IR 05000282/2002004
| ML022070457 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/2002 |
| From: | Lanksbury R NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Nazar M Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-004 | |
| Download: ML022070457 (42) | |
Text
July 25, 2002
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/02-04; 50-306/02-04
Dear Mr. Nazar:
On June 30, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 3, 2002, with you and members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC reviewed two security related issues that were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with one of those findings which pertains to protection of Safeguards Information (SGI). The violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating plant.
The NRC has increased security requirements at Prairie Island in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and will issue temporary instructions in the near future to verify by inspection the licensee's compliance with the Order and current security regulations. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and any response you provide, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Project Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-282/02-04; 50-306/02-04
REGION III==
Docket Nos:
50-282, 50-306 License Nos:
50-282/02-04; 50-306/02-04 Licensee:
Nuclear Management Company, LLC Facility:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Location:
1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Dates:
April 1 through June 30, 2002 Inspectors:
J. Adams, Senior Resident Inspector S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector D. Karjala, Resident Inspector M. Mitchell, Radiation Specialist, DRS A. Dunlop, Reactor Engineer, DRS M. Farber, Reactor Engineer, DRS B. Winter, Reactor Engineer, DRS G. Pirtle, Physical Security Inspector, DRS Approved by:
Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Project Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000282-02-04; IR 05000306-02-04, on 4/1/2002-5/16/2002; Nuclear Management Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Physical Protection.
This report covers a 13-week routine resident inspection. The inspection was conducted by resident and regional inspectors. Two Green security-related findings were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the Significance Determination Process (SDP) does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A.
Inspector-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B.
Licensee Identified Findings Cornerstone: Physical Protection Two security-related findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by the licensee, one of which was a Non-Cited Violation, and were reviewed by the inspector. Corrective actions taken by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These findings and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Sections 4OA3.2 and 4OA7 of this report.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period. Unit 2 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
Hot Weather, Tornado, and Low Water Preparations a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a detailed review of the summer plant operation, high wind, and tornado hazard procedures; Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR); design bases documents (DBDs) for the screenhouse and emergency diesel generators (EDGs);
applicable Technical Specifications (TSs); and the Prairie Island Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE). The inspectors also reviewed a permanent plant modification of EDGs D1 and D2 that restored their operability with the design bases cooling water inlet temperature of 95 F (see Section 1R17). A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
The inspectors conducted inspections of the following risk significant mitigating systems:
cooling water (common to both units);
offsite alternating current (AC) power;
Unit 1 and 2 AC Transformers;
Unit 1 EDG D1 and D2; and
Unit 2 EDG D5 and D6.
The inspectors reviewed the selected systems to verify that the material conditions and system configuration supported the systems availability and operability under adverse weather conditions, and to verify that additional cooling equipment specified in the summer plant operation procedure was available and operating as specified in the procedure. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the areas specified in the tornado hazards surveillance procedure (SP) to verify that potential missile hazards to transformers and the switchyard had been removed or properly secured.
The inspectors reviewed a number of weather-related action requests (Ars) that entered problems that, if left uncorrected, could affect the performance of mitigating systems or result in an initiating event. The review was conducted to verify that the licensee entered problems into the corrective action program, identified appropriate corrective actions, and implemented those corrective actions.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments (71111.02)
Review of Evaluations and Screenings for Changes, Tests, or Experiments a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed nine 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and 21 screenings completed by the licensees engineering staff during the last 2 years and performed under the 10 CFR 50.59 process. These documents were reviewed to ensure consistency with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The inspectors used Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, November 2000. The inspectors also consulted Inspection Manual, Part 9900, "10 CFR GUIDANCE: 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments." Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed at the end of the report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a partial equipment alignment walkdown of the following risk significant mitigating systems:
On April 26, 2002, inspectors conducted an equipment alignment verification of the D5 EDG while the D6 EDG was unavailable for surveillance testing.
- On June 19, 2002, inspectors conducted an equipment alignment verification of the 21 component cooling water pump while the 22 component cooling water pump was unavailable for preventative maintenance.
- On June 24, 2002, inspectors conducted an equipment alignment verification of the D1 EDG while the D2 EDG was unavailable for surveillance testing.
The inspectors utilized the valve and electrical breaker status checklists to verify that system components and support systems were properly configured to support the operability of the available train. The inspectors performed a physical inspection of the available train, and reviewed outstanding work orders (WOs) and ARs to verify that the available train would be capable to perform its design function as described in USAR
and TSs. The inspectors also reviewed housekeeping in the area to verify that there were no housekeeping issues that could affect the available trains function.
The inspectors reviewed ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on the availability and accessibility of fire protection equipment, the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the IPEEE; their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient; or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. The inspectors reviewed the documents listed at the end of this report and toured fire areas to verify that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition.
The inspectors assessed the following areas:
Fire Area 20, Bus 15 Switchgear Room;
Fire Area 22, Bus 111 Switchgear Room;
Fire Area 25, EDG D1 Room;
Fire Area 26, EDG D2 Room;
Fire Area 31, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump 11 and 21 Room;
Fire Area 32, AFW Pump 12 and 22 Room;
Fire Area 33, Battery 11 Room;
Fire Area 34, Battery 12 Room;
Fire Area 80, Bus 121 Switchgear Room; and
Fire Area 81, Bus 16 Switchgear Room.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
.1 External Flood Protection Inspection a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and IPEEE associated with external flooding; the abnormal procedure for flooding; the most recently completed SP for the inspection of plant flooding barriers; the design bases document addressing internal and external hazards; and the design change package for flood panel and door design changes. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the implemented corrective actions taken to correct the loss of safety function of plant flood barriers (see Section 4OA2) and Licensee Event Report (LER) 01-03-01 documenting the loss of safety function (see Section 4OA3).
The inspectors performed a physical inspection of all flood protection barriers with a specific focus on the deficiencies noted in the most recent performance of the SP for the inspection of plant flood barriers. The inspectors assessed whether the actions specified in the abnormal procedure for flooding could be performed in a timely manner if required, and if the necessary hardware and consumable materials were available and still within their shelf life. The inspectors also discussed the recent modifications of flood barriers with the project engineer.
The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during this inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action program, that problems associated with plant equipment relied upon to prevent or minimize flooding were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Internal Flood Protection Inspection a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and Individual Plant Examination (IPE) associated with internal flooding in the area of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps and instrument air compressors, the design bases document addressing internal and external hazards, and the design bases document for the D5/D6 EDG building. The inspectors conducted a physical walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pump rooms and the D5/D6 building to verify that piping systems in these areas were being maintained, that drain paths from these areas had been maintained, and that there were no accumulations of loose materials that could plug drain paths. The inspectors reviewed the response times assumed in the flood analysis for operator actions to verify that operators could reasonably be expected to complete the required actions in the assumed time.
The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that problems associated with plant equipment relied upon to prevent or minimize flooding were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an operating staff crew during an as found requalification examination on the simulator. The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of:
clarity and formality of communications;
ability to take timely, appropriate, and safe actions;
prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms;
procedure use;
control board manipulations;
oversight and direction from supervisors; and
group dynamics.
The inspectors compared crew performance in the above areas to licensee management expectations and guidelines as presented in the operations section work instructions (SWIs) listed at the end of this report and to the critical tasks listed in the exercise guide at the end of this report. The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control room board configurations. The inspectors observed licensee evaluators to verify that they noted weaknesses observed by the inspectors and discussed them in the critique at the end of the session.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the Unit 1 reactor protection system to ensure that the maintenance rule was properly implemented. This evaluation included the following aspects:
whether the reactor protection system was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
- whether the reactor protection system performance problems constituted maintenance rule functional failures;
whether the reactor protection system had been assigned the proper safety significance classification;
whether the licensee properly classified the reactor protection system as (a)(1) or (a)(2) based on the systems performance; and
whether the performance criteria for the reactor protection system were appropriate for its (a)(2) classification.
The above aspects were evaluated by the inspectors during the review of the maintenance rule scoping and report documents. The inspectors also reviewed significant WOs and ARs to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected and that unavailable time had been properly calculated. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities and during activities where more than one risk significant system or train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant mitigating equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration, where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the licensees daily configuration risk assessment records, observed shift turnover meetings, observed daily plant status meetings, and reviewed risk assessment documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the equipment configurations were properly listed, that protected equipment was identified and controlled, and that significant aspects of plant risk were communicated to the necessary personnel. The inspectors discussed daily and emergent risk assessments with operators and risk assessment engineers.
The inspectors reviewed the following emergent and planned maintenance activities associated with maintenance rule risk significant systems:
On April 12, 2002, the D5 EDG was out-of-service for planned maintenance when an emergent failure of the 12 diesel driven cooling water pump lubricating water supply occurred;
On June 4, 2002, the D1 EDG was out-of-service for replacement of the water supply solenoid valve and the 12 boric acid transfer pump was inoperable during a period of possible severe weather;
- On June 12, 2002, the 12 diesel driven cooling water pump was declared inoperable because of erratic governor operation during a routine surveillance test; and
On June 26, 2002, the 12 component cooling water pump and the 11 boric acid storage tank were out-of-service for planned maintenance, two of the eight intake traveling screens were out-of-service for corrective maintenance, one intake traveling screen was degraded, and both bypass intake traveling screen bypass gates were degraded.
The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that problems associated with plant risk assessment were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated plant conditions, selected condition reports (CRs), and corrective action program (CAP) documents for risk significant components and systems in which operability issues were questioned. These conditions were evaluated to determine whether the continued operability of the components and systems were justified. The inspectors compared the component or systems function and design criteria in the applicable sections of the TSs and USAR to the licensees evaluations to verify that the components and systems were operable. The inspectors reviewed equipment to verify that compensatory measures necessary to maintain operability were in place, functioned as intended, and were properly controlled. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
The inspectors evaluated the following conditions:
Inaccurate assumptions used in the analysis for the non-return check valves in the main steam line break event (General Condition Report 2002 01283);
Improper classification of safety-related cooling water pump lubrication water supply components as nonsafety-related (AR CAP 023064);
Okonite/Scotch Equipment Qualification (EQ) splices installed in a non-tested configuration (AR CAP 023138);
EQ Okonite Tape Splice Configuration Turnover Evaluation;
Scaffold 1109R was found in contact with 21 component cooling water pump discharge header (AR CAP 023905);
Potential excessive end play on the 11 safety injection pump (AR CAP 023818);
and
Incorrect o-ring material install on the Units 1 and 2 pressurizer power operated relief valve block valves (AR CAP 023907).
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWA) (71111.16)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed newly identified OWAs to verify that the functional capability of the system, human reliability in responding to an initiating event, or the ability of operators to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures was not significantly affected.
The inspectors reviewed the following OWAs:
Diesel generator D6 fuel oil storage tank level indication from the emergency response computer system; and
Unit 2 loop A pressurizer spray valve controller in manual.
The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and TSs and discussed the OWAs with control room operators. The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that problems associated with D6 fuel oil storage tank level indication and the loop A pressurizer spray valve controller were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue was identified and scheduled for implementation. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)
.1 Permanent Plant Modification Installed On-Line a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed design change 02D101 which added several valves to the D1 and D2 coolant systems to eliminate coolant cross-flow. The licensee determined that this modification was necessary to restore the EDGs to a configuration that could provide the rated load with a cooling water flow of 400 gallons per minute at 95F. The inspectors reviewed the modification to verify that it did not adversely affect the availability, reliability, or the functional capability of the D1/D2 EDGs. The inspectors also reviewed three supporting engineering calculations, a 10 CFR Part 21 notification from the diesel vendor, WOs for the installation of the modification, the post-modification testing, and commercial grade dedication of components. The inspectors performed a physical walkdown of the D1 and D2 EDGs and observed the operation of both engines following the installation of the modifications. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Biennial Review of Recent Permanent Plant Modifications a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed 20 permanent plant modifications that were performed by the licensees engineering staff during the last 2 years. These were divided among the various programs that the licensee used to make changes to the plant. Nine of the modifications were done under the design change process. In addition, the inspectors evaluated 2 setpoint changes, 2 equivalent engineering change evaluations, 3 substitution part/component equivalent evaluations, and 4 commercial grade evaluations. The modifications were chosen based upon the effect on systems that had high probabilistic risk analysis significance or high maintenance rule safety significance.
The modifications were reviewed to verify that the completed design changes were in accordance with specified design requirements and the licensing bases, and to confirm that the changes did not affect the modified system or other systems safety function.
As applicable to the status of the modification, post-modification testing was reviewed to verify that the system, and associated support systems, functioned properly and that the modification accomplished its intended function. The inspectors evaluated the modifications against the licensees design basis documents and the USAR. The inspectors also used applicable industry standards, such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code, to evaluate acceptability of the modifications.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating, barrier integrity, and support systems to ensure that the post-maintenance testing was performed adequately, demonstrated that the maintenance was successful, and that operability was restored after the testing. The inspectors reviewed the appropriate sections of the TSs, the USAR, and maintenance documents to determine the systems safety functions and the scope of the maintenance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
The inspectors observed and evaluated the post-maintenance activities for the following:
D5 Overspeed Trip Repair and Temporary Modification Removal on April 11, 2002;
- D1 EDG Water Supply Solenoid Valve Replacement on June 4, 2002;
12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Governor Adjustment on June 13, 2002; and
22 Component Cooling (CC) Pump Preventive Maintenance (PM) on June 19, 2002.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed selected surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data to verify that the equipment performance met SP acceptance criteria. The inspectors observed the tested equipment to verify that it was capable of performing its intended safety functions as described in TSs and the USAR. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that the testing met the required TS frequency; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the applicable procedures; that operators met prerequisites and established the proper plant conditions; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded. In addition, the inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that the licensee was identifying surveillance test problems at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
The following tests were observed and/or evaluated:
SP 1102, 11 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test on April 17, 2002;
SP 2307, D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Test on April 25, 2002;
SP 1335, D2 Diesel Generator 18-Month 24-Hour Load Test on April 28, 2002; and
SP 2102, 22 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test on May 20, 2002.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Modifications (71111.23)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed temporary modification 02T121. This temporary modification installed a ground strap on the Unit 2 source range monitor 2N31 to reduce the noise-induced counts. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification description and the 10 CFR 50.59 screening to ensure they were completed in accordance with the licensee administrative work instruction (AWI) guidance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and TSs to verify that the installation did not affect the specified design function or operability of the system. The inspectors
discussed installation and removal WOs, plans for permanent corrective action, and temporary modification removal with engineering personnel. The inspectors also reviewed documents to verify that minor deficiencies identified during the course of inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action program. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the licensee perform an emergency preparedness drill on April 3, 2002. The inspectors observed activities in the control room simulator, technical support center, and emergency operations facility. The inspectors also attended the post-drill facility critiques in the technical support center and emergency operations facility immediately following the drill and the overall drill critique on April 4. The focus of the inspectors activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the drill performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same weaknesses and deficiencies and entered them into the corrective action program. The inspectors placed emphasis on observations regarding event classification, notifications, protective action recommendations, and site evacuation and accountability activities. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package listed at the end of this report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety 2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)
.1 Plant Walkdowns a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the radiological conditions of radiation areas and high radiation areas (HRAs) in the auxiliary and radwaste buildings. The inspector performed walkdowns and reviewed licensee controls to determine if the controls (i.e., surveys, postings, and barricades) were adequate to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensees TSs.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety 2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02)
.1 Walkdown of Radioactive Waste Systems a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the liquid and solid radioactive waste system description in the USAR and the most recent information regarding the types and amounts of radioactive waste generated and disposed. The inspector performed walkdowns of the liquid and solid radwaste processing systems to verify that the systems agreed with the descriptions in the USAR and the Process Control Program, and to assess the material condition and operability of the systems. The inspector reviewed the current processes for transferring waste resins into transportation containers to determine if appropriate waste stream mixing and/or sampling procedures were utilized. The inspector also reviewed the methodologies for waste concentration averaging to determine if representative samples of the waste product were provided for the purposes of waste classification in accordance with 10 CFR 61.55. During this inspection, the licensee was not conducting waste processing.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Waste Characterization and Classification a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensees radiochemical sample analysis results for each of the licensees waste streams, including dry active waste, resins, and filters.
The inspector also reviewed the licensees use of scaling factors to quantify difficult-to-measure radionuclides (e.g., pure alpha or beta emitting radionuclides). The reviews were conducted to verify that the licensees program assured compliance with 10 CFR 61.55 and 10 CFR 61.56, as required by Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 20. The inspector also reviewed the licensees waste characterization and classification program to ensure that the waste stream composition data accounted for changing operational parameters and thus remained valid between the annual sample analysis updates.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Transportation Records a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed five exempt and non-exempt package shipment manifests completed in 2000 and 2001 to verify compliance with NRC and Department of Transportation requirements (i.e., 10 CFR Parts 20 and 71 and 49 CFR Parts 172 and 173). The licensee did not have any non-exempt package preparation or shipping underway during the inspection.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Identification and Resolution of Problems a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed a Quality Assurance audit of the Radioactive Waste and Transportation Program, along with self-assessments of the Radioactive Waste and Transportation Programs to evaluate the effectiveness of the self-assessment process to identify, characterize, and prioritize problems. The inspector also reviewed corrective action documentation to verify that previous radioactive waste and radioactive materials transportation related issues were adequately addressed. The inspector also selectively reviewed year 2001 CRs that addressed radioactive waste and radioactive materials transportation program deficiencies, to verify that the licensee had effectively implemented the corrective action program.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3.
SAFEGUARDS Cornerstone: Physical Protection 3PP1 Access Authorization (AA) Program (Behavior Observation Only) (71130.01)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspector interviewed five supervisors and five non-supervisors (both licensee and contractor employees) to determine their knowledge level and practice for implementing the licensees program responsibilities. Selected procedures pertaining to the Behavior Observation Program and associated training activities were reviewed. Also licensee Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) semi-annual test results were reviewed. In addition, the inspector reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments and security logged events.
The inspector also interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensees corrective action program.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3PP2 Access Control (Identification, Authorization and Search of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles) (71130.02)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the licensees protected area access control equipment testing and maintenance procedures. The inspector observed licensee testing of all access control equipment to determine if testing and maintenance practices were performance based. On two occasions, during peak ingress periods, the inspector observed in-processing search of personnel, packages, and vehicles to determine if search practices were conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and that staffing was sufficient to adequately control the ingress process. Interviews were conducted and records were reviewed to verify that security staffing levels were consistently and appropriately implemented, and that procedures were prepared to address denial of unescorted access authorization. Also the inspector reviewed the licensees process for limiting access to only authorized personnel to the protected area and vital equipment.
The inspector reviewed the licensees program to control security keys and security related computer data.
The inspector reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, maintenance request records, and security logged events for identification and resolution of problems. In addition, the inspector interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensees corrective action system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)
.1 Initiating Events Cornerstone Performance Indicators a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the PI data submitted by the licensee for completeness and accuracy for the following PIs in the Initiating Events Cornerstone:
1.
Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours, and 2.
Unplanned Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal The inspectors compared the data reported by the licensee to the definitions and guidance contained in the NEI guidance listed at the end of this report. The inspectors
reviewed licensee event reports, monthly operating reports, and NRC inspection reports for the period July 2001 through March 2002 to verify that the licensee had reported all occurrences for those three quarters.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Physical Protection Performance Indicators a.
Inspection Scope The inspector verified the data for the Physical Protection Performance Indicators (PI)
pertaining to Fitness-For-Duty Personnel Reliability, Personnel Screening Program, and Protected Area Security Equipment. Specifically, a sample of plant reports related to security events, security shift activity logs, fitness-for-duty reports, and other applicable security records were reviewed for the fourth quarter of 2001 and the first quarter of 2002.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1 Review of Corrective Actions For the D5/D6 Fuel and Lubricating Oil Incompatibility Event a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the completeness and the effectiveness of licensee corrective actions for a previous finding that involved the incompatibility of the fuel oil and lubricating oil in the Unit 2 D5 and D6 EDGs. Inspectors reviewed the completion of corrective actions and ensured that the timeliness of the licensees corrective actions were commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Review of Corrective Actions For the Loss of Function Associated with Flood Barriers a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the completeness and the effectiveness of licensee corrective actions for a previous finding that involved deficiencies with the plant flood barriers.
These deficiencies resulted in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition. The inspectors reviewed CR 20015571 that initially documented the deficient flood barriers, the subsequent root cause evaluation, LER 1-03-01, LER 1-03-01 Supplement 1, and
the documentation associated with the permanent plant modification that implemented the corrective actions that restored the function of the flood barriers.
The inspectors assessed whether the timeliness of the licensees corrective actions were commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. The inspectors compared the completion dates of the actions that restored function to the flood barriers to the annual period when the plant experiences a high susceptibility to external flooding. The inspectors reviewed USAR and IPEEE sections discussing external flooding and which indicated that the period of high susceptibility existed in the months of March and April.
The inspectors reviewed all corrective actions completed by the end of January 2002 to verify these actions restored the flood barrier function.
The inspectors reviewed other corrective actions, not required for the restoration of flood barrier function and which had not been completed by January 2002, to verify that they would not prevent the flood barriers from protecting the plant in the event of external flooding.
The inspectors performed a physical walkdown of the flood barriers to assess the current material condition of the flood barriers and note any deficiencies that would prevent the barriers from performing their function. The inspectors also observed the performance of SP 1293, Inspection of Flood Control Measures, to verify that all acceptance criteria were met.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems Associated With Permanent Plant Modifications a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed 12 CRs associated with Prairie Islands permanent plant modifications and 10 CFR 50.59 program to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to verify the effectiveness of corrective actions for the identified issues.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup (71153)
.1 (Closed) LER 1-01-03, Supplement 1: Plant in Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies.
This event report described a licensee-identified condition where 16 of 17 flood panels, that would be installed during a flood condition where water level crest is predicted to exceed 692' elevation, were degraded. The issue included not having the correct
gasket materials, inadequate anchor bolt installation capabilities, and the inability to install the panels in a timely manner. A Phase 3 risk assessment was completed using information from the IPEEE. Based on the assessment, it was determined that the issue was of very low risk significance (Green).
The inspectors reviewed Supplement 1 to this event report and noted that the licensee identified two additional deficiencies during the implementation of corrective actions to correct the D5/D6 flood panel deficiencies discussed in the original LER. These additional deficiencies did not change the significance of the event since the flood panels in question were determined to have been non-functional due to degraded gasket material. These new deficiencies were identified during corrective actions to restore the flood barrier function. The newly identified deficiencies were entered into the corrective action program with AR CAP 023003 and CAP 023071. Corrective actions had been completed and the function of all flood panels had been fully restored.
.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report No. 50-282/01-06-00: Security Responders Out-of-Position Due to Plant Fire.
Green. On August 3, 2001, a fire occurred within the protected area (PA) due to an electrical fault in non-safeguards Bus 12. The Red Wing Fire Department responded to assist in the control of the fire. While involved in fire control support activities, some armed responders were in locations that would have prevented them from being able to respond to their established defensive positions within the time lines established (specific time lines are SGI and exempt from public disclosure). The responders were out of position for between 15 minutes and two hours. During these time periods, the responders were always within the PA and able to provide some level of contingency response, but not within the specific time lines established for their positions.
Since the incident occurred prior to September 11, 2001, the regulatory requirement for the minimum number of armed responders was identified in the security plan (number of required armed responders is SGI and exempt from public disclosure). In this case, the number of actual armed responders exceeded the minimum number required by the security plan and no violations of NRC requirements occurred. The licensee had developed a response strategy and voluntarily added responders to enhance their capabilities. Part of that strategy included self-imposed requirements regarding the timeliness of responders. This incident effected that timeliness.
Additionally, within an hour of the start of the fire an additional supervisor, qualified for armed response duties, arrived onsite and could have provided an additional level of response in case of a contingency event. This issue was reported to the NRC within one hour, and a written Licensee Event Report was submitted to the NRC within 30 days. No prior similar events have occurred. Interviews with the security director disclosed that in the future, armed responders would not be used as they were in this incident, with a limited exception.
This issue was evaluated through the SDP and determined to be of low safety significance (Green). The issue is considered greater than minor, but of low safety significance, because, although the cornerstone attribute relating to response was effected (for a limited time and only a small portion of the capability) it represented a
vulnerability in the response system because it increased the potential for failure; but there were no actual intrusions and less than two similar findings were identified during the past four quarters. Moreover, the fire within the PA was an unpredictable event and the mis-positioning of the responders would have been unknown to an adversary.
4OA6 Meeting(s)
.1 Interim Exit Meeting Summary of the Access Control, As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), Instrumentation, and Transportation The results of the access control, ALARA, instrumentation, and transportation inspection were presented to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 17, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the information presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
.2 Interim Exit Meeting Summary of the Permanent Plant Modification and Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Inspection The results of the permanent plant modification and evaluations of changes, tests, and experiments inspection were presented to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 21, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the information presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
.3 Interim Exit Meeting Summary of the Physical Security Inspection The results of the Safeguards inspection were presented to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 21, 2002. The licensee staff was advised that an unresolved item pertaining to protection of SGI was identified, and that they would be advised later of the resolution of the issue.
The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered safeguards or proprietary information. No safeguards or proprietary information was identified.
On July 9, 2002, the licensee was advised that the unresolved item discussed above pertaining to inadequate protection of SGI was a licensee identified severity level IV Non-Cited Violation.
.4 Exit Meeting The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 3, 2002.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.
10 CFR 73.21(d)(2) states in part, While unattended, SGI shall be stored in a locked security storage container.
Contrary to this requirement, SGI (lesson plans and portions of security plans) found in the security trainers office (located outside of the protected area) was not stored in a locked security storage container. The duration of this issue is not know, but may have existed for up to one year (50-282/306/02-04-01).
The licensee inventoried and assumed control of the SGI, entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP 023101), and entered the incident in their safeguards event log. Because there was no evidence that the significant SGI (portions of security plans) was compromised, this violation is not more than of very low significance, and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation.
On April 12, 2002, the licensee discovered some lesson plans marked as SGI, and a double-enveloped package (both envelopes sealed) with SGI (portions of security plans)
within it. It was stored in an unlocked filing cabinet in the security trainers office located outside of the protected area. The outer sealed envelope was addressed to the security trainer with no SGI markings, and the inner sealed envelope was marked as SGI. The inadequate storage of the SGI may have occurred for up to one year. The individual the package was addressed to had not worked in the security trainer position and office for up to a year prior to the discovery date (April 12, 2002), and had terminated employment prior to the discovery date. Therefore, he was not available for the licensee or inspector to interview to determine further circumstances and details pertaining to receipt, transportation, or use of the SGI material.
This issue was evaluated through the SDP and determined to be of low safety significance (Green). The inspectors review of the material determined that the information in the lesson plans would not substantially assist an individual in gaining unauthorized or undetected access to the plant. The most significant documents were pages of the Point Beach and Prairie Island security plans (stored within a double sealed envelope) that described the location and description of vital areas, which could assist in radiological sabotage if the information was compromised. Although the SGI material was subject to compromise (not stored adequately) for up to a year, the fact that both envelopes were sealed when discovered indicates that the material was not compromised.
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee T. Amundson, Manager Business Support P. Huffman, Manager of System Engineering B. Jefferson, Director Site Operations J. Jensen, Interim Director of Engineering A. Johnson, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry J. Kivi, Licensing Engineer R. Lingle, Operations Manager J. Maki, Production Planning Manager M. McKeown, Manager of Design Engineering L. Meyer, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance M. Nazar, Site Vice President J. Waddell, Superintendent Security M. Werner, Plant Manager R. Womack, Manager of Engineering Programs D. Blakesley, Senior Nuclear Security Consultant J. Corwin, Nuclear Security Consultant H. Nyberg, Training Coordinator, The Wackenhut Corporation J. Waddell, Security Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-282/306/20-04-01 NCV SGI was not Adequately Protected (Section 4OA7)
Closed 50-282/01-01-03, Supplement 1 LER Plant in Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies (Section 1R15)
50-282/01-06-00 LER Security Responders Out of Position Due to Plant Fire (Section 4OA3)
50-282/306/20-04-01 NCV SGI was not Adequately Protected (Section 4OA7)
Discussed None
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AB Abnormal Operating Procedure AC Alternating Current ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System AFW Auxiliary Feedwater ALARA As-Low-As Reasonably Achievable AR Action Request AWI Administrative Work Instruction CAP Corrective Action Program CC Component Cooling CE Condition Evaluation CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report DBD Design Bases Document DRS Division of Reactor Safety EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EQ Equipment Qualification ERCS Emergency Response Computer System FFD Fitness-For-Duty GEN General Condition Report HRA High Radiation Area IMC Inspection Manual Chapter INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IPE Individual Plant Examination IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IR
Inspection Report
LCO
Limiting Conditions for Operation
LER
Licensee Event Report
NEI
Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OPR
Operator Workaround
Protected Area
Publicly Available Records
Performance Indicator
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Preventive Maintenance
Probalistic Risk Assessment
Reactor Coolant Pump
Significance Determination Process
Safeguards Information
Safety Injection
Surveillance Procedure
SWI
Section Work Instruction
TCN
Temporary Change Notice
TS
Technical Specification
Updated Safety Analysis Report
Work Order
XOE
External Operating Experience
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
SP 1039 (WO 0116291)
Tornado Hazard Monthly Site Inspection
Revision 6
Abnormal Operating
Procedure (AB) 2
Tornado/Severe Thunderstorm
Revision 19
Test Procedure 1636
Summer Plant Operation
Revision 10
Temporary Instruction
02-29
D1/D2 Cooling Water Configuration
March 22, 2002
NSPLMI-96001
Individual Plant Examination of External
Events, Section C2
Revision 0
Design Bases Document
(DBD) STR-04
Design Bases Document for the Prairie
Island Screenhouse, Page 60
Revision 3
Design Bases Document - Environmental
Qualification of Electrical Equipment,
Section 2.10, Page A-20
Revision 3
ENG-ME-178
Screenhouse Ventilation Evaluation
DBD SYS-38A
Design Bases Document - Emergency
Diesel Generators, Section 4.2.5, Page 91
Revision 2
Design Bases Document - Environmental
Qualification of Electrical Equipment,
Section 2.7, Page A-17
Revision 3
Diesel Ventilation, Section 10.3.12
Revision 23
2RY Transformer Local Alarm Received
April 12, 2002
Missile Hazards During Tornado Season
April 24, 2002
Condition Evaluation (CE)
000122
Evaluation of Policy Related to Leaving
Carts In or Near the Vehicle Trap
April 26, 2002
Missing Roof Hatch Allowing Rain to Leak
On Energized Equipment
April 28, 2002
CE 000136
Evaluate Missing Roof Hatch Above Motor
Control Center 2F
April 29, 2002
Tornado Missiles Near D1/D2
April 30, 2002
Corrective Action (CA)
001022
Tornado Missile Hazard Correction
May 2, 2002
CE 000149
Evaluate Change to the Tornado Missile
Protection Process
May 2, 2002
Received Equipment High Temperature
Alarms on 11Circ Water Pump
May 30, 2002
SP 1039 Tornado Hazard Monthly Site
Inspection
June 7, 2002
1GT Generator Main Transformer High Oil
Temperature
June 23, 2002
Evaluate the Effectiveness of the Summer
Operation Procedure
June 24, 2002
Failure to Change Generation Transformer
Filter Media
June 24, 2002
Known Overheating Problem Caused by
Filter Media
June 25, 2002
1R02
Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments
Procedures
NMC 50.59 Resource Manual
Revision 1
5AWI 3.3.5
50.59 Screenings
Revision 5
5AWI 3.3.6
10CFR50.59 Evaluations
Revision 2
5AWI 4.9.0
Safety Analysis Reports
Revision 8
5AWI 6.1.4
Design Change Project Description/Safety
Assessment
Revision 2
1C18 AOP1
Makeup or Boration of the Reactor Coolant
System Using a Safety Injection Pump
Revision 0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
Revision 21
1ECA-0.0
Loss of All Safeguards AC Power
Revision 15
1ES-0.1
Reactor Trip Recovery
Revision 19
Condition Reports Written as a Result of Inspection
Incorrect Completion of PINGP [Prairie
Island Nuclear Generating Plant] 279 for
Safety Evaluation 584
June 20, 2002
Distribution of Completed 50.59 Evaluations
June 20, 2002
AR OTH 020549
Clarity USAR Page 6.2-23 Concerning
Safety Injection (SI) Accumulator Check
Valves
June 21, 2002
10 CFR 50.59 Screenings
218
11/22 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump
Shaft Bearing Isolation Valves
April 29, 2002
1017
Update to 2 Emergency Contingency
Action 0.0
June 26, 2001
1063
00RV01, Bottom Mount Reduced Inventory
Thermocouples
July 24, 2001
1173
Substitution Part/Component Equivalent
ME-0690
September 19,
2001
1189
Use SI Pump for Borated Water Makeup
October 12, 2001
1098
Cross-Connect CC Pumps
August 23, 2001
1215
Turbine Driven AFW Pump Control Switch
in Manual
January 15, 2002
1259
22 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Governor
Replacement
November 1, 2001
1262
WO 0114936, Setpoint Change 2456
November 2, 2001
1285
Calculation ENG-ME-481
January 8, 2002
1296
Temporary Modification 01T102
January 11, 2002
1402
Temporary Change to SP 1106A
February 16, 2002
1419
Replace FV-PCV-1025 DC45/46 with
LPN-RK Fuses
February 28, 2002
1423
Equipment Engineering Change 1406,
Bearing Change
March 8, 2002
1430
11, 21, and 22 CC Unit Cooler Coil
Replacement
March 18, 2002
1435
Calculation ENG-ME-499, Revision 0
April 3, 2002
1458
WO 0108013 - Fuse Change
April 10, 2002
1464
12 & 22 Diesel Cooling Water Panel Audible
Alarms
April 17, 2002
1468
Fuse Replacement for BKR 253-21/Setpoint
2462. WO 0203609
April 18, 2002
1482
Loop Delta T Emergency Response
Computer System (ERCS) Alarm Setpoint
Changes WO 0203637 & 0203639
May 7, 2002
01VC01
Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Water
Injection Check Valve Replacement/
Relocation
January 8, 2002
50.59 Evaluations
123
Downgrading Chemical and Volume Control
System Charging Pump
November 30,
2001
181
Safety Evaluation for the Improper Install of
Raychem Manufactured Heat Shrinkable
Tubing at Prairie Island Unit 1
December 21,
2001
251
Charging Pump Reclassification
December 14,
1994
252
Molded Case Circuit Breakers on Safety
Related Equipment
January 26, 2002
265
Untraceable Molded Case Circuit Breakers
Installed in Safety Related Applications
January 26, 2002
584
Appendix R Program Document Update -
Containment Sump B Valve Hot Short Issue
April 18, 2001
1004
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
January 23, 2002
1007
Steam Generator Level and Containment
Temperature Restrictions in Support of Main
Steam Line Break Analysis
April 1, 2002
02D101
Isolate D1/D2 Coolant System Crossflow
May 1, 2002
6.2.1
Safety Injection System Design Basis
Revision 22
10.2.3
Chemical and Volume Control System
Revision 23
10.4.2
Component Cooling System
Revision 22
11.9.1.2
Auxiliary Feedwater System Design Basis
Revision 23
11.9.2.2
Auxiliary Feedwater System Description
Revision 23
USAR Submittal Inputs
000309
Single Failure Discussion
December 7, 2000
000302
Single Failure Analysis Containment Spray
System
December 3, 2000
010004
AFW System
January 10, 2001
010034
Cooling Water
February 25, 2001
010056
Containment Isolation Valves
March 22, 2001
Miscellaneous
10 CFR 50.71(e) Letter to
NRC
Submittal of Revision No. 23 to the USAR
July 1, 2001
Changes, Tests, or Experiments
NEI 96.07
Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations
Revision 1
1R04
Equipment Alignment
D5 EDG
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 110
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-9
D5 Diesel Generator Valve Status
Revision 9
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-10
D5 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Local
Panels and Switches
Revision 5
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-11
D5 Diesel Generator Main Control Room
Switch and Indicating Light Status
Revision 3
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-12
D5 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and
Panel Switches
Revision 8
D5 2B Start Air Receiver Pressure
Transmitter
21 CC Pump
Component Cooling Water System
Revision 91
USAR Section 10.4.2
Component Cooling System
Revision 22
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.14-2
Unit 2 Component Cooling System
Revision 22
2CC-1-13 Has an Oil Leak on Actuator Gear
Box
April 22, 2002
Tubing on Scaffold 1109 Touching CC
Pump 21
June 19, 2002
Scaffolds Erected Too Close to Equipment
June 23, 2002
D1 EDG
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 110
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-1
D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status
Revision 19
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-2
D1 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Room
Cooling Local Panels
Revision 8W
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-3
D1 Diesel Generator Main Control Room
Switch and Indicating Light Status
Revision 13
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-4
D1 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and
Panel Switches
Revision 11
1R05
Fire Protection
Plant Safety Procedure
F5
Fire Fighting
Revision 27
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix A
Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire
Detection Zone 82, Emergency Diesel
Generator D-1 Room
Revision 10
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix A
Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire
Detection Zone 6, Emergency Diesel
Generator D-2 Room
Revision 10
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix A
Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire
Detection Zone 2, Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump Rooms
Revision 10
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix A
Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire
Detection Zone 1, Batteries 11 and 12
Rooms
Revision 7
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix A
Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire
Detection Zone 11, Bus 15 & 16 Switchgear
Rooms
Revision 7
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix A
Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire
Detection Zone 43, Bus 111 & 121
Switchgear Rooms
Revision 7
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix F
Fire Hazard Analysis
Revision 12
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix D
Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room
Revision 8
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix A
Fire Strategies
Revision 7
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001
Appendix B
Internal Fires Analysis
Revision 2
1R06
Flood Protection Measures
External Flooding
USAR Section 2.4.3.5
Floods
Revision 21
USAR Appendix F
Probable Maximum Flood Study
Revision 4
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001
Appendix C, Section
C.2.3.1
External Flooding
Revision 0
DBD-TOP-05
Design Bases Document for Harzards
Revision 2
AB 4
Flood
Revision 20
SP 1293 (WO 0113018)
Inspection of Flood Control Measures
Revision 9
Design Change 01BM02
Flood Panel and Door Design Changes
Revision 1
50.59 Screening 1184
Design Change 01BM02, Revision 1
Revision 1
Review of Surveillance SP 1293 Inspection
of Flood Control Measures
May 1, 2002
121 Cooling Tower Pump House Sump
Pump Tripped on Overload
April 16, 2002
Defect in Weld in Flood Panel MK-1
April 11, 2002
IPE NSPLMI-94001
Section 3.3.8
Internal Flooding Evaluation
Revision 0
IPE NSPLMI-94001
Section 6.3
Class FEH-TB1, Flood with Loss of
Secondary Cooling and Bleed and Feed
Revision 0
DBD-TOP-05
Design Bases Document for Harzards
Revision 2
DBD-STR-05
Design Bases Document for the D5/D6
Building
Revision 2
Burned Up Starter Coil Found On Breaker
253-21 for 21 Turbine Building Sump Pump
April 15, 2002
Evaluate as a Temporary Modification Bilge
Pumps in the Turbine Building Drain - Unit 1
Condenser Pit North West Corner
June 20, 2002
1R011 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Simulator Exercise Guide
Simulator Cycle Quiz 37
Revision 0
SWI O-0
Conduct of Operations
Revision 1
SWI O-2
Shift Organization, Operations, and
Turnover
Revision 46
SWI O-10
Operation Manual Usage
Revision 41
SWI O-25
Periodic Data Acquisition and Logkeeping
Revision 29
1R12
Maintenance Rule Implementation
General
2000 Equipment Performance Annual
Report
April 20, 2001
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document,
Volume 1A
Revision 3
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document,
Volume 1B
Revision 3
NEI Industry Guideline for Monitoring the
Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear
Power Plants
Revision 2
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance
at Nuclear Power Plants
Revision 2
1PC-478 A/B Repeatedly Found Out-of-
Tolerance
April 12, 2002
Apparent Cause
Evaluation 008290
Perform Apparent Cause Evaluation Into
Why 1PC-478 A/B Has Been Found 1PC-4
Found Out-of-Tolerance Repeatedly
April 18, 2002
CE 000057
Conduct Rework Analysis Into the Repeated
Instances of 1PC-478 A/B is Found Out-of-
Tolerance During the Performance of
Quarterly SP 1003
April 18, 2002
Maintenance Rule
Evaluation 000005
Evaluate 1PC-478 A/B Out-of-Tolerance
May 31, 2002
Repeated Calibration Trend Based on
SP 1003
May 6, 2002
AR CAPs Were Found Not Flagged as
Potential Maintenance Rule Functional
Failure or Assigned a Maintenance Rule
Evaluation During Screening
May 31, 2002
Decreasing Bay Levels Due to Lost Intake
Screens
June 19, 2002
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 110
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
5AWI 1.9.0
Look Ahead Process
Revision 0
5AWI 15.1.7
Voluntary Limiting Conditions for Operation
(LCO) Process
Revision 1
D1 Water Supply Solenoid Valve
May 14, 2002
Cooling Water System
Revision 131
USAR Section 10.4
Plant Cooling System
Revision 22
12 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump
Inoperable Due to Governor Hunting
June 12, 2002
12 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump
Speed Hunting
April 19, 2002
Daily Risk Assessments
April, 12, 2002,
June 4, 12, and
26, 2002
Probalistic Risk
Assessment (PRA)
Project File V.SPA.02.008
Risk Significance of Intake Traveling
Screens/Bypass Gates Failure Event
June 24, 2002
H 24.1
Assessment and Management of Risk
Associated with Maintenance Activities
Revision 3
Units 1 and 2 in PRA Orange Condition
April 12, 2002
11 Condensate Pump Removed from
Service for Maintenance Prior to Risk
Assessment
April 16, 2002
Failure to Log Entry into PRA Orange
Condition
April 18, 2002
Apparent Error in Prairie Island IPEEE
April 24, 2002
Stopped Work Control Center from Tagging
Out 21 Cooling Water Strainer with D2 Out-
of-Service During B Week
June 25, 2002
LCO Time Extended Because Breaker
Inspection Not Performed in a Timely
Manner
June 26, 2002
1R15
Operability Evaluations
General Condition Report
(GEN) 2002 01283
Inaccurate Assumptions Used in the
Analysis for the Non-Return Check Valves in
the Main Steam Line Break Event
February 11, 2002
P. Huffman Update to
GEN 2002 01283
Inaccurate Assumptions Used in the
Analysis for the Non-Return Check Valves in
the Main Steam Line Break Event
February 22, 2002
Detailed Basis For
Operability 2002-02-08
Operability Determination Addendum
March 13, 2002
Nuclear Analysis
Department File
OC.PX.2002.021
H. Nelson Memo to P. Huffman
March 4, 2002
Reportability
Determination for GEN
2002 01283
Inaccurate Assumptions Used in the
Analysis for the Non-return Check Valves in
the Main Steam Line Break Event
H. Nelson Memo to S.
Thomas, Nuclear Analysis
Department
OC.PX.2002.024
Main Steam Line Break Significance
Determination Analysis
March 14, 2002
50.59 Evaluation Analysis
1007
Steam Generator Level and Containment
Temperature Restrictions in Support of Main
Steam Line Break Analysis
Revsion 0
USAR Section 14.5.5
Rupture of a Steam Pipe
Revision 22
Assess Classification of the Bearing
Lubricating Water Supply Piping and Flow
Switches
April 10, 2002
Incomplete Engineering Judgement
April 15, 2002
USAR Section 10.4
Plant Cooling Water System
Revision 23
Evaluation of Vertical Cooling Water Pump
Flow Switches
April 15, 2002
Okonite/Scotch EQ Splices Installed in a
Non-Tested Configuration
April 17, 2002
EQ Okonite Tape Splice Configuration
Turnover Evaluation
Clarification on EQ Okonite Tape Splice
Configuration Turnover Evaluation, Section
Number of Wraps Around Splice
April 23, 2002
A Pipe Hanger Near MV-32034 in Old
Screenhouse is Contacting Conduit
June 6, 2002
(OPR) 000315
Pipe Hanger Rubbing Against Conduit for
the 121 Motor Driven Cooling Water Pump
June 10, 2002
Scaffold 1109 Touching Component Cooling
Pump 21
June 19, 2002
Scaffolds Erected Too Close to Equipment
June 23, 2002
(Supplement)
Supplemental Engineering Information
June 27, 2002
11 SI Pump Motor is Seeking Magnetic
Center
June 13, 2002
OPR 000316
Evaluate the Operability of 11 SI Pump
June 13, 2002
Vendor Manual
XH-1-1393
Bingham Willamette SI Pump
Perform Test Procedure 1087A
June 13, 2002
Incorrect O-Ring Material Was Used for EQ
MOVs [Motor-Operated Valves] in
Containment
June 19, 2002
OPR 000319
Operability Determination for the Use of
Incorrect O-Ring Material on Power
Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valves
June 19, 2002
Pressurizer PORVs
Revision 135
Reactor Coolant System Bases
Revision 135
USAR, Section 4.4
Reactor Pressure Relief System
Revision 23
1R16
D6 Fuel Oil Level
AR CAP023556
D6 Fuel Oil Storage Tank ERCS Level
Indication
May 20, 2002
ERCS PT 2U8003A is Erratic and Unreliable
Diesel Generators
Revision 147
SP 2001
Unit 2 Daily Control Room Log
Revision 56
2C38
D5/D6 Fuel Oil System, Attachment A
Revision 15
Temporary Instruction
02-13
24 D6 Fuel Oil Storage Tank ERCS Point
Unit 2 Pressurizer Spray Valve A in Manual
Pressure/Temperature Limits
Revision 135
USAR, Section 4.4
Reactor Pressure Relief System
Revision 23
DBD SYS-04
Design Bases Document for the Reactor
Coolant System
Revision 2
Unit 2 Loop A Pressurizer Spray Valve
CV-31228 is Controlling Erratically
April 27, 2002
CE 000135
Evaluate Control Response of the Unit 2
Loop A Pressurizer Spray Valve
April 29, 2002
1R17
Permanent Plant Modifications
USAR, Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator System
Revision 23
Design Change Notice
02D101
Isolate D1/D2 Coolant System Cross-Flow
Revision 0
Install Cross Flow Isolation Valve, Air Vent,
Coolant Sample Valve, and Re-Route
Expansion Tank Overflow Pipe at D1 Diesel
Generator
May 13, 2002
Install Cross Flow Isolation Valve, Air Vent,
Coolant Sample Valve, and Re-Route
Expansion Tank Overflow Pipe at D2 Diesel
Generator
May 21, 2002
Coltec Industries Letter
Standby Diesel Generator Crossflow
July 8, 1992
Coltec Industries
10 CFR 21 Notification
Part 21 Notification for Fairbanks Morse
Engine Division Model 38TD8-1/8 Cooling
System Investigation - Arkansas Nuclear
One Unit 2
September 13,
1991
ENG-ME-409
Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Heat
Exchanger Performance with Reduced
Cooling Water Flow
April 9, 2002
ENG-ME-479
Tube Plugging Criteria for Unit 1 Diesel
Generator Heat Exchanger
September 27,
2001
ENG-ME-480
Operability Determination for Unit 1 Diesel
Generator Heat Exchangers with Tubes
Plugged and 85F Cooling Water
September 28,
2001
Evaluation Number
PI-0348
Application of the Armstrong Model AV-11
Vent in the D1/D2 Diesel Generator Jacket
Coolant Lines
Revision 0
Drawing NF-39255-1
Diesel Generator D1 & D2 Units 1 and 2
Flow diagram
Revision Z
Permanent Plant Modifications Biennial Inspection Documents
Procedures
5AWI 3.14.1
Setpoint Control
Revision 12
5AWI 3.14.2
Electrical Process and Protection Setpoint
Control
Revision 8
5AWI 6.1.0
Design Change General
Revision 7
5AWI 6.1.1
Design Inputs
Revision 3
5AWI 6.1.2
Design Documents, Review, and Verification Revision 4
5AWI 6.1.3
Design Change Package, Logs and
Records
Revision 2
5AWI 6.1.5
Design Change Implementation Plans
Revision 3
5AWI 6.1.6
Design Change Review and Approval
Revision 5
5AWI 6.1.7
Design Change Work Orders
Revision 5
5AWI 6.1.8
Engineering Change Requests
Revision 2
5AWI 6.1.9
Design Change Turnover for Operation
Revision 3
5AWI 6.1.10
Design Change Close-out
Revision 2
5AWI 6.2.0
Equipment Engineering Change Evaluation
Revision 4
5AWI 6.4.0
Existing Component Functional
Performance and Design Requirements
Identification
Revision 1
5AWI 6.4.0
Existing Component Functional
Performance and Design Requirements
Identification
Revision 1
5AWI 8.2.3
Dedication of Commercial Grade Items
Revision 3
C1.1.20.7-1
D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status
Revision 19
C70300
Remote Alarm Response Procedure (Raw
Water Supply Not Available)
Revision 1
H9
Fuse Control Program
Revision 6
SP 1210
Monthly Safeguards Hold Verification
Revision 18
Commercial Grade Evaluations
PI-0064
Cooling Water Strainer Parts
Revision 4
PI-0190
VP 591 Flowrite Double Seated Valves and
Valve Parts
Revision 4
PI-0343
Westinghouse Test Relay Model 1161540
Revision 1
PI-0348
Armstrong Model AV-11 Vent
Revision 0
Design Changes
99DC02
Replace 12 & 22 Batteries
Revision 0
99DC03
Relocation of 125 Volts Direct Current EQ
Circuits
Revision 1
99SF02
Replace Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger
Revision 0
99SI02
Repower Residual Heat Removal Sump B
Suction Valves
Revision 0
00FP01
PORV and PORV Block Valve Cable
Reroute
Revision 0
00RV01
Bottom Mount Reduced Inventory
Thermocouples
Revision 0
01EA01
Bus 12 Control & Instrument Cable
Restoration
Revision 0
01VC01
RCP Seal Water Injection Check Valve
Replacement/Relocation
Revision 0
02D101
Isolate D1/D2 Coolant System Crossflow
Revision 0
Equipment Engineering Change Evaluations
1020
AFW Pump Suction and Discharge
Pressure Switches
January 31, 2002
1023
RCP Seal Water Injection Check Valves
February 4, 2002
Drawings
NE-40008, Sh. 39
11 Containment Sump B Isolation Valve B-1
MV 32077
Revision BU
Setpoint Changes
New Gains per SP 2722 Loop Delta T
Revision 5
2TR-2002/3
Increase to 190 Degrees. After
Replacement Return Setpoint to Original
185 Degrees
Revision 2
Substitution Part/Component Equivalent
ME-0336
Charging Pump Drive Shaft Keyway
Dimensions
December 14,
2001
ME-0690
Replace Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump
Discharge Check Valves
September 27,
2001
PN-0617
Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump Heat
Exchanger Cooling Outlet Valves
April 6, 2001
4.4.4
Reactor Pressure Relief System Design
Basis
Revision 23
10.2.2
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System
Revision 23
Miscellaneous
Temporary Change
Notice (TCN) 2002-1056
Unit 1 Startup Procedure
April 9, 2002
TCN 2001-1405
Air Removal System
April 4, 2001
Engineering Design Standard for Motor
Control Center Control Circuit Fuse
Selection Criteria, Section 3.3.1.6
Revision 1
1R19
Post-Maintenance Testing
Replace 2SSH-5566, D5 Engine 1
Overspeed Detector High
SP 2295
D5 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start
Revision 23
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 110
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
D1 Water Supply Solenoid Valve
May 14, 2002
Cooling Water System
Revision 131
USAR Section 10.4
Plant Cooling System
Revision 22
12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Inoperable
Due to Governor Hunting
June 12, 2002
SP 1106A
12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Monthly Test Revision 59
Component Cooling Water System
Revision 91
USAR Section 10.4.2
Component Cooling System
Revision 22
P3119-1-22 22 Component Cooling Pump
June 19, 2002
Preventive Maintenance
Procedure PM 3119-1-22
22 CC Pump Annual Inspection
Revision 13
1R22
Surveillance Testing
SP 1102
11 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test
Revision 75
SP 2102
22 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test
Revision 68
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Revision 116
USAR Section 11.9.2.2
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Revision 23
Steam Leak on Control Valve 31060
February 28, 2002
SP 1335
D2 Diesel Generator 18-Month 24-Hour
Load Test
Revision 7
SP 2307
D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start
Test
Revision 17
Periodic Testing of Emergency Power
Systems
Revision 113
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
SP 2094
Bus 25 Load Sequencer Test
Revision 16
TS 4.1-1c, Item 11
Auto Load Sequencers
Revision 161
USAR Section 8.3.2.2
Load Sequencing
Revision 21
Both PORVs Not Declared Inoperable
During Performance of SP 1182A (Over-
Pressure Protection System Test)
April 19,2002
SP 1182A
Overpressure Protection System Refueling
Outage Functional Test
Revision 13W
Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves
Revision 135
1R23
5AWI 6.5.0
Revision 11
No AR Written for Portable Fan Set Up at
RMU 141
June 19, 2002
Package 02T121
Installation of a Ground Strap on 2N31
Preamplifier
50.59 Screening 1408
Temporary Modification 02T121
Revision 0
Installation of Temporary Modification
02T121
Remove Temporary Modification 02T121
Instrumentation
Revision 111
USAR, Section 7.3
Nuclear Instruments
Revision 23
1EP6
Drill Evaluation
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Emergency Plan Rehearsal Drill Package
April 3, 2002
Revision 0
Technical Support Center Ventilation Door is
Not Always Closed After Ventilation is Set
Up
Accountability Report Included Names of
Individuals Who Are No Longer Employed
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline
Revision 2
LER 1-01-04
Water Intrusion into a Control Rod Electrical
Cabinet Results in Dropped Rods Causing a
Negative Flux Reactor Trip
Revision 0
LER 1-01-05
Fault and Fire in Non-Safeguards Circuit
Breaker Results in Reactor Trip and AFW
System Actuation
Revision 0
LER 2-01-04
Manual Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to
High Differential Condenser Backpressure
Revision 0
LER 2-01-05
Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2 Initiated in
Response to a High Differential Pressure
Between the Turbine Steam Condensers
Caused by an Inadvertent Venting of One
Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak
Revision 0
Monthly Operating
Reports
July 2001 Through March 2002
NRC Inspection Reports
01-15, 01-16, 01-17, 01-18, and 01-19
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
USAR Section 2.4.3.5
Floods
Revision 21
USAR Appendix F
Probable Maximum Flood Study
Revision 4
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001
Appendix C, Section
C.2.3.1
External Flooding
Revision 0
AB 4
Flood
Revision 20
SP1293
Inspection of Flood Control Measures
Revision 9
Design Change 01BM02
Flood Panel and Door Design Changes
Revision 1
50.59 Screening 1184
Design Change 01BM02, Revision 1
Revision 1
LER 1-01-03
Plant in an Unanalyzed Condition Due to
Flood Panel Deficiencies
September 10,
2001
LER 1-01-03,
Supplement 1
Plant in an Unanalyzed Condition Due to
Flood Panel Deficiencies
April 12, 2002
Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-4
April 1, 2002
Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-1
April 11, 2002
AR OTH 023859
AR OTH 000188 Related to D6 Root Cause
Closed with Incomplete Action
June 14, 2002
AR OTH 001239
Followup on Status of Technical
Communication
May 24, 2002
AR OTH 000188
Revise Communication Process
May 26, 2002
CR 20014617
Prairie Island Not Receiving Technical
Service Notes
May 27, 2001
CR 20014518
Perform Independent Review of SACM
Related External Operating Experience
(XOE) Assessments
May 23, 2001
CR 20015167
Establish Standards for Independence of
Technical Advice from Outside Vendors
June 21, 2001
CR 20013446
Develop/Implement Process on Use of
Operating Experience
May 14, 2001
CR 20014150
Reassess XOE
May 9, 2001
CR 20014252
Submit LER 2-01-03 for Unit 2 Shutdown
May 14, 2001
CR 20014601
Revise 18-Month PMs for Six-Year AMOT
Valves
May 25, 2001
CR 20014611
Evaluate Organization & Programmatic
Issues
May 26, 2001
CR 20014612
Review Use of Shell Rotella T in D5 and D6
May 26, 2001
CR 20014696
Develop, Implement, and Reinforce
Standardized Tools for Problem Solving
May 30, 2001
CR 20015166
Enforce Management Expectations
Involving Independence of Technical
Reviews for XOEs
June 21, 2001
CR 20015168
Add a Process to XOE Responses to
Monitor Critical Characteristics
June 21, 2001
CR 20017857
Have a Living, Component Specific
Database of Operating Experience
September 23,
2001
CR 200185151
Perform a Self-Assessment of the
Effectiveness of the Operating Experience
Program
October 17, 2001
Permanent Plant Modifications Biennial Inspection Documents
CR 20016428
Screening 1025 Did Not Identify the
Function or Performance Requirement for
the Component Being Changed
August 1, 2001
CR 20016467
Screening 1035 Does Not Adequately
Identify Design Function
August 3, 2001
CR 20016619
Incomplete 50.59 Screening
August 10, 2001
CR 20016829
Screened Vent Opening Cut in Ends of
Buses 11 and in 1990 Without Modification,
Now Design Change Process
August 17, 2001
CR 20017759
PINGP 1300 - TCN Marked That Change
Was Not Exempt from 50.59 Screening but
No Screening Was Documented (20011405)
September 20,
2001
CR 20018422
Screening 1195 and 1194 Did Not
Sufficiently Address Why Setpoint Increase
Is Not Adverse
October 11, 2001
CR 200185705
50.59 Screening 1196 Did Not Identify in
Part 2 That the Activity Involved Could
Initiate a Transient
November 1, 2001
CR 200185788
50.59 Screening 1208 & 1209 Not in
Compliance with 5AWI 3.3.5
November 5,
2001
CR 200186587
The Second Factory Acceptance Test for 22
Replacement Battery
November 29,
2001
CR 200187181
Self-Assessment of 50.59 Process
December 18,
2001
CR 200200116
Drawing Changes Contain Errors - Mod
94L473
February 5, 2002
CR 200200204
Turnover on Modification Was Done Without
Work Being Completed. WO Status Was
85 Work Complete and Then Was Lost.
Work Not Done.
February 27, 2002
CR 200200514
Inadequate Work Order Reviews and/or
Walkdowns
January 21, 2002
CR 200200625
Modification 99SF04 Not Closed Within
1 Year as Required by 5AWI6.1.0
January 22, 2002
CR 200200988
Drawing X-H-106-1936 Was Not Updated to
Reflect Changes Associated with
Modification 79L537
February 1, 2002
CR 200201209
22 Battery Rack Had One HILTI Bolt -
Required Minimum Embedment Not Met
February 5, 2002
CR 200201241
Foreign Material Found in One Battery Cell
February 7, 2002
CR 200201335
Piece of Battery Plug Floating Inside 22
Battery Cell
February 9, 2002
CR 200202163
TCN to SP 2103 and SP 2101 Implemented
Without 50.59 Screening.
March 5, 2002
Drawing NF 92190 Not Upgraded During
Design Change 96C006
March 22, 2002
Potential Negative Trend in Modification
Turnovers and Reviews
April 22, 2002
Less Than Adequate Design Change
Planning Activities
May 6, 2002
Pipe Support Installed at Wrong Elevation
May 15, 2001
CE 000243
Standard Quality Part Used Where Safety
Related Parts are Required
May 17, 2001
4OA3 Event Followup
LER 1-01-03
Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood
Panel Deficiencies
September 10,
2001
LER 1-01-03,
Supplement 1
Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood
Panel Deficiencies
April 12, 2002
Design Change 01BM02
Flood Panel and Door Design Changes
Revision 1
Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-4
April 1, 2002
Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-1
April 11, 2002
3PP Plant Protection
Administrative Work
Instruction 5AWI 5.1.0
Site Security
Revision 7
Administrative Work
Instruction 5AWI 3.18.0
Fitness-For-Duty Program
Revision 5
Corporate Control
Directive N1ACD 2.12
Fitness-For-Duty Program
Revision 3
Fitness-For-Duty Program Performance
Data
June 30 and
December 31,
2001
Security Event Logs
September 2001
through May
2002
Nuclear Oversight
Observation Report
(NOOR) 2001-06-1116
Fitness-For-Duty
August 6 and
September 6,
2001
NOOR 2001-06-130
Corrective Actions
September 17-
19, 2001
NOOR 2001-06-131
Self-Assessments
September 21,
2001
Security Administrative
Procedure SAP 2.8
Quarterly Security Report
Revision 2
Security Instruction
Procedure (SIP) 1.1
Badge Control
Revision 0
SIP 1.5
Escort Responsibilities
Revision 0
SIP 4.1
Testing and Inspection of Systems and
Equipment
revision 2
SIP 4.2
Calibration and Surveillance Procedure
Revision 0
SIP 5.1
Reporting of Security Events
Revision 3
SP 1620
Quarterly Metal Detector Calibration
Revision 10
SP 1621
Explosive Vapor Detector Annual Test
Revision 13
SP 1653
Quarterly X-Ray Machine Test
Revision 6
Summary of Access Equipment
WO/PM/SPS
July 17.2001
through
June 14, 2002
Security Activity Reports
October 2001
through March
2002
4OA1 Performance
Indicator Verification
FFD Personnel Reliability, Personnel
Screening, and Security Equipment
Performance Indicator Data
Fourth Quarter
2001 through
First Quarter
2002
SAP 2.8
Quarterly Security Report
Revision 2
Security Event Logs
October 2001
through March
2002