IR 05000282/2002004

IR 05000282-02-004; IR 05000306-02-004, on 4/1/02-5/16/02, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Physical Protection

ML022070457
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	07/25/2002
From:	Lanksbury R NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB5
To:	Nazar M Nuclear Management Co
References
IR-02-004
Download: ML022070457 (42)

Text

uly 25, 2002

SUBJECT:

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/02-04; 50-306/02-04

Dear Mr. Nazar:

On June 30, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 3, 2002, with you and members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC reviewed two security related issues that were evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with one of those findings which pertains to protection of Safeguards Information (SGI). The violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating plant.

The NRC has increased security requirements at Prairie Island in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and will issue temporary instructions in the near future to verify by inspection the licensee's compliance with the Order and current security regulations. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and any response you provide, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Project Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 50-282/02-04; 50-306/02-04

REGION III==

Docket Nos: 50-282, 50-306 License Nos: DPR-42, DPR-60 Report No: 50-282/02-04; 50-306/02-04 Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Location: 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2002 Inspectors: J. Adams, Senior Resident Inspector S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector D. Karjala, Resident Inspector M. Mitchell, Radiation Specialist, DRS A. Dunlop, Reactor Engineer, DRS M. Farber, Reactor Engineer, DRS B. Winter, Reactor Engineer, DRS G. Pirtle, Physical Security Inspector, DRS Approved by: Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Project Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000282-02-04; IR 05000306-02-04, on 4/1/2002-5/16/2002; Nuclear Management Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Physical Protection.

This report covers a 13-week routine resident inspection. The inspection was conducted by resident and regional inspectors. Two Green security-related findings were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the Significance Determination Process (SDP) does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Findings Cornerstone: Physical Protection Two security-related findings of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by the licensee, one of which was a Non-Cited Violation, and were reviewed by the inspector. Corrective actions taken by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These findings and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Sections 4OA3.2 and 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period. Unit 2 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

Hot Weather, Tornado, and Low Water Preparations a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a detailed review of the summer plant operation, high wind, and tornado hazard procedures; Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR); design bases documents (DBDs) for the screenhouse and emergency diesel generators (EDGs);

applicable Technical Specifications (TSs); and the Prairie Island Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE). The inspectors also reviewed a permanent plant modification of EDGs D1 and D2 that restored their operability with the design bases cooling water inlet temperature of 95 EF (see Section 1R17). A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

The inspectors conducted inspections of the following risk significant mitigating systems:

• cooling water (common to both units);

• offsite alternating current (AC) power;

• Unit 1 and 2 AC Transformers;

• Unit 1 EDG D1 and D2; and

• Unit 2 EDG D5 and D6.

The inspectors reviewed the selected systems to verify that the material conditions and system configuration supported the systems availability and operability under adverse weather conditions, and to verify that additional cooling equipment specified in the summer plant operation procedure was available and operating as specified in the procedure. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the areas specified in the tornado hazards surveillance procedure (SP) to verify that potential missile hazards to transformers and the switchyard had been removed or properly secured.

The inspectors reviewed a number of weather-related action requests (Ars) that entered problems that, if left uncorrected, could affect the performance of mitigating systems or result in an initiating event. The review was conducted to verify that the licensee entered problems into the corrective action program, identified appropriate corrective actions, and implemented those corrective actions.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments (71111.02)

Review of Evaluations and Screenings for Changes, Tests, or Experiments a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed nine 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and 21 screenings completed by the licensees engineering staff during the last 2 years and performed under the 10 CFR 50.59 process. These documents were reviewed to ensure consistency with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The inspectors used Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, November 2000. The inspectors also consulted Inspection Manual, Part 9900, "10 CFR GUIDANCE: 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments." Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed at the end of the report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a partial equipment alignment walkdown of the following risk significant mitigating systems:

• On April 26, 2002, inspectors conducted an equipment alignment verification of the D5 EDG while the D6 EDG was unavailable for surveillance testing.

• On June 19, 2002, inspectors conducted an equipment alignment verification of the 21 component cooling water pump while the 22 component cooling water pump was unavailable for preventative maintenance.

• On June 24, 2002, inspectors conducted an equipment alignment verification of the D1 EDG while the D2 EDG was unavailable for surveillance testing.

The inspectors utilized the valve and electrical breaker status checklists to verify that system components and support systems were properly configured to support the operability of the available train. The inspectors performed a physical inspection of the available train, and reviewed outstanding work orders (WOs) and ARs to verify that the available train would be capable to perform its design function as described in USAR

and TSs. The inspectors also reviewed housekeeping in the area to verify that there were no housekeeping issues that could affect the available trains function.

The inspectors reviewed ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on the availability and accessibility of fire protection equipment, the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the IPEEE; their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient; or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. The inspectors reviewed the documents listed at the end of this report and toured fire areas to verify that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition.

The inspectors assessed the following areas:

• Fire Area 20, Bus 15 Switchgear Room;

• Fire Area 22, Bus 111 Switchgear Room;

• Fire Area 25, EDG D1 Room;

• Fire Area 26, EDG D2 Room;

• Fire Area 31, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump 11 and 21 Room;

• Fire Area 32, AFW Pump 12 and 22 Room;

• Fire Area 33, Battery 11 Room;

• Fire Area 34, Battery 12 Room;

• Fire Area 80, Bus 121 Switchgear Room; and

• Fire Area 81, Bus 16 Switchgear Room.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

.1 External Flood Protection Inspection a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and IPEEE associated with external flooding; the abnormal procedure for flooding; the most recently completed SP for the inspection of plant flooding barriers; the design bases document addressing internal and external hazards; and the design change package for flood panel and door design changes. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the implemented corrective actions taken to correct the loss of safety function of plant flood barriers (see Section 4OA2) and Licensee Event Report (LER) 01-03-01 documenting the loss of safety function (see Section 4OA3).

The inspectors performed a physical inspection of all flood protection barriers with a specific focus on the deficiencies noted in the most recent performance of the SP for the inspection of plant flood barriers. The inspectors assessed whether the actions specified in the abnormal procedure for flooding could be performed in a timely manner if required, and if the necessary hardware and consumable materials were available and still within their shelf life. The inspectors also discussed the recent modifications of flood barriers with the project engineer.

The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during this inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action program, that problems associated with plant equipment relied upon to prevent or minimize flooding were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Internal Flood Protection Inspection a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and Individual Plant Examination (IPE) associated with internal flooding in the area of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pumps and instrument air compressors, the design bases document addressing internal and external hazards, and the design bases document for the D5/D6 EDG building. The inspectors conducted a physical walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pump rooms and the D5/D6 building to verify that piping systems in these areas were being maintained, that drain paths from these areas had been maintained, and that there were no accumulations of loose materials that could plug drain paths. The inspectors reviewed the response times assumed in the flood analysis for operator actions to verify that operators could reasonably be expected to complete the required actions in the assumed time.

The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that problems associated with plant equipment relied upon to prevent or minimize flooding were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an operating staff crew during an as found requalification examination on the simulator. The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of:

• clarity and formality of communications;

• ability to take timely, appropriate, and safe actions;

• prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms;

• procedure use;

• control board manipulations;

• oversight and direction from supervisors; and

• group dynamics.

The inspectors compared crew performance in the above areas to licensee management expectations and guidelines as presented in the operations section work instructions (SWIs) listed at the end of this report and to the critical tasks listed in the exercise guide at the end of this report. The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control room board configurations. The inspectors observed licensee evaluators to verify that they noted weaknesses observed by the inspectors and discussed them in the critique at the end of the session.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the Unit 1 reactor protection system to ensure that the maintenance rule was properly implemented. This evaluation included the following aspects:

• whether the reactor protection system was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;

• whether the reactor protection system performance problems constituted maintenance rule functional failures;

• whether the reactor protection system had been assigned the proper safety significance classification;

• whether the licensee properly classified the reactor protection system as (a)(1) or (a)(2) based on the systems performance; and

• whether the performance criteria for the reactor protection system were appropriate for its (a)(2) classification.

The above aspects were evaluated by the inspectors during the review of the maintenance rule scoping and report documents. The inspectors also reviewed significant WOs and ARs to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected and that unavailable time had been properly calculated. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities and during activities where more than one risk significant system or train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant mitigating equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration, where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the licensees daily configuration risk assessment records, observed shift turnover meetings, observed daily plant status meetings, and reviewed risk assessment documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the equipment configurations were properly listed, that protected equipment was identified and controlled, and that significant aspects of plant risk were communicated to the necessary personnel. The inspectors discussed daily and emergent risk assessments with operators and risk assessment engineers.

The inspectors reviewed the following emergent and planned maintenance activities associated with maintenance rule risk significant systems:

• On April 12, 2002, the D5 EDG was out-of-service for planned maintenance when an emergent failure of the 12 diesel driven cooling water pump lubricating water supply occurred;

• On June 4, 2002, the D1 EDG was out-of-service for replacement of the water supply solenoid valve and the 12 boric acid transfer pump was inoperable during a period of possible severe weather;

• On June 12, 2002, the 12 diesel driven cooling water pump was declared inoperable because of erratic governor operation during a routine surveillance test; and

• On June 26, 2002, the 12 component cooling water pump and the 11 boric acid storage tank were out-of-service for planned maintenance, two of the eight intake traveling screens were out-of-service for corrective maintenance, one intake traveling screen was degraded, and both bypass intake traveling screen bypass gates were degraded.

The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that problems associated with plant risk assessment were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated plant conditions, selected condition reports (CRs), and corrective action program (CAP) documents for risk significant components and systems in which operability issues were questioned. These conditions were evaluated to determine whether the continued operability of the components and systems were justified. The inspectors compared the component or systems function and design criteria in the applicable sections of the TSs and USAR to the licensees evaluations to verify that the components and systems were operable. The inspectors reviewed equipment to verify that compensatory measures necessary to maintain operability were in place, functioned as intended, and were properly controlled. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

The inspectors evaluated the following conditions:

• Inaccurate assumptions used in the analysis for the non-return check valves in the main steam line break event (General Condition Report 2002 01283);

• Improper classification of safety-related cooling water pump lubrication water supply components as nonsafety-related (AR CAP 023064);

• Okonite/Scotch Equipment Qualification (EQ) splices installed in a non-tested configuration (AR CAP 023138);

• EQ Okonite Tape Splice Configuration Turnover Evaluation;

• Scaffold 1109R was found in contact with 21 component cooling water pump discharge header (AR CAP 023905);

• Potential excessive end play on the 11 safety injection pump (AR CAP 023818);

and

• Incorrect o-ring material install on the Units 1 and 2 pressurizer power operated relief valve block valves (AR CAP 023907).

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWA) (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed newly identified OWAs to verify that the functional capability of the system, human reliability in responding to an initiating event, or the ability of operators to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures was not significantly affected.

The inspectors reviewed the following OWAs:

• Diesel generator D6 fuel oil storage tank level indication from the emergency response computer system; and

• Unit 2 loop A pressurizer spray valve controller in manual.

The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and TSs and discussed the OWAs with control room operators. The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that problems associated with D6 fuel oil storage tank level indication and the loop A pressurizer spray valve controller were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue was identified and scheduled for implementation. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

.1 Permanent Plant Modification Installed On-Line a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed design change 02D101 which added several valves to the D1 and D2 coolant systems to eliminate coolant cross-flow. The licensee determined that this modification was necessary to restore the EDGs to a configuration that could provide the rated load with a cooling water flow of 400 gallons per minute at 95EF. The inspectors reviewed the modification to verify that it did not adversely affect the availability, reliability, or the functional capability of the D1/D2 EDGs. The inspectors also reviewed three supporting engineering calculations, a 10 CFR Part 21 notification from the diesel vendor, WOs for the installation of the modification, the post-modification testing, and commercial grade dedication of components. The inspectors performed a physical walkdown of the D1 and D2 EDGs and observed the operation of both engines following the installation of the modifications. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Biennial Review of Recent Permanent Plant Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed 20 permanent plant modifications that were performed by the licensees engineering staff during the last 2 years. These were divided among the various programs that the licensee used to make changes to the plant. Nine of the modifications were done under the design change process. In addition, the inspectors evaluated 2 setpoint changes, 2 equivalent engineering change evaluations, 3 substitution part/component equivalent evaluations, and 4 commercial grade evaluations. The modifications were chosen based upon the effect on systems that had high probabilistic risk analysis significance or high maintenance rule safety significance.

The modifications were reviewed to verify that the completed design changes were in accordance with specified design requirements and the licensing bases, and to confirm that the changes did not affect the modified system or other systems safety function.

As applicable to the status of the modification, post-modification testing was reviewed to verify that the system, and associated support systems, functioned properly and that the modification accomplished its intended function. The inspectors evaluated the modifications against the licensees design basis documents and the USAR. The inspectors also used applicable industry standards, such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code, to evaluate acceptability of the modifications.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating, barrier integrity, and support systems to ensure that the post-maintenance testing was performed adequately, demonstrated that the maintenance was successful, and that operability was restored after the testing. The inspectors reviewed the appropriate sections of the TSs, the USAR, and maintenance documents to determine the systems safety functions and the scope of the maintenance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

The inspectors observed and evaluated the post-maintenance activities for the following:

• D5 Overspeed Trip Repair and Temporary Modification Removal on April 11, 2002;

• D1 EDG Water Supply Solenoid Valve Replacement on June 4, 2002;

• 12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Governor Adjustment on June 13, 2002; and

• 22 Component Cooling (CC) Pump Preventive Maintenance (PM) on June 19, 2002.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed selected surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data to verify that the equipment performance met SP acceptance criteria. The inspectors observed the tested equipment to verify that it was capable of performing its intended safety functions as described in TSs and the USAR. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that the testing met the required TS frequency; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the applicable procedures; that operators met prerequisites and established the proper plant conditions; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded. In addition, the inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that the licensee was identifying surveillance test problems at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

The following tests were observed and/or evaluated:

• SP 1102, 11 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test on April 17, 2002;

• SP 2307, D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Test on April 25, 2002;

• SP 1335, D2 Diesel Generator 18-Month 24-Hour Load Test on April 28, 2002; and

• SP 2102, 22 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test on May 20, 2002.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed temporary modification 02T121. This temporary modification installed a ground strap on the Unit 2 source range monitor 2N31 to reduce the noise-induced counts. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification description and the 10 CFR 50.59 screening to ensure they were completed in accordance with the licensee administrative work instruction (AWI) guidance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of the USAR and TSs to verify that the installation did not affect the specified design function or operability of the system. The inspectors

discussed installation and removal WOs, plans for permanent corrective action, and temporary modification removal with engineering personnel. The inspectors also reviewed documents to verify that minor deficiencies identified during the course of inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action program. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the licensee perform an emergency preparedness drill on April 3, 2002. The inspectors observed activities in the control room simulator, technical support center, and emergency operations facility. The inspectors also attended the post-drill facility critiques in the technical support center and emergency operations facility immediately following the drill and the overall drill critique on April 4. The focus of the inspectors activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the drill performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same weaknesses and deficiencies and entered them into the corrective action program. The inspectors placed emphasis on observations regarding event classification, notifications, protective action recommendations, and site evacuation and accountability activities. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package listed at the end of this report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety 2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

.1 Plant Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the radiological conditions of radiation areas and high radiation areas (HRAs) in the auxiliary and radwaste buildings. The inspector performed walkdowns and reviewed licensee controls to determine if the controls (i.e., surveys, postings, and barricades) were adequate to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensees TSs.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety 2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02)

.1 Walkdown of Radioactive Waste Systems a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the liquid and solid radioactive waste system description in the USAR and the most recent information regarding the types and amounts of radioactive waste generated and disposed. The inspector performed walkdowns of the liquid and solid radwaste processing systems to verify that the systems agreed with the descriptions in the USAR and the Process Control Program, and to assess the material condition and operability of the systems. The inspector reviewed the current processes for transferring waste resins into transportation containers to determine if appropriate waste stream mixing and/or sampling procedures were utilized. The inspector also reviewed the methodologies for waste concentration averaging to determine if representative samples of the waste product were provided for the purposes of waste classification in accordance with 10 CFR 61.55. During this inspection, the licensee was not conducting waste processing.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Waste Characterization and Classification a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensees radiochemical sample analysis results for each of the licensees waste streams, including dry active waste, resins, and filters.

The inspector also reviewed the licensees use of scaling factors to quantify difficult-to-measure radionuclides (e.g., pure alpha or beta emitting radionuclides). The reviews were conducted to verify that the licensees program assured compliance with 10 CFR 61.55 and 10 CFR 61.56, as required by Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 20. The inspector also reviewed the licensees waste characterization and classification program to ensure that the waste stream composition data accounted for changing operational parameters and thus remained valid between the annual sample analysis updates.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Transportation Records a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed five exempt and non-exempt package shipment manifests completed in 2000 and 2001 to verify compliance with NRC and Department of Transportation requirements (i.e., 10 CFR Parts 20 and 71 and 49 CFR Parts 172 and 173). The licensee did not have any non-exempt package preparation or shipping underway during the inspection.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed a Quality Assurance audit of the Radioactive Waste and Transportation Program, along with self-assessments of the Radioactive Waste and Transportation Programs to evaluate the effectiveness of the self-assessment process to identify, characterize, and prioritize problems. The inspector also reviewed corrective action documentation to verify that previous radioactive waste and radioactive materials transportation related issues were adequately addressed. The inspector also selectively reviewed year 2001 CRs that addressed radioactive waste and radioactive materials transportation program deficiencies, to verify that the licensee had effectively implemented the corrective action program.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS Cornerstone: Physical Protection 3PP1 Access Authorization (AA) Program (Behavior Observation Only) (71130.01)

a. Inspection Scope The inspector interviewed five supervisors and five non-supervisors (both licensee and contractor employees) to determine their knowledge level and practice for implementing the licensees program responsibilities. Selected procedures pertaining to the Behavior Observation Program and associated training activities were reviewed. Also licensee Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) semi-annual test results were reviewed. In addition, the inspector reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments and security logged events.

The inspector also interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensees corrective action program.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control (Identification, Authorization and Search of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles) (71130.02)

a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensees protected area access control equipment testing and maintenance procedures. The inspector observed licensee testing of all access control equipment to determine if testing and maintenance practices were performance based. On two occasions, during peak ingress periods, the inspector observed in-processing search of personnel, packages, and vehicles to determine if search practices were conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and that staffing was sufficient to adequately control the ingress process. Interviews were conducted and records were reviewed to verify that security staffing levels were consistently and appropriately implemented, and that procedures were prepared to address denial of unescorted access authorization. Also the inspector reviewed the licensees process for limiting access to only authorized personnel to the protected area and vital equipment.

The inspector reviewed the licensees program to control security keys and security related computer data.

The inspector reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, maintenance request records, and security logged events for identification and resolution of problems. In addition, the inspector interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensees corrective action system.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)

.1 Initiating Events Cornerstone Performance Indicators a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the PI data submitted by the licensee for completeness and accuracy for the following PIs in the Initiating Events Cornerstone:

1. Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours, and 2. Unplanned Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal The inspectors compared the data reported by the licensee to the definitions and guidance contained in the NEI guidance listed at the end of this report. The inspectors

reviewed licensee event reports, monthly operating reports, and NRC inspection reports for the period July 2001 through March 2002 to verify that the licensee had reported all occurrences for those three quarters.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Physical Protection Performance Indicators a. Inspection Scope The inspector verified the data for the Physical Protection Performance Indicators (PI)

pertaining to Fitness-For-Duty Personnel Reliability, Personnel Screening Program, and Protected Area Security Equipment. Specifically, a sample of plant reports related to security events, security shift activity logs, fitness-for-duty reports, and other applicable security records were reviewed for the fourth quarter of 2001 and the first quarter of 2002.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1 Review of Corrective Actions For the D5/D6 Fuel and Lubricating Oil Incompatibility Event a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the completeness and the effectiveness of licensee corrective actions for a previous finding that involved the incompatibility of the fuel oil and lubricating oil in the Unit 2 D5 and D6 EDGs. Inspectors reviewed the completion of corrective actions and ensured that the timeliness of the licensees corrective actions were commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Review of Corrective Actions For the Loss of Function Associated with Flood Barriers a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the completeness and the effectiveness of licensee corrective actions for a previous finding that involved deficiencies with the plant flood barriers.

These deficiencies resulted in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition. The inspectors reviewed CR 20015571 that initially documented the deficient flood barriers, the subsequent root cause evaluation, LER 1-03-01, LER 1-03-01 Supplement 1, and

the documentation associated with the permanent plant modification that implemented the corrective actions that restored the function of the flood barriers.

The inspectors assessed whether the timeliness of the licensees corrective actions were commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. The inspectors compared the completion dates of the actions that restored function to the flood barriers to the annual period when the plant experiences a high susceptibility to external flooding. The inspectors reviewed USAR and IPEEE sections discussing external flooding and which indicated that the period of high susceptibility existed in the months of March and April.

The inspectors reviewed all corrective actions completed by the end of January 2002 to verify these actions restored the flood barrier function.

The inspectors reviewed other corrective actions, not required for the restoration of flood barrier function and which had not been completed by January 2002, to verify that they would not prevent the flood barriers from protecting the plant in the event of external flooding.

The inspectors performed a physical walkdown of the flood barriers to assess the current material condition of the flood barriers and note any deficiencies that would prevent the barriers from performing their function. The inspectors also observed the performance of SP 1293, Inspection of Flood Control Measures, to verify that all acceptance criteria were met.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems Associated With Permanent Plant Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed 12 CRs associated with Prairie Islands permanent plant modifications and 10 CFR 50.59 program to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to verify the effectiveness of corrective actions for the identified issues.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

.1 (Closed) LER 1-01-03, Supplement 1: Plant in Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Deficiencies.

This event report described a licensee-identified condition where 16 of 17 flood panels, that would be installed during a flood condition where water level crest is predicted to exceed 692' elevation, were degraded. The issue included not having the correct

gasket materials, inadequate anchor bolt installation capabilities, and the inability to install the panels in a timely manner. A Phase 3 risk assessment was completed using information from the IPEEE. Based on the assessment, it was determined that the issue was of very low risk significance (Green).

The inspectors reviewed Supplement 1 to this event report and noted that the licensee identified two additional deficiencies during the implementation of corrective actions to correct the D5/D6 flood panel deficiencies discussed in the original LER. These additional deficiencies did not change the significance of the event since the flood panels in question were determined to have been non-functional due to degraded gasket material. These new deficiencies were identified during corrective actions to restore the flood barrier function. The newly identified deficiencies were entered into the corrective action program with AR CAP 023003 and CAP 023071. Corrective actions had been completed and the function of all flood panels had been fully restored.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report No. 50-282/01-06-00: Security Responders Out-of-Position Due to Plant Fire.

Green. On August 3, 2001, a fire occurred within the protected area (PA) due to an electrical fault in non-safeguards Bus 12. The Red Wing Fire Department responded to assist in the control of the fire. While involved in fire control support activities, some armed responders were in locations that would have prevented them from being able to respond to their established defensive positions within the time lines established (specific time lines are SGI and exempt from public disclosure). The responders were out of position for between 15 minutes and two hours. During these time periods, the responders were always within the PA and able to provide some level of contingency response, but not within the specific time lines established for their positions.

Since the incident occurred prior to September 11, 2001, the regulatory requirement for the minimum number of armed responders was identified in the security plan (number of required armed responders is SGI and exempt from public disclosure). In this case, the number of actual armed responders exceeded the minimum number required by the security plan and no violations of NRC requirements occurred. The licensee had developed a response strategy and voluntarily added responders to enhance their capabilities. Part of that strategy included self-imposed requirements regarding the timeliness of responders. This incident effected that timeliness.

Additionally, within an hour of the start of the fire an additional supervisor, qualified for armed response duties, arrived onsite and could have provided an additional level of response in case of a contingency event. This issue was reported to the NRC within one hour, and a written Licensee Event Report was submitted to the NRC within 30 days. No prior similar events have occurred. Interviews with the security director disclosed that in the future, armed responders would not be used as they were in this incident, with a limited exception.

This issue was evaluated through the SDP and determined to be of low safety significance (Green). The issue is considered greater than minor, but of low safety significance, because, although the cornerstone attribute relating to response was effected (for a limited time and only a small portion of the capability) it represented a

vulnerability in the response system because it increased the potential for failure; but there were no actual intrusions and less than two similar findings were identified during the past four quarters. Moreover, the fire within the PA was an unpredictable event and the mis-positioning of the responders would have been unknown to an adversary.

4OA6 Meeting(s)

.1 Interim Exit Meeting Summary of the Access Control, As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), Instrumentation, and Transportation The results of the access control, ALARA, instrumentation, and transportation inspection were presented to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 17, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the information presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Interim Exit Meeting Summary of the Permanent Plant Modification and Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Inspection The results of the permanent plant modification and evaluations of changes, tests, and experiments inspection were presented to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 21, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the information presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.

No proprietary information was identified.

.3 Interim Exit Meeting Summary of the Physical Security Inspection The results of the Safeguards inspection were presented to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 21, 2002. The licensee staff was advised that an unresolved item pertaining to protection of SGI was identified, and that they would be advised later of the resolution of the issue.

The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered safeguards or proprietary information. No safeguards or proprietary information was identified.

On July 9, 2002, the licensee was advised that the unresolved item discussed above pertaining to inadequate protection of SGI was a licensee identified severity level IV Non-Cited Violation.

.4 Exit Meeting The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Mano Nazar and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 3, 2002.

The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.

10 CFR 73.21(d)(2) states in part, While unattended, SGI shall be stored in a locked security storage container.

Contrary to this requirement, SGI (lesson plans and portions of security plans) found in the security trainers office (located outside of the protected area) was not stored in a locked security storage container. The duration of this issue is not know, but may have existed for up to one year (50-282/306/02-04-01).

The licensee inventoried and assumed control of the SGI, entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP 023101), and entered the incident in their safeguards event log. Because there was no evidence that the significant SGI (portions of security plans) was compromised, this violation is not more than of very low significance, and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation.

On April 12, 2002, the licensee discovered some lesson plans marked as SGI, and a double-enveloped package (both envelopes sealed) with SGI (portions of security plans)

within it. It was stored in an unlocked filing cabinet in the security trainers office located outside of the protected area. The outer sealed envelope was addressed to the security trainer with no SGI markings, and the inner sealed envelope was marked as SGI. The inadequate storage of the SGI may have occurred for up to one year. The individual the package was addressed to had not worked in the security trainer position and office for up to a year prior to the discovery date (April 12, 2002), and had terminated employment prior to the discovery date. Therefore, he was not available for the licensee or inspector to interview to determine further circumstances and details pertaining to receipt, transportation, or use of the SGI material.

This issue was evaluated through the SDP and determined to be of low safety significance (Green). The inspectors review of the material determined that the information in the lesson plans would not substantially assist an individual in gaining unauthorized or undetected access to the plant. The most significant documents were pages of the Point Beach and Prairie Island security plans (stored within a double sealed envelope) that described the location and description of vital areas, which could assist in radiological sabotage if the information was compromised. Although the SGI material was subject to compromise (not stored adequately) for up to a year, the fact that both envelopes were sealed when discovered indicates that the material was not compromised.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee T. Amundson, Manager Business Support P. Huffman, Manager of System Engineering B. Jefferson, Director Site Operations J. Jensen, Interim Director of Engineering A. Johnson, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry J. Kivi, Licensing Engineer R. Lingle, Operations Manager J. Maki, Production Planning Manager M. McKeown, Manager of Design Engineering L. Meyer, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance M. Nazar, Site Vice President J. Waddell, Superintendent Security M. Werner, Plant Manager R. Womack, Manager of Engineering Programs D. Blakesley, Senior Nuclear Security Consultant J. Corwin, Nuclear Security Consultant H. Nyberg, Training Coordinator, The Wackenhut Corporation J. Waddell, Security Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-282/306/20-04-01 NCV SGI was not Adequately Protected (Section 4OA7)

Closed 50-282/01-01-03, LER Plant in Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood Panel Supplement 1 Deficiencies (Section 1R15)

50-282/01-06-00 LER Security Responders Out of Position Due to Plant Fire (Section 4OA3)

50-282/306/20-04-01 NCV SGI was not Adequately Protected (Section 4OA7)

Discussed None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AB Abnormal Operating Procedure AC Alternating Current ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System AFW Auxiliary Feedwater ALARA As-Low-As Reasonably Achievable AR Action Request AWI Administrative Work Instruction CAP Corrective Action Program CC Component Cooling CE Condition Evaluation CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report DBD Design Bases Document DRS Division of Reactor Safety EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EQ Equipment Qualification ERCS Emergency Response Computer System FFD Fitness-For-Duty GEN General Condition Report HRA High Radiation Area IMC Inspection Manual Chapter INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IPE Individual Plant Examination IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IR Inspection Report LCO Limiting Conditions for Operation LER Licensee Event Report NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OPR Operability Determination OWA Operator Workaround PA Protected Area PARS Publicly Available Records PI Performance Indicator

PINGP Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant PM Preventive Maintenance PRA Probalistic Risk Assessment RCP Reactor Coolant Pump SDP Significance Determination Process SGI Safeguards Information SI Safety Injection SP Surveillance Procedure SWI Section Work Instruction TCN Temporary Change Notice TS Technical Specification USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report WO Work Order XOE External Operating Experience

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection SP 1039 (WO 0116291) Tornado Hazard Monthly Site Inspection Revision 6 Abnormal Operating Tornado/Severe Thunderstorm Revision 19 Procedure (AB) 2 Test Procedure 1636 Summer Plant Operation Revision 10 (WO 0117413)

Temporary Instruction D1/D2 Cooling Water Configuration March 22, 2002 02-29 NSPLMI-96001 Individual Plant Examination of External Revision 0 Events, Section C2 Design Bases Document Design Bases Document for the Prairie Revision 3 (DBD) STR-04 Island Screenhouse, Page 60 DBD TOP-03 Design Bases Document - Environmental Revision 3 Qualification of Electrical Equipment, Section 2.10, Page A-20 ENG-ME-178 Screenhouse Ventilation Evaluation DBD SYS-38A Design Bases Document - Emergency Revision 2 Diesel Generators, Section 4.2.5, Page 91 DBD TOP-03 Design Bases Document - Environmental Revision 3 Qualification of Electrical Equipment, Section 2.7, Page A-17 USAR Diesel Ventilation, Section 10.3.12 Revision 23 AR CAP 023084 2RY Transformer Local Alarm Received April 12, 2002 AR CAP 023259 Missile Hazards During Tornado Season April 24, 2002 Condition Evaluation (CE) Evaluation of Policy Related to Leaving April 26, 2002 000122 Carts In or Near the Vehicle Trap AR CAP 023298 Missing Roof Hatch Allowing Rain to Leak April 28, 2002 On Energized Equipment CE 000136 Evaluate Missing Roof Hatch Above Motor April 29, 2002 Control Center 2F AR CAP 023324 Tornado Missiles Near D1/D2 April 30, 2002 Corrective Action (CA) Tornado Missile Hazard Correction May 2, 2002 001022 CE 000149 Evaluate Change to the Tornado Missile May 2, 2002 Protection Process AR CAP 023641 Received Equipment High Temperature May 30, 2002 Alarms on 11Circ Water Pump AR CAP 023751 SP 1039 Tornado Hazard Monthly Site June 7, 2002 Inspection

AR CAP 023949 1GT Generator Main Transformer High Oil June 23, 2002 Temperature AR CAP 023965 Evaluate the Effectiveness of the Summer June 24, 2002 Operation Procedure AR CAP 023967 Failure to Change Generation Transformer June 24, 2002 Filter Media AR CAP 023969 Known Overheating Problem Caused by June 25, 2002 Filter Media 1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments Procedures NMC 50.59 Resource Manual Revision 1 5AWI 3.3.5 50.59 Screenings Revision 5 5AWI 3.3.6 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Revision 2 5AWI 4.9.0 Safety Analysis Reports Revision 8 5AWI 6.1.4 Design Change Project Description/Safety Revision 2 Assessment 1C18 AOP1 Makeup or Boration of the Reactor Coolant Revision 0 System Using a Safety Injection Pump 1E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Revision 21 1ECA-0.0 Loss of All Safeguards AC Power Revision 15 1ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Recovery Revision 19 Condition Reports Written as a Result of Inspection AR CAP 023916 Incorrect Completion of PINGP [Prairie June 20, 2002 Island Nuclear Generating Plant] 279 for Safety Evaluation 584 AR CAP 023917 Distribution of Completed 50.59 Evaluations June 20, 2002 AR OTH 020549 Clarity USAR Page 6.2-23 Concerning June 21, 2002 Safety Injection (SI) Accumulator Check Valves 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings 218 11/22 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump April 29, 2002 Shaft Bearing Isolation Valves 1017 Update to 2 Emergency Contingency June 26, 2001 Action 0.0 1063 00RV01, Bottom Mount Reduced Inventory July 24, 2001 Thermocouples

1173 Substitution Part/Component Equivalent September 19, ME-0690 2001 1189 Use SI Pump for Borated Water Makeup October 12, 2001 1098 Cross-Connect CC Pumps August 23, 2001 1215 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Control Switch January 15, 2002 in Manual 1259 22 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Governor November 1, 2001 Replacement 1262 WO 0114936, Setpoint Change 2456 November 2, 2001 1285 Calculation ENG-ME-481 January 8, 2002 1296 Temporary Modification 01T102 January 11, 2002 1402 Temporary Change to SP 1106A February 16, 2002 1419 Replace FV-PCV-1025 DC45/46 with February 28, 2002 LPN-RK Fuses 1423 Equipment Engineering Change 1406, March 8, 2002 Bearing Change 1430 11, 21, and 22 CC Unit Cooler Coil March 18, 2002 Replacement 1435 Calculation ENG-ME-499, Revision 0 April 3, 2002 1458 WO 0108013 - Fuse Change April 10, 2002 1464 12 & 22 Diesel Cooling Water Panel Audible April 17, 2002 Alarms 1468 Fuse Replacement for BKR 253-21/Setpoint April 18, 2002 2462. WO 0203609 1482 Loop Delta T Emergency Response May 7, 2002 Computer System (ERCS) Alarm Setpoint Changes WO 0203637 & 0203639 01VC01 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Water January 8, 2002 Injection Check Valve Replacement/

Relocation 50.59 Evaluations 123 Downgrading Chemical and Volume Control November 30, System Charging Pump 2001 181 Safety Evaluation for the Improper Install of December 21, Raychem Manufactured Heat Shrinkable 2001 Tubing at Prairie Island Unit 1

251 Charging Pump Reclassification December 14, 1994 252 Molded Case Circuit Breakers on Safety January 26, 2002 Related Equipment 265 Untraceable Molded Case Circuit Breakers January 26, 2002 Installed in Safety Related Applications 584 Appendix R Program Document Update - April 18, 2001 Containment Sump B Valve Hot Short Issue 1004 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling January 23, 2002 1007 Steam Generator Level and Containment April 1, 2002 Temperature Restrictions in Support of Main Steam Line Break Analysis 02D101 Isolate D1/D2 Coolant System Crossflow May 1, 2002 USAR 6.2.1 Safety Injection System Design Basis Revision 22 10.2.3 Chemical and Volume Control System Revision 23 10.4.2 Component Cooling System Revision 22 11.9.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Design Basis Revision 23 11.9.2.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Description Revision 23 USAR Submittal Inputs 000309 Single Failure Discussion December 7, 2000 000302 Single Failure Analysis Containment Spray December 3, 2000 System 010004 AFW System January 10, 2001 010034 Cooling Water February 25, 2001 010056 Containment Isolation Valves March 22, 2001 Miscellaneous 10 CFR 50.71(e) Letter to Submittal of Revision No. 23 to the USAR July 1, 2001 NRC 10 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests, or Experiments NEI 96.07 Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations Revision 1

1R04 Equipment Alignment D5 EDG TS 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Systems Revision 110 USAR Section 8.4 Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems Revision 23 Integrated Checklist D5 Diesel Generator Valve Status Revision 9 C1.1.20.7-9 Integrated Checklist D5 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Local Revision 5 C1.1.20.7-10 Panels and Switches Integrated Checklist D5 Diesel Generator Main Control Room Revision 3 C1.1.20.7-11 Switch and Indicating Light Status Integrated Checklist D5 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and Revision 8 C1.1.20.7-12 Panel Switches WO 0109522 D5 2B Start Air Receiver Pressure Transmitter 21 CC Pump TS 3.3.C Component Cooling Water System Revision 91 USAR Section 10.4.2 Component Cooling System Revision 22 Integrated Checklist Unit 2 Component Cooling System Revision 22 C1.1.14-2 WO 0203695 2CC-1-13 Has an Oil Leak on Actuator Gear April 22, 2002 Box AR CAP 023905 Tubing on Scaffold 1109 Touching CC June 19, 2002 Pump 21 AR CAP 023948 Scaffolds Erected Too Close to Equipment June 23, 2002 D1 EDG TS 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Systems Revision 110 USAR Section 8.4 Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems Revision 23 Integrated Checklist D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status Revision 19 C1.1.20.7-1 Integrated Checklist D1 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Room Revision 8W C1.1.20.7-2 Cooling Local Panels Integrated Checklist D1 Diesel Generator Main Control Room Revision 13 C1.1.20.7-3 Switch and Indicating Light Status Integrated Checklist D1 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and Revision 11 C1.1.20.7-4 Panel Switches 1R05 Fire Protection Plant Safety Procedure Fire Fighting Revision 27 F5

Plant Safety Procedure Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Revision 10 F5, Appendix A Detection Zone 82, Emergency Diesel Generator D-1 Room Plant Safety Procedure Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Revision 10 F5, Appendix A Detection Zone 6, Emergency Diesel Generator D-2 Room Plant Safety Procedure Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Revision 10 F5, Appendix A Detection Zone 2, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms Plant Safety Procedure Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Revision 7 F5, Appendix A Detection Zone 1, Batteries 11 and 12 Rooms Plant Safety Procedure Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Revision 7 F5, Appendix A Detection Zone 11, Bus 15 & 16 Switchgear Rooms Plant Safety Procedure Detection Zones and Fire Areas, Fire Revision 7 F5, Appendix A Detection Zone 43, Bus 111 & 121 Switchgear Rooms Plant Safety Procedure Fire Hazard Analysis Revision 12 F5, Appendix F Plant Safety Procedure Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room Revision 8 F5, Appendix D Plant Safety Procedure Fire Strategies Revision 7 F5, Appendix A IPEEE NSPLMI-96001 Internal Fires Analysis Revision 2 Appendix B 1R06 Flood Protection Measures External Flooding USAR Section 2.4.3.5 Floods Revision 21 USAR Appendix F Probable Maximum Flood Study Revision 4 IPEEE NSPLMI-96001 External Flooding Revision 0 Appendix C, Section C.2.3.1 DBD-TOP-05 Design Bases Document for Harzards Revision 2 AB 4 Flood Revision 20 SP 1293 (WO 0113018) Inspection of Flood Control Measures Revision 9 Design Change 01BM02 Flood Panel and Door Design Changes Revision 1 50.59 Screening 1184 Design Change 01BM02, Revision 1 Revision 1 AR CAP 023335 Review of Surveillance SP 1293 Inspection May 1, 2002 of Flood Control Measures

AR CAP 023129 121 Cooling Tower Pump House Sump April 16, 2002 Pump Tripped on Overload AR CAP 023071 Defect in Weld in Flood Panel MK-1 April 11, 2002 Internal Flooding IPE NSPLMI-94001 Internal Flooding Evaluation Revision 0 Section 3.3.8 IPE NSPLMI-94001 Class FEH-TB1, Flood with Loss of Revision 0 Section 6.3 Secondary Cooling and Bleed and Feed DBD-TOP-05 Design Bases Document for Harzards Revision 2 DBD-STR-05 Design Bases Document for the D5/D6 Revision 2 Building AR CAP 023110 Burned Up Starter Coil Found On Breaker April 15, 2002 253-21 for 21 Turbine Building Sump Pump AR CAP 023910 Evaluate as a Temporary Modification Bilge June 20, 2002 Pumps in the Turbine Building Drain - Unit 1 Condenser Pit North West Corner 1R011 Licensed Operator Requalification Program Simulator Exercise Guide Simulator Cycle Quiz 37 Revision 0 SWI O-0 Conduct of Operations Revision 1 SWI O-2 Shift Organization, Operations, and Revision 46 Turnover SWI O-10 Operation Manual Usage Revision 41 SWI O-25 Periodic Data Acquisition and Logkeeping Revision 29 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation General 2000 Equipment Performance Annual April 20, 2001 Report Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, Revision 3 Volume 1A Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, Revision 3 Volume 1B NUMARC 93-01 NEI Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Revision 2 Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.160 Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance Revision 2 at Nuclear Power Plants AR CAP 023100 1PC-478 A/B Repeatedly Found Out-of- April 12, 2002 Tolerance

Apparent Cause Perform Apparent Cause Evaluation Into April 18, 2002 Evaluation 008290 Why 1PC-478 A/B Has Been Found 1PC-4 Found Out-of-Tolerance Repeatedly CE 000057 Conduct Rework Analysis Into the Repeated April 18, 2002 Instances of 1PC-478 A/B is Found Out-of-Tolerance During the Performance of Quarterly SP 1003 Maintenance Rule Evaluate 1PC-478 A/B Out-of-Tolerance May 31, 2002 Evaluation 000005 AR CAP 023395 Repeated Calibration Trend Based on May 6, 2002 SP 1003 AR CAP 023657 AR CAPs Were Found Not Flagged as May 31, 2002 Potential Maintenance Rule Functional Failure or Assigned a Maintenance Rule Evaluation During Screening AR CAP 023908 Decreasing Bay Levels Due to Lost Intake June 19, 2002 Screens 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control TS 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Systems Revision 110 USAR Section 8.4 Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems Revision 23 5AWI 1.9.0 Look Ahead Process Revision 0 5AWI 15.1.7 Voluntary Limiting Conditions for Operation Revision 1 (LCO) Process WO 0204455 D1 Water Supply Solenoid Valve May 14, 2002 TS 3.3.D Cooling Water System Revision 131 USAR Section 10.4 Plant Cooling System Revision 22 AR CAP 023800 12 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump June 12, 2002 Inoperable Due to Governor Hunting AR CAP 023170 12 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump April 19, 2002 Speed Hunting Daily Risk Assessments April, 12, 2002, June 4, 12, and 26, 2002 Probalistic Risk Risk Significance of Intake Traveling June 24, 2002 Assessment (PRA) Screens/Bypass Gates Failure Event Project File V.SPA.02.008 H 24.1 Assessment and Management of Risk Revision 3 Associated with Maintenance Activities AR CAP 023088 Units 1 and 2 in PRA Orange Condition April 12, 2002

AR CAP 023133 11 Condensate Pump Removed from April 16, 2002 Service for Maintenance Prior to Risk Assessment AR CAP 023154 Failure to Log Entry into PRA Orange April 18, 2002 Condition AR CAP 023257 Apparent Error in Prairie Island IPEEE April 24, 2002 AR CAP 023970 Stopped Work Control Center from Tagging June 25, 2002 Out 21 Cooling Water Strainer with D2 Out-of-Service During B Week AR CAP 023986 LCO Time Extended Because Breaker June 26, 2002 Inspection Not Performed in a Timely Manner 1R15 Operability Evaluations General Condition Report Inaccurate Assumptions Used in the February 11, 2002 (GEN) 2002 01283 Analysis for the Non-Return Check Valves in the Main Steam Line Break Event P. Huffman Update to Inaccurate Assumptions Used in the February 22, 2002 GEN 2002 01283 Analysis for the Non-Return Check Valves in the Main Steam Line Break Event Detailed Basis For Operability Determination Addendum March 13, 2002 Operability 2002-02-08 Nuclear Analysis H. Nelson Memo to P. Huffman March 4, 2002 Department File OC.PX.2002.021 Reportability Inaccurate Assumptions Used in the Determination for GEN Analysis for the Non-return Check Valves in 2002 01283 the Main Steam Line Break Event H. Nelson Memo to S. Main Steam Line Break Significance March 14, 2002 Thomas, Nuclear Analysis Determination Analysis Department OC.PX.2002.024 50.59 Evaluation Analysis Steam Generator Level and Containment Revsion 0 1007 Temperature Restrictions in Support of Main Steam Line Break Analysis USAR Section 14.5.5 Rupture of a Steam Pipe Revision 22 AR CAP 023064 Assess Classification of the Bearing April 10, 2002 Lubricating Water Supply Piping and Flow Switches AR CAP 023118 Incomplete Engineering Judgement April 15, 2002 USAR Section 10.4 Plant Cooling Water System Revision 23 Evaluation of Vertical Cooling Water Pump April 15, 2002 Flow Switches

AR CAP 023138 Okonite/Scotch EQ Splices Installed in a April 17, 2002 Non-Tested Configuration EQ Okonite Tape Splice Configuration Turnover Evaluation Clarification on EQ Okonite Tape Splice April 23, 2002 Configuration Turnover Evaluation, Section Number of Wraps Around Splice AR CAP 023737 A Pipe Hanger Near MV-32034 in Old June 6, 2002 Screenhouse is Contacting Conduit Operability Determination Pipe Hanger Rubbing Against Conduit for June 10, 2002 (OPR) 000315 the 121 Motor Driven Cooling Water Pump AR CAP 023905 Scaffold 1109 Touching Component Cooling June 19, 2002 Pump 21 AR CAP 023948 Scaffolds Erected Too Close to Equipment June 23, 2002 AR CAP 023948 Supplemental Engineering Information June 27, 2002 (Supplement)

AR CAP 023818 11 SI Pump Motor is Seeking Magnetic June 13, 2002 Center OPR 000316 Evaluate the Operability of 11 SI Pump June 13, 2002 Vendor Manual Bingham Willamette SI Pump XH-1-1393 WO 0205412 Perform Test Procedure 1087A June 13, 2002 AR CAP 023907 Incorrect O-Ring Material Was Used for EQ June 19, 2002 MOVs [Motor-Operated Valves] in Containment OPR 000319 Operability Determination for the Use of June 19, 2002 Incorrect O-Ring Material on Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valves TS Section 3.1.A.2 Pressurizer PORVs Revision 135 TS Bases, Section 3.1 Reactor Coolant System Bases Revision 135 USAR, Section 4.4 Reactor Pressure Relief System Revision 23 1R16 OWAs D6 Fuel Oil Level AR CAP023556 D6 Fuel Oil Storage Tank ERCS Level May 20, 2002 Indication WO 0201784 ERCS PT 2U8003A is Erratic and Unreliable TS 4.6.A Diesel Generators Revision 147 SP 2001 Unit 2 Daily Control Room Log Revision 56 2C38 D5/D6 Fuel Oil System, Attachment A Revision 15

Temporary Instruction 24 D6 Fuel Oil Storage Tank ERCS Point 02-13 Unit 2 Pressurizer Spray Valve A in Manual TS Section 3.1.B.2 Pressure/Temperature Limits Revision 135 USAR, Section 4.4 Reactor Pressure Relief System Revision 23 DBD SYS-04 Design Bases Document for the Reactor Revision 2 Coolant System AR CAP 023297 Unit 2 Loop A Pressurizer Spray Valve April 27, 2002 CV-31228 is Controlling Erratically CE 000135 Evaluate Control Response of the Unit 2 April 29, 2002 Loop A Pressurizer Spray Valve 1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications USAR, Section 8.4 Plant Standby Diesel Generator System Revision 23 Design Change Notice Isolate D1/D2 Coolant System Cross-Flow Revision 0 02D101 WO 0202198 Install Cross Flow Isolation Valve, Air Vent, May 13, 2002 Coolant Sample Valve, and Re-Route Expansion Tank Overflow Pipe at D1 Diesel Generator WO 0202199 Install Cross Flow Isolation Valve, Air Vent, May 21, 2002 Coolant Sample Valve, and Re-Route Expansion Tank Overflow Pipe at D2 Diesel Generator Coltec Industries Letter Standby Diesel Generator Crossflow July 8, 1992 Coltec Industries Part 21 Notification for Fairbanks Morse September 13, 10 CFR 21 Notification Engine Division Model 38TD8-1/8 Cooling 1991 System Investigation - Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 ENG-ME-409 Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Heat April 9, 2002 Exchanger Performance with Reduced Cooling Water Flow ENG-ME-479 Tube Plugging Criteria for Unit 1 Diesel September 27, Generator Heat Exchanger 2001 ENG-ME-480 Operability Determination for Unit 1 Diesel September 28, Generator Heat Exchangers with Tubes 2001 Plugged and 85EF Cooling Water Commercial Grade Application of the Armstrong Model AV-11 Revision 0 Evaluation Number Vent in the D1/D2 Diesel Generator Jacket PI-0348 Coolant Lines Drawing NF-39255-1 Diesel Generator D1 & D2 Units 1 and 2 Revision Z Flow diagram

Permanent Plant Modifications Biennial Inspection Documents Procedures 5AWI 3.14.1 Setpoint Control Revision 12 5AWI 3.14.2 Electrical Process and Protection Setpoint Revision 8 Control 5AWI 6.1.0 Design Change General Revision 7 5AWI 6.1.1 Design Inputs Revision 3 5AWI 6.1.2 Design Documents, Review, and Verification Revision 4 5AWI 6.1.3 Design Change Package, Logs and Revision 2 Records 5AWI 6.1.5 Design Change Implementation Plans Revision 3 5AWI 6.1.6 Design Change Review and Approval Revision 5 5AWI 6.1.7 Design Change Work Orders Revision 5 5AWI 6.1.8 Engineering Change Requests Revision 2 5AWI 6.1.9 Design Change Turnover for Operation Revision 3 5AWI 6.1.10 Design Change Close-out Revision 2 5AWI 6.2.0 Equipment Engineering Change Evaluation Revision 4 5AWI 6.4.0 Existing Component Functional Revision 1 Performance and Design Requirements Identification 5AWI 6.4.0 Existing Component Functional Revision 1 Performance and Design Requirements Identification 5AWI 8.2.3 Dedication of Commercial Grade Items Revision 3 C1.1.20.7-1 D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status Revision 19 C70300 Remote Alarm Response Procedure (Raw Revision 1 Water Supply Not Available)

H9 Fuse Control Program Revision 6 SP 1210 Monthly Safeguards Hold Verification Revision 18 Commercial Grade Evaluations PI-0064 Cooling Water Strainer Parts Revision 4 PI-0190 VP 591 Flowrite Double Seated Valves and Revision 4 Valve Parts PI-0343 Westinghouse Test Relay Model 1161540 Revision 1 PI-0348 Armstrong Model AV-11 Vent Revision 0 Design Changes 99DC02 Replace 12 & 22 Batteries Revision 0

99DC03 Relocation of 125 Volts Direct Current EQ Revision 1 Circuits 99SF02 Replace Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Revision 0 99SI02 Repower Residual Heat Removal Sump B Revision 0 Suction Valves 00FP01 PORV and PORV Block Valve Cable Revision 0 Reroute 00RV01 Bottom Mount Reduced Inventory Revision 0 Thermocouples 01EA01 Bus 12 Control & Instrument Cable Revision 0 Restoration 01VC01 RCP Seal Water Injection Check Valve Revision 0 Replacement/Relocation 02D101 Isolate D1/D2 Coolant System Crossflow Revision 0 Equipment Engineering Change Evaluations 1020 AFW Pump Suction and Discharge January 31, 2002 Pressure Switches 1023 RCP Seal Water Injection Check Valves February 4, 2002 Drawings NE-40008, Sh. 39 11 Containment Sump B Isolation Valve B-1 Revision BU MV 32077 Setpoint Changes 2TM-405R New Gains per SP 2722 Loop Delta T Revision 5 2TR-2002/3 Increase to 190 Degrees. After Revision 2 Replacement Return Setpoint to Original 185 Degrees Substitution Part/Component Equivalent ME-0336 Charging Pump Drive Shaft Keyway December 14, Dimensions 2001 ME-0690 Replace Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump September 27, Discharge Check Valves 2001 PN-0617 Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump Heat April 6, 2001 Exchanger Cooling Outlet Valves USAR 4.4.4 Reactor Pressure Relief System Design Revision 23 Basis 10.2.2 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Revision 23 Miscellaneous Temporary Change Unit 1 Startup Procedure April 9, 2002 Notice (TCN) 2002-1056

TCN 2001-1405 Air Removal System April 4, 2001 Engineering Design Standard for Motor Revision 1 Control Center Control Circuit Fuse Selection Criteria, Section 3.3.1.6 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing WO 0200988 Replace 2SSH-5566, D5 Engine 1 Overspeed Detector High SP 2295 D5 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Revision 23 TS 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Systems Revision 110 USAR Section 8.4 Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems Revision 23 WO 0204455 D1 Water Supply Solenoid Valve May 14, 2002 TS 3.3.D Cooling Water System Revision 131 USAR Section 10.4 Plant Cooling System Revision 22 AR CAP 023800 12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Inoperable June 12, 2002 Due to Governor Hunting SP 1106A 12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Monthly Test Revision 59 TS 3.3.C Component Cooling Water System Revision 91 USAR Section 10.4.2 Component Cooling System Revision 22 WO 0115753 P3119-1-22 22 Component Cooling Pump June 19, 2002 PM Preventive Maintenance 22 CC Pump Annual Inspection Revision 13 Procedure PM 3119-1-22 1R22 Surveillance Testing SP 1102 11 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test Revision 75 SP 2102 22 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test Revision 68 TS 4.8.A Auxiliary Feedwater System Revision 116 USAR Section 11.9.2.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Revision 23 WO 0201947 Steam Leak on Control Valve 31060 February 28, 2002 SP 1335 D2 Diesel Generator 18-Month 24-Hour Revision 7 Load Test SP 2307 D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Revision 17 Test TS 4.6 Periodic Testing of Emergency Power Revision 113 Systems USAR Section 8.4 Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems Revision 23 SP 2094 Bus 25 Load Sequencer Test Revision 16

TS 4.1-1c, Item 11 Auto Load Sequencers Revision 161 USAR Section 8.3.2.2 Load Sequencing Revision 21 AR CAP 023175 Both PORVs Not Declared Inoperable April 19,2002 During Performance of SP 1182A (Over-Pressure Protection System Test)

SP 1182A Overpressure Protection System Refueling Revision 13W Outage Functional Test TS Section 3.1.A.2 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves Revision 135 1R23 Temporary Modifications 5AWI 6.5.0 Temporary Modifications Revision 11 AR CAP 023902 No AR Written for Portable Fan Set Up at June 19, 2002 RMU 141 Temporary Modification Installation of a Ground Strap on 2N31 Package 02T121 Preamplifier 50.59 Screening 1408 Temporary Modification 02T121 Revision 0 WO 0201740 Installation of Temporary Modification 02T121 WO 0201741 Remove Temporary Modification 02T121 TS Section 3.5 Instrumentation Revision 111 USAR, Section 7.3 Nuclear Instruments Revision 23 1EP6 Drill Evaluation Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant April 3, 2002 Emergency Plan Rehearsal Drill Package Revision 0 AR CAP 000092 Technical Support Center Ventilation Door is Not Always Closed After Ventilation is Set Up AR CAP 023008 Accountability Report Included Names of Individuals Who Are No Longer Employed 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Revision 2 Indicator Guideline LER 1-01-04 Water Intrusion into a Control Rod Electrical Revision 0 Cabinet Results in Dropped Rods Causing a Negative Flux Reactor Trip LER 1-01-05 Fault and Fire in Non-Safeguards Circuit Revision 0 Breaker Results in Reactor Trip and AFW System Actuation

LER 2-01-04 Manual Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to Revision 0 High Differential Condenser Backpressure LER 2-01-05 Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2 Initiated in Revision 0 Response to a High Differential Pressure Between the Turbine Steam Condensers Caused by an Inadvertent Venting of One Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak Monthly Operating July 2001 Through March 2002 Reports NRC Inspection Reports 01-15, 01-16, 01-17, 01-18, and 01-19 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems USAR Section 2.4.3.5 Floods Revision 21 USAR Appendix F Probable Maximum Flood Study Revision 4 IPEEE NSPLMI-96001 External Flooding Revision 0 Appendix C, Section C.2.3.1 AB 4 Flood Revision 20 SP1293 Inspection of Flood Control Measures Revision 9 Design Change 01BM02 Flood Panel and Door Design Changes Revision 1 50.59 Screening 1184 Design Change 01BM02, Revision 1 Revision 1 LER 1-01-03 Plant in an Unanalyzed Condition Due to September 10, Flood Panel Deficiencies 2001 LER 1-01-03, Plant in an Unanalyzed Condition Due to April 12, 2002 Supplement 1 Flood Panel Deficiencies AR CAP 023003 Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-4 April 1, 2002 AR CAP 023071 Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-1 April 11, 2002 AR OTH 023859 AR OTH 000188 Related to D6 Root Cause June 14, 2002 Closed with Incomplete Action AR OTH 001239 Followup on Status of Technical May 24, 2002 Communication AR OTH 000188 Revise Communication Process May 26, 2002 CR 20014617 Prairie Island Not Receiving Technical May 27, 2001 Service Notes CR 20014518 Perform Independent Review of SACM May 23, 2001 Related External Operating Experience (XOE) Assessments CR 20015167 Establish Standards for Independence of June 21, 2001 Technical Advice from Outside Vendors CR 20013446 Develop/Implement Process on Use of May 14, 2001 Operating Experience

CR 20014150 Reassess XOE May 9, 2001 CR 20014252 Submit LER 2-01-03 for Unit 2 Shutdown May 14, 2001 CR 20014601 Revise 18-Month PMs for Six-Year AMOT May 25, 2001 Valves CR 20014611 Evaluate Organization & Programmatic May 26, 2001 Issues CR 20014612 Review Use of Shell Rotella T in D5 and D6 May 26, 2001 CR 20014696 Develop, Implement, and Reinforce May 30, 2001 Standardized Tools for Problem Solving CR 20015166 Enforce Management Expectations June 21, 2001 Involving Independence of Technical Reviews for XOEs CR 20015168 Add a Process to XOE Responses to June 21, 2001 Monitor Critical Characteristics CR 20017857 Have a Living, Component Specific September 23, Database of Operating Experience 2001 CR 200185151 Perform a Self-Assessment of the October 17, 2001 Effectiveness of the Operating Experience Program Permanent Plant Modifications Biennial Inspection Documents CR 20016428 Screening 1025 Did Not Identify the August 1, 2001 Function or Performance Requirement for the Component Being Changed CR 20016467 Screening 1035 Does Not Adequately August 3, 2001 Identify Design Function CR 20016619 Incomplete 50.59 Screening August 10, 2001 CR 20016829 Screened Vent Opening Cut in Ends of August 17, 2001 Buses 11 and in 1990 Without Modification, Now Design Change Process CR 20017759 PINGP 1300 - TCN Marked That Change September 20, Was Not Exempt from 50.59 Screening but 2001 No Screening Was Documented (20011405)

CR 20018422 Screening 1195 and 1194 Did Not October 11, 2001 Sufficiently Address Why Setpoint Increase Is Not Adverse CR 200185705 50.59 Screening 1196 Did Not Identify in November 1, 2001 Part 2 That the Activity Involved Could Initiate a Transient CR 200185788 50.59 Screening 1208 & 1209 Not in November 5 ,

Compliance with 5AWI 3.3.5 2001 CR 200186587 The Second Factory Acceptance Test for 22 November 29, Replacement Battery 2001

CR 200187181 Self-Assessment of 50.59 Process December 18, 2001 CR 200200116 Drawing Changes Contain Errors - Mod February 5 , 2002 94L473 CR 200200204 Turnover on Modification Was Done Without February 27, 2002 Work Being Completed. WO Status Was 85 Work Complete and Then Was Lost.

Work Not Done.

CR 200200514 Inadequate Work Order Reviews and/or January 21, 2002 Walkdowns CR 200200625 Modification 99SF04 Not Closed Within January 22, 2002 1 Year as Required by 5AWI6.1.0 CR 200200988 Drawing X-H-106-1936 Was Not Updated to February 1, 2002 Reflect Changes Associated with Modification 79L537 CR 200201209 22 Battery Rack Had One HILTI Bolt - February 5, 2002 Required Minimum Embedment Not Met CR 200201241 Foreign Material Found in One Battery Cell February 7, 2002 CR 200201335 Piece of Battery Plug Floating Inside 22 February 9, 2002 Battery Cell CR 200202163 TCN to SP 2103 and SP 2101 Implemented March 5, 2002 Without 50.59 Screening.

AR CAP 000023 Drawing NF 92190 Not Upgraded During March 22, 2002 Design Change 96C006 AR CAP 023224 Potential Negative Trend in Modification April 22, 2002 Turnovers and Reviews AR CAP 023385 Less Than Adequate Design Change May 6, 2002 Planning Activities AR CAP 023506 Pipe Support Installed at Wrong Elevation May 15, 2001 CE 000243 Standard Quality Part Used Where Safety May 17, 2001 Related Parts are Required 4OA3 Event Followup LER 1-01-03 Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood September 10, Panel Deficiencies 2001 LER 1-01-03, Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood April 12, 2002 Supplement 1 Panel Deficiencies Design Change 01BM02 Flood Panel and Door Design Changes Revision 1 AR CAP 023003 Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-4 April 1, 2002 AR CAP 023071 Defect Weld in Flood Panel MK-1 April 11, 2002

3PP Plant Protection Administrative Work Site Security Revision 7 Instruction 5AWI 5.1.0 Administrative Work Fitness-For-Duty Program Revision 5 Instruction 5AWI 3.18.0 Corporate Control Fitness-For-Duty Program Revision 3 Directive N1ACD 2.12 Fitness-For-Duty Program Performance June 30 and Data December 31, 2001 Security Event Logs September 2001 through May 2002 Nuclear Oversight Fitness-For-Duty August 6 and Observation Report September 6, (NOOR) 2001-06-1116 2001 NOOR 2001-06-130 Corrective Actions September 17-19, 2001 NOOR 2001-06-131 Self-Assessments September 21, 2001 Security Administrative Quarterly Security Report Revision 2 Procedure SAP 2.8 Security Instruction Badge Control Revision 0 Procedure (SIP) 1.1 SIP 1.5 Escort Responsibilities Revision 0 SIP 4.1 Testing and Inspection of Systems and revision 2 Equipment SIP 4.2 Calibration and Surveillance Procedure Revision 0 SIP 5.1 Reporting of Security Events Revision 3 SP 1620 Quarterly Metal Detector Calibration Revision 10 SP 1621 Explosive Vapor Detector Annual Test Revision 13 SP 1653 Quarterly X-Ray Machine Test Revision 6 Summary of Access Equipment July 17.2001 WO/PM/SPS through June 14, 2002

Security Activity Reports October 2001 through March 2002 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification FFD Personnel Reliability, Personnel Fourth Quarter Screening, and Security Equipment 2001 through Performance Indicator Data First Quarter 2002 SAP 2.8 Quarterly Security Report Revision 2 Security Event Logs October 2001 through March 2002 45