low Power Bypass Valve MSR C2 Low Power Bypass Valve MSR Al Low Power Bypass Valve MSR B1 Low Power Bypass Valve MSR Cl Low Power Bypass Valve Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 3 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 3 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 3 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 3 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 3 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 2 IHI-30 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mH - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 APPENDIX C Main Steam (1) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1 &2-VLV-1-522 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 1 1&2-VLV-1-523 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 1 1&2-VLV-1 -524 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 1 1&2-VLV-1 -525 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 1 1&2-VLV-1 -526 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 1 1&2-VLV-1 -527 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 4 1&2-VLV-1 -528 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 4 1&2-VLV-1-529 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 4 1&2-VLV-1-530 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 4 1&2-VLV-1-531 25 47W801-1 Main Steam Safety Valve from SG 4 1&2-VLV-1-868 24 47W801-2 SG Blowdown Heat Exchanger Isolation Valve 1&2-VLV-1-869 24 47W801-2 SG Blowdown Heat Exchanger Isolation Valve Main & Auxiliary Feedwater (3)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1&2-PMP-3-118 1&2-PMP-3-128 1 &2-PMP-3-142 1 &2-FCV-3-33 1 &2-FCV-3-35 1 &2-FCV-3-35A 1 &2-L-3-39 1 &2-L-3-43 I &2-FCV-3-47 1 &2-FCV-3-48 1 &2-FCV-3-48A 1 &2-L-3-52 1 &2-L-3-56 1 &2-FCV-3-87 1 &2-FCV-3-90 1 &2-FCV-3-90A 1 &2-L-3-93 1 &2-L-3-94 1 &2-L-3-98 1 &2-FCV-3-103A 1 &2-L-3-106 1 &2-L-3-107 11 11 47W803-2 47W803-2 14&15 47W803-2 22 22 22 47W803-1 47W803-1 47W610-3-1 12,16 47W610-3-1 12,16 47W610-3-1 22 22 22 47W803-1 47W803-1 47W610-3-1 12,16 47W610-3-1 12,16 47W610-3-1 22 22 22 12 12,16 12,16 22 12 12,16 47W803-1 47W803-1 47W610-3-2 47W610-3-2 47W610-3-2 47W610-3-2 47W610-3-2 47W610-3-2 47W610-3-2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B-B Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-S SG 1 Main Feedwater Isolation Valve SG I Main Feedwater Control Valve Feedwater Low Load Bypass to SG 1 SG 1 NR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 1 WR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 2 MFW Isolation Valve SG 2 MFW Control Valve Feedwater Low Load Bypass to SG 2 SG 2 NR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 2 WR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 3 MFW Isolation Valve SG 3 MFW Control Valve Feedwater Low Load Bypass to SG 3 SG 3 NR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 3 NR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 3 WR Level Instrumentation Loop Feedwater Low Load Bypass to SG 4 SG 4 NR Level Instrumentation Loop SG 4 NR Level Instrumentation Loop III-31
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Main & Auxiliary Feedwater (3) (continued)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 1 &2-FCV-3-1 00 1 &2-FCV-3-103 1 &2-L-3-1 11 1 &2-FCV-3-116A 1 &2-FCV-3-116B 1 &2-FCV-3-126A 1 &2-FCV-3-126B 1 &2-FCV-3-136A 1 &2-FCV-3-136B 1 &2-P-3-138A I &2-F-3-142 I &2-L-3-148 1 &2-LSV-3-148 I &2-LCV-3-148 K,,.2J 1&2-P-3-148 I &2-L-3-156 I &2-LCV-3-156 1 &2-LSV-3-156 1 &2-P-3-156 I &2-L-3-164 I &2-LSV-3-164 1 &2-LCV-3-164 1 &2-P-3-164 1 &2-L-3-171 I &2-LCV-3-171 I &2-LSV-3-171 I &2-P-3-171 1 &2-L-3-172 1 &2-LCV-3-172
- 1 &2-LSV-3-172 22 22 12,16 19 19 19 19 19 19 47W803-1 47W803-1 47W610-3-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 14,15 47W610-3-3 14,15 47W610-3-3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 12 47W610-3-3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 16 16 16 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W61 0-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W61 0-3-3 47W61 0-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 SG 4 MFW Isolation Valve SG 4 MFW Isolation Valve SG 4 WR Level Instrumentation Loop ERCW Header A Isolation Valve ERCW Header A Isolation Valve ERCW Header B IsolationValve ERCW Header B Isolation Valve ERCW Header A Isolation Valve ERCW Header A Isolation Valve Turbine Driven AFW Pump Outlet Pressure Instrumentation Loop TDAFWP Flow Instrumentation Loop SG 3 Level Instrumentation Loop Solenoid for Loop 3 MDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 3 MDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 3 Level Bypass Pressure Switch Instrumentation Loop SG 2 Level Instrumentation Loop SG 2 MDAFWP Level Control Valve Solenoid for Loop 2 MDAFWP Level Control Valve SG 2 Level Bypass Switch Instrumentation Loop SG I Level instrumentation Loop Solenoid for Loop I MDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 1 MDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 1 Level Bypass Pressure Switch Instrumentation Loop SG 4 Level Instrumentation Loop SG 4 MDAF WP Level Control Valve Solenoid for Loop 4 MDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 4 Level Bypass Pressure Switch Instrumentation Loop SG 3 Level Instrumentation Loop SG 3 TDAF WP Level Control Valve Solenoid for Loop 3 TDAF WP Feed Reg Valve PS-3-140A, -140B, -150B, -160A, and -160B have been deleted by ECN-L5883 111-32 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component 1 &2-L-3-173 1 &2-LCV-3-173 1 &2-LSV-3-173 1 &2-L-3-174 1 &2-LSV-3-174 I&2-LCV-3-174 1 &2-L-3-175 1 &2-LCV-3-175 I &2-LSV-3-175 1 &2-FCV-3-179A I &2-FCV-3-179B 1 &2-FCV-3-400 1 &2-FCV-3-401 1 &2-VLV-3-826 1 &2-VLV-3-827 1 &2-VLV-3-828 I &2-VLV-3-829 I &2-VLV-3-834 1 &2-VLV-3-835 1 &2-VLV-3-836 1 &2-VLV-3-837 I &2-VLV-3-867 I &2-VLV-3-868 1 &2-VLV-3-877 1 &2-VLV-3-878 Main & Auxiliary Feedwater (3) (Continued)
Key Reference 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 19 19 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 16 16 16 16 Drawincq 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W610-3-3 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 47W803-2 Description SG 2 Level Instrumentation Loop SG 2 TDAF WP Level Control Valve Solenoid for Loop 2 TDAF WP Level Control.Valve SG I Level Instrumentation Loop Solenoid for Loop 1 TDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 1 TDAF WP Level Control Valve SG 4 Level Control Instrumentation Loop SG 4 TDAF WP Level Control Valve Solenoid for Loop 4 TDAF WP Level Control Valve ERCW Header B Isolation Valve ERCW Header B Isolation Valve Air operated Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-A Recirculation valve Air operated Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B-B Recirculation valve Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B-B to SG 3 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-A to SG 2 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-A to SG 1 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B-B to SG 4 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B-B to SG 3 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A-A to SG 2 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-A to SG 1 Manual Isolation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-B to SG 4 TDAFW Pump Discharge Isolation Valve for SG 3 TDAFW Pump Discharge Isolation Valve for SG 2 TDAFW Pump Discharge Isolation Valve for SG 1 TDAFW Pump Discharge Isolation Valve for SG 4 PS-3-165A and -165B have been deleted by ECN-L5883.
111-33 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Ventilation (30)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description SI SI SI I &2-P-30-42 I &2-P-30-43 1 &2-P-30-44 1 &2-T-30-175 1 &2-T-30-176 1&2-CLR-30-182 I &2-CLR-30-183 1 &2-T-30-182 1 &2-T-30-183 2-CLR-30-184 2-CLR-30-185 1-CLR-30-190 I-CLR-30-191 1&2-TS-30-214 1,2-HS-30-214 1-FAN-030-244A-A I-FAN-030-244B-A 1-FAN-030-244D-A 2-FAN-030-246A-B 2-FAN-030-246B-B 2-FAN-030-246D-B I-FAN-030-248A-B I-FAN-030-248B-B I-FAN-030-248D-B 1-FAN-030-250A-A 1-FAN-030-250B-A 1-FAN-030-250D-A 47W866-1 47W866-1 47W866-1 40 47W866-8 40 47W866-8 37R 47W866-8 37R 47W866-8 37R 47W866-8 37R 47W866-8 370 47W866-8 370 47W866-8 370 47W866-8 370 47W866-8
- 37N, 14,15 37N 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37K 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 1-FCO-30-443 2-FCO-30-444 1-FCO-30-445 2-FCO-30-446 1-FCO-30-447 1 -HS-30-447B I-TS-30-447B 1-HS-30-447C 47W610-30-6 47W610-30-6 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47866-3 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 Containment Pressure Instrument Loop Containment Pressure Instrument Loop Containment Pressure Instrument Loop RHR Pump Room Coolers Temperature Switch Instrumentation Loop RHR Pump Room Coolers Temperature Switch Instrumentation Loop CCP Rm Cir Fan B-B CCP Rm Cir Fan A-A CCP Rm CIr Temp Control Instrumentation Loop CCP Rm CIr Temp Control Instrumentation Loop AFW & Boric Acid Xfer Pump Rm CIr A AFW & Boric Acid Xfer Pump Rm Cir B CCS & AFW Room CIr A CCS & AFW Room Cir B Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Vent Fan Temp Switch Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Vent Fan Handswitch 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling 480V Transformer Room Cooling DG Building Intake Damper DG Building Intake Damper DG Building Intake Damper DC Building Intake Damper DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch 111-34 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III-SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Ventilation (30) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 2-FCO-30-448 2-TS-30-448B 2-HS-30-448B 2-HS-30-448C 1-FCO-30-449 2-TS-30-449B 1 -HS-30-449B 1-HS-30-449C 2-FCO-30-450 2-HS-30-450B 2-HS-30-450C 2-TS-30-450B 1-FCO-30-451 1-TS-30-451B 1-HS-30-451 B 1-HS-30-451C 2-TS-30-452B 2-FCO-30-452 2-HS-30-452B 2-HS-30-452C 1-FCO-30-453 1-TS-30-453B 1-HS-30-453B 1-HS-30-453C 2-FCO-30-454 2-HS-30-454B 2-TS-30-454B 2-HS-30-454C 1-FCO-30-459 1-HS-30-459B 1-HS-30-459C 2-FCO-30-460 2-HS-30-460B 2-HS-30-460C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 37C 37C 37C 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DC Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DC Building Exhaust Damper DC Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DC Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Damper DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Damper Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Building Exhaust Temperature Switch DG Building Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Damper DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Damper DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch 111-35 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART HI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES APPENDIX C Ventilation (30) (Continue Key Reference Drawing 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 47W866-9 37C 37C 37C 2-FCO-30-462 2-HS-30-462B 2-HS-30-462C 1-FAN-30-459 2-FAN-30-460 1-FAN-30-461 1-FAN-30-462 1-FAN-30-447 2-FAN-30-448 1-FAN-30-449 2-FAN-30-450 1-FAN-30-451 2-FAN-30-452 I-FAN-30-453 2-FAN-30-454 I-FAN-30-459 2-FAN-30-460 I-FAN-30-461 2-FAN-30-462 1 &2-FAN-30-214 1-CLR-30-175 1-CLR-30-176 2-CLR-30-175 2-CLR-30-176 I &2-CLR-30-183 1 &2-CLR-30-182 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 37C 14/15, 37N 40 40 40 40 1,37R 1,37R 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-9 47W866-11 47W866-8 47W866-8 47W866-8 47W866-8 47W866-8 47W610-30-5 47W866-8 47W610-30-5 Component 1-FCO-30-461 1-HS-30-461B 1-HS-30-461C 111-36 Rev. 12 d)
Description DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Damper DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Damper DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch DG Electric Board Room Exhaust Fan Handswitch E;ec Bd Room 1A-A Elec. Panel/Gen. Fan E;ec Bd Room 2A-A Elec. Panel/Gen. Fan E;ec Bd Room 1B-B Elec. Panel/Gen. Fan E;ec Bd Room 2B-B Elec. Panel/Gen. Fan DG Room IA-A Exhaust Fan I DG Room 2A-A Exhaust Fan 1 DG Room 1B-B Exhaust Fan 1 DG Room 2B-B Exhaust Fan 1 DG Room 1A-A Exhaust Fan 2 DG Room 2A-A Exhaust Fan 2 DG Room 1B-B Exhaust Fan 2 DG Room 2B-B Exhaust Fan 2 DG Electric Board Room 1A-A Exhaust DG Electric Board Room 2A-A Exhaust DG Electric Board Room 1 B-B Exhaust DG Electric Board Room 28-B Exhaust DC Powered TDAFW Pump Room Fan RHR Pump 1A Cooling Fan RHR Pump 1B Cooling Fan RHR Pump 2A Cooling Fan RHR Pump 28 Cooling Fan 1&2 CCP Room Cooler Fan A-A 1 &2 CCP Room Cooler Fan B-B
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES A/C (Cooling & Heating) (31)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 0-HS-31A-20A 0-HS-31A-20B 0-FCO-31A-20 0-FSV-31A-20 0-T-31A-22 0-FSV-31A-22A 0-FSV-31A-22B 0-FCO-31A-23 0-FSV-31A-23 0-HS-31A-23A 0-HS-31A-23B 0-T-31A-39 0-FSV-31A-39A 0-FSV-31A-39B 0-TCV-31A-47 &
~ 0-TCV-31A-48 O-TCV-31A-49 0-TCV-31A-50 37A 37A 37A 37A 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 37A 37A 37A 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 Loop 0-T-31A-52 0-TCV-31A-65 & Loop 0-TCV-31A-66 & Loop O-TCV-31A-67 & Loop 0-TCV-31A-68 & Loop 0-T-31A-70 0-P-31 A-I 26 O-P-31 A-1 27 0-T-31A-128 0-T-31A-129 O-LG-31A-l 30 0-LOOP-31A-131 0-T-31A-1 32 0-T-31A-133 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 37A 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-2 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 MCR Air Handling Unit Handswitch MCR Air Handling Unit Handswitch MCR Air Handling Unit Inlet Damper MCR Air Handling Unit Solenoid Valve MCR AHU Temperature Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Solenoid Valve MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Solenoid Valve MCR AHU Inlet Damper MCR AHU Solenoid Valve MCR Air Handling Unit Handswitch MCR Air Handling Unit Handswitch MCR AHU Temperature Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Solenoid Valve MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Solenoid Valve MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Air Controls Instrument Loop MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Cooling Fluid Control MCR AHU Air Control Instrument Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Pressure Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Pressure Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Temperature Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Temperature Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Oil Sump Level Glass MCR AHU Condensing Unit A-A MCR AHU Condensing Unit Oil Pump Motor Temperature Instrumentation Loop Oil Cooler MCR AHU Condensing Unit Control Instrumentation Loop 111-37 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES A/C (Cooling & Heating) (31) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description D-LOOP-31A-134 0-ET-31A-136 0-P-31A-141 0-P-31A-142 0-T-31A-143 0-T-31A-144 0-LG-31A-145 0-LOOP-31A-146 0-T-31A-147 0-T-31A-148 0-ET-31 A-1 51 0-LOOP-31A-149 0-P-31A-172 0-P-31A-173 0-FCO-31 A-1 76 0-T-31 A-I 76 0-FCO-31 A-1 77 0-T-31 A-177 0-CHR-311-126B-A O-CHR-311-141 B-B 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-4 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 37A 47W867-2 MCR AHU Condensing Unit A-A MCR AHU Condensing Unit A-A Comp.
Motor Overload Transmitter MCR AHU Condensing Unit Liquid Pressure Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Liquid Pressure Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Temperature Controls Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Temperature Controls Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Oil Sump Level Glass MCR AHU Condensing Unit B-B MCR AHU Condensing Unit Oil Pump Motor Temperature Instrumentation Loop Oil Cooler HCR AHU Condensing Unit Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit B-B Comp.
Motor Overload Transmitter MCR AHU Condensing Unit B-B MCR AHU Condensing Unit Liquid Pressure Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Condensing Unit Liquid Pressure Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Inlet Bypass Damper MCR AHU Inlet Damper Control Instrumentation Loop MCR AHU Inlet Bypass Damper MCR AHU Inlet Damper Control Instrumentation Loop MCR Air Conditioning Unit A-A MCR Air Conditioning Unit B-B Control Air (32)
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-nm nnnnf 0-FSV-32-37 0-FSV-32-42 0-FSV-32-61 0-FSV-32-62 1-FCV-32-80 13 47W845-5 13 47W845-5 13 47W845-6 13 47W848-1 13 47W848-1 Station Air Compressor B Coolant Water Inlet Valve Station Air Compressor A Coolant Water Inlet Valve Auxiliary Air Compressor A-A Cooling Water Inlet Auxiliary Air Compressor A-A Unloader Valve Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation IH-38 Rev. 12
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ein.t i n l')*e*Hntinn
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Control Air (32) (continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 2-FCV-32-81 0-FCV-32-82 0-PS-32-82 0-FCV-32-85 0-PS-32-85 0-FSV-32-87 0-FSV-32-88 1-FCV-32-102 2-FCV-32-103 1-FCV-32-1 10 2-FCV-32-1 11 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 7,8,13 7,8,13 0-CMP-032-025 O-CMP-032-26 O-CMP-032-60 O-CMP-032-86 Control Circuit for Air Comp A Control Circuit for Air Comp B Control Circuit for Aux Air Comp A Control Circuit for Aux Air Comp B 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W846-1 47W846-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 47W846-1 47W846-1 47W848-1 47W848-1 Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation Auxiliary Air Compressor A-A Auxiliary Building Isolation Auxiliary Air Compressor A-A Auxiliary Building Isolation Control Auxiliary Air Compressor B-B Auxiliary Building Isolation Valve Auxiliary Air Compressor B-B Auxiliary Building Isolation Control Auxiliary Air Compressor B-B Auxiliary Building Isolation Auxiliary Air Compressor B-B Unloader Valve Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation Control Air Containment Isolation Manual Isolation Station Air Compressor A Station Air Compressor B Aux Air Compressor A Aux Air Compressor B Component O-VLV-33-500 0-VLV-33-501 Key Reference Drawing 13 47W846-1 13 47W846-1 Service Air (33)
Description Station Air to Control Air Manual Isolation Station Air to Control Air Manual Isolation 111-39 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 Feedwater Control System (46)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1&2-FIC-46-57 14, 15 47W610-46-1 TDAFWP Flow Control Instrument Loop 1&2-SC-46-57 14, 15 47W610-46-1 TDAFWP Speed Control Instrument Loop Chemical and Volume Control System (62)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1 &2-F-62-001A 1 &2-F-62-014A 1 &2-F-62-027A 1 &2-F-62-040A I &2-FCV-62-9 I&2-FCV-62-22 I&2-FCV-62-35 I&2-FCV-62-48 1 &2-FCV-62-54 1 &2-FCV-62-55 I &2-FCV-62-56 1 &2-FCV-62-69 1 1 &2-FCV-62-70 1 &2-FCV-62-72 2
2 2
2 48 48 48 48 8,48 8,48 8,48 7,48 7,48 7,48 I &2-FCV-62-73 1 &2-FCV-62-74 1 &2-FCV-62-84 1 &2-FCV-62-85 1 &2-FCV-62-86 1 &2-FCV-62-89 1 &2-FCV-62-90 1 &2-FCV-62-91 1 &2-FCV-62-93 1&2-F-62-93 1-FCV-62-98 2-FCV-62-98 1-FCV-62-99 2-FCV-62-99 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 7,48 47W809-1 7,48 47W809-1 34 34 47W809-1 47W809-1 34 47W809-1 34 2,34 2,34 2,34 2
47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 I
47W809-1 I
47W809-1 1 1 47W809-1 47W809-1 RCP 1 Seal Water Flow Instrument Loop RCP 2 Seal Water Flow Instrument Loop RCP 3 Seal Water Flow Instrument Loop RCP 4 Seal Water Flow Instrument Loop RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve RCP Seal Return Isolation Valve Excess Letdown Isolation Valve Excess Letdown Isolation Valve Excess Letdown Isolation Valve RCS Loop 3 Letdown Flow Valve RCS Loop 3 Letdown Flow Valve Regen Heat Exchanger Letdown Isolation Valve Regen Heat Exchanger Letdown Isolation Valve Regen Heat Exchanger Letdown Isolation Valve Auxiliary Spray Isolation Valve Alternate Charging Flow RCS CL loop 1 Isolation Valve Normal Charging Flow RCS CL Loop 4 Isolation Valve Charging Flow Control Valve Charging Flow Isolation Valve Charging Flow Isolation Valve Charging Header Flow Control Valve Charging Flow Instrumentation Loop Centrifugal Charging Pump Minimum Flow Isolation Valve Centrifugal Charging Pump Minimum Flow Isolation Valve Centrifugal Charging Pump Isolation Valve Centrifugal Charging Pump Isolation Valve 111-40
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART I - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES APPENDIX C Chemical and Volume Control System (62) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1 &2-PCV-62-119 1 &2-PCV-62-120 1 &2-FSV-62-125 1 &2-PCV-62-126 1 &2-L-62-129A 1 &2-L-62-130A 1 &2-LCV-62-132 1 &2-LCV-62-133 1 &2-LCV-62-135 1 &2-LCV-62-136 1 &2-FCV-62-77 1 &2-PCV-62-81 1 &2-VLV-62-672 1 &2-FCV-62-59 1 &2-FCV-62-61 1 &2-FCV-62-63 1 &2-VLV-62-526 1 &2-VLV-62-527 1 &2-VLV-62-534 1 &2-VLV-62-533 1 &2-VLV-62-535 1 &2-VLV-62-536 1 &2-VLV-62-537 1 &2-VLV-62-539 1 &2-VLV-62-689 1 &2-VLV-62-692 I &2-VLV-62-693 1 &2-PMP-62-108 1 &2-PMP-62-104 5
5 5
5 4
4 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 4,5 47W809-1 4,5 47W809-1 4,5 47W809-1 4,5 47W809-1 48 48 47W809-1 47W809-1 48 47W809-1 48 48 48 34 2
34 2
2 2
2 2
5 5
5 1
1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 47W809-1 VCT Isolation From Nitrogen VCT Isolation From Hydrogen VCT Vent Isolation VCT Vent Isolation VCT Level Instrumentation Loop VCT Level Instrumentation Loop VCT Outlet Isolation Valve VCT Outlet Isolation Valve Charging Pump Flow from RWST Charging Pump Flow from RWST Normal Letdown Isolation Valve VCT Letdown Pressure Control Valve PCV by-pass valve Excess Letdown Three-way Valve Excess Letdown Isolation Valve Excess Letdown Isolation Valve Charging Flow Manual Bypass Valve CCP A Manual Isolation to Charging Charging Flow Manual Bypass Valve CCP B Manual Isolation to Charging Charging Flow Manual Isolation Valve Charging Flow Manual Isolation Valve Charging Flow Manual Isolation Valve Charging Flow Manual Isolation Valve VCT Gas Sample Manual Isolation Manual VCT Isolation From Nitrogen Manual VCT Isolation From Hydrogen 1 &2-Centrifugal Charging Pump A-A 1&2-Centrifugal Charging Pump B-B 11141 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART m - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 APPENDIX C Chemical and Volume Control System (62) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawinq Description 1 &2-PMP-62-247 I
47W610-62-2 CCP Aux Lube Oil Pump A-A 1&2-PMP-62-244 I
47W610-62-2 CCP Aux Lube Oil Pump B-B 1 &2-LCV-62-118 48 47W809-1 VCT Level Control Valve 1 &2-RV-62-662 48 47W809-1 Normal Letdown to PRT 1 &2-VLV-62-723 48 47W809-1 Normal Letdown Header Isolation Valve 1 &2-RV-62-636 48 47W809-1 Excess Letdown Relief Valve to PRT 1&2-VLV-62-715 48 47W809-1 Excess Letdown Header Isolation Valve Safety Injection System (63)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1 &2-FCV-63-1 I &2-FCV-63-5 I &2-FCV-63-6 1 &2-FCV-63-7 1 &2-FCV-63-8 1 &2-FCV-63-11 I &2-FCV-63-25 1 &2-FCV-63-26 I &2-FCV-63-39 I &2-FCV-63-40
"*1
&2-FCV-63-41
"*1
&2-FCV-63-42 I &2-FCV-63-47 1 &2-FCV-63-63 I &2-FCV-63-65 I &2-FCV-63-67 1 &2-FCV-63-72 1 &2-FCV-63-73 1 &2-FCV-63-80 I &2-FCV-63-87 I &2-F-63-091 1 &2-F-63-092 30 5
5 5
30 30 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6 6
6 47W811-1 47W811-1 47W811-1 47W81 1-1 47W811-1 47W811-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W811-1 5
47W811-1 36 36 36 5,
5, 36 36 30 30 47W811-1 47W830-6 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 47W81 1-1 RWST to RHR Pump Flow Control RWST To SIS Pump Flow Control SIS Pump Inlet To Cvcs Charging Pump SIS Pump Inlet To Cvcs Charging Pump RHR Pump Supply To Ccps Flow Control RHRP Outlet To Sip Inlet Isolation Valve SIS CCPIT Shutoff SIS CCPIT Shutoff SIS CCPIT Shutoff SIS CCPIT Shutoff SIS CCPIT TO CVCS Boric Acid Tank SIS CCPIT TO CVCS Boric Acid Tank SIS Pump IA-A Inlet Valve AT NO. 4 Nitrogen Isolation Valve AT NO. 4 Nitrogen Vent Valve AT NO. 4 Flow Isolation Valve Containment Sump Flow Isolation Valve Containment Sump Flow Isolation Valve AT NO. 3 Flow Isolation Valve AT NO. Nitrogen Isolation Valve RHR Flow Instrumentation Loop RHR Flow Instrumentation Loop
- THESE VALVES ARE CLOSED WITH CONTROL AIR REMOVED.
11142
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART fII - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 Safety Injection System (63) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description I&2-FCV-63-93 30 47W811-1 RHR Pump A-A Discharge to Cold Leg 2 & 3 1 &2-FCV-63-94 30 47W811-1 RHR Pump B-B Discharge to Cold Leg 1 & 4 1 &2-FCV-63-98 36 47W81 1-1 AT NO. 2 Flow Isolation Valve 1&2-FCV-63-107 36 47W81 1-1 AT NO. 2 Nitrogen Isolation Valve I &2-FCV-63-118 36 47W811-1 AT NO. I Flow Isolation Valve 1 &2-FCV-63-127 36 47W811-1 AT NO. 1 Nitrogen Isolation Valve 1 &2-FCV-63-172 30 47W811-1 RHR Hot Leg Injection Isolation Valve 1&2-HS-63-133A SI 47W811-2 SI ACTUATION Handswitch in MCR 1&2-HS-63-133B SI 47W811-2 SI ACTUATION Handswitch in MCR 1 &2-VLV-63-574 6
47W811-1 SIS CCPIT Outlet Valve to Boric Acid and CVCS Holdup Tanks ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER (67)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 0-FCV-67-12 0-FCV-67-14
- 1-FCV-67-22
- 2-FCV-67-22
- 1-FCV-67-24
- 2-FCV-67-24 1 &2-FCV-67-66 1-FCV-67-162 I-FCV-67-164 2-FCV-67-217 2-FCV-67-219 3
47W845-1 3
47W845-1 3
3 3
3 47W845-1 47W845-1 47W845-1 47W845-1 3
47W845-1 37-0 47W845-6 37-0 47W845-6 37-0 47W845-4 37-0 47W845-4 ERCW Header A Return Discharge Canal Shutoff Valve ERCW Header A Return Discharge Canal Shutoff Valve ERCW HDR 1A/2A Cross-Tie ERCW 2A/1A Cross-Tie ERCW HDR 1 B/2B Cross-Tie ERCW HDR 2B/1 B Cross-Tie DG Heat Exchanger Isolation Valve CCS & AFW Pump Space Cooler Isolation Valve CCS & AFW Pump Space Cooler Isolation Valve BA & AFW Pump Space Cooler Isolation Valve BA & AFW Pump Space Cooler Isolation Valve
- THESE VALVES HAVE POWER REMOVED 111-43
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES APPENDIX C Essential Raw Cooling Water (67) (Continued)
Reference nrfl~n Dp..crintio n 3
3 3
1 &2-FCV-67-66 I &2-FCV-67-67 I -FCV-67-81 2-FCV-67-81 I-FCV-67-82 2-FCV-67-82 I-FCV-67-123 2-FCV-67-123 1-FCV-67-124 2-FCV-67-124 1 -FCV-67-125 2-FCV-67-125 I -FCV-67-126 2-FCV-67-126 I-FCV-67-127 2-FCV-67-127 1-FCV-67-128 2-FCV-67-128 1-FCV-67-146 2-FCV-67-146 47W845-1 47W845-1 47W845-2 3
47W845-2 3
47W845-2 3
47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 3,13 47W845-2 3
47W845-2 70 47W845-2 70 47W845-2 DG Hx Isolation Valve DG Hx Isolation Valve Auxiliary Building ERCW Supply Header 1A Isolation Valve Auxiliary Building ERCW Supply Header 2A Isolation Valve Auxiliary Building ERCW Supply Header lB Isolation Valve Auxiliary Building ERCW Supply Header 2B Isolation Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger IB Supply Control Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 2B Supply Control Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 1B Discharge Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 2B Discharge Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 1A Supply Control Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 2A Supply Control Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 1A Discharge Valve Containment Spray Heat Exchanger 2A Discharge Valve Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to Air Conditioning Equipment 1A, and Service Air Compressor Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to Air Conditioning Equipment 2A Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to Air Conditioning Equipment 1B, and Service Air Compressor Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to Air Conditioning Equipment 2B CCS Heat Exchanger 1A1/1A2 Discharge Control Valve CCS Heat Exchanger 2A1/2A2 Discharge Control Valve 111-44 Key r'.nm nnn~nf Rev 12 w
lw~~~l-----
=,
-- 1 1 iv
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART m - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component 1-FCV-67-147 2-FCV-67-147 0-FCV-67-151 0-FCV-67-152 1-FCV-67-168 2-FCV-67-168 1-FCV-67-170 2-FCV-67-170 I -FCV-67-188 2-FCV-67-188 1-FCV-67-190 2-FCV-67-190 0-TCV-67-197 0-TCV-67-201 0-FCV-67-205 0-FCV-67-208 1 &2-FCV-67-223 0-FCV-67-364 0-FCV-67-365 I-FCV-67-424 Essential Raw Cooling Water (67)
Key Reference Drawina 3
47W845-2 3,19 47W845-2 70 70 3,37R 3,37R 3,37R 3,37R 40 40 40 40 37A 37A 13 47W845-2 47W845-2 47W845-6 47W845-4 47W845-6 47W845-4 47W845-6 47W845-4 47W845-6 47W845-4 47W845-6 47W845-6 47W845-5 13 47W845-5 3
19 3
3 47W845-2 47W845-1 47W845-1 3,19 47W845-2 (Continued)
De,scription Cross Connect Valve, Main Supply Control Header 1A Cross Connect Valve, Main Supply Header 2B CCS Heat Exchanger 0B1/0B2 Discharge Control Valve CCS Heat Exchanger 0BI/0B2 Discharge Control Valve Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to CCP Room Cooler 1A Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to CCP Room Cooler 2A Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to CCP Room Cooler 1B Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to CCP Room Cooler 2B Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to RHR Pump Room Cooler 1A Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to RHR Pump Room Cooler 2A Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to RHR Pump Room Cooler I B Supply Valve for ERCW Flow to RHR Pump Room Cooler 2B MCR A/C Discharge Isolation MCR A/C Discharge Isolation Station Service and Control Air Compressor Supply Header A Isolation Valve Station Service and Control Air Compressor Supply Header 1 B Isolation Valve Supply Header 1 B to Header 2A Isolation Valve Header A Return Discharge Canal Shutoff Valve Header A Return Discharge Canal Shutoff Valve ERCW HDR 1B to HDR 2A Isolation Valve 11145 0
Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mII - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Essential Raw Cooling Water (67) (Continued)
Key Reference Component Drawingq Description 0-FCV-67-478 1 -FCV-67-489 2-FCV-67-489 1&2-VLV-67-1073 1&2-VLV-67-1070 1-FCV-67-492 2-FCV-67-492 O-PMP-67-432 0-PMP-67-436 O-PMP-67-460 0-PMP-67-464 O-PMP-67-440 O-PMP-67-444 0-PMP-67-452 O-PMP-67-456 1-STN-67-491 2-STN-67-491 1-STN-67-490 2-STN-67-490 70,19 47W845-2 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 Supply Valve ERCW to Component Coolant Heat Exchanger 1A1/1A2 ERCW Strainer BIB-B Isolation Valve ERCW Strainer B2B-B Isolation Valve Strainer B Backwash Isolation Valve Strainer A Backwash Isolation Valve ERCW Strainer AlA-A Isolation Valve ERCW Strainer A2A-A Isolation Valve ERCW Pump J-A ERCW Pump K-A ERCW Pump Q-A ERCW Pump R-A ERCW Pump L-B ERCW Pump M-B ERCW Pump N-B ERCW Pump P-B ERCW Strainer AlA-A for Header 1A ERCW Strainer A2A-A for Header 2A ERCW Strainer B1AB-B for Header 1B ERCW Strainer B2B-B for Header 2B ERCW Header 2A&1 B ERCW Header 2B&1A 0-PMP-67-470 O-PMP-67-477 O-PMP-67-482 O-PMP-67-487 0-SCN-67-471 0-SCN-67-475 0-SCN-67-480 O-SCN-67-485 3
47W845-1,5 3
47W845-1,5 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 47W845-5 Screen Wash Pump A-A Screen Wash Pump B-B Screen Wash Pump C-B Screen Wash Pump D-A Traveling Screen A-A Traveling Screen B-B Traveling Screen C-B Traveling Screen D-A 11146 Rev. 12 10
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART m - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Reactor Coolant (68)
Key Reference Component 1 &2-T-68-1 1 &2-T-68-18 1 &2-T-68-24 1 &2-T-68-41 1 &2-T-68-43 1&2-T-68-60 1&2-T-68-65 1 &2-P-68-66 1&2-P-68-69 1&2-T-68-83 I &2-L-68-320 1&2-P-68-323 I&2-FCV-68-332 I&2-FCV-68-333 1 &2-PCV-68-334 I &2-P-68-334 1 &2-L-68-335 1 &2-L-68-339 I &2-P-68-340 I &2-PCV-68-340A 1 &2-PCV-68-340B 1 &2-PCV-68-340D I &2-P-68-342C I&2-FSV-68-394 1 &2-FSV-68-395 1 &2-FSV-68-396 I &2-FSV-68-397 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 2
2 SI 7,28,48 28 28 28 28,7,48 28,7,48 28,7,48 28,7,48 Drawinq 47W610-68-1 47W610-68-1 47W610-68-2 47W610-68-2 47W610-68-3 47W610-68-3 47W610-68-4 47W610-68-7 47W610-68-7 47W610-68-4 47W61 0-68-5 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W610-68-5 47W610-68-5 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W61 0-68-5 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 47W813-1 Description Loop I Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop I Cold Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 2 Cold Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 3 Cold Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Loop 4 Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop RCS Pressure Instrumentation Loop for PI-68-66A RCS Pressure Instrumentation Loop for PR-68-69 Loop 4 Cold Leg Temperature Instrumentation Loop Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Loop Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation Loop Pressurizer Relief Block Valve Pressurizer Relief Block Valve Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation Loop RCS Pressurizer Water Level RCS Pressurizer Water Level Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation Loop Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Spray Valve Pressurizer Spray Valve Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation Loop for PI-68-342A Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation Valve Reactor Vessel Head Vent Throttle Valve Reactor Vessel Head Vent Throttle Valve 11147 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component 0-FCV-70-1 1 &2-FCV-70-2 1 &2-FCV-70-3 1 &2-FCV-70-4 I-FCV-70-8 1-FCV-70-9 I -FCV-70-1 0 0-FCV-70-11 0-FCV-70-12 I-FCV-70-13 2-FCV-70-14 2-FCV-70-15 2-FCV-70-16 2-FCV-70-18 0-FCV-70-22 I-FCV-70-23 1-FCV-70-25 1-FCV-70-26 1-FCV-70-27 2-FCV-70-28 2-FCV-70-29 0-FCV-70-34 0-FCV-70-39 Component Cooling Water Syst Key Reference Drawinq 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 9
47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 0-FCV-70-40 K>
0-FCV-70-41 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 111-48 Rev. 12 tem (70)
Description SFPCS HX B Outlet Isolation Valve RHR HTX A Inlet Valve RHR HTX B Inlet Valve Miscellaneous Equip. Header Inlet Valve CCS HTX 1A1/1A2, Outlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 1A1/1A2 & 0B1I/0B2, Outlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 1A1/1A2 & 0B1/0B2, Outlet Isolation Valve SFPCS Hx A Outlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 0BI/0B2 Outlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 1A1/1A2 & 0B1I/0B2, Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 2A1/2A2 & 0BIB/02, Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 2A1/2A2 Outlet Isolation Valve CCS Hx 2A1/2A21 Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 2A1/2A2 & 0B1/0B2, Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 0BIB/02 Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 1A1/1A2 & 0B1/0B2, Inlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 1A/1A2 Inlet Valve CCS Pumps 1A-A and 1B-B to C-S Outlet Isolation Valve CCS Pumps 1A-A and 1B-B to C-S Outlet Isolation Valve CCS Pump 2A-A and 2B-B to C-S Outlet CCS Pump 2A-A and 2B-B to C-S Outlet Isolation Valve CCS Pump IA-A to 1B-B Inlet Isolation Valve CCS Pump 2A-A to 2B-B Inlet Isolation Valve SFPCS Hx A Inlet Isolation Valve SFPCS Hx B Inlet Isolation Valve
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART M - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component 1-FCV-70-64 I-FCV-70-74 I &2-FCV-70-75 2-FCV-70-76 2-FCV-70-78 1 &2-F-70-81 A 1&2-F-70-81 B 1 &2-F-70-81 D I &2-F-70-81 E I&2-FCV-70-87 1 &2-FCV-70-90 1 &2-FCV-70-133 1 &2-FCV-70-134 1 &2-FCV-70-153 I &2-FCV-70-156 0-FCV-70-193 I &2-FCV-70-85 I &2-FCV-70-143 1 &2-TCV-70-192 0-FCV-70-194 2-FCV-70-195 2-FCV-70-196 Component Cooling Water System Key Reference Drawing 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 70 9
9 9
9 9
9 9
9 70,31 70,31 70 48 48 48 70 70 70 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-4 47W859-4 47W859-1 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 11149 Rev. 12 (70) (Continued)
Description CCS Pumps 1A-A and 1B-B to C-S Inlet Isolation Valve CCS Pumps 1A-A and 1B-B to C-S Inlet Isolation Valve RHR Heat Exchanger B Return Header Isolation Valve CCS Pumps 2A-A and 2B-B to C-S Inlet Isolation Valve CCS Pumps 2A-A and 2B-B to C-S Inlet Isolation Valve CCS Containment Flow Instrumentation Loop CCS Containment Flow Instrumentation Loop CCS Containment Flow Instrumentation Loop CCS Containment Flow Instrumentation Loop Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Return Isolation Valve Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Return Isolation Valve Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Coolant Isolation Valve Reactor Coolant Pump Thermal Barrier Coolant Isolation Valve RHR Heat Exchanger B Outlet Valve RHR Heat Exchanger A Outlet Valve SFPCS Heat Exchanger A & B Inlet Valve CCS to Excess Letdown HX CCS to Excess Letdown HX CCS to Letdown HX SFPCS Heat Exchanger A & B Inlet Valve CCS HTX 2A1/2A2 & OB1/0B2, Outlet Isolation Valve CCS HTX 2A1/2A2 & 0BI/0B2, Outlet Isolation Valve
-SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART mI - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Component 0-FCV-70-197 O-VLV-70-529A O-VLV-70-529B 1 &2-VLV-70-531 0-FCV-70-198 I &2-VLV-70-545A I &2-VLV-70-545B 1 &2-VLV-70-546A I&2-VLV-70-546B I &2-VLV-70-574 I &2-VLV-70-587 0-VLV-70-601 O-VLV-70-636 1 &2-VLV-70-637 1 &2-VLV-70-661 1-PMP-70-046 1-PMP-70-038 2-PMP-70-059 2-PMP-70-033 0-PMP-70-051 1 &2-PMP-70-131 1 &2-PMP-70-130 Component Cooling Water System Key Reference Drawing 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 47W859-1 70 70 70 70 70 70 31 31 31 31 31 31 70 70 70 70 70 9
9 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-4 47W859-4 47W859-4 47W859-4 47W859-2&3 47W859-2 47W859-2 47W859-2 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-1 47W859-2,3 47W859-2,3 Containment Spray (72)
Component 1 &2-FCV-72-2 1 &2-FCV-72-20 1 &2-FCV-72-21 1 &2-FCV-72-22 Key Reference Drawing 5
47W812-1 5
47W812-1 5
47W812-1 5
47W812-1 Description Containment Spray Header B Isolation Valve Containment Sump Isolation to CSPs Containment Spray Pump RWST Isolation Containment Spray Pump RWST Isolation 111-50 Rev. 12 (70) (Continued)
Description SFPCS HTX Supply Header Valve SFPCS HTX A Outlet Manual Isolation Valve SFPCS HTX B Outlet Manual Isolation Valve SFPCS HTX Return Manual Isolation Valve SFPCS HTX Supply Header Valve RHR A Inlet Isolation Valve RHR B Inlet Isolation Valve RHR HTX A Outlet Valve RHR HTX 1A-A Outlet Valve Non Regen Letdown HTX Manual Inlet Non Regen Letdown HTX Manual Outlet Aux Waste Evaporator Inlet isolation Aux Waste Evaporator Outlet isolation BAE&GS Inlet Isolation Valve BAE&GS Outlet Isolation Valve CCS Pump 1A-A CCS Pump 1B-B CCS Pump 2A-A CCS Pump 26-B CCS Pump C-S RCP Thermal Barrier Booster Pump A A
RCP Thermal Barrier Booster Pump B B
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 1&2-FCV-72-23 5
47W812-1 Containment Sump Isolation to CSPs Containment Spray (72) (continued)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1&2-FCV-72-39 5
47W812-1 Containment Spray Header A Isolation Valve 1&2-FCV-72-40 5, 30 47W812-1 RHR Spray Header A Isolation Valve 1&2-FCV-72-41 5, 30 47W812-1 RHR Spray Header B Isolation Valve 1,2-PMP-72-27 5
47W812-1 Containment Spray Pump A-A 1,2-PMP-72-10 5
47W812-1 Containment Spray Pump B-B Residual Heat Removal (74)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 1&2-FCV-74-1 7,30 47W810-1 RHR System Isolation Valve 1&2-FCV-74-2 7,30 47W810-1 RHR System Isolation Valve I &2-FCV-74-3 30 47W81 0-1 RHR Pump A-A Inlet Flow Control Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-12 5,30 47W810-1 RHR Pump A-A Min Flow Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-16 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX A Outlet Flow Control Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-21 30 47W81 0-1 RHR Pump B-B Inlet Flow Control Valve I&2-FCV-74-24 5,30 47W810-1 RHR Pump B-B Mini Flow Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-28 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX B Outlet Flow Control Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-32 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX Bypass Flow Control Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-33 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX A Bypass Valve 1 &2-FCV-74-35 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX B Bypass Valve 1 &2-HCV-74-36 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX A Bypass Valve 1 &2-HCV-74-37 30 47W81 0-1 RHR HTX B Bypass Valve I&2-PMP-74-10 31,4,5 47W81 0-1 RHR Pump A-A 1&2-PMP-74-20 31,4,5 47W81 0-1 RHR Pump B-B Waste Disposal System (77)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description 0-PCV-77-89 5
47W830-4 Waste Gas Compressor Isolation From VCT Vent Path 111-51
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Neutron Monitoring System (92) and Reactor Protection System (99)
Key Reference Component Drawing Description I &2-HS-RT-001 I &2-HS-RT-002 I &2-XI-92-5001 B 1 &2-XI-92-5002B 1 &2-BCTF-99-CU/IB-A 1 &2-BCTF-99-CU/iC-B 1 &2-BCTB-85-DE/4D 1 &2-BCTB-85-DF/3B 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 47W611-99-1 47W611-99-1 47W611-99-2 47W611-99-2 47W611-99-1 47W611-99-1 47W611-99-1 47W611-99-1 Reactor Trip Hand Switch A Reactor Trip Hand Switch B Source Range Detector Count Rate N31 Source Range Detector Count Rate N31 Reactor Trip Breaker A Reactor Trip Breaker B Rod Drive Motor Generator Set Breaker Rod Drive Motor Generator Set Breaker HI-52 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES TABLE 111-3 Rev. 12 INSTRUMENTATION LIST FOR MAIN CONTROL ROOM Description Pressurizer Water Level Pressurizer Water Level Pressurizer Water Level RCS WR Pressure RCS WR Pressure RCS WR Pressure SG-1 Steam Press SG-1 Steam Press SG-2 Steam Press SG-2 Steam Press SG-3 Steam Press SG-3 Steam Press SG-4 Steam Press SG-4 Steam Press PI-68-342A PI-68-66A PI-68-69 PI-1-2A PI-1-2B PI-1-9A PI-1-9B PI-1-20A PI-1-20B PI-1-27A PI-1-27B LI-3-43A LI-3-174 LI-3-164 LI-3-38*
LI-3-39 LI-3-56A LI-3-156 LI-3-173 LI-3-51*
LI-3-52 LI-3-98A LI-3-172 LI-3-148 LI-3-93*
LI-3-94 LI-3-111A LI-3-175 LI-3-171 LI-3-106*
LI-3-107 4Either one One of three One of three Either one Either one Either one Either one one Loops Required Indicator LI-68-339A LI-68-320 LI-68-335A SG-1 NR Level SG-1 NR Level SG-2 NR Level SG-2 NR Level SG-3 NR Level SG-3 NR Level SG-4 NR Level SG-4 NR Level 111-53
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART II - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 12 TABLE MI-3 INSTRUMENTATION LIST FOR MAIN CONTROL ROOM Indicator Description TI-68-1 RCS Loop 1 Hot Leg TI-68-18 RCS Loop 1 Cold Leg TI-68-24 RCS Loop 2 Hot Leg TI-68-41 RCS Loop 2 Cold Leg Two Loops TI-68-43 required RCS Loop 3 Hot Leg TI-68-60 RCS Loop 3 Cold Leg TI-68-65 RCS Loop 4 Hot Leg TI-68-83 RCS Loop 4 Cold Leg F-062-001 RCP I Seal Water Flow F-062-014 RCP 2 Seal Water Flow F-062-027 RCP 3 Seal Water Flow F-062-040 RCP 4 Seal Water Flow 1-T-062-004 RCP 1 Seal Temperature 1-T-062-017 RCP 2 Seal Temperature 1-T-062-030 RCP 3 Seal Temperature 1-T-062-043 RCP 4 Seal Temperature Source Range Flux Monitor XI-92-5001B Either one XI-92-5002B Condensate Storage Tank Level
- 1.
LI-2-230A Either one for Tank A (Note 1)
- 2.
LI-2-230D
- 3.
LI-2-233A Either one for Tank B (Note 1)
- 4.
LI-2-233D Chemical and Volume Control
- 1.
LI-62-129 (Tank Level-VCT)
Note 2
- 2.
FI-62-93A (Charging Flow)
Note 3 Note 1:
If MCR indication is not available, local monitoring of tank level or AFW suction pressure is acceptable Note 2:
Refer to key 4 for actionslIthis level indication is not available.
Note 3:
This indicator is only required if the normal charging path is chosen in key 2.
"*Denotes steam generator level transmitters whose sense lines have been verified as being unaffected by a fire inside containment (Reference 11.21).
Only the sense lines are Appendix R equipment (i.e., the cabling was not K>
evaluated).
111-54
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES TABLE 1111-4 Rev. 12 INSTRUMENTATION LIST FOR AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM Pressurizer Pressure and Level Level LI-68-325C LI-68-326C Either one Pressure
- 1.
PI-68-336C
- 2.
PI-68-337C
- 3.
PI-68-342C One of three Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Temperature
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
4.
TI-68-1C (Loop 1)
TI-68-24C (Loop 2)
TI-68-43C (Loop 3)
TI-68-65C (Loop 4)
All four loops Steam Generator Pressure and Level Pressure
- 1.
PI-1-1C (Loop 1)
- 2.
P1-1-8C (Loop 2)
- 3.
P1-1-19C (Loop 3)
- 4.
PI-1-26C (Loop 4)
All four loops Level LIC-3-164 (Loop 1)
LIC-3-156 (Loop 2)
LIC-3-148 (Loop 3)
LIC-3-171 (Loop 4)
All four loops Source Range Flux Monitor
- 1.
XI-92-5 Level Indication for Tanks Volume Control Tank
- 1.
LI-62-129C
- 2.
LI-62-130C 111-55 I.
2.
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
4.
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART Ill - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES TABLE HI-4 INSTRUMENTATION LIST FOR AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM Diagnostic Instrumentation for Shutdown Systems Auxiliary Feedwater System
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5.
FI-3-163C (Loop 1)
FI-3-155C (Loop 2)
All four loops FI-3-147C (Loop 3)
FI-3-170C (Loop 4)
FI-3-142C (Aux FPT Disch)
Chemical and Volume Control Tank
- 1.
TI-62-80C (Ltdn Ht Exch Outlet)
- 2.
PI-62-92C (Chg Hdr Press)
- 3.
FI-62-93C (Chg Hdr Flow)
- 4.
FI-62-137C (Emer Boration)
Safety Injection System
- 1.
FI-63-91 C (RHR Pmp A-A to RCS 2&3 CL)
- 2.
FI-63-92C (RHR Pmp B-B to RCS 1&4 CL)
Either one Essential Raw Coolina Water
- 1.
2.
FI-67-61 C (ERCW Supply Hdr A)
FI-67-62C (ERCW Supply Hdr B)
Either one Residual Heat Removal
- 1.
2.
TI-74-38C (RHR Htx A Outlet Temp)
TI-74-40C (RHR Htx B Outlet Temp)
Either one III-56 Rev. 12
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Part VI determines the level of compliance with applicable NFPA codes. The objective is achieved by:
(1) reviewing documentation and plant procedures to determine the location of passive and active fire protection features; (2) identifying the codes and standards of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) to which SQN is committed for the installation of passive and active fire protection features; and (3) comparing SQN's existing levels and configurations of passive and active fire protection features against the criteria contained within each applicable NFPA code and standard.
Where deviations from the code criteria are identified, justifications for existing configurations to demonstrate equivalent levels of protection may be required. Those code deviations that have a potential impact on the operational capabilities of the specific fire protection feature are identified and justified in Part VII, Section 5 of the FPR. Partial detection and suppression code deviations in locations which require full detection and suppression in order to comply with 10CFR50 Appendix R are identified and justified in Part VII, Section 2 (alternative shutdown requirements in the control building) and Part VII, Section 3 (full detection and suppression evaluations) of the FPR. Those code deviations which do not impact on the operational capabilities of the specific fire protection feature are identified and justified in Section 3.0 of this part. The compliance status of SQN fire protection features against the applicable codes is identified in this Part.
The inspection, testing, maintenantce, and training on fire protection features within each code was not reviewed for compliancq however, future changes which are significant in nature andcnflict with NFPA requirements in these regards will be addressed in this part Part II, Section 14.0 of the FPR identifies the scope of testing and inspection, and related frequency for regulatory required fire protection systems and features.
2.0 SCOPE The scope of this evaluation is limited to those fire protection systems or features that are provided for those buildings and areas that contain systems, cables, or components relied on for safety related and fire safe shutdown (FSSD) purposes. This evaluation addresses fire protection systems or features in the reactor buildings, auxiliary building, control building, diesel generator building, turbine building, additional equipment buildings, and intake pumping station.
Other buildings that do not contain systems, components, or cables relied on for safety related and FSSD purposes are not included in the scope of this review.
The scope of the review was to identify the passive and active fire protection features as installed and evaluate the level of compliance with the applicable NFPA codes. Included in this review were automatic detection systems, manual and automatic fixed suppression systems (water-based and carbon dioxide suppression systems), fire doors, fire dampers, manual hose stations, portable extinguishers, exterior hydrants and fire pumps.
VI-1
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11 The scope of this evaluation was accomplished through a combination of field walkdowns and a review of documentation for references to passive and active fire protection features. Those codes which are referenced in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 are covered in this Part, with documentation reviewed and/or field walkdowns performed to evaluate those fire protection features that are relied on for compliance with Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 and Appendix R to 10CFR50. Documentation reviews and/or field walkdowns were not performed for all applicable codes referenced in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1. Section 3.3 provides the bases for the level of review and methods of documentation for each applicable NFPA code addressed in this Part.
To establish the level of compliance with the NFPA codes addressed in this Part, plant documentation dealing with fire protection related issues was reviewed. Information on the fire protection features was then reviewed to determine the level of compliance or applicability with the NFPA codes. As a general rule, the appendix of each NFPA code states that it is not a portion of the code and is included for information purposes only. As such, appendices to the codes were not included in the scope of the evaluation.
However, where appropriate, the guidance contained in the appendices was utilized to either justify existing configurations or identify additional fire protection features that should be provided.
The code conformance evaluation was conducted by experienced fire protection engineers familiar with the application of NFPA codes and standards to nuclear power plants. Personnel holding Member Grade status in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers were responsible for review of the level of code compliance and preparation of the bases for justification of deviations identified in this Part. The code conformance evaluation was developed and/or reviewed by both engineering and fire operations personnel.
3.0 APPLICABLE NFPA CODES In order to determine which NFPA codes require review at SQN, NFPA codes listed in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 were identified. A total of 30 NFPA codes are specifically identified; however not all the codes are directly applicable to SQN. Codes not applicable to SQN were identified, along with the bases for non applicability.
3.1 NFPA Codes Not Applicable - General The following NFPA codes are not applicable to SQN because the code requirements are not directly applicable to the multi-story noncombustible construction structures such as those at SQN:
NFPA 92M-1972 Waterproofing and Draining of Floors (Waterproofing of floors is not required at SQN. Adequate drainage exists as documented in suppression effects calculations.)
NFPA 204-1968, Smoke and HeatVenting (Smoke and heat venting is covered by pre-fire plans and implemented by the fire brigade. Additionally, plant operating procedures further support the operation of systems utilized in smoke and heat venting activities.
NFPA 204 was applicable to single story structures and has been superseded by NFPA 204M.)
VI-2
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11 The following NFPA codes are considered not applicable to SQN because the codes provide general guidance on training and organization of fire brigades and guidance on fire loss prevention, some of which have also been superseded by new codes:
NFPA 4-1977 NFPA 4A-1969 NFPA 6-1974 NFPA 7-1974 NFPA 8-1974 Organization for Fire Services Fire Department Organization Recommendations for Organization of Industrial Fire Loss Prevention Recommendations for Management Control of Fire Emergencies Recommendations for Management Responsibility for Effects of Fire on Operations NFPA 27-1975 Private Fire Brigades NFPA 197-1966 NFPA 601-1975 Initial Fire Attack, Training, Standard On Guard Service in Fire Loss Prevention The training and organization of the SQN fire brigade is identified in detail in Part II of the FPR, thereby demonstrating proper training and organization of onsite fire fighting capabilities.
3.2 NFPA Codes Not Applicable Site-Specific Fire Protection Features A number of NFPA codes that are typically applicable to nuclear power plants are not applicable based on site-specific methods for implementation of fire protection features. In most cases, existing fire protection features were identified and evaluated for the level of protection afforded by the fire protection feature. This approach was applicable to specific features with code requirements that did not readily lend themselves to an in-depth code evaluation. Compliance with code criteria is only provided to the extent identified below for the existing fire protection features.
3.2.1 NFPA 10-1975: Portable Fire Extinguisher Portable extinguishers are not installed in accordance with the spacing and location criteria nor inspected at the specified frequency of NFPA 10. Portable extinguishers are provided solely for the use by personnel trained in their use. Fire brigade members and hot work fire watches receive hands-on training in use of portable extinguishers. Fire brigade members are also cognizant of the location of extinguishers for fire fighting purposes through the extinguisher inspection program and pre-fire plans. The experience history was used as a base for an inspection frequency of quarterly. Refer to Part II, Section 14.0 of this FPR for more information.
3.2.2 NFPA 11B-1977: Foam-Water Sprinkler Systems NFPA 11 B is not applicable because foam-water sprinkler systems are not located in plant buildings that contain systems, components, or cables relied on for fire safe shutdown.
VI-3
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI-NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11 II 3.2.3 NFPA 12A and 12B: Halon 1301 and 1211 Extinguishing Systems NFPA 12A and NFPA 12B are not applicable because these systems are not located in plant buildings that contain systems, components, or cables relied on for fire safe shutdown.
3.2.4 NFPA 25-1993: Water System Tests NFPA 25 is not a code of record at SQN for any specific fire protection feature test and inspection requirement.
3.2.5 NFPA 26-1958: Valve Supervision SQN's method of ensuring valve position is identified in Part II of the FPR. Valve positions are inspected in accordance with plant procedures.
3.2.6 NFPA 49-1975: Hazardous Chemical Reactions Hazardous chemical reaction code criteria are only applicable to the storage and handling of chemicals by the chemistry department. Administrative procedures govern hazardous chemical use. The criteria of NFPA 49 has no impact on the fire safe shutdown conformance program and was therefore not reviewed.
3.2.7 NFPA 50A-1973: Gaseous Hydrogen Systems Hydrogen is supplied to the volume control tanks (VCT) through seismically qualified piping from the exterior wall of the auxiliary building to the VCTs. The piping is seismically designed for pressure boundary retention between the VCTs and the isolation valves adjacent to the tanks. The remainder of the piping in the Auxiliary Building is seismically supported but not designed for pressure boundary retention.
Two isolation valves are installed on the hydrogen supply line on the exterior wall of the Auxiliary Building that are designed to close automatically on high hydrogen flow rate in the downstream piping.
VI-4
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI -NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11 3.2.8 NFPA 51-1975: Oxvyen Fuel Gas Systems for Welding and Cutting NFPA 51 is applicable to large manifolded oxygen fuel gas systems and the use of oxy-acetylene cylinders for cutting and welding activities. Large manifolded systems are not used at SQN. The use of oxy acetylene cylinders is controlled through the approval and control of ignition source activities and is discussed inNFPA 51B.
3.2.9 NFPA 90A-1975: Air Conditioning and Ventilation Systems The heating, venting and air conditioning (HVAC) systems at SQN are not designed to NFPA 90A.
The HVAC systems are designed as described in FSAR chapters 3, 6 and 9. The required locations for fire dampers were reviewed by a comparison of HVAC duct locations and the locations of regulatory fire barriers.
Specific HVAC penetrations through regulatory fire barriers without fire dampers are addressed in Part VII of the FPR. Damper closure under air flow conditions are addressed by shutting off HVAC fans where necessary. Justification for sealing thermal expansion gaps between the ductwork and the barrier is provided by fire test documentation. Access to fire dampers is usually provided by access doors. However, in some cases, bolted connection duct sections require removal for access to fire dampers.
3.2.10 NFPA 251: Fire Tests of Building Materials The fire rating of walls and floor/ceiling assemblies is based on a comparison with typical UL designs as documented in Part II of the FPR. The fire rating of raceway fire barrier materials is addressed under a separate program that has been reviewed in detail by the NRC. There are no other claims regarding SQN's level of compliance with NFPA 251.
3.3 Applicable NFPA Codes Reviewed in Detail for Compliance The remaining NFPA codes referenced in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 are applicable and relied on to establish compliance with fire safe shutdown regulations and guidance documents. Detailed code evaluations were conducted on the applicable sections of these codes to identify code requirements. Sections on the code that are not applicable to SQN are not discussed in the following evaluations. Documentation was reviewed and field investigations were conducted in order to establish the level of compliance with code requirements.
The following list identifies the codes, along with the year of the edition, which were used to evaluate the adequacy of existing fire protection features against code requirements:
3.3.1 NFPA 12-1973 Carbon Dioxide Systems (Chapter 1 & 2) 3.3.2 NFPA 13-1975' Automatic Sprinkler Systems (refer to Part VII) 3.3.3 NFPA 14-1974 Standpipe and Hose Systems (Chapters 1-7) 3.3.4 NFPA 15-1973 Water Spray FixedSystems for Fire Protection 3.3.5 NFPA 20-1973 &
Centrifugal Fire Pumpi NFPA 20-1993 3.3.6 NFPA 24-1973 Outside Protection 1NFPA 13-1987 is theCOR for the wet pipe sprinkler systems installed in the Turbine Building.
2NFPA 20-1993 will be theCOR for the new fire pump installation.
V1-5
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI-NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11 3.3.7 NFPA 30-1973 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code (Chapter 4 & 5) 3.3.8 NFPA 51B-1976 Cutting and Welding Processes 3.3.9 NFPA 69-1973 Explosion Prevention Systems 3.3.10 NFPA 72D-1975 Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems 3.3.11 NFPA 72E-1974 Automatic Fire Detectors (All) 3.3.12 NFPA 80-1981 Fire Doors and Windows (All) 3.3.13 NFPA 194-1974 &
Fire Hose Connectors (All) and Fire Hose (All)
NFPA 196-1974 Note that TVA is typically the designer, installer, operator, maintainer, owner and also that the Corporate Engineering, Chief Engineer serves as the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). For many fundamental NFPA code requirements, the TVA design process, construction specifications, operating and maintenance instructions, drawing control and approval process for nuclear plants take precedence (e.g.,
drawing preparation and format, calculation preparation and format, etc.).
A summary description of code compliance is provided for each of the above codes.
3.3.1 NFPA 12-1973: "Carbon Dioxide Systems" NFPA 12-1973 is the Code of Record (COR) for SQN CO systems. The C02 systems at SQN are identified as System 39 and are installed in selected areas for protection of safety-related and non-safety related equipment. SQN is in general compliance with NFPA-12-1973. Operation of the CJ-fire protection system is not required for safe shutdown. Safe shutdown is provided by Appendix R III.G and III.L separation in conjunction with fire detection, automatic sprinklers and electrical raceway fire barrier systems.
Therefore NFPA 12-1973 will not be reviewed in detail for compliance.
3.3.2 NFPA 13-1975: Automatic Sprinkler Systems This is the COR applicable to pre-action and deluge system installed in safety related areas at SQN.
SQN has non-safety-related under deck wet pipe sprinkler systems installed in the turbine building. The turbine building wet pipe sprinkler systems were designed/and installed to NFPA 13 (1987) and American Nuclear Insurer Requirements. Preaction and deluge systems are operated and maintained in accordance with approved operating and maintenance procedures. Preoperational, post-modification and periodic surveillance tests (except main drain test) ensure system operational status. Fire pumps are addressed under NFPA-20.
Piping is supported per TVA seismic design requirements. Drain lines are fitted with hose connections to facilitate drainage. Risers are not equipped with flanged joints at each floor due to other factors affecting the sprinkler system design in a nuclear plant environment. The sprinkler systems are typically hydraulically designed. Valves that are required to be locked and/or sealed in a required position are verified periodically to be locked and/or sealed Typically, all sprinkler flow control valves are supplied by water from two directions with section isolation valves used in lieu of check valves (except inside containment). Fire department connections are not provided for sprinkler systems serving nuclear safety related areas. Valves are typically numbered and identified on configuration controlled drawings and name tags in the field.
Vl-6
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11 Literal code conformance for the exact location and spacing of sprinkler heads is not always achievable due to congestion (e.g., tray, conduit, and pipe supports). Extensive sprinkler system walkdowns were conducted as part of the Appendix R reevaluation. The spacing and location of sprinklers, branch lines, sprinkler spray patterns, and types of sprinklers are addressed in the sprinkler design packages and sprinkler walk downs done for compliance with Appendix R intervening combustibles and to address major obstructions. In plant areas required for spatial separation with intervening combustibles, the sprinklers were modified to comply with the intervening combustible sprinkler system criteria. Sprinklers under ducts, decks, galleries, and open gratings over 4 feet wide are typically provided when required by the intervening combustible deviation criteria. See Part VII of the FPR. In other areas, the sprinkler systems have been designed to meet the general intent of the code, however, deviations from the code requirements do exists.
Nonenclosed or unprotected elevators, stairs, and shafts are not provided with water curtains and draft stops except between where required for separation of safe shutdown equipment. See Part X and VII of this FPR.
Seismic piping design and spray shields are provided on select sprinkler systems when necessary to protect at least one train of safe shutdown equipment from damage due to inadvertent spray.
Pressure gages are installed above and below preaction valves; however, they do not serve an operation function. Hydraulically designed sprinkler system calculations are performed in accordance with TVA Nuclear Engineering Procedure (NEP) 3.1 Calculations. Information is documented on a combination of drawings (flow, isometric, pipe layout) and calculations.
Strainers are typically provided in the supply to each preaction valve. Flushing connections are not provided. Auxiliary drains for trapped water in piping are provided in lieu of 2 valves and 2" nipples.
See Part VII of this FPR for additional evaluations (i.e. bushings, etc.).
3.3.3 NFPA 14-1974: Standpipe and Hose Systems This code applies to piping, valves, hoses and fire nozzles installed in the interior of safety related structures for the purpose of manual fire fighting. Interior hose systems are 1 1/2" and designed for 100 gpm.
These hose stations do not meet literal compliance with the code. Supply piping may be < 4" in some cases.
Some standpipes have > 100' of hose attached. Hose stations are located in or near the enclosed stairways of the control building. Main riser valves are not all post indicator types. Hose connections are 2 1/2 "diameter on the roof of safety-related structures. Branch lines serving more than one hose station do not always have isolation valves.
Fire department connections are not provided for standpipe/hose systems serving nuclear safety related areas.
SQN provides hose stations for fire brigade use as discussed in Part II, Section 9.0. Plant personnel are instructed in General Employee Training to not use such equipment unless they are trained in its use. Fire brigade personnel are adequately trained in the use of the hose stations.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI-NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev. 11 Approved hose valves are used at each outlet. The fire brigade is trained in the use of fire hose where pressures in excess of 100 psi can be experienced. The fire hose is maintained to accommodate these higher pressures. Therefore, the pressure reducing devices are not required.
Standpipes in auxiliary and control buildings are interconnected to the buildings internal HPFP loop, but not necessarily at the lowest elevation.
Indicating and check valves at connections to water supplies are not always provided. Standpipes can be isolated by system 26 (HPFP system) valves in the piping network. Check valves to prevent back flow are not warranted.
High pressure valves are not used, even though system spikes in excess of design pressure can occur due to pump start surges before relief devices compensate. This is acceptable and in accordance with the systems ANSI B31.1 requirements.
Listed materials are used and the piping can withstand working pressure of system. Piping is in accordance with ANSI B3 1.1 material requirements.
Valves of approved indicating type are not provided at main riser in all cases. Sprinkler systems can be isolated and not preclude ability to provide hose stream coverage Water supply control valves to standpipes are not post indicating type.
The supply valves are under administrative controls (e.g., locking or sealing the valve in position, and strict control of work) and the access restriction to trained and qualified personnel provides adequate assurance that the valves are in the proper position.
The tops of each standpipe do not have a 3 1/2 inch dial spring pressure gage.
Activation of push button stations in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 annulus and lower containment will cause an alarm to be annunciated in the MCR fire detection alarm console. Flow alarms are not provided on all standpipes. As previously stated, the hose stations are provided for trained fire brigade personnel. Other site personnel are trained to report fires. After reporting a fire an individual may attempt to extinguish the fire only if he/she has been trained in the use of fire fighting equipment (see part II, Section 7.8). Adequate notification of standpipe operation will therefore be communicated to the Main Control Room.
3.3.4 NFPA 15-1973: Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection Four distinct types of water spray fixed systems for fire protection are used to protect special hazards in safety related areas. The hazards protected are unique to a nuclear power plant and therefore direct code application and compliance is beyond the scope of NFPA 15 in respect to the overall goals of the National Fire Codes. However, NFPA 15-1975 forms the design basis of the water spray systems. Listed below is a synopsis of each system and the key application of NFPA 15.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11 3.3.4.1 Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP)
Each of the four RCPs are protected by a closed head, automatic pre-action water spray fixed system.
Listed nozzles are located around the top of the RCP motor along a ring header. The systems are hydraulically designed in accordance with NFPA 13 & 15 and produce a minimum design density of 0.25 gpm/ft2. This density corresponds to NFPA 15 requirement for transformer protection (oil hazard). The pre action system is automatically actuated upon initiation of cross zoned thermal detectors located above the motor.
3.3.4.2 Charcoal Filters Closed head, automatic pre-action water spray fixed systems are provided for the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup (CREAC), Containment Purge Air Exhaust System (CPAES), Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS), and the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS). The use of water spray fixed systems for protection of charcoal filters is the only type of suppression system recognized by NFPA 803-1983 (Table 10-1.2). The systems are hydraulically designed in accordance with NFPA 13 & 15 and produce a minimum design density of 0.25 gpm/fi across the surface of the exposed filters.
In accordance with NFPA 15, Section 4-4.1.2, a design density was determined for this unique application based on analysis of the combustibles. The flow density of 0.25 gpm/?hcorresponds to the -flow density specified in Section 5-4.6.1 of NFPA 850, "Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Fossil Fueled Steam Electric Generating Plants" for sprinklers provided for coal handling structures subject to accumulations of coal or coal dust. Charcoal filters have a lower heat energy value (i.e., Btu/volume) than coal (based on lesser density and chemistry of the material). The flow density of 0.20 gpm/niiver the plan area for bag-type dust collectors (in coal handling facilities) is adequate for the hazard. Therefore the use of 0.25 gpm/ft2 for the charcoal is conservative.
The temperatures for the fusible elements in the spray nozzles was determined by correlating the maximum temperature expected in the filter units to the recommendations of NFPA 13, Table 2-2.3.1, "Temperature Ratings, Classifications and Color Codings."
In the event of a charcoal fire in the ABGTS, EGTS, CREAC or CPAES filter units, the thermal/smoke detectors will annunciate the alarm and trip the spray system's deluge valve, allowing water up to the closed nozzles. After shutdown of the fan and closure of the downstream damper, the heat will build inside the unit. This will ensure operation of the thermal elements in the nozzles if they have not previously been activated by the fire.
The Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) charcoal filter is furnished with a manually actuated open head fire suppression system connection which is designed for a 12 gpm flow rate at 65 psig in the High Pressure Fire Protection (HPFP) water supply at the charcoal filter header. The PASS charcoal filter fire protection system will be manually actuated in the event of a fire in the charcoal unit. This will preclude the possibility of inadvertent actuation and subsequent wetting of the charcoal. Automatic detection is not considered warranted for this specific installation in the PASF filters. A manually actuated valve is used.
These filters see very limited use (short periods only after an accident), unlike the other systems which would probably be used continuously during a radiological emergency. The heavy duty air tight construction of the filter system enclosure would likely contain a charcoal fire (charcoal used in this manner typically does not N
produce flaming combustion, but rather smolders) and there are no significant quantities of combustibles VI-9
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11 located near the filter enclosures. As secondary protection to the enclosure, the room the PASF filter enclosures are contained in is provided with automatic detection. Manual standpipe hose stations are available for exterior application, if needed.
3.3.4.3 Reactor Building Containment Annulus Cable Interactions An automatic, pre-action sprinkler system, utilizing standard upright sprinkler heads, provides a unique application of a water spray fixed system in the reactor building containment annulus.Section III.G.2.e of 10CFR50 Appendix R, allows the use of "fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the fire area" as one of the means of providing fire protection of safe shutdown capability inside a non inerted containment.
3.3.4.4 Cable Tray Water Spray Systems Two open head -water spray systems are installed to protect the (1) Train A cable trays in the 480v shutdown board room 1B2-B and (2) Train B cable trays in the 480v Shutdown Board Room 2A2-A. Each system is actuated by line type thermal detectors located at the top and bottom of the protected stack of trays crossed zoned with smoke detectors.
3.3.5 NFPA 20-1973 & 1993: Centrifugal Fire Pumps The potable water supplied HPFP pumps are a standard fire pump design from a fire pump manufacturer and meets all the requirements of NFPA-20, 1993. Refer to Part II for a description of the fire pumps.
3.3.6 NFPA 24-1973: Outside Protection The code applies to yard piping supplying, hydrants, sprinklers, hose stations, etc. The system 26 (high pressure fire protection system) flow diagrams are under configuration control and maintained in the Main Control Room. This clearly complies with the intent of the code (as applicable to a nuclear plant).
S QN does not rely on the public water system for pressure/capacity. Adequate water supply is determined by flow test. Yard mains are of ample size. No pressure regulating valves used in the main process water supply flowpath. Pressure control valves are used similar to relief valves to control over pressure conditions.
Automatic pump start is described in Part II.
The HPFP system is a dedicated potable water system. Water for the fire pump storage tanks is supplied by the municipal utility. The HPFP system is normally pressurized when the fire pumps are not running by a cross connect to the fire tank potable water supply and two jockey pumps which automatically start if the potable water supply cannot maintain system header pressure. The cross connect is downstream of the potable water backflow preventer and contains a pressure regulator and check valve to isolate the fire protection system from a failure of the potable water supply and prevent recirculation back to the fire tanks during fire pump operation.
The two 8" carbon steel headers from the IPS to the AB and ERCW station are not lined. These headers serve as nuclear safety-related supplies to the Steam Generators during flood mode operations.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev. 11 Fire department connections are not used for safety related areas (approved by AHIJ). Both indicating and non-indicating valves are used in the HPFP system. Check valves are in accordance with approved material (e.g., ANSI B331.1).
Post indicating valves (PIV) are not installed in all required locations. Some PIVs are not located exactly 36" above the ground level (grade), but are accessible for proper operation. Break-away locks or seals are used on fire protection system valves to administratively control their position. Inspection of valve positions are performed at the frequency specified in Part II, Section 14.0.
The requirement for hose houses and equipment criteria is met by mobile apparatus and/or hose houses. Couplings are of same size and thread, and are interchangeable with those of the local fire department. Nozzles are of the approved type. Selection, coating and lining, and fitting ofjoints for piping is per TVA design, construction, and modification procedures. These procedures provide guidance that meets or exceeds the code. A loop system is provided for systems in the DGB, CB, AB, and RBs. Minimum size of underground pipe is 6 inches except for the 4" supply to the DGB.
3.3.7 NFPA 30-1973: Flammable and Combustible Liquids NFPA 3 0-1973 was only evaluated for storage and transport of combustible materials (Chapters 4 &
5). SQN is in general compliance with the intent of applicable sections of chapters 4 and 5 (i.e., approved containers, size, storage cabinets, tanks, closed containers, covered containers, fire extinguishers, repairs and housekeeping, etc.).
3.3.8 NFPA 51B-1976: Cutting and Welding Processes The use of ignition sources such as welding, flame cutting, thermite welding, thawing pipe brazing, grinding, arc gouging, torch applied roofing, and open flame soldering within safety-related areas are controlled through the approval and issuance of a permit. TVA adequately addresses the primary functional requirements of NFPA 51B through the implementation of administrative controls, permits that are reviewed and approved by appropriate plant personnel, and the use of fire watches for ignition source work activities in safety-related areas of the plant. Refer to Part II, Section 11.0 for more details.
Designated smoking areas are located outside of building structures.
3.3.9 NFPA 69-1973: Explosion Prevention Systems NFPA 69 is applicable only to the battery rooms. The exhaust air system for these areas is designed to limit the potential build-up of hydrogen gas to less than 2%. The systems as installed meet the intent of the code; however, there are no means to control and monitor the combustible gas concentration.
3.3.10 NFPA 72D-1975: Proprietary Protective Signaling System NFPA 72D-1975 applies to TVA System 13. The system is typically a "Class A" supervised system. The central supervising station is located in the Main Control Room which is a security area with strict access control. The system is arranged to receive and record all signals, and a direct supervised circuit to local fire department is not deemed necessary. The fire alarm console in the Main Control Room is a UL listed device designed by Pyrotronics, Inc. The audible alarm levels have been adjusted to meet the VI-11
SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11
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requirements of the human factors analysis for the MCR. All plant areas do not have audible signals that can be heard above background.
An exception to SQN General Engineering Specification, G-73 R5, "Installation, Modification and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems and Features," has been implemented to allow the bypassing of the Main Control Room (MCR) audible indicating appliance when a dedicated operator is stationed at the console. NFPA 72D does not address situations in which the alarm device is located in an area in which many audible devices are relied upon to provide continuous monitoring of other plant systems, in addition to the fire protection system. Numerous audible alarms result in a significant distraction to the MCR Operators, who are monitoring other sensitive and safety-related plant equipment. Therefore, an allowance has been implemented to silence, muffle, or mute the audible portion of the indicating appliance based on the contingency that the annunciation may only be altered when an operator has been designated to monitor the console continuously until the normal annunciation system is restored. If the console is to be unattended by a dedicated operator, the audible alarm is to be returned to the normal configuration. Applicable plant procedures provide these specifications.
Access to the "central supervising station" (Main Control Room) is not limited to only those personnel required to operate the system. Site security procedures ensures strict access control for personnel who can be on site and further restricts access to the Main Control Room. Areas in the Main Control Room that involve control functions of the plant, have additional access restrictions applied. The combination of these controls ensure the proper operation of and response to the "central supervising station".
Room JOperation and supervision of the fire alarm station is not the only safety function of the Main Control Room operators. They are responsible for all MCR alarm response functions.
Upon receipt of a selected low threshold fire alarm signal, the fire brigade is not immediately activated. Upon receipt of an alarm from a cross zone detection system, an individual is dispatched to the area to determine cause of alarm. If a fire exists, the individual notifies the Main Control Room and they in turn notify the fire brigade. If both zones of a cross zoned detection system alarm, the fire brigade is notified immediately. Non-cross zoned detector alarms are investigated. This allows alarms to be addressed at a proper level while still maintaining a rapid response by fire brigade to actual fires.
System is rated to operate at 120v +/- 10v and 60 +/-2 cycles. System is nominal 120V.
Water flow actuated devices and transmitters are not being tested every two months.
Water flow through the test connection is not performed. A main drain test is not performed after operation of a system isolation control valve. See Section 3.2.2 of Part VI.
The alarm power and trouble power for the local panels come from the same power panel, but from different circuit breakers. The same primary and secondary power supplies power both alarm and trouble circuits. The power service connection and overcurrent protective devices are not in locked panels; however, access to panels is under operations control.
A distinctive signal is used for the central console alarm; however, console alarm signals may not take priority over all other control room signals. Priority is determined by the licensed operators.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev. 11 "Primary and secondary power supply is not within the control room; they are provided for the fire "alarm console from offsite and onsite power sources. The fire alarm system has the emergency diesel generators as the automatic secondary power supply. Emergency diesel generators (DG) are not reviewed against NFPA 37, and the DGs are not operated weekly (they are designed, tested, and operated based on FSAR regulatory guide, and Technical Specification requirements with the intent of ensuring the supply is met).
Signal attachments and circuits (pressure switches) can be removed or tampered with and not cause an alarm. The site personnel access control and the work control system provide adequate assurance that work on such devices are properly controlled and documented. Therefore, there is not a need for such alarms as would be in areas accessible to the general public where tampering is a concern.
Releasing circuits for CQ, sprinkler and spray systems are typically not supervised.
Sprinkler system control valves are not electrically supervised, but are locked or sealed open and periodically inspected. Administrative controls (e.g., locking or sealing the valve in position, and strict site access and work control) for valve manipulation assures that the valve has not been tampered with and is in the proper position.
Both visual and recorded displays are in compliance, but records are not preserved for later inspection. Plant procedures have reporting requirements for conditions adverse to quality. These procedures require that an adverse condition report be initiated when the problem was identified. Printouts can be provided by the fire alarm console to support the adverse condition report and aid in the reconstruction of a sequence of events to meet the intent of the code.
3.3.11 NFPA 72E-1974: Automatic Fire Detectors Specific areas may not have fire detectors installed. See Part X and VII for specifics. The literal requirement of fire detectors spacing may not have been met in all cases; however the intent is met by providing detectors commensurate with the hazard.
Smoke detectors in the high ceiling areas are not installed alternately on two levels. In general, high ceilings are addressed by reduced spacing of detectors at ceiling level as opposed to two levels of detectors.
This is acceptable because stratification is not a concern because of the HVAC mixing of the air and/or the low combustible loading of the area. The spacing of detectors on the refuel floor does not meet code requirements. The existing detectors in conjunction with the room size, ceiling height, combustible loading, and special separation provide a reasonable level of fire protection.
Use of the duct detectors in lieu of area detectors is provided for the Reactor Building upper and lower compartment coolers. Regulatory requirements for detectors are met in the Reactor Building. Duct detectors are used to address the cooler hazard. Thermal detectors are used to address the RCP motor hazard.
Duct detectors are not provided per NFPA 90A requirements; fans that service area of the fire are manually shut down when necessary to ensure that air flow will not prevent fire dampers from closing.
Periodic testing of smoke and restorable heat detectors is conducted annually instead of semiannually. This is based on the reliability of the fire detectors and an evaluation of the deviation's impact on the ability to achieve and maintain plant shutdown in the event of a fire.
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SQN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT PART VI - NFPA CODE EVALUATION Rev.11 3.3.12 NFPA 80-1981: Fire Doors and Windows A summary door evaluation list was utilized to review fire doors per NFPA 80. As noted on the compartmentation drawings in Part X of the FPR, evaluations have been performed by TVA or nationally recognized laboratories on those fire door assemblies that are not listed or labeled as fire rated door assemblies. TVA has ensured that the hardware and other components of fire door assemblies comply with NFPA 80 requirements or are appropriately evaluated. Specific attachments to fire doors, such as for security hardware, do not adversely impact on the fire rating of fire door assemblies as identified in Generic Letter 86-10. The quantity and location of fusible links on rolling/sliding fire doors is dependent on the fire hazards and other fire protection features provided (i.e. some doors may have only one link vs the code required three when combined with fire detection/suppression and/or low combustible loadings). See Part VII.
3.3.13 NFPA 194-1974: Fire Hose Connectors: NFPA 196-1974: Fire Hose Fire Hose Connectors (NFPA 194) and Fire Hose (NFPA 196) address the acceptable connectors and materials for fire hose assemblies. Fire hoses and their connectors are visually inspected. Fire hose and connectors are expendable items. Replacement parts are purchased to the current standards at the time of purchase.
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